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{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DIRIBUTION,DEMON~TION SYSIEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)S 05000529./COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1" ACCESSXON NBR:8912270182 DOC.DATE: 89/12/16 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED             DIRIBUTION,DEMON~TION SYSIEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
NO DOCKET'ACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2', Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M.
ACCESSXON NBR:8912270182             DOC.DATE: 89/12/16     NOTARIZED: NO                   DOCKET
Arizona Public Service Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document'ontrol Branch (Document Control Desk)
'ACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2', Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M.         Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document'ontrol Branch (Document Control Desk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Special Rept 2-SR-88-006,Suppl 1:on 881014,radiation
Special Rept 2-SR-88-006,Suppl 1:on 881014,radiation unit inoperable for greater than 72 h.             'onitoring DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D         COPIES RECEIVED:LTR     Qincident ENCL 1 SIZE:             3 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),                       Rpt, etc.
'onitoring unit inoperable for greater than 72 h.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR Q ENCL 1 SIZE: 3 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), incident Rpt, etc.I NOTES:Standardized plant.RECXPIENT'OPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA.1 1 CHAN, T 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DS P/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DET/EMEB9H3
I                                             S NOTES:Standardized plant.                                                                   05000529.
~NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8D NRR/DST/SPLB8D1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT NOTES 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DET/ESGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRQ/J)SZ/SRXB 8E REG F 02 GN FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1, 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l,l 1 1 D D NO'IE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
                                                                                                        /
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASIZI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 40 ENCL 40 D D i l, JAI 1ES hl LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION I Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O BOX 52034~PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00605-JML/TDS/JJN December 16, 1989 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
RECXPIENT'OPIES ID   CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL                          LTTR ENCL PD5 LA                       1    1                            .1             1 CHAN, T                     1    1"                            1             1 D
INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON               1    1    ACRS MOELLER            2            2 ACRS WYLIE                   1    1    AEOD/DOA                1            1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB               1    1    AEOD/ROAB/DSP          2            2 DEDRO                       1    1    NRR/DET/ECMB 9H        1            1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3             1    1    NRR/DET/ESGB 8D        1,            1
        ~
NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11             1    1    NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10        1            1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11              1     1     NRR/DREP/PRPB11        2            2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D             1    1    NRR/DST/SICB 7E        1            1 NRR/DST/SPLB8D1              1    1    NRQ/J)SZ/SRXB 8E       1            1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT              1    1    REG F         02       1            1 RES/DSIR/EIB                1            GN     FILE 01 l,l 1                            1            1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S              4    4    L ST LOBBY   WARD       1            1 LPDR                        1  .
1    NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G                  1    1    NSIC MURPHY,G.A         1             1 NUDOCS FULL TXT              1     1 NOTES                                    1     1 D
D D
NO'IE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASIZI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR             40   ENCL   40


==Dear Sirs:==
i l,
Subj ect:.Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 2 Docket No.STN 50-.529 (License No.NPF-51)Supplement to Special Report 2-SR-88'-006 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Special Report 2-SR-88-006 prepared and submitted pursuant'to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and 6.9.2.This report discusses an inoperable radiation monitoring unit.This report is submitted to provide updated information from, the original report.4 If you have any questions, please.contact T.D.Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602)393-2521.Very truly yours, JML/TDS/JJN/kj Attachment cc: W.F.Conway (all w/a)J.B.Martin E.E.Van Brunt T.J.Polich M.J.Davis A.C.Gehr 7122701S2 S9'121<PDR ADOCK 05000 29 PDC


PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Radiation Monitoring-Unit Inoperable For Greater Than 72 Hours License No.NPF-51 Docket No.STn 50-529 Supplement to Special Report 2-SR-88-006 This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (T.S.)3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and T.S.6.9.2 to report an event in which the Containment Building Atmosphere Process Monitor (RU-1)=was inoperable for greater than 72 hours.The 72 hour limit for operability was exceeded at approximately 1036 MST on October 14, 1988.Pursuant to T.S.3.3.3.1 ACTION 27b the moveable air monitor (RU-53)was placed on line.At approximately 1036 MST on October 11,'1988, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 100 percent power when RU-1 was taken out of service to perform Surveillance Test (ST)36ST-9SQ05,"Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for Baseline Process Monitors."~During the performance of the ST, the Single Channel Analyzer (SCA)amplifier board could not be adjusted within specifications.
I Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00605-JML/TDS/JJN JAI 1ES hl LEVINE                                            December 16, 1989 VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document    Control Desk Washington,    DC  20555
An approved work order was issued to troubleshoot and either rework or replace components as required.The SCA amplifier board was replaced and satisfactorily retested.The original SCA amplifier board was modified in accordance with approved work documents to include a vendor designed enhancement.
 
The saturation range adjustment resistor was changed to a lower resistance to increase the range when saturation occurs.(Saturation is an inherent characteristic of the'cintillation detector/monitor and occurs when the frequency of radiation exceeds the ability of the detector/monitor to distinguish increasing levels of radiation.)
==Dear    Sirs:==
The SCA amplifier board was sent to the warehouse for future use.I The performance of the ST requires the utilization of several radioactive sources including a 0.5 microcurie, Cesium-137 source and a 0.5 microcurie, Barium-133 source.These sources are utilized to calibrate RU-1's response.During the performance of the ST, the technician reviewed the procedural steps and determined that an incorrect source was utilized in a portion of the RU-1 calibration.
 
The technician had been appropriately using an'approximately 0.5 microcurie, Cesium-137 source for calibration.
Subj  ect:. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
However, during subsequent sections of the procedure, the technician did not switch the Barium-133 source for the Cesium-137 source as required by the procedure.
Unit  2 Docket No. STN 50-.529 (License No. NPF-51)
The applicable steps were successfully reperformed using the correct sources The delay associated with this error was approximately 45 minutes.The procedures were reviewed by the Unit 2 Instrument and Control Supervisor and were determined to be adequate regarding this aspect.However, a procedure error was identified during the subsequent performance of the ST as discussed in the following paragraph.
Supplement to Special Report 2-SR-88'-006 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Special Report 2-SR-88-006 prepared and submitted pursuant 'to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION                27 and 6.9.2.      This report discusses an inoperable radiation monitoring unit.
During the subsequent performance of the ST, the sample flow rate was I.J determined to be low.An approved work order was issued to troubleshoot and either rework or replace components as required.Troubleshooting determined that an automatic bypass valve was fully opened or causing the low sample flow rate.Further investigation determined that the approved ST procedure had been revised in error.The voltage power supply leads were supposed to be connected to the flow transmitter leads to ensure the bypass valve closed.Instead, the procedure instructed that voltage power supply leads shall be connected to the terminals where the flow transmitter leads had been lifted.~The procedure was changed to correct the error.The procedure had been revised to incorporate enhancements.
This report is submitted to provide updated information from, the original report.
However, the error occurred when the step to connect the voltage power supply was incorporated into the preceding step.The procedural error was reviewed and determined that the'performance of the procedure could not result in, the monitor being returned to service in an inoperable condition.
If you    have any questions, 4
Upon completion of the work order and appropriate surveillance test, RU-1 was restored to an operable status on October 14;1988 at approximately 1500 MST.The monitor was out of service for approximately 76 hours and 24 minutes.}}
please .contact T.      D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602)  393-2521.
Very    truly yours, JML/TDS/JJN/kj Attachment cc:      W. F. Conway  (all w/a)
J. B. Martin E. E. Van Brunt T. J. Polich M. J. Davis A. C. Gehr 7122701S2 S9'121<
PDR    ADOCK 05000 29 PDC
 
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Radiation Monitoring-Unit Inoperable For Greater Than         72 Hours License No. NPF-51 Docket No. STn 50-529 Supplement to Special Report 2-SR-88-006 This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and T.S. 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Containment Building Atmosphere Process Monitor (RU-1)=was inoperable for greater than 72 hours. The 72 hour limit for operability was exceeded at approximately 1036 MST on October 14, 1988. Pursuant to T.S. 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27b the moveable air monitor (RU-53) was placed on line.
At approximately 1036   MST on October 11,'1988, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION)   at approximately 100 percent power when RU-1 was taken out of service to perform Surveillance Test (ST) 36ST-9SQ05, "Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for Baseline Process Monitors."
~
During the performance of the ST, the Single Channel Analyzer (SCA) amplifier board could not be adjusted within specifications.         An approved work order was issued to troubleshoot and either rework or replace components as required.
The SCA amplifier board was replaced and satisfactorily retested.
The original SCA amplifier board   was modified in accordance with approved work documents to include   a vendor designed enhancement.       The saturation range adjustment resistor   was changed to a lower resistance to increase the range when saturation occurs.     (Saturation is an inherent characteristic of the detector/monitor and occurs when the frequency of radiation         'cintillation exceeds the ability of the detector/monitor to distinguish increasing levels of radiation.) The SCA amplifier board was sent to the warehouse for future use.
I The performance   of the ST requires the utilization of several radioactive sources including a 0.5 microcurie, Cesium-137 source and a 0.5 microcurie, Barium-133 source. These sources are utilized to calibrate RU-1's response.
During the performance of the ST, the technician reviewed the procedural steps and determined that an incorrect source was utilized in a portion of the RU-1 calibration. The technician had been appropriately using an 'approximately 0.5 microcurie, Cesium-137 source for calibration. However, during subsequent sections of the procedure, the technician did not switch the Barium-133 source for the Cesium-137 source as required by the procedure. The applicable steps were successfully reperformed using the correct sources           The delay associated with this error was approximately       45 minutes. The procedures were reviewed by the Unit 2 Instrument and     Control Supervisor and were determined   to be adequate regarding this aspect.       However, a procedure error was identified during the subsequent performance of the ST as discussed in the following paragraph.
During the subsequent     performance of the ST, the sample flow rate was
 
I.
J
 
determined to be low. An approved work order was issued to troubleshoot and either rework or replace components as required. Troubleshooting determined that an automatic bypass valve was fully opened or causing the low sample flow rate. Further investigation determined that the approved ST procedure had been revised in error. The voltage power supply leads were supposed to be connected to the flow transmitter leads to ensure the bypass valve closed.
Instead, the procedure instructed that voltage power supply leads shall be connected to the terminals where the flow transmitter leads had been lifted.   ~
The procedure was changed to correct the error.
The procedure had been revised to incorporate enhancements. However, the error occurred when the step to connect the voltage power supply was incorporated into the preceding step. The procedural error was reviewed     and determined that the 'performance of the procedure could not result in, the monitor being returned to service in an inoperable condition.
Upon completion of the work order and appropriate surveillance test, RU-1 was restored to an operable status on October 14; 1988 at approximately 1500 MST.
The monitor was out of service for approximately 76 hours and 24 minutes.}}

Latest revision as of 10:32, 29 October 2019

Special Rept 2-SR-88-006,Suppl 1:on 881014,containment Bldg Atmosphere Process Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.On 881111,single Channel Analyzer Amplifier Board Could Not Be Adjusted within Specs.Approved Work Order Issued
ML17305A453
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 12/16/1989
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00605-JML-T, 2-SR-88-006, NUDOCS 8912270182
Download: ML17305A453 (8)


Text

ACCELERATED DIRIBUTION,DEMON~TION SYSIEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSXON NBR:8912270182 DOC.DATE: 89/12/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET

'ACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2', Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document'ontrol Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special Rept 2-SR-88-006,Suppl 1:on 881014,radiation unit inoperable for greater than 72 h. 'onitoring DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR Qincident ENCL 1 SIZE: 3 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Rpt, etc.

I S NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529.

/

RECXPIENT'OPIES ID CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 .1 1 CHAN, T 1 1" 1 1 D

INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1, 1

~

NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/DST/SPLB8D1 1 1 NRQ/J)SZ/SRXB 8E 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 REG F 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 GN FILE 01 l,l 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 .

1 NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES 1 1 D

D D

NO'IE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASIZI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 40 ENCL 40

i l,

I Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00605-JML/TDS/JJN JAI 1ES hl LEVINE December 16, 1989 VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subj ect:. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-.529 (License No. NPF-51)

Supplement to Special Report 2-SR-88'-006 File: 89-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Special Report 2-SR-88-006 prepared and submitted pursuant 'to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and 6.9.2. This report discusses an inoperable radiation monitoring unit.

This report is submitted to provide updated information from, the original report.

If you have any questions, 4

please .contact T. D. Shriver, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours, JML/TDS/JJN/kj Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all w/a)

J. B. Martin E. E. Van Brunt T. J. Polich M. J. Davis A. C. Gehr 7122701S2 S9'121<

PDR ADOCK 05000 29 PDC

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Radiation Monitoring-Unit Inoperable For Greater Than 72 Hours License No. NPF-51 Docket No. STn 50-529 Supplement to Special Report 2-SR-88-006 This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and T.S. 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Containment Building Atmosphere Process Monitor (RU-1)=was inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit for operability was exceeded at approximately 1036 MST on October 14, 1988. Pursuant to T.S. 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27b the moveable air monitor (RU-53) was placed on line.

At approximately 1036 MST on October 11,'1988, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 100 percent power when RU-1 was taken out of service to perform Surveillance Test (ST) 36ST-9SQ05, "Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for Baseline Process Monitors."

~

During the performance of the ST, the Single Channel Analyzer (SCA) amplifier board could not be adjusted within specifications. An approved work order was issued to troubleshoot and either rework or replace components as required.

The SCA amplifier board was replaced and satisfactorily retested.

The original SCA amplifier board was modified in accordance with approved work documents to include a vendor designed enhancement. The saturation range adjustment resistor was changed to a lower resistance to increase the range when saturation occurs. (Saturation is an inherent characteristic of the detector/monitor and occurs when the frequency of radiation 'cintillation exceeds the ability of the detector/monitor to distinguish increasing levels of radiation.) The SCA amplifier board was sent to the warehouse for future use.

I The performance of the ST requires the utilization of several radioactive sources including a 0.5 microcurie, Cesium-137 source and a 0.5 microcurie, Barium-133 source. These sources are utilized to calibrate RU-1's response.

During the performance of the ST, the technician reviewed the procedural steps and determined that an incorrect source was utilized in a portion of the RU-1 calibration. The technician had been appropriately using an 'approximately 0.5 microcurie, Cesium-137 source for calibration. However, during subsequent sections of the procedure, the technician did not switch the Barium-133 source for the Cesium-137 source as required by the procedure. The applicable steps were successfully reperformed using the correct sources The delay associated with this error was approximately 45 minutes. The procedures were reviewed by the Unit 2 Instrument and Control Supervisor and were determined to be adequate regarding this aspect. However, a procedure error was identified during the subsequent performance of the ST as discussed in the following paragraph.

During the subsequent performance of the ST, the sample flow rate was

I.

J

determined to be low. An approved work order was issued to troubleshoot and either rework or replace components as required. Troubleshooting determined that an automatic bypass valve was fully opened or causing the low sample flow rate. Further investigation determined that the approved ST procedure had been revised in error. The voltage power supply leads were supposed to be connected to the flow transmitter leads to ensure the bypass valve closed.

Instead, the procedure instructed that voltage power supply leads shall be connected to the terminals where the flow transmitter leads had been lifted. ~

The procedure was changed to correct the error.

The procedure had been revised to incorporate enhancements. However, the error occurred when the step to connect the voltage power supply was incorporated into the preceding step. The procedural error was reviewed and determined that the 'performance of the procedure could not result in, the monitor being returned to service in an inoperable condition.

Upon completion of the work order and appropriate surveillance test, RU-1 was restored to an operable status on October 14; 1988 at approximately 1500 MST.

The monitor was out of service for approximately 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> and 24 minutes.