ML062210297
| ML062210297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/2006 |
| From: | Laura Smith Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Keenan J Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-012 | |
| Download: ML062210297 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000275/2006012
Text
August 9, 2006
John S. Keenan
Senior Vice President - Generation
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 770000
Mail Code B32
San Francisco, CA 94177-0001
SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2006012 AND
Dear Mr. Keenan:
From June 5 through 22, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted the
onsite portion of a team inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The enclosed report
documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with your staff as described in Section
4OA6 of this report.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the
identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and
regulations and the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed approximately 280
action requests, associated non-conformance reports and apparent cause evaluations, and
other supporting documents. The team reviewed cross-cutting aspects of NRC and
licensee-identified findings and interviewed personnel regarding the condition of a safety
conscious work environment at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that, in general, your
processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were effective; thresholds for
identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were
adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a relatively high
number of self-revealing and NRC identified findings were noted at your site during the
assessment period. Ineffective and incomplete corrective actions led to a number of repeat
problems that could have been prevented, with a notable number of repeat findings of
previously documented NRC-identified and self-revealing findings. Overall however
performance had improved in the all areas of your corrective action program since the last
problem identification and resolution inspection. The team concluded that while a
safety-conscious work environment existed at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
DLProulx for
Linda J. Smith, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket: 50-275, 323
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000275; 323/2006012
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/enclosure:
Donna Jacobs
Vice President, Nuclear Services
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424
James R. Becker, Vice President
Diablo Canyon Operations and
Station Director, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424
Sierra Club San Lucia Chapter
ATTN: Andrew Christie
P.O. Box 15755
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406
Nancy Culver
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
P.O. Box 164
Pismo Beach, CA 93448
Pacific Gas and Electric Company -3-
Chairman
San Luis Obispo County Board of
Supervisors
County Government Building
1055 Monterey Street, Suite D430
San Luis Obispo, CA 93408
Truman Burns\Robert Kinosian
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Ave., Rm. 4102
San Francisco, CA 94102-3298
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel
857 Cass Street, Suite D
Monterey, CA 93940
Director, Radiological Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Richard F. Locke, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 7442
San Francisco, CA 94120
City Editor
The Tribune
3825 South Higuera Street
P.O. Box 112
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-0112
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Sacramento, CA 95814
Jennifer Tang
Field Representative
United States Senator Barbara Boxer
1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 240
San Francisco, CA 94111
Pacific Gas and Electric Company -4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (TWJ)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (FLB2)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)
J. Lamb, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JGL1)
ROPreports
DC Site Secretary (AWC1)
SUNSI Review Completed: ______ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: ________
/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive
R:\_DC\2006\DC2006-012RP-RWD.wpd ML
RIV:SRI/PBE RI:PBA RI:PBB SOE:OB SRI:EB2
RWDeese RBCohen TAMcConnell TOMcKernon DLProulx
T=DLProulx T=DLProulx /RA/
8/8/06 8/8/06 8/8/06 8/8/06 8/4/06
C:PSB C:EB2
WBJones LJSmith
/RA/ DLPfor
8/7/06 8/8/06
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket.: 50-275, 323
Report No.: 05000275,323/2006012
Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila Beach, California
Dates: June 5-22, 2006
Team Leader: R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector, Projects Branch E
Inspectors: R. Cohen, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch A
T. McConnell, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch B
T. McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch
D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2
Approved By: Linda Smith, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000275, 323/2006012; 6/5-22/2006; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial
Identification and Resolution of Problems.
The inspection was conducted by three resident inspectors and one regional specialist
inspector. One unresolved item was identified during this inspection. The significance of most
findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance
determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC
management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3,
dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The team reviewed approximately 280 action requests, apparent cause evaluations, and root
cause analyses, as well as supporting documents to assess problem identification and
resolution activities. In general, the corrective action program procedures and processes were
effective, thresholds for identifying issues were low, and corrective actions were adequate to
address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a number of self-revealing
and NRC identified findings in each of these attributes of your problem identification and
resolution program were noted over the past two years. Many of these findings were related to
equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable safety-related equipment. The
team noted improvement in all three areas when comparing the results of this and more recent
inspections when compared to inspections two years ago.
Based on the interviews conducted, the team concluded that a positive safety conscious work
environment existed at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The team determined that employees felt
free to raise safety concerns to station managers and supervisors, the employee concerns
program, and the NRC. However, the team noted two isolated incidents regarding the
environment that did not foster openly raising safety concerns. The licensee had already taken
actions to address the concerns. All the interviewees believed that potential safety issues were
being addressed.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
-2- Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
The team based the following conclusions, in part, on all issues that were identified in
the assessment period, which ranged from June 25, 2004, (the last biennial problem
identification and resolution inspection) to the end of the inspection on June 22, 2006.
The issues are divided into two groups. The first group (Current Issues) included
problems identified during the assessment period where at least one performance
deficiency occurred during the assessment period. The second group (Historical Issues)
included issues that were identified during the assessment period where all the
performance deficiencies occurred outside the assessment period.
a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification
(1) Inspection Scope
The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones to determine if
problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective
action program for evaluation and resolution. The team performed field walkdowns of
selected systems and equipment to inspect for deficiencies that should have been
entered in the corrective action program. The team also observed control room
operations and reviewed operator logs, plant tracking logs, and station work orders to
ensure conditions adverse to quality were being entered into the corrective action
program. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of self assessments, trending
reports, system health reports, and various other documents related to the corrective
action program.
The team interviewed station personnel, attended action request (AR) review team and
corrective action review board meetings, and evaluated corrective action documentation
to determine the licensees threshold for entering problems in their corrective action
program. In addition, the team reviewed the licensees evaluation of selected industry
operating experience information, including operator event reports, NRC generic letters
and information notices, and generic vendor notifications to ensure that issues
applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.
(2) Assessment
The team determined that, in general, problems were properly identified and entered into
the corrective action program as evidenced by the relatively few findings identified during
the assessment period. The team concluded that the licensees current threshold for
entering issues into the corrective action program was appropriately low. However, the
licensee did fail in some instances to identify or document deficiencies which led to
unnecessarily operating the units with degraded conditions affecting safety.
-3- Enclosure
As listed below, four NRC-identified and self-revealing issues were documented during
the period. The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and
resolution aspects in effectiveness of problem identification has been fairly steady since
2004, with two findings in the last half of 2004, two in all of year 2005, and no additional
findings identified during this inspection in the effectiveness of problem identification
area. The team concluded that the licensees performance had improved in the area of
effectiveness of problem identification when compared to the previous problem
identification and resolution assessment (NRC Inspection Report 05000275;
323/2004012).
Current Issues
Example 1: The licensee failed to promptly identify multiple grounds in the breaker
control circuitry for Containment Spray Pump 2-2, resulting in the degraded control wires
affecting the pumps circuitry for 70 days following the initial ground indication. (NRC
Inspection Report 05000275,323 (IR) 2004004).
Example 2. The licensee failed to establish compensatory measures to ensure the
prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan was met, in part due to
the fact that the licensee missed opportunities to identify the emergency plan impact
prior to removing seismic instrumentation from service. (IR 2004005)
Example 3: The licensee failed promptly identify a condition adverse to quality.
Specifically, PG&E initially screened industry operating experience regarding the
potential for containment recirculation sump valves failing to open following certain
small-break loss of cooling accidents as not being applicable to Diablo Canyon Power
Plant. (IR 2005004)
Example 4: Licensee operators had two opportunities to identify the mispositioning of
Valve SFS-2-8765 but failed to identify the condition. The mis-positioned valve resulted
in a loss of approximately 2600 gallons of water from the spent fuel pool. (IR 2005005)
Historical Issues
Example 1: The licensee failed to recognize a broken bonnet stud on the Unit 2
Atmospheric Dump Valve PCV-21 as a significant condition adverse to quality and
promptly perform an operability assessment. (IR 2001007)
Example 2: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a nonconservative safety
features setpoint by not ensuring that the Unit 2 plant response to a loss of feedwater
flow to Steam Generator 2-4 was appropriate during their post trip event review process.
Example 3: The licensee failed to identify and correct a leak in Check Valve FW-2-370
and the backward installation of the disk for Check Valve FW-2-377 despite auxiliary
feedwater system backflow alarms and industry experience on properly assembly of the
-4- Enclosure
Example 4: The licensee failed to correct the population of Rockwell-Edwards valves in
safety-related and risk-significant system that were susceptible to failure of the packing
gland follower flange because they did not properly identify all of the potentially affected
valves. (IR 2003008)
b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
(1) Inspection Scope
The team reviewed ARs, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the
licensees ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors
reviewed a sample of ARs, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the
licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic
implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended
various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues
identified.
In addition, the team reviewed licensee evaluations of selected industry operating
experience reports, including licensee event reports, NRC generic letters, bulletins and
information notices, and generic vendor notifications to assess whether issues
applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.
The team performed a historical review of ARs and notifications written over the last 5
years that addressed the emergency diesel generators, safety related switchgear
ventilation, the auxiliary feedwater system, and the component cooling water system.
(2) Assessment
The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in
accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC
requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the
licensee was generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant
conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, ineffective prioritization and
evaluation of issues resulted in a relatively high number of self-revealing and NRC
identified findings during the period. One of these findings culminated in a plant trip.
Others were related to equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable
safety-related equipment.
The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the licensee was
generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant conditions
adverse to quality. The team noted that the quality and rigor of root causes had
improved when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution
assessment. Additionally, the trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification
and resolution aspects in evaluation of problems has been improving since 2004, with
six findings in 2004 and two in 2005, however, the inspectors identified one additional
finding during this inspection in the evaluation area. The team concluded that the
licensee had improved in performance in the area of prioritization and evaluation of
issues when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution assessment.
-5- Enclosure
Current Issues
Example 1: The licensee failed to properly evaluate the cause for Safety Injection Check
Valve SI-1-8820 not seating following a forward flow test after the valve was found stuck
open during a back flow leak test. (IR 2004003)
Example 2: The licensee failed to properly evaluate indications of reverse rotation of the
fan motor for a containment fan cooler unit (CFCU), impacting the operability of the
CFCU over the 13-year period that reverse rotation was observed. (IR 2004005)
Example 3: The licensee failed to recognize the significance of not establishing
compensatory measures to ensure the prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon
Example 4: The licensee failed to maintain approximately 70 safety related solenoid
operated valves in an environmentally qualified condition because they did not promptly
evaluate the extent of condition of a previous valve failure. This failure delayed the
identification of elastomer qualification issues for approximately 1 year and ultimately
caused a loss of Steam Generator feed event and a Unit 2 manual plant trip.
Example 5: The licensee failed to properly prioritize an issue regarding the
re-submission of required documents for individual criminal history record information
and subsequently missed the opportunity to have their security department correct the
issue. (IR 2004007)
Example 6: The licensee did not fully evaluate the extent of a problem regarding
generally-licensed devices and did not ascertain that the radiation sources and
generally-licensed devices were properly controlled in accordance with NRC regulations
and/or vendor instructions. (IR 2004009)
Example 7: The licensee failed to adequately evaluate and therefore provide for timely
corrective actions regarding emergency core cooling system check valve back-leakage
and its potential to cause gas-binding of emergency core cooling system pumps and/or
water hammer of emergency core cooling system piping. (IR 2005005)
Example 8: The licensee improperly evaluated operating experience related to the
minimum flow settings for the auxiliary feedwater pumps, in that they did not properly
verify the minimum flow settings with the pump manufacturer. (IR 2005006)
Historical Issue
Example: The licensee failed to appropriately prioritize and evaluate battery charger
failures between January 1999 and May 2003 because they consistently assigned low
significance, did not assign any cause investigation, and did not recognize a trend of
charger failures existed, even when multiple failures were identified in a short period of
time. (IR 2003010)
c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
-6- Enclosure
(1) Inspection Scope
The team reviewed plant records, primarily ARs, to verify that corrective actions related
to identified problems were developed and implemented, including corrective actions to
address common cause or generic concerns. The team sampled specific technical
issues to evaluate the adequacy of the licensees operability assessments.
Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of ARs that addressed past NRC identified
violations, for each affected cornerstone, to ensure that the corrective actions
adequately addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The team also
reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other ARs, work orders, or tracking
programs to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.
(2) Assessment
The effectiveness of identified corrective actions to address adverse conditions was
generally adequate. The NRC identified numerous instances over the assessment
period where historical corrective actions were not effective but, overall, the licensee
demonstrated acceptable performance in this area. Of note, the inspectors observed
that the licensee had allowed recurrence of four previously documented NRC-identified
or self-revealing findings. These repeat findings, listed below as Examples 4, 5, 9, and
10, represented a significant portion of the examples from the report period.
The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and resolution aspects in
effectiveness of corrective actions has been improving since 2004, with four findings in
the last half of 2004, seven in all of 2005, and no additional findings identified during this
inspection or other inspections completed in 2006 before the exit date of this inspection.
The team concluded that the licensee had improved in performance in the area of
effectiveness of corrective actions when compared to the previous problem identification
and resolution assessment.
Current Issues
Example 1: The licensee failed to assess the extent of condition regarding a failed
pressurizer heater connection and thereby missed an opportunity to identify a corrosive
agent that degraded all heater electrical connections for the Unit 1 pressurizer, causing
at least one connection to fail. (IR 2004004)
Example 2: The licensee failed take adequate corrective actions to prevent the
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) void space from exceeding the volume allowed
by plant procedures, causing operators to declare the ECCS inoperable and enter
Technical Specification 3.0.3 twice. (IR 2004005)
Example 3: The licensee failed to maintain design control of the emergency diesel
generator fuel oil transfer system requirements after original corrective actions after the
licensee originally identified the issue did not correct the problem. (IR 2004006)
-7- Enclosure
Example 4: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a failure to perform surveys of a
high radiation area in the Unit 2 Gas Decay Tank Room during evolutions due to
ineffective corrective actions. (IR 2004006)
Example 5: The licensee failed to adequately resolve a condition adverse to their fire
protection program. Specifically, operations department responders were not required to
participate in fire drills for initial qualification or to maintain their qualification, which was
noted to be a previously identified qualification deficiency. (IR 2005002)
Example 6: The licensee failed to promptly correct a cracked lube oil instrument sensing
line on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3, thereby increasing the potential for the diesel
generator to trip on low lube oil level. (IR 2005002)
Example 7: The licensee failed to effectively implement interim corrective actions for
Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1, which led to unplanned unavailability of the diesel
generator to remove carbonized lube oil from the lube oil system. (IR 2005003)
Example 8: The licensee failed to identify the root cause and propose any corrective
actions to prevent recurrence of the Unit 2 pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints being
significantly out of tolerance, despite a history of pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints
being out of tolerance. (IR 2005003)
Example 9: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency
when they failed to conduct a circuit isolation plan when maintenance personnel were
performing work on Startup Transformer 1-1, which was which was a risk management
action required by plant procedure. The circuit isolation plan would have provided an
opportunity to identify the potential of disrupting startup power to Unit 2, which occurred
as a result of the maintenance activities. (IR 2005005)
Example 10: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency
when they failed to post an area within Vault 26 as a radiation area. (IR 2005005)
Example 11: The licensee failed to take adequate corrective action to address an on-
going problem with emergency core cooling system gas voiding in the common suction
crossover line. The licensee had a sustained history of gas voiding in emergency core
cooling system piping, which had the potential to lead to failure of the centrifugal
charging pumps or safety injection pumps during the switchover from cold-leg
recirculation to hot-leg recirculation during a loss-of-coolant accident. (IR 2005-06)
Historical Issues
Example 1: The licensee failed to take action to docket a justification and schedule to
correct a nonconservative Technical Specification dealing with dose equivalent iodine
activity in the reactor coolant system. (IR 2001006)
Example 2: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a previous event because of
ineffective corrective action in placement of ventilation louvers on the 12 kilovolt
grounding transformer fuse boxes. (IR 2003005)
-8- Enclosure
Example 3: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct lube oil carbonization in
the emergency diesel generator lube oil systems, resulting in diesel generator
unavailability to clean the lube oil lines. (IR 2003007)
Example 4: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a degraded mechanical
governor on emergency diesel generator 2-2, causing the degraded governor to remain
in service for over six months and requiring increasing difficulty by operators to maintain
the required load on the diesel generator. (IR 2003007)
Example 5: The licensee failed to correct a safety-related battery charger design
deficiency between January 1999 and May 2003 after multiple battery charger failures.
d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment
(1) Inspection Scope
The team interviewed approximately 27 individuals from different departments
representing a cross section of functional organizations and supervisory and
non-supervisory personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that
would challenge the establishment of a safety conscience work environment.
(2) Assessment
The team concluded that a safety conscious work environment existed at the Diablo
Canyon Power Plant. Employees felt free to enter issues into the corrective action
program, as well as raise safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns
program, and the NRC. However, two isolated concerns were discovered by the team
concerning the environment for raising concerns specific regarding two different
organizations. The team noted that due to recent organizational changes, the licensee
had addressed the concerns the individuals raised. The team concluded, based on
interviews, that the conditions raised by the concerned individuals were no longer
present and never prevented individuals from raising their concerns. All of the
interviewees believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were
no instances identified where these individuals had experienced negative consequences
for bringing safety issues to the NRC.
e. Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection
(1) Inspection Scope
During the reviews described in Sections 4OA2 a.(1), 4OA2 b.(1), and 4OA2 c.(1),
above, the inspectors identified the following unresolved item.
(2) Findings and Observations
(I) Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps
-9- Enclosure
During a walkdown of the residual heat removal pumps during the weeks of
June 5 and June 19, 2006, inspectors noted oil in the vicinity of the drain plugs
for the motors for Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1-1, 2-1, and 2-2. The team
questioned the licensee as to the source of the oil, specifically questioning
whether the motors were leaking from the motor oil drain plugs during operation.
Additionally, the inspectors discovered that the licensee was not performing the
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cure time for the drain plug sealant recommended by the vendor which
would ensure proper sealing characteristics. The team noted that any small
leakage combined with the required lengthy mission time for the pumps could
result in a situation where a loss of adequate inventory of motor oil could occur
and challenge long term operation of the pumps.
The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment to provide reasonable
assurance of operability of the pumps based on the observed conditions.
Additionally the licensee made plans to measure leakage from the pumps during
the next pump runs. Because the inspectors could not ascertain the source and
the rate of the oil leakage until the pumps are run and could not determine the
effect of a shortened sealant cure time, the team treated this issue as an
unresolved item: URI 05000275,323/2006012-01, Oil Found in the Vicinity of
Residual Heat Removal Pumps.
4OA6 Exit Meeting
On June 22, 2006, at the end of the onsite portion of the inspection, the inspection
findings were discussed with Mr. J. Keenan and other members of the licensees staff.
The licensee acknowledged the findings.
The team asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. The licensee did not identify any proprietary
information that may have been reviewed by the team.
Attachment: Supplemental Information
-10- Enclosure
Supplemental Information
Partial List of Persons Contacted
Licensee
J. Becker, Vice President - Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director
K. Peters, Director, Engineering Services
J. Welsch, Manager, Operations
M. Meko, Director, Site Services
R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection
D. Jacobs, Vice President - Nuclear Services
P. Roller, Director, Performance Improvement
B. Waltos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
J. Purkis, Director, Maintenance Services
P. Roller, Director, Operations Services
D. Taggart, Manager, Quality Verification
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000275,323/2006012-01 URI Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat
Removal Pumps (Section 4OA2.e(2)(i))
Documents Reviewed
In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were
selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the
inspection and to support any findings:
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
Action Requests
A0111266 A0537891 A0577808 A0589499 A0600842 A0608942
A0162000 A0548704 A0580131 A0589740 A0601862 A0609107
A0302183 A0553420 A0580778 A0589959 A0601877 A0609150
A0334222 A0557532 A0581860 A0590358 A0602129 A0609937
A0425218 A0558389 A0581890 A0590574 A0602745 A0611033
A0427658 A0562738 A0583472 A0592778 A0603995 A0611346
A0459989 A0562741 A0584386 A0592779 A0605066 A0611505
A0491470 A0562742 A0585459 A0592782 A0605096 A0611638
A0499791 A0566266 A0586913 A0594018 A0605203 A0611784
A0513762 A0571554 A0586915 A0597931 A0607200 A0612144
A0528837 A0571556 A0587031 A0598237 A0607398 A0612248
A0530124 A0573112 A0587032 A0598825 A0608163 A0613109
A0535731 A0577295 A0587150 A0598883 A0608433 A0613505
A0535871 A0577690 A0587494 A0599961 A0608483 A0614983
A-1 Attachment
A0615425 A0634736 A0646838 A0659971 A0664021 A0670344
A0616852 A0634915 A0648502 A0660081 A0664053 A0670432
A0617647 A0635851 A0648550 A0661082 A0664134 A0670555
A0617988 A0635980 A0649123 A0661405 A0664825 A0670572
A0618799 A0636501 A0649373 A0661677 A0664885 A0670586
A0618992 A0636815 A0649461 A0661818 A0664920 A0670655
A0619215 A0636903 A0649887 A0661988 A0665039 A0670658
A0619650 A0638978 A0649932 A0661990 A0665166 A0670706
A0621027 A0639044 A0652157 A0662045 A0665588 A0670727
A0622185 A0640437 A0652663 A0662138 A0665755 A0670734
A0622355 A0640943 A0652667 A0662331 A0666116 A0670790
A0622599 A0640963 A0652726 A0662502 A0666132 A0670820
A0623479 A0641228 A0652914 A0663128 A0666319 A0670857
A0624472 A0642000 A0653033 A0663281 A0666828 A0670868
A0624585 A0642041 A0653445 A0663526 A0666867 A0670868
A0625005 A0642114 A0656436 A0663561 A0667282 A0670920
A0625548 A0642617 A0656452 A0663626 A0667383 A0671047
A0626353 A0642979 A0657228 A0663634 A0667541 A0671215
A0628329 A0642982 A0657247 A0663646 A0667549 A0671425
A0628375 A0643434 A0657248 A0663731 A0667755 A0671529
A0629528 A0644041 A0657515 A0663823 A0667995 A0671556
A0629995 A0644920 A0657517 A0663838 A0668040 A0671557
A0630154 A0644933 A0658443 A0663853 A0668297 A0671722
A0630229 A0644941 A0658540 A0663854 A0668929 A0671723
A0633325 A0644949 A0658670 A0663858 A0669488 A0671724
A0633568 A0644951 A0658794 A0663941 A0669488 A0671771
A0633772 A0645232 A0658795 A0663949 A0669488
A0634066 A0645298 A0659274 A0663985 A0669871
A0634214 A0646729 A0659858
Procedures
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme 5
3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Amendment
169
AD7.ID2 Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme 7
AR PK-18-06 Diesel 13 Lube Oil System 8
EOP E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 15
MP E-3.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Overhaul 10
MP E-10.1 RHR Pump Motor Overhaul 17A
MP E-14.1 Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul 8
A-2 Attachment
MP E-17.1 Westinghouse Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Motor Overhaul 14
MP E-53.2 Split End Bell, 4000-Volt Motor Overhaul 16
MP E-57.2B Equipment Wiring and Terminations 37
OM4.ID15 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) 3
OM4.ID16 Plant Health Committee 1
OM 7 Corrective Action Program 3
OM7.ID1 Problem Identification and Resolution - Action Requests 22
OM7.ID.1 PI&R Action Requests 0
OM7.ID.3 Noncomformance Report and Technical Review Group 11
OM7.ID.3 Root Cause Investigations - Root Cause Team 16A
OM7.ID4 Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation 8
OM7.ID7 Integrated Problem Response Team 0F
OM7.ID10 Trend Analysis Program 7
OM7.ID11 10 CFR 21 Reportability Review Process 2A
OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 9
OM7.IDC1 Engineering Use of the Trend Analysis Program for 0
Equipment Failures
Drawings
NUMBER ITEM REVISION
Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 48
106712 Unit 1 Containment Spray 34
106710 Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System 36
System Health Reports
SYSTEM TITLE DATE
12 Containment Spray January 2006
10 Residual Heat Removal System January 2006
39 Radiation Monitors January 2006
21A Diesel Generator System January 2006
A-3 Attachment
Work Orders
WO C0196475 WO R0259278 WO R0259280 WO R0264116 WO R0264775
Information Notices
2004-01 2004-10 2005-11 2005-24 2006-03
2004-07 2004-11 2005-16 2005-26 2006-04
2004-09 2005-08 2005-21
04-03-03 04-03-04 04-04-05 04-04-07
Nonconformance Reports
N001722
N002178
N002195
N002189
N002194
Drawing
NUMBER ITEM REVISION
663030 Motor AC Frame Vertical Lower Bearing Assembly 1
Operator Logs
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, May 19, 2006, Dayshift
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, November 3, 2006, Dayshift
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, April 19, 2006, Dayshift
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, September 22, 2005, Nightshift
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, June 6, 2006, Nightshift
Calculation
NUMBER ITEM REVISION
M-928 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Safe, Shutdown Analysis 1
Miscellaneous
Vendor Manual for Model 3600 V-5A Indicating Gauges
Inservice Testing Program Revision 9/6, PG&E Letter DCL-94-057, dated March 21, 1994
A-4 Attachment
Testing of Diesel Generator Air Start and Fuel Oil Transfer Systems, PG&E letter DCL-92-236,
dated October 26, 1992
Preventive Maintenance Optimization Diablo Canyon, Dated April 16, 2006, Integrated
Equipment Reliability Strategy Background Information Document Switchyard, Revision 0
Instrumentation Obsolescence Management, I & C Long Term Strategy, Dated November 14,
2005
Quick Hit Self Assessment - Operability Determination Program, Dated June 1-30, 2005
PG&E 2006 Performance Improvement Program Audit, Dated June 21, 2006
Surveillance Procedure STP V-5C, ECCS Hot Leg Check Valve Leak Test
White Paper - Evaluate Possible Minor Water Hammer During p-CSP-A11, A0607398
dated June 20, 2006
FSAR, Chapter 17, Revisions 15 and 16
A-5 Attachment
Information Request 1
April 17, 2006
Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection
(IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)
The inspection will cover the period of June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2006. All requested information
should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The information may be provided in
either electronic or paper media or a combination of these. Information provided in electronic
media may be in the form of e-mail attachment(s), CDs, thumb drives, or 3 1/2 inch floppy disks.
The agencys text editing software is Corel WordPerfect 8, Presentations, and Quattro Pro;
however, we have document viewing capability for MS Word, Excel, Power Point, and Adobe
Acrobat (.pdf) text files.
Please provide the following information to Rick Deese by May 3, 2006:
Note: On summary lists please include a description of problem, status, initiating date, and
owner organization.
1. Summary list of all action requests of significant conditions adverse to quality opened or
closed during the period
2. Summary list of all action requests which were generated during the period
3. A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll-up" one or more smaller
issues for the period
4. Summary list of all action requests which were down-graded or up-graded in significance
during the period
5. List of all root cause analyses completed during the period
6. List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at end of the period
7. List of all apparent cause analyses completed during the period
8. List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program during
the period
9. List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during
the period
10. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities completed
during the period
11. A list of all quality assurance audits and surveillances scheduled for completion during
the period, but which were not completed
A-6 Attachment
12. All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third
party assessments completed during the period
13. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period
and broken down by functional organization
14. Current revisions of corrective action program procedures
15. A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at Diablo Canyon during the
period
16. Action requests or other actions generated for each of the items below:
(1) Part 21 Reports:
2004-02, -08, -10, -14, -15, -17, -21, -22, -24, -27
2005-01, -05, -07, -12, -13, -16, -17, -20, -22, -26, -30, -33, -37, -38, -41
2006-01, -03, -04, -05
(2) NRC Information Notices:
2004-01, -05, -07, -08, -09, -10, -11, -12, -16, -19, -21
2005-01, -02, -03, -04, -06, -08, -09, -11, -14, -16, -19, -20, -21, -23, -24, -25,
-26, -29, -30, -31, -32
2006-02, -03, -04, -05, -08
(3) All LERs issued by Diablo Canyon during the period
(4) NCVs and Violations issued to Diablo Canyon during the period (including
licensee identified violations)
(17) Safeguards event logs for the period
(18) Radiation protection event logs
(19) Current system health reports or similar information
(20) Current predictive performance summary reports or similar information
(21) Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
(22) List of risk significant components and systems
(23) List of actions done and/or in the Human Performance Improvement Plan referenced in
the last PIR inspection
A-7 Attachment
Information Request 2
May 18, 2006
Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection
(IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)
Please provide the following Action Requests to Rick Deese by May 30, 2006:
A0528027 A0562776 A0573563 A0577113 A0601877 A0648182
A0540712 A0562778 A0573913 A0577117 A0620471 A0658028
A0557259 A0562785 A0573920 A0578216 A0620857 A0658496
A0560825 A0562791 A0573922 A0578228 A0629704 A0659407
A0562763 A0562793 A0573923 A0578447 A0631420 A0660739
A0562767 A0562794 A0574552 A0580008 A0633646 A0663705
A0562773 A0569355 A0576825 A0584097 A0634065
A0562775 A0569841 A0576844 A0589785 A0637904
A-8 Attachment