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{{#Wiki_filter:<CCELE~D DOCUMENT DIST~UTIPgy S TEM ACCESSIOR NBR:9212180012 DOC.DATE: 92/12/14 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:< CCELE~D DOCUMENT DIST~UTIPgy S TEM ACCESSIOR NBR:9212180012             DOC.DATE:   92/12/14   NOTARIZED:   NO"         DOCKET I
NO" DOCKET I ,'i.FAC1L:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH.NAME , AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M.
,'i . FAC1L:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME ,         AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M.       'rizona       Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power AFFILIATION RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT Document .Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
'rizona Public Service Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document.Control Branch (Document Control Desk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Special rept:on 920810,PASS declared inoperable due to tubing being rerouted.Chemistry Sys Status Procedure 74DP-9ZZ04 revised to direct chemistry personnel to ensure that functional test is performed.W/921214 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL 1 SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:Standardized plant.05000530 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA TRAMMELLgC
Special rept:on 920810,PASS declared inoperable due to tubing being rerouted. Chemistry Sys Status Procedure 74DP-9ZZ04 revised to direct chemistry personnel to ensure that functional test is performed.W/921214             ltr.
" INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D NRR/DST/SPLB8D1
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D           COPIES RECEIVED:LTR       J ENCL   1   SIZE:
,EG~E4 02 RGN5 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EGSG BRYCEgJ.H NRC PDR NSIC POORE,W.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1" 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS PLEASE IIELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESV, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.504-2065)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31  
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:Standardized     plant.                                                       05000530 RECIPIENT             COPIES            RECIPIENT          COPIES ID CODE/NAME            LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME       LTTR ENCL PD5 LA                       1      1    PD5 PD                  1      1 TRAMMELLgC                   1      1 INTERNAL:   ACNW                         2      2    ACRS                    2    . 2 AEOD/DOA                     1      1    AEOD/DSP/TPAB          1      1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP               2      2      NRR/DET/EMEB 7E        1      1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10             1      1      NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10        1      1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB               1      1      NRR/DREP/PRPB11        2      2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D             1      1      NRR/DST/SICB8H3        1      1 NRR/DST/SPLB8D1             1      1      NRR/DST/SRXB 8E        1      1
                  ,EG~E4 02                 1      1"    RES/DSIR/EIB          1      1 RGN5     FILE 01            1      1 EXTERNAL: EGSG BRYCEgJ.H                 2     2     L ST LOBBY WARD        1     1 NRC PDR                      1     1     NSIC MURPHY,G.A       1     1 NSIC POORE,W.               1     1     NUDOCS FULL TXT        1     1 D
D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS                                                           D PLEASE IIELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESV, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR               31   ENCL   31


IIAMES M.LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O.BOX 52034~PHOENIX, ARI2ONA 85072-2034 192-00816-JML/TRB/JJN Oecember 14, 1992 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555  
Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARI2ONA 85072-2034 192-00816-JML/TRB/JJN IIAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT                                                Oecember     14, 1992 NUCLEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555


==Dear Sirs:==
==Dear Sirs:==


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
j Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 3 Docket No.STN 50-530 (License No.NPF-74)Special Report 3-SR-92-004-02
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) j            Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)
.File: 92-020-404 Enclosed please find Supplement 2 to Special Report 3-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS)3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2.This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven days.A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.If you have any questions, please contact Thomas.R.Bradish at (602)393-5421.Sincerely, JML/TRB/J JN/pmm Enclosure cc: J.B.Martin (all w/enclosure)
Special Report 3-SR-92-004-02 .
J.A.Sloan W.F.Conway 9212180012 921214 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S PDR l'
File: 92-020-404 Enclosed please find Supplement 2 to Special Report 3-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven days.     A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.
ENCLOSURE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS f
If you have any questions, please contact Thomas. R. Bradish at (602) 393-5421.
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS LICENSE NO.NPF-74 DOCKET NO.50-530 SPECIAL REPORT 3-SR-92-004-02 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Sincerely, JML/TRB/JJN/pmm Enclosure cc:     J. B. Martin (all w/enclosure)
This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS)3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Po'st Accident Sampling System (PASS)was inoperable for a period greater than seven days.The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1005 MST on August 17, 1992.BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
J. A. Sloan W. F. Conway 9212180012 921214 PDR   ADOCK 05000530 S                   PDR
PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions.
 
The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis.The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.ACTIONS TAKEN: On August 10, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (power operation) when PASS was~declared inoperable at approximately 1000 MST for maintenance.
l '
The maintenance involved rerouting field tubing to permit easier access for future maintenance.
ENCLOSURE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS
Following the completion of work at approximately 1503 MST on August 10, 1992, PASS was declared operable.On September 2, 1992, Chemistry Technicians discovered that the PASS was unable to draw a vacuum on the gaseous sample bomb.Initial troubleshooting determined on September 4, 1992, that the maintenance performed on August 10, 1992, may have caused the PASS to be inoperable.
 
The PASS was reworked and operability was restored on September 5, 1992.1 of2  
f PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS LICENSE NO. NPF-74 DOCKET NO. 50-530 SPECIAL REPORT 3-SR-92-004-02 INITIALCONDITIONS:
This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Po'st Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1005 MST on August 17, 1992.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.
ACTIONS TAKEN:
On August 10, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (power operation) when PASS was       ~
declared inoperable at approximately 1000 MST for maintenance. The maintenance involved rerouting field tubing to permit easier access for future maintenance. Following the completion of work at approximately 1503 MST on August 10, 1992, PASS was declared operable.
On September 2, 1992, Chemistry Technicians discovered that the PASS was unable to draw a vacuum on the gaseous sample bomb. Initial troubleshooting determined on September 4, 1992, that the maintenance performed on August 10, 1992, may have caused the PASS to be inoperable. The PASS was reworked and operability was restored on September 5, 1992.
1 of2


CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:
CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:
I The investigation determined that the tubing was rerouted using additional 1/4 inch tubing and modifying the existing 1/2 inch tubing.The additional 1/4 inch tubing was installed between the same diarrieter tubing that extended from the PASS station and the rerouted 1/2 inch tubing.Due to the additional length and number of turns in the rerouted vent, line, sufficient vacuum could not be established after the modification.
I The investigation determined that the tubing was rerouted using additional 1/4 inch tubing and modifying the existing 1/2 inch tubing. The additional 1/4 inch tubing was installed between the same diarrieter tubing that extended from the PASS station and the rerouted 1/2 inch tubing. Due to the additional length and number of turns in the rerouted vent, line, sufficient vacuum could not be established after the modification.
The planner had intended the line to be rerouted using 1/2 inch tubing and prescribed inventory numbers which corresponded to 1/2 tubing.However, the mechanic rerouted the line using shop stock material and did not have to order any more material.APS is continuing to investigate this issue to determine what actions are appropriate for similar circumstances in the future.This investigation is expected to be completed by December 30, 1992.,The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.This supplement is expected to be submitted by February 1, 1992.ln addition to the work which resulted in the PASS being inoperable, an appropriate retest was not conducted to identify that PASS was inoperable prior to declaring the PASS operable.An lnservice Leak Test was originally specified but later deleted since the tubing was open ended and could not have been readily pressurized.
The planner had intended the line to be rerouted using 1/2 inch tubing and prescribed inventory numbers which corresponded to 1/2 tubing. However, the mechanic rerouted the line using shop stock material and did not have to order any more material. APS is continuing to investigate this issue to determine what actions are appropriate for similar circumstances in the future. This investigation is expected to be completed by December 30, 1992.,The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.
Operations, Chemistry, and the Work Group Supervisor concurred with the decision to delete the retest requirement and determined that no further testing was required.Appendix A of the retest procedure (30DP-9WP04) lists parameters (pressure,.temperature, flow)to be checked for work involving tubing.Flow requirements.
This supplement is expected to be submitted by February 1, 1992.
could have been checked by attempting to draw a vacuum.The Chemistry System Status procedure, 74DP-9ZZ04, was revised to direct Chemistry personnel to ensure that a functional test is performed following maintenance which may affect the sampling capability.
ln addition to the work which resulted in the PASS being inoperable, an appropriate retest was not conducted to identify that PASS was inoperable prior to declaring the PASS operable. An lnservice Leak Test was originally specified but later deleted since the tubing was open ended and could not have been readily pressurized. Operations, Chemistry, and the Work Group Supervisor concurred with the decision to delete the retest requirement and determined that no further testing was required.
PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE: Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 2137 on September 5, 1992.2 of 2 I}}
Appendix A of the retest procedure (30DP-9WP04) lists parameters (pressure, temperature, flow) to be checked for work involving tubing. Flow requirements. could have been checked by attempting to draw a vacuum.
The Chemistry System Status procedure, 74DP-9ZZ04, was revised to direct Chemistry personnel to ensure that a functional test is performed following maintenance which may affect the sampling capability.
PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:
Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 2137 on September 5, 1992.
2 of 2
 
I}}

Latest revision as of 03:45, 4 February 2020

Special Rept:On 920810,PASS Declared Inoperable Due to Tubing Being Rerouted.Chemistry Sys Status Procedure 74DP-9ZZ04 Revised to Direct Chemistry Personnel to Ensure That Functional Test Is performed.W/921214 Ltr
ML17306B184
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 12/14/1992
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00816-JML-T, 192-816-JML-T, NUDOCS 9212180012
Download: ML17306B184 (10)
v • d • e


Text

< CCELE~D DOCUMENT DIST~UTIPgy S TEM ACCESSIOR NBR:9212180012 DOC.DATE: 92/12/14 NOTARIZED: NO" DOCKET I

,'i . FAC1L:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME , AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. 'rizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power AFFILIATION RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT Document .Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special rept:on 920810,PASS declared inoperable due to tubing being rerouted. Chemistry Sys Status Procedure 74DP-9ZZ04 revised to direct chemistry personnel to ensure that functional test is performed.W/921214 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL 1 SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 TRAMMELLgC 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 . 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NRR/DST/SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1

,EG~E4 02 1 1" RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGSG BRYCEgJ.H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS D PLEASE IIELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESV, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARI2ONA 85072-2034 192-00816-JML/TRB/JJN IIAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT Oecember 14, 1992 NUCLEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) j Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)

Special Report 3-SR-92-004-02 .

File: 92-020-404 Enclosed please find Supplement 2 to Special Report 3-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven days. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas. R. Bradish at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely, JML/TRB/JJN/pmm Enclosure cc: J. B. Martin (all w/enclosure)

J. A. Sloan W. F. Conway 9212180012 921214 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S PDR

l '

ENCLOSURE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS

f PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS LICENSE NO. NPF-74 DOCKET NO. 50-530 SPECIAL REPORT 3-SR-92-004-02 INITIALCONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Po'st Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1005 MST on August 17, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On August 10, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (power operation) when PASS was ~

declared inoperable at approximately 1000 MST for maintenance. The maintenance involved rerouting field tubing to permit easier access for future maintenance. Following the completion of work at approximately 1503 MST on August 10, 1992, PASS was declared operable.

On September 2, 1992, Chemistry Technicians discovered that the PASS was unable to draw a vacuum on the gaseous sample bomb. Initial troubleshooting determined on September 4, 1992, that the maintenance performed on August 10, 1992, may have caused the PASS to be inoperable. The PASS was reworked and operability was restored on September 5, 1992.

1 of2

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

I The investigation determined that the tubing was rerouted using additional 1/4 inch tubing and modifying the existing 1/2 inch tubing. The additional 1/4 inch tubing was installed between the same diarrieter tubing that extended from the PASS station and the rerouted 1/2 inch tubing. Due to the additional length and number of turns in the rerouted vent, line, sufficient vacuum could not be established after the modification.

The planner had intended the line to be rerouted using 1/2 inch tubing and prescribed inventory numbers which corresponded to 1/2 tubing. However, the mechanic rerouted the line using shop stock material and did not have to order any more material. APS is continuing to investigate this issue to determine what actions are appropriate for similar circumstances in the future. This investigation is expected to be completed by December 30, 1992.,The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.

This supplement is expected to be submitted by February 1, 1992.

ln addition to the work which resulted in the PASS being inoperable, an appropriate retest was not conducted to identify that PASS was inoperable prior to declaring the PASS operable. An lnservice Leak Test was originally specified but later deleted since the tubing was open ended and could not have been readily pressurized. Operations, Chemistry, and the Work Group Supervisor concurred with the decision to delete the retest requirement and determined that no further testing was required.

Appendix A of the retest procedure (30DP-9WP04) lists parameters (pressure, temperature, flow) to be checked for work involving tubing. Flow requirements. could have been checked by attempting to draw a vacuum.

The Chemistry System Status procedure, 74DP-9ZZ04, was revised to direct Chemistry personnel to ensure that a functional test is performed following maintenance which may affect the sampling capability.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 2137 on September 5, 1992.

2 of 2

I

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