ML062210297

IR 05000275-06-012 and IR 0500323-06-012; on June 5 - 22, 2006; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML062210297
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/09/2006
From:	Laura Smith Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Keenan J Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR-06-012
Download: ML062210297 (22)

See also: IR 05000275/2006012

Text

August 9, 2006

John S. Keenan

Senior Vice President - Generation

and Chief Nuclear Officer

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P.O. Box 770000

Mail Code B32

San Francisco, CA 94177-0001

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND

RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2006012 AND

05000323/2006012

Dear Mr. Keenan:

From June 5 through 22, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted the

onsite portion of a team inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The enclosed report

documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with your staff as described in Section

4OA6 of this report.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the

identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and

regulations and the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed approximately 280

action requests, associated non-conformance reports and apparent cause evaluations, and

other supporting documents. The team reviewed cross-cutting aspects of NRC and

licensee-identified findings and interviewed personnel regarding the condition of a safety

conscious work environment at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that, in general, your

processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were effective; thresholds for

identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were

adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a relatively high

number of self-revealing and NRC identified findings were noted at your site during the

assessment period. Ineffective and incomplete corrective actions led to a number of repeat

problems that could have been prevented, with a notable number of repeat findings of

previously documented NRC-identified and self-revealing findings. Overall however

performance had improved in the all areas of your corrective action program since the last

problem identification and resolution inspection. The team concluded that while a

safety-conscious work environment existed at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company -2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

DLProulx for

Linda J. Smith, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-275, 323

License: NPF-80, NPF-82

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000275; 323/2006012

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/enclosure:

Donna Jacobs

Vice President, Nuclear Services

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

P.O. Box 56

Avila Beach, CA 93424

James R. Becker, Vice President

Diablo Canyon Operations and

Station Director, Pacific Gas and

Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

P.O. Box 56

Avila Beach, CA 93424

Sierra Club San Lucia Chapter

ATTN: Andrew Christie

P.O. Box 15755

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406

Nancy Culver

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace

P.O. Box 164

Pismo Beach, CA 93448

Pacific Gas and Electric Company -3-

Chairman

San Luis Obispo County Board of

Supervisors

County Government Building

1055 Monterey Street, Suite D430

San Luis Obispo, CA 93408

Truman Burns\Robert Kinosian

California Public Utilities Commission

505 Van Ness Ave., Rm. 4102

San Francisco, CA 94102-3298

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

Robert R. Wellington, Esq.

Legal Counsel

857 Cass Street, Suite D

Monterey, CA 93940

Director, Radiological Health Branch

State Department of Health Services

P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)

Sacramento, CA 95899-7414

Richard F. Locke, Esq.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P.O. Box 7442

San Francisco, CA 94120

City Editor

The Tribune

3825 South Higuera Street

P.O. Box 112

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-0112

James D. Boyd, Commissioner

California Energy Commission

1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)

Sacramento, CA 95814

Jennifer Tang

Field Representative

United States Senator Barbara Boxer

1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 240

San Francisco, CA 94111

Pacific Gas and Electric Company -4-

Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)

DRP Director (ATH)

DRS Director (DDC)

DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)

Senior Resident Inspector (TWJ)

Branch Chief, DRP/D (WBJ)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (FLB2)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)

RITS Coordinator (KEG)

DRS STA (DAP)

V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)

J. Lamb, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JGL1)

ROPreports

DC Site Secretary (AWC1)

SUNSI Review Completed: ______ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: ________

/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive

R:\_DC\2006\DC2006-012RP-RWD.wpd ML

RIV:SRI/PBE RI:PBA RI:PBB SOE:OB SRI:EB2

RWDeese RBCohen TAMcConnell TOMcKernon DLProulx

T=DLProulx T=DLProulx /RA/

8/8/06 8/8/06 8/8/06 8/8/06 8/4/06

C:PSB C:EB2

WBJones LJSmith

/RA/ DLPfor

8/7/06 8/8/06

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket.: 50-275, 323

License: NPF-80, NPF-82

Report No.: 05000275,323/2006012

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach

Avila Beach, California

Dates: June 5-22, 2006

Team Leader: R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector, Projects Branch E

Inspectors: R. Cohen, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch A

T. McConnell, Resident Inspector, Projects Branch B

T. McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch

D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2

Approved By: Linda Smith, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000275, 323/2006012; 6/5-22/2006; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Biennial

Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The inspection was conducted by three resident inspectors and one regional specialist

inspector. One unresolved item was identified during this inspection. The significance of most

findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance

determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC

management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3,

dated July 2000.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team reviewed approximately 280 action requests, apparent cause evaluations, and root

cause analyses, as well as supporting documents to assess problem identification and

resolution activities. In general, the corrective action program procedures and processes were

effective, thresholds for identifying issues were low, and corrective actions were adequate to

address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a number of self-revealing

and NRC identified findings in each of these attributes of your problem identification and

resolution program were noted over the past two years. Many of these findings were related to

equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable safety-related equipment. The

team noted improvement in all three areas when comparing the results of this and more recent

inspections when compared to inspections two years ago.

Based on the interviews conducted, the team concluded that a positive safety conscious work

environment existed at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The team determined that employees felt

free to raise safety concerns to station managers and supervisors, the employee concerns

program, and the NRC. However, the team noted two isolated incidents regarding the

environment that did not foster openly raising safety concerns. The licensee had already taken

actions to address the concerns. All the interviewees believed that potential safety issues were

being addressed.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

-2- Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team based the following conclusions, in part, on all issues that were identified in

the assessment period, which ranged from June 25, 2004, (the last biennial problem

identification and resolution inspection) to the end of the inspection on June 22, 2006.

The issues are divided into two groups. The first group (Current Issues) included

problems identified during the assessment period where at least one performance

deficiency occurred during the assessment period. The second group (Historical Issues)

included issues that were identified during the assessment period where all the

performance deficiencies occurred outside the assessment period.

a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones to determine if

problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective

action program for evaluation and resolution. The team performed field walkdowns of

selected systems and equipment to inspect for deficiencies that should have been

entered in the corrective action program. The team also observed control room

operations and reviewed operator logs, plant tracking logs, and station work orders to

ensure conditions adverse to quality were being entered into the corrective action

program. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of self assessments, trending

reports, system health reports, and various other documents related to the corrective

action program.

The team interviewed station personnel, attended action request (AR) review team and

corrective action review board meetings, and evaluated corrective action documentation

to determine the licensees threshold for entering problems in their corrective action

program. In addition, the team reviewed the licensees evaluation of selected industry

operating experience information, including operator event reports, NRC generic letters

and information notices, and generic vendor notifications to ensure that issues

applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.

(2) Assessment

The team determined that, in general, problems were properly identified and entered into

the corrective action program as evidenced by the relatively few findings identified during

the assessment period. The team concluded that the licensees current threshold for

entering issues into the corrective action program was appropriately low. However, the

licensee did fail in some instances to identify or document deficiencies which led to

unnecessarily operating the units with degraded conditions affecting safety.

-3- Enclosure

As listed below, four NRC-identified and self-revealing issues were documented during

the period. The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and

resolution aspects in effectiveness of problem identification has been fairly steady since

2004, with two findings in the last half of 2004, two in all of year 2005, and no additional

findings identified during this inspection in the effectiveness of problem identification

area. The team concluded that the licensees performance had improved in the area of

effectiveness of problem identification when compared to the previous problem

identification and resolution assessment (NRC Inspection Report 05000275;

323/2004012).

Current Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to promptly identify multiple grounds in the breaker

control circuitry for Containment Spray Pump 2-2, resulting in the degraded control wires

affecting the pumps circuitry for 70 days following the initial ground indication. (NRC

Inspection Report 05000275,323 (IR) 2004004).

Example 2. The licensee failed to establish compensatory measures to ensure the

prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon Emergency Plan was met, in part due to

the fact that the licensee missed opportunities to identify the emergency plan impact

prior to removing seismic instrumentation from service. (IR 2004005)

Example 3: The licensee failed promptly identify a condition adverse to quality.

Specifically, PG&E initially screened industry operating experience regarding the

potential for containment recirculation sump valves failing to open following certain

small-break loss of cooling accidents as not being applicable to Diablo Canyon Power

Plant. (IR 2005004)

Example 4: Licensee operators had two opportunities to identify the mispositioning of

Valve SFS-2-8765 but failed to identify the condition. The mis-positioned valve resulted

in a loss of approximately 2600 gallons of water from the spent fuel pool. (IR 2005005)

Historical Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to recognize a broken bonnet stud on the Unit 2

Atmospheric Dump Valve PCV-21 as a significant condition adverse to quality and

promptly perform an operability assessment. (IR 2001007)

Example 2: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a nonconservative safety

features setpoint by not ensuring that the Unit 2 plant response to a loss of feedwater

flow to Steam Generator 2-4 was appropriate during their post trip event review process.

(IR 2002007)

Example 3: The licensee failed to identify and correct a leak in Check Valve FW-2-370

and the backward installation of the disk for Check Valve FW-2-377 despite auxiliary

feedwater system backflow alarms and industry experience on properly assembly of the

check valves. (IR 2003006)

-4- Enclosure

Example 4: The licensee failed to correct the population of Rockwell-Edwards valves in

safety-related and risk-significant system that were susceptible to failure of the packing

gland follower flange because they did not properly identify all of the potentially affected

valves. (IR 2003008)

b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed ARs, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the

licensees ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors

reviewed a sample of ARs, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the

licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic

implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended

various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues

identified.

In addition, the team reviewed licensee evaluations of selected industry operating

experience reports, including licensee event reports, NRC generic letters, bulletins and

information notices, and generic vendor notifications to assess whether issues

applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.

The team performed a historical review of ARs and notifications written over the last 5

years that addressed the emergency diesel generators, safety related switchgear

ventilation, the auxiliary feedwater system, and the component cooling water system.

(2) Assessment

The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in

accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC

requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the

licensee was generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant

conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, ineffective prioritization and

evaluation of issues resulted in a relatively high number of self-revealing and NRC

identified findings during the period. One of these findings culminated in a plant trip.

Others were related to equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable

safety-related equipment.

The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the licensee was

generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant conditions

adverse to quality. The team noted that the quality and rigor of root causes had

improved when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution

assessment. Additionally, the trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification

and resolution aspects in evaluation of problems has been improving since 2004, with

six findings in 2004 and two in 2005, however, the inspectors identified one additional

finding during this inspection in the evaluation area. The team concluded that the

licensee had improved in performance in the area of prioritization and evaluation of

issues when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution assessment.

-5- Enclosure

Current Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to properly evaluate the cause for Safety Injection Check

Valve SI-1-8820 not seating following a forward flow test after the valve was found stuck

open during a back flow leak test. (IR 2004003)

Example 2: The licensee failed to properly evaluate indications of reverse rotation of the

fan motor for a containment fan cooler unit (CFCU), impacting the operability of the

CFCU over the 13-year period that reverse rotation was observed. (IR 2004005)

Example 3: The licensee failed to recognize the significance of not establishing

compensatory measures to ensure the prompt implementation of the Diablo Canyon

Emergency Plan. (IR 2004005)

Example 4: The licensee failed to maintain approximately 70 safety related solenoid

operated valves in an environmentally qualified condition because they did not promptly

evaluate the extent of condition of a previous valve failure. This failure delayed the

identification of elastomer qualification issues for approximately 1 year and ultimately

caused a loss of Steam Generator feed event and a Unit 2 manual plant trip.

(IR 2004005)

Example 5: The licensee failed to properly prioritize an issue regarding the

re-submission of required documents for individual criminal history record information

and subsequently missed the opportunity to have their security department correct the

issue. (IR 2004007)

Example 6: The licensee did not fully evaluate the extent of a problem regarding

generally-licensed devices and did not ascertain that the radiation sources and

generally-licensed devices were properly controlled in accordance with NRC regulations

and/or vendor instructions. (IR 2004009)

Example 7: The licensee failed to adequately evaluate and therefore provide for timely

corrective actions regarding emergency core cooling system check valve back-leakage

and its potential to cause gas-binding of emergency core cooling system pumps and/or

water hammer of emergency core cooling system piping. (IR 2005005)

Example 8: The licensee improperly evaluated operating experience related to the

minimum flow settings for the auxiliary feedwater pumps, in that they did not properly

verify the minimum flow settings with the pump manufacturer. (IR 2005006)

Historical Issue

Example: The licensee failed to appropriately prioritize and evaluate battery charger

failures between January 1999 and May 2003 because they consistently assigned low

significance, did not assign any cause investigation, and did not recognize a trend of

charger failures existed, even when multiple failures were identified in a short period of

time. (IR 2003010)

c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

-6- Enclosure

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed plant records, primarily ARs, to verify that corrective actions related

to identified problems were developed and implemented, including corrective actions to

address common cause or generic concerns. The team sampled specific technical

issues to evaluate the adequacy of the licensees operability assessments.

Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of ARs that addressed past NRC identified

violations, for each affected cornerstone, to ensure that the corrective actions

adequately addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The team also

reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other ARs, work orders, or tracking

programs to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.

(2) Assessment

The effectiveness of identified corrective actions to address adverse conditions was

generally adequate. The NRC identified numerous instances over the assessment

period where historical corrective actions were not effective but, overall, the licensee

demonstrated acceptable performance in this area. Of note, the inspectors observed

that the licensee had allowed recurrence of four previously documented NRC-identified

or self-revealing findings. These repeat findings, listed below as Examples 4, 5, 9, and

10, represented a significant portion of the examples from the report period.

The trend of NRC identified findings with problem identification and resolution aspects in

effectiveness of corrective actions has been improving since 2004, with four findings in

the last half of 2004, seven in all of 2005, and no additional findings identified during this

inspection or other inspections completed in 2006 before the exit date of this inspection.

The team concluded that the licensee had improved in performance in the area of

effectiveness of corrective actions when compared to the previous problem identification

and resolution assessment.

Current Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to assess the extent of condition regarding a failed

pressurizer heater connection and thereby missed an opportunity to identify a corrosive

agent that degraded all heater electrical connections for the Unit 1 pressurizer, causing

at least one connection to fail. (IR 2004004)

Example 2: The licensee failed take adequate corrective actions to prevent the

emergency core cooling system (ECCS) void space from exceeding the volume allowed

by plant procedures, causing operators to declare the ECCS inoperable and enter

Technical Specification 3.0.3 twice. (IR 2004005)

Example 3: The licensee failed to maintain design control of the emergency diesel

generator fuel oil transfer system requirements after original corrective actions after the

licensee originally identified the issue did not correct the problem. (IR 2004006)

-7- Enclosure

Example 4: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a failure to perform surveys of a

high radiation area in the Unit 2 Gas Decay Tank Room during evolutions due to

ineffective corrective actions. (IR 2004006)

Example 5: The licensee failed to adequately resolve a condition adverse to their fire

protection program. Specifically, operations department responders were not required to

participate in fire drills for initial qualification or to maintain their qualification, which was

noted to be a previously identified qualification deficiency. (IR 2005002)

Example 6: The licensee failed to promptly correct a cracked lube oil instrument sensing

line on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3, thereby increasing the potential for the diesel

generator to trip on low lube oil level. (IR 2005002)

Example 7: The licensee failed to effectively implement interim corrective actions for

Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1, which led to unplanned unavailability of the diesel

generator to remove carbonized lube oil from the lube oil system. (IR 2005003)

Example 8: The licensee failed to identify the root cause and propose any corrective

actions to prevent recurrence of the Unit 2 pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints being

significantly out of tolerance, despite a history of pressurizer safety valve lift setpoints

being out of tolerance. (IR 2005003)

Example 9: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency

when they failed to conduct a circuit isolation plan when maintenance personnel were

performing work on Startup Transformer 1-1, which was which was a risk management

action required by plant procedure. The circuit isolation plan would have provided an

opportunity to identify the potential of disrupting startup power to Unit 2, which occurred

as a result of the maintenance activities. (IR 2005005)

Example 10: The licensee failed to prevent a repeat of a similar performance deficiency

when they failed to post an area within Vault 26 as a radiation area. (IR 2005005)

Example 11: The licensee failed to take adequate corrective action to address an on-

going problem with emergency core cooling system gas voiding in the common suction

crossover line. The licensee had a sustained history of gas voiding in emergency core

cooling system piping, which had the potential to lead to failure of the centrifugal

charging pumps or safety injection pumps during the switchover from cold-leg

recirculation to hot-leg recirculation during a loss-of-coolant accident. (IR 2005-06)

Historical Issues

Example 1: The licensee failed to take action to docket a justification and schedule to

correct a nonconservative Technical Specification dealing with dose equivalent iodine

activity in the reactor coolant system. (IR 2001006)

Example 2: The licensee failed to prevent recurrence of a previous event because of

ineffective corrective action in placement of ventilation louvers on the 12 kilovolt

grounding transformer fuse boxes. (IR 2003005)

-8- Enclosure

Example 3: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct lube oil carbonization in

the emergency diesel generator lube oil systems, resulting in diesel generator

unavailability to clean the lube oil lines. (IR 2003007)

Example 4: The licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a degraded mechanical

governor on emergency diesel generator 2-2, causing the degraded governor to remain

in service for over six months and requiring increasing difficulty by operators to maintain

the required load on the diesel generator. (IR 2003007)

Example 5: The licensee failed to correct a safety-related battery charger design

deficiency between January 1999 and May 2003 after multiple battery charger failures.

(IR 2003010)

d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope

The team interviewed approximately 27 individuals from different departments

representing a cross section of functional organizations and supervisory and

non-supervisory personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that

would challenge the establishment of a safety conscience work environment.

(2) Assessment

The team concluded that a safety conscious work environment existed at the Diablo

Canyon Power Plant. Employees felt free to enter issues into the corrective action

program, as well as raise safety concerns to their supervision, the employee concerns

program, and the NRC. However, two isolated concerns were discovered by the team

concerning the environment for raising concerns specific regarding two different

organizations. The team noted that due to recent organizational changes, the licensee

had addressed the concerns the individuals raised. The team concluded, based on

interviews, that the conditions raised by the concerned individuals were no longer

present and never prevented individuals from raising their concerns. All of the

interviewees believed that potential safety issues were being addressed and there were

no instances identified where these individuals had experienced negative consequences

for bringing safety issues to the NRC.

e. Specific Issues Identified During This Inspection

(1) Inspection Scope

During the reviews described in Sections 4OA2 a.(1), 4OA2 b.(1), and 4OA2 c.(1),

above, the inspectors identified the following unresolved item.

(2) Findings and Observations

(I) Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps

-9- Enclosure

During a walkdown of the residual heat removal pumps during the weeks of

June 5 and June 19, 2006, inspectors noted oil in the vicinity of the drain plugs

for the motors for Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1-1, 2-1, and 2-2. The team

questioned the licensee as to the source of the oil, specifically questioning

whether the motors were leaking from the motor oil drain plugs during operation.

Additionally, the inspectors discovered that the licensee was not performing the

72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cure time for the drain plug sealant recommended by the vendor which

would ensure proper sealing characteristics. The team noted that any small

leakage combined with the required lengthy mission time for the pumps could

result in a situation where a loss of adequate inventory of motor oil could occur

and challenge long term operation of the pumps.

The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment to provide reasonable

assurance of operability of the pumps based on the observed conditions.

Additionally the licensee made plans to measure leakage from the pumps during

the next pump runs. Because the inspectors could not ascertain the source and

the rate of the oil leakage until the pumps are run and could not determine the

effect of a shortened sealant cure time, the team treated this issue as an

unresolved item: URI 05000275,323/2006012-01, Oil Found in the Vicinity of

Residual Heat Removal Pumps.

4OA6 Exit Meeting

On June 22, 2006, at the end of the onsite portion of the inspection, the inspection

findings were discussed with Mr. J. Keenan and other members of the licensees staff.

The licensee acknowledged the findings.

The team asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection

should be considered proprietary. The licensee did not identify any proprietary

information that may have been reviewed by the team.

Attachment: Supplemental Information

-10- Enclosure

Supplemental Information

Partial List of Persons Contacted

Licensee

J. Becker, Vice President - Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director

K. Peters, Director, Engineering Services

J. Welsch, Manager, Operations

M. Meko, Director, Site Services

R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection

D. Jacobs, Vice President - Nuclear Services

P. Roller, Director, Performance Improvement

B. Waltos, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

J. Purkis, Director, Maintenance Services

P. Roller, Director, Operations Services

D. Taggart, Manager, Quality Verification

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000275,323/2006012-01 URI Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat

Removal Pumps (Section 4OA2.e(2)(i))

Documents Reviewed

In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were

selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the

inspection and to support any findings:

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Action Requests

A0111266 A0537891 A0577808 A0589499 A0600842 A0608942

A0162000 A0548704 A0580131 A0589740 A0601862 A0609107

A0302183 A0553420 A0580778 A0589959 A0601877 A0609150

A0334222 A0557532 A0581860 A0590358 A0602129 A0609937

A0425218 A0558389 A0581890 A0590574 A0602745 A0611033

A0427658 A0562738 A0583472 A0592778 A0603995 A0611346

A0459989 A0562741 A0584386 A0592779 A0605066 A0611505

A0491470 A0562742 A0585459 A0592782 A0605096 A0611638

A0499791 A0566266 A0586913 A0594018 A0605203 A0611784

A0513762 A0571554 A0586915 A0597931 A0607200 A0612144

A0528837 A0571556 A0587031 A0598237 A0607398 A0612248

A0530124 A0573112 A0587032 A0598825 A0608163 A0613109

A0535731 A0577295 A0587150 A0598883 A0608433 A0613505

A0535871 A0577690 A0587494 A0599961 A0608483 A0614983

A-1 Attachment

A0615425 A0634736 A0646838 A0659971 A0664021 A0670344

A0616852 A0634915 A0648502 A0660081 A0664053 A0670432

A0617647 A0635851 A0648550 A0661082 A0664134 A0670555

A0617988 A0635980 A0649123 A0661405 A0664825 A0670572

A0618799 A0636501 A0649373 A0661677 A0664885 A0670586

A0618992 A0636815 A0649461 A0661818 A0664920 A0670655

A0619215 A0636903 A0649887 A0661988 A0665039 A0670658

A0619650 A0638978 A0649932 A0661990 A0665166 A0670706

A0621027 A0639044 A0652157 A0662045 A0665588 A0670727

A0622185 A0640437 A0652663 A0662138 A0665755 A0670734

A0622355 A0640943 A0652667 A0662331 A0666116 A0670790

A0622599 A0640963 A0652726 A0662502 A0666132 A0670820

A0623479 A0641228 A0652914 A0663128 A0666319 A0670857

A0624472 A0642000 A0653033 A0663281 A0666828 A0670868

A0624585 A0642041 A0653445 A0663526 A0666867 A0670868

A0625005 A0642114 A0656436 A0663561 A0667282 A0670920

A0625548 A0642617 A0656452 A0663626 A0667383 A0671047

A0626353 A0642979 A0657228 A0663634 A0667541 A0671215

A0628329 A0642982 A0657247 A0663646 A0667549 A0671425

A0628375 A0643434 A0657248 A0663731 A0667755 A0671529

A0629528 A0644041 A0657515 A0663823 A0667995 A0671556

A0629995 A0644920 A0657517 A0663838 A0668040 A0671557

A0630154 A0644933 A0658443 A0663853 A0668297 A0671722

A0630229 A0644941 A0658540 A0663854 A0668929 A0671723

A0633325 A0644949 A0658670 A0663858 A0669488 A0671724

A0633568 A0644951 A0658794 A0663941 A0669488 A0671771

A0633772 A0645232 A0658795 A0663949 A0669488

A0634066 A0645298 A0659274 A0663985 A0669871

A0634214 A0646729 A0659858

Procedures

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme 5

3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation Amendment

169

AD7.ID2 Standard Plant Priority Assignment Scheme 7

AR PK-18-06 Diesel 13 Lube Oil System 8

EOP E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 15

MP E-3.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Overhaul 10

MP E-10.1 RHR Pump Motor Overhaul 17A

MP E-14.1 Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul 8

A-2 Attachment

MP E-17.1 Westinghouse Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Motor Overhaul 14

MP E-53.2 Split End Bell, 4000-Volt Motor Overhaul 16

MP E-57.2B Equipment Wiring and Terminations 37

OM4.ID15 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) 3

OM4.ID16 Plant Health Committee 1

OM 7 Corrective Action Program 3

OM7.ID1 Problem Identification and Resolution - Action Requests 22

OM7.ID.1 PI&R Action Requests 0

OM7.ID.3 Noncomformance Report and Technical Review Group 11

OM7.ID.3 Root Cause Investigations - Root Cause Team 16A

OM7.ID4 Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation 8

OM7.ID7 Integrated Problem Response Team 0F

OM7.ID10 Trend Analysis Program 7

OM7.ID11 10 CFR 21 Reportability Review Process 2A

OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 9

OM7.IDC1 Engineering Use of the Trend Analysis Program for 0

Equipment Failures

Drawings

NUMBER ITEM REVISION

Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 48

106712 Unit 1 Containment Spray 34

106710 Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System 36

System Health Reports

SYSTEM TITLE DATE

12 Containment Spray January 2006

10 Residual Heat Removal System January 2006

39 Radiation Monitors January 2006

21A Diesel Generator System January 2006

A-3 Attachment

Work Orders

WO C0196475 WO R0259278 WO R0259280 WO R0264116 WO R0264775

Information Notices

2004-01 2004-10 2005-11 2005-24 2006-03

2004-07 2004-11 2005-16 2005-26 2006-04

2004-09 2005-08 2005-21

NCVs

04-03-03 04-03-04 04-04-05 04-04-07

Nonconformance Reports

N001722

N002178

N002195

N002189

N002194

Drawing

NUMBER ITEM REVISION

663030 Motor AC Frame Vertical Lower Bearing Assembly 1

Operator Logs

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, May 19, 2006, Dayshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 2, November 3, 2006, Dayshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, April 19, 2006, Dayshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, September 22, 2005, Nightshift

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations Shift Log, Unit 1, June 6, 2006, Nightshift

Calculation

NUMBER ITEM REVISION

M-928 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Safe, Shutdown Analysis 1

Miscellaneous

Vendor Manual for Model 3600 V-5A Indicating Gauges

Inservice Testing Program Revision 9/6, PG&E Letter DCL-94-057, dated March 21, 1994

A-4 Attachment

Testing of Diesel Generator Air Start and Fuel Oil Transfer Systems, PG&E letter DCL-92-236,

dated October 26, 1992

Preventive Maintenance Optimization Diablo Canyon, Dated April 16, 2006, Integrated

Equipment Reliability Strategy Background Information Document Switchyard, Revision 0

Instrumentation Obsolescence Management, I & C Long Term Strategy, Dated November 14,

2005

Quick Hit Self Assessment - Operability Determination Program, Dated June 1-30, 2005

PG&E 2006 Performance Improvement Program Audit, Dated June 21, 2006

Surveillance Procedure STP V-5C, ECCS Hot Leg Check Valve Leak Test

White Paper - Evaluate Possible Minor Water Hammer During p-CSP-A11, A0607398

dated June 20, 2006

FSAR, Chapter 17, Revisions 15 and 16

A-5 Attachment

Information Request 1

April 17, 2006

Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection

(IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)

The inspection will cover the period of June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2006. All requested information

should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The information may be provided in

either electronic or paper media or a combination of these. Information provided in electronic

media may be in the form of e-mail attachment(s), CDs, thumb drives, or 3 1/2 inch floppy disks.

The agencys text editing software is Corel WordPerfect 8, Presentations, and Quattro Pro;

however, we have document viewing capability for MS Word, Excel, Power Point, and Adobe

Acrobat (.pdf) text files.

Please provide the following information to Rick Deese by May 3, 2006:

Note: On summary lists please include a description of problem, status, initiating date, and

owner organization.

1. Summary list of all action requests of significant conditions adverse to quality opened or

closed during the period

2. Summary list of all action requests which were generated during the period

3. A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll-up" one or more smaller

issues for the period

4. Summary list of all action requests which were down-graded or up-graded in significance

during the period

5. List of all root cause analyses completed during the period

6. List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at end of the period

7. List of all apparent cause analyses completed during the period

8. List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program during

the period

9. List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during

the period

10. All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities completed

during the period

11. A list of all quality assurance audits and surveillances scheduled for completion during

the period, but which were not completed

A-6 Attachment

12. All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third

party assessments completed during the period

13. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period

and broken down by functional organization

14. Current revisions of corrective action program procedures

15. A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at Diablo Canyon during the

period

16. Action requests or other actions generated for each of the items below:

(1) Part 21 Reports:

2004-02, -08, -10, -14, -15, -17, -21, -22, -24, -27

2005-01, -05, -07, -12, -13, -16, -17, -20, -22, -26, -30, -33, -37, -38, -41

2006-01, -03, -04, -05

(2) NRC Information Notices:

2004-01, -05, -07, -08, -09, -10, -11, -12, -16, -19, -21

2005-01, -02, -03, -04, -06, -08, -09, -11, -14, -16, -19, -20, -21, -23, -24, -25,

-26, -29, -30, -31, -32

2006-02, -03, -04, -05, -08

(3) All LERs issued by Diablo Canyon during the period

(4) NCVs and Violations issued to Diablo Canyon during the period (including

licensee identified violations)

(17) Safeguards event logs for the period

(18) Radiation protection event logs

(19) Current system health reports or similar information

(20) Current predictive performance summary reports or similar information

(21) Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period

(22) List of risk significant components and systems

(23) List of actions done and/or in the Human Performance Improvement Plan referenced in

the last PIR inspection

A-7 Attachment

Information Request 2

May 18, 2006

Diablo Canyon Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection

(IP 71152; Inspection Report 05000275/06-12; 05000323/06-12)

Please provide the following Action Requests to Rick Deese by May 30, 2006:

A0528027 A0562776 A0573563 A0577113 A0601877 A0648182

A0540712 A0562778 A0573913 A0577117 A0620471 A0658028

A0557259 A0562785 A0573920 A0578216 A0620857 A0658496

A0560825 A0562791 A0573922 A0578228 A0629704 A0659407

A0562763 A0562793 A0573923 A0578447 A0631420 A0660739

A0562767 A0562794 A0574552 A0580008 A0633646 A0663705

A0562773 A0569355 A0576825 A0584097 A0634065

A0562775 A0569841 A0576844 A0589785 A0637904

A-8 Attachment