IR 05000275/2006012
| ML062510427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/2006 |
| From: | Laura Smith Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Keenan J Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-012 | |
| Download: ML062510427 (25) | |
Text
ber 8, 2006
SUBJECT:
SECOND ERRATA FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2006012 AND 05000323/2006012
Dear Mr. Keenan:
Please discard the entire NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000275;323/2006012, including the first errata, and replace with the report enclosed with this letter. The purpose of the change is to make editorial corrections to the first page of the cover letter and to enclosure pages 5 and 10. The changes are needed to reflect that no findings of significance were identified and that a telephonic re-exit was conducted.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Linda J. Smith, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-275, 323 License: NPF-80, NPF-82
Enclosures:
As stated
Pacific Gas and Electric Company -2-
REGION IV==
Docket.: 50-275, 323 License: NPF-80, NPF-82 Report No.: 05000275,323/2006012 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, California Dates: June 5-22, 2006 Team Leader: R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector, Projects Branch E Inspectors: R. Cohen, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch A T. McConnell, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch B T. McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Approved By: Linda Smith, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000275, 323/2006012; 6/5-22/2006; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems.
The inspection was conducted by three resident inspectors and one regional specialist inspector. One unresolved item was identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 280 action requests, apparent cause evaluations, and root cause analyses, as well as supporting documents to assess problem identification and resolution activities. In general, the corrective action program procedures and processes were effective, thresholds for identifying issues were low, and corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a number of self-revealing and NRC identified findings in each of these attributes of your problem identification and resolution program were noted over the past two years. Many of these findings were related to equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable safety-related equipment. The team noted improvement in all three areas when comparing the results of this and more recent inspections when compared to inspections two years ago.
Based on the interviews conducted, the team concluded that a positive safety conscious work environment existed at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The team determined that employees felt free to raise safety concerns to station managers and supervisors, the employee concerns program, and the NRC. However, the team noted two isolated incidents regarding the environment that did not foster openly raising safety concerns. The licensee had already taken actions to address the concerns. All the interviewees believed that potential safety issues were being addressed.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings None.
-2- Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS 4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems The team based the following conclusions, in part, on all issues that were identified in the assessment period, which ranged from June 25, 2004, (the last biennial problem identification and resolution inspection) to the end of the inspection on June 22, 2006.
The issues are divided into two groups. The first group (Current Issues) included problems identified during the assessment period where at least one performance deficiency occurred during the assessment period. The second group (Historical Issues) included issues that were identified during the assessment period where all the performance deficiencies occurred outside the assessment period.
a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team performed field walkdowns of selected systems and equipment to inspect for deficiencies that should have been entered in the corrective action program. The team also observed control room operations and reviewed operator logs, plant tracking logs, and station work orders to ensure conditions adverse to quality were being entered into the corrective action program. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of self assessments, trending reports, system health reports, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.
The team interviewed station personnel, attended action request (AR) review team and corrective action review board meetings, and evaluated corrective action documentation to determine the licensees threshold for entering problems in their corrective action program. In addition, the team reviewed the licensees evaluation of selected industry operating experience information, including operator event reports, NRC generic letters and information notices, and generic vendor notifications to ensure that issues applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.
(2) Assessment The team determined that, in general, problems were properly identified and entered into the corrective action program as evidenced by the relatively few findings identified during the assessment period. The team concluded that the licensees current threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program was appropriately low. However, the licensee did fail in some instances to identify or document deficiencies which led to unnecessarily operating the units with degraded conditions affecting safety.
-3- Enclosure
As listed below, four NRC-identified and self-revealing issues were documented during the period. The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and resolution aspects in effectiveness of problem identification has been fairly steady since 2004, with two findings in the last half of 2004, two in all of year 2005, and no additional findings identified during this inspection in the effectiveness of problem identification area. The team concluded that the licensees performance had improved in the area of effectiveness of problem identification when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution assessment (NRC Inspection Report 05000275; 323/2004012).
Current Issues Example 1: The licensee failed to promptly identify multiple grounds in the breaker control circuitry for Containment Spray Pump 2-2, resulting in the degraded control wires affecting the pumps circuitry for 70 days following the initial ground indication. (NRC Inspection Report 05000275,323 (IR) 2004004).
Example 2. The licensee failed to establish compensatory measures to ensure the prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan was met, in part due to the fact that the licensee missed opportunities to identify the emergency plan impact prior to removing seismic instrumentation from service. (IR 2004005)
Example 3: The licensee failed promptly identify a condition adverse to quality.
Specifically, PG&E initially screened industry operating experience regarding the potential for containment recirculation sump valves failing to open following certain small-break loss of cooling accidents as not being applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant. (IR 2005004)
Example 4: Licensee operators had two opportunities to identify the mispositioning of Valve SFS-2-8765 but failed to identify the condition. The mis-positioned valve resulted in a loss of approximately 2600 gallons of water from the spent fuel pool. (IR 2005005)
Historical Issues Example 1: The licensee failed to recognize a broken bonnet stud on the Unit 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve PCV-21 as a significant condition adverse to quality and promptly perform an operability assessment. (IR 2001007)
Example 2: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a nonconservative safety features setpoint by not ensuring that the Unit 2 plant response to a loss of feedwater flow to Steam Generator 2-4 was appropriate during their post trip event review process. (IR 2002007)
Example 3: The licensee failed to identify and correct a leak in Check Valve FW-2-370 and the backward installation of the disk for Check Valve FW-2-377 despite auxiliary feedwater system backflow alarms and industry experience on properly assembly of the check valves. (IR 2003006)
-4- Enclosure
Example 4: The licensee failed to correct the population of Rockwell-Edwards valves in safety-related and risk-significant system that were susceptible to failure of the packing gland follower flange because they did not properly identify all of the potentially affected valves. (IR 2003008)
b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed ARs, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the licensees ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ARs, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues identified.
In addition, the team reviewed licensee evaluations of selected industry operating experience reports, including licensee event reports, NRC generic letters, bulletins and information notices, and generic vendor notifications to assess whether issues applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.
The team performed a historical review of ARs and notifications written over the last 5 years that addressed the emergency diesel generators, safety related switchgear ventilation, the auxiliary feedwater system, and the component cooling water system.
(2) Assessment The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the licensee was generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, ineffective prioritization and evaluation of issues resulted in a relatively high number of self-revealing and NRC identified findings during the period. One of these findings culminated in a plant trip.
Others were related to equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable safety-related equipment.
The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the licensee was generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant conditions adverse to quality. The team noted that the quality and rigor of root causes had improved when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution assessment. Additionally, the trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and resolution aspects in evaluation of problems has been improving since 2004, with six findings in 2004 and two in 2005. The team concluded that the licensee had improved in performance in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution assessment.
-5- Enclosure
Current Issues Example 1: The licensee failed to properly evaluate the cause for Safety Injection Check Valve SI-1-8820 not seating following a forward flow test after the valve was found stuck open during a back flow leak test. (IR 2004003)
Example 2: The licensee failed to properly evaluate indications of reverse rotation of the fan motor for a containment fan cooler unit (CFCU), impacting the operability of the CFCU over the 13-year period that reverse rotation was observed. (IR 2004005)
Example 3: The licensee failed to recognize the significance of not establishing compensatory measures to ensure the prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan. (IR 2004005)
Example 4: The licensee failed to maintain approximately 70 safety related solenoid operated valves in an environmentally qualified condition because they did not promptly evaluate the extent of condition of a previous valve failure. This failure delayed the identification of elastomer qualification issues for approximately 1 year and ultimately caused a loss of Steam Generator feed event and a Unit 2 manual plant trip.
Example 5: The licensee failed to properly prioritize an issue regarding the re-submission of required documents for individual criminal history record information and subsequently missed the opportunity to have their security department correct the issue. (IR 2004007)
Example 6: The licensee did not fully evaluate the extent of a problem regarding generally-licensed devices and did not ascertain that the radiation sources and generally-licensed devices were properly controlled in accordance with NRC regulations and/or vendor instructions. (IR 2004009)
Example 7: The licensee failed to adequately evaluate and therefore provide for timely corrective actions regarding emergency core cooling system check valve back-leakage and its potential to cause gas-binding of emergency core cooling system pumps and/or water hammer of emergency core cooling system piping. (IR 2005005)
Example 8: The licensee improperly evaluated operating experience related to the minimum flow settings for the auxiliary feedwater pumps, in that they did not properly verify the minimum flow settings with the pump manufacturer. (IR 2005006)
Historical Issue Example: The licensee failed to appropriately prioritize and evaluate battery charger failures between January 1999 and May 2003 because they consistently assigned low significance, did not assign any cause investigation, and did not recognize a trend of charger failures existed, even when multiple failures were identified in a short period of time. (IR 2003010)
-6- Enclosure
c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed plant records, primarily ARs, to verify that corrective actions related to identified problems were developed and implemented, including corrective actions to address common cause or generic concerns. The team sampled specific technical issues to evaluate the adequacy of the licensees operability assessments.
Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of ARs that addressed past NRC identified violations, for each affected cornerstone, to ensure that the corrective actions adequately addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The team also reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other ARs, work orders, or tracking programs to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.
(2) Assessment The effectiveness of identified corrective actions to address adverse conditions was generally adequate. The NRC identified numerous instances over the assessment period where historical corrective actions were not effective but, overall, the licensee demonstrated acceptable performance in this area. Of note, the inspectors observed that the licensee had allowed recurrence of four previously documented NRC-identified or self-revealing findings. These repeat findings, listed below as Examples 4, 5, 9, and 10, represented a significant portion of the examples from the report period.
The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and resolution aspects in effectiveness of corrective actions has been improving since 2004, with four findings in the last half of 2004, seven in all of 2005, and no additional findings identified during this inspection or other inspections completed in 2006 before the exit date of this inspection.
The team concluded that the licensee had improved in performance in the area of effectiveness of corrective actions when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution assessment.
Current Issues Example 1: The licensee failed to assess the extent of condition regarding a failed pressurizer heater connection and thereby missed an opportunity to identify a corrosive agent that degraded all heater electrical connections for the Unit 1 pressurizer, causing at least one connection to fail. (IR 2004004)
Example 2: The licensee failed take adequate corrective actions to prevent the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) void space from exceeding the volume allowed by plant procedures, causing operators to declare the ECCS inoperable and enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 twice. (IR 2004005)
Example 3: The licensee failed to maintain design control of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system requirements after original corrective actions after the licensee originally identified the issue did not correct the problem. (IR 2004006)
-7- Enclosure
Example 4: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a failure to perform surveys of a high radiation area in the Unit 2 Gas Decay Tank Room during evolutions due to ineffective corrective actions. (IR 2004006)
Example 5: The licensee failed to adequately resolve a condition adverse to their fire protection program. Specifically, operations department responders were not required to participate in fire drills for initial qualification or to maintain their qualification, which was noted to be a previously identified qualification deficiency. (IR 2005002)
Example 6: The licensee failed to promptly correct a cracked lube oil instrument sensing line on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3, thereby increasing the potential for the diesel generator to trip on low lube oil level. (IR 2005002)
Example 7: The licensee failed to effectively implement interim corrective actions for Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1, which led to unplanned unavailability of the diesel generator to remove carbonized lube oil from the lube oil system. (IR 2005003)
Example 8: The licensee failed to identify the root cause and propose any corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the Unit 2 pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints being significantly out of tolerance, despite a history of pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints being out of tolerance. (IR 2005003)
Example 9: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency when they failed to conduct a circuit isolation plan when maintenance personnel were performing work on Startup Transformer 1-1, which was which was a risk management action required by plant procedure. The circuit isolation plan would have provided an opportunity to identify the potential of disrupting startup power to Unit 2, which occurred as a result of the maintenance activities. (IR 2005005)
Example 10: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency when they failed to post an area within Vault 26 as a radiation area. (IR 2005005)
Example 11: The licensee failed to take adequate corrective action to address an on-going problem with emergency core cooling system gas voiding in the common suction crossover line. The licensee had a sustained history of gas voiding in emergency core cooling system piping, which had the potential to lead to failure of the centrifugal charging pumps or safety injection pumps during the switchover from cold-leg recirculation to hot-leg recirculation during a loss-of-coolant accident. (IR 2005-06)
Historical Issues Example 1: The licensee failed to take action to docket a justification and schedule to correct a nonconservative Technical Specification dealing with dose equivalent iodine activity in the reactor coolant system. (IR 2001006)
-8- Enclosure
Example 2: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a previous event because of ineffective corrective action in placement of ventilation louvers on the 12 kilovolt grounding transformer fuse boxes. (IR 2003005)
Example 3: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct lube oil carbonization in the emergency diesel generator lube oil systems, resulting in diesel generator unavailability to clean the lube oil lines. (IR 2003007)
Example 4: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a degraded mechanical governor on emergency diesel generator 2-2, causing the degraded governor to remain in service for over six months and requiring increasing difficulty by operators to maintain the required load on the diesel generator. (IR 2003007)
Example 5: The licensee failed to correct a safety-related battery charger design deficiency between January 1999 and May 2003 after multiple battery charger failures.
d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope The team interviewed approximately 27 individuals from different departments representing a cross section of functional organizations and supervisory and non-supervisory personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscience work environment.
(2) Assessment The team concluded that a safety conscious work environment existed at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Employees felt free to enter issues into the corrective action program, as well as raise safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns program, and the NRC. However, two isolated concerns were discovered by the team concerning the environment for raising concerns specific regarding two different organizations. The team noted that due to recent organizational changes, the licensee had addressed the concerns the individuals raised. The team concluded, based on interviews, that the conditions raised by the concerned individuals were no longer present and never prevented individuals from raising their concerns. All of the interviewees believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were no instances identified where these individuals had experienced negative consequences for bringing safety issues to the NRC.
e. Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection (1) Inspection Scope During the reviews described in Sections 4OA2 a.(1), 4OA2 b.(1), and 4OA2 c.(1),
above, the inspectors identified the following unresolved item.
(2) Findings and Observations-9- Enclosure
(I) Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps During a walkdown of the residual heat removal pumps during the weeks of June 5 and June 19, 2006, inspectors noted oil in the vicinity of the drain plugs for the motors for Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1-1, 2-1, and 2-2. The team questioned the licensee as to the source of the oil, specifically questioning whether the motors were leaking from the motor oil drain plugs during operation.
Additionally, the inspectors discovered that the licensee was not performing the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cure time for the drain plug sealant recommended by the vendor which would ensure proper sealing characteristics. The team noted that any small leakage combined with the required lengthy mission time for the pumps could result in a situation where a loss of adequate inventory of motor oil could occur and challenge long term operation of the pumps.
The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment to provide reasonable assurance of operability of the pumps based on the observed conditions.
Additionally the licensee made plans to measure leakage from the pumps during the next pump runs. Because the inspectors could not ascertain the source and the rate of the oil leakage until the pumps are run and could not determine the effect of a shortened sealant cure time, the team treated this issue as an unresolved item: URI 05000275,323/2006012-01, Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps.
4OA6 Exit Meeting On June 22, 2006, at the end of the onsite portion of the inspection, the inspection findings were discussed with Mr. and other members of the licensees staff.
The licensee acknowledged the findings.
A telephonic re-exit was conducted on August 9, 2006 with Mr. S. Ketelson, Regulatory Services Manager, and other members of your staff.
The team asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The licensee did not identify any proprietary information that may have been reviewed by the team.
Attachment: Supplemental Information-10- Enclosure
Supplemental Information Partial List of Persons Contacted Licensee J. Becker, Vice President - Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director K. Peters, Director, Engineering Services J. Welsch, Manager, Operations M. Meko, Director, Site Services R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection D. Jacobs, Vice President - Nuclear Services P. Roller, Director, Performance Improvement B. Waltos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness J. Purkis, Director, Maintenance Services P. Roller, Director, Operations Services D. Taggart, Manager, Quality Verification LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000275,323/2006012-01 URI Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps (Section 4OA2.e(2)(i))
Documents Reviewed In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems Action Requests A0111266 A0537891 A0577808 A0589499 A0600842 A0608942 A0162000 A0548704 A0580131 A0589740 A0601862 A0609107 A0302183 A0553420 A0580778 A0589959 A0601877 A0609150 A0334222 A0557532 A0581860 A0590358 A0602129 A0609937 A0425218 A0558389 A0581890 A0590574 A0602745 A0611033 A0427658 A0562738 A0583472 A0592778 A0603995 A0611346 A0459989 A0562741 A0584386 A0592779 A0605066 A0611505 A0491470 A0562742 A0585459 A0592782 A0605096 A0611638 A0499791 A0566266 A0586913 A0594018 A0605203 A0611784 A0513762 A0571554 A0586915 A0597931 A0607200 A0612144 A0528837 A0571556 A0587031 A0598237 A0607398 A0612248 A0530124 A0573112 A0587032 A0598825 A0608163 A0613109 A0535731 A0577295 A0587150 A0598883 A0608433 A0613505 A0535871 A0577690 A0587494 A0599961 A0608483 A0614983 A-1 Attachment
A0615425 A0634736 A0646838 A0659971 A0664021 A0670344 A0616852 A0634915 A0648502 A0660081 A0664053 A0670432 A0617647 A0635851 A0648550 A0661082 A0664134 A0670555 A0617988 A0635980 A0649123 A0661405 A0664825 A0670572 A0618799 A0636501 A0649373 A0661677 A0664885 A0670586 A0618992 A0636815 A0649461 A0661818 A0664920 A0670655 A0619215 A0636903 A0649887 A0661988 A0665039 A0670658 A0619650 A0638978 A0649932 A0661990 A0665166 A0670706 A0621027 A0639044 A0652157 A0662045 A0665588 A0670727 A0622185 A0640437 A0652663 A0662138 A0665755 A0670734 A0622355 A0640943 A0652667 A0662331 A0666116 A0670790 A0622599 A0640963 A0652726 A0662502 A0666132 A0670820 A0623479 A0641228 A0652914 A0663128 A0666319 A0670857 A0624472 A0642000 A0653033 A0663281 A0666828 A0670868 A0624585 A0642041 A0653445 A0663526 A0666867 A0670868 A0625005 A0642114 A0656436 A0663561 A0667282 A0670920 A0625548 A0642617 A0656452 A0663626 A0667383 A0671047 A0626353 A0642979 A0657228 A0663634 A0667541 A0671215 A0628329 A0642982 A0657247 A0663646 A0667549 A0671425 A0628375 A0643434 A0657248 A0663731 A0667755 A0671529 A0629528 A0644041 A0657515 A0663823 A0667995 A0671556 A0629995 A0644920 A0657517 A0663838 A0668040 A0671557 A0630154 A0644933 A0658443 A0663853 A0668297 A0671722 A0630229 A0644941 A0658540 A0663854 A0668929 A0671723 A0633325 A0644949 A0658670 A0663858 A0669488 A0671724 A0633568 A0644951 A0658794 A0663941 A0669488 A0671771 A0633772 A0645232 A0658795 A0663949 A0669488 A0634066 A0645298 A0659274 A0663985 A0669871 A0634214 A0646729 A0659858 Procedures NUMBER TITLE REVISION Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme 5 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Amendment 169 AD7.ID2 Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme 7 AR PK-18-06 Diesel 13 Lube Oil System 8 EOP E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 15 MP E-3.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Overhaul 10 MP E-10.1 RHR Pump Motor Overhaul 17A MP E-14.1 Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul 8 A-2 Attachment
MP E-17.1 Westinghouse Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Motor Overhaul 14 MP E-53.2 Split End Bell, 4000-Volt Motor Overhaul 16 MP E-57.2B Equipment Wiring and Terminations 37 OM4.ID15 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) 3 OM4.ID16 Plant Health Committee 1 OM 7 Corrective Action Program 3 OM7.ID1 Problem Identification and Resolution - Action Requests 22 OM7.ID.1 PI&R Action Requests 0 OM7.ID.3 Noncomformance Report and Technical Review Group 11 OM7.ID.3 Root Cause Investigations - Root Cause Team 16A OM7.ID4 Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation 8 OM7.ID7 Integrated Problem Response Team 0F OM7.ID10 Trend Analysis Program 7 OM7.ID11 10 CFR 21 Reportability Review Process 2A OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 9 OM7.IDC1 Engineering Use of the Trend Analysis Program for 0 Equipment Failures Drawings NUMBER ITEM REVISION Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 48 106712 Unit 1 Containment Spray 34 106710 Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System 36 System Health Reports SYSTEM TITLE DATE 12 Containment Spray January 2006 10 Residual Heat Removal System January 2006 39 Radiation Monitors January 2006 21A Diesel Generator System January 2006 A-3 Attachment
Work Orders WO C0196475 WO R0259278 WO R0259280 WO R0264116 WO R0264775 Information Notices 2004-01 2004-10 2005-11 2005-24 2006-03 2004-07 2004-11 2005-16 2005-26 2006-04 2004-09 2005-08 2005-21 NCVs 04-03-03 04-03-04 04-04-05 04-04-07 Nonconformance Reports N001722 N002178 N002195 N002189 N002194 Drawing NUMBER ITEM REVISION 663030 Motor AC Frame Vertical Lower Bearing Assembly 1 Operator Logs Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, May 19, 2006, Dayshift Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, November 3, 2006, Dayshift Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, April 19, 2006, Dayshift Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, September 22, 2005, Nightshift Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, June 6, 2006, Nightshift Calculation NUMBER ITEM REVISION M-928 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Safe, Shutdown Analysis 1 Miscellaneous Vendor Manual for Model 3600 V-5A Indicating Gauges A-4 Attachment
Inservice Testing Program Revision 9/6, PG&E Letter DCL-94-057, dated March 21, 1994 Testing of Diesel Generator Air Start and Fuel Oil Transfer Systems, PG&E letter DCL-92-236, dated October 26, 1992 Preventive Maintenance Optimization Diablo Canyon, Dated April 16, 2006, Integrated Equipment Reliability Strategy Background Information Document Switchyard, Revision 0 Instrumentation Obsolescence Management, I & C Long Term Strategy, Dated November 14, 2005 Quick Hit Self Assessment - Operability Determination Program, Dated June 1-30, 2005 PG&E 2006 Performance Improvement Program Audit, Dated June 21, 2006 Surveillance Procedure STP V-5C, ECCS Hot Leg Check Valve Leak Test White Paper - Evaluate Possible Minor Water Hammer During p-CSP-A11, A0607398 dated June 20, 2006 FSAR, Chapter 17, Revisions 15 and 16 A-5 Attachment
Information Request 1 April 17, 2006 Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection (IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)
The inspection will cover the period of June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2006. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The information may be provided in either electronic or paper media or a combination of these. Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of e-mail attachment(s), CDs, thumb drives, or 3 1/2 inch floppy disks.
The agencys text editing software is Corel WordPerfect 8, Presentations, and Quattro Pro; however, we have document viewing capability for MS Word, Excel, Power Point, and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files.
Please provide the following information to Rick Deese by May 3, 2006:
Note: On summary lists please include a description of problem, status, initiating date, and owner organization.
1. Summary list of all action requests of significant conditions adverse to quality opened or closed during the period 2. Summary list of all action requests which were generated during the period 3. A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll-up" one or more smaller issues for the period 4. Summary list of all action requests which were down-graded or up-graded in significance during the period 5. List of all root cause analyses completed during the period 6. List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at end of the period 7. List of all apparent cause analyses completed during the period 8. List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program during the period 9. List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during the period 10. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities completed during the period 11. A list of all quality assurance audits and surveillances scheduled for completion during the period, but which were not completed A-6 Attachment
12. All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period 13. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization 14. Current revisions of corrective action program procedures 15. A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at Diablo Canyon during the period 16. Action requests or other actions generated for each of the items below:
(1) Part 21 Reports:
2004-02, -08, -10, -14, -15, -17, -21, -22, -24, -27 2005-01, -05, -07, -12, -13, -16, -17, -20, -22, -26, -30, -33, -37, -38, -41 2006-01, -03, -04, -05 (2) NRC Information Notices:
2004-01, -05, -07, -08, -09, -10, -11, -12, -16, -19, -21 2005-01, -02, -03, -04, -06, -08, -09, -11, -14, -16, -19, -20, -21, -23, -24, -25,
-26, -29, -30, -31, -32 2006-02, -03, -04, -05, -08 (3) All LERs issued by Diablo Canyon during the period (4) NCVs and Violations issued to Diablo Canyon during the period (including licensee identified violations)
(17) Safeguards event logs for the period (18) Radiation protection event logs (19) Current system health reports or similar information (20) Current predictive performance summary reports or similar information (21) Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period (22) List of risk significant components and systems (23) List of actions done and/or in the Human Performance Improvement Plan referenced in the last PIR inspection A-7 Attachment
Information Request 2 May 18, 2006 Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection (IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)
Please provide the following Action Requests to Rick Deese by May 30, 2006:
A0528027 A0562776 A0573563 A0577113 A0601877 A0648182 A0540712 A0562778 A0573913 A0577117 A0620471 A0658028 A0557259 A0562785 A0573920 A0578216 A0620857 A0658496 A0560825 A0562791 A0573922 A0578228 A0629704 A0659407 A0562763 A0562793 A0573923 A0578447 A0631420 A0660739 A0562767 A0562794 A0574552 A0580008 A0633646 A0663705 A0562773 A0569355 A0576825 A0584097 A0634065 A0562775 A0569841 A0576844 A0589785 A0637904 A-8 Attachment