ML17251A238

Responds to NRC 880727 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000,per Insp Rept 50-244/88-10.Corrective Actions:Check Valves Have Been Exercised Monthly as Part of Test Procedure.Penalty Paid

ML17251A238
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/26/1988
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
EA-88-154, NUDOCS 8809010097
Download: ML17251A238 (26)

See also: IR 05000244/1988010

Text

ACCESSION NBR:8809010097

DOC.DATE: 88/08/26 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244

Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

~~~~%ECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas 6 Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Ofc of Enforcement (Post 870413)SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 880727 ltr re violations

noted in Insp Rept 50-244/88-10.Corrective

actions:check

valves exercised.

DISTRIBUTION

CODE: IE14D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR

/ENCL L SIZE:/DL TITLE: Enforcement

Action Non-2.790-Licensee

Response NOTES:License

Exp date in accordance

with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 LA STAHLEiC INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA DEDRO NRR/DREP/EPB

10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

OE LIEBERMANgJ

RGN1 FILE 03 ERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 PD AEOD/DSP/TPAB

NRR/DOEA/EAB

11 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12

OE 01 G FIL 02 RGN2/DRSS/EPRPB

NRC PDR COPIES LTTR.ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1@gory/Fd TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 18 ENCL 18

f 4

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649-0001

August 26, 1988 J c c c D te Q H c abaci cocle v ia 5 46 2 700 Director, Office of Enforcement

U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: Inspection

Report 50-244/88-10

Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition

of Civil Penalty Enforcement

Action EA 88-154 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's (RG&E)response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition

of Civil Penalty dated July 27, 1988.The first enclosure is RG&E's Reply to Notice of Violation filed in accordance

with 10CFR2.201.

The Reply admits the violations

and, documents the corrective

actions taken.Also enclosed is a check for$50,000, the amount of the civil penalty.The second enclosure is RG&E's Answer to the Proposed Imposition

of Civil Penalty, filed in accordance

with 10CFR2.205.

Although RG&E has chosen not to contest the proposed civil penalty, we have included information

for the record describing

reasons why the NRC could have mitigated the proposed penalty.These reasons include our excellent enforcement

record at Ginna, prior good performance

in the general area of concern, and alternative

operation and maintenance

practices.

Very truly yours, 8809010097

880826 PDR ADOCK 05000244 G PNU Robert C.Me edy General Manage Nuclear Production

Enclosures

xc: Mr.William T.Russell Regional Administrator

U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

ENCLOSURE 1 Re 1 to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection

Report 88-10 stated: "During an NRC inspection

conducted.

on May 16-20, 1988, viola-tions of NRC requirements

were identified.

In accordance

with the"General Statement of Policy and.Procedure for NRC Enforce-ment Action," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.The particular

violations

and associated

civil penalty are set forth below: Technical Specification 4.2 requires that inservice testing (IST)of pumps and valves be performed in accordance

with Section ZI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and.applicable

Addenda, as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(1).

Article IWV-1100 of the ASME Code, Section ZI, 1977 edition, which is applicable

in this situation, requires, in part, periodic testing for those valves which are required to perform a specific function in shutting down a reactor to the cold shutdown condition, or in mitigating

the consequences

of an accident.Contrary to the above, as of May 20, 1988, the IST test program for pumps and valves did not include periodic testing of the following safety related check valves that are used to mitigate the consequence

of an accident: a.Check valves Nos.3504B and 3505B in the main steam supply lines for the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine;and b.-Main feedwater check valves Nos.3992 and 3993.,I, lh 2..-'-Puticle

IWV-3522 of ASME Code, Section ZI, 1977-edition, which is applicable

in this situation, requires, in part, that the testing required by Article IWV-1100 be performed by exercising

the check valves to the position required to fulfill their function during plant operation.

Further, if only limited operation.

of a check valve is practical during plant operation, the check valve shall be full stroke exercised during.cold shutdowns.

Contrary to the above, as of May 20, 1988, the following check valves which are used to mitigate the consequences

of an accident, had not been full-stroke

exercised to the position required to fulfill their functions:

a.Nos.9627A and B in the 1C and 1D standby auxiliary feedwater pump service water suction lines;b.Nos.862A and B in the 1A and 1B containment

spray pump discharge lines: c.Nos.710A and B in the 1A and 1B residual heat removal (RHR)pump discharge;

d.Nos.853A and B in the core deluge check;e.No.854 in the refueling water storage tank (RWST)to RHR pump suction check;f.Nos.842A and B in the loop A and B accumulator

dump line check;and g.Nos.867A and B in the loop A and B accumulator

dump and safety injection (SI)to cold leg." I The following responses are provided.Admission or denial of the alle ed violation 1.Rochester Gas and Electric admits to Violation 1.The Inservice'Test Program delineated

in Appendix C of the Ginna Station Quality Assurance Manual did not include check valves 3504B, 3505B, 3992 and 3993.(1)Check Valves 3504B and 3505B (a)lanation and reasons for the violation These valves were installed as part of a 1981 system modification, subsequent

to the establishment

of the current IST program.RG&E's controls for reviewing the impact of modifications

on the IST program scope were less formal in 1981 than our present practice."'The 6 point modification

improvement

established

in 1985 has resulted in more through review of modifica-tions relative to the impact on the IST Program.(b)Corrective

ste s that have been taken and.the results achieved.The check valves have been exercised monthly as part of the PT-16, Auxiliary Feedwater System, test procedure to demonstrate

operation of the turbine driven AFW pump.Each valve has been sequentially

tested since May 1988 to assure proper opening, backseating

and return to the post test normally closed position.

e p

(c)Corrective

ste s that will be taken to avoid further violations

and when full com liance will be achieved.Steps to preclude further violations

include formaliza-

tion of the testing of these valves in accordance

with IST commitments

by the end of this year.Further, RG&E modification

control procedures

have been modified to specifically

require that the effect of all modifica-tions will be reviewed to identify any required IST Program changes.Additional

actions being taken to ensure adequacy of the IST Program are described later in this reply.(2)Check Valves 3992 and 3993 (a)Ex lanation and reasons for the violation Lack of comprehensive

selection criteria at the time-of RG&E's IST Program establishment

contributed

to feedwater check valves 3992 and 3993 not being included in the program.Original program selections

considered

safeguards

systems actuated to mitigate the conse-quences of an accident or to provide safe shutdown, but did not specifically

include valves forming the boundary to interfacing

systems.RG&E is completing

its review of systems and has found very few potential omissions.

These potential omissions are being evaluated for inclusion and for significance

at this time.An additional

contributing

cause was that an independent

assessment

of the IST program for scope and adequacy was not conducted at the time of its develop-ment.(b)Corrective

ste s that have been taken and the results achieved.As a result of RG&E's review of SOER 86-03, these valves were disassembled

in 1986 and 1987.It was determined

that the valves were capable of performing

their intended functions.

As further assurance of the capability

of these valves to perform this isolation function, during each plant startup when the AFW pumps are in operation a large pressure differential

exists across these valves maintaining

them closed.(c)Corrective

ste s that will be taken to avoid further violations

and when full com liance will be achieved.Actions taken to preclude further violations

include formalization

of the testing of these valves during cold shutdown, beginning with the 1989 refueling outage, in accordance

with IST commitments, and plans to include these valves in the next IST Program submittal scheduled for 1989.Additional

actions being taken to ensure adequacy of the IST program are described later in this response.

~JP

Admission or denial of the alle ed violation 2.In response to Violation 2, Rochester Gas and Electric admits, with one exception, that the governing test procedures

did not provide for full stroke exercising

without a corresponding

relief request from Article IWV-3522 of ASME code,Section XI, 1977 edition.Consistent

with page 9 paragraph 4 of the inspection

report, SI Accumulator

Discharge check valves 842 A and B are tested.in accordance

with a partial stroking relief request submitted to the NRC with program revision 3A on June 20, 1983.(a)Ex lanation and.reasons for the violation.

Ten years ago, when.the existing program was established, comprehensive

detailed test specifications

were not developed, which could have been used as input to the procedures

used to perform testing.Additionally

the check valve test procedures

that were established

to comply with IVV-3521 used"observation

of substantially

free flow" as an indicator that the valve disk moved promptly away from the seat Internal audits of the program did not identify part-stroke testing of the valves as deficient due to our inter-pretation of"substantially

free flow" as being"demons-trated partial flow".(b)Corrective

ste s that have been taken and the results achieved.Engineering

dispositions

have been provided for each valve, for which full flow testing has not been performed and relief has not been requested.

These measures will ensure future valve testing meets our current commitments

Valves 9627A&B Di sition Quarterly Partial stroke testing will be augmented, hy disassembly

of one valve each refueling shutdown.If that valve is inoperable, the other valve will he disassembled.

Note: Relief request is being prepared..

862A&B Test Procedure PT-3,'ontainment

Spray System, is heing revised to require a mechanical

exerciser to move the disc.The force required to initiate movement will he measured, and subsequent

movement will be demonstrated

to the position required to fulfill its function.Note: The reference value will be es-tablished and subsequent

testing will demonstrate

a breakaway force within 50%from the established

reference value.

Valves Dis sition 710A&B 853A&B 854 PT-2.10.2 will be revised to verify the minimum safeguards

flow of 1560 in each flow path during refueling cavity fill.Note: A relief request for the deferral of quarterly to the refueling frequency to be prepared.842A&B 867A&B For the 1989 outage, either of the following two options for 842A&B and 867A&B will be implemented

to supplement

the existing partial stroke testing.~tion A-Discharge each accumulatcr

and measure the pressure and level drop vs.time.Evaluate these parameters

against the required system performance

to demonstrate

check valve operability

.~tice B-Disassemble

and inspect either 867A or 867B and either 842A or 842B for operability

verification, using a maintenance

procedure.

Should the inspected.

valve require corrective

maintenance, the other check valve of similar number will also be inspected.

Note: Relief requests are being prepared.(c)Corrective

ste s that will he taken to avoid further violations

and when full com liance will he achieved,.

The short term and long term actions heing taken for both violations

will ensure adequacy of the IST Program and avoid similar violations

are: Short Term Actions: These short,.term

actions will ensure that ASME Section XI requirements..

are heing met by the IST Program and.are heing properly.implemented

by procedures.

a 0 Comprehensive

selection criteria have been developed and are heing used to guide an in-depth review of the current program.This review will identify program pump and valve additions or deletions and test category changes for both the current IST program and for the third 10-year interval program, scheduled to be submitted next year.These selection criteria will identify all valves required to be tested, in accordance

with the RG&E Section XI IST program, including interfacing

system boundary valves.

b.An indepth review has been completed of the IST implementing

procedures

to identify any other potential discrepancies

from current program commitments.

Corrective

actions are being taken to resolve any deficiencies

as they are identified

in accordance

with applicable

procedures.

These actions include procedure changes, additional

testing, generation

of relief requests and cold shutdown justifications.

Justifica-

tions for continued operation are being formulated

as appropriate.

c Existing valves are also being evaluated to the recently established

test category guidelines

to ascertain need for revised testing requirements

relative to the 19S6 edition of ASME Section XI.These evaluations

are being performed, concurrently

with the reviews described in item (a)for identifying

valve additions or deletions.

The attached milestone schedule identifies

the dates for evaluation

completion

and issuance of interim program changes.Engineering

will be involved in this effort and will be defining the safety function parameters

relative to each valve (for example full flow rates).This information

will be provided to the personnel performing

and, reviewing test results.d.e.gi Plans for an independent

assessment

of the program revisions have been formulated

and will be implemented

in early September.'est

procedures

are being revised to implement the interim program changes.The December completion

is identified

on the attached-schedule.

i r Selected personnel involved in our program assessment

have visited three other utilities to discuss their programs and have reviewed current IST programs made.=available

from other nuclear plants.Audits of the IST program activities

are being enhanced 6o include technical expertise in pump and valve testing and other Section XI requirements.

Lon Term Actions: These long term actions will ensure that the IST Program will receive the necessary engineering

support to be maintained

and monitored adequately

to prove continued operability

of Ginna pumps and valves.

a~Responsibility

for program control will be shifted from the Quality Assurance group to another group prior to the end of 1988.This change will facilitate

the communication

of industry pump and valve issues to a group more directly involved with technical issues.This change will also provide separation

between the groups with program respon-sibility and audit responsibility.

b.Actions are being taken to ensure that notifications

of industry experience, vendor bulletins and NRC issuances involving the program are reviewed by cognizant IST test and program personnel.

In summary, the efforts which began after the NRC inspection

to~.establish

definitive

IST selection guidelines

and test require-ment guidelines

are providing a documented.

basis for not only identifying

the changes and.additions to the current program and implementing

test procedures

but are also providing a basis upon which responses to regulatory

review inquiries can be facilitated

and.for which future changes can be adequately

considered.

Attached is a milestone schedule of the.actions being taken which, when completed, will provide full compliance

to testing commitments.

MILESTONE SCHEDULE Action TCD Review IST implementing

procedures

to identify potential discrepancies

from current program commitments

Completed Initiate proposed interim actions and proposed resolution

to differences

noted in 1 Completed Finalize selection criteria for which valves and pumps will be added to the program Evaluate relevant PGIDs to new criteria for potential addition to program Finalize test category selection guidance requirements

Revise Mod control procedures

to ensure modifi-cation impact on IST program is considered

Evaluate new and existing program valves to new selection criteria delineated

in 5 above and establish related test recpxirements

and corresponding

test acceptance

criteria for each valve Completed 10/07/88 Completed Completed 10/15/88 Begin independent

assessment.

of program development

Augment and revise procedures

consistent

with proposed.program revisions 09/01/88 12/15/88

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ENCLOSURE 2 ANSWER TO PROPOSED IMPOSITION

OF CIVIL PENALTY Although Rochester Gas and Electric has chosen not to contest the proposed civil penalty, RG&E believes that mitigation

could have been granted.The reasons for our position are (1)the superior enforcement

history of the Ginna facility and prior good performance

in the area of concern, (2)the level of safety significance

of the violations, (3)the prompt and extensive corrective

actions taken, and (4)our response to prior notice of related events.The Staff stated in the Notice of Violation (at 2): "A basis exists for 50%mitigation

of the base penalty in view of your prior good enforcement

history in the area of surveillance

testing, as evidenced by a Category I SALP rating in this area during.the last three rating periods.Full 100'%itigation

based on this factor is inappropriate

since the root cause of the violation was inadequate

engineering

support, which received a Category II SALP rating during the last rating period, which was the first period that engineering

support was evaluated as a separate area.Furthermore, ,a basis exists for 50%escalation

of the civil penalty in light of your prior notice, via NRC Information Notice 86-01 and INPO SOER 86-03, of the need to adequately

test operation of check valves.Therefore, on balance, no adjustment

to the civil penalty amount is ,"appropriate." For the following reasons, RG&E believes that the Staff should have considered

granting mitigation.

1.Past Performance

During the 18 years of operating the Ginna facility, RG&E has an excellent record relative to enforcement

action., As this record shows, RG&E places the highest priority on compliance

with NRC requirements

and maintaining

a cooperative

working relationship

with the NRC Staff.RG&E's commitment

in the area of concern is reflected in

the Category I SALP rating for surveillance

testing during the last three rating periods.From a policy standpoint, such exemplary past performance

should be rewarded.The NRC's Enforcement

Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, allows for up to 100%mitigation

for prior good performance.

The Staff, however, concluded that 100%mitigation

was not appropriate

given the Category II SALP rating for engineering

support during the last rating period.RG&E respectfully

submits that a Category II SALP rating (which basically means"satisfactory

performance")

should not be cited in this manner as essentially

an escalation

factor.Such a satisfactory

rating should not adversely affect other mitigation

or escalation

conclusions.

Level of Safet Si ificance Although RG&E admits that the valves in question were not tested in accordance

with ASME Section XI criteria, we have also determined

by analysis that the lack of testing did not result in the violation of any Ginna safety limits.RG&E recognizes

that all these valves ,should have been included in the IST program, and that relief requests should have been submitted to permit less than full flow testing of the valves as necessary.

However, RG&E does believe that the partial testing, operation, and maintenance

practices on the valves provided reasonable

assurance of their capability

to perform the required functions.

Most of these valves will be addressed in relief requests, currently being prepared for submittal to the Staff, to permit alternatives

to full flow testing (the SI accumulator

discharge check valves were the subject of a relief request filed in 1983 but not yet acted on by the Staff).These relief requests have already been discussed with the NRC Staff as the basis for continued operation.

Pr t.and Extensive Corrective

Actions RG&E'.s-prompt and extensive corrective

actions are detailed in the Reply provided in Enclosure 1 to this lettei.In brief terms, RG&E has not only aggressively

pursued resolution

of the specific violations, it has also adopted comprehensive

short-term

and long-term measures which will result in a substantially

improved IST program.RG&E has not narrowly focused its actions on the cited deficiencies, but rather has taken broad initiatives

to resolve any programmatic

weaknesses.

These unusually extensive corrective

actions warrant mitigation

under the NRC's Enforcement

Policy (See 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, V.B.2).

~g

4.Res nse to Prior Notice The NOV concluded that a basis exists for 50%escalation

as a result of prior notification

in Information Notice 86-01 and INPO SOER 86-03.It should be noted that RG&E did perform extensive maintenance

in response to these issuances, and performed maintenance

of valves 3992 and 3993 as a direct result of our review of SOER 86-03.Since RG&E did consider these issuances, and performed a number of actions as a result of these documents, we do not believe that we should be cited for escalation

of enforcement

action.