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| {{#Wiki_filter:DesignSxalysisReactorTria&~stemreliabilityRochesterGasandElectricCorporation89EastAvenueRochester,NewYork14649Em3698PHV0October18,198585112b0271851119PDR*DOCK05000244PPDR | | {{#Wiki_filter:Design Sxalysis Reactor Tria &~stem reliability Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Em 3698 PHV 0 October 18, 1985 85112b0271 851119 PDR *DOCK 05000244 P PDR |
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1.01.2~PuruseTheprimaryobjectiveofthisanalysisistoestablishanestimatedfailureratefor,theReactorTrip(RT)breakers.TheanalysiswillbebasedonhistoricaldatatakenatGinnaStationovera16yearperiod.Anassessmentwillalsobemadeoftheimpactof12additionalRTbreakertestsonthederivedmaximumfailurerate.Thevalidityofthean'alysisisbasedonspecificmaintenanceactivitiesbeingperformedandthetestingprogrambeingsufficientlycomprehensive.Therefore,themaintenanceandtestactivitiesaredescribedalongwiththeanalysis.jTheprimarypurpose,of,Generic'etter83-28wastoachieveahighreactoi"trip'systemreliabilityby,requiringtheadditionofadiversetrippi.ngfeature(STA)oneachbreaker,theinclusionofindependenttestingofeachfeature,"responsetimetesting,andtrendingofboth"m'echanical'andelectricalparameters.Thetrendingactivitiesresultedinadditionalelectricalandmechanicaltriptests.Theparametersselectedfortrendingareconsideredtobegoodindicatorsofanimpendingfailure.Ifunchanged,thesetrendswillgivefurtherassurancethattheRTbreakerswillbeavailable,whenrequired.Trending,discussedinSection5,providesameansofdetectingincipientfailures.Italsomonitorstheeffectivenessofthetestandmaintenanceprograms.GenericLetter83-28proposesthatadditionalmonthlyon-linetestingbeperformed.Thistestingwilladd12moreelectricaltestsperyearperbreaker.Section4ofthisanalysisestablishesabasisfortheprobabilityofasinglebreakerfailure.Theresultswillshowthatadditionaltestingwillproducenosignificantchangein'heconfidencelevelsassociatedwiththehistoricaldatafailureprobability.2.0RTTestinProram2.1TheRTbreakertripdata,takenoverasixteenyearperiod,consistsoftheverificationofatripondemandbyeachofthetworeactortripbreakersandtheverificationofeachRPSlogicfunctionduringchanneltesting.TheRTbreakertestsareperformedeachrefuelingoutageandusetheoutputoftheRP'Ssystemlogic(RTrelays)totripthebreakers.ThelogicorchanneltestsareperformedmonthlyandconsistofbothsetpointandlogicverificationuptobutnotincludingtheRTrelays.ThetestintervalassociatedwitheachtypetesthasbeeninexistanceDESIGNANALYSISEWRNO.3698PAGE1OF4REV.DATE10/18/85 2.2duringthe16yearperiod.The"asfound"functionaltestdatatakenduringthe1985outagewasfoundtoberepeatablewiththetestresultsoftheprioryearwhichindicatesnosignificantchangesinbreakeroperability.Specifically,theRTbreaker"asfound"responsetimeswerefoundtoberepeatablewiththepostmaintenanceresponsetimesrecordedtheprioryearinthemaintenanceandtestsoftheRTbreakerspriortotheissuance'fgenericletter83-28.AfailureratefortheRTbreakerscanbedeterminedusinghistoricaldata.Thetworeactortripbreakersandthebypassbreaker.havebeentriptestedeachrefuelingoutagesince1969.PriortotheissuanceofGenericLetter83-28,eachof'the,reactor',tripbreakerswere;trippedaminimumof23,timese'achyear.'welveof'thesetripswereelectricaltrips.The24'triptestsonthetwoRTbreakersovera16yearperiodplustheadditional46testsperformedduringthe1985refuelingoutagetotals430test's.;,Nofailures,,werefoundoverthe16yearperi'od.This'atawi:llbeusedinSection4.2.3Whileon-line,thereactortriplogicsystemistestedmonthly.Specifically,theindividualrelaysassociatedwithananalogsignaloneachprotectionchannelaretestedtoverifytheirsetpoints.Thetestsareperformedoneachofthefourchannelsandconsistofinputtingtestsignalsandverifyingthesetpointsandoutputrelaylogic.ThistestverifiestheRPSystemuptothereactortriprelays.TheRTrelaysandbreakersaretestedconcurrentlyeachrefuelingoutage.3.0Maintenance3.1AcomprehensiveRTbreakermaintenanceprogramhasbeenfollowedsince1969.Asaresult,thetwoDB50breakersperformasthoughtheywerenewattheendofeachrefuelingoutage.3.2ThemaintenanceprogramassociatedwiththetwoRTbreakersandthebypassbreakerhasbeenenhancedfollowingtheissuanceofGenericletter83-28.Mechanicalandelectricalparametersarenowbeingmeasuredandtrendedtoforecastanydegradationinoperability.Fourparametershavebeenselected,consistentwith4.2.2ofGenericLetter83-28,fortrending.Theyare;(1)undervoltagetripattachmentDESIGNANALYSISEWRNO.3698PAGE2OF4REV.0DATE10/18/85 CLtf,lg1 dropoutvoltage,(2)tripperbartripforce,(3)breakerresponsetimeforboththeUVTAandtheSTAand(4)breakerinsulationresistance.TheparametersaredeterminedwiththeRTbreakersintheasfoundconditionpriortomaintenance.Followingthe,maintenancethebreakersareagaintestedpriortogoingintoservice.4.0FailureRateEstimate4.14.2Atotalof430electricallyactuatedautomaticRTbreakertripshavebeenrecordedwithoutasinglefailure.Anestimateofthemaximumfailurerateataconfidencelevelof99.5%servesasabenchmarktoassesstheimpactofthe12additionalyearlytestsrequestedbytheNRCStaff.Fromactualtestdata,themaximumfailurerateis0.0122at99.5%confidence.EachRTbreakerhasbeentestedusingonlyoneofthetripattachmentswhicharenowredundantoneachbreaker.Seriestripbreakersrequirethatfourindependentfailuresoccurbeforeth'e'RTbreakerfunctus.'onwillnotbesuccessful'lycompletedupondemand.If12additional'estshadbeenperformedeachyear(withoutafailure)thefailureratewouldhavebeen0.0069.Thissmalldecreaseinfailure.ratedoesnotsignicantlychangetheprobabilityoftheseriesbreake'rstosuccessfullyperformthetripfunctionanddoesnotjustifythepotentiallyincreasedriskassociatedwithonlinetestingoftheRTbreakers.5.0TrendinLimitsandResults5.1TheRTbreakersresponsetimeshavebeenmeasuredoverseveralyears,however,thedatahasonlybeenrecordedsincethe1985refuelingoutage.ThedataforeachbreakerhasbeenconsistentandshowsthattheelapsedtimefromtheSTAbeingenergizeduntiltheRTbreakerisphysicallyopenrangesfrom57-60milliseconds.Thiscorrespondstoapproximately3.5cycles.ThedatafortheUVTAundersimilarconditionrangesfrom79-85miliseconds.Thiscorrespondstoapproximately5cycles.TheDB50breakerisnormallya4cyclebreakerwhentrippedbyitsshuntcoil.TheresponsetimesindicatethattheasfoundconditionoftheRTbreakersaresimilartowhatwouldbeexpectedofnewbreakers.Theasfoundresponsetimesmaybeusedtodemonstratethatthebreakershavebeenoperationalbetweenrefuelingoutages.Thisconditioncouldonlyberepeatedprovidedthatthemaintenanceissufficientlycomprehensiveandthatthetestfrequencyisnotexcessive.DESIGNANALYSISEWRNO.3698PAGE3OF4REV.DATE10/18/85 E'~v1r,~ | | 1.0 ~Pur use The primary objective of this analysis is to establish an estimated failure rate for, the Reactor Trip (RT) breakers. The analysis will be based on historical data taken at Ginna Station over a 16 year period. |
| 5.2TheresponsetimeassumedintheGinnaStationaccidentanalysesis10cycles.Asignificantmarginexistsbetweenthemeasuredandtherequiredvalues;Therefore,basedonthetestdata(overatwoyearperiod)thetestandmaintenanceintervalshavebeenadequate.However,shouldthe"as-found"responsetimeofeithertheUVTAortheSTAexceed8cycles,on-linetestingandmaintenancewillbeperformedconsistentwiththeWestinghouseOwner'sGrouprecommendations.6.0ResultsandConclusion6.1A16yearaccumulationofhistoricaltestdata'hasindicatedthattheRTbreakersandthebypassbreakerhaveperformedasahighlyreliablecomponentinthereactorprotectionsystem.Inaddition,theperformanceofadditionalon-linetestingwillnotsignificantlydecreasetheprobabilityofRTbreakerfailureupondemandandmaycontributetofailuremodescausedbyexcessivebreakeroperatingcycles.6.2ThemaintenanceandtestingprogramassociatedwiththeRTandbypassbreakers,whichincludesmeasuringandtrendingmechanicalandelectricalparametersandindependenttestingoftheUVTAandSTAcomponents,willprovidebetterassurancethattheprobabilityoffailureupondemandwillbeminimized.Shoulddriftinginthetrendedparametersbenotedthatindicatesanyformofdegradationthenincreasedmonitoringbymonthlyon-linetesting,willbeperformed.6.3InlieuofchangingtheRTbreakertestintervalstothosesuggestedbyGenericletter85-09,thisanalysissupportscontinuedon-linechanneltestsonamonthlybasisandbreakertestingonarefuelingoutagebasis.'IDESIGNANALYSISEWRNO.3698PAGE4,OF4NREV.0DATE10/18/851 | | An assessment will also be made of the impact of 12 additional RT breaker tests on the derived maximum failure rate. The validity of the an'alysis is based on specific maintenance activities being performed and the testing program being sufficiently comprehensive. |
| ~.gli,,Cg~,~~~.~a.e,IPIC}} | | Therefore, the maintenance and test activities are described along with the analysis. |
| | j 1.2 The primary purpose, of, Generic'etter 83-28 was to achieve a high reactoi"trip'system reliability by, requiring the addition of a diverse trippi.ng feature (STA) on each breaker, the inclusion of independent testing of each feature," response time testing, and trending of both "m'echanical 'and electrical parameters. |
| | The trending activities resulted in additional electrical and mechanical trip tests. The parameters selected for trending are considered to be good indicators of an impending failure. If unchanged, these trends will give further assurance that the RT breakers will be available, when required. Trending, discussed in Section 5, provides a means of detecting incipient failures. It also monitors the effectiveness of the test and maintenance programs. |
| | Generic Letter 83-28 proposes that additional monthly on-line testing be performed. This testing will add 12 more electrical tests per year per breaker. |
| | Section 4 of this analysis establishes a basis for the probability of a single breaker failure. The results will show that additional testing will produce no significant change in'he confidence levels associated with the historical data failure probability. |
| | 2.0 RT Testin Pro ram 2.1 The RT breaker trip data, taken over a sixteen year period, consists of the verification of a trip on demand by each of the two reactor trip breakers and the verification of each RPS logic function during channel testing. The RT breaker tests are performed each refueling outage and use the output of the RP'S system logic (RT relays) to trip the breakers. The logic or channel tests are performed monthly and consist of both setpoint and logic verification up to but not including the RT relays. The test interval associated with each type test has been in existance DESIGN ANALYSIS REV. |
| | PAGE 1 OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 DATE 10/18/85 |
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| | during the 16 year period. The "as found" functional test data taken during the 1985 outage was found to be repeatable with the test results of the prior year which indicates no significant changes in breaker operability. Specifically, the RT breaker "as found" response times were found to be repeatable with the post maintenance response times recorded the prior year in the maintenance and tests of the RT breakers prior to the issuance'f generic letter 83-28. A failure rate for the RT breakers can be determined using historical data. |
| | 2.2 The two reactor trip breakers and the bypass breaker. |
| | have been trip tested each refueling outage since 1969. Prior to the issuance of Generic Letter 83-28, each of 'the, reactor',trip breakers were;tripped a minimum of 23,times e'ach year.'welve of 'these trips were electrical trips. The 24'trip tests on the two RT breakers over a 16 year period plus the additional 46 tests performed during the 1985 refueling outage totals 430 test's.;,No failures,,were found over the 16 year peri'od. This'ata wi:ll be used in Section 4. |
| | 2.3 While on-line, the reactor trip logic system is tested monthly. Specifically, the individual relays associated with an analog signal on each protection channel are tested to verify their setpoints. The tests are performed on each of the four channels and consist of inputting test signals and verifying the setpoints and output relay logic. This test verifies the RP System up to the reactor trip relays. The RT relays and breakers are tested concurrently each refueling outage. |
| | 3.0 Maintenance 3.1 A comprehensive RT breaker maintenance program has been followed since 1969. As a result, the two DB50 breakers perform as though they were new at the end of each refueling outage. |
| | 3.2 The maintenance program associated with the two RT breakers and the bypass breaker has been enhanced following the issuance of Generic letter 83-28. |
| | Mechanical and electrical parameters are now being measured and trended to forecast any degradation in operability. Four parameters have been selected, consistent with 4.2.2 of Generic Letter 83-28, for trending. They are; (1) undervoltage trip attachment DESIGN ANALYSIS REV. 0 PAGE 2 OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 DATE 10/18/85 |
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| | dropout voltage, (2) tripper bar trip force, (3) breaker response time for both the UVTA and the STA and (4) breaker insulation resistance. The parameters are determined with the RT breakers in the as found condition prior to maintenance. Following the, maintenance the breakers are again tested prior to going into service. |
| | 4.0 Failure Rate Estimate 4.1 A total of 430 electrically actuated automatic RT breaker trips have been recorded without a single failure. An estimate of the maximum failure rate at a confidence level of 99.5% serves as a benchmark to assess the impact of the 12 additional yearly tests requested by the NRC Staff. |
| | 4.2 From actual test data, the maximum failure rate is 0.0122 at 99.5% confidence. Each RT breaker has been tested using only one of the trip attachments which are now redundant on each breaker. Series trip breakers require that four independent failures occur before th'e'RT breaker functus.'on will not be successful'ly completed upon demand. If 12 had been performed each year (without a failure) additional'ests the failure rate would have been 0.0069. This small decrease in failure. rate does not signicantly change the probability of the series breake'rs to successfully perform the trip function and does not justify the potentially increased risk associated with on line testing of the RT breakers. |
| | 5.0 Trendin Limits and Results 5.1 The RT breakers response times have been measured over several years, however, the data has only been recorded since the 1985 refueling outage. The data for each breaker has been consistent and shows that the elapsed time from the STA being energized until the RT breaker is physically open ranges from 57-60 milliseconds. This corresponds to approximately 3.5 cycles. The data for the UVTA under similar condition ranges from 79-85 miliseconds. This corresponds to approximately 5 cycles. The DB50 breaker is normally a 4 cycle breaker when tripped by its shunt coil. |
| | The response times indicate that the as found condition of the RT breakers are similar to what would be expected of new breakers. The as found response times may be used to demonstrate that the breakers have been operational between refueling outages. |
| | This condition could only be repeated provided that the maintenance is sufficiently comprehensive and that the test frequency is not excessive. |
| | DESIGN ANALYSIS REV. |
| | PAGE 3 OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 DATE 10/18/85 |
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| | 5.2 The response time assumed in the Ginna Station accident analyses is 10 cycles. A significant margin exists between the measured and the required values; Therefore, based on the test data (over a two year period) the test and maintenance intervals have been adequate. However, should the "as-found" response time of either the UVTA or the STA exceed 8 cycles, on-line testing and maintenance will be performed consistent with the Westinghouse Owner's Group recommendations. |
| | 6.0 Results and Conclusion 6.1 A 16 year accumulation of historical test data'has indicated that the RT breakers and the bypass breaker have performed as a highly reliable component in the reactor protection system. In addition, the performance of additional on-line testing will not significantly decrease the probability of RT breaker failure upon demand and may contribute to failure modes caused by excessive breaker operating cycles. |
| | 6.2 The maintenance and testing program associated with the RT and bypass breakers, which includes measuring and trending mechanical and electrical parameters and independent testing of the UVTA and STA components, will provide better assurance that the probability of failure upon demand will be minimized. Should drifting in the trended parameters be noted that indicates any form of degradation then increased monitoring by monthly on-line testing, will be performed. |
| | 6.3 In lieu of changing the RT breaker test intervals to those suggested by Generic letter 85-09, this analysis supports continued on-line channel tests on a monthly basis and breaker testing on a refueling outage basis. |
| | 'I DESIGN ANALYSIS REV. 0 PAGE 4, OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 N DATE 10/18/85 1 |
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Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
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Text
Design Sxalysis Reactor Tria &~stem reliability Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Em 3698 PHV 0 October 18, 1985 85112b0271 851119 PDR *DOCK 05000244 P PDR
1.0 ~Pur use The primary objective of this analysis is to establish an estimated failure rate for, the Reactor Trip (RT) breakers. The analysis will be based on historical data taken at Ginna Station over a 16 year period.
An assessment will also be made of the impact of 12 additional RT breaker tests on the derived maximum failure rate. The validity of the an'alysis is based on specific maintenance activities being performed and the testing program being sufficiently comprehensive.
Therefore, the maintenance and test activities are described along with the analysis.
j 1.2 The primary purpose, of, Generic'etter 83-28 was to achieve a high reactoi"trip'system reliability by, requiring the addition of a diverse trippi.ng feature (STA) on each breaker, the inclusion of independent testing of each feature," response time testing, and trending of both "m'echanical 'and electrical parameters.
The trending activities resulted in additional electrical and mechanical trip tests. The parameters selected for trending are considered to be good indicators of an impending failure. If unchanged, these trends will give further assurance that the RT breakers will be available, when required. Trending, discussed in Section 5, provides a means of detecting incipient failures. It also monitors the effectiveness of the test and maintenance programs.
Generic Letter 83-28 proposes that additional monthly on-line testing be performed. This testing will add 12 more electrical tests per year per breaker.
Section 4 of this analysis establishes a basis for the probability of a single breaker failure. The results will show that additional testing will produce no significant change in'he confidence levels associated with the historical data failure probability.
2.0 RT Testin Pro ram 2.1 The RT breaker trip data, taken over a sixteen year period, consists of the verification of a trip on demand by each of the two reactor trip breakers and the verification of each RPS logic function during channel testing. The RT breaker tests are performed each refueling outage and use the output of the RP'S system logic (RT relays) to trip the breakers. The logic or channel tests are performed monthly and consist of both setpoint and logic verification up to but not including the RT relays. The test interval associated with each type test has been in existance DESIGN ANALYSIS REV.
PAGE 1 OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 DATE 10/18/85
during the 16 year period. The "as found" functional test data taken during the 1985 outage was found to be repeatable with the test results of the prior year which indicates no significant changes in breaker operability. Specifically, the RT breaker "as found" response times were found to be repeatable with the post maintenance response times recorded the prior year in the maintenance and tests of the RT breakers prior to the issuance'f generic letter 83-28. A failure rate for the RT breakers can be determined using historical data.
2.2 The two reactor trip breakers and the bypass breaker.
have been trip tested each refueling outage since 1969. Prior to the issuance of Generic Letter 83-28, each of 'the, reactor',trip breakers were;tripped a minimum of 23,times e'ach year.'welve of 'these trips were electrical trips. The 24'trip tests on the two RT breakers over a 16 year period plus the additional 46 tests performed during the 1985 refueling outage totals 430 test's.;,No failures,,were found over the 16 year peri'od. This'ata wi:ll be used in Section 4.
2.3 While on-line, the reactor trip logic system is tested monthly. Specifically, the individual relays associated with an analog signal on each protection channel are tested to verify their setpoints. The tests are performed on each of the four channels and consist of inputting test signals and verifying the setpoints and output relay logic. This test verifies the RP System up to the reactor trip relays. The RT relays and breakers are tested concurrently each refueling outage.
3.0 Maintenance 3.1 A comprehensive RT breaker maintenance program has been followed since 1969. As a result, the two DB50 breakers perform as though they were new at the end of each refueling outage.
3.2 The maintenance program associated with the two RT breakers and the bypass breaker has been enhanced following the issuance of Generic letter 83-28.
Mechanical and electrical parameters are now being measured and trended to forecast any degradation in operability. Four parameters have been selected, consistent with 4.2.2 of Generic Letter 83-28, for trending. They are; (1) undervoltage trip attachment DESIGN ANALYSIS REV. 0 PAGE 2 OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 DATE 10/18/85
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dropout voltage, (2) tripper bar trip force, (3) breaker response time for both the UVTA and the STA and (4) breaker insulation resistance. The parameters are determined with the RT breakers in the as found condition prior to maintenance. Following the, maintenance the breakers are again tested prior to going into service.
4.0 Failure Rate Estimate 4.1 A total of 430 electrically actuated automatic RT breaker trips have been recorded without a single failure. An estimate of the maximum failure rate at a confidence level of 99.5% serves as a benchmark to assess the impact of the 12 additional yearly tests requested by the NRC Staff.
4.2 From actual test data, the maximum failure rate is 0.0122 at 99.5% confidence. Each RT breaker has been tested using only one of the trip attachments which are now redundant on each breaker. Series trip breakers require that four independent failures occur before th'e'RT breaker functus.'on will not be successful'ly completed upon demand. If 12 had been performed each year (without a failure) additional'ests the failure rate would have been 0.0069. This small decrease in failure. rate does not signicantly change the probability of the series breake'rs to successfully perform the trip function and does not justify the potentially increased risk associated with on line testing of the RT breakers.
5.0 Trendin Limits and Results 5.1 The RT breakers response times have been measured over several years, however, the data has only been recorded since the 1985 refueling outage. The data for each breaker has been consistent and shows that the elapsed time from the STA being energized until the RT breaker is physically open ranges from 57-60 milliseconds. This corresponds to approximately 3.5 cycles. The data for the UVTA under similar condition ranges from 79-85 miliseconds. This corresponds to approximately 5 cycles. The DB50 breaker is normally a 4 cycle breaker when tripped by its shunt coil.
The response times indicate that the as found condition of the RT breakers are similar to what would be expected of new breakers. The as found response times may be used to demonstrate that the breakers have been operational between refueling outages.
This condition could only be repeated provided that the maintenance is sufficiently comprehensive and that the test frequency is not excessive.
DESIGN ANALYSIS REV.
PAGE 3 OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 DATE 10/18/85
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5.2 The response time assumed in the Ginna Station accident analyses is 10 cycles. A significant margin exists between the measured and the required values; Therefore, based on the test data (over a two year period) the test and maintenance intervals have been adequate. However, should the "as-found" response time of either the UVTA or the STA exceed 8 cycles, on-line testing and maintenance will be performed consistent with the Westinghouse Owner's Group recommendations.
6.0 Results and Conclusion 6.1 A 16 year accumulation of historical test data'has indicated that the RT breakers and the bypass breaker have performed as a highly reliable component in the reactor protection system. In addition, the performance of additional on-line testing will not significantly decrease the probability of RT breaker failure upon demand and may contribute to failure modes caused by excessive breaker operating cycles.
6.2 The maintenance and testing program associated with the RT and bypass breakers, which includes measuring and trending mechanical and electrical parameters and independent testing of the UVTA and STA components, will provide better assurance that the probability of failure upon demand will be minimized. Should drifting in the trended parameters be noted that indicates any form of degradation then increased monitoring by monthly on-line testing, will be performed.
6.3 In lieu of changing the RT breaker test intervals to those suggested by Generic letter 85-09, this analysis supports continued on-line channel tests on a monthly basis and breaker testing on a refueling outage basis.
'I DESIGN ANALYSIS REV. 0 PAGE 4, OF 4 EWR NO. 3698 N DATE 10/18/85 1
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