ML20140C250

Enforcement Conference Rept 50-271/85-21 on 850904.Major Items discussed:850808 Unplanned whole-body Exposure of Technician & Licensee Corrective Actions.Technician Relieved of Health Physics Duties Until Status Reassessed

ML20140C250
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	01/16/1986
From:	Bellamy R, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140C247	List: ML20140C243 ML20140C250
References
50-271-85-21-EC, NUDOCS 8601270282
Download: ML20140C250 (5)

See also: IR 05000271/1985021

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. M85-397

Docket No. 50-271

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License No. DPR-28 Priority --

Category C

Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

1671 Worcester Road

Framingham, Massachusetts 01701

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Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

Meeting At: 'NRC Region I, King of Prussia, PA

Meeting Conducted: September 4, 1985

Prepared by: b. -( w H #

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W. J.(/Pasciak, Chief, Ef fluents Radiation _

Protection Section

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Approved by: b0h k.h

R. R. Bellamy, Chief, Emengstrcy Preparedness

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and Radiological Protection Branch y

Meeting Summary: Enforcement Conference at NRC Region I, King of Prussia,

Pennsylvania, on September 4, 1985 to discuss the findings of Special Inspec-

tion 50-271/85-21. The topics discussed during the meeting ~were,. an unplanned

whole-body exposure of a technician on August 8,1985 and license corrective

actions.

The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted about

1-1/2 hours.

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8601270282 860116

PDR ADOCK 05000271-

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DETAILS

1. Principle Participants

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

W. Murphy, VP & Manager of Operations, VYAPC

J. Pelletier, Plant Manager, VYAPC

B. Leach, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor, VYAPC

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator

R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor

Projects (DRP)

W. J. Raymond, SRI, DRP

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R. R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness

and Radiological Protection Branch, DRSS

3 W. J. Pasciak, Chief, ERPS

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EP&RPB, DRSS

H. Bicehouse, Radiation Specialist, ERPS, EP&RPB, DRSS

, 2. Purpose

The Enforcement Conference was held at the request of NRC Region I to dis-

cuss the August 8, 1985, unplanned whole-body exposure that a

Chemistry-Health Physics Technician received as a result of entry into the

TIP Room. The discussions-at the meeting focused on the circumstances

surrounding the entry, the training and experience of the individual who

received the unplanned exposure, and licensee corrective actions.

l 3. Discussion

NRC Management stated that this enforcement conference was requested to

discuss the findings of the special radiation protection inspection con-

ducted on August 9, 1985, (Report No. 50-271/85-21). The licensee was

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asked to provide his perception of the findings presented in Report No.

50-271/85-21; provide additional-qualifying information; and provide the

status of his corrective actions.

4. Licensee Presentation

! Licensee management emphasized its commitment to thoroughly understand the

causes that resulted in this unplanned exposure. Licensee management in-

dicated that the circumstances described in Inspection Report 50-271/85-21

were accurate. Licensee management elaborated on the events described in

Inspection Report No. 50-271/85-21.

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On August 8, 1985, at approximately 6:05 p.m., a request was made by the

Senior I&C Engineer of the on-shift Chemistry & HP Technician that a

radiological survey of the TIP room was needed. The survey was initially

requested to determine whether dose rates were low enough to allow access

to the room for repair work. (Licensee management indicated at the meet-

ing that it was still not clear what was the purpose of the entry.) At

approximately 6:10 p.m. the technician met the Assistant I&C Foreman at

the checkpoint. The technician stated that the Assistant I&C Foreman

requested an RWP and that the TIP room would be entered that night.

In an attempt to determine the proper procedure to follow to enter the

room, the technician tried to call several Chemistry & HP Assistants but

was unable to contact them. The technician called the Chemistry & HP

Supervisor at home and was told that exposure rates could be as high as

1000 R/hr and to go and. enter the room and perform the survey. The tech-

nician was not given specific precautionary instructions indicating at

what dose levels the survey should be terminated. On the way to the TIP

room the technician met a Chemistry & HP Assistant who told him that he

once observed exposure rates as high as 450 R/hr in the TIP room. The

Chemistry & HP Assistant did not provide clear instructions to the tech-

nician regarding specific numerical dose levels at which the survey should

be terminated.

The TIP room was entered by the technician while an auxiliary operator

stood by the door entry way. The technician estimated that the entire

time period he was in the TIP room was about 2 minutes. The dose on the

technician's TLD (1.3 rem) is consistent with this and the description

of his activities while in the TP room. Licensee management provided

, extensive details of activities of the technician while in the TIP room.

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Upon leaving the TIP room area the technician's self-reading dosimeter

(500 mred full-scale) was offscale and the Auxiliary Operator's self-

reading Casimeter read 270 mrad. Processing of the technician's TLD

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indicated a whole-body dose of 1.3 rem. The technician's whole-body

, dose is likely not to be significantly different from his extremity

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dose because the highest sources were a considerable distance away from

where he was standing during all of his activity in the area.

The Chemistry & HP Technician had approximately 7 months job experience

at the facility as an HP technician and prior to this he had no in plant

HP experience. Before beginning his activities as a Chemistry & HP

Technician he spent several months full-time in the VY training program.

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Licensee management described the immediate corrective actions implemented

as a result of the unplanned exposure. Those actions were also presented

to the inspector on August 9, 1985, and included:

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Requested the Nuclear Service Department to perform a detailed study

of doses received by the technician and the Auxiliary Operator who

entered the TIP room.

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A whole-body count to be made of the two individuals.

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Read the TLD of the Auxiliary Operator who entered the TIP roo.n.

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Relieve the technician of HP duties until the status of his readiness

to perform HP duties is formally reassessed.

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Determine if the enclosed space entry r.svisions apply to the TIP

room. If they do, properly post the room. If they don't, remove the

stenciling which suggests that they apply. This shall be done prior

to any further TIP room entries.

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The following administrative controls regarding TIP room entry were

immediately applied:

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An RWP shall be required for all TIP room entries.

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The RWP shall be signed by the Chemistry and Health Physics Su-

i pervisor, the Shift Supervisor and all Department Heads who have

4 personnel involved in work under the RWP. The Chem. & HP

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Supervisor shall assure that the RWP specifies in detail the

nature of the activities to be performed, the expected dose rates

and the action to be taken if specified higher dose rates are

encountered. The Shift Supervisor's signature will indicate his

approval to do the specified work, will indicate that he has

verified that the TIPS have not been used in the core in the

last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and will indicate that the TIP machines have been

White tagged to disable any movement of the TIPS. The other

department heads signatures shall indicate that they have assured

themselves that their personnel working under the RWP are keenly

aware of the potential dose rates that can be encountered in the

room, that they understand the limitations to the work they can

perform under the RWP and that they understand the. actions to be

taken if the specified higher dose rates occur.

• Any TIP Room access will include a " rescue man" available at the

doorway to assist in an emergency.

The key to the TIP Room will be kept by the Chem. & HP Supervi-

sor and not released for use until he is satisfied all the above

conditions are met.

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A reoort will be generated to thoroughly document and analyze this

event and to provide recommended long term corrective actions. This

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report should also consider the corrective actions mentioned above

i and make recommendations regarding them a; may be appropriate.

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Tne licensee stated that long term TIP Room entry procedures were being

j dispositioned.

5. Concluding Statements

Licensee management concluded by stating their belief that adequate cor-

i rections had been made or would be made to address the safety issues

identified.

NRC management acknowledged that interim plans and actions were adequate.

, NRC Region I management stated that the licensee would be informed of the

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need for and nature of appropriate enforcement action relative to the ap-

parent violations at a later time.

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