ML062210297

IR 05000275-06-012 and IR 0500323-06-012; on June 5 - 22, 2006; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML062210297
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/09/2006
From:	Smith L J Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Keenan J S Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR-06-012
Download: ML062210297 (22)

See also: IR 05000275/2006012

Text

August 9, 2006

John S. Keenan

Senior Vice President - Generation

and Chief Nuclear Officer

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P.O. Box 770000

Mail Code B32

San Francisco, CA 94177-0001SUBJECT:DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND

RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2006012 AND

05000323/2006012

Dear Mr. Keenan:

From June 5 through 22, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted the

onsite portion of a team inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The enclosed report

documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with your staff as described in Section

4OA6 of this report.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the

identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and

regulations and the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed approximately 280

action requests, associated non-conformance reports and apparent cause evaluations, and

other supporting documents. The team reviewed cross-cutting aspects of NRC and

licensee-identified findings and interviewed personnel regarding the condition of a safety

conscious work environment at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that, in general, your

processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were effective; thresholds for

identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were

adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a relatively high

number of self-revealing and NRC identified findings were noted at your site during the

assessment period. Ineffective and incomplete corrective actions led to a number of repeat

problems that could have been prevented, with a notable number of repeat findings of

previously documented NRC-identified and se

lf-revealing findings. Overall however

performance had improved in the all areas of y

our corrective action program since the last

problem identification and resolution inspection. The team concluded that while a

safety-conscious work environment exis

ted at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company-2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the P

ublicly Available Records component of NRC's

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is

accessible from the NRC web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, DLProulx for

Linda J. Smith, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-275, 323

License: NPF-80, NPF-82

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000275; 323/2006012

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/enclosure:

Donna Jacobs

Vice President, Nuclear Services

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

P.O. Box 56

Avila Beach, CA 93424

James R. Becker, Vice President

Diablo Canyon Operations and

Station Director, Pacific Gas and

Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

P.O. Box 56

Avila Beach, CA 93424

Sierra Club San Lucia Chapter

ATTN: Andrew Christie

P.O. Box 15755

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406

Nancy Culver

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace

P.O. Box 164

Pismo Beach, CA 93448

Pacific Gas and Electric Company-3-

Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of

Supervisors

County Government Building

1055 Monterey Street, Suite D430

San Luis Obispo, CA 93408

Truman Burns\Robert Kinosian

California Public Utilities Commission

505 Van Ness Ave., Rm. 4102

San Francisco, CA 94102-3298

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

Robert R. Wellington, Esq.

Legal Counsel

857 Cass Street, Suite D

Monterey, CA 93940

Director, Radiological Health Branch

State Department of Health Services

P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)

Sacramento, CA 95899-7414

Richard F. Locke, Esq.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P.O. Box 7442

San Francisco, CA 94120

City Editor

The Tribune

3825 South Higuera Street

P.O. Box 112

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-0112

James D. Boyd, Commissioner

California Energy Commission

1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)

Sacramento, CA 95814

Jennifer Tang

Field Representative

United States Senator Barbara Boxer

1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 240

San Francisco, CA 94111

Pacific Gas and Electric Company-4-

Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (TWJ)Branch Chief, DRP/D (WBJ)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (FLB2)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)RITS Coordinator (KEG)DRS STA (DAP)V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)J. Lamb, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JGL1)ROPreports

DC Site Secretary (AWC1)SUNSI Review Completed: ______ADAMS: Yes G No Initials: ________ Publicly Available

G Non-Publicly Available

G Sensitive Non-SensitiveR:\_DC\2006\DC2006-012RP-RWD.wpdML RIV:SRI/PBERI:PBARI:PBBSOE:OBSRI:EB2

RWDeeseRBCohenTAMcConnellTOMcKernonDLProulxT=DLProulxT=DLProulx/RA/8/8/068/8/068/8/068/8/068/4/06C:PSBC:EB2WBJonesLJSmith/RA/DLPfor8/7/068/8/06OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

Enclosure-1-ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV Docket.:50-275, 323 License:NPF-80, NPF-82

Report No.:05000275,323/2006012

Licensee:Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Facility:Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Location:7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach

Avila Beach, CaliforniaDates:June 5-22, 2006

Team Leader:R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector, Projects Branch E

Inspectors:R. Cohen, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch A

T. McConnell, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch B

T. McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch

D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2Approved By:Linda Smith, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000275, 323/2006012; 6/5-22/2006; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial

Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The inspection was conducted by three resident inspectors and one regional specialist

inspector. One unresolved item was identified during this inspection. The significance of most

findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance

determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC

management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3,

dated July 2000.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team reviewed approximately 280 action requests, apparent cause evaluations, and root

cause analyses, as well as supporting documents to assess problem identification and

resolution activities. In general, the corrective action program procedures and processes were

effective, thresholds for identifying issues were low, and corrective actions were adequate to

address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a number of self-revealing

and NRC identified findings in each of these attributes of your problem identification and

resolution program were noted over the past two y

ears. Many of these findings were related to

equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable safety-related equipment. The

team noted improvement in all three areas when

comparing the results of this and more recent

inspections when compared to inspections two years ago.

Based on the interviews conducted, the team concluded that a positive safety conscious work

environment existed at Diablo Canyon Power Pl

ant. The team determined that employees felt

free to raise safety concerns to station managers and supervisors, the employee concerns

program, and the NRC. However, the team noted two isolated incidents regarding the

environment that did not foster openly raising safety concerns. The licensee had already taken

actions to address the concerns. All the interviewees believed that potential safety issues were

being addressed. A.Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

Enclosure-3-REPORT DETAILS4OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team based the following conclusions, in part, on all issues that were identified in

the assessment period, which ranged from June 25, 2004, (the last biennial problem

identification and resolution inspection) to the end of the inspection on June 22, 2006.

The issues are divided into two groups. The first group (Current Issues) included

problems identified during the assessment period where at least one performance

deficiency occurred during the assessment period. The second group (Historical Issues)

included issues that were identified during the assessment period where all the

performance deficiencies occurred outside the assessment period. a.Effectiveness of Problem Identification (1)Inspection Scope

The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones to determine if

problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective

action program for evaluation and resolution. The team performed field walkdowns of

selected systems and equipment to inspect for deficiencies that should have been

entered in the corrective action program. The team also observed control room

operations and reviewed operator logs, plant tracking logs, and station work orders to

ensure conditions adverse to quality were being entered into the corrective action

program. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of self assessments, trending

reports, system health reports, and various other documents related to the corrective

action program.

The team interviewed station personnel, attended action request (AR) review team and

corrective action review board meetings, and evaluated corrective action documentation

to determine the licensee's threshold for entering problems in their corrective action

program. In addition, the team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of selected industry

operating experience information, including operator event reports, NRC generic letters

and information notices, and generic vendor notifications to ensure that issues

applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed. (2)Assessment

The team determined that, in general, problems were properly identified and entered into

the corrective action program as evidenced by

the relatively few findings identified during

the assessment period. The team concluded that the licensee's current threshold for

entering issues into the corrective action program was appropriately low. However, the

licensee did fail in some instances to identify or document deficiencies which led to

unnecessarily operating the units with degraded conditions affecting safety.

Enclosure-4-As listed below, four NRC-identified and self-revealing issues were documented during

the period. The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and

resolution aspects in effectiveness of problem

identification has been fairly steady since

2004, with two findings in the last half of 2004, two in all of year 2005, and no additional

findings identified during this inspection in the effectiveness of problem identification

area. The team concluded that the licensee's performance had improved in the area of

effectiveness of problem identification

when compared to the previous problem

identification and resolution assessment (NRC Inspection Report 05000275;

323/2004012).

Current Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to promptly identify multiple grounds in the breaker

control circuitry for Containment Spray Pump 2-2, resulting in the degraded control wires

affecting the pump's circuitry for 70 days following the initial ground indication. (NRC

Inspection Report 05000275,323 (IR) 2004004).

Example 2. The licensee failed to establish compensatory measures to ensure the

prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan was met, in part due to

the fact that the licensee missed opportunities to identify the emergency plan impact

prior to removing seismic instrumentation from service. (IR 2004005)

Example 3: The licensee failed promptly identify a condition adverse to quality.

Specifically, PG&E initially screened industry operating experience regarding the

potential for containment recirculation sump valves failing to open following certain

small-break loss of cooling accidents as not being applicable to Diablo Canyon Power

Plant. (IR 2005004)

Example 4: Licensee operators had two opportunities to identify the mispositioning of

Valve SFS-2-8765 but failed to identify the condition. The mis-positioned valve resulted

in a loss of approximately 2600 gallons of water from the spent fuel pool. (IR 2005005)

Historical Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to recognize a broken bonnet stud on the Unit 2

Atmospheric Dump Valve PCV-21 as a significant condition adverse to quality and

promptly perform an operability assessment. (IR 2001007)

Example 2: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a nonconservative safety

features setpoint by not ensuring that the Unit 2 plant response to a loss of feedwater

flow to Steam Generator 2-4 was appropriate during their post trip event review process.

(IR 2002007)

Example 3: The licensee failed to identify and correct a leak in Check Valve FW-2-370

and the backward installation of the disk for Check Valve FW-2-377 despite auxiliary

feedwater system backflow alarms and indus

try experience on properly assembly of the

check valves. (IR 2003006)

Enclosure-5-Example 4: The licensee failed to correct the population of Rockwell-Edwards valves in

safety-related and risk-significant system that were susceptible to failure of the packing

gland follower flange because they did not properly identify all of the potentially affected

valves. (IR 2003008) b.Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues (1)Inspection Scope

The team reviewed ARs, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the

licensee's ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors

reviewed a sample of ARs, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the

licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic

implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended

various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues

identified.

In addition, the team reviewed licensee evaluations of selected industry operating

experience reports, including licensee event reports, NRC generic letters, bulletins and

information notices, and generic vendor notifications to assess whether issues

applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.

The team performed a historical review of ARs and notifications written over the last 5

years that addressed the emergency diesel generators, safety related switchgear

ventilation, the auxiliary feedwater system , and the component cooling water system. (2)Assessment

The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in

accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC

requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the

licensee was generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant

conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, ineffective prioritization and

evaluation of issues resulted in a relatively high number of self-revealing and NRC

identified findings during the period. One of these findings culminated in a plant trip.

Others were related to equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable

safety-related equipment.

The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the licensee was

generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant conditions

adverse to quality. The team noted that the quality and rigor of root causes had

improved when compared to the previous

problem identification and resolution

assessment. Additionally, the trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification

and resolution aspects in evaluation of problems has been improving since 2004, with

six findings in 2004 and two in 2005, however, the inspectors identified one additional

finding during this inspection in the evaluation area. The team concluded that the

licensee had improved in performance in the area of prioritization and evaluation of

issues when compared to the previous probl

em identification and resolution assessment.

Enclosure-6-Current Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to properly evaluate the cause for Safety Injection Check

Valve SI-1-8820 not seating following a forward flow test after the valve was found stuck

open during a back flow leak test. (IR 2004003)

Example 2: The licensee failed to properly evaluate indications of reverse rotation of the

fan motor for a containment fan cooler unit (CFCU), impacting the operability of the

CFCU over the 13-year period that reverse rotation was observed. (IR 2004005)

Example 3: The licensee failed to recognize the significance of not establishing

compensatory measures to ensure the prom

pt implementation of the Diablo Canyon

Emergency Plan. (IR 2004005)

Example 4: The licensee failed to maintain approximately 70 safety related solenoid

operated valves in an environmentally qualifi

ed condition because they did not promptly

evaluate the extent of condition of a previous valve failure. This failure delayed the

identification of elastomer qualification issues for approximately 1 year and ultimately

caused a loss of Steam Generator feed event and a Unit 2 manual plant trip.

(IR 2004005)

Example 5: The licensee failed to properly prioritize an issue regarding the

re-submission of required documents for individual criminal history record information

and subsequently missed the opportunity to hav

e their security department correct the

issue. (IR 2004007)

Example 6: The licensee did not fully evaluate the extent of a problem regarding

generally-licensed devices and did not ascertain that the radiation sources and

generally-licensed devices were properly controlled in accordance with NRC regulations

and/or vendor instructions. (IR 2004009)

Example 7: The licensee failed to adequately evaluate and therefore provide for timely

corrective actions regarding emergency core

cooling system check valve back-leakage

and its potential to cause gas-binding of emergency core cooling system pumps and/or

water hammer of emergency core cooling system piping. (IR 2005005)

Example 8: The licensee improperly evaluated operating experience related to the

minimum flow settings for the auxiliary feedwater pumps, in that they did not properly

verify the minimum flow settings with the pump manufacturer. (IR 2005006)

Historical Issue

Example: The licensee failed to appropriately prioritize and evaluate battery charger

failures between January 1999 and May 2003 because they consistently assigned low

significance, did not assign any cause investigation, and did not recognize a trend of

charger failures existed, even when multiple failures were identified in a short period of

time. (IR 2003010) c.Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

Enclosure-7- (1)Inspection Scope

The team reviewed plant records, primarily ARs, to verify that corrective actions related

to identified problems were developed and implemented, including corrective actions to

address common cause or generic concerns. The team sampled specific technical

issues to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's operability assessments.

Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of ARs that addressed past NRC identified

violations, for each affected cornerstone, to ensure that the corrective actions

adequately addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The team also

reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other ARs, work orders, or tracking

programs to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely. (2)Assessment

The effectiveness of identified corrective actions to address adverse conditions was

generally adequate. The NRC identified numerous instances over the assessment

period where historical corrective actions were not effective but, overall, the licensee

demonstrated acceptable performance in this area. Of note, the inspectors observed

that the licensee had allowed recurrence of four previously documented NRC-identified

or self-revealing findings. These repeat findings, listed below as Examples 4, 5, 9, and

10, represented a significant portion of the examples from the report period.

The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and resolution aspects in

effectiveness of corrective actions has been improving since 2004, with four findings in

the last half of 2004, seven in all of 2005, and no additional findings identified during this

inspection or other inspections completed in 2006 before the exit date of this inspection.

The team concluded that the licensee had improved in performance in the area of

effectiveness of corrective actions when compar

ed to the previous problem identification

and resolution assessment.

Current Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to assess the extent of condition regarding a failed

pressurizer heater connection and thereby missed an opportunity to identify a corrosive

agent that degraded all heater electrical connections for the Unit 1 pressurizer, causing

at least one connection to fail. (IR 2004004)

Example 2: The licensee failed take adequate corrective actions to prevent the

emergency core cooling system (ECCS) void space from exceeding the volume allowed

by plant procedures, causing operators to declare the ECCS inoperable and enter

Technical Specification 3.0.3 twice. (IR 2004005)

Example 3: The licensee failed to maintain design control of the emergency diesel

generator fuel oil transfer system requirements after original corrective actions after the

licensee originally identified the issue did not correct the problem. (IR 2004006)

Enclosure-8-Example 4: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a failure to perform surveys of a

high radiation area in the Unit 2 Gas Decay Tank Room during evolutions due to

ineffective corrective actions. (IR 2004006)

Example 5: The licensee failed to adequately resolve a condition adverse to their fire

protection program. Specifically, operations department responders were not required to

participate in fire drills for initial qualification or to maintain their qualification, which was

noted to be a previously identified qualification deficiency. (IR 2005002)

Example 6: The licensee failed to promptly correct a cracked lube oil instrument sensing

line on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3, thereby increasing the potential for the diesel

generator to trip on low lube oil level. (IR 2005002)

Example 7: The licensee failed to effectively implement interim corrective actions for

Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1, which led to unplanned unavailability of the diesel

generator to remove carbonized lube oil from the lube oil system. (IR 2005003)

Example 8: The licensee failed to identify the root cause and propose any corrective

actions to prevent recurrence of the Unit 2 pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints being

significantly out of tolerance, despite a history of pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints

being out of tolerance. (IR 2005003)

Example 9: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency

when they failed to conduct a circuit isolation plan when maintenance personnel were

performing work on Startup Transformer 1-1, which was which was a risk management

action required by plant procedure. The circuit isolation plan would have provided an

opportunity to identify the potential of disrupting startup power to Unit 2, which occurred

as a result of the maintenance activities. (IR 2005005)

Example 10

The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency

when they failed to post an area within Vault 26 as a radiation area. (IR 2005005)

Example 11

The licensee failed to take adequate corrective action to address an on-

going problem with emergency core cooling system gas voiding in the common suction

crossover line. The licensee had a sustained history of gas voiding in emergency core

cooling system piping, which had the potential to lead to failure of the centrifugal

charging pumps or safety injection pumps

during the switchover from cold-leg

recirculation to hot-leg recirculation during a loss-of-coolant accident. (IR 2005-06)

Historical Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to take action to docket a justification and schedule to

correct a nonconservative Technical Specification dealing with dose equivalent iodine

activity in the reactor coolant system. (IR 2001006)

Example 2: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a previous event because of

ineffective corrective action in placement

of ventilation louvers on the 12 kilovolt

grounding transformer fuse boxes. (IR 2003005)

Enclosure-9-Example 3: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct lube oil carbonization in

the emergency diesel generator lube oil systems, resulting in diesel generator

unavailability to clean the lube oil lines. (IR 2003007)

Example 4: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a degraded mechanical

governor on emergency diesel generator 2-2, causing the degraded governor to remain

in service for over six months and requiring increasing difficulty by operators to maintain

the required load on the diesel generator. (IR 2003007)

Example 5: The licensee failed to correct a safety-related battery charger design

deficiency between January 1999 and May 2003 after multiple battery charger failures.

(IR 2003010) d.Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment (1)Inspection Scope

The team interviewed approximately 27

individuals from different departments

representing a cross section of functional organizations and supervisory and

non-supervisory personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that

would challenge the establishment of a safety conscience work environment. (2)Assessment

The team concluded that a safety conscious

work environment existed at the Diablo

Canyon Power Plant. Employees felt free to enter issues into the corrective action

program, as well as raise safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns

program, and the NRC. However, two isolated concerns were discovered by the team

concerning the environment for raising concerns specific regarding two different

organizations. The team noted that due to recent organizational changes, the licensee

had addressed the concerns the individuals raised. The team concluded, based on

interviews, that the conditions raised by the concerned individuals were no longer

present and never prevented individuals from raising their concerns. All of the

interviewees believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were

no instances identified where these individuals had experienced negative consequences

for bringing safety issues to the NRC. e.Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection (1)Inspection Scope

During the reviews described in Sections 4OA2 a.(1), 4OA2 b.(1), and 4OA2 c.(1), above, the inspectors identified the following unresolved item. (2)Findings and Observations(I)Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps

Enclosure-10-During a walkdown of the residual heat removal pumps during the weeks of

June 5 and June 19, 2006, inspectors noted oil in the vicinity of the drain plugs

for the motors for Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1-1, 2-1, and 2-2. The team

questioned the licensee as to the source of the oil, specifically questioning

whether the motors were leaking from the motor oil drain plugs during operation.

Additionally, the inspectors discovered that the licensee was not performing the

72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cure time for the drain plug sealant recommended by the vendor which

would ensure proper sealing characteristics. The team noted that any small

leakage combined with the required lengthy mission time for the pumps could

result in a situation where a loss of adequate inventory of motor oil could occur

and challenge long term operation of the pumps.

The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment to provide reasonable

assurance of operability of the pumps based on the observed conditions.

Additionally the licensee made plans to

measure leakage from the pumps during

the next pump runs. Because the inspectors could not ascertain the source and

the rate of the oil leakage until the pumps are run and could not determine the

effect of a shortened sealant cure time, the team treated this issue as an

unresolved item: URI 05000275,323/2006012-01, Oil Found in the Vicinity of

Residual Heat Removal Pumps.4OA6Exit Meeting

On June 22, 2006, at the end of the onsite portion of the inspection, the inspection

findings were discussed with Mr. J. Keenan and other members of the licensee's staff.

The licensee acknowledged the findings.

The team asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection

should be considered proprietary. The licensee did not identify any proprietary

information that may have been reviewed by the team.

Attachment: Supplemental Information

Attachment

A - 1 Supplemental Information

Partial List of Persons Contacted

Licensee J. Becker, Vice President - Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director

K. Peters, Director, Engineering Services

J. Welsch, Manager, Operations

M. Meko, Director, Site Services

R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection

D. Jacobs, Vice President - Nuclear Services

P. Roller, Director, Performance Improvement

B. Waltos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

J. Purkis, Director, Maintenance Services

P. Roller, Director, Operations Services

D. Taggart, Manager, Quality Verification

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened05000275,323/2006012-01URIOil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat

Removal Pumps (Section 4OA2.e(2)(i))Documents Reviewed

In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were

selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the

inspection and to support any findings:

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Action Requests

A0111266 A0162000

A0302183

A0334222

A0425218

A0427658

A0459989

A0491470

A0499791

A0513762

A0528837

A0530124

A0535731

A0535871 A0537891 A0548704

A0553420

A0557532

A0558389

A0562738

A0562741

A0562742

A0566266

A0571554

A0571556

A0573112

A0577295

A0577690 A0577808 A0580131

A0580778

A0581860

A0581890

A0583472

A0584386

A0585459

A0586913

A0586915

A0587031

A0587032

A0587150

A0587494 A0589499 A0589740

A0589959

A0590358

A0590574

A0592778

A0592779

A0592782

A0594018

A0597931

A0598237

A0598825

A0598883

A0599961 A0600842 A0601862

A0601877

A0602129

A0602745

A0603995

A0605066

A0605096

A0605203

A0607200

A0607398

A0608163

A0608433

A0608483 A0608942 A0609107

A0609150

A0609937

A0611033

A0611346

A0611505

A0611638

A0611784

A0612144

A0612248

A0613109

A0613505

A0614983

Attachment

A - 2 A0615425 A0616852

A0617647

A0617988

A0618799

A0618992

A0619215

A0619650

A0621027

A0622185

A0622355

A0622599

A0623479

A0624472

A0624585

A0625005

A0625548

A0626353

A0628329

A0628375

A0629528

A0629995

A0630154

A0630229

A0633325

A0633568

A0633772

A0634066

A0634214 A0634736 A0634915

A0635851

A0635980

A0636501

A0636815

A0636903

A0638978

A0639044

A0640437

A0640943

A0640963

A0641228

A0642000

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A0646729 A0646838 A0648502

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A0659858 A0659971 A0660081

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A0661988

A0661990

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A0662138

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A0663985 A0664021 A0664053

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A0669871 A0670344 A0670432

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A0671771 Procedures

NUMBER TITLE REVISIONStandard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme53.4.15RCS Leakage Detection InstrumentationAmendment

169AD7.ID2Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme7

AR PK-18-06Diesel 13 Lube Oil System8

EOP E-2Faulted Steam Generator Isolation15

MP E-3.1Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Overhaul10

MP E-10.1RHR Pump Motor Overhaul17A

MP E-14.1Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul8

Attachment

A - 3MP E-17.1Westinghouse Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Motor Overhaul14MP E-53.2Split End Bell, 4000-Volt Motor Overhaul16

MP E-57.2BEquipment Wiring and Terminations37

OM4.ID15Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)3

OM4.ID16Plant Health Committee1

OM 7Corrective Action Program3

OM7.ID1Problem Identification and Resolution - Action Requests22

OM7.ID.1PI&R Action Requests0

OM7.ID.3Noncomformance Report and Technical Review Group11

OM7.ID.3Root Cause Investigations - Root Cause Team16A

OM7.ID4Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation8

OM7.ID7Integrated Problem Response Team0F

OM7.ID10Trend Analysis Program7

OM7.ID1110 CFR 21 Reportability Review Process2A

OM7.ID12Operability Determination9

OM7.IDC1Engineering Use of the Trend Analysis Program for

Equipment Failures

0 Drawings NUMBER ITEM REVISIONDiesel Engine Generator 1-348106712Unit 1 Containment Spray34

106710Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System36

System Health Reports

SYSTEM TITLE DATE12Containment SprayJanuary 200610Residual Heat Removal SystemJanuary 2006

39Radiation MonitorsJanuary 200621ADiesel Generator SystemJanuary 2006

Attachment

A - 4 Work Orders

WO C0196475 WO R0259278 WO R

0259280 WO R0264116 WO R0264775

Information Notices

2004-01 2004-07

2004-09 2004-10 2004-11

2005-08 2005-11 2005-16

2005-21 2005-24 2005-26 2006-03 2006-04 NCV's04-03-03 04-03-04 04-04-05 04-04-07

Nonconformance Reports

N001722 N002178

N002195

N002189

N002194 Drawing NUMBER ITEM REVISION663030Motor AC Frame Vertical Lower Bearing Assembly1

Operator Logs

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, May 19, 2006, Dayshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, November 3, 2006, Dayshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, April 19, 2006, Dayshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, September 22, 2005, Nightshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, June 6, 2006, Nightshift

Calculation

NUMBER ITEM REVISIONM-92810 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Safe, Shutdown Analysis1

Miscellaneous

Vendor Manual for Model 3600 V-5A Indicating Gauges

Inservice Testing Program Revision 9/6, PG&E Letter DCL-94-057, dated March 21, 1994

Attachment

A - 5 Testing of Diesel Generator Air Start and Fuel Oil Transfer Systems, PG&E letter DCL-92-236, dated October 26, 1992

Preventive Maintenance Optimization Diablo Canyon, Dated April 16, 2006, Integrated

Equipment Reliability Strategy Background Information Document Switchyard, Revision 0

Instrumentation Obsolescence Management, I & C Long Term Strategy, Dated November 14, 2005 Quick Hit Self Assessment - Operability Determination Program, Dated June 1-30, 2005

PG&E 2006 Performance Improvement Program Audit, Dated June 21, 2006

Surveillance Procedure STP V-5C, "ECCS Hot Leg Check Valve Leak Test"

White Paper - Evaluate Possible Minor Water Hammer During p-CSP-A11," A0607398

dated June 20, 2006

FSAR, Chapter 17, Revisions 15 and 16

Attachment

A - 6 Information Request 1

April 17, 2006Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection (IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)

The inspection will cover the period of June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2006. All requested information

should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The information may be provided in

either electronic or paper media or a combination of these. Information provided in electronic

media may be in the form of e-mail attachment(s

), CDs, thumb drives, or 3 1/2 inch floppy disks.

The agency's text editing software is Corel WordPerfect 8, Presentations, and Quattro Pro;

however, we have document viewing capability for MS Word, Excel, Power Point, and Adobe

Acrobat (.pdf) text files.

Please provide the following information to Rick Deese by May 3, 2006:

Note:On summary lists please include a description of problem, status, initiating date, and

owner organization.1.Summary list of all action requests of significant conditions adverse to quality opened or

closed during the period2.Summary list of all action requests which were generated during the period

3.A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll-up" one or more smaller

issues for the period4.Summary list of all action requests which were down-graded or up-graded in significance

during the period5.List of all root cause analyses completed during the period

6.List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at end of the period

7.List of all apparent cause analyses completed during the period

8.List of plant safety issues raised or addr

essed by the employee concerns program during

the period9.List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during

the period10.All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities completed

during the period11.A list of all quality assurance audits and surveillances scheduled for completion during

the period, but which were not completed

Attachment

A - 712.All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third

party assessments completed during the period13.Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period

and broken down by functional organization14.Current revisions of corrective action program procedures

15.A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at Diablo Canyon during the

period16.Action requests or other actions generated for each of the items below:(1)Part 21 Reports:

2004-02, -08, -10, -14, -15, -17, -21, -22, -24, -27

2005-01, -05, -07, -12, -13, -16, -17, -20, -22, -26, -30, -33, -37, -38, -41

2006-01, -03, -04, -05(2)NRC Information Notices:

2004-01, -05, -07, -08, -09, -10, -11, -12, -16, -19, -21 2005-01, -02, -03, -04, -06, -08, -09, -11, -14, -16, -19, -20, -21, -23, -24, -25, -26, -29, -30, -31, -32

2006-02, -03, -04, -05, -08(3)All LERs issued by Diablo Canyon during the period

(4)NCVs and Violations issued to Diablo Canyon during the period (including

licensee identified violations)(17)Safeguards event logs for the period

(18)Radiation protection event logs

(19)Current system health reports or similar information

(20)Current predictive performance summa

ry reports or similar information(21)Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period

(22)List of risk significant components and systems

(23)List of actions done and/or in the Human Performance Improvement Plan referenced in

the last PIR inspection

Attachment

A - 8 Information Request 2 May 18, 2006Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection (IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)

Please provide the following Action Requests to Rick Deese by May 30, 2006:

A0528027 A0540712

A0557259

A0560825

A0562763

A0562767

A0562773

A0562775 A0562776 A0562778

A0562785

A0562791

A0562793

A0562794

A0569355

A0569841 A0573563 A0573913

A0573920

A0573922

A0573923

A0574552

A0576825

A0576844 A0577113 A0577117

A0578216

A0578228

A0578447

A0580008

A0584097

A0589785 A0601877 A0620471

A0620857

A0629704

A0631420

A0633646

A0634065

A0637904 A0648182 A0658028

A0658496

A0659407

A0660739

A0663705