ML18012A357: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:y CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION@BR:9609190064 DOC.DATE: 96/09/13 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:y           CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM           (RIDS)
NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M.
ACCESSION @BR:9609190064           DOC.DATE: 96/09/13       NOTARIZED: NO         DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina               05000400 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M.         Carolina Power & I ight Co.
Carolina Power&I ight Co.DONAHUE,J.W.
DONAHUE,J.W.         Carolina Power   & Light   Co.
Carolina Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400
RECIP. NAME         RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 96-016-00:on 960814,reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance test, required by TSs not performed.
LER   96-016-00:on 960814,reactor         trip bypass breaker surveillance test, required by TSs not performed. Caused by inadequate procedures not ensuring testing done prior to                       A placing them in svc.Rev of deficient procedures.W/960912 ltr DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL ) SIZE:
Caused by inadequate procedures not ensuring testing done prior to placing them in svc.Rev of deficient procedures.W/960912 ltr DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL)SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.A NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 t" 0 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHYiG.A NRC PDR COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCI ID CODE/NAME 1 1 LE,N 1 AEGD/SP-D/~B 1 FILE CENTE~R 1 NRR DE/EE~B 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POOREgW.1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 R D U N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT.415-2083)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 Carolina Power 8a Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 1 8 1996 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-96-158 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-016-00 Sir or Madam: In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
NOTES:Application for permit renewal         filed.                             05000400 t" 0
This report describes a failure to perform proper surveillance testing on the reactor trip bypass breakers as required by Technical Specifications.
RECIPIENT          COPIES              RECIPIENT         COPIES ID CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCI        ID CODE/NAME       LTTR ENCL          R PD2-1 PD                 1    1      LE,N                    1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS                           1      AEGD/SP-D/~B            2    2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB                 1      FILE  CENTE~R          1    1 NRR/DE/ECGB                   1      NRR DE/EE~B            1    1 NRR/DE/EMEB                   1      NRR/DRCH/HHFB          1    1 NRR/DRCH/HICB                  1      NRR/DRCH/HOLB          1    1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB                 1      NRR/DRPM/PECB          1    1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB                 1      NRR/DSSA/SRXB          1    1          D RES/DSIR/EIB                   1      RGN2    FILE 01        1    1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD           1    1      LITCO BRYCE,J H        2    2 NOAC MURPHYiG.A           1    1      NOAC POOREgW.          1    1 NRC PDR                   1   1       NUDOCS FULL TXT        1   1 U
Sincerely, J.W.Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr.J.B.Brady (HNP Senior Resident-NRC)Mr.S.D.Ebneter (NRC Regional Administrator
N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
-Region II)Mr.N.B.Le (NRC Project Manager-NRR)'9609i90064 960rsti3 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR State Road H34 New Hill NC NRC FORM 366 (4.95)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THI MANDATORY WFORMATION COLLEC'I)ON REOUESTI 5M HRS.REPORTED lESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED (NTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AHD FEO BACK TO UIOUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROU(G BURDEN ESTIMATE'FO THE)NFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT6 f33L US.NUCLEAR REGUtAIORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555600), ANO YO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 0)50.OID(l OfFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.FACIUTY NAME (I)Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 OOCKET NUMBER 12)50-400 PAGE (3)1OF2 TITLE (4)Failure to perform reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
MONTH OAY 8 14 YEAR EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)YEAR SEO E I NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 96-016-0 REPORT DATE (7)MONTH OAY YEAR 9 13 96 FACIUTY NAME FACIUTY NAME OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)OOCKET NUMBER 05000 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)1 00%20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR           26    ENCL   26
(1)20.2203(a)(2) li)20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)
 
(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)
Carolina Power    8a Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 1 8 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                                Serial: HNP-96-158 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk                                                            10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-016-00 Sir or Madam:
(3)(n)20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)
In accordance with Title       10 to the Code   of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a failure to perform proper surveillance testing on the reactor trip bypass breakers as required by Technical Specifications.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)TELEPHONE NUMBER Bnoivde Area Code)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NAC Form 366A THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B)(Check one or more)(11)Michael Verrilli Sr.Analyst-Licensing (919)362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single.spaced typewr((ten lines)(16)On August 14, 1996, during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), a deficiency was identified with surveillance testing for the reactor trip bypass breakers.Specifically, Technical Specifications require performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breaker in service.Testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the"connected" position and closed.Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips.This condition was caused by inadequate surveillance test procedures which did not ensure testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers before placing them in service.This condition has existed since May 1986, when the procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers.A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term"in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers.Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in the FSAR could have been a contributing factor to the procedure error.Immediate corrective actions included revising the deficient surveillance procedures.
Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c:       Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior Resident - NRC)
Additional corrective actions will include revising the deficient FSAR sections and reviewing the event with appropriate Operations and Maintenance personnel.
Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC Regional Administrator - Region II)
NRC fORM 366A l496)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION TAG)LITT NAME n)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit rY1 OOCXET 50400 LER NUMBER IB)BEOUENTIAL RETIBION NUMBER NUMBER 96-016-00 PAGE I3)2 OF 2 TEXT III mort spssv r's rsrprpsd.vsv sddr)drrrsl sopr'vs ol fYRC form 36QI ill)EVENT DESCRIPTION:
Mr. N. B. Le (NRC Project Manager - NRR)
On August 14, 1996, with the plant in mode 1, operating at 100%power, a deficiency was identified with the Train A and Train B Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic&Master Relay Tests (MST-I0001 and MST-I0320).
      '9609i90064 960rsti3 PDR     ADOCK 05000400 S                         PDR State Road H34   New Hill NC
This deficiency was identified during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)which describes the testing process for the reactor trip bypass breakers (EIIS Code: JG-BKR).Specifically, Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 requires performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service.However, testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the"connected" position and closed.Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips, which constitutes a violation of Technical Specifications and is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).
 
CAUSE: The cause of this event was inadequate surveillance test procedures.
NRC FORM 366                                 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                             APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 (4.95)                                                                                                                EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE       TO COMPLY WITH THI MANDATORY WFORMATION COLLEC'I)ON REOUESTI 5M HRS. REPORTED lESSONS LEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT                          (LER)                      INCORPORATED (NTO THE   UCENSING PROCESS AHD FEO BACK TO UIOUSTRY.
MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 did not ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers were tested before being placed in service.These breakers have a"test" position which should have been used, rather than racking the breaker into the"connected" position and closing them, which actually connected the reactor trip bypass breakers to the rod control system and placed them in service.This condition has existed since May 1986, when both procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers.A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term"in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers.Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in FSAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 could have been a contributing factor to the pr'ocedure error.This section incorrectly states that HNP"does not propose to verify the operability of each bypass breaker prior to placing it in service each time the main reactor trip breakers are to be tested." SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROU(G BURDEN ESTIMATE 'FO THE )NFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT6 f33L US. NUCLEAR REGUtAIORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of                                WASHINGTON, DC 20555600), ANO YO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 0)50.
There were no safety consequences as a result of this event.MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 have provided previous testing of the reactor trip bypass breaker remote manual shunt trips prior to opening the main reactor trip breakers.Based on a review of completed testing, the reactor trip bypass breakers functioned properly during this previous testing.PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: There have been no previous HNP events related to improperly testing the reactor trip bypass breakers prior to placing them in service.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:
digits/characters for each block)                              OID(l OfFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.
1.Procedures MST-10001 and MST-I0320 were revised to ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers are properly tested before placing them in service.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED: 1.'SAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 will be revised to eliminate the conflicting wording pertaining to the testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers.This will be completed by November 15, 1996.2.This event will be reviewed with Maintenance and Operations personnel involved with developing, revising and reviewing procedures to emphasize the importance of fully understanding Technical Specification testing requirements.
FACIUTY NAME (I)                                                                             OOCKET NUMBER 12)                                     PAGE (3)
This will be completed by December 1, 1996.}}
Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1                                                                      50-400                              1OF2 TITLE (4)
Failure to perform reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.
EVENT DATE (5)                   LER NUMBER (6)               REPORT DATE (7)                         OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACIUTY NAME                                OOCKET NUMBER SEO  E  I      REVISION MONTH        OAY      YEAR    YEAR                                MONTH    OAY    YEAR NUMBER      NUMBER                                                                                  05000 FACIUTY NAME                                DOCKET NUMBER 8        14                96    016              0        9        13    96                                                          05000 OPERATING                   THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B) (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9)                       20.2201(b)                     20.2203(a)(2) (v)                   50.73(a) (2) (i)                       50.73(a)(2) (viii) 20.2203(a) (1)                 20.2203(a)(3)(i)                   50.73(a)(2)(ii)                       50.73(a)(2)(x)
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 00%        20.2203(a)(2) li)               20.2203(a) (3)(n)                   50.73(a)(2)(iii)                       73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)               20.2203(a)(4)                       50.73(a)(2)(iv)                       OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)             50.36(c) (1)                        50.73(a)(2)(v)                   Specify in Abstract below or in NAC Form 366A 20.2203(a) (2) (iv)             50.36(c)(2)                        50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
TELEPHONE NUMBER Bnoivde Area Code)
Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing                                                                  (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
REPORTABLE                                                                            REPORTABLE CAUSE        SYSTEM      COMPONENT      MANUFACTURER                            CAUSE        SYSTEM      COMPONENT      MANUFACTURER TO NPROS                                                                              TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)                                              EXPECTED MONTH        OAY        YEAR YES                                                                                                  SUBMISSION (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).                           X  NO                        DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single. spaced typewr((ten lines) (16)
On August 14, 1996, during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), a deficiency was identified with surveillance testing for the reactor trip bypass breakers. Specifically, Technical Specifications require performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breaker in service. Testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the "connected" position and closed. Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips.
This condition was caused by inadequate surveillance test procedures which did not ensure testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers before placing them in service. This condition has existed since May 1986, when the procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers. A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term "in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers.
Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in the FSAR could have been a contributing factor to the procedure error.
Immediate corrective actions included revising the deficient surveillance procedures. Additional corrective actions will include revising the deficient FSAR sections and reviewing the event with appropriate Operations and Maintenance personnel.
 
NRC fORM 366A                                                                                                            US. NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION l496)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION TAG)LITT NAME n)                                      OOCXET      LER NUMBER IB)                PAGE I3)
BEOUENTIAL    RETIBION NUMBER      NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant                ~ Unit rY1                  50400                                  2      OF    2 96 -    016      -   00 TEXT IIImort spssv r's rsrprpsd. vsv sddr)drrrsl sopr'vs ol fYRC form 36QI  ill)
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On August 14, 1996, with the plant in mode 1, operating at 100% power, a deficiency was identified with the Train A and Train B Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic & Master Relay Tests (MST-I0001 and MST-I0320). This deficiency was identified during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which describes the testing process for the reactor trip bypass breakers (EIIS Code: JG-BKR). Specifically, Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 requires performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service. However, testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the "connected" position and closed. Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips, which constitutes a violation of Technical Specifications and is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).
CAUSE:
The cause of this event was inadequate surveillance test procedures. MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 did not ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers were tested before being placed in service. These breakers have a "test" position which should have been used, rather than racking the breaker into the "connected" position and closing them, which actually connected the reactor trip bypass breakers to the rod control system and placed them in service. This condition has existed since May 1986, when both procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers. A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term "in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers. Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in FSAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 could have been a contributing factor to the pr'ocedure error. This section incorrectly states that HNP "does not propose to verify the operability of each bypass breaker prior to placing it in service each time the main reactor trip breakers are to be tested."
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 have provided previous testing of the reactor trip bypass breaker remote manual shunt trips prior to opening the main reactor trip breakers.
Based on a review of completed testing, the reactor trip bypass breakers functioned properly during this previous testing.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
There have been no previous HNP events related to improperly testing the reactor trip bypass breakers prior to placing them in service.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:
: 1.        Procedures MST-10001 and MST-I0320 were revised to ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers are properly tested before placing them in service.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:
: 1.      'SAR              section 7.2.2.2.3.10 will be revised to eliminate the conflicting wording pertaining to the testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers. This will be completed by November 15, 1996.
: 2.         This event will be reviewed with Maintenance and Operations personnel involved with developing, revising and reviewing procedures to emphasize the importance of fully understanding Technical Specification testing requirements. This will be completed by December 1, 1996.}}

Latest revision as of 04:59, 22 October 2019

LER 96-016-00:on 960814,reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Surveillance Test,Required by TSs Not Performed.Caused by Inadequate Procedures Not Ensuring Testing Done Prior to Placing Them in Svc.Procedures revised.W/960912 Ltr
ML18012A357
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/13/1996
From: Donahue J, Verrilli M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-158, LER-96-016, LER-96-16, NUDOCS 9609190064
Download: ML18012A357 (4)


Text

y CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION @BR:9609190064 DOC.DATE: 96/09/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power & I ight Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-016-00:on 960814,reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance test, required by TSs not performed. Caused by inadequate procedures not ensuring testing done prior to A placing them in svc.Rev of deficient procedures.W/960912 ltr DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL ) SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 t" 0

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCI ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL R PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 AEGD/SP-D/~B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 FILE CENTE~R 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 NRR DE/EE~B 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 D RES/DSIR/EIB 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHYiG.A 1 1 NOAC POOREgW. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 U

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Carolina Power 8a Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 1 8 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-96-158 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-016-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a failure to perform proper surveillance testing on the reactor trip bypass breakers as required by Technical Specifications.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior Resident - NRC)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC Regional Administrator - Region II)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC Project Manager - NRR)

'9609i90064 960rsti3 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR State Road H34 New Hill NC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 (4.95) EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THI MANDATORY WFORMATION COLLEC'I)ON REOUESTI 5M HRS. REPORTED lESSONS LEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INCORPORATED (NTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AHD FEO BACK TO UIOUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROU(G BURDEN ESTIMATE 'FO THE )NFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT6 f33L US. NUCLEAR REGUtAIORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of WASHINGTON, DC 20555600), ANO YO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 0)50.

digits/characters for each block) OID(l OfFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.

FACIUTY NAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER 12) PAGE (3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1OF2 TITLE (4)

Failure to perform reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACIUTY NAME OOCKET NUMBER SEO E I REVISION MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 8 14 96 016 0 9 13 96 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B) (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a)(2) (viii) 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

POWER LEVEL (10) 1 00% 20.2203(a)(2) li) 20.2203(a) (3)(n) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in NAC Form 366A 20.2203(a) (2) (iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUMBER Bnoivde Area Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH OAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (lf yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single. spaced typewr((ten lines) (16)

On August 14, 1996, during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), a deficiency was identified with surveillance testing for the reactor trip bypass breakers. Specifically, Technical Specifications require performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breaker in service. Testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the "connected" position and closed. Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips.

This condition was caused by inadequate surveillance test procedures which did not ensure testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers before placing them in service. This condition has existed since May 1986, when the procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers. A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term "in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers.

Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in the FSAR could have been a contributing factor to the procedure error.

Immediate corrective actions included revising the deficient surveillance procedures. Additional corrective actions will include revising the deficient FSAR sections and reviewing the event with appropriate Operations and Maintenance personnel.

NRC fORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION l496)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION TAG)LITT NAME n) OOCXET LER NUMBER IB) PAGE I3)

BEOUENTIAL RETIBION NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~ Unit rY1 50400 2 OF 2 96 - 016 - 00 TEXT IIImort spssv r's rsrprpsd. vsv sddr)drrrsl sopr'vs ol fYRC form 36QI ill)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On August 14, 1996, with the plant in mode 1, operating at 100% power, a deficiency was identified with the Train A and Train B Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic & Master Relay Tests (MST-I0001 and MST-I0320). This deficiency was identified during a review of the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which describes the testing process for the reactor trip bypass breakers (EIIS Code: JG-BKR). Specifically, Technical Specification Table 4.3-1 requires performing a remote manual shunt trip test prior to placing the reactor trip bypass breakers in service. However, testing of the remote manual shunt trip at HNP has previously been conducted after the reactor trip bypass breakers were racked into the "connected" position and closed. Therefore, the breakers were actually in service and connected to the rod control system during previous testing of the remote manual shunt trips, which constitutes a violation of Technical Specifications and is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).

CAUSE:

The cause of this event was inadequate surveillance test procedures. MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 did not ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers were tested before being placed in service. These breakers have a "test" position which should have been used, rather than racking the breaker into the "connected" position and closing them, which actually connected the reactor trip bypass breakers to the rod control system and placed them in service. This condition has existed since May 1986, when both procedures were revised to incorporate testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers. A probable cause for the May 1986 procedure error was a mis-interpretation of the term "in-service" and how it applied to the reactor trip bypass breakers. Investigation also revealed that conflicting information in FSAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 could have been a contributing factor to the pr'ocedure error. This section incorrectly states that HNP "does not propose to verify the operability of each bypass breaker prior to placing it in service each time the main reactor trip breakers are to be tested."

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. MST-I0001 and MST-I0320 have provided previous testing of the reactor trip bypass breaker remote manual shunt trips prior to opening the main reactor trip breakers.

Based on a review of completed testing, the reactor trip bypass breakers functioned properly during this previous testing.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

There have been no previous HNP events related to improperly testing the reactor trip bypass breakers prior to placing them in service.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. Procedures MST-10001 and MST-I0320 were revised to ensure that the reactor trip bypass breakers are properly tested before placing them in service.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. 'SAR section 7.2.2.2.3.10 will be revised to eliminate the conflicting wording pertaining to the testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers. This will be completed by November 15, 1996.
2. This event will be reviewed with Maintenance and Operations personnel involved with developing, revising and reviewing procedures to emphasize the importance of fully understanding Technical Specification testing requirements. This will be completed by December 1, 1996.