ML20140C250
| ML20140C250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1986 |
| From: | Ronald Bellamy, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140C247 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-85-21-EC, NUDOCS 8601270282 | |
| Download: ML20140C250 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1985021
Text
.-
.-
-
=-
.
e
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. M85-397
Docket No.
50-271
License No. DPR-28
Priority
--
Category
C
2
Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
1671 Worcester Road
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
4
!
Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
Meeting At:
'NRC Region I, King of Prussia, PA
Meeting Conducted: September 4, 1985
Prepared by: b.
H
l 18 b
-( w
W. J.(/Pasciak, Chief, Ef fluents Radiation _
kmdate'
Protection Section
Approved by: b0h k.h
h i b ,19 P 6
R. R. Bellamy, Chief, Emengstrcy Preparedness
\\1
datet
and Radiological Protection Branch
y
Meeting Summary:
Enforcement Conference at NRC Region I, King of Prussia,
Pennsylvania, on September 4, 1985 to discuss the findings of Special Inspec-
tion 50-271/85-21. The topics discussed during the meeting ~were,. an unplanned
whole-body exposure of a technician on August 8,1985 and license corrective
actions.
The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted about
1-1/2 hours.
8601270282 860116
.
ADOCK 05000271-
G
-
--
.
.
.
-.
. - .
,
_
.
'
. .
2
DETAILS
1.
Principle Participants
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
W. Murphy, VP & Manager of Operations, VYAPC
J. Pelletier, Plant Manager, VYAPC
B. Leach, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor, VYAPC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
i
T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator
R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor
Projects (DRP)
R. R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness
'
and Radiological Protection Branch, DRSS
W. J. Pasciak, Chief, ERPS
3
l
EP&RPB, DRSS
H. Bicehouse, Radiation Specialist, ERPS, EP&RPB, DRSS
2.
Purpose
,
The Enforcement Conference was held at the request of NRC Region I to dis-
cuss the August 8, 1985, unplanned whole-body exposure that a
Chemistry-Health Physics Technician received as a result of entry into the
TIP Room.
The discussions-at the meeting focused on the circumstances
surrounding the entry, the training and experience of the individual who
received the unplanned exposure, and licensee corrective actions.
l
3.
Discussion
NRC Management stated that this enforcement conference was requested to
discuss the findings of the special radiation protection inspection con-
ducted on August 9, 1985, (Report No. 50-271/85-21).
The licensee was
_
asked to provide his perception of the findings presented in Report No.
50-271/85-21; provide additional-qualifying information; and provide the
status of his corrective actions.
4.
Licensee Presentation
!
Licensee management emphasized its commitment to thoroughly understand the
causes that resulted in this unplanned exposure.
Licensee management in-
dicated that the circumstances described in Inspection Report 50-271/85-21
were accurate.
Licensee management elaborated on the events described in
Inspection Report No. 50-271/85-21.
!
l
I
-.
-
-
_
.
_
_
.
. .
3
On August 8, 1985, at approximately 6:05 p.m., a request was made by the
Senior I&C Engineer of the on-shift Chemistry & HP Technician that a
radiological survey of the TIP room was needed. The survey was initially
requested to determine whether dose rates were low enough to allow access
to the room for repair work.
(Licensee management indicated at the meet-
ing that it was still not clear what was the purpose of the entry.) At
approximately 6:10 p.m. the technician met the Assistant I&C Foreman at
the checkpoint. The technician stated that the Assistant I&C Foreman
requested an RWP and that the TIP room would be entered that night.
In an attempt to determine the proper procedure to follow to enter the
room, the technician tried to call several Chemistry & HP Assistants but
was unable to contact them. The technician called the Chemistry & HP
Supervisor at home and was told that exposure rates could be as high as
1000 R/hr and to go and. enter the room and perform the survey. The tech-
nician was not given specific precautionary instructions indicating at
what dose levels the survey should be terminated. On the way to the TIP
room the technician met a Chemistry & HP Assistant who told him that he
once observed exposure rates as high as 450 R/hr in the TIP room.
The
Chemistry & HP Assistant did not provide clear instructions to the tech-
nician regarding specific numerical dose levels at which the survey should
be terminated.
The TIP room was entered by the technician while an auxiliary operator
stood by the door entry way. The technician estimated that the entire
time period he was in the TIP room was about 2 minutes.
The dose on the
technician's TLD (1.3 rem) is consistent with this and the description
of his activities while in the TP room.
Licensee management provided
extensive details of activities of the technician while in the TIP room.
,
I
Upon leaving the TIP room area the technician's self-reading dosimeter
(500 mred full-scale) was offscale and the Auxiliary Operator's self-
reading Casimeter read 270 mrad.
Processing of the technician's TLD
indicated a whole-body dose of 1.3 rem. The technician's whole-body
'
dose is likely not to be significantly different from his extremity
,
l
dose because the highest sources were a considerable distance away from
where he was standing during all of his activity in the area.
The Chemistry & HP Technician had approximately 7 months job experience
at the facility as an HP technician and prior to this he had no in plant
HP experience. Before beginning his activities as a Chemistry & HP
Technician he spent several months full-time in the VY training program.
-
.
'
b
'
. _ _ .
.
__
_
_
_.
.
'
. .
.
4
Licensee management described the immediate corrective actions implemented
as a result of the unplanned exposure. Those actions were also presented
to the inspector on August 9, 1985, and included:
Requested the Nuclear Service Department to perform a detailed study
--
of doses received by the technician and the Auxiliary Operator who
entered the TIP room.
A whole-body count to be made of the two individuals.
--
Read the TLD of the Auxiliary Operator who entered the TIP roo.n.
'
--
Relieve the technician of HP duties until the status of his readiness
--
to perform HP duties is formally reassessed.
Determine if the enclosed space entry r.svisions apply to the TIP
--
room.
If they do, properly post the room.
If they don't, remove the
stenciling which suggests that they apply. This shall be done prior
to any further TIP room entries.
i
--
The following administrative controls regarding TIP room entry were
immediately applied:
l
An RWP shall be required for all TIP room entries.
"
The RWP shall be signed by the Chemistry and Health Physics Su-
i
pervisor, the Shift Supervisor and all Department Heads who have
personnel involved in work under the RWP.
The Chem. & HP
4
Supervisor shall assure that the RWP specifies in detail the
i
nature of the activities to be performed, the expected dose rates
and the action to be taken if specified higher dose rates are
encountered. The Shift Supervisor's signature will indicate his
approval to do the specified work, will indicate that he has
verified that the TIPS have not been used in the core in the
last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and will indicate that the TIP machines have been
White tagged to disable any movement of the TIPS. The other
department heads signatures shall indicate that they have assured
themselves that their personnel working under the RWP are keenly
aware of the potential dose rates that can be encountered in the
room, that they understand the limitations to the work they can
perform under the RWP and that they understand the. actions to be
taken if the specified higher dose rates occur.
Any TIP Room access will include a " rescue man" available at the
doorway to assist in an emergency.
The key to the TIP Room will be kept by the Chem. & HP Supervi-
sor and not released for use until he is satisfied all the above
conditions are met.
I
_
.
.
.
. .
. . . _ .
.
-
. . - . _ . ~-
.
-
.
- - -
..
a
.
r
5
l
.
l
A reoort will be generated to thoroughly document and analyze this
--
event and to provide recommended long term corrective actions.
This
report should also consider the corrective actions mentioned above
<
and make recommendations regarding them a; may be appropriate.
i
'
Tne licensee stated that long term TIP Room entry procedures were being
j
dispositioned.
5.
Concluding Statements
Licensee management concluded by stating their belief that adequate cor-
i
rections had been made or would be made to address the safety issues
identified.
NRC management acknowledged that interim plans and actions were adequate.
,
NRC Region I management stated that the licensee would be informed of the
j
need for and nature of appropriate enforcement action relative to the ap-
i
parent violations at a later time.
a
i
1
i
,
I
I
i
i
i
!
!
!
'
~_
~
,
e
,
,
- , , , - < - - , -
-
--
,- ,
,-
- , . -
,a
- -,
--r
--
-
~