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{{#Wiki_filter:ssososoossssoss9DRADQCK05000335PPDRQFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEPLANT-UNITNO.1SPENTFUELSTORAGE,FACILITYMODIFICATIONSAFETY.ANALYSISREPORTDOCKETNO.50-335  
{{#Wiki_filter:ssososooss ssoss9DRADQCK05000335PPDRQFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEPLANT-UNITNO.1SPENTFUELSTORAGE,FACILITYMODIFICATION SAFETY.ANALYSISREPORTDOCKETNO.50-335  
>I',l'4H TABLEOFCONTENTSSECTIONPAGE
>I',l'4H TABLEOFCONTENTSSECTIONPAGE


==1.0INTRODUCTION==
==1.0INTRODUCTION==
1.1LicenseAmendmentRequested1.2CurrentStatus1.3"InterfaceswithOtherOrganizations1.4SummaryofReport1.5Conclusions1.6References2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1ExistingRacks2.2NewHighDensityRacks3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULICCONSIDERATIONS3.1NeutronMultiplicationFactor1-21-22-12-12-13-13-13.1.13.1.23.1.33.1.43.1.5NormalStoragePostulatedAccidentsCalculationMethodsRackModificationAcceptanceCriteriaforCriticality3-13-23"23-93-103.2DecayHeatCalculationsfortheSpentFuelPool(Bulk)3.2.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesign3.2.2DecayHeatAnalyses3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeup3.3Thermal-HydraulicAnalysesfortheSpentFuelPool(Localized)3.3.1Basis3.3.2ModelDescription3.3.3CladdingTemperature3-103-103-113"143-153-153-153-16 TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)SECTIONPAGE3.4PotentialFuelandRackHandlingAccidents3.4.1RackModuleMishandling342TemporaryConstructionCraneDrop3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDrop)3.5TechnicalSpecificationChanges3.6References3-163-173-173-173-173-184.0MECHANICAL,MATERIAL,ANDSTRUCTURALCONSIDERATIONS4.1DescriptionofStructure4.1.1DescriptionofFuelHandlingBuilding4.1.2DescriptionofSpentFuelRacks4.2ApplicableCodes,Standards,andSpecifications4.2.1NRCDocuments4.2.2IndustryCodesandStandards4.3SeismicandImpactLoads4.4LoadsandLoadCombinations4-14-14-14-54-74-84-94.4.1SpentFuelPool4.4.2SpentFuelRacks4.5DesignandAnalysisProcedures4-94-114-124.5.14.5.2DesignandAnalysisProceduresforSpentFuelPoolDesignandAnalysisProceduresforSpentFuelStorageRacks4-124-134.6StructuralAcceptanceCriteria4-204.6.14.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.54.6.64.6.74.6.8StructuralAcceptanceCriteriaforSpentFuelPoolStructureStructuralAcceptanceCriteriaforSpentFuelStorageRacksFuelHandlingCraneUpliftAnalysisImpactAnalysisWeldStressesSummaryofMechanical'nalysisDefinitionofTermsUsedInSection4LateralRackMovement4-204-234-274-274-274-284-294-30 4
 
TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)PAGE4.7Materials,QualityControl,andSpecialCon-structionTechniques4.7.1ConstructionMaterials4.7.2NeutronAbsorbingMaterial4.7.3QualityAssurance4.7.4ConstructionTechniques4.8TestingandIn-ServiceSurveillance4.8.1ProgramIntent4.8.2DescriptionofSpecimens4.8.3SpecimenEvaluation4.9References4-304-304-304-304-304-324-324-324-324-335.0COST/BENEFITANDENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT5.1Cost/BenefitandThermalAssessment5-15-15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.5NeedforIncreasedStorageCapacityEstimatedCostsConsiderationofAlternativesResourcesCommittedThermalImpactontheEnvironment5-15-15-25-25-25.2RadiologicalEvaluation5-35.2.15.2.25.2.35.2.45.2.5SolidRadwasteGaseousReleasesPersonnelExposureRadiationProtectionDuringRe"RackActivitiesRackDisposal5-35-35-35-45-55.3AccidentEvaluation5-65.3.15.3.25.3.35.3.45.3.5SpentFuelHandlingAccidentsFuelDecayLoadsOverSpentFuelTemperatureandWaterDensityEffectsConclusions5-65-85-95-95-95.4References5-10 Vted TABLE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLESTITLEDesignDataTableofModuleDataModuleDimensionsandWeightSummaryofCriticalSafetyAnalysesMinimumBurnupValuesReactivityEffectsofAbnormalandAccidentConditionsPAGE2-32-53-203-213-22FuelBurnupValuesforRequiredReactivities(k~)3-23withFuelofVariousInitialEnrichmentsComparisonofCold,CleanReactivitiesCalculatedat36.5Mwd/kgUBurnupand4.5XEnrichment3-2403-63-83-93-103-113-123-133-14EstimatedUncertaintiesinReactivityDueToFuelDepletionEffectsLongTermChangesinReactivityinStorageRackDesignBasis(Limiting)FuelAssemblySpecifications(CE14x14)Thermal/HydraulicCasesTreatedPeakingFactorDataEssentialHeatTransferDatafortheFuelPoolHeatExchangerPowerGenerationRatioPreviouslyDischargedBatchesBulkPoolTemperaturevs.TimeDuringNormalDischargePoolBulkTemperaturevs.TimeSubsequenttoCompletionofDischarge3-253-263-273-283-293-303-313-323-33 TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TABLETITLEPAGE3-153-163-173-183-194-14-24-34-4LossofCoolingafterCompletionofNormalRefuelingDischargeBulkPoolTemperaturevs.TimeDuringFullCoreDischargePoolBulkTemperaturevs.TimeSubsequenttoCompletionofFullCoreDischargeLossofCoolingAfterCompletionofFullCoreDischargeLocalandCladdingTemperatureDataBoraflexExperienceforHighDensityRacksMaximumStressSummaryStress/StrainSummaryforLinersandAnchorsSoilBearingStressesStabilitySafetyFactorsDegreesofFreedomNumberingSystemforGapElementsandFrictionElements3-343-353-363-373-384-354-364-374-384-394-404-84-94-10RackMaterialDataAdjustableHeightSupportMaterialDataBoundingValuesforStressFactors4-414-424-435-1NuclearFuelDischargeInformationStLucieUnit15-115-25-35-4AnnualFuelSavingsAttributedtoStLucieUnitNo.1GaseousReleasesFromFuelHandlingBuildingGammaIsotopicAnalysisSpentFuelPoolWater5-125-135-14 5-55-65-75-8TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TITLEAnticipatedDosesDuringRerackingEffectofTemperatureandVoidonCalculatedReactivityofStorageRackSpentFuelPoolPurificationSystemRadionuclideAnalysisReportResinActivitySpentFuelPoolAirborneActivityRadionuclideAnalysisReportPAGE5-155-165-175-18 FIGURE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEPoolLayoutTypicalRackElevation-Region1TypicalRackElevation-Region2AcceptableBurnupDomaininRegion2oftheStLuciePlantSpentFuelStorageRacksRegion1StorageCellGeometryRegion2StorageCellGeometryComparisonofDepletionCalculationsforFuelof4.5XInitialEnrichment3-53-64-24-44-54-64-74-84-12BulkPoolTemperatureModelforCodeBULKTEMIdealizationofRackAssemblyThermalChimneyFlowModelChannelElement-Regions1and2CompositeBoxAssembly-Region1GapElement-Region1TypicalCellElevation-Region1TypicalCellElevation-Region2AdjustableSupport3x3TypicalArray-Region13x3TypicalArray-Region2FuelHandlingBuildingSpectraEnvelopeCurvesMatPlanandSectionModelOverallViewNorthSouthSSEvii TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEEastWestSSEVerticalSSESchematicModelforDYNARACKRacktoRackImpactSpringsImpactSpringsArrangementatNodei,SpringMassSimulationforTwo-DimensionalMotionTestCoupon LISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGESPAGETitlePageiiiiiiivvviviiviii1-11-22-12-22-32H2-5Figure2-1Figure2-2Figure2-33-13-23-33H3-53W3-73W333-103-113-123-133-143-153-163-173-183-193-203-213-223-233-243-253-263-273-283-29REVISION00000000000000000000000000000PAGE3-303-313-323-333-343-353-363-373-38Figure3-1Figure3-2Figure3-3Figure3HFigure3-5Figure3W4-14-24-34-44-54W4-74W4H4-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-194-204-214-224-234-244-254-264-274-284-294-304-314-324-33REVISION LISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGESPAGE4-344-354-364-374-384-394%04-414%24%34444454-46Figure4-1Figure4-2Figure4-3Figure4-4Figure4-5REVISION0FigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigure5-15-25-35H5-55<5-75%5%5-105-115-125-135-145-155-165-175-185-194W4-74W494-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-190000100000000'000000 A'Ll4fAVg(.qf'4 l.0INTRODUCTION1.1LICENSEAMENDMENTREQUESTEDFloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)hascontractedforthedesignandmanufactureofnewspentfuelstoragerackstobeplacedintothespentfuelpoolofStLucieUnitNo.1.Thepurposeofthenewracksistoincreasetheamountofspentfuelthatcanbestoredintheexistingspentfuelpool.Theracksaredesignedsothattheycanstorespentfuelassembliesinahighdensityarray.Therefore,FPLherebyrequeststhataLicenseAmendmentbeissuedtotheStLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperatingLicenseDPR-67(1)toincludeinstallationanduseofnewstorageracksthatmeetthecriteriacontainedherein.ThisSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)hasbeenpreparedtosupportthisrequestforlicenseamendment.1.2CURRENTSTATUSTheexistingracksinthespentfuelpoolatStLucieUnitNo.1have728totalstoragecells.Withthepresentlyavailablestoragecells,StLucieUnitNo.1lostthefull-corereservestoragecapabilityaftertheseventhrefueling,whichwascompletedinthespringof1987.TocorrectthissituationandprovidesufficientcapacityatStLucieUnitNo.1tostoredischargedfuelassemblies,FPLplanstoreplacetheexistingstoragerackswithnewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.Thedesignofthenewrackswillallowformoredensestorageofspentfuel,thusenablingtheexistingpooltostoremorefuelinthespentfuelpool.Thenewhighdensityrackshaveausablestoragecapacityof1706cells,extendingthefull-core-reservestoragecapabilityuntiltheyear2009.Ifafullcoreoffloadisrequiredintheinterim,priortotheinstallationofthenewracks,FPLintendstotransferenoughoftheoldestspentfuelfromSt.LucieUnit1toSt.LucieUnit2toallowfullcoreoffload.AproposedlicenseamendmenttoallowspentfueltransferwassubmittedinJuly1986(2)andisbeingreviewedbytheNRC.1.3INTERFACESWITHOTHERORGANIZATIONSFPLhasoverallresponsibilityforthismodification.Holtec,Internationalhasdesignedthenewspentfuelstorageracks.JosephOat(JO)isresponsibleforthefabricationofthenewspentfuelstorageracksandtheevaluationofthoseracksunderaccidentconditions.EbascoServices,Inc.isresponsibleforthebuildingstructuralanalysis,theevaluationofthespentfuelcoolingsystemandtherelatedaccidentevaluations.Theinstaller,whowillbechosenlater,isresponsiblefortheinstallationofthenewspentfuelpoolracks.1.4SUMMARYOFREPORTThisSafetyAnalysisReportfollowstheguidanceoftheNRCpositionpaperentitled,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978,asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979().Sections3.0through5.0ofthisreportareconsistentwiththesection/subsectionformatandcontentoftheNRCpositionpaper,SectionsIIIthroughV.0076L/0011L 0~P~"~
1.1LicenseAmendment Requested 1.2CurrentStatus1.3"Interfaces withOtherOrganizations 1.4SummaryofReport1.5Conclusions 1.6References 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1ExistingRacks2.2NewHighDensityRacks3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULIC CONSIDERATIONS 3.1NeutronMultiplication Factor1-21-22-12-12-13-13-13.1.13.1.23.1.33.1.43.1.5NormalStoragePostulated Accidents Calculation MethodsRackModification Acceptance CriteriaforCriticality 3-13-23"23-93-103.2DecayHeatCalculations fortheSpentFuelPool(Bulk)3.2.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesign3.2.2DecayHeatAnalyses3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeup3.3Thermal-Hydraulic AnalysesfortheSpentFuelPool(Localized) 3.3.1Basis3.3.2ModelDescription 3.3.3CladdingTemperature 3-103-103-113"143-153-153-153-16 TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)SECTIONPAGE3.4Potential FuelandRackHandlingAccidents 3.4.1RackModuleMishandling 342Temporary Construction CraneDrop3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDrop)3.5Technical Specification Changes3.6References 3-163-173-173-173-173-184.0MECHANICAL,
Thenuclearandthermal-hydraulicaspectsofthereport(Section3.0)addresstheneutronmultiplicationfactor,consideringnormalstorageandhandlingofspentfuelaswellaspostulatedaccidentswithrespecttocriticalityandtheabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemtomaintainsufficientcooling.Movementofspentfuelstoredinthespentfuelpoolduringremovalofthepresentracksandinstallationofthenewracksisalsoaddressed.Section4.0,whichdescribesthemechanical,materialandstructuralaspectsofthenewracks,containsinformationconcerningthecapabilityofthefuelassemblies,storageracks,andspentfuelpoolsystemtowithstandtheeffectsofnaturalphenomenaandotherserviceloadingconditions.Theenvironmentalaspectsofthereport(Section5.0)concernthethermalandradiologicalreleasefromthefacilityundernormalandaccidentconditions.Thissectionalsoaddressestheoccupationalradiationexposures,generationofradioactivewaste,needforexpansion,commitmentofmaterialandnonmaterialresources,andacost-benefitassessment.
: MATERIAL, ANDSTRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 4.1Description ofStructure 4.1.1Description ofFuelHandlingBuilding4.1.2Description ofSpentFuelRacks4.2Applicable Codes,Standards, andSpecifications 4.2.1NRCDocuments 4.2.2IndustryCodesandStandards 4.3SeismicandImpactLoads4.4LoadsandLoadCombinations 4-14-14-14-54-74-84-94.4.1SpentFuelPool4.4.2SpentFuelRacks4.5DesignandAnalysisProcedures 4-94-114-124.5.14.5.2DesignandAnalysisProcedures forSpentFuelPoolDesignandAnalysisProcedures forSpentFuelStorageRacks4-124-134.6Structural Acceptance Criteria4-204.6.14.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.54.6.64.6.74.6.8Structural Acceptance CriteriaforSpentFuelPoolStructure Structural Acceptance CriteriaforSpentFuelStorageRacksFuelHandlingCraneUpliftAnalysisImpactAnalysisWeldStressesSummaryofMechanical'nalysis Definition ofTermsUsedInSection4LateralRackMovement4-204-234-274-274-274-284-294-30 4
TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)PAGE4.7Materials, QualityControl,andSpecialCon-struction Techniques 4.7.1Construction Materials 4.7.2NeutronAbsorbing Material4.7.3QualityAssurance 4.7.4Construction Techniques 4.8TestingandIn-Service Surveillance 4.8.1ProgramIntent4.8.2Description ofSpecimens 4.8.3SpecimenEvaluation 4.9References 4-304-304-304-304-304-324-324-324-324-335.0COST/BENEFIT ANDENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 5.1Cost/Benefit andThermalAssessment 5-15-15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.5NeedforIncreased StorageCapacityEstimated CostsConsideration ofAlternatives Resources Committed ThermalImpactontheEnvironment 5-15-15-25-25-25.2Radiological Evaluation 5-35.2.15.2.25.2.35.2.45.2.5SolidRadwasteGaseousReleasesPersonnel ExposureRadiation Protection DuringRe"RackActivities RackDisposal5-35-35-35-45-55.3AccidentEvaluation 5-65.3.15.3.25.3.35.3.45.3.5SpentFuelHandlingAccidents FuelDecayLoadsOverSpentFuelTemperature andWaterDensityEffectsConclusions 5-65-85-95-95-95.4References 5-10 Vted TABLE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLESTITLEDesignDataTableofModuleDataModuleDimensions andWeightSummaryofCriticalSafetyAnalysesMinimumBurnupValuesReactivity EffectsofAbnormalandAccidentConditions PAGE2-32-53-203-213-22FuelBurnupValuesforRequiredReactivities (k~)3-23withFuelofVariousInitialEnrichments Comparison ofCold,CleanReactivities Calculated at36.5Mwd/kgUBurnupand4.5XEnrichment 3-2403-63-83-93-103-113-123-133-14Estimated Uncertainties inReactivity DueToFuelDepletion EffectsLongTermChangesinReactivity inStorageRackDesignBasis(Limiting)
FuelAssemblySpecifications (CE14x14)Thermal/Hydraulic CasesTreatedPeakingFactorDataEssential HeatTransferDatafortheFuelPoolHeatExchanger PowerGeneration RatioPreviously Discharged BatchesBulkPoolTemperature vs.TimeDuringNormalDischarge PoolBulkTemperature vs.TimeSubsequent toCompletion ofDischarge 3-253-263-273-283-293-303-313-323-33 TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TABLETITLEPAGE3-153-163-173-183-194-14-24-34-4LossofCoolingafterCompletion ofNormalRefueling Discharge BulkPoolTemperature vs.TimeDuringFullCoreDischarge PoolBulkTemperature vs.TimeSubsequent toCompletion ofFullCoreDischarge LossofCoolingAfterCompletion ofFullCoreDischarge LocalandCladdingTemperature DataBoraflexExperience forHighDensityRacksMaximumStressSummaryStress/Strain SummaryforLinersandAnchorsSoilBearingStressesStability SafetyFactorsDegreesofFreedomNumbering SystemforGapElementsandFrictionElements3-343-353-363-373-384-354-364-374-384-394-404-84-94-10RackMaterialDataAdjustable HeightSupportMaterialDataBoundingValuesforStressFactors4-414-424-435-1NuclearFuelDischarge Information StLucieUnit15-115-25-35-4AnnualFuelSavingsAttributed toStLucieUnitNo.1GaseousReleasesFromFuelHandlingBuildingGammaIsotopicAnalysisSpentFuelPoolWater5-125-135-14 5-55-65-75-8TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TITLEAnticipated DosesDuringReracking EffectofTemperature andVoidonCalculated Reactivity ofStorageRackSpentFuelPoolPurification SystemRadionuclide AnalysisReportResinActivitySpentFuelPoolAirborneActivityRadionuclide AnalysisReportPAGE5-155-165-175-18 FIGURE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEPoolLayoutTypicalRackElevation
-Region1TypicalRackElevation
-Region2Acceptable BurnupDomaininRegion2oftheStLuciePlantSpentFuelStorageRacksRegion1StorageCellGeometryRegion2StorageCellGeometryComparison ofDepletion Calculations forFuelof4.5XInitialEnrichment 3-53-64-24-44-54-64-74-84-12BulkPoolTemperature ModelforCodeBULKTEMIdealization ofRackAssemblyThermalChimneyFlowModelChannelElement-Regions1and2Composite BoxAssembly-Region1GapElement-Region1TypicalCellElevation
-Region1TypicalCellElevation
-Region2Adjustable Support3x3TypicalArray-Region13x3TypicalArray-Region2FuelHandlingBuildingSpectraEnvelopeCurvesMatPlanandSectionModelOverallViewNorthSouthSSEvii TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEEastWestSSEVerticalSSESchematic ModelforDYNARACKRacktoRackImpactSpringsImpactSpringsArrangement atNodei,SpringMassSimulation forTwo-Dimensional MotionTestCoupon LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGESPAGETitlePageiiiiiiivvviviiviii1-11-22-12-22-32H2-5Figure2-1Figure2-2Figure2-33-13-23-33H3-53W3-73W333-103-113-123-133-143-153-163-173-183-193-203-213-223-233-243-253-263-273-283-29REVISION00000000000000000000000000000PAGE3-303-313-323-333-343-353-363-373-38Figure3-1Figure3-2Figure3-3Figure3HFigure3-5Figure3W4-14-24-34-44-54W4-74W4H4-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-194-204-214-224-234-244-254-264-274-284-294-304-314-324-33REVISION LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGESPAGE4-344-354-364-374-384-394%04-414%24%34444454-46Figure4-1Figure4-2Figure4-3Figure4-4Figure4-5REVISION0FigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigure5-15-25-35H5-55<5-75%5%5-105-115-125-135-145-155-165-175-185-194W4-74W494-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-190000100000000'000000 A'Ll4fAVg(.qf'4 l.0INTRODUCTION 1.1LICENSEAMENDMENT REQUESTED FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)hascontracted forthedesignandmanufacture ofnewspentfuelstoragerackstobeplacedintothespentfuelpoolofStLucieUnitNo.1.Thepurposeofthenewracksistoincreasetheamountofspentfuelthatcanbestoredintheexistingspentfuelpool.Theracksaredesignedsothattheycanstorespentfuelassemblies inahighdensityarray.Therefore, FPLherebyrequeststhataLicenseAmendment beissuedtotheStLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperating LicenseDPR-67(1) toincludeinstallation anduseofnewstorageracksthatmeetthecriteriacontained herein.ThisSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)hasbeenpreparedtosupportthisrequestforlicenseamendment.
1.2CURRENTSTATUSTheexistingracksinthespentfuelpoolatStLucieUnitNo.1have728totalstoragecells.Withthepresently available storagecells,StLucieUnitNo.1lostthefull-core reservestoragecapability aftertheseventhrefueling, whichwascompleted inthespringof1987.Tocorrectthissituation andprovidesufficient capacityatStLucieUnitNo.1tostoredischarged fuelassemblies, FPLplanstoreplacetheexistingstoragerackswithnewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.Thedesignofthenewrackswillallowformoredensestorageofspentfuel,thusenablingtheexistingpooltostoremorefuelinthespentfuelpool.Thenewhighdensityrackshaveausablestoragecapacityof1706cells,extending thefull-core-reserve storagecapability untiltheyear2009.Ifafullcoreoffloadisrequiredintheinterim,priortotheinstallation ofthenewracks,FPLintendstotransferenoughoftheoldestspentfuelfromSt.LucieUnit1toSt.LucieUnit2toallowfullcoreoffload.Aproposedlicenseamendment toallowspentfueltransferwassubmitted inJuly1986(2)andisbeingreviewedbytheNRC.1.3INTERFACES WITHOTHERORGANIZATIONS FPLhasoverallresponsibility forthismodification.
Holtec,International hasdesignedthenewspentfuelstorageracks.JosephOat(JO)isresponsible forthefabrication ofthenewspentfuelstorageracksandtheevaluation ofthoseracksunderaccidentconditions.
EbascoServices, Inc.isresponsible forthebuildingstructural
: analysis, theevaluation ofthespentfuelcoolingsystemandtherelatedaccidentevaluations.
Theinstaller, whowillbechosenlater,isresponsible fortheinstallation ofthenewspentfuelpoolracks.1.4SUMMARYOFREPORTThisSafetyAnalysisReportfollowstheguidanceoftheNRCpositionpaperentitled, "OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"
datedApril14,1978,asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979().Sections3.0through5.0ofthisreportareconsistent withthesection/subsection formatandcontentoftheNRCpositionpaper,SectionsIIIthroughV.0076L/0011L 0~P~"~
Thenuclearandthermal-hydraulic aspectsofthereport(Section3.0)addresstheneutronmultiplication factor,considering normalstorageandhandlingofspentfuelaswellaspostulated accidents withrespecttocriticality andtheabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemtomaintainsufficient cooling.Movementofspentfuelstoredinthespentfuelpoolduringremovalofthepresentracksandinstallation ofthenewracksisalsoaddressed.
Section4.0,whichdescribes themechanical, materialandstructural aspectsofthenewracks,containsinformation concerning thecapability ofthefuelassemblies, storageracks,andspentfuelpoolsystemtowithstand theeffectsofnaturalphenomena andotherserviceloadingconditions.
Theenvironmental aspectsofthereport(Section5.0)concernthethermalandradiological releasefromthefacilityundernormalandaccidentconditions.
Thissectionalsoaddresses theoccupational radiation exposures, generation ofradioactive waste,needforexpansion, commitment ofmaterialandnonmaterial resources, andacost-benefit assessment.


==1.5CONCLUSION==
==1.5CONCLUSION==
SOnthebasisoftheevaluationsandinformationpresentedinthisreport,plusoperatingexperiencewithhighdensityfuelstorageatStLucieUnit2andTurkeyPointUnit3,FPLconcludesthattheproposedmodificationofStLucieUnitNo.1spentfuelstoragefacilitiesprovidessafespentfuelstorage,andthatthemodificationiscong~tentwiththefacilitydesignandoperatingcriteriaasprovidedintheFSARandoperatinglicense.
S Onthebasisoftheevaluations andinformation presented inthisreport,plusoperating experience withhighdensityfuelstorageatStLucieUnit2andTurkeyPointUnit3,FPLconcludes thattheproposedmodification ofStLucieUnitNo.1spentfuelstoragefacilities providessafespentfuelstorage,andthatthemodification iscong~tent withthefacilitydesignandoperating criteriaasprovidedintheFSARandoperating license.


==1.6REFERENCES==
==1.6REFERENCES==
StLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperatingLicensesDPR67,DocketNo.50-335.2~FPLletterL-86-250datedJuly2,1986.3~NuclearRegulatoryCommission,LettertoAllPowerReactorLicensees,fromB.K.Grimes,April14,1978,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.StLuciePlantUnitNo.1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.1-20076L/0011L 4Jg~l!,I 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1EXISTINGRACKSThespentfuelpoolatSt.LucieUnit1presentlycontainsspentfuelassemblystoragerackswhicharedesignedtoprovidestoragelocationsforupto728fuelassemblies.Theracksaredesignedtomaintainthestoredfuelinasafe,eoolable,andsubcriticalconfigurationduringnormalandabnormalconditions.Thepresentstorageracksarearectangulararraycomposedof14modules.Eachstoragerackmoduleisselfsupportingandrestsonstainlesssteelpads.Thepresentracksarefreestandinginthattheyareneitherboltednorweldedtothefloor,noraretheyattachedtothepoolwalls.Theinterfacewiththepoolboundariesisdesignedtotransfernormalandshearloadsviatheracksupportsintothepoolbottomslab.Eachfuelassemblystoragemoduleiscomposedofrectangularstoragecavitiesfabricatedfromone-quarterinchthickstainlesssteelplate,witheachcavitycapableofacceptingonefuelassembly.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitieshavelead-insurfacesatthetoptoprovideguidanceforinsertionoffuelassemblies.Thecavitiesareopenatthetopandbottomtoprovideaflowpathforconvectivecoolingofspentfuelassembliesthroughnaturalcirculation.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitiesareconnectedbyachevrongridstructuretoformmoduleswhichlimitstructuraldeformationsandmaintainanominalcenter-to-centerspacingof12.53inchesbetweenadjacentstoragecavitiesduringdesignconditionsincludingseismic.ForfurtherinformationontheexistingspentfuelstorageracksseeSection9.1.2intheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.2.2NEWHIGHDENSITYRACKSThenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracksconsistofindividualcellswith8.65inchby8.65inch(nominal)squarecross-section,eachofwhichaccommodatesasingleCombustionEngineeringorExxonPWRfuelassemblyorequivalent,fromeitherSt.LucieUnit1orUnit2.Atotalof1706cellsarearrangedin17distinctmodulesofvaryingsizesintworegions.Region1isdesignedforstorageofnewfuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235.Region1isalsodesignedtostorefuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235thathavenotachievedadequateburnupforRegion2.TheRegion2cellsarecapableofaccommodatingfuelassemblieswithvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithinanacceptableboundasdiscussedinthisreport.Forexample,correspondingto4.5and4.0percentinitialenrichments,theminimumrequiredburn-upsforsafestorageinRegion2are36.5and30.9MWD/KgU,respectively.Figure2-1showsthearrangementoftherackmodulesinthespentfuelpool.Thehighdensityracksareengineeredtoachievethedualobjectiveofmaximumprotectionagainststructuralloadings(arisingfromgroundmotion,thermalstresses,etc.)'andthemaximizationofavailablestoragelocations.Ingeneral,agreaterwidth-to-heightaspectratioprovidesgreatermarginagainstrigidbodytipping.Hence,themodulesaremadeaslargeaspossiblewithintheconstraintsoftransportationandsitehandlingcapabilities.2-10076L/0011L tty,gW"f AsshowninFigure2-1,there-are17discretemodulesarrangedinthefuelpool.Eachrackmoduleisequipped(seeFigures2-2and2-3)withgirdlebars,3/4-inchthickby3-1/2incheshigh.Thenominalgapbetweenadjacentmodulewallsis1-1/2inches.Themodulesmakesurfacecontactbetweentheircontiguouswallsatthegirdlebarlocationsandthusmaintainaspecifiedgapbetweenthecellwalls.Table2-1givestherelevantdesigndataoneachregion.Themodulesinthetworegionsareofeightdifferenttypes.Tables2-2and2-3summarizethephysicaldataforeachmoduletype.ThepoisoninRegions1and2isBoraflex.Theuseofthisabsorbermaterialistoprecludeinadvertentcriticality.0076L/0011L2-2Revision1 TABLE2-1DESIGNDATARegionMin.B-10FluxTrapCellPitchLoadingGap(nominalinch)(arealdensity)(nominalinch)10.128.86.020gm/cm.007gm/cm21.120.02-30076L/0011L TABLE2-2TABLEOFMODULEDATAMODULEI.D.NO.OFMODULESNO.OFCELLSINNWDIRECTIONNO.OFCELLSINEWDIRECTIONTOTALNO.OFCELLSPERMODULERegion1AlandA281Region1BlandB21090Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2131311710488Region2Fl1296-Region2GlandG2Region2*Hl121310896*Cellsmissinginthismoduleduetosparger.RefertoFigure2-1.0076L/0011LRevision1 TABLE2-3MODULEDIMENSIONSANDWEIGHTMODULEI.D.NOMINALCROSS%ECTION+DIMENSIONSN-SEWESTIMATEDDRYWEIGHT(lbs)PERMODULERegion1AlandA290-1/4"90-1/4"26,700Region1BlandB290-1/4"100-7/16"29,800Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2Region2FlRegion2GlandG2Region2Hl115-11/16"80-1/6"97-7/8"71-3/16"106-3/4"71-3/16"106-3/4"80-1/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"24,10021,500187200190800.22,300190800*Excludinggirdlebars0076L/0011LRevision1 U~,V')~U,UU N~-413/1B"REF78'8.7/8"~~87.7/8"~i444"(37-0")111/8"REF.CrrCC7crrCLUJC'C7LrrCC7rcrr8CASKAREAEl11x8E211x8Hl13x8-4x20113x8COrAl9x9REGION1A29x9REGION1CtCSCJ7Crr7cbCC7G112x9C113x9C213x9ll0CIll0C0C/7r~C0OQmmcrrez--IG)C~xz~O0zMC/7OXcrrErrcr7O4COcbCC7CC7r819x10REGION1G212x9C313x9C413x9Fl12x8D213x8D313x8B29x10REGION11~1/2"1~1/2"~106.3/4"~~115.11/16"115.11/16"90-1/4"51/255/8"REFCOTrC)COCC7r  
 
+.os"10.12"PITCHGIROLEBARIttIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIoIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATIONREGION1FIGURE2-2 P'hh~~PPP>>fPPPPP-P'PPPPPIIh)~~I'P 04II8.86"PITCHGIRDLEBAR4IIIIIttIIILJIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATIONREGION2FIGURE2-3 3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULICCONSIDERATIONS3.1NEUTRONMULTIPLICATIONFACTORThefollowingsubsectionsdescribetheconditionsinthespentfuelpoolwhichareassumedincalculatingtheeffectiveneutronmultiplicationfactor(keff),theanalysismethodology,andtheanalysisresults.ThecriticalityanalysesofeachofthetwoseparateregionsofthespentfuelstoragepoolaresummarizedinTable3-1fortheanticipatednormalstorageconditions.ThecalculatedmaximumreactivityinRegion2includesaburnup-dependentallowanceforuncertaintyindepletioncalculationsand,furthermore,providesanadditionalmarginof0.00655kbelowthelimitingeffectivemultiplicationfactor(k~~)of0.95.Ascoolingtimeincreasesinlong-termstorage,decayofPu-ZOIresultsinasignificantdecreaseinreactivity,whichwillprovideanincreasingsubcriticalitymarginandtendstofurthercompensateforanyuncertaintyindepletioncalculations.Spacingbetweentwodifferentrackmodulesissufficienttoprecludeadversenuclearinteraction,sincetheminimumspacingbetweenracksisgreaterthanthedesignwatergapspacing.Region2canaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentsanddischargefuelburnups,providedthecombinationfallswithintheacceptabledomainillustratedinFigure3-1.Forconvenienceofreference,theminimumburnupvaluesinFigure3-1havebeenfittedbylineartangentsatvariousvaluesandtheresultsaretabulatedinTable3-2.Linearinterpolationbetweenthetabulatedvalueswillalwaysyieldvaluesonorconservativelyabovethecurveoflimitingburnups.ThesedatawillbeimplementedinappropriateadministrativeprocedurestoassureverifiedburnupasspecifiedindraftRegulatoryGuide1.13,Revision2.Administrativeprocedureswillalsobeemployedtoconfirmandassurethepresenceofsolublepoisoninthepoolwateratalltimes,providingafurthermarginofsafetyandassuringsubcriticalityintheeventoffuelmisplacementduringfuelhandlingoperations,asdiscussedinSection3.1.2.3.1.1.1NewFuelStorageinRegion2Criticalityanalysesconfirmthatacheckerboardpattern(fuelassembliesaligneddiagonally)providesanacceptablek~forthestorageoffreshfuelassembliesof4.5XenrichmentinRegion2.Thesecalculationsindicateanominalk~of0.819+0.025(95X/95X)whenfullyfloodedwithcleanunboratedwater.Thisvalueissubstantiallylessthanthelimitingkeffof0.95,evenwiththeadditionofareasonableallowanceforuncertainties.\WithBoraflexabsorberbetweenassemblies,conditionsdonotexistfortheappearanceofapeakinreactivityatlowmoderatordensities,andthefullyfloodedconditioncorrespondstothehighestreactivity(optimummoderation).Thus,thecheckerboardpatternofnew4.5XenrichedfuelinRegion2representsasafeconfigurationinconformancewithbothStandardReviewPlan(SRP)9.1.1and9.1.2.3-10076L/0011L L)~(~I$4'4%I'I~tJr~4(1v"k' 3.1.2PostulatedAccidentsAlthoughcreditforthesolublepoisonnormallypresentinthespentfuelpoolwaterispermittedunderabnormaloraccidentconditions",mostabnormaloraccidentconditionswillnotresultinexceedingthelimitingreactivity(keffof0.95)evenintheabsenceofsolublepoison.TheeffectsonreactivityofcredibleabnormalandaccidentconditionsaresummarizedinTable3-3.Oftheseabnormal/accidentconditions,onlyonehasthepotentialforamorethannegligiblepositivereactivityeffect.Theinadvertentmisplacementofafreshfuelassembly(eitherintoaRegion2storagecelloroutsideandadjacenttoarackmodule)hasthepotentialforexceeIingthelimitingreactivityshouldtherebeaconcurrentandindependentaccidentconditionresultinginthelossofallsolublepoison.Administrativeproceduresassurethepresenceofsolublepoisonatalltimesandwillprecludethepossibilityofthesimultaneousoccurrenceofthesetwoindependentaccidentconditions.ThelargestreactivityincreaseoccursforaccidentallyplacinganewfuelassemblyintoaRegion2storagecellwithallothercellsfullyloadedwithfuelofthehighestpermissiblereactivity.Underthiscondition,thepresenceofapproximately500ppmsolubleboronassuresthattheinfinitemultiplicationfactorwouldnotexceedthedesignbasisreactivityforRegion2.Withthenormalconcentrationofsolublepoisonpresent(1720ppmboron),k~islessthan0.80andthestoragerackswouldnotbecriticalevenifRegion2weretobefullyloadedwithfreshfuelof4.5Xenrichment.Thisconcentrationofsolubleboronalsoprecludesthepossibilityofexceedingthecriticalitylimitintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.SeeSection5.3fordiscussionsonAccidentEvaluations.3.1.3CalculationMethods3t103+]CriticalityAnalysisforRegion13.1.3.1.1NominalDesignCaseUndernormalconditions,withnominaldimensions,thekmvaluescalculatedbythreedifferentmethodsofanalysisareasfollows:AnalticalMethodBias-correctedk~CASMO-2E0.9313+0.0018AMPX-KENO(27-gpSCALE)0.9210+0.0084Diffusion/blackness0.9313theoryMaximumk~(95X/95X)0.93310.92940.9313TheAMPX-KENOcalculationsincludeaone-sidedtolerancefactor(13)correspondingto95Xprobabilityata95Xconfidence'limit..Forthenominaldesigncase,theCASMO-2Ecalculationyieldsthehighestreactivityand,therefore,theindependentverificationcalculationssubstantiateCASMO-2Eastheprimarycalculationalmethod.*DoublecontingencyprincipleofANSIN16.1-1975,asspecifiedintheApril4,1978NRCletter(Section1.2)andimpliedintheproposedrevision(draft)toReg.Guide1.13(Section1.4,AppendixA)~3-20076L/0011L 3.1.3.1.2BoronLoadingVariationTheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedinRegion1storagecellsarenominally0.075inchthick,withaB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm.Independent2manufacturin~tolerancelimitsare+0.007inchinthicknessand+0.009g/cminB-10content.Thisassurestha)atanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration(0.1158gramB-10/cm)andminimumBoraflexthickness(0.068inch)maycoincide,theboron-lO,arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.020g/cm.DifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculationsindicatethatthesetolerancelimitsresultinreactivityuncertaintyof+0.0021Akforboroncontentand+0.00445kforBoraflexthicknessvariations.3.1.3.1.3StorageCellLatticePitchVariationThedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassembliesinRegion1is10.12inches.Adecreaseinstoragecelllatticespacingmayormaynotincreasereactivitydependinguponotherdimensionalchangesthatmaybeassociatedwiththedecreaseinlatticespacing.Increasingthewaterthicknessbetweenthefuelandtheinnerstainlesssteelboxresultsinasmallincreaseinreactivity.Thereactivityeffectoftheflux-trapwaterthickness,however,ismoresignificant,anddecreasingtheflux-trapwaterthicknessincreasesreactivity.Bothoftheseeffectshavebeenevaluatedforindependentdesigntolerances.Theinnerstainlesssteelboxdimension,8.650+0.032inches,definestheinnerwaterthicknessbetweenthefuelandtheinsidebox.Forthetolerancelimit,theuncertaintyinreactivityis+0.00115kasdeterminedbydifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculations,withk~increasingastheinnerstainlesssteelboxdimension(andderivativelatticespacing)increases.Thedesignflux-trapwater.thicknessis1.120+0.040inches,whichresultsinanuncertaintyof+0.0043Qkduetothetoleranceinflux-trapwaterthickness,assumingthewaterthicknessissimultaneouslyreducedonallfoursides.Sincethemanufacturingtolerancesoneachofthefoursidesarestatisticallyindependent,thenactualreactivityuncertaintieswouldbelessthan+0.0043,althoughthemoreconservativevaluehasbeenusedinthecriticalityevaluation.3.1.3.1.4BoraflexWidthToleranceVariationThereferencestoragecelldesignforRegion1(Figure3-2)usesaBoraflexbladewidthof7.50+0.0625inches.ApositiveincrementinreactivityoccursforadecreaseinBoraflexabsorberwidth.Forareductioninwidthofthemaximumtolerance,0.0625inch,thecalculatedpositivereactivityincrementis+0.00175k.3.1.3.1.5StainlessSteelThicknessTolerancesThenominalstainlesssteelthicknessinRegion1is0.080+0.005inchfortheinnerstainlesssteelboxand0.020+0.003inchfortheBoraflexcoverplate.Themaximumpositivereactivityeffectoftheexpectedstainlesssteelthicknesstolerancevariations,statisticallycombined,wascalculated(CASMO-2E)tobe+0.00105k.3-30076L/0011L k't'A'yc,ICl'pp<,"-.qduTIgyIN''4stIl~Jk~1%.
StLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperating LicensesDPR67,DocketNo.50-335.2~FPLletterL-86-250datedJuly2,1986.3~NuclearRegulatory Commission, LettertoAllPowerReactorLicensees, fromB.K.Grimes,April14,1978,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"
3.1.3.1.6FuelEnrichmentandDensityVariationThedesignmaximumenrichmentis4.50+0.05wtXU-235.CalculationsofthesensitivitytosmallenrichmentvariationsbyCASMO-2Eyieldedacoefficientof0.00545kper0.1wtXU-235atthedesignenrichment.ForatoleranceonU-235enrichmentof+0.05inwtX,theuncertaintyonkcois+0.00275k.CalculationswerealsomadewiththeU02fueldensityincreasedtothemaximumexpectedvalueof10.811g/cm3(smeareddensity).Forthereferencedesigncalculations,theuncertaintyinreactivityis+0.00055koverthemaximumexpectedrangeofU02densities.3.1.3.1.7FuelPinPitchNormally,thefuelpinsinthelatticearearrangedona0.577inchlatticespacing.Forthemaximumexpectedtoleranceof+0.0023inch,thecalculateduncertaintyis+0.00245k.3.1.3.1.8EccentricPositioningofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackTheFuelAssemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculationswerealsomadewiththefuelassembliesassumedtobethecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assemblyclusteratclosestapproach).Thesecalculationsindicatedthatthereactivityincreasesveryslightly,asdeterminedbydifferentialPD$07calculationswithdiffusioncoefficients"generatedbyNULIFandablacknesstheoryroutine.ThisuncertaintyisincludedintheevaluationofthehighestpossiblereactivityoftheRegion1storagecells.3.1.3.1.9SummaryofRegion1Cri.ticalityResultsTable3-1demonstratesthattheCASMO-2EcalculatedresultsforRegion1storingfreshfuelat4.50w/oU-235enrichmentpluscalculationalbiasanduncertaintiesexhibitamaximumk~of0.9409whichallowsamarginof0.0091Qkbelowthelimitingeffectivemultiplicationfactorof0.95.3.1.3.2CriticalityAnalysisforRegion23.1.3.2.1NominalDesignCaseTheprincipalmethodofanalysisinRegion2wastheCASMO-2Ecode,usingtherestartoptioninCASMOtotransferfuelofaspecifiedburnupintothestoragerackconfigurationatareferencetemperatureof4oC(maximummoderatordensity).Calculationsweremadeforfuelofseveraldifferentinitialenrichmentsand,ateachenrichment,alimitingkmvaluewasestablishedwhichincludedanadditionalfactorforuncertaintyintheburnupanalysisandfortheaxialburnupdistribution.TherestartCASMO-2Ecalculations(cold,clean,rackgeometry)weretheninterpolatedtodefinetheburnupvalueyieldingthelimitingka>valueforeachenrichment,asindicatedinTable3-4.TheseconvergedburnupvaluesdefinetheboundaryoftheacceptabledomainshowninFigure3-1.*ThiscalculationalapproachwasnecessarysincethereactivityeffectsaretoosmalltobecalculatedbyKENO,andCASMO-2Egeometryisnotreadilyamenabletoeccentricpositioningofafuelassembly.3-40076L/0011L I'if'Itcl4fQ10f Ataburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,thesensitivitytoburnupiscalculatedtobe-0.00746kperMwd/kgU.Duringlong-termstorage,thekcvaluesoftheRegion2fuelrackwilldecreasecontinuouslyfromdecayofPu-241,asindicatedinSection3.1.3.3.4.TwoindependentcalculationalmethodswereusedtoprovideadditionalconfidenceinthereferenceRegion2criticalityanalyses.Fuelof1.69Kinitialenrichment(approximatelyequivalenttothereferencerackdesignforburnedfuel)wasanalyzedbyAMPX-KENO(27-groupSCALEcross-sectionlibrary)andbytheCASMO-2EmodelusedfortheRegion2rackanalysis.Forthiscase,theCASMO-2Ek~(0.9304)waswithinthestatisticaluncertaintyofthebias-correctedvalue(0.9347+0.0064)(95K/95X)obtainedintheAMPX-KENOcalculations.ThisagreementconfirmsthevalidityoftheprimaryCASMO-2Ecalculations.ThesecondindependentmethodofanalysisusedwastheNULIFcodeforburnupanalysis,andforgeneratingdiffusiontheoryconstants(cold,clean)forthecompositionat36.5Mwd/kgUwithfuelof4.5Xinitialenrichment.Theseconstants,togetherwithblacknesstheoryconstantsfortheBoraflexabsorber,werethenusedinatwo-dimensionalPD$07calculationforthestoragerackconfiguration.Theresultofthiscalculation(keof0.8959)wassomewhatlowerthanthecorrespondingCASMO-2Ecalculationforthesameconditions(kaof0.9114)andthusalsotendstoconfirmthevalidityoftheprimarycalculationalmethod.3.1.3.2.2BoronLoadingVariationTheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedintheRegion2storagecellsarenominally0.031inchthickwithaB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm2.Independentmanufacturinglimitsare+0.007inchinthicknessand+0.009g/cm3inB-10content.Thisassuresthatatanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration(0.1158gB-10/cm)andtheminimumBoraflexthickness(0.024inch)maycoincide,theboron-10arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.007g/cm.2DifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculationsindicatethatthesetolerancelimitsresultinanincrementalreactivityuncertaintyof+0.0036Qkforboroncontentand+0.0111QkforBoraflexthickness.3.1.3.2.3BoraflexWidthToleranceThereferencestoragecelldesignforRegion2(Figure3-3)usesaBoraflexabsorberwidthof7.25+0.0625inches.Forareductioninwidthofthemaximumtolerance,thecalculatedpositivereactivityincrementis0.0011Qk.3.1.3.2.4StorageCellLatticePitchVariationsThedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassembliesinRegion2is8.86+0.04inches,correspondingtoanuncertaintyinreactivityof0.00165k.3.1.3.2.5StainlessSteelThicknessToleranceThenominalthicknessofthestainlesssteelboxwallis0.080inchwithatolerancelimitof+0.005inch,resultinginanuncertaintyinreactivityof+0.00025k.3-50076L/0011L  
asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.StLuciePlantUnitNo.1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.1-20076L/0011L 4Jg~l!,I 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1EXISTINGRACKSThespentfuelpoolatSt.LucieUnit1presently containsspentfuelassemblystoragerackswhicharedesignedtoprovidestoragelocations forupto728fuelassemblies.
".4l~lipv>$'lyt 3.1.3.2.6FuelEnrichment,DensityandPinPitchVariationUncertaintiesinreactivityduetotolerancesonfuelenrichment,UO2density,andpinpitchinRegion2areassumedtobethesameasthosedeterminedforRegionl.3.1.3.2.7EccentricPositioningofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackThefuelassemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculationswerealsomadewiththefuelassembliesassumedtobeinthecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assemblyclusteratclosestapproach).Thesecalculationsindicatedthatthereactivitydecreasesveryslightly,asdeterminedbyPDQ07calculationswithdiffusioncoefficientsgeneratedbyNULIFandablacknesstheoryroutine.Thehighestreactivitythereforecorrespondstothereferencedesignwiththefuelassembliespositionedinthecenterofthestoragecells.3.1.3.3AnalyticalMethodology3.1.3.3.1ReferenceAnalyticalMethodsandBiasTheCASMO-2Ecomputercode',atwo-dimensionalmultigrouptransporttheorycodeforfuelassemblies,hasbeenbenchmarkedandisusedbothasaprimarymethodofanalysis,andasameansofevaluatingsmallreactivityincrementsassociatedwithmanufacturingtolerance.CASMO-2Ebenchmarkingresultedinacalculationalbiasof0.0013+0.0018(95X/95X).Infuelrackanalyses,forindependentverification,criticalityanalysesofthehighdensityspentfue)stgagerackswerealsoperformedwiththeAHPE-[computerpackage'usingthe27-groupSCALEcross-sectionlibran)withtheNITAWLsubroutineforU23Sresonanceshieldingeffects(Nordheimintegraltreatment).Benchmarkcalculationsresultedinabiasof0.0106+0.0048(95X/95X)~InthegeometricmodelusedinKENO,eachfuelrodanditscladdingweredescribedexplicitly.InRegion1calculations,areflectingboundarycondition(zeroneutroncurrent)wasusedintheaxialdirectionandatthecenterlineofthewatergapbetweenstoragecells.Theseboundaryconditionshavetheeffectofcreatinganinfinitearrayofstoragecellsinalldirections.InRegion2,thezerocurrentboundaryconditionwasappliedatthecenteroftheBoraflexabsorbersheetsbetweenstoragecells.TheAMPX-KENOMonteCarlocalculationsinherentlyincludeastatisticaluncertaintyduetotherandomnatureofneutrontracking.TominimizethestatisticaluncertaintyoftheKENO-calculatedreactivity,atotalof50,000neutronhistoriesisnormallyaccumulatedforeachcalculation,in100generationsof500neutronseach.*SCALEisanacronymforStandardizedComputerAnalysisforLicensingEvaluation,astandardcross-sectionsetdevelopedbyORNLfortheUSNRC.3-60076L/0011L Kr(
Theracksaredesignedtomaintainthestoredfuelinasafe,eoolable, andsubcritical configuration duringnormalandabnormalconditions.
CASMO"2Eisalsousedforburnupcalculations,withindependentverificationbyEPRI-CELLandNULIFcalculations.Intrackinglong-term(30-year)reactivityeffectsofspentfuelstoredinRegion2ofthefuelstoragerack,EPRI-CELLcalculationsindicateacontinuousreductioninreactivitywithtime(afterXedecay)dueprimarilytoPu-241decayandAm-241growth.Athirdindependentmethodofcriticalityanalysis,utilizingdiffusion/blacknesstheory,wasalsousedforadditionalconfidenceinresultsoftheprimarycalculationalmethods,althoughnorelianceforcriticalitysafetyisplacedonthereactivityvaluefromthediffusion/blacknesstheorytechnique.Thistechnique,however,isusedforauxiliarycalculationsofthesmallincrementalreactivityeffectofeccentricfuelpositioningthatwouldotherwisebelostinnormalKENOstatisticalvariations,orwouldbeinconsistentwithCASMO-2Egeometrylimitations.Crosssectionsforthediffusion/blacknesstheorycalculationswerederivedfromtheNULIFcomputercode),supplementedbyablacknesstheoryroutinethateffectivelyimposesatransporttheoryboundaryconditionatthesurfaceoftheBoraflexneutronabsorber.Twodifferentspatialdiffusiontheorycodes,PDQ07(intwodimensionsandSNEID*inonedimension,wereusedtocalculatereactivities.3.1.3.3.2FuelBurnupCalculationsFuelburnupcalculationsi'nthehotoperatingconditionwereperformedprimarilywiththeCASMO"2Ecode.However,toenhancethecredibilityoftheburnupcalculations,theCASMO-2EresultswereindependentlycheckedbycalculationswiththeNULIFcode(7)andwithEPRI-CELL(9).Figure3-4comparesresultsoftheseindependentmethodsofburnupanalysisunderhotreactoroperatingconditions.TheresultsagreewiththeCASMOcalculationwithin0.00546kinthehotoperatingcondition.AnarchivecalculationwiththeCHEETAH-PcodeisalsopresentedinFigure3-4foradditionalconfidence.Similarcomparisonswereobtainedinburnupcalculationsforotherinitialenrichments,asindicatedinFigure3-4.Inadditiontodepletioncalculationsunderhotoperatingconditions,reactivitycomparisonsunderconditionsmorerepresentativeoffueltobestoredintheracks(cold,xenon-free)arealsosignificantinstoragerackcriticalityanalyses.Table3-5comparesthecold,xenon"freereactivitiescalculatedbyCASM0-2E,EPRI-CELL,anddiffusion/blacknesstheory.Intherackundercoldconditions,theCASMO-2EcalculationsgaveaslightlyhigherreactivityvaluefortheRegion2fuelstoragecell,andthegoodagreementgenerallyobservedlendscredibilitytothecalculations.*SNEIDisaone-dimensionaldiffusiontheoryroutinedevelopedbyBlack&VeatchandverifiedbycomparisonwithPDQ07one-dimensionalcalculations.3-70076L/0011L iIPIgI~Cl4s41kIQI~'I'IIII'JII/11~'FIII~,I~$1YIt4I Nodefinitivemethodexistsfordeterminingtheuncertaintyinburnup-dependentreactivitycalculations.Allofthecodesdiscussedabovehavebeenusedtoaccuratelyfollowreactivitylossratesino~e~atinareactors.CASMO-2Ehasbeenextensivelybenchmarked(1>>yagainst1230cold,clean,criticalexperiments(includingplutonium-bearingfuel),MonteCarlocalculations,reactoroperations,andhyavy-elementconcentrationinirradiatedfuel.Inparticular,theanalyses<10>ofllcriticalexperimentswithplutonium-bearingfuelgaveanaveragekeffof1.002+0.011(95X/95X),showingadequatetreatmentoftheplutoniumnuclides.Inaddition,Johansson(11)hasobtainedverygoodagreementincalculationsofclose-packed,high-plutonium-content,experimentalconfigurations.Sincecritical-experimentdatawithspentfuelisnotavailable,itisnecessarytoassignanuncertaintyinreactivitybasedonotherconsiderations,supportedbythecloseagreementbetweendifferentcalculationalmethodsandthegeneralindustryexperienceinpredictingreactivitylossratesinoperatingplants.Overaconsiderableportionoftheburnup,thereactivitylossrateinPMRsisapproximately0.01AkforeachMwd/kgUburnup,becomingsomewhatsmalleratthehigherburnups.Byconservativelyassuminganuncertaintyinreactivityof0.0005timestheburnupinMwd/kgU,aburnup-dependentuncertaintyisdefinedthatincreaseswithincreasingfuelburnup,aswouldbereasonablyexpected.Thisassumptionprovidesanestimateoftheburnupuncertaintythatismoreconservativeandboundsestimatesfrequentlyemployedinotherfuelracklicensingapplications(i.e.,5Xofthetotalreactivitydecrement).Atthedesignbasisburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,theestimateofburnupuncertaintyis0.0183Ak;Table3-6summarizesresultsoftheburnupanalysesandestimateduncertaintiesatotherburnups.Theseuncertaintiesareappreciablylarger,ingeneral,thanwouldbe'suggestedbytheindustryexperienceinpredictingreactivitylossratesandboronlet-downcurvesovermanycyclesinoperatingplants.Theincreasinglevelofconservatismatthehigherfuelburnupsprovidesanadequatemarginintheuncertaintyestimatetoaccommodatethepossibleexistenceofasmallpositivereactivityincrementfromtheaxialdistributioninburnup(seeSection3.1.3.3.3).Inaddition,althoughtheburnupuncertaintymaybeeitherpositiveornegative,itistreatedasanadditivetermratherthanbeingcombinedstatisticallywithotheruncertainties.Thus,theallowanceforuncertaintyinburnupcalculationsisconsideredtobeaconservativeestimate,particularlyinviewofthesubstantialreactivitydecreasewithagedfuel,asdiscussedinSection3.1.3.3.4.*Onlythatportionoftheuncertaintyduetoburnup.'theruncertaintiesareaccountedforelsewhere.3-80076L/0011L S$kQt'+1qZil, 3.1.3.3.3EffectofAxialBurnupDistributionInitially,fuelloadedintothereactorwillburnwithaslightlyskewedcosinepowerdistribution.Asburnupprogresses,theburnupdistributionwilltendtoflatten,becomingmorehighlyburnedinthecentralregionsthanintheupperandlowerends.ThiseffectmaybeclearlyseeninthecurvescompiledinReference12.Athighburnup,themorereactivefuelneartheendsofthefuelassembly(lessthanaverageburned)occursinregionsoflowerreactivityworthduetoneutronleakage.Consequently,itisexpectedthatdistributed-burnupfuelassemblieswouldexhibitaslightlylowerreactivitythanthatcalculatedfortheaverageburnup.Asburnupprogresses,thedistribution,tosomeextent,tendstobeself-regulatingascontrolledbytheaxialpowerdistribution,precludingtheexistenceoflargeregionsofsignificantlyreducedburnup.Anumberofone-dimensionaldiffusiontheoryanalyseshavebeenmadebaseduponcalculatedandmeasuredaxialburnupdistributions.Theseanalysesconfirmtheminor,andgenerallynegative,reactivityeffectoftheaxiallydistributedburnup.Thetrendsobserved,however,suggestthepossibilityofasmallpositivereactivityeffectatthehighburnupvalues(estimatedtobeasmuchas0.0066kat36.5Mwd/kgU);buttheuncertaintyinkcduetoburnup,assignedatthehigherburnups(Section3.1.3.3.2),isadequatelyconservativetoencompassthepotentialforasmallpositivereactivityeffectofaxialburnupdistributions.Furthermore,reactivitysignificantlydecreaseswithtimeinstorage(Section3.1.3.3.4),and,inaddition,"thereisafurthermargininreactivity()0.0066k)sincethemaximumcalculatedvalue(0.9435)isbelowthelimitingkegpvalue(0.95).ThesefactorswouldaccommodateanyreasonablereactivityeZKectsthatmightbelargerthanexpected.3.1.3.3.4Long-termDecaySincethefuelracksinRegion2areintendedtocontainspentfuelforlongperiodsoftime,calculationsweremadeusingEPRI-CELL(whichincorporatestheCINDERcode)tofollowthelong-termchangesinreactivityofspentfuelovera30-yearperiod.CINDERtracksthedecayandburnupdependenceofsome179fissionproducts.Earlyinthedecayperiod,xenongrowsfromiodinedecay(reducingreactivity)andsubsequentlydecays,withthereactivityreachingamaximumat100-200hours.ThedecayofPu-241(13"yearhalf-life)andgrowthofAm-241substantiallyreducereactivityduringlongtermstorage,asindicatedinTable3-7.Thereferencedesigncriticalitycalculationsdonottakecreditforthislong-termreductioninreactivity,otherthantoindicateanincreasingsubcriticalitymargininRegion2ofthespentfuelstoragepool.3.1.4RackModificationThedesignbasisfuelassembly,illustratedinFigure3-2,isa14x14arrayoffuelrodswith20rodsreplacedby5controlrodguidetubes.Table3-8summarizesthedesignspecificationsandtheexpectedrangeofsignificantvariations.Independentcalculations,withotherpotentialfuelassemblyspecifications,confirmedthatthe14x14CEdesignexhibitedthehighestreactivityandwasthereforeusedasthedesignbasis.3-90076L/0011L t$th4iI'I4jll~~g~li 3.1.4.1Region1StorageCellsThenominalspentfuelstoragecellusedforthecriticalityanalysesofRegion1storagecellsisshowninFigure3-2.TherackiscomposedofBoraflexabsorbermaterialsandwichedbetweenan8.65-inchI.D.,0.080-inchthickinnerstainlesssteelbox,anda0.020-inchouterstainlesssteelcoverplate.Thefuelassembliesarecentrallylocatedineachstoragecellonanominallatticespacingof10.120+0.05inches.Stainlesssteelgapchannelsconnectonestoragecellboxtoanotherinarigidstructureanddefineanouterwaterspacebetweenboxes.Thisouterwaterspaceconstitutesaflux-trapbetweenthetwoBoraflexabsorbersheetsthatareessentiallyopaque(black)tothermalneutrons.TheBoraflexabsorberhasathicknessof0.075+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm2.3.1.4.2Region2StorageCellsRegion2storagecellsweredesignedforfuelof4.5wtXU-235initialenrichmentburnedto36.5Mwd/kgU.Inthisregion,thestoragecellsarecomposedofasingleBoraflexabsorbersandwichedbetweenthe0.080-inchstainlesssteelwallsofadjacentstoragecells.Thesecells,showninFigure3-3,arelocatedonalatticespacingof8.86+0.040inches.TheBoraflexabsorberhasathicknessof0.031+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm.3.1.5AcceptanceCriteriaforCriticalitCriticalityisprecludedbyspacingofthefuelassemblies,whichensuresthatasubcriticalarrayofkefflessthanorequalto0.95ismaintained,assumingunboratedpoolwater.Thepool,however,willalwayscontainboricacidattherefuelingconcentrationof1720ppmwheneverthereisirradiatedfuelinthepool.Theneutronmultiplicationfactorinspentfuelpoolsshallbelessthanorequalto0.95,includingalluncertainties,underallconditions.CalculatedmaximumreactivityuncertaintiesforfuelstoredintheracksarepresentedinTable3-1.Methodsofinitialandlong-termverificationofpoisonmaterialstabilityandmechanicalintegrityarediscussedinSection4.8.3.2DECAYHEATCALCULATIONSFORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(BULK)3.2.1SentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesignFornormalrefuelingdischargeconditions,onefuelpoolpumpandthefuelpoolheatexchangerareinservice.Duringabnormalrefuelingconditions,suchasfullcoredischarge,twofuelpoolpumpsandtheheatexchangerareinservice.Thesystemismanuallycontrolledandtheoperationmonitoredlocally,exceptasfollows.Apressureswitchonthefuelpoolpumpdischargeheaderannunciateslowheaderpressureinthecontrolroom.Thefuelpoolhightemperaturealarmandlowlevelalarmsareannunciatedinthecontrolroom.Intheeventthefuelpoolpumpbreakersareopened,analarmisannunciatedinthecontrolroom.Thecomponentcoolingwaterflowtothefuelpoolheatexchangerisinitiallyad)ustedtotherequiredflow.Furtheradjustmentsofthecomponentcoolingwaterarenotrequired.Thecomponentcoolingwaterdischargelinehasaflowindicator.Highandlowcomponentcoolingwaterflowalarmsareannunciatedinthecontrolroom.3-100076L/0011L t'~yCP7'tr, Theclarityandpurityofthewaterinthefuelpoolismaintainedbythepurificationportionofthefuelpoolsystem.Thepurificationloopconsistsofthefuelpoolpurificationpump,ionexchanger,filter,strainersandsurfaceskimmers.Mostofthepurificationflowisdrawnthroughthesurfaceskimmerstoremovesurfacedebris.Abasketstrainerisprovidedinthepurificationlinetothepumpsuctiontoremoveanyrelativelylargeparticulatematter.Thefuelpoolwateriscirculatedbythepumpthroughafilter,whichremovesparticulateslargerthan5micronsize,andthroughanionexchangertoremoveionicmaterial.Connectionsareprovidedforpurificationoftherefuelingwatertankandrefuelingwatercavity.FuelpoolwaterchemistryisgiveninFSARTable9.1-2.Thefuelpoolpipingisarrangedsothatthepoolcannotbeinadvertentlydrainedtouncoverthefuelintheeventofasupplyordischargepiperupture.Allfuelpoolpipingisarrangedtopreventgravitydrainingthefuelpool.Topreventsiphoningofthefuelpool,thefuelpooldischargeandpurificationsuctionlineshave1/2"and1/4"holesrespectively1footbelowthenormalwaterlevel.Theonlymeansofdrainingthepoolbelowthesesiphonbreakerholesisthroughanopenlineinthecoolingloopwhileoperatingthepoolcoolingpumps.Insuchaneventthefuelpoolwaterlevelcanbereducedbyonly6feetsincethepumpsuctionconnectionentersnearthetopofthepool.TheremainingwaterintheSpentFuelPoolwillprovideadequateshieldingandheatremovalcapabilitiesatthispoint.Thetemperatureandlevelalarmswouldwarntheoperatorofsuchanevent.3.2.2DecaHeatAnalyses3.2.2.1BasisTheSt.LuciePlantUnit1reactorisratedat2700megawattsthermal(MWt).Thecorecontains217fuelassemblies.Thus,theaverageoperatingpowerperfuelassembly,Po,is12.44MW.Thefueldischargecanbemadeinoneofthefollowingtwomodes:NormalrefuelingdischargeFullcoredischargeTables3-9through3-11givetheparametersforbulkandlocalpooltemperatureanalyses.3.2.2.2ModelDescriptionNUREG-0800BranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,"ResidualDecayEnergyForLightWaterReactorsForLongTermCooling"~~~isutilizedtocomputetheheatdissipationrequirementsinthepool.03-110076L/0011L  
Thepresentstorageracksarearectangular arraycomposedof14modules.Eachstoragerackmoduleisselfsupporting andrestsonstainless steelpads.Thepresentracksarefreestandinginthattheyareneitherboltednorweldedtothefloor,noraretheyattachedtothepoolwalls.Theinterface withthepoolboundaries isdesignedtotransfernormalandshearloadsviatheracksupportsintothepoolbottomslab.Eachfuelassemblystoragemoduleiscomposedofrectangular storagecavitiesfabricated fromone-quarter inchthickstainless steelplate,witheachcavitycapableofaccepting onefuelassembly.
Thefuelassemblystoragecavitieshavelead-insurfacesatthetoptoprovideguidanceforinsertion offuelassemblies.
Thecavitiesareopenatthetopandbottomtoprovideaflowpathforconvective coolingofspentfuelassemblies throughnaturalcirculation.
Thefuelassemblystoragecavitiesareconnected byachevrongridstructure toformmoduleswhichlimitstructural deformations andmaintainanominalcenter-to-center spacingof12.53inchesbetweenadjacentstoragecavitiesduringdesignconditions including seismic.Forfurtherinformation ontheexistingspentfuelstorageracksseeSection9.1.2intheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.2.2NEWHIGHDENSITYRACKSThenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracksconsistofindividual cellswith8.65inchby8.65inch(nominal) squarecross-section, eachofwhichaccommodates asingleCombustion Engineering orExxonPWRfuelassemblyorequivalent, fromeitherSt.LucieUnit1orUnit2.Atotalof1706cellsarearrangedin17distinctmodulesofvaryingsizesintworegions.Region1isdesignedforstorageofnewfuelassemblies withenrichments upto4.5weightpercentU-235.Region1isalsodesignedtostorefuelassemblies withenrichments upto4.5weightpercentU-235thathavenotachievedadequateburnupforRegion2.TheRegion2cellsarecapableofaccommodating fuelassemblies withvariousinitialenrichments whichhaveaccumulated minimumburnupswithinanacceptable boundasdiscussed inthisreport.Forexample,corresponding to4.5and4.0percentinitialenrichments, theminimumrequiredburn-upsforsafestorageinRegion2are36.5and30.9MWD/KgU,respectively.
Figure2-1showsthearrangement oftherackmodulesinthespentfuelpool.Thehighdensityracksareengineered toachievethedualobjective ofmaximumprotection againststructural loadings(arisingfromgroundmotion,thermalstresses, etc.)'andthemaximization ofavailable storagelocations.
Ingeneral,agreaterwidth-to-height aspectratioprovidesgreatermarginagainstrigidbodytipping.Hence,themodulesaremadeaslargeaspossiblewithintheconstraints oftransportation andsitehandlingcapabilities.
2-10076L/0011L tty,gW"f AsshowninFigure2-1,there-are17discretemodulesarrangedinthefuelpool.Eachrackmoduleisequipped(seeFigures2-2and2-3)withgirdlebars,3/4-inchthickby3-1/2incheshigh.Thenominalgapbetweenadjacentmodulewallsis1-1/2inches.Themodulesmakesurfacecontactbetweentheircontiguous wallsatthegirdlebarlocations andthusmaintainaspecified gapbetweenthecellwalls.Table2-1givestherelevantdesigndataoneachregion.Themodulesinthetworegionsareofeightdifferent types.Tables2-2and2-3summarize thephysicaldataforeachmoduletype.ThepoisoninRegions1and2isBoraflex.
Theuseofthisabsorbermaterialistoprecludeinadvertent criticality.
0076L/0011L 2-2Revision1 TABLE2-1DESIGNDATARegionMin.B-10FluxTrapCellPitchLoadingGap(nominalinch)(arealdensity)(nominalinch)10.128.86.020gm/cm.007gm/cm21.120.02-30076L/0011L TABLE2-2TABLEOFMODULEDATAMODULEI.D.NO.OFMODULESNO.OFCELLSINNWDIRECTION NO.OFCELLSINEWDIRECTION TOTALNO.OFCELLSPERMODULERegion1AlandA281Region1BlandB21090Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2131311710488Region2Fl1296-Region2GlandG2Region2*Hl121310896*Cellsmissinginthismoduleduetosparger.RefertoFigure2-1.0076L/0011L Revision1 TABLE2-3MODULEDIMENSIONS ANDWEIGHTMODULEI.D.NOMINALCROSS%ECTION+
DIMENSIONS N-SEWESTIMATED DRYWEIGHT(lbs)PERMODULERegion1AlandA290-1/4"90-1/4"26,700Region1BlandB290-1/4"100-7/16" 29,800Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2Region2FlRegion2GlandG2Region2Hl115-11/16" 80-1/6"97-7/8"71-3/16"106-3/4"71-3/16"106-3/4"80-1/16"115-11/16" 71-3/16"115-11/16" 71-3/16"24,10021,500187200190800.22,300190800*Excluding girdlebars0076L/0011L Revision1 U~,V')~U,UU N~-413/1B"REF78'8.7/8"~~87.7/8"~i444"(37-0")111/8"REF.CrrCC7crrCLUJC'C7LrrCC7rcrr8CASKAREAEl11x8E211x8Hl13x8-4x20113x8COrAl9x9REGION1A29x9REGION1CtCSCJ7Crr7cbCC7G112x9C113x9C213x9ll0CIll0C0C/7r~C0OQmmcrrez--IG)C~xz~O0zMC/7OXcrrErrcr7O4COcbCC7CC7r819x10REGION1G212x9C313x9C413x9Fl12x8D213x8D313x8B29x10REGION11~1/2"1~1/2"~106.3/4"~
~115.11/16" 115.11/16" 90-1/4"51/255/8"REFCOTrC)COCC7r  
+.os"10.12"PITCHGIROLEBARIttIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIoIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATION REGION1FIGURE2-2 P'hh~~PPP>>fPPPPP-P'PPPPPIIh)~~I'P 04II8.86"PITCHGIRDLEBAR4IIIIIttIIILJIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATION REGION2FIGURE2-3 3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULIC CONSIDERATIONS 3.1NEUTRONMULTIPLICATION FACTORThefollowing subsections describetheconditions inthespentfuelpoolwhichareassumedincalculating theeffective neutronmultiplication factor(keff),theanalysismethodology, andtheanalysisresults.Thecriticality analysesofeachofthetwoseparateregionsofthespentfuelstoragepoolaresummarized inTable3-1fortheanticipated normalstorageconditions.
Thecalculated maximumreactivity inRegion2includesaburnup-dependent allowance foruncertainty indepletion calculations and,furthermore, providesanadditional marginof0.00655kbelowthelimitingeffective multiplication factor(k~~)of0.95.Ascoolingtimeincreases inlong-term storage,decayofPu-ZOIresultsinasignificant decreaseinreactivity, whichwillprovideanincreasing subcriticality marginandtendstofurthercompensate foranyuncertainty indepletion calculations.
Spacingbetweentwodifferent rackmodulesissufficient toprecludeadversenuclearinteraction, sincetheminimumspacingbetweenracksisgreaterthanthedesignwatergapspacing.Region2canaccommodate fuelofvariousinitialenrichments anddischarge fuelburnups,providedthecombination fallswithintheacceptable domainillustrated inFigure3-1.Forconvenience ofreference, theminimumburnupvaluesinFigure3-1havebeenfittedbylineartangentsatvariousvaluesandtheresultsaretabulated inTable3-2.Linearinterpolation betweenthetabulated valueswillalwaysyieldvaluesonorconservatively abovethecurveoflimitingburnups.Thesedatawillbeimplemented inappropriate administrative procedures toassureverifiedburnupasspecified indraftRegulatory Guide1.13,Revision2.Administrative procedures willalsobeemployedtoconfirmandassurethepresenceofsolublepoisoninthepoolwateratalltimes,providing afurthermarginofsafetyandassuringsubcriticality intheeventoffuelmisplacement duringfuelhandlingoperations, asdiscussed inSection3.1.2.3.1.1.1NewFuelStorageinRegion2Criticality analysesconfirmthatacheckerboard pattern(fuelassemblies aligneddiagonally) providesanacceptable k~forthestorageoffreshfuelassemblies of4.5Xenrichment inRegion2.Thesecalculations indicateanominalk~of0.819+0.025(95X/95X) whenfullyfloodedwithcleanunborated water.Thisvalueissubstantially lessthanthelimitingkeffof0.95,evenwiththeadditionofareasonable allowance foruncertainties.
\WithBoraflexabsorberbetweenassemblies, conditions donotexistfortheappearance ofapeakinreactivity atlowmoderator densities, andthefullyfloodedcondition corresponds tothehighestreactivity (optimummoderation).
Thus,thecheckerboard patternofnew4.5XenrichedfuelinRegion2represents asafeconfiguration inconformance withbothStandardReviewPlan(SRP)9.1.1and9.1.2.3-10076L/0011L L)~(~I$4'4%I'I~tJr~4(1v"k' 3.1.2Postulated Accidents Althoughcreditforthesolublepoisonnormallypresentinthespentfuelpoolwaterispermitted underabnormaloraccidentconditions",
mostabnormaloraccidentconditions willnotresultinexceeding thelimitingreactivity (keffof0.95)evenintheabsenceofsolublepoison.Theeffectsonreactivity ofcredibleabnormalandaccidentconditions aresummarized inTable3-3.Oftheseabnormal/
accidentconditions, onlyonehasthepotential foramorethannegligible positivereactivity effect.Theinadvertent misplacement ofafreshfuelassembly(eitherintoaRegion2storagecelloroutsideandadjacenttoarackmodule)hasthepotential forexceeIing thelimitingreactivity shouldtherebeaconcurrent andindependent accidentcondition resulting inthelossofallsolublepoison.Administrative procedures assurethepresenceofsolublepoisonatalltimesandwillprecludethepossibility ofthesimultaneous occurrence ofthesetwoindependent accidentconditions.
Thelargestreactivity increaseoccursforaccidentally placinganewfuelassemblyintoaRegion2storagecellwithallothercellsfullyloadedwithfuelofthehighestpermissible reactivity.
Underthiscondition, thepresenceofapproximately 500ppmsolubleboronassuresthattheinfinitemultiplication factorwouldnotexceedthedesignbasisreactivity forRegion2.Withthenormalconcentration ofsolublepoisonpresent(1720ppmboron),k~islessthan0.80andthestoragerackswouldnotbecriticalevenifRegion2weretobefullyloadedwithfreshfuelof4.5Xenrichment.
Thisconcentration ofsolubleboronalsoprecludes thepossibility ofexceeding thecriticality limitintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.
SeeSection5.3fordiscussions onAccidentEvaluations.
3.1.3Calculation Methods3t103+]Criticality AnalysisforRegion13.1.3.1.1 NominalDesignCaseUndernormalconditions, withnominaldimensions, thekmvaluescalculated bythreedifferent methodsofanalysisareasfollows:AnalticalMethodBias-corrected k~CASMO-2E0.9313+0.0018AMPX-KENO (27-gpSCALE)0.9210+0.0084Diffusion/blackness 0.9313theoryMaximumk~(95X/95X) 0.93310.92940.9313TheAMPX-KENO calculations includeaone-sided tolerance factor(13)corresponding to95Xprobability ata95Xconfidence'limit..
Forthenominaldesigncase,theCASMO-2Ecalculation yieldsthehighestreactivity and,therefore, theindependent verification calculations substantiate CASMO-2Eastheprimarycalculational method.*Doublecontingency principle ofANSIN16.1-1975, asspecified intheApril4,1978NRCletter(Section1.2)andimpliedintheproposedrevision(draft)toReg.Guide1.13(Section1.4,AppendixA)~3-20076L/0011L 3.1.3.1.2 BoronLoadingVariation TheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedinRegion1storagecellsarenominally 0.075inchthick,withaB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm.Independent 2manufacturin~
tolerance limitsare+0.007inchinthickness and+0.009g/cminB-10content.Thisassurestha)atanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration (0.1158gramB-10/cm)andminimumBoraflexthickness (0.068inch)maycoincide, theboron-lO,areal densitywillnotbelessthan0.020g/cm.Differential CASMO-2Ecalculations indicatethatthesetolerance limitsresultinreactivity uncertainty of+0.0021Akforboroncontentand+0.00445kforBoraflexthickness variations.
3.1.3.1.3 StorageCellLatticePitchVariation Thedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassemblies inRegion1is10.12inches.Adecreaseinstoragecelllatticespacingmayormaynotincreasereactivity depending uponotherdimensional changesthatmaybeassociated withthedecreaseinlatticespacing.Increasing thewaterthickness betweenthefuelandtheinnerstainless steelboxresultsinasmallincreaseinreactivity.
Thereactivity effectoftheflux-trap waterthickness, however,ismoresignificant, anddecreasing theflux-trap waterthickness increases reactivity.
Bothoftheseeffectshavebeenevaluated forindependent designtolerances.
Theinnerstainless steelboxdimension, 8.650+0.032inches,definestheinnerwaterthickness betweenthefuelandtheinsidebox.Forthetolerance limit,theuncertainty inreactivity is+0.00115kasdetermined bydifferential CASMO-2Ecalculations, withk~increasing astheinnerstainless steelboxdimension (andderivative latticespacing)increases.
Thedesignflux-trap water.thickness is1.120+0.040inches,whichresultsinanuncertainty of+0.0043Qkduetothetolerance influx-trap waterthickness, assumingthewaterthickness issimultaneously reducedonallfoursides.Sincethemanufacturing tolerances oneachofthefoursidesarestatistically independent, thenactualreactivity uncertainties wouldbelessthan+0.0043,althoughthemoreconservative valuehasbeenusedinthecriticality evaluation.
3.1.3.1.4 BoraflexWidthTolerance Variation Thereference storagecelldesignforRegion1(Figure3-2)usesaBoraflexbladewidthof7.50+0.0625inches.Apositiveincrement inreactivity occursforadecreaseinBoraflexabsorberwidth.Forareduction inwidthofthemaximumtolerance, 0.0625inch,thecalculated positivereactivity increment is+0.00175k.3.1.3.1.5 Stainless SteelThickness Tolerances Thenominalstainless steelthickness inRegion1is0.080+0.005inchfortheinnerstainless steelboxand0.020+0.003inchfortheBoraflexcoverplate.
Themaximumpositivereactivity effectoftheexpectedstainless steelthickness tolerance variations, statistically
: combined, wascalculated (CASMO-2E) tobe+0.00105k.3-30076L/0011L k't'A'yc,ICl'pp<,"-.qduTIgyIN''4stIl~Jk~1%.
3.1.3.1.6FuelEnrichment andDensityVariation Thedesignmaximumenrichment is4.50+0.05wtXU-235.Calculations ofthesensitivity tosmallenrichment variations byCASMO-2Eyieldedacoefficient of0.00545kper0.1wtXU-235atthedesignenrichment.
Foratolerance onU-235enrichment of+0.05inwtX,theuncertainty onkcois+0.00275k.Calculations werealsomadewiththeU02fueldensityincreased tothemaximumexpectedvalueof10.811g/cm3(smeareddensity).
Forthereference designcalculations, theuncertainty inreactivity is+0.00055koverthemaximumexpectedrangeofU02densities.
3.1.3.1.7 FuelPinPitchNormally, thefuelpinsinthelatticearearrangedona0.577inchlatticespacing.Forthemaximumexpectedtolerance of+0.0023inch,thecalculated uncertainty is+0.00245k.3.1.3.1.8 Eccentric Positioning ofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackTheFuelAssemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculations werealsomadewiththefuelassemblies assumedtobethecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assembly clusteratclosestapproach).
Thesecalculations indicated thatthereactivity increases veryslightly, asdetermined bydifferential PD$07calculations withdiffusion coefficients" generated byNULIFandablackness theoryroutine.Thisuncertainty isincludedintheevaluation ofthehighestpossiblereactivity oftheRegion1storagecells.3.1.3.1.9 SummaryofRegion1Cri.ticality ResultsTable3-1demonstrates thattheCASMO-2Ecalculated resultsforRegion1storingfreshfuelat4.50w/oU-235enrichment pluscalculational biasanduncertainties exhibitamaximumk~of0.9409whichallowsamarginof0.0091Qkbelowthelimitingeffective multiplication factorof0.95.3.1.3.2Criticality AnalysisforRegion23.1.3.2.1 NominalDesignCaseTheprincipal methodofanalysisinRegion2wastheCASMO-2Ecode,usingtherestartoptioninCASMOtotransferfuelofaspecified burnupintothestoragerackconfiguration atareference temperature of4oC(maximummoderator density).
Calculations weremadeforfuelofseveraldifferent initialenrichments and,ateachenrichment, alimitingkmvaluewasestablished whichincludedanadditional factorforuncertainty intheburnupanalysisandfortheaxialburnupdistribution.
TherestartCASMO-2Ecalculations (cold,clean,rackgeometry) weretheninterpolated todefinetheburnupvalueyieldingthelimitingka>valueforeachenrichment, asindicated inTable3-4.Theseconverged burnupvaluesdefinetheboundaryoftheacceptable domainshowninFigure3-1.*Thiscalculational approachwasnecessary sincethereactivity effectsaretoosmalltobecalculated byKENO,andCASMO-2Egeometryisnotreadilyamenabletoeccentric positioning ofafuelassembly.
3-40076L/0011L I'if'Itcl4fQ10f Ataburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,thesensitivity toburnupiscalculated tobe-0.00746kperMwd/kgU.Duringlong-term storage,thekcvaluesoftheRegion2fuelrackwilldecreasecontinuously fromdecayofPu-241,asindicated inSection3.1.3.3.4.
Twoindependent calculational methodswereusedtoprovideadditional confidence inthereference Region2criticality analyses.
Fuelof1.69Kinitialenrichment (approximately equivalent tothereference rackdesignforburnedfuel)wasanalyzedbyAMPX-KENO (27-group SCALEcross-section library)andbytheCASMO-2EmodelusedfortheRegion2rackanalysis.
Forthiscase,theCASMO-2Ek~(0.9304)waswithinthestatistical uncertainty ofthebias-corrected value(0.9347+0.0064)(95K/95X) obtainedintheAMPX-KENO calculations.
Thisagreement confirmsthevalidityoftheprimaryCASMO-2Ecalculations.
Thesecondindependent methodofanalysisusedwastheNULIFcodeforburnupanalysis, andforgenerating diffusion theoryconstants (cold,clean)forthecomposition at36.5Mwd/kgUwithfuelof4.5Xinitialenrichment.
Theseconstants, togetherwithblackness theoryconstants fortheBoraflexabsorber, werethenusedinatwo-dimensional PD$07calculation forthestoragerackconfiguration.
Theresultofthiscalculation (keof0.8959)wassomewhatlowerthanthecorresponding CASMO-2Ecalculation forthesameconditions (kaof0.9114)andthusalsotendstoconfirmthevalidityoftheprimarycalculational method.3.1.3.2.2 BoronLoadingVariation TheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedintheRegion2storagecellsarenominally 0.031inchthickwithaB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm2.Independent manufacturing limitsare+0.007inchinthickness and+0.009g/cm3inB-10content.Thisassuresthatatanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration (0.1158gB-10/cm)andtheminimumBoraflexthickness (0.024inch)maycoincide, theboron-10arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.007g/cm.2Differential CASMO-2Ecalculations indicatethatthesetolerance limitsresultinanincremental reactivity uncertainty of+0.0036Qkforboroncontentand+0.0111QkforBoraflexthickness.
3.1.3.2.3 BoraflexWidthTolerance Thereference storagecelldesignforRegion2(Figure3-3)usesaBoraflexabsorberwidthof7.25+0.0625inches.Forareduction inwidthofthemaximumtolerance, thecalculated positivereactivity increment is0.0011Qk.3.1.3.2.4 StorageCellLatticePitchVariations Thedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassemblies inRegion2is8.86+0.04inches,corresponding toanuncertainty inreactivity of0.00165k.3.1.3.2.5 Stainless SteelThickness Tolerance Thenominalthickness ofthestainless steelboxwallis0.080inchwithatolerance limitof+0.005inch,resulting inanuncertainty inreactivity of+0.00025k.3-50076L/0011L  
".4l~lipv>$'lyt 3.1.3.2.6 FuelEnrichment, DensityandPinPitchVariation Uncertainties inreactivity duetotolerances onfuelenrichment, UO2density,andpinpitchinRegion2areassumedtobethesameasthosedetermined forRegionl.3.1.3.2.7 Eccentric Positioning ofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackThefuelassemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculations werealsomadewiththefuelassemblies assumedtobeinthecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assembly clusteratclosestapproach).
Thesecalculations indicated thatthereactivity decreases veryslightly, asdetermined byPDQ07calculations withdiffusion coefficients generated byNULIFandablackness theoryroutine.Thehighestreactivity therefore corresponds tothereference designwiththefuelassemblies positioned inthecenterofthestoragecells.3.1.3.3Analytical Methodology 3.1.3.3.1 Reference Analytical MethodsandBiasTheCASMO-2Ecomputercode',atwo-dimensional multigroup transport theorycodeforfuelassemblies, hasbeenbenchmarked andisusedbothasaprimarymethodofanalysis, andasameansofevaluating smallreactivity increments associated withmanufacturing tolerance.
CASMO-2Ebenchmarking resultedinacalculational biasof0.0013+0.0018(95X/95X).
Infuelrackanalyses, forindependent verification, criticality analysesofthehighdensityspentfue)stgagerackswerealsoperformed withtheAHPE-[computerpackage'usingthe27-groupSCALEcross-section libran)withtheNITAWLsubroutine forU23Sresonance shielding effects(Nordheim integraltreatment).
Benchmark calculations resultedinabiasof0.0106+0.0048(95X/95X)
~Inthegeometric modelusedinKENO,eachfuelrodanditscladdingweredescribed explicitly.
InRegion1calculations, areflecting boundarycondition (zeroneutroncurrent)wasusedintheaxialdirection andatthecenterline ofthewatergapbetweenstoragecells.Theseboundaryconditions havetheeffectofcreatinganinfinitearrayofstoragecellsinalldirections.
InRegion2,thezerocurrentboundarycondition wasappliedatthecenteroftheBoraflexabsorbersheetsbetweenstoragecells.TheAMPX-KENO MonteCarlocalculations inherently includeastatistical uncertainty duetotherandomnatureofneutrontracking.
Tominimizethestatistical uncertainty oftheKENO-calculated reactivity, atotalof50,000neutronhistories isnormallyaccumulated foreachcalculation, in100generations of500neutronseach.*SCALEisanacronymforStandardized ComputerAnalysisforLicensing Evaluation, astandardcross-section setdeveloped byORNLfortheUSNRC.3-60076L/0011L Kr(
CASMO"2Eisalsousedforburnupcalculations, withindependent verification byEPRI-CELL andNULIFcalculations.
Intrackinglong-term (30-year) reactivity effectsofspentfuelstoredinRegion2ofthefuelstoragerack,EPRI-CELL calculations indicateacontinuous reduction inreactivity withtime(afterXedecay)dueprimarily toPu-241decayandAm-241growth.Athirdindependent methodofcriticality
: analysis, utilizing diffusion/blackness theory,wasalsousedforadditional confidence inresultsoftheprimarycalculational methods,althoughnorelianceforcriticality safetyisplacedonthereactivity valuefromthediffusion/blackness theorytechnique.
Thistechnique, however,isusedforauxiliary calculations ofthesmallincremental reactivity effectofeccentric fuelpositioning thatwouldotherwise belostinnormalKENOstatistical variations, orwouldbeinconsistent withCASMO-2Egeometrylimitations.
Crosssectionsforthediffusion/blackness theorycalculations werederivedfromtheNULIFcomputercode),supplemented byablackness theoryroutinethateffectively imposesatransport theoryboundarycondition atthesurfaceoftheBoraflexneutronabsorber.
Twodifferent spatialdiffusion theorycodes,PDQ07(intwodimensions andSNEID*inonedimension, wereusedtocalculate reactivities.
3.1.3.3.2 FuelBurnupCalculations Fuelburnupcalculations i'nthehotoperating condition wereperformed primarily withtheCASMO"2Ecode.However,toenhancethecredibility oftheburnupcalculations, theCASMO-2Eresultswereindependently checkedbycalculations withtheNULIFcode(7)andwithEPRI-CELL(9).
Figure3-4comparesresultsoftheseindependent methodsofburnupanalysisunderhotreactoroperating conditions.
TheresultsagreewiththeCASMOcalculation within0.00546kinthehotoperating condition.
Anarchivecalculation withtheCHEETAH-P codeisalsopresented inFigure3-4foradditional confidence.
Similarcomparisons wereobtainedinburnupcalculations forotherinitialenrichments, asindicated inFigure3-4.Inadditiontodepletion calculations underhotoperating conditions, reactivity comparisons underconditions morerepresentative offueltobestoredintheracks(cold,xenon-free) arealsosignificant instoragerackcriticality analyses.
Table3-5comparesthecold,xenon"free reactivities calculated byCASM0-2E, EPRI-CELL, anddiffusion/blackness theory.Intherackundercoldconditions, theCASMO-2Ecalculations gaveaslightlyhigherreactivity valuefortheRegion2fuelstoragecell,andthegoodagreement generally observedlendscredibility tothecalculations.
*SNEIDisaone-dimensional diffusion theoryroutinedeveloped byBlack&Veatchandverifiedbycomparison withPDQ07one-dimensional calculations.
3-70076L/0011L iIPIgI~Cl4s41kIQI~'I'IIII'JII/11~'FIII~,I~$1YIt4I Nodefinitive methodexistsfordetermining theuncertainty inburnup-dependent reactivity calculations.
Allofthecodesdiscussed abovehavebeenusedtoaccurately followreactivity lossratesino~e~atina reactors.
CASMO-2Ehasbeenextensively benchmarked(1>>
yagainst1230cold,clean,criticalexperiments (including plutonium-bearing fuel),MonteCarlocalculations, reactoroperations, andhyavy-element concentration inirradiated fuel.Inparticular, theanalyses<10>
ofllcriticalexperiments withplutonium-bearing fuelgaveanaveragekeffof1.002+0.011(95X/95X),
showingadequatetreatment oftheplutonium nuclides.
Inaddition, Johansson(11) hasobtainedverygoodagreement incalculations ofclose-packed, high-plutonium-content, experimental configurations.
Sincecritical-experiment datawithspentfuelisnotavailable, itisnecessary toassignanuncertainty inreactivity basedonotherconsiderations, supported bythecloseagreement betweendifferent calculational methodsandthegeneralindustryexperience inpredicting reactivity lossratesinoperating plants.Overaconsiderable portionoftheburnup,thereactivity lossrateinPMRsisapproximately 0.01AkforeachMwd/kgUburnup,becomingsomewhatsmalleratthehigherburnups.Byconservatively assuminganuncertainty inreactivity of0.0005timestheburnupinMwd/kgU,aburnup-dependent uncertainty isdefinedthatincreases withincreasing fuelburnup,aswouldbereasonably expected.
Thisassumption providesanestimateoftheburnupuncertainty thatismoreconservative andboundsestimates frequently employedinotherfuelracklicensing applications (i.e.,5Xofthetotalreactivity decrement).
Atthedesignbasisburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,theestimateofburnupuncertainty is0.0183Ak;Table3-6summarizes resultsoftheburnupanalysesandestimated uncertainties atotherburnups.Theseuncertainties areappreciably larger,ingeneral,thanwouldbe'suggested bytheindustryexperience inpredicting reactivity lossratesandboronlet-downcurvesovermanycyclesinoperating plants.Theincreasing levelofconservatism atthehigherfuelburnupsprovidesanadequatemarginintheuncertainty estimatetoaccommodate thepossibleexistence ofasmallpositivereactivity increment fromtheaxialdistribution inburnup(seeSection3.1.3.3.3).
Inaddition, althoughtheburnupuncertainty maybeeitherpositiveornegative, itistreatedasanadditivetermratherthanbeingcombinedstatistically withotheruncertainties.
Thus,theallowance foruncertainty inburnupcalculations isconsidered tobeaconservative
: estimate, particularly inviewofthesubstantial reactivity decreasewithagedfuel,asdiscussed inSection3.1.3.3.4.
*Onlythatportionoftheuncertainty duetoburnup.'ther uncertainties areaccounted forelsewhere.
3-80076L/0011L S$kQt'+1qZil, 3.1.3.3.3 EffectofAxialBurnupDistribution Initially, fuelloadedintothereactorwillburnwithaslightlyskewedcosinepowerdistribution.
Asburnupprogresses, theburnupdistribution willtendtoflatten,becomingmorehighlyburnedinthecentralregionsthanintheupperandlowerends.ThiseffectmaybeclearlyseeninthecurvescompiledinReference 12.Athighburnup,themorereactivefuelneartheendsofthefuelassembly(lessthanaverageburned)occursinregionsoflowerreactivity worthduetoneutronleakage.Consequently, itisexpectedthatdistributed-burnup fuelassemblies wouldexhibitaslightlylowerreactivity thanthatcalculated fortheaverageburnup.Asburnupprogresses, thedistribution, tosomeextent,tendstobeself-regulating ascontrolled bytheaxialpowerdistribution, precluding theexistence oflargeregionsofsignificantly reducedburnup.Anumberofone-dimensional diffusion theoryanalyseshavebeenmadebaseduponcalculated andmeasuredaxialburnupdistributions.
Theseanalysesconfirmtheminor,andgenerally
: negative, reactivity effectoftheaxiallydistributed burnup.Thetrendsobserved, however,suggestthepossibility ofasmallpositivereactivity effectatthehighburnupvalues(estimated tobeasmuchas0.0066kat36.5Mwd/kgU);
buttheuncertainty inkcduetoburnup,assignedatthehigherburnups(Section3.1.3.3.2),
isadequately conservative toencompass thepotential forasmallpositivereactivity effectofaxialburnupdistributions.
Furthermore, reactivity significantly decreases withtimeinstorage(Section3.1.3.3.4),
and,inaddition, "thereisafurthermargininreactivity
()0.0066k)sincethemaximumcalculated value(0.9435)isbelowthelimitingkegpvalue(0.95).Thesefactorswouldaccommodate anyreasonable reactivity eZKectsthatmightbelargerthanexpected.
3.1.3.3.4 Long-term DecaySincethefuelracksinRegion2areintendedtocontainspentfuelforlongperiodsoftime,calculations weremadeusingEPRI-CELL (whichincorporates theCINDERcode)tofollowthelong-term changesinreactivity ofspentfuelovera30-yearperiod.CINDERtracksthedecayandburnupdependence ofsome179fissionproducts.
Earlyinthedecayperiod,xenongrowsfromiodinedecay(reducing reactivity) andsubsequently decays,withthereactivity reachingamaximumat100-200hours.ThedecayofPu-241(13"yearhalf-life) andgrowthofAm-241substantially reducereactivity duringlongtermstorage,asindicated inTable3-7.Thereference designcriticality calculations donottakecreditforthislong-term reduction inreactivity, otherthantoindicateanincreasing subcriticality margininRegion2ofthespentfuelstoragepool.3.1.4RackModification Thedesignbasisfuelassembly, illustrated inFigure3-2,isa14x14arrayoffuelrodswith20rodsreplacedby5controlrodguidetubes.Table3-8summarizes thedesignspecifications andtheexpectedrangeofsignificant variations.
Independent calculations, withotherpotential fuelassemblyspecifications, confirmed thatthe14x14CEdesignexhibited thehighestreactivity andwastherefore usedasthedesignbasis.3-90076L/0011L t$th4iI'I4jll~~g~li 3.1.4.1Region1StorageCellsThenominalspentfuelstoragecellusedforthecriticality analysesofRegion1storagecellsisshowninFigure3-2.TherackiscomposedofBoraflexabsorbermaterialsandwiched betweenan8.65-inchI.D.,0.080-inchthickinnerstainless steelbox,anda0.020-inch outerstainless steelcoverplate.
Thefuelassemblies arecentrally locatedineachstoragecellonanominallatticespacingof10.120+0.05inches.Stainless steelgapchannelsconnectonestoragecellboxtoanotherinarigidstructure anddefineanouterwaterspacebetweenboxes.Thisouterwaterspaceconstitutes aflux-trap betweenthetwoBoraflexabsorbersheetsthatareessentially opaque(black)tothermalneutrons.
TheBoraflexabsorberhasathickness of0.075+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm2.3.1.4.2Region2StorageCellsRegion2storagecellsweredesignedforfuelof4.5wtXU-235initialenrichment burnedto36.5Mwd/kgU.Inthisregion,thestoragecellsarecomposedofasingleBoraflexabsorbersandwiched betweenthe0.080-inch stainless steelwallsofadjacentstoragecells.Thesecells,showninFigure3-3,arelocatedonalatticespacingof8.86+0.040inches.TheBoraflexabsorberhasathickness of0.031+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm.3.1.5Acceptance CriteriaforCriticalit Criticality isprecluded byspacingofthefuelassemblies, whichensuresthatasubcritical arrayofkefflessthanorequalto0.95ismaintained, assumingunborated poolwater.Thepool,however,willalwayscontainboricacidattherefueling concentration of1720ppmwheneverthereisirradiated fuelinthepool.Theneutronmultiplication factorinspentfuelpoolsshallbelessthanorequalto0.95,including alluncertainties, underallconditions.
Calculated maximumreactivity uncertainties forfuelstoredintheracksarepresented inTable3-1.Methodsofinitialandlong-term verification ofpoisonmaterialstability andmechanical integrity arediscussed inSection4.8.3.2DECAYHEATCALCULATIONS FORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(BULK)3.2.1SentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesignFornormalrefueling discharge conditions, onefuelpoolpumpandthefuelpoolheatexchanger areinservice.Duringabnormalrefueling conditions, suchasfullcoredischarge, twofuelpoolpumpsandtheheatexchanger areinservice.Thesystemismanuallycontrolled andtheoperation monitored locally,exceptasfollows.Apressureswitchonthefuelpoolpumpdischarge headerannunciates lowheaderpressureinthecontrolroom.Thefuelpoolhightemperature alarmandlowlevelalarmsareannunciated inthecontrolroom.Intheeventthefuelpoolpumpbreakersareopened,analarmisannunciated inthecontrolroom.Thecomponent coolingwaterflowtothefuelpoolheatexchanger isinitially ad)ustedtotherequiredflow.Furtheradjustments ofthecomponent coolingwaterarenotrequired.
Thecomponent coolingwaterdischarge linehasaflowindicator.
Highandlowcomponent coolingwaterflowalarmsareannunciated inthecontrolroom.3-100076L/0011L t'~yCP7'tr, Theclarityandpurityofthewaterinthefuelpoolismaintained bythepurification portionofthefuelpoolsystem.Thepurification loopconsistsofthefuelpoolpurification pump,ionexchanger, filter,strainers andsurfaceskimmers.
Mostofthepurification flowisdrawnthroughthesurfaceskimmerstoremovesurfacedebris.Abasketstrainerisprovidedinthepurification linetothepumpsuctiontoremoveanyrelatively largeparticulate matter.Thefuelpoolwateriscirculated bythepumpthroughafilter,whichremovesparticulates largerthan5micronsize,andthroughanionexchanger toremoveionicmaterial.
Connections areprovidedforpurification oftherefueling watertankandrefueling watercavity.Fuelpoolwaterchemistry isgiveninFSARTable9.1-2.Thefuelpoolpipingisarrangedsothatthepoolcannotbeinadvertently drainedtouncoverthefuelintheeventofasupplyordischarge piperupture.Allfuelpoolpipingisarrangedtopreventgravitydrainingthefuelpool.Topreventsiphoning ofthefuelpool,thefuelpooldischarge andpurification suctionlineshave1/2"and1/4"holesrespectively 1footbelowthenormalwaterlevel.Theonlymeansofdrainingthepoolbelowthesesiphonbreakerholesisthroughanopenlineinthecoolingloopwhileoperating thepoolcoolingpumps.Insuchaneventthefuelpoolwaterlevelcanbereducedbyonly6feetsincethepumpsuctionconnection entersnearthetopofthepool.Theremaining waterintheSpentFuelPoolwillprovideadequateshielding andheatremovalcapabilities atthispoint.Thetemperature andlevelalarmswouldwarntheoperatorofsuchanevent.3.2.2DecaHeatAnalyses3.2.2.1BasisTheSt.LuciePlantUnit1reactorisratedat2700megawatts thermal(MWt).Thecorecontains217fuelassemblies.
Thus,theaverageoperating powerperfuelassembly, Po,is12.44MW.Thefueldischarge canbemadeinoneofthefollowing twomodes:Normalrefueling discharge Fullcoredischarge Tables3-9through3-11givetheparameters forbulkandlocalpooltemperature analyses.
3.2.2.2ModelDescription NUREG-0800 BranchTechnical PositionASB9-2,"Residual DecayEnergyForLightWaterReactorsForLongTermCooling"~
~~isutilizedtocomputetheheatdissipation requirements inthepool.03-110076L/0011L  
'7<'nIglp'il0g~
'7<'nIglp'il0g~
Withthelongtermuncertaintyfactor,K,asspecifiedinSRP9.1.3(15)theoperatingpower,Po,istakenequaltotheratedpower,eventhoughthereactormaybeoperatingatlessthanitsratedpowerduringmuchoftheexposureperiodforthebatchoffuelassemblies.Thecomputationsandresultsreportedherearebasedonthedischargetakingplacewhentheinventoryoffuelinthepoolwillbeatitsmaximumresultinginanupperboundonthedecayheatrate.Havingdeterminedtheheatdissipationrate,thenexttaskistoevaluatethetime-dependenttemperatureofthepoolwater.Table3-9identifiestheloadingcasesexamined.ThisisaconservativerepresentationofactualandfutureexpecteddischargessuchasthosepresentedinTable5-1.BULKTEMtreatsthegeneralizedpoolcoolingproblemshowninFigure3"5.Anumberofsimplifyingassumptionsaremadewhichrendertheanalysisconservative,including:Theheatexchangerisassumedtohavemaximumfouling.Thus,thetemperatureeffectiveness,P,fortheheatexchangerutilizedintheanalysisisthelowestpostulatedvaluecalculatedfromheatexchangertechnicaldatasheets.Nocreditistakenfortheimprovementinthefilmcoefficientsoftheheatexchangerastheoperatingtemperaturerisesduetomonotonicreductioninthewaterkinematicviscositywithtemperaturerise.Thus,thefilmcoefficientusedinthecomputationsarelowerbounds.Nocreditistakenforheatlossbyevaporationofthepoolwater.Nocreditistakenforheatlosstopoolwallsandpoolfloorslab.Thebasicenergyconservationrelationshipforthepoolheatexchangersystemyields:Ql-Q2dtdTwhere'.ctThermalcapacityofstoredwaterinthepoolTemperatureofpoolwaterattime,7HeatgenerationrateduetostoredfuelassembliesinthepoolQ2HeatremovedinthefuelpoolheatexchangerThisequationissolvedasaninitialvalueproblembynotingthatthecoolerheatremovalratemustequaltheheatgenerationratefrompreviouslydischargedassemblies.Hence,0076L/0011L 4~'d where:PCONS:Wcool':HeatgenerationratefrompreviouslystoredassembliesCoolantthermalflowrateTemperatureeffectivenessofthefuelpoolcoolerTinCoincidentpoolwatertemperature(initialvaluebeforebeginningofdischarge)CoolantinlettemperatureTheaboveequationyieldsTinPCONSWcoolP+tcoolThevalueofTincomputedfromtheaboveformulaistheinitialvalueofthepoolwatertemperature(atthestartoffueldischarge).BULKTEMautomatesthesolutionoftheaboveequationusingthetheorypresentedinReference16.Tabulatedresultsarepresentedinthenextsub-section.3'''BulkPoolTemperatureResultseTable3-12givesthetotaldimensionlesspowergenerationratioofallfuelassemblybatchespreviouslystoredinthepoolconsistingofatotalof18batches.ThefirstcolumninTable3-12givesthebatchnumber,andthelastcolumngivesthedimensionlesspower,definedastheheatgenerationrateofthebatchdividedbythenominaloperatingpowerofonefuelassembly.ItisnotedfromTable3-12thatthecumulativepoweris0.14timestheoperatingpowerofonefuelassembly.Tables3-13/3-14and3-16/3-17givethebulktemperaturevs.timedata.The'ollowingkeyoutputdataisgleanedfromthesetables:Maximumpoolbulktemperature:Normaldischarge:133.3FFullcoredischarge:150.8oFTable3-14Table3-17Tables3-15and3-18givetime-to-boildata.Time-to-boil(ifcoolantflowislostuponcompletionofdischargeandwhenthebulkpooltemperatureismaximum):Normaldischargecondition:13.43hoursTable3-15Fullcoredischargecondition:5.04hoursTable3-183-130076L/0011L  
Withthelongtermuncertainty factor,K,asspecified inSRP9.1.3(15)theoperating power,Po,istakenequaltotheratedpower,eventhoughthereactormaybeoperating atlessthanitsratedpowerduringmuchoftheexposureperiodforthebatchoffuelassemblies.
'I"VI'l.gjll1kg'I 3.2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemSummaryThespentfueldecayheatcalculationswereperformedinaccordancewiththemethodprovidedinNRCBranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2ResidualDecayEnergyforLight-WaterReactorsforLong-TermCooling(15~.Theexistingspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisconsideredtobeadequate.Thespentfuelpoolisdesignedtowithstandstressesassociatedwithasteady-statewatertemperatureof217oF.AsshowninTable3-17thepoolpeaktransientwatertemperatureafterfullcoredischargeislessthan151oF.Intheeventofacompletelossofcoolingcapability,thereissufficienttimetoprovideanalternatemeansforcooling.Thetotalincreaseinheatloadre)ectedtotheenvironmentthroughthecoolingsystemsduetotheincreasedspentfuelstorageoverthecurrentheatloadrejectedis1.7x10Btu/hour.Thisrepresentsanincreaseofapproximately0.03percentofthetotalheatrejectedtotheenvironment.Theincreaseinheatrejectedwillhavenegligibleimpactontheenvironment.Theincreaseinheatloaddoesnotalterinanywaytheexistingfacilitydesignbases.Thus,theheatloadincreaseisacceptable.Thisdecayheatanalysisisalsoboundingforthetemporaryfuelstorageconfiguration(seeSection4.7.4)thatwillbeutilizedduringrackinstallation.3.2.2.4.1SafetyEvaluationThecalculationsfortheamountofthermalenergythatmayhavetoberemovedbythespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemaremadeinaccordancewithBranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2(Reference15).Theresultingbulkspentfuelpooltemperaturesareacceptable.3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeuThereareseveralsourcesoffreshwateronthesitethatareavailabletothefuelhandlingbuilding;namely,refuelingwaterstoragetank,citywaterstoragetankviathefiremain,citywaterstoragetanksviatheportablefirepump,andprimarywatertank.Theconcurrentlossofthesesourcesandthefuelpoolcoolingsystemisremote.Duetothefuelpool'sboil-offperiod,thereissufficienttimetoobtainmakeup.ItshouldbenotedthataseismicCategoryIbackupsaltwatersupplyisavailablefromtheintakecoolingwaterintertie.Astandpipeonthefuelhandlingbuildingisprovidedfromgradetotheoperatingdeckelevationandhoseconnectionsareprovidedatbothendsofthestandpipe.Thus,viafirehose,thefuelpoolmakeupcanbereadilysuppliedbytheintakecoolingwaterpumps.Theheadprovidedbythesepumpsissufficienttoprovidetherequiredfuelpoolmakeup.Thestructuralandleaktightintegrityofthefuelpoolwillnotbecompromisedbycontinuousfuelpooltemperaturesofupto217F.Theresultsofthebulkdecayheatanalysesindicatethatthesetemperaturesarenotexceeded.Theintakecoolingwatersystemconnectionviathehoseconnectionscanprovide150gpmofmakeup.SeeFSARSubsection9.1.3.4.3-140076L/0011L  
Thecomputations andresultsreportedherearebasedonthedischarge takingplacewhentheinventory offuelinthepoolwillbeatitsmaximumresulting inanupperboundonthedecayheatrate.Havingdetermined theheatdissipation rate,thenexttaskistoevaluatethetime-dependent temperature ofthepoolwater.Table3-9identifies theloadingcasesexamined.
\NI' 3.3THERMAL-HYDRAULICANALYSESFORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(LOCALIZED)Thepurposeofthethermal-hydraulicanalysesistodeterminethemaximumfuelcladtemperatureswhichmayoccurasaresultofusingthenewhighdensityspentfuelracksintheStLucieUnit1spentfuelpool.3.3.1BasesInordertodetermineanupperboundonthemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature,aseriesofconservativeassumptionsaremade.Themostimportantassumptionsarelistedbelow:Asstatedabove,thefuelpoolwillcontainspentfuelwithvaryingtime-after-shutdown(7's).SincetheheatemissionfallsoffrapidlywithincreasingTs,itisobviouslyconservativetoassumethatallfuelassembliesarefreshandtheyallhavehadthemaximumpostulatedyearsofoperatingtimeinthereactor.Theheatemissionrateofeachfuelassemblyisassumedtobeequalandmaximum.AsshowninFigure2-1,themodulesoccupyanirregularfloorspaceinthepool.Forthehydrothermalanalysis,acirclecircumscribingtheactualrackfloorspaceisdrawn(Figure3-6).ItisfurtherassumedthatthecylinderwiththiscircleasitsbaseXspackedwithfuelassembliesatthenominallayoutpitch.Theactualdowncomerspacearoundtherackmodulegroupvaries,asshowninFigure2-1.Thenominaldowncomergapavailableinthepoolisassumedtobethetotalgapavailablearoundtheidealizedcylindricalrack;thus,themaximumresistancetodownwardflowisincorporatedintotheanalysis(Figure3-7).Nodowncomerflowisassumedtoexistbetweentherackmodules.3.3.2ModelDescritionUsingthebasesdescribedabove,aconservativeidealizedmodelfortherackassemblageisobtained.'hewaterflowisaxisymmetricabouttheverticalaxisofthecircularrackassemblageand,thus,theflowistwo-dimensional(axisymmetricthree-dimensional).Figure3-7showsatypical"flowchimney"renderingofthethermalhydraulicsmodel.Thegoverningequationtocharacterizetheflowfieldinthepoolisanintegralequationthatcanbesolvedforthelowerplenumvelocityfield(intheradialdirection)andaxialvelocity(in-cellvelocityfield),byusingthemethodofcollocation.Itshouldbeaddedthatthehydrodynamiclosscoefficientswhichenterintothefovyulytionoftheintegralequationarealsotakenfromwellmecognizedsources<17>andwhereverdiscrepanciesinreportedvaluesexist,theconservativevaluesareconsistentlyused.Reference18givesthedetailsofmathematicalanalysisusedinthissolutionprocess..3-150076L/0011L  
Thisisaconservative representation ofactualandfutureexpecteddischarges suchasthosepresented inTable5-1.BULKTEMtreatsthegeneralized poolcoolingproblemshowninFigure3"5.Anumberofsimplifying assumptions aremadewhichrendertheanalysisconservative, including:
~ll$lg' Aftertheaxialvelocityfieldisevaluated,thefuelassemblycladdingtemperaturecanbecalculated.Theknowledgeoftheoverallflowfieldenablespinpointingofthestoragelocationwiththeminimumaxialflow(i.e.,maximumwateroutlettemperatures).Thisiscalledthemost"choked"location.Inordertofindanupperboundonthetemperatureinatypicalcell,itisassumedthatitislocatedatthemostchokedlocation.Knowingtheglobalplenumvelocityfield,therevisedaxialflowthroughthischokedcellcanbecalculatedbysolvingtheBernoulliequationfortheflowcircuitthroughthiscell.Thus,anabsoluteupperboundonthewaterexittemperatureandmaximumfuelcladdingtemperatureisobtained.Inviewoftheaforementionedassumptions,thetemperaturescalculatedinthismanneroverestimatethetemperaturerisethatwillactuallyoccurinthepool.THERPOOL,basedonthetheoryofReference18,automatesthiscalculation.Finally,themaximumspecificpowerofafuelarrayqAcanbegivenby:where:qFxyqaveragefuelassemblyspecificpowerFxyradialpeakingfactorThedataonradialandaxialpeakingfactorsmaybefoundinTable3-10.Themaximumtemperatureriseofpoolwaterinthemostdisadvantageouslyplacedfuelassemblyiscomputedforallloadingcases.Table3-19,thirdcolumn,givestheoutputsfromTHERPOOLintabularform.3.3.3.CladdingTemperature~~~Havingdeterminedthemaximumlocalwatertemperatureinthepool,itisnowpossibletodeterminethemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature.AfuelrodcanproduceFoottimestheaverageheatemissionrateoverasmalllength,whereTtistfietotalpeakingfactor.Theaxialheatdissipationinarodisknowntoreachamaximuminthecentralregion,andtaperoffatitstwoextremities.Foraddedconservatism,itisassumedthatthepeakheatemissionoccursatthetopwherethelocalwatertemperaturealsoreachesitsmaximum.Futhermore,nocreditistakenforaxialconductionofheatalongtherod.Thehighlyconservativemodelthusconstructedleadstosimplealgebraicequationswhichdirectlygivethemaximumlocalcladdingtemperature,tc.Table3-19,fourthcolumn,summarizesthekeyoutputdata.Itisfoundthatthemaximumvalueofthelocalwatertemperatureiswellbelowthenucleateboilingconditionvalue.Theincrementalcladdingtemperatureistoosmalltoproducesignificantthermalstresses.3.4POTENTIALFUELANDRACKHANDLINGACCIDENTSThemethodformovingtheracksintoandoutofthespentfuelpoolisbrieflydiscussedinSection4.7.4.2.Themethodsutilizedensurethatpostulatedaccidentsdonotresultinalossofcoolingtoeitherthespentfuelpoolorthereactor,orresultinakeffinthespentfuelpoolexceeding0.95.3-160076L/0011L  
Theheatexchanger isassumedtohavemaximumfouling.Thus,thetemperature effectiveness, P,fortheheatexchanger utilizedintheanalysisisthelowestpostulated valuecalculated fromheatexchanger technical datasheets.Nocreditistakenfortheimprovement inthefilmcoefficients oftheheatexchanger astheoperating temperature risesduetomonotonic reduction inthewaterkinematic viscosity withtemperature rise.Thus,thefilmcoefficient usedinthecomputations arelowerbounds.Nocreditistakenforheatlossbyevaporation ofthepoolwater.Nocreditistakenforheatlosstopoolwallsandpoolfloorslab.Thebasicenergyconservation relationship forthepoolheatexchanger systemyields:Ql-Q2dtdTwhere'.ctThermalcapacityofstoredwaterinthepoolTemperature ofpoolwaterattime,7Heatgeneration rateduetostoredfuelassemblies inthepoolQ2Heatremovedinthefuelpoolheatexchanger Thisequationissolvedasaninitialvalueproblembynotingthatthecoolerheatremovalratemustequaltheheatgeneration ratefrompreviously discharged assemblies.
Hence,0076L/0011L 4~'d where:PCONS:Wcool':Heatgeneration ratefrompreviously storedassemblies CoolantthermalflowrateTemperature effectiveness ofthefuelpoolcoolerTinCoincident poolwatertemperature (initialvaluebeforebeginning ofdischarge)
Coolantinlettemperature TheaboveequationyieldsTinPCONSWcoolP+tcoolThevalueofTincomputedfromtheaboveformulaistheinitialvalueofthepoolwatertemperature (atthestartoffueldischarge).
BULKTEMautomates thesolutionoftheaboveequationusingthetheorypresented inReference 16.Tabulated resultsarepresented inthenextsub-section.
3'''BulkPoolTemperature ResultseTable3-12givesthetotaldimensionless powergeneration ratioofallfuelassemblybatchespreviously storedinthepoolconsisting ofatotalof18batches.ThefirstcolumninTable3-12givesthebatchnumber,andthelastcolumngivesthedimensionless power,definedastheheatgeneration rateofthebatchdividedbythenominaloperating powerofonefuelassembly.
ItisnotedfromTable3-12thatthecumulative poweris0.14timestheoperating powerofonefuelassembly.
Tables3-13/3-14 and3-16/3-17 givethebulktemperature vs.timedata.The'ollowing keyoutputdataisgleanedfromthesetables:Maximumpoolbulktemperature:
Normaldischarge:
133.3FFullcoredischarge:
150.8oFTable3-14Table3-17Tables3-15and3-18givetime-to-boil data.Time-to-boil (ifcoolantflowislostuponcompletion ofdischarge andwhenthebulkpooltemperature ismaximum):
Normaldischarge condition:
13.43hoursTable3-15Fullcoredischarge condition:
5.04hoursTable3-183-130076L/0011L  
'I"VI'l.gjll1kg'I 3.2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemSummaryThespentfueldecayheatcalculations wereperformed inaccordance withthemethodprovidedinNRCBranchTechnical PositionASB9-2ResidualDecayEnergyforLight-Water ReactorsforLong-Term Cooling(15~.
Theexistingspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisconsidered tobeadequate.
Thespentfuelpoolisdesignedtowithstand stressesassociated withasteady-state watertemperature of217oF.AsshowninTable3-17thepoolpeaktransient watertemperature afterfullcoredischarge islessthan151oF.Intheeventofacompletelossofcoolingcapability, thereissufficient timetoprovideanalternate meansforcooling.Thetotalincreaseinheatloadre)ectedtotheenvironment throughthecoolingsystemsduetotheincreased spentfuelstorageoverthecurrentheatloadrejectedis1.7x10Btu/hour.
Thisrepresents anincreaseofapproximately 0.03percentofthetotalheatrejectedtotheenvironment.
Theincreaseinheatrejectedwillhavenegligible impactontheenvironment.
Theincreaseinheatloaddoesnotalterinanywaytheexistingfacilitydesignbases.Thus,theheatloadincreaseisacceptable.
Thisdecayheatanalysisisalsoboundingforthetemporary fuelstorageconfiguration (seeSection4.7.4)thatwillbeutilizedduringrackinstallation.
3.2.2.4.1 SafetyEvaluation Thecalculations fortheamountofthermalenergythatmayhavetoberemovedbythespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemaremadeinaccordance withBranchTechnical PositionASB9-2(Reference 15).Theresulting bulkspentfuelpooltemperatures areacceptable.
3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeuThereareseveralsourcesoffreshwateronthesitethatareavailable tothefuelhandlingbuilding; namely,refueling waterstoragetank,citywaterstoragetankviathefiremain,citywaterstoragetanksviatheportablefirepump,andprimarywatertank.Theconcurrent lossofthesesourcesandthefuelpoolcoolingsystemisremote.Duetothefuelpool'sboil-offperiod,thereissufficient timetoobtainmakeup.ItshouldbenotedthataseismicCategoryIbackupsaltwatersupplyisavailable fromtheintakecoolingwaterintertie.
Astandpipe onthefuelhandlingbuildingisprovidedfromgradetotheoperating deckelevation andhoseconnections areprovidedatbothendsofthestandpipe.
Thus,viafirehose,thefuelpoolmakeupcanbereadilysuppliedbytheintakecoolingwaterpumps.Theheadprovidedbythesepumpsissufficient toprovidetherequiredfuelpoolmakeup.Thestructural andleaktight integrity ofthefuelpoolwillnotbecompromised bycontinuous fuelpooltemperatures ofupto217F.Theresultsofthebulkdecayheatanalysesindicatethatthesetemperatures arenotexceeded.
Theintakecoolingwatersystemconnection viathehoseconnections canprovide150gpmofmakeup.SeeFSARSubsection 9.1.3.4.3-140076L/0011L  
\NI' 3.3THERMAL-HYDRAULIC ANALYSESFORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(LOCALIZED)
Thepurposeofthethermal-hydraulic analysesistodetermine themaximumfuelcladtemperatures whichmayoccurasaresultofusingthenewhighdensityspentfuelracksintheStLucieUnit1spentfuelpool.3.3.1BasesInordertodetermine anupperboundonthemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature, aseriesofconservative assumptions aremade.Themostimportant assumptions arelistedbelow:Asstatedabove,thefuelpoolwillcontainspentfuelwithvaryingtime-after-shutdown (7's).Sincetheheatemissionfallsoffrapidlywithincreasing Ts,itisobviously conservative toassumethatallfuelassemblies arefreshandtheyallhavehadthemaximumpostulated yearsofoperating timeinthereactor.Theheatemissionrateofeachfuelassemblyisassumedtobeequalandmaximum.AsshowninFigure2-1,themodulesoccupyanirregular floorspaceinthepool.Forthehydrothermal
: analysis, acirclecircumscribing theactualrackfloorspaceisdrawn(Figure3-6).ItisfurtherassumedthatthecylinderwiththiscircleasitsbaseXspackedwithfuelassemblies atthenominallayoutpitch.Theactualdowncomer spacearoundtherackmodulegroupvaries,asshowninFigure2-1.Thenominaldowncomer gapavailable inthepoolisassumedtobethetotalgapavailable aroundtheidealized cylindrical rack;thus,themaximumresistance todownwardflowisincorporated intotheanalysis(Figure3-7).Nodowncomer flowisassumedtoexistbetweentherackmodules.3.3.2ModelDescritionUsingthebasesdescribed above,aconservative idealized modelfortherackassemblage isobtained.
'hewaterflowisaxisymmetric abouttheverticalaxisofthecircularrackassemblage and,thus,theflowistwo-dimensional (axisymmetric three-dimensional).
Figure3-7showsatypical"flowchimney"rendering ofthethermalhydraulics model.Thegoverning equationtocharacterize theflowfieldinthepoolisanintegralequationthatcanbesolvedforthelowerplenumvelocityfield(intheradialdirection
)andaxialvelocity(in-cellvelocityfield),byusingthemethodofcollocation.
Itshouldbeaddedthatthehydrodynamic losscoefficients whichenterintothefovyulytion oftheintegralequationarealsotakenfromwellmecognized sources<17>
andwhereverdiscrepancies inreportedvaluesexist,theconservative valuesareconsistently used.Reference 18givesthedetailsofmathematical analysisusedinthissolutionprocess..
3-150076L/0011L  
~ll$lg' Aftertheaxialvelocityfieldisevaluated, thefuelassemblycladdingtemperature canbecalculated.
Theknowledge oftheoverallflowfieldenablespinpointing ofthestoragelocationwiththeminimumaxialflow(i.e.,maximumwateroutlettemperatures).
Thisiscalledthemost"choked"location.
Inordertofindanupperboundonthetemperature inatypicalcell,itisassumedthatitislocatedatthemostchokedlocation.
Knowingtheglobalplenumvelocityfield,therevisedaxialflowthroughthischokedcellcanbecalculated bysolvingtheBernoulli equationfortheflowcircuitthroughthiscell.Thus,anabsoluteupperboundonthewaterexittemperature andmaximumfuelcladdingtemperature isobtained.
Inviewoftheaforementioned assumptions, thetemperatures calculated inthismanneroverestimate thetemperature risethatwillactuallyoccurinthepool.THERPOOL, basedonthetheoryofReference 18,automates thiscalculation.
Finally,themaximumspecificpowerofafuelarrayqAcanbegivenby:where:qFxyqaveragefuelassemblyspecificpowerFxyradialpeakingfactorThedataonradialandaxialpeakingfactorsmaybefoundinTable3-10.Themaximumtemperature riseofpoolwaterinthemostdisadvantageously placedfuelassemblyiscomputedforallloadingcases.Table3-19,thirdcolumn,givestheoutputsfromTHERPOOLintabularform.3.3.3.CladdingTemperature
~~~Havingdetermined themaximumlocalwatertemperature inthepool,itisnowpossibletodetermine themaximumfuelcladdingtemperature.
AfuelrodcanproduceFoottimestheaverageheatemissionrateoverasmalllength,whereTtistfietotalpeakingfactor.Theaxialheatdissipation inarodisknowntoreachamaximuminthecentralregion,andtaperoffatitstwoextremities.
Foraddedconservatism, itisassumedthatthepeakheatemissionoccursatthetopwherethelocalwatertemperature alsoreachesitsmaximum.Futhermore, nocreditistakenforaxialconduction ofheatalongtherod.Thehighlyconservative modelthusconstructed leadstosimplealgebraic equations whichdirectlygivethemaximumlocalcladdingtemperature, tc.Table3-19,fourthcolumn,summarizes thekeyoutputdata.Itisfoundthatthemaximumvalueofthelocalwatertemperature iswellbelowthenucleateboilingcondition value.Theincremental claddingtemperature istoosmalltoproducesignificant thermalstresses.
3.4POTENTIAL FUELANDRACKHANDLINGACCIDENTS Themethodformovingtheracksintoandoutofthespentfuelpoolisbrieflydiscussed inSection4.7.4.2.Themethodsutilizedensurethatpostulated accidents donotresultinalossofcoolingtoeitherthespentfuelpoolorthereactor,orresultinakeffinthespentfuelpoolexceeding 0.95.3-160076L/0011L  
~~
~~
3.4.1RackModuleMishandlinThepotentialformishandlingofrackmodulesduringthererackoperationhasbeenevaluated.Atnotimewillthecaskhandlingcraneorthetemporaryconstructioncranecarryarackmoduledirectlyoverarackcontainingspentfuel.Theproceduresandadministrativecontrolsgoverningthererackoperationwillensurethesafehandlingofrackmodules.BoththetemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcranemeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSectionP.l.lofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"<19'ntheunlikelyeventthatarackshouldstrikethesideofanotherrackmodulecontainingfuelassemblies,theconsequencesofthispostulatedaccidentwouldbeboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.2TemporaryConstructionCraneDroDuringthererackoperation,atemporaryconstructioncranewillbeinstalledintheFuelHandlingBuilding.ThisinstallationwillbeperformedusingliftrigswhichmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofapostulatedaccidentduringthisinstallationareboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDro)Duringthere-rackingoperation,itwillbenecessarytoraiseandmaneuvertheoldracksoutofthespentfuelpoolinordertoinstallthenewspentfuelracks(SeeSection4.7.4).Thehandlingoftheseheavyloadswillbeaccomplishedbytheuseofatemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcrane.BothofthesecranesmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSection5.1.1ofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofdroppingarackintheSpentFuelPoolweredeterminedbyreviewingtheanalysisinFSARSubsection9.1.4fordroppingofthespentfuelcask.Theresultsofthiscaskdropanalysisdemonstratedthatthepoolfloorwouldremainelasticduringimpactandthatcrackswouldnotdevelop.Thiscaskweighssubstantiallymorethanasinglerackassemblyandhasasmallercrosssectionalareaforloaddistribution.Therefore,therackdropscenarioisboundedbythepreviousanalysisforacaskdropscenario,andlossofspentfuelcoolingfromlossofpoolwaterinventorywillnotoccurasaresultofarackdrop.3.5TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESThisproposedamendmentpermitsreplacementofthespentfuelpoolrackstoensurethatsufficientcapacityexistsforstorageofspentfuelatSt.LucieUnit1.Thenewracksincreasetheavailablestorageto1706spentfuelassembliesandisexpectedtoprovideadequatestoragespaceuntiltheyear2009.3-170076L/0011L I'NI'i,Kl's>""II.VII't~lf1'IB1 TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangesaredescribedbelow:1.Specification3/4.9.14BasesisrevisedtoreflecttheassumptionsusedincalculationsofdosesbasedontheDecayTimes.2.Specification5.6.1.a.lisrevisedtocorrespondtothe.StandardTechnicalSpecificationsforCombustionEngineeringPressurizedWaterReactors(NUREG-0212Rev2).3.Specification5.6.l.a.2isrevisedtoshowthenominalcenter-to-centerdistanceforthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.4.Specification5.6.1.a.3iseditedtodiscusstheboronconcentrationonly.5.Specification5.6.1.a.4iscreatedtoindicatethepresenceofBoraflexinthecells.6.Specification5.6.1.bandaccompanyingFigure5.6-1arecreatedtodefinethefuelenrichment/burnuplimitsforstorageineachregionofthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.7.Specification5.6.1ciseditoriallychangedfrom"b"to"c".8.Specification5.6.3ischangedtoshowthecapacityofthehigh-capacityspentfuelstorageracks.
3.4.1RackModuleMishandlin Thepotential formishandling ofrackmodulesduringthererackoperation hasbeenevaluated.
Atnotimewillthecaskhandlingcraneorthetemporary construction cranecarryarackmoduledirectlyoverarackcontaining spentfuel.Theprocedures andadministrative controlsgoverning thererackoperation willensurethesafehandlingofrackmodules.Boththetemporary construction craneandthecaskhandlingcranemeetthedesignandoperational requirements ofSectionP.l.lofNUREG-0612, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"<19'n theunlikelyeventthatarackshouldstrikethesideofanotherrackmodulecontaining fuelassemblies, theconsequences ofthispostulated accidentwouldbeboundedbythecaskdropevaluations described inSection5.3.1.2.3.4.2Temporary Construction CraneDroDuringthererackoperation, atemporary construction cranewillbeinstalled intheFuelHandlingBuilding.
Thisinstallation willbeperformed usingliftrigswhichmeetthedesignandoperational requirements ofNUREG-0612, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."Theconsequences ofapostulated accidentduringthisinstallation areboundedbythecaskdropevaluations described inSection5.3.1.2.3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDro)Duringthere-racking operation, itwillbenecessary toraiseandmaneuvertheoldracksoutofthespentfuelpoolinordertoinstallthenewspentfuelracks(SeeSection4.7.4).Thehandlingoftheseheavyloadswillbeaccomplished bytheuseofatemporary construction craneandthecaskhandlingcrane.Bothofthesecranesmeetthedesignandoperational requirements ofSection5.1.1ofNUREG-0612, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."Theconsequences ofdroppingarackintheSpentFuelPoolweredetermined byreviewing theanalysisinFSARSubsection 9.1.4fordroppingofthespentfuelcask.Theresultsofthiscaskdropanalysisdemonstrated thatthepoolfloorwouldremainelasticduringimpactandthatcrackswouldnotdevelop.Thiscaskweighssubstantially morethanasinglerackassemblyandhasasmallercrosssectional areaforloaddistribution.
Therefore, therackdropscenarioisboundedbythepreviousanalysisforacaskdropscenario, andlossofspentfuelcoolingfromlossofpoolwaterinventory willnotoccurasaresultofarackdrop.3.5TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESThisproposedamendment permitsreplacement ofthespentfuelpoolrackstoensurethatsufficient capacityexistsforstorageofspentfuelatSt.LucieUnit1.Thenewracksincreasetheavailable storageto1706spentfuelassemblies andisexpectedtoprovideadequatestoragespaceuntiltheyear2009.3-170076L/0011L I'NI'i,Kl's>""II.VII't~lf1'IB1 TheproposedTechnical Specification changesaredescribed below:1.Specification 3/4.9.14Basesisrevisedtoreflecttheassumptions usedincalculations ofdosesbasedontheDecayTimes.2.Specification 5.6.1.a.lisrevisedtocorrespond tothe.StandardTechnical Specifications forCombustion Engineering Pressurized WaterReactors(NUREG-0212 Rev2).3.Specification 5.6.l.a.2isrevisedtoshowthenominalcenter-to-center distanceforthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.4.Specification 5.6.1.a.3 iseditedtodiscusstheboronconcentration only.5.Specification 5.6.1.a.4 iscreatedtoindicatethepresenceofBoraflexinthecells.6.Specification 5.6.1.bandaccompanying Figure5.6-1arecreatedtodefinethefuelenrichment/burnup limitsforstorageineachregionofthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.7.Specification 5.6.1ciseditorially changedfrom"b"to"c".8.Specification 5.6.3ischangedtoshowthecapacityofthehigh-capacityspentfuelstorageracks.


==3.6REFERENCES==
==3.6REFERENCES==
FORSECTION3~~~1.A.Ahlin,M.Edenius,H.Haggblom,"CASMO-AFuelAssemblyBurnupProgram,"AE-RF-76-4158,Studsvikreport(proprietary).2.A.AhlinandM.Edenius,"CASMO-AFastTransportTheoryDepletionCodeforLWRAnalysis,"ANSTransactions,Vol.26,p.604,1977.3.M.Edeniusetal.,"CASMOBenchmarkReport,"Studsvik/RF-78-6293,AktiebolagetAtomenergi,March1978.4.Green,Lucious,Petrie,Ford,White,Wright,"PSR-63/AMPX-1(codepackage),AMPXModularCodeSystemforGeneratingCoupledMultigroupNeutron-GammaLibrariesfromENDF/B,"ORNL-TM-3706,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,March1976.5.L.M.PetrieandN.F.Cross,"KENO-IV,AnImprovedMonteCarloCriticalityProgram,"ORNL-4938,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,November1975.6.R.,M.Westfalletal.,"SCALE:AModularCodeSystemforPerformingStandardizedComputerAnalysesforLicensingEvaluation,"NUREG/CR-0200,1979.3-180076L/0011L jI-lllp't~',hVgyII1't W.A.Wittkopf,"NULIF-NeutronSpectrumGenerator,Fe~roupConstantGeneratorandFuelDepletionCode,"BAW-426,TheBabcock6WilcoxCompany,August1976.W.R.Cadwell,PD$07ReferenceManual,WAPD-TM-678,BettisAtomicPowerLaboratory,January1967.W.J.Eich,"AdvancedRecycleMethodologyProgram,CEM-3,"ElectricPowerResearchInstitute,1976.E.E.Pilat,"MethodsfortheAnalysisofBoilingWaterReactors(LatticePhysics),"YAEC-1232,YankeeAtomicElectricCo.,December1980.E.Johansson,"ReactorPhysicsCalculationsonClose-PackedPressurizedWaterReactorLattices,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.68,pp.263-268,February1985.H.Richings,SomeNotesonPWR(W)PowerDistributionProbabilitiesforLOCAProbabilisticAnalyses,NRCMemorandumtoP.S.Check,datedJuly5J1977.M.G.Natrella,ExperimentalStatistics,NationalBureauofStandards,Handbook91,August1963.J.M.Canoetal.,"SupercriticalityThroughOptimumModerationinNuclearFuelStorage,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.48,pp.251-260,May1980.NUREG-0800,U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,StandardReviewPlan,BranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,Rev.2,July1981.Singh,K.P.,JournalofHeatTransfer,TransactionsoftheASME,August1981,Vol.1-3,"SomeFundamentalRelationshipsforTubularHeatExchangerThermalPerformance."GeneralElectricCorporation,R&DDataBooks,"HeatTransferandFluidFlow,"1974andupdates.Singh,K.P.etal.,"MethodforComputingtheMaximumWaterTemperatureinaFuelPoolContainingSpentNuclearFuel,"HeatTransferEngineering,Vol.7,No.1-2,pp.72-82(1986).NuclearRegulatoryCommission,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NUREG-0612,July1980.3-190076L/0011L
'~TI*("~t~Uf'f~~'I~If~'I4 TABLE3-1SUMMARYOFCRITICALITYSAFETYANALYSESRegion1Region2Minimumacceptableburnup84.5XinitialenrichmentTemperatureassumedforanalysisReferencek~(nominal)CalculationalbiasUncertaintiesBiasB-10concentrationBoraflexthicknessBoraflexwidthInnerboxdimensionWatergapthicknessSSthicknessFuelenrichmentFueldensityFuelelementpitchStatisticalcombinationEccentricassemblypositionAllowanceforburnupuncertaintyTotalMaximumreactivity(with1720ppmsolubleboron)4'c0.93130.0013+0.0018+0.0021+0.0044+0.0017+0.0011+0.0043+0.0010+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0080+0.0003N/A0.9329+0.00800.9409(0.767)36.5Mwd/kgU4'c0.91140.0013+0.0018+0.0036+0.0111+0.0011+0.0016H'/A+0.0002+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0125negative+0.01830.9310+0.01250.9435(0.760)(1)Squarerootofsumofsquares.N/A-NotApplicable3-200076L/0011L


TABLE3-2MINIMUMBURNUPVALUESInitialEnrichment,XMinimumBurnup,Mwd/kgU1.631.752.002.252.502.753.003.253.503.754.004.254.5002.306.009.7012.9016.1019.1522.2025.1528.1030.9033.7036.503-210076L/0011L TABLE3-3REACTIVITYEFFECTSOFABNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONSAccident/AbnormalConditionsReactivityEffectTemperatureincreaseVoid(boiling)AssemblydroppedontopofrackLateralrackmodulemovementMisplacementofafuelassemblyNegativeinbothregionsNegativeinbothregionsNegligibleNegligiblePositive0,3-220076L/0011L TABLE3-4FUELBURNUPVALUESFORREQUIREDREACTIVITIES(k~)WITHFUELOFVARIOUSINITIALENRICHMENTS(Referencekc0.9297)InitialEnrichmentUncertaintyinBurnup,5kDesignLimitkcCalculatedBurnuplimitMwd/kgU1.62.02.53.03.54.04.500.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.50(1)SeeSubsection3.1.3.3.23-230076L/0011L TABLE3-5COMPARISONOFCOLD,CLEANREACTIVITIESCALCULATEDAT36.5Mwd/kgUBURNUPAND4.5XENRICHMENTk~Xe-free,4CCalculationalMethodInfiniteArray9fFuelAssemblies~inReactorSpacingAssembliesinRegion2CellCASMO-2EDIFFUSION/BLACKNESSTHEORYEPRI-CELLl.12121.13061.12810.91140.8972(1)Cold,cleanconditionincontrasttohotoperatingconditionsofFigure3-4.(2)EPRI-CELLk~atmaximumvalueduringlong-term(30-year)storage.3-240076L/0011L TABLE3-6ESTIMATEDUNCERTAINTIESINREACTIVITYDUETOFUELDEPLETIONEFFECTSInitialEnrichmentDesignBurnupMwd/kgU0.0005TimesBurnup,5kDesignkcgReactivityLoss,6k<1.62.02.53.03.54.04.505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.5000.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911500.05790.12840.18280.22620.26200.2924(1)Totalreactivitydecrease,calculatedforthecold,Xe-freeconditioninthefuelstoragerack,fromthebeginning-of-lifetothedesignburnup.3-250076L/0011L  
FORSECTION3~~~1.A.Ahlin,M.Edenius,H.Haggblom, "CASMO-AFuelAssemblyBurnupProgram,"
~h~l TABLE3-7LONG-TERMCHANGESINREACTIVITYINSTORAGERACKStorageTime,years5kfromShutdown(Xenon-free)at4.5XEand36.5Mwd/kgU0.51.010.020.030.0-0.0047-0.0088-0.0470-0.0673-0.07883-260076L/0011L 0TABLE3-8DESIGNBASIS(LIMITING)FUELASSEMBLYSPECIFICATIONS(CE14x14)FuelRodDataCladdingoutsidediameter,in.Claddingthickness,in.CladdingmaterialPelletdiameter,in.U02stackdensity,g/cmEnrichment,AXU-2350.4400.028Zircaloy-40.37710.281+0.0314.5+0.05FuelAssemblyDataMaximumnumberoffuelrodsFuelrodpitch,in.ControlrodguidetubeNumberOutsidediameter,in.Insidediameter,in.MaterialU-235Loadinggrams/axialcmofassembly176(14x14array)0.577+0.002351.1151.035Zircaloy-451.7+0.703-270076L/0011L TABLE3-9THERMAL/HYDRAULICCASESTREATED*1.NormalBatchDischarge:Irradiationtime:54months(1.42x10sees)8Additionofthemostrecentbatch:150hoursaftershutdownBatchsize:80assemblies2.PullCoreDischargeIrradiationtime:73assemblies90days72assemblies21months72assemblies39monthsFueltransferbegins7daysaftershutdown.*Thepoolhastotalstoragecapacityof1706storagecells.Itisconservativelyassumedthat18batchesof80assemblieshavebeenpreviouslydischargedat18monthintervals.Eachassemblyinthesepreviousdischargeshashad54monthsofexposureatfullpower(12.44MWt).3-280076L/0011L TABLE3-10PEAKINGFACTORDATAFuelMaximumRadialPeakingFactorMaximumAxialPeakingFactorSt.LucieUnit1CE14x14andExxon14x141.671.32StLucieUnit2,CE16x16l.751.353-290076L/0011L V,rrJL~
AE-RF-76-4158, Studsvikreport(proprietary).
TABLE3-11ESSENTIALHEATTRANSFERDATAFORTHEFUELPOOLHEATEXCHANGERNumberofheatexchangers:Coolantflowrate:Temperatureeffectiveness:one3560gpm0.36{twopumps)*0.263{onepump)Heattransfersurfacearea:Overallheattransfercoefficient{fouled){twopumps):43SOsq.ft.260Btu/sq.ft.-hr-oF*Temperatureefficiencyoftheheatexchangeriscalculatedinthefollowingmanner,usingtheinformationprovidedintheFSAR:PaCoolingwateroutlet-inletPoolwaterinlet-coolingwaterinlet118-100150-100.363-300076L/0011L t~'e TABLE3-12POWERGENERATIONRATIOPREVIOUSLYDISCHARGEDBATCHESBatchBatchNo.SizeTimeAfterShutReactorExposureNonDimensionalDowninDaysTimeinDaysPowerGen.Ratio12345678910ll121317188080808080808080808080808080808080809719.99179.98639.98099.97559.97019.96479.95939.95399.94859.94319.93779.93239.92699.92159.91619.91079.9540.01643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.5.00487.00505.00523.00542.00562.00582.00603.00624.00647.00670.00694.00720.00746.00776~00815.00888.01097..01893CUMULATIVEDIMENSIONLESSPOWER1.3374E-013-310076L/0011L TABLE3-13BULKPOOLTEMPERATUREVS.TIMEDURINGNORMALREFUELINGDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)150.00*151.00106.0108.8.5689E+07.1643E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischargeisassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously,simulatedbyonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-320076L/0011L  
2.A.AhlinandM.Edenius,"CASMO-AFastTransport TheoryDepletion CodeforLWRAnalysis,"
ANSTransactions, Vol.26,p.604,1977.3.M.Edeniusetal.,"CASMOBenchmark Report,"Studsvik/RF-78-6293, Aktiebolaget Atomenergi, March1978.4.Green,Lucious,Petrie,Ford,White,Wright,"PSR-63/AMPX-1 (codepackage),
AMPXModularCodeSystemforGenerating CoupledMultigroup Neutron-GammaLibraries fromENDF/B,"ORNL-TM-3706, OakRidgeNationalLaboratory, March1976.5.L.M.PetrieandN.F.Cross,"KENO-IV, AnImprovedMonteCarloCriticality Program,"
ORNL-4938, OakRidgeNationalLaboratory, November1975.6.R.,M.Westfalletal.,"SCALE:AModularCodeSystemforPerforming Standardized ComputerAnalysesforLicensing Evaluation,"
NUREG/CR-0200, 1979.3-180076L/0011L jI-lllp't~',hVgyII1't W.A.Wittkopf, "NULIF-NeutronSpectrumGenerator, Fe~roupConstantGenerator andFuelDepletion Code,"BAW-426,TheBabcock6WilcoxCompany,August1976.W.R.Cadwell,PD$07Reference Manual,WAPD-TM-678, BettisAtomicPowerLaboratory, January1967.W.J.Eich,"Advanced RecycleMethodology Program,CEM-3,"ElectricPowerResearchInstitute, 1976.E.E.Pilat,"MethodsfortheAnalysisofBoilingWaterReactors(LatticePhysics),"
YAEC-1232, YankeeAtomicElectricCo.,December1980.E.Johansson, "ReactorPhysicsCalculations onClose-Packed Pressurized WaterReactorLattices,"
NuclearTechnology, Vol.68,pp.263-268,February1985.H.Richings, SomeNotesonPWR(W)PowerDistribution Probabilities forLOCAProbabilistic
: Analyses, NRCMemorandum toP.S.Check,datedJuly5J1977.M.G.Natrella, Experimental Statistics, NationalBureauofStandards, Handbook91,August1963.J.M.Canoetal.,"Supercriticality ThroughOptimumModeration inNuclearFuelStorage,"
NuclearTechnology, Vol.48,pp.251-260,May1980.NUREG-0800, U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, StandardReviewPlan,BranchTechnical PositionASB9-2,Rev.2,July1981.Singh,K.P.,JournalofHeatTransfer, Transactions oftheASME,August1981,Vol.1-3,"SomeFundamental Relationships forTubularHeatExchanger ThermalPerformance."
GeneralElectricCorporation, R&DDataBooks,"HeatTransferandFluidFlow,"1974andupdates.Singh,K.P.etal.,"MethodforComputing theMaximumWaterTemperature inaFuelPoolContaining SpentNuclearFuel,"HeatTransferEngineering, Vol.7,No.1-2,pp.72-82(1986).NuclearRegulatory Commission, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NUREG-0612, July1980.3-190076L/0011L
'~TI*("~t~Uf'f~~'I~If~'I4 TABLE3-1SUMMARYOFCRITICALITY SAFETYANALYSESRegion1Region2Minimumacceptable burnup84.5Xinitialenrichment Temperature assumedforanalysisReference k~(nominal)
Calculational biasUncertainties BiasB-10concentration Boraflexthickness BoraflexwidthInnerboxdimension Watergapthickness SSthickness Fuelenrichment FueldensityFuelelementpitchStatistical combination Eccentric assemblypositionAllowance forburnupuncertainty TotalMaximumreactivity (with1720ppmsolubleboron)4'c0.93130.0013+0.0018+0.0021+0.0044+0.0017+0.0011+0.0043+0.0010+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0080+0.0003N/A0.9329+0.00800.9409(0.767)36.5Mwd/kgU4'c0.91140.0013+0.0018+0.0036+0.0111+0.0011+0.0016H'/A+0.0002+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0125negative+0.01830.9310+0.01250.9435(0.760)(1)Squarerootofsumofsquares.N/A-NotApplicable 3-200076L/0011L
 
TABLE3-2MINIMUMBURNUPVALUESInitialEnrichment, XMinimumBurnup,Mwd/kgU1.631.752.002.252.502.753.003.253.503.754.004.254.5002.306.009.7012.9016.1019.1522.2025.1528.1030.9033.7036.503-210076L/0011L TABLE3-3REACTIVITY EFFECTSOFABNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONS Accident/Abnormal Conditions Reactivity EffectTemperature increaseVoid(boiling)
AssemblydroppedontopofrackLateralrackmodulemovementMisplacement ofafuelassemblyNegativeinbothregionsNegativeinbothregionsNegligible Negligible Positive0,3-220076L/0011L TABLE3-4FUELBURNUPVALUESFORREQUIREDREACTIVITIES (k~)WITHFUELOFVARIOUSINITIALENRICHMENTS (Reference kc0.9297)InitialEnrichment Uncertainty inBurnup,5kDesignLimitkcCalculated BurnuplimitMwd/kgU1.62.02.53.03.54.04.500.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.50(1)SeeSubsection 3.1.3.3.2 3-230076L/0011L TABLE3-5COMPARISON OFCOLD,CLEANREACTIVITIES CALCULATED AT36.5Mwd/kgUBURNUPAND4.5XENRICHMENT k~Xe-free,4CCalculational MethodInfiniteArray9fFuelAssemblies~
inReactorSpacingAssemblies inRegion2CellCASMO-2EDIFFUSION/BLACKNESS THEORYEPRI-CELL l.12121.13061.12810.91140.8972(1)Cold,cleancondition incontrasttohotoperating conditions ofFigure3-4.(2)EPRI-CELL k~atmaximumvalueduringlong-term (30-year) storage.3-240076L/0011L TABLE3-6ESTIMATED UNCERTAINTIES INREACTIVITY DUETOFUELDEPLETION EFFECTSInitialEnrichment DesignBurnupMwd/kgU0.0005TimesBurnup,5kDesignkcgReactivity Loss,6k<1.62.02.53.03.54.04.505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.5000.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911500.05790.12840.18280.22620.26200.2924(1)Totalreactivity
: decrease, calculated forthecold,Xe-freecondition inthefuelstoragerack,fromthebeginning-of-life tothedesignburnup.3-250076L/0011L  
~h~l TABLE3-7LONG-TERM CHANGESINREACTIVITY INSTORAGERACKStorageTime,years5kfromShutdown(Xenon-free) at4.5XEand36.5Mwd/kgU0.51.010.020.030.0-0.0047-0.0088-0.0470-0.0673-0.07883-260076L/0011L 0TABLE3-8DESIGNBASIS(LIMITING)
FUELASSEMBLYSPECIFICATIONS (CE14x14)FuelRodDataCladdingoutsidediameter, in.Claddingthickness, in.CladdingmaterialPelletdiameter, in.U02stackdensity,g/cmEnrichment, AXU-2350.4400.028Zircaloy-4 0.37710.281+0.0314.5+0.05FuelAssemblyDataMaximumnumberoffuelrodsFuelrodpitch,in.ControlrodguidetubeNumberOutsidediameter, in.Insidediameter, in.MaterialU-235Loadinggrams/axial cmofassembly176(14x14array)0.577+0.002351.1151.035Zircaloy-4 51.7+0.703-270076L/0011L TABLE3-9THERMAL/HYDRAULIC CASESTREATED*1.NormalBatchDischarge:
Irradiation time:54months(1.42x10sees)8Additionofthemostrecentbatch:150hoursaftershutdownBatchsize:80assemblies 2.PullCoreDischarge Irradiation time:73assemblies 90days72assemblies 21months72assemblies 39monthsFueltransferbegins7daysaftershutdown.
*Thepoolhastotalstoragecapacityof1706storagecells.Itisconservatively assumedthat18batchesof80assemblies havebeenpreviously discharged at18monthintervals.
Eachassemblyinthesepreviousdischarges hashad54monthsofexposureatfullpower(12.44MWt).3-280076L/0011L TABLE3-10PEAKINGFACTORDATAFuelMaximumRadialPeakingFactorMaximumAxialPeakingFactorSt.LucieUnit1CE14x14andExxon14x141.671.32StLucieUnit2,CE16x16l.751.353-290076L/0011L V,rrJL~
TABLE3-11ESSENTIAL HEATTRANSFERDATAFORTHEFUELPOOLHEATEXCHANGER Numberofheatexchangers:
Coolantflowrate:Temperature effectiveness:
one3560gpm0.36{twopumps)*0.263{onepump)Heattransfersurfacearea:Overallheattransfercoefficient
{fouled){twopumps):43SOsq.ft.260Btu/sq.ft.-hr-oF
*Temperature efficiency oftheheatexchanger iscalculated inthefollowing manner,usingtheinformation providedintheFSAR:PaCoolingwateroutlet-inletPoolwaterinlet-coolingwaterinlet118-100150-100.363-300076L/0011L t~'e TABLE3-12POWERGENERATION RATIOPREVIOUSLY DISCHARGED BATCHESBatchBatchNo.SizeTimeAfterShutReactorExposureNonDimensional DowninDaysTimeinDaysPowerGen.Ratio12345678910ll121317188080808080808080808080808080808080809719.99179.98639.98099.97559.97019.96479.95939.95399.94859.94319.93779.93239.92699.92159.91619.91079.9540.01643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.5.00487.00505.00523.00542.00562.00582.00603.00624.00647.00670.00694.00720.00746.00776~00815.00888.01097..01893CUMULATIVE DIMENSIONLESS POWER1.3374E-013-310076L/0011L TABLE3-13BULKPOOLTEMPERATURE VS.TIMEDURINGNORMALREFUELING DISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)150.00*151.00106.0108.8.5689E+07.1643E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischarge isassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously, simulated byonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-320076L/0011L  


TABLE3-14POOLBULKTEMPERATUREVS.TIMESUBSEQUENTTOCOMPLETIONOFNORMALREFUELINGDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)151.00161.00171.00181.00191.00201.00211.00221.00231.00241.00251.00261.00271.00281.00291.00301.00311.00321.00331.00341.00351.00361.00371.00381.00391.00108.8130.0133.2133.3133.0132.6132.2131.8131.5131.1130.8130.6130.3130.1129.8129.6129.4129.2129.0128.8128.6128.4128.3128.1127.9.1642E+08.1613E+08.1588E+08.1565E+08.1544E+08.1525E+08.1507E+08.1490E+08.1475E+08.1461E+08.1447E+08.1435E+08.1423E+08.1411E+08.1401E+08.1390E+08.1380E+08.1371E+08.1362E+08.1353E+08.1344E+08.1336E+081328E+08.1320E+08.1313E+083-330076L/0011L TABLE3-15LOSSOFCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETIONOFNORMALREFUELINGDISCHARGECaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation(ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)WhenheatgenerationismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperatureeiamaximum16.7913.4316933.016294.02.672.573-340076L/0011L k
TABLE3-14POOLBULKTEMPERATURE VS.TIMESUBSEQUENT TOCOMPLETION OFNORMALREFUELING DISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)151.00161.00171.00181.00191.00201.00211.00221.00231.00241.00251.00261.00271.00281.00291.00301.00311.00321.00331.00341.00351.00361.00371.00381.00391.00108.8130.0133.2133.3133.0132.6132.2131.8131.5131.1130.8130.6130.3130.1129.8129.6129.4129.2129.0128.8128.6128.4128.3128.1127.9.1642E+08.1613E+08.1588E+08.1565E+08.1544E+08.1525E+08.1507E+08.1490E+08.1475E+08.1461E+08.1447E+08.1435E+08.1423E+08.1411E+08.1401E+08.1390E+08.1380E+08.1371E+08.1362E+08.1353E+08.1344E+08.1336E+081328E+08.1320E+08.1313E+083-330076L/0011L TABLE3-15LOSSOFCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETION OFNORMALREFUELING DISCHARGE CaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation (ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)
TABLE3-16BUIXPOOLTEMPERATUREVSTIMEDURINGFULLCOREDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)168.00*169.00113.6117.8.8690E+07.3371E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischargeisassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously,simulatedbyonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-350076L/0011L TABLE3-17POOLBULKTEMPERATUREVSTIMESUBSEQUENTTOCOMPLETIONOFFULLCOREDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)169.00179.00189.00199.00209.00219.00229.00239.00249.00259.00269.00279.00289.00299.00309.00319.00329.00339.00349.00359.00369.00379.00389.00399.00409.00117.8148.8150.8150.2149.4148.7148.1147.4146.9146.3145.8145.3144.8144.4144.0143.6143.2142.8142.5142.1141.8141.5141.1140.8140.5.3370E+08.3307E+08.3249E+08.3197E+08.3149E+08.3104E+08.3062E+08.3024E+08.2987E+08.2953E+08.2921E+08.2991E+08.2862E+08.2834E+08.2807E+08.2782E+08.2758E+08.2734E+08.2712E+08.2690E+08.2668E+08.2648E+08.2628E+08.2608e+08.2589E+083-360076L/0011L 11ti1II TABLE3-18LOSSOPCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETIONOFPULLCOREDISCHARGECaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation(ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)WhenheatgenerationismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperatureismaximum7.475.0434742.233660.05.475.33-370076L/0011L III TABLE3-19LOCALANDCLADDINGTEMPERATUREDATACaseInstantMaximumLocalMaximumWaterCladdingTemp.oFTemp.oFNormaldischargeWhenthepoolheatgenerationrateisatitspeakvalue155.9198.8NormaldischargeFullcoredischargeFullcoredischargeWhenthepoolbulktemperatureisatitspeakvalueWhentheheatgenerationrateinthepoolisatthepeakvalueWhenthepoolbulktemperatureisatitspeakvalue179.2162.8188.0219.4209.4222.803-380076L/0011L II 4030Uh4025DZ20,xu015ACCEPTABLEBURNUPDOMAINUNACCEPTABLEBURNUPDOMAIN1002.02.53.0,3.54.0INITIALENRICHMENT,WT%U-2354.5FLORIDAPOWER5LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1ACCEPTABIEBURNUPDOMAININREGION2OFTHEST.LUCIEPLANTSPENTFUELSTORAGERACKSFIGURE3-1 OO~OO0OO~~~~0~~~~~~~~~0~0~0~0~~~~~~~0~OO~0~0~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~OO~~00~~~~~~0~~~~0~~~OO~~0OOOOOl~~OO~eo~ee0~~~~e~~~~~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
Whenheatgeneration ismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperature eiamaximum16.7913.4316933.016294.02.672.573-340076L/0011L k
TABLE3-16BUIXPOOLTEMPERATURE VSTIMEDURINGFULLCOREDISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)168.00*169.00113.6117.8.8690E+07.3371E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischarge isassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously, simulated byonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-350076L/0011L TABLE3-17POOLBULKTEMPERATURE VSTIMESUBSEQUENT TOCOMPLETION OFFULLCOREDISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)169.00179.00189.00199.00209.00219.00229.00239.00249.00259.00269.00279.00289.00299.00309.00319.00329.00339.00349.00359.00369.00379.00389.00399.00409.00117.8148.8150.8150.2149.4148.7148.1147.4146.9146.3145.8145.3144.8144.4144.0143.6143.2142.8142.5142.1141.8141.5141.1140.8140.5.3370E+08.3307E+08.3249E+08.3197E+08.3149E+08.3104E+08.3062E+08.3024E+08.2987E+08.2953E+08.2921E+08.2991E+08.2862E+08.2834E+08.2807E+08.2782E+08.2758E+08.2734E+08.2712E+08.2690E+08.2668E+08.2648E+08.2628E+08.2608e+08.2589E+083-360076L/0011L 11ti1II TABLE3-18LOSSOPCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETION OFPULLCOREDISCHARGE CaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation (ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)
Whenheatgeneration ismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperature ismaximum7.475.0434742.233660.05.475.33-370076L/0011L III TABLE3-19LOCALANDCLADDINGTEMPERATURE DATACaseInstantMaximumLocalMaximumWaterCladdingTemp.oFTemp.oFNormaldischarge Whenthepoolheatgeneration rateisatitspeakvalue155.9198.8Normaldischarge Fullcoredischarge Fullcoredischarge Whenthepoolbulktemperature isatitspeakvalueWhentheheatgeneration rateinthepoolisatthepeakvalueWhenthepoolbulktemperature isatitspeakvalue179.2162.8188.0219.4209.4222.803-380076L/0011L II 4030Uh4025DZ20,xu015ACCEPTABLE BURNUPDOMAINUNACCEPTABLE BURNUPDOMAIN1002.02.53.0,3.54.0INITIALENRICHMENT, WT%U-2354.5FLORIDAPOWER5LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1ACCEPTABI EBURNUPDOMAININREGION2OFTHEST.LUCIEPLANTSPENTFUELSTORAGERACKSFIGURE3-1 OO~OO0OO~~~~0~~~~~~~~~0~0~0~0~~~~~~~0~OO~0~0~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~OO~~00~~~~~~0~~~~0~~~OO~~0OOOOOl~~OO~eo~ee0~~~~e~~~~~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
o~~~~~~~~~0~~~o~~~~~~~~~~o~~0~o~~oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~ocoo~e~oo~~o~~o%o~o0~~~~~~~~~o~o~oo~o~~0+0~~~~~~ohio~~~~o~~~~~~~~~~o~0~o~oo~o~~o~~o~~~0~~~~0~o~~o~oo~~e~o~~~o~oo0~~~~~oooo  
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1.40OrnOQCg->Ocnirzo~mcoz0lTiXOg~C~mmmezlmHO+llQ4zI0g7COr~CO0g~mmrQozIHGJC+~zOQz1.30C9R~1.200IOxLUIz;'I.10LLzhC1.000.900102.5%%dE152025FUELBURNUP,IVIWD/KGU3.5%ECASNIO-2ENULIFEPRI-CELLCHEETAH-P,(COINCIDESWITH4.5%ECASNIO)304.5'YoE40 POOLATBULKTEMPERAlURE,t'COOLANTAT8)COOLANTAT02COOLANTAT0;COOLANTAT~NHXKg)O~orm~Itl~OCn+ZOrnftlo+mac'n~mCCmNPmIO>ommR4>rz~C)zC~K+0zCOOLER&#xb9;1COOLER&#xb9;2COOLER&#xb9;iCOOLERSNHX ASSUMEDADDEDFUELASSEMBLIESACTUALOUTLINEOFPOOLACTUALOUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLIESRACKASSEMBLY++if+++++IDEALIZEDOUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLY0mlVTl0AC0llmPcmr0th0C0OQmmQo~I~C)C+0+0IDEALIZEDOUTLINEOFPOOLBOUNDARY
1.40OrnOQCg->Ocnirzo~mcoz0lTiXOg~C~mmmezlmHO+llQ4zI0g7COr~CO0g~mmrQozIHGJC+~zOQz1.30C9R~1.200IOxLUIz;'I.10LLzhC1.000.900102.5%%dE152025FUELBURNUP,IVIWD/KGU 3.5%ECASNIO-2ENULIFEPRI-CELLCHEETAH-P, (COINCIDES WITH4.5%ECASNIO)304.5'YoE40 POOLATBULKTEMPERAlURE, t'COOLANTAT8)COOLANTAT02COOLANTAT0;COOLANTAT~NHXKg)O~orm~Itl~OCn+ZOrnftlo+mac'n~mCCmNPmIO>ommR4>rz~C)zC~K+0zCOOLER&#xb9;1COOLER&#xb9;2COOLER&#xb9;iCOOLERSNHX ASSUMEDADDEDFUELASSEMBLIES ACTUALOUTLINEOFPOOLACTUALOUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLIES RACKASSEMBLY++if+++++IDEALIZED OUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLY0mlVTl0AC0llmPcmr0th0C0OQmmQo~I~C)C+0+0IDEALIZED OUTLINEOFPOOLBOUNDARY
 
IZFUELBUNDLEXmTlA9xzm4lV0OII0ch0I0C0OQmmI~rR4C)gZ4o40z0XmaOI0ZnOC 4.0MECHANICAL,
: MATERIAL, ANDSTRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 4.1DESCRIPTION OPSTRUCTURE 4.1.1DescritionoftheFuelHandlingBuildingTheFuelHandlingBuilding(FHB)consistsofcast-in-place reinforced concreteinteriorandexteriorwalls.Itiscompletely isolatedfromallotherstructures.
Thefloorsandroofareofbeamandgirderconstruction supported bycolumns.Acompletedescription ofthePHBisprovidedinSection3.8.1.1.2 oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.TheFHBgeneralarrangement isshownonFSARFigures1.2-18and1.2-19.ThePHBhasbeendesignedasaseismicClassIstructure inaccordance withthecriteriaoutlinedinSections3.8.1.1.2 and3.8.1.4through3.8.1.7oftheupdatedPSAR.Thebuildingexteriorwalls,floorsandinteriorpartitions aredesignedtoprovideplantpersonnel withthenecessary biological radiation shielding andprotecttheequipment insidefromtheeffectsofadverseenvironmental conditions including tornadoandhurricane winds,temperature, externalmissilesandflooding.
Thespentfuelpoolisacast-in-place steellinedreinforced concretetankstructure thatprovidesspaceforstorageofspentfuelassemblies, controlelementassemblies, newfuelduringinitialcoreloadingandaspentfuelshippingcask.ThefuelpoolportionofthePHBincluding thewallsandroofdirectlyabovethepoolisdesignedtowithstand, withoutpenetration, theimpactofhighvelocityexternalmissilesthatmightoccurduringthepassageofatornado.Thedesignmissilesarefurtherdiscussed inSection3.5oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.Thespentfuelhandlingsystemincludesinterlocks, travellimitsandotherprotective devicestominimizetheprobability ofeithermishandling orofequipment malfunction thatcouldresultininadvertent damagetoafuelassemblyandpotential fissionproductrelease.Theinterlocks preventmovementintothewallswhilelimitswitchespreventthespentfuelhandlingmachinefromraisingthefuelaboveaheightwhere,lessthanninefeetseparates thesurfaceofthewaterfromthetopoftheactivefuellength.Aleakdetection systemisprovidedinthespentfuelpooltomonitor100percentofthepoollinerplateweldseams.Thissystemconsistsofanetworkofstainless steelanglesattachedtotheoutsideofthepoollinerwallsandtheunderside ofthepoollinerfloorbymeansofweldsandsealedwithepoxymaterial.
Intheeventthatoneoftheweldseamsdevelopsaleak,theliquidentersthemonitorchannelsystemandflowstooneof19collection pointsatthebaseofthepool,fromwhichtheleakcanbetracedbacktoaspecificpoolarea.4.1.2Description ofSpentFuelRacksThefunctionofthespentfuelstorageracksistoprovideforstorageofspentfuelassemblies inafloodedpool,whilemaintaining aeoolablegeometry, preventing criticality, andprotecting thefuelassemblies fromexcessive mechanical orthermalloadings.
4-10077L/0011L 0eeo0~~1fl0l0~~
Alistofdesigncriteriaisgivenbelow:Theracksaredesignedinaccordance withtheNRC,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"
datedApril14,1978(asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979)andSRPSection3.8.4[1].2.Theracksaredesignedtomeetthenuclearrequirements ofANSIN210-1976.
Theeffective multiplication factor,kff,inthespentfuelpoolislessthanorequalto0.95,incfutiing alluncertainties andunderallcredibleconditions.
3~Theracksaredesignedtoallowcoolantflowsuchthatboilinginthewaterchannelsbetweenthefuelassemblies intherackdoesnotoccur.Maximumfuelcladdingtemperatures arecalculated forvariouspoolcoolingconditions asdescribed inSection3.3.4~TheracksaredesignedtoseismicCategoryIrequirements, andareclassified asANSSafetyClass3andASMECodeClass3Component SupportStructures.
Thestructural evaluation andseismicanalysesareperformed usingthespecified loadsandloadcombinations inSection4.4.Theracksaredesignedtowithstand loadswithoutviolating thecriticality acceptance criteriawhichmayresultfromfuelhandlingaccidents andfromthemaximumupliftforceofthespentfuelhandlingmachine.6.7~8.Eachstoragepositionintheracksisdesignedtosupportandguidethefuelassemblyinamannerthatwillminimizethepossibility ofapplication ofexcessive lateral,axialandbendingloadstofuelassemblies duringfuelassemblyhandlingandstorage.Theracksaredesignedtoprecludetheinsertion ofafuelassemblyinotherthandesignlocations withintherackarray.Thematerials usedinconstruction oftheracksarecompatible withthestoragepoolenvironment andwillnotcontaminate thefuelassemblies.
4.1.2.1DesignofSpentFuelRacks4.1.2.1.1 Region1Therackmoduleisfabricated fromASMESA-240-304L austenitic stainless steelsheetandplatematerial, andSA-351-CF3 castingmaterialandSA-564-630 precipitation hardenedstainless steel(to1100oF)forsupportsonly.TheweldfillermaterialutilizedinbodyweldsisASMESFA-5.9,Classification ER308L.Boraflexservesastheneutronabsorbermaterial.
Additional information onBorafiexmaybefoundinSection3.1.3.TheBoraflexeexperience listisgiveninTable4-1.4-20077L/0011L 0ll~~ElC~01 Atypicalmodulecontainsstoragecellswhichhavean8.65-inch nominalsquarecross-sectional opening.Thisdimension ensuresthatfuelassemblies withmaximumexpectedaxialbowcanbeinsertedandremovedfromthestoragecellswithoutanydamagetothefuelassemblies ortherackmodules.Pigure4-7showsahorizontal cross-section ofa3x3array.Thecellsprovideasmoothandcontinuous surfaceforlateralcontactwiththefuelassembly.
Theanatomyoftherackmodulesisbestexplained bydescribing thecomponents ofthedesign,namely:InternalSquareTubeNeutronAbsorbermaterial(Boraflex)
Poisonsheathing GapelementBaseplate SupportassemblyTopLead-In4.1.2.1.1.1 InternalSquareTubeThiselementprovidesthelateralbearingsurfacetothefuelassembly.
Itisfabricated byjoiningtwoformedchannels(Pigure4-1)usingacontrolled seamweldingoperation.
Thiselementisan8.65-inch square(nominal) cross-section by169incheslong.4.1.2.1.1.2 NeutronAbsorberMaterial(Boraflex)
Boraflexisplacedonallfoursidesofasquaretubeoveralengthof143"(minimum),
whichprovidestherequisite B-10screenforallstoredassemblies including afour-inch shrinkage allowance.
4.1.2.1.1.3 AbsorberSheathing Theabsorbersheathing (coverplate),showninFigure4-2,servestopositionandretaintheabsorbermaterialinitsdesignated space.Thisisaccomplished byspotweldingthecoversheettothesquaretubealongtheformer'sedgesatnumerous(atleast20)locations.
Thismannerofattachment ensuresthattheabsorbermaterialwillnotsagorlaterally displaceduringfabrication processes andunderanysubsequent loadingcondition.
4.1.2.1.1.4 GapElementGapelements, illustrated inPigure4-3,positiontwoinnerboxesatapredetermined distancetomaintaintheminimumfluxtrapgaprequiredbetweentwoboxes.Thegapelementisweldedtotheinnerboxbyfilletwelds.Anarrayofcomposite boxassemblies weldedasindicated inFigure4-7formsthehoneycomb gridworkofcellswhichharnesses thestructural strengthofallsheetandplatetypemembersinanefficient manner.Thearrayofcomposite boxeshasoverallbending,torsional, andaxialrigidities whichareanorderofmagnitude greaterthanconfigurations utilizing gridbartypeofconstruction.
4-30077L/0011L
~~ea0l0 e4.1.2.1.1.5 Baseplate Thebaseplate isa3/4&nchthickplatetypememberwhichhas6-inchdiameterholesconcentrically locatedwithrespecttotheinternalsquaretube,exceptatsupportleglocations, wheretheholesizeis5inchesindiameter.
Theseholesprovidetheprimarypathforcoolantflow.Secondary flowpathsareavailable betweenadjacentcellsviathelateralflowholes(1inchindiameter) neartherootofthehoneycomb (Figure4-4)whichprecludeflowblockages.
Thehoneycomb isweldedtothebaseplate with3/32-inch filletwelds.4.1.2.1.1.
6SupportAssemblyEachmodulehasatleastfoursupportlegs.Allsupportsareadjustable inlengthtoenablelevelingoftherack.Thevariableheightsupportassemblyconsistsofaflat-footed spindlewhichridesintoaninternally-threaded cylindrical member.Thecylindrical memberisattachedtotheunderside ofthebaseplate throughfilletandpartialpenetration welds.Thebaseoftheflat-footed spindlesitsonthepoolfloor.Levelingoftherackmodulesisaccomplished byturningthesquaresprocketinthespindleusingalongarm(approximately 46feetlong)squareheadwrench.Figure4-6showsaverticalcrossMection oftheadjustable supportassembly.
Thesupportselevatethemodulebaseplate approximately 5-5/8inchesabovethepoolfloor,thuscreatingthewaterplenumforcoolantflow.Thelateralholesinthecylindrical memberprovidethecoolantentrypathleadingintothebottomofthestoragelocations.
4.1.2.1.1.7 TopLead-InLead-insareprovidedoneachcelltofacilitate fuelassemblyinsertion.
Contiguous wallsofadjacentcellsarestructurally connected atthelead-inswithasuitableventopening.Theselead-injointsaidinreducingthelateraldeflection oftheinnersquaretubeduetotheimpactoffuelassemblies duringthegroundmotion(postulated seismicmotionspecified intheFSAR).Thistypeofconstruction leadstonaturalventinglocations fortheintermell spacewheretheneutronabsorbermaterialislocated.4.1.2.1.2Region2DesignTherackmodulesinRegion2arefabricated fromthesamematerialasthatusedforRegion1modules,i.e.,ASMESA-240-304L austenitic stainless steel.As,showninFigure4-5atypicalRegion2modulestoragecellalsohasan8.65-inch nominalsquarecrossmectional opening.Figure4Wshowsahorizontal cross-section ofa3x3array.Therackconstruction variesfromthatforRegion1inasmuchasthestainless steelcoverplates,gapelementsandtoplead-insareeliminated.
Hence,thebasiccomponents ofthisdesignareasfollows:InnertubeNeutronabsorbermaterialSidestripsBaseplate Supportassembly0077L/0011L Revision1 mI'~e Inthisconstruction, twochannelelementsformthecellofan8.65-inch nominalsquarecross-sectional opening.ThepoisonmaterialisplacedbetweentwoboxesasshowninFigure4-8.Stainless steelsidestripsareinsertedonbothsidesofthepoisonmaterialtofirmlylocateitinthelateraldirection.
Thebottomstrippositions thepoisonmaterialintheverticaldirection toenvelopetheentireactivefuellengthofafuelassembly(Figure4-5).TwoadjacentboxesandthesidestripbetweenboxesareweldedtogetherasshowninFigure4-8,toformthehoneycomb rackmodule.Thebaseplate andsupportassemblies areincorporated inexactlythesamemannerasdescribed forRegion1inthepreceding section.4.1.2.2FuelHandlingThedesignofthespentfuelrackswillnotaffectthec'onclusions ofthefuelhandlingaccidents presented intheFSAR(Section15.4.3)andsummarized bytheNRCintheSafetyEvaluation Report.Thatis,theradiological dosesforthepostulated fuelcaskandfuelassemblydropaccidents arewellwithinthe10CFR100criteria.
4.2APPLICABLE CODES,STANDARDS, ANDSPECIFICATIONS Thedesignandfabrication ofthespentfuelracksandtheanalysisofthespentfuelpoolhavebeenperformed inaccordance withtheapplicable portionsofthefollowing NRCRegulatory Guides,StandardReviewPlanSections, andpublished standards:
~~~4.2.1NRCDocuments a.April14,1978NRCOTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications, asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.b.StLuciePlantUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.C~NRCRegulatory Guides1.13,Rev2SpentFuelStorageFacilityDesignBasisDec.1981(Draft)1.25March1972Assumptions UsedforEvaluating thePotential Radiological Consequences ofaFuelHandlingAccidentintheFuelHandlingandStorageFacilityforBoilingandPressurized WaterReactors0077L/0011L (l
1.26,Rev3Feb.1976QualityGroupClassifications andStandards forHater,SteamandRadioactive WasteContaining Components ofNuclearPowerPlants1.29,Rev3Sept.19781.31,Rev31.71,Rev01.85,Rev22SeismicDesignClassification ProposedControlofFerriteComponent inStainless SteelHeldMaterialWelderQualification forAreasofLimitedAccessibility MaterialCodeCaseAcceptability ASMESectionIIIDivisionI1.92,Rev11.124,Rev1Jan.19783.41,Rev1Combining ModalResponses andSpatialComponents inSeismicResponseAnalysisServiceLimitsandLoadCombinations forClass1Linear-Type Component SupportsValidation ofCalculational MethodsforNuclearCriticality Safety.NRCStandardReviewPlan-NUREG-0800 Rev1,July1981Section3.7,SeismicDesignRev1,July1981Section3.8.4,OtherSeismicCategoryIStructures, AppendixDRev3,July1981Section9.1.2,SpentFuelStorageRev1,July1981Section9.1.3,SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemRev2,July1981NRCBranchTechnical PositionASB9-2,ResidualDecayEnergyforLightWaterReactorsforLongTermCoolingGeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlants,CodeofFederalRegulations, Title10,Part50,AppendixA(GDCNos.1,2,61,62and63)NUREG-0612 ControlofHeavyloadsatNuclearPowerPlants.4-60077L/0011L no0 4.2.2IndustrCodesandStandards ANSIN14.6-1978 AmericanNationalStandardforSpecialLiftingDevicesforShippingContainers Weighing10,000PoundsorMoreforNuclearMaterials ANSIN16.1-75NuclearCriticality SafetyinOperations withFissionable Materials OutsideReactorsANSIN16.9-75ANSIN18.2-1973 Validation ofCalculation MethodsforNuclearCriticality SafetyNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationary Pressurized WaterReactorPlantsANSIN45.2.2Packaging,
: Shipping, Receiving, StorageandHandlingofItemsforNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN45.2.1ANSIN45.2.11CleaningofFluidSystemsandAssociated Components duringConstruction PhaseofNuclearPowerPlants1974QualityAssurance Requirements fortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlantsANSIANS-57.2-1983 DesignRequirements forLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilities atNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN210-76DesignObjectives forLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilities atNuclearPowerStationsASMESectionIII(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984AddendaNuclearPowerPlantComponentsp Subsection NFACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2(1977Edition)CodeforConcreteReactorVesselsandContainments ACI318-63AISC1980BuildingCodeRequirements forReinforced ConcreteSpecification fortheDesign,Fabrication andErectionofStructural SteelforBuildings, EighthEditionAWSDl.lASNT-TC-lA June1980Structural WeldingCodeAmericanSocietyforNondestructive Testing(Recommended PracticeforPersonnel Qualification) 4-70077L/0011L r
ASMEIIPartA6C(1983Editionuptoandincluding Summer1984Addenda)MaterialSpecifications PartAFerrous,PartCWeldingRods,Electrodes andFillerMetalsASMEIX(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984Addenda)Welding&BrazingQualifications ASMEBoilerandPressureVessel,'ectionV,(1983Editionuptoandincluding Summer1984Addenda)Non-destructive Examination 4.3SEISMICANDIMPACTLOADSTheobjective oftheseismicanalysisofthespentfuelracksistodetermine thestructural responses resulting fromthesimultaneous application ofthreeorthogonal seismicexcitations.
Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetimehistorymethod.Seismicfloorresponsespectraforthespentfuelpoolfloorhavebeendeveloped usingthemethodsdescribed inSubsections 3.7.1and3.7.2oftheStLucieUnitNo1UpdatedFSAR.Theparameters oftheoriginallumpedmassmodeloftheFuelHandlingBuildingwereadjustedtoreflecttheincreased masscorresponding tothenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.Theresulting floorresponsespectraareshowninFigure4-9.Thesespectrawerethenusedtogeneratestatistically independent timehistoryexcitations, oneforeachofthethreeorthogonal directions.
Sincethespentfuelrackshavenoconnection withthepoolwallsorwitheachother,thepoolfloortimehistories areusedasinputtothedynamicanalysisoftheracks,asdescribed inSubsection 4.5.2.2.1.
Fluidcouplingisalsoconsidered asdescribed therein.Deflection ormovements ofracksunderearthquake loadingislimitedbydesignsuchthatthenuclearparameters outlinedinSection3.1arenotexceeded.
Impactloadshavebeenconsidered asdiscussed inSubsection 4.6.4.Theinteraction betweenthefuelassemblies andtherackhasbeenconsidered, particularly gapeffects.Theresulting impactloadsareofsmallmagnitudes sothereisnostructural damagetothefuelassemblies.
Thespentfuelpoolstructure hasbeenreanalyzed fortheincreased dead,thermalandseismicloadingresulting fromthestorageofadditional fuelassemblies inthepool,asdescribed inSubsection 4.5.1.4-80077L/0011L e~1f4 4.4LOADSANDLOADCOMBINATIONS 4.4.1SentFuelPool4.4.1.1Loads*Thefollowing designloadswereconsidered inthespentfuelpoolanalysis:
a)Structural DeadLoad(D)Deadloadconsistsofthedeadweightofthespentfuelracks,thepoolwaterandtheconcretestructure, superstructure, wallsandmiscellaneous buildingitemswithintheFuelHandlingBuilding.
b)LiveLoad(L)Liveloadsarerandomtemporary loadconditions formaintenance whichincludethespentfuelcaskdeadweight.c)SeismicLoads(SSEandOBE)SeismicloadsincludetheloadsinducedbySafeShutdownEarthquake (SSE)andOperating BasisEarthquake (OBE).Thehydrodynamic loadduringtheearthquake eventswasalsoconsidered.
d)NormalOperating ThermalLoads(T)Theloadinducedbynormalthermalgradients existingbetweenthebuildinginteriorandtheambientexternalenvironment wasconsidered.
Theconditions are:SummerInterior" watertemperature 150PExteriorairtemperature Soiltemperature Winter93'P70'PInteriorwatertemperature 150FExteriorairtemperature Soiltemperature 32'p70oPPorallcases,the"asconstructed" concretetemperature wasassumedtobe70P.Alineargradientthroughthewallandmatwasassumed.4-90077L/0011L SII e)Accident(LossofFuelPoolCooling)ThermalLoad(TA)Thethermalaccidenttemperature forthespentfuelpoolwateris217oFthroughout thepool.Atthistemperature, theexteriorairtemperature at40Fwasassumedforthecriticalthermalgradientthroughthewall.70Fsoiltemperature wasused.Thethermalgradientwasassumedtobelinear.f)FuelCaskDropLoad(M)A25toncaskdropfromthemaximumheightof58feetabovethepoolfloor(Elevation 79.50')wasconsidered.
(ThecaskbottommustattainElevation 77.00'orentryintothebuilding.)
4.4.1.2LoadCombinations Inthespentfuelpoolanalysis, thefollowing loadcombinations, fromtheStLucreNo.1UpdatedFSAR,Section3.8.1.5,wereconsidered:
a)NormalOperation 1.5(D+T)+1.8Lb)OBECondition 1.25(D+T+OBE+0.2L)c)SSECondition 105(D+T+0.2L)+1.0SSEd)AccidentandCaskDrop105(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+T+0.2L)+1.0MFortheevaluation ofthelinerandlineranchors,theaboveloadcombinations areapplicable exceptthatloadfactorsforallcasesmaybetakenequalto1.0(inaccordance withTableCC-3230-1 ofACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2)inconjunction withthestructural acceptance criteriaofthisSARsubsection 4.6.1.1.b.
Linearanalyseswithoutiterations wereperformed initially todetermine thecriticalloadcombinations.
Asaresult,thefollowing loadingcaseswereselectedforthenon-linear concretecrackinganalysis:
i)ii)iii)iv)v)vi)vii)1.5D+1.8L1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+Tsummer+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0M105(D+0.2L)+1.0M4-100077L/0011L nJ05c0~,fI' 4.4.2SpentFuelRacks14.4.2.1LoadsThefollowing loadsDeadLoad(D)wereconsidered intherackdesign:Deadweight-induced stresses(including fuelassemblyweight).(D')=LiveLoad(L)Deadweightofemptyrack.0forthestructure, sincetherearenomovingobjectsintherackloadpath.FuelDropAccidentLoad(Fd)=Forcecausedbytheaccidental dropoftheheaviestloadfromthemaximumpossibleheight.(SeeSection4.6.6.)CraneUpliftLoadUpwardforceontherackscausedbypostulated stuckfuelassembly(4000lbs).SeismicLoads(E)Operating BasisEarthquake.
(E')=SafeShutdownEarthquake.
Thermal(To)Loads(Ta)Differential temperature inducedloads(normalcondition).
Differential temperature inducedloads(abnormal designcondition).
Forupsetandemergency conditions, Tisthedifferential temperature forthefullycoreoffloadcondition, Forfaultedconditions, Taisthedifferential temperature forthelossofcoolingcondition.
Theconditions TaandTocauselocalthermalstressestobeproduced.
Theworstsituation willbeobtainedwhenanisolatedstoragelocationhasafuelassemblywhichisgenerating heatatthemaximumpostulated rate.Thesurrounding storagelocations areassumedtocontainnofuel.Theheatedwatermakesunobstructed contactwiththeinsideofthestoragewalls,therebyproducing themaximumpossibletemperature difference betweentheadjacentcells.Thesecondary stressesthusproducedarelimitedtothebodyoftherack;thatis,thesupportlegsdonotexperience thesecondary (thermal) stresses.
4.4.2.2LoadCombinations Eachcomponent operating condition hasbeenevaluated fortheapplicable loadingcombinations listedbelow:4-110077L/0011L C
0a)NormalCondition b)UpsetCondition c)Emergency Condition d)FaultedCondition D+LD+L+TD+L+To+ED'TD+L+Ta+ED+L+Ta+PfD+Ta+FDD+T+Pf+ED+T+FD+ED+L+T+E'+L+FDD+L+Pf4.5DESIGNANDANALYSISPROCEDURES 4.5.1DesignandAnalysisProcedures fortheSpentFuelPool4.5.1.1SpentFuelPoolStructure FiniteElementAnalysisInthisanalysis, theEBS/NASTRAN program,developed byEbascoandlinkedtothecommercially available NASTRANprogram,wasused.Variouslayersofconcreteandreinforcing barswereusedtodetermine theeffectsofconcretecracking.
Thenonlinear analysisschemebasedonthecombination ofstiffness iteration andloaditeration methods,whichwereavailable inEBS/NASTRAN program,wasusedtoautomatically determine thestressesintheconcreteandreinforcing barsaftertheconcretecracks.Thefiniteelementmodelusedinthisanalysiscanbesummarized asfollows:a)Sincetheeffectoftheadditional fuelrackloadonthepoolfloorislimitedtothematinthepoolarea,theupperportionofthepoolwallsisnotrequiredforthere-evaluation.
Therefore, thefiniteelementmodelincludedthelowerportionofwalls,thepoolfloor(mat)andtheunderlying soil.Thestructural components includedinthemodelareshownonFigure4-10.Thecut-offboundaryofthewallsisatEL.45.25ft.b)Thefollowing boundaryconditions wereusedatthemodelcut-offboundaries:
i)Southendofthemat-Rotational springsrepresenting thebendingresistance ofthecut-offmatwereprovided.
4-120077L/0011L IfIII ii)Topofthewalls-Therotationabouttheaxisparalleltotheedgeofthewallwasrestrained toconsidertheeffectofthecut-offwall.Thisassumedboundarycondition haslittleeffectontheresponseofthepoolmat,sincetheboundaryisfarabovethemat.Thiswasdemonstrated inthelinearanalysisresults.iii)Southendofeastandwestwalls-Sincetherigidityofthecut-offwallsisverysmall,afreeboundarycondition wasassumed.Acomputerplotofthefiniteelementmodelispresented inFigure4-11whichshowstheoverallviewofthemodelindicating thecomposite ofthefourexteriorandoneinteriorwalls.4.5.1.2LinerandAnchorage AnalysisThelineranditsanchorswereevaluated forthetemperature load,thestraininducedloadduetothedeformation ofthefloor,andthehorizontal seismicload.TheprogramPOSBUKFdeveloped byEbascowasusedforthelinerbucklinganalysisduetothetemperature andstraininducedloads.Thisprogramiscapableofdetermining thepost-buckling stress/strain ifthelinerplatebuckles.Theeffectofthehydrostatic pressurewasconsidered inthisanalysis.
Incalculating thein-planeshearduetothehorizontal seismicloadstransmitted fromthefuelracktotheliner,themaximumassumedfrictioncoefficient of0.8wasused.Thelineranchorswereevaluated fortheunbalanced linerin-planeforceduetothetemperature andstraininducedloads,aswellasthehorizontal seismicin-planeshearforce.4.5.1.3Foundation Stability andSoilBearingAdetailedsoilbearingevaluation wasperformed fortheincreased fuelrackloading.Thesoilstresseswereobtainedateachmatcornerandcomparedtotheallowable value.Stability calculations wereperformed foroverturning andsliding.4.5.2DesignandAnalysisProcedures forSpentFuelStorageRacksThepurposeofthissubsection istodemonstrate thestructural adequacyofthespentfuelrackdesignundernormalandaccidentloadingconditions.
Themethodofanalysispresented hereinusesatime-history integration methodsimilartothatpreviously usedintheLicensing ReportsonHighDensityFuelRacksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2(DocketNos50-254and50-265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),GrandGulfUnit1(DocketNo50-416),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),DiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323)andByronUnits1and2(DocketNos50-454and50-455).Theresultsshowthatthehighdensityspentfuelracksarestructurally adequatetoresistthepostulated stresscombinations associated withlevelA,B,CandDconditions asdefinedinReferences 1and2.4-130077L/0011L
~Il~Ie 4.5.2.1AnalysisOutlineThespentfuelstorageracksareseismicCategoryIequipment.
Thus,theyarerequiredtoremainfunctional duringandafteraSafeShutdownEarthquake(
).Asnotedpreviously, theseracksareneitheranchoredtothepoolfloornoraretheyattachedtothesidewalls.Theindividual rackmodulesarenotinterconnected.
Furthermore, aparticular rackmaybecompletely loadedwithfuelassemblies (whichcorresponds togreatestrackinertia),
oritmaybecompletely empty.Thecoefficient offriction, p,betweenthysupportsandpoolfloorisdetermined asfollows.According toRabinowicz<"~
theresultsof199testsperformed onaustenitic stainless steelplatessubmerged inwatershowameanvalueofp,tobe0.503withastandarddeviation of0.125.Theupperandlowerbounds(basedontwicethestandarddeviation) arethus0.753and0.253,respectively.
Twoseparateanalysesareperformed fortherackassemblies withvaluesofthecoefficient offrictionequalto0.2(lowerlimit)and0.8(upperlimit),respectively.
Analysesperformed forthegeometrically limitingrackmodulesfocusonlimitingvaluesofthecoefficient offriction, andthenumberoffuelassemblies stored.Typicalcasesstudiedare:Fullyloadedrack(allstoragelocations occupied),
p~0.8,0.2(p~coefficient offricti.on)
NearlyemptyrackP0.8,02RackhalffullP=0.2,0.8Poolfloorslabacceleration datadeveloped fortheSafeShutdownEarthquake (SSE)areshowninFigures4-12through4-14.Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetime-history method.Thepoolslabacceleration dataweredeveloped fromthebuildingresponsespectra.Theobjective oftheseismicanalysisistodetermine thestructural response(stresses, deformation, rigidbodymotion,etc)duetosimulataneous application ofthethreeindependent, orthogonal excitations.
Theseismicanalysisisperformed inthreesteps,namely:1.Development ofanonlinear dynamicmodelconsisting ofinertialmasselementsandgapandfrictionelements.
2.Generation oftheequations ofmotionandinertialcouplingandsolutionoftheequations usingthe"component elementtimeintegration scheme">todetermine nodalforcesanddisplacements.
3.Computation ofthedetailedstressfieldintherack(atthecriticallocation) andinthesupportlegsusingthenodalforcescalculated inthepreviousstep.ThesestressesarecheckedagainstthedesignlimitsgiveninSection4.6.2.2.Abriefdescription ofthedynamicmodelfollows.4-140077L/0011L e~eeP~e0e 4.5.2.2FuelRack-FuelAssemblyModelSincetheracksarenotanchoredtothepoolslaborattachedtothepoolwallsortoeachother,theycanexecuteawidevarietyofrigidbodymotions.Forexample,therackmayslideonthepoolfloor(so-called "slidingcondition");
oneormorelegsmaymomentarily losecontactwiththeliner("tipping condition");
ortherackmayexperience acombination ofslidingandtippingconditions.
Thestructural modelshouldpermitsimulation ofthesekinematic eventswithinherentbuilt-inconservatisms.
Sincetheseracksareequippedwithgirdlebarstodissipate energyduetointer-rack impact(ifitoccurs),itisalsonecessary tomodeltheinter-rack impactphenomena inaconservative manner.Similarly, liftoffofthesupportlegsandsubsequent impactsmustbemodelledusingappropriate impactelements, andCoulombfrictionbetweentherackandthepoollinermustbesimulated byappropriate piecewise linearsprings.Thesespecialattributes oftherackdynamicsrequireastrongemphasisonthemodelingofthelinearandnonlinear springs,dampers,andstopelements.
Themodeloutlineintheremainder ofthissection,andthemodeldescription inthefollowing sectiondescribethedetailedmodelingtechnique tosimulatetheseeffects,withemphasisplacedonthenonlinearity oftherackseismicresponse.
4.5.2.2.1 OutlineofModelaOThefuelrackstructure isafoldedmetalplateassemblage weldedtoabaseplate andsupported onfourlegs.Therackstructure itselfisaveryrigidstructure.
Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticell rackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructure iscapturedalmostcompletely bythebehaviorofasixdegrees-of-freedom structure; therefore, themovementoftherackcross-section atanyheightis,described intermsofthesixdegrees-of-freedom oftherackbase.b.Theseismicmotionofafuelrackischaracterized byrandomrattlingoffuelassemblies intheirindividual storagelocations.
Assumingthatallassemblies vibrateinphaseobviously exaggerates thecomputeddynamicloadingontherackstructure.
Thisassumption, however,greatlyreducestherequireddegrees-of-freedom neededtomodelthefuelassemblies whicharerepresented byfivelumpedmasseslocatedatdifferent levelsoftherack.Thecentroidofeachfuelassemblymasscanbelocated,relativetotherackstructure centroidatthatlevel,soastosimulateapartially loadedrack.c.Thelocalflexibility oftherack-support interface ismodeledconservatively intheanalysis.
d.Therackbasesupportmayslideorliftoffthepoolfloor.e.Thepoolfloorandwallshaveaspecified time-history ofseismicaccelerations alongthethreeorthogonal directions.
Fluidcouplingbetweenrackandassemblies, andbetweenrackandadjacentracks,issimulated byintroducing appropriate inertialcouplingintothesystemkineticenergy,Inclusion oftheseeffectsusesthemethodsofReferences 4and6forrack/assembly couplingandforrack/rack coupling(seeSection4.5.2.2.3 ofthisreport).4-150077L/0011L aoe g.Potential impactsbetweenrackandassemblies areaccounted forbyappropriate "compression only"gapelementsbetweenmassesinvolved.
h.Fluiddampingbetweenrackandassemblies, andbetweenrackandadjacentrack,isconservatively neglected.
Thesupportsaremodeledas"compression only"elementsfortheverticaldirection andas"rigidlinks"fordynamicanalysis.
Thebottomofasupportlegisattachedtoafrictional elementasdescribed inSection4.5.2.2.2.Thecrossmection inertialproperties ofthesupportlegsarecomputedandusedinthefinalcomputations todetermine supportlegstresses.
Theeffectofsloshinghasbeenshowntobenegligible atthebottomofapoolandhenceisneglected.
k.Intermack impact,ifitoccurs,issimulated byaseriesofgapelementsatthetopandbottomofoftherackinthetwohorizontal directions.
Themostconservative caseofadjacentrackmovementisassumed;eachadjacentrackisassumedtomovecompletely outofphasewiththerackbeinganalyzed.
1.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelassemblies inthestoragelocations isconservatively neglected intheresultsreportedherein.m.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelrackinthewaterisalsoconservatively neglected intheresultsreportedherein.n.Therattlingofthefuelassemblies insidethestoragelocations causesthe"gap"betweenthefuelassemblies andthecellwalltochangefromamaximumoftwicethenominalgaptoatheoretical zerogap.However,thefluidcouplingcoefficients(8) utilizedarebasedonlinearvibration theory(9).
Studiesintheliterature showthatinclusion ofthenonlinear effect(viz.,vibration amplitude ofthesameorderofmagnitude asthegap)drastically lowerstheequipment response(>0).
Figure4-15showsaschematic ofthemodel.Sixdegreesmf-freedom areusedtotrackthemotionoftherackstructure.
Figures4-16and4-17,respectively, showtheintermack impactspringsandfuelassembly/storage cellimpactsprings.Themodelforsimulating fuelassemblymotionincorporates fivelumpedmasses.Thelowermassisassumedtobeattachedtothebaseplate andtomovewiththebaseplate.
Thefourrattlingmassesarelocatedatquarterheight,halfheight,threequarterheightandtopoftherack.Twodegrees-of-freedom areusedtotrackthemotionofeachrattlingmass.Thesolutionprocedure described inthefollowing isimplemented incomputercodeDYNARACK, whichisavalidated computercodeunderHoltec'sQAprogram.0077L/0011L 4-16Revision1 4vL1L' 4.5.2.2.2 ModelDescription
~~~~eabsolutedegrees-of-freedom associated witheachofthemasslocations areshowninFigure4-15.Asshown,thediscretemassfractions arelocatedatheightsz=0,0.25H,0.5H,0.75HandHrespectively.
Table4Wgivesthedegreesmf-freedom andtheassociated generalized coordinates.
Ui(t)isthepoolfloorslabdisplacement seismictime-history.
1hus,astabulated inTable4WandshowninFigure4-15,therearesixteendegreesmf-freedom inthesystem.NotshowninFigure4-15arethegapelementsusedtomodelthesupportlegsandtheimpactswithadjacentracks.4.5.2.2.3 FluidCouplingAneffectofsomesignificance requiring carefulmodelingistheso-called "fluidcouplingeffect".Ifonebodyofmass(m)vibratesadjacenttoanotherbody(massm),andbothbodiesaresubmerged inafrictionless fluidmedium,thenNewton'sequations ofmotionforthetwobodieshavetheform:~~~~(ml+Mll)Xl-M12X2=appliedforcesonmassml~~~~M21Xl+(m2+M22)X2appliedforcesonmassm2~~~~Xl,X2denoteabsoluteaccelerations ofmassmlandm2,respectively.
Mll,M12,M21andM22arefluidcouplingcoefficients whichdependontheshapeoXthetwobodies,theirrelativedisposition, etc.Fritz(9)ivesdata<<rMijforvariousbodyshapesandarrangements.
Itistobeotedthattheaboveequationindicates thattheeffectofthefluidistoaddacertainamountofmasstothebody(Mlltobody1),andanexternalforcewhichisproportional totheacceleration oftheadjacentbody(massm2),Ttlustheacceleration oftheonebodyaffectstheforcefieldonanother.Thisforceisastrongfunctionoftheinterbody gap,reachinglargevaluesforverysmallgaps.Thisinertialcouplingiscalledfluidcoupling.
Ithasanimportant effectinrackdynamics.
Thelateralmotionofafuelassemblyinsidethestoragelocationwillencounter thiseffect.Sowillthemotionofarackadjacenttoanotherrack.'theseeffectsareincludedintheequations ofmotion.1hefluidcouplingisbetweenfuelarraynodeiandcellwallinFigure4-17.Furthermore, therackequations containcouplingtermswhichmodeltheeffectoffluidinthegapsbetweenadjacentracks.Thecouplingtermsmodelingtheeffectsoffluidflowingbetweenadjacentracksarecomputedassumingthatalladjacentracksarevibrating 180degreesoutofphasefromtherackbeinganalyzed.
Therefore, onlyonerackisconsidered surrounded byahydrodynamic masscomputedasiftherewereaplaneofsymmetrylocatedinthemiddleofthegapregion.Finally,fluidvirtualmassisincludedintheverticaldirection vibration equations oftherack;virtualinertiaisalsoaddedtothegoverning equationcoresponding totherotational degreemf-freedom, q(t).0077L/00llL 4-17Revision1 444C4~/
4.5.2.2.4 DampingInreality,dampingoftherackmotionarisesfrommaterialhysteresis (material damping),
relativeintercomponent motioninstructures (structural damping),
andfluiddrageffects(fluiddamping).
Intheanalysis, amaximumof2Xstructural dampingisimposedonelementsoftherackstructure duringSSEseismicsimulations.
Thisisinaccordance withtheStLucieUnit1FSAR(13).
Materialandfluiddampingareconservatively neglected.
Thedynamicmodelhastheprovision toincorporate fluiddampingeffects;however,nofluiddampinghasbeenusedforthisanalysis.
4.5.2.2.5ImpactReferring toFigure4-18,anyfuelassemblynodemayimpactthecorresponding structural massnode.Tosimulatethi.simpact,fourcompressionmnly gapelementsaroundeachrattlingfuelassemblynodeareprovided(seeFigure4-17).Asnotedpreviously, fluiddampersmayalsobeprovidedinparallelwiththesprings.Thecompressive loadsdeveloped inthesespringsprovidethenecessary datatoevaluatetheintegrity ofthecellwallstructure andstoredarrayduringtheseismicevent.Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheimpactspringsusedtosimulateanypotential forintermack impacts.Section4.5.2.4.2 givesmoredetailsontheseadditional impactsprings.4.5.2.3AssemblyoftheDynamicModelThecartesian coordinate systemassociated withtherackhasthefollowing nomenclature:
ox~Horizontal coordinate alongtheshortdirection ofrackrectangular platformoyHorizontal coordinate alongthelongdirection oftherackrectangular platformozVertically upwardAsdescribed inthepreceding section,therack,alongwiththebase,supports, andstoredfuelassemblies, ismodeledforthegeneralthree-dimensional (3-D)motionsimulation byafourteendegreemf-freedommodel.Tosimulatetheimpactandslidingphenomena
: expected, 60nonlinear gapelementsand16nonlinear frictionelementsareused.Gapandfrictionelements, withtheirconnectivity andpurpose,arepresented inTable4-7.Ifthesimulation modelisrestricted totwodimensions (onehorizontal motionplusverticalmotion,forexample)forthepurposesofmodelclarification only,thenadescriptive modelofthesimulated structure whichincludesgapandfrictionelementsisshowninFigure4-18.(Notethatonlythetoprattlingmassisshownforclarity.)
Theimpactsbetweenfuelassemblies andrackshowupinthegapelement,havinglocalstiffness KI,inFigure4-18.InTable4-7,gapelements5through8areforthevibrating massatthetopoftherack.Thesupportleg~pringratesQaremodeledbyelements1through4inTable4-7.Notethat0077L/0011L 4-18Revision1 (I4I thelocalcompliance oftheconcretefloorisincludedinKd.Tosimulateslidingpotential, frictionelements1through8inTable4-7areemployed.
Frictionelements2and8,and4and6(Table4-7)arerepresented asKfinFigure4-18.Thefrictionofthesupport/liner interface ismodeledbyapiecewise linearspringwithasuitablylargestiffness Kfuptothelimitinglateralload,N,whereNisthecurrentcompression loadattheinterface betweensupportandliner.Ateverytimestepduringthetransient
: analysis, thecurrentvalueofN(eitherzeroforliftoffcondition, oracompressive finitevalue)iscomputed.
Finally,thesupportrotational fr<<t<<nspringsKRreflectanyrotational restraint thatmaybeofferedbythefoundation.
Thisspringrateiscalculated usingamodifiedBoussinesq equation(4) andisincludedtosimulatetheresistive momentofthesupporttocounteract rotationoftherackleginaverticalplane.Thisrotationspringisalsononlinear, withazerospringconstantvalueassignedafteracertainlimitingcondition ofslabmomentloadingisreached.Thenonlinearity ofthesesprings(friction elements9,11,13and15inTable4-7)reflectstheedginglimitation imposedonthebaseoftheracksupportlegs.Inthisanalysis, thiseffectisneglected; anysupportlegbending,inducedbyliner/baseplate frictionforces,isresistedbythelegactingasabeamcantilevered fromtherackbaseplate.
Forthe3Wsimulation, allsupportelements(listedinTable4-7)areincludedinthemodel.Couplingbetweenthetwohorizontal seismicmotionsisprovidedbothbytheoffsetofthefuelassemblygroupcentroidwhichcausestherotationoftheentirerackandbythepossibility ofliftoffofoneormoresupportlegs.Thepotential existsfortheracktobesupported ononeormoresupportlegsortoliftoffcompletely duringanyinstantofacomplex3Wseismicevent.Allofthesepotential eventsmaybesimulated duringa3-Dmotionandhavebeenobservedintheresults.4.5.2.4TimeIntegration oftheEquations ofMotion4.5.2.4.1Time-History AnalysisUsing16DOFRackModelHavingassembled thestructural model,thedynamicequations ofmotioncorresponding toeachdegree-of-freedom canbewrittenbyusingNewton'ssecondlawofmotion;orbyusingLagrange's equation.
Thesystemofequations canberepresented inmatrixnotationas:~~[M](q)=(Q)+(G)wherethevector(Q)isafunctionofnodaldisplacements andvelocities, and(G)dependsonthecouplinginertiaandthegroundacceleration.
Premultiplying theaboveequations by[M]1renderstheresulting equationuncoupled inmass.~~Wehave:(q)~[M]1(Q)+[M]1(G)Asnotedearlier,inthenumerical simulations runtoverifystructural integrity duringaseismicevent,allelementsofthefuelassemblies areassumedtomoveinphase.Thiswillprovidemaximumimpactforcelevel,andinduceadditional conservatism inthetime-history analysis.
0077L/0011L 4-19Revision1 El4
'Ihisequationsetismassuncoupled, displacement coupled,andisideallyuitedfornumerical solutionusingacentraldifference scheme.Thecomputerrogram"DYNARACK'"
isutilizedforthispurpose.Stressesinvariousportionsofthestructure arecomputedfromknownelementforcesateachinstantoftime.Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticell rackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructure iscapturedalmostcompletely bythebehaviorofasixdegreemf-freedom structure; therefore, inthisanalysismodel,themovementoftherackcrossmection atanyheightisdescribed intermsoftherackbasedegreesmf-freedom (ql(t),"q6(t)).Theremaining degrees-of-freedom areassociated withhorizontal movements ofthefuelassemblymasses.Inthisdynamicmodel,fiverattlingmassesareusedtorepresent fuelassemblymovement.
Therefore, thefinaldynamicmodelconsistsofsixdegreesmf-freedom fortherackplustenadditional massdegrees-of-freedom forthefiverattlingmasses.Theremaining portionofthefuelassemblyisassumedtomovewiththerackbase.Thus,thetotalityoffuelmassisincludedinthesimulation.
4.5.2.4.2Evaluation ofPotential forInter-Rack ImpactSincetheracksarecloselyspaced,thesimulation includesimpactspringstomodelthepotential forintermack impact,especially forlowvaluesofthefrictioncoefficient betweenthesupportandthepoolliner.Toaccountforthispotential, fiveintermack gapelementswerelocatedateachsideoftherackatthetopandatthebaseplate.
Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheseapelements.
Loadsintheseelements, computedduringthedynamicanalysis, reusedtoassessrackintegrity ifinter-rack impactoccurs.4.6STRUCTURAL EVALUATION CRITERIA4.6.1Structural AccetanceCriteriaforSentFuelPoolStructure 4.6.1.1CriteriaThestresses/strains resulting fromtheloadingcombinations described inSection4.4.1satisfythefollowing acceptance criteria:
a)SpentFuelPoolConcreteStructure Thedesignstresslimitsdescribed inSection3.8.1.6ofStLucieUnitNo.1UpdatedFSARwereusedfortheevaluation ofthespentfuelpoolreinforced concretestructural components.
Thecapacityofallsectionswascomputedinaccordance withACI318+3PartIV-B,UltimateStrengthDesign.*Thenumerical procedure underlying DYNARACKhasbeenpreviously utilizedinicensingof'similar racksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2DocketNos50-254and265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),andDiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323).0077L/0011L 4-20Revision1 thpIt~~1Ii(~~
Re:St.LuciePlantDocketNo.50-33510CFR50.59 REPORTSt.LuciePlantUnit1ReportofChangesMadeUndertheProvisions of10CFR50.59forthePeriodEndingJanuary22,~1988GRMATWS.RAI DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDFORFSARAMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITlE118-181848-182892-182188-182846-183878-183336-183348-183383-183412-183174-184187-184-1842-184815-185822-185824-185839-185847-185ceo-185873-185131-185142-185155-1858-18-18-28-18-18-18-18-18-28-18AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACENENT AUXILIARY BUILDINGJIBHOISTDIESELGENERATOR UPGRADEREMOVALOFSTEAN6ENERATOR DELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERS REACTORUPPERCAVITYHANDRAIL~NITR06ENSUPPLYSYSTEMINSTRUNENT AIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONCCMHEATEXCHANGER RETUBINGSECURITYCONSOLES-LEDHICROMAVE DETECTORREPLACEMENT HAINSTEANSAFETYVALVELIFTLEVERRENOVALED6CFDRELAYREPLACEMENT EX-CORENEUTRONFLUXMONITORING SYSTEMUPGRADETRAVELING MATERSCREENUPGRADEDIESEL6ENERATOR AIRSTARTSYSTEHPIPINGMODIFICATION INSTRUMENT AIRUPGRADETIEINSEPASINSTALLATION DIESELGENERATOR SUBSYSTEM FLOMDIAGRAMS6ESANRELAYPCCARDREPLACENEN1 NSRRETUBINGNSRPERFORATED PLATENODIFICATION REPLACEMENT OFRISDEVICESAPPENDIXRCONTROLROONINDEPENDENCE FORALlERNATE SHUTDOMNREACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFITNGRIGPIPEASSENBLYTURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEHNODIFICATION DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDFORFSAR-AMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITLE174-185179-185282-185884-186887-186823-186832-186837-186843-186871-186874-186882-186186-186888-186898-186893-186895-186898-186186-186116-186117-186118-186119-1868-188-18-18-1RCPOILLIFTSYSTENPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENT DIESEL6ENERATOR COOLIN6SYSTENVALVEREPLACENENT CGMSTRAINERBACKFl.USHDRAINLUBEOILCENTRIFUGE ANNUNCIATION NRVACTUATION SOLENOIOS NAINFEEDMATER PUNPLUBEOILPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENT EXCITERCOOLERVENTSANODRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEPCBTRANSFORNER REPLACENENT NON-SAFETY RELATEDNISGELLANEOUS PIPINGSYSTENSNOOIFIGATIONS FHBHVACPENETRATION BARRIERSHEATERDRAINPUNPDENINERALIZEO MATERSUPPLY.HAINSTEANPIPIN6NODIFICATION LOMPOWERFEED'MATER CONTROLSYSTEMNISAPPLICATION OFLINITORQUE OPERATORISOLATEDPHASEBUSDUCTJUNPERNOOIFICATION CLOSEINTERCEPT VALVECIRCUITNODIFICATION RTGBANNUNCIATOR 6ROUNDDETECTION REPLACENENT OFINSTRUNENT SCALESHYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONS:
REPLACEOFVLVSI-V-25-11 13.15HIREXCITATION SYSTENTURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIREXTRACTION STEANPIPIN6ANOFITTIN6NATERIALUP6RADEREACTORCAVITYSEALRING18CFR58.49 ENVIRONNENTAL QUALlFICAT'ION LISTREVISIONPRESSURIZER NISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCA6E DOCUMENTS REVIEVEDFORFSARAMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITLE126-186132-186136-186139-186148-186141-186143-186146-186148-186151-186153-18688.1-187-187-187818-187811-187.812-187817-187827-187828-187832-187..-834-187 835-187844-187846-1878-18-18-18-18-1AFASDVNHODIFICATION EXCESSIVE AC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPREPLACEMENT OFSGLEVELTRANSMITTERS MASONRYMALLHODIFICATIONS ANNUNCIATOR-NUISANCEALARNSPRESSURIZER LEVELINSTRUMENTATION HODIFICATION PASSDISSOLVED HYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSl1ISCELLANEOUS ICMSYSTEHMODIFICATIONS ICMISOlATION VALVEREPLACEMENT 488VOLTACLOADCENTER18-2TRANSFORMER COOLINGROSEHOUNT ANDVALCOREQENHANCEHENT IEBULLETIN85-83HOVSMITCHSETTINGSNRCIEBULLETING 85-83HOVPOSITIONINDICATION OVERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEMHODIFICATION PROTECTIVE COATINGSREPAIR/REPL INREACTORCONTAINHENT BLDGCONDENSER HOTMELDNITROGENINJECTION CONNECTIONS FEEDMATER HEATERANDEXTRACTION PIPESHIELDING CCMHEATEXCHANGER SHElLSIDEDRAINADDITIONNISCELLANEOUS SNUBBERMODIFICATION REPLACEMENT OFRMTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46 PRESSURIZER SURGELINESAHPLEVALVEV1218REPLACEMENT CONDENSER OUTLETTUBESHEETANDMATERBOXCOATINGSREPLACEMENT OFRAYCHEHSPLICESNSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATION CONTAINMENT BLDGTELESCOPING JIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTS DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDEORESARAMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITLE887-187897-187188-187888-984227-984178-98519S-S85815-986112-986138-9868-18'8CODEBOUNDRYORAMIN6REVISIONTSCBLOCKMALL287AMODIFICATIONS TURBINE6ANTRYCRANEHAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADENON-HANUAL PARKINGLOTTURBINEGANTRYCRANESEPARATION REQUIREMENTS TIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTION FIREHAINANOPLANTFIREl.OOPMATERTREATMENT PLANTCAUSTICDILUTIONMATERBOOSTERPUNPTELEPHONE SYSTEMUPGRADETURBINEBUILONGGANTRYCRANEGIRDERINSPECTION ANOTBISOLNEUTRALIZATION BASINCLOSUREtlONITORMELLSN/ASTLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYEVALUATION REVIEW PCM118-181AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACEMENT SYSTEMDESCRIPTION FUNCTIONThepurposeofthismodification istoreplacethelubricated plugvalvesontheinstrument airdryerwithnon-lubricated type'stopreventgreaseintrusion intotheinstrument airsystem.DESIGNDESCRIPTION Thegreasesealedplugvalvesoriginally installed ontheinstrument airdryerallowgreasetocontaminate thesystemandplugupthecoolercausingtheblowertotriponhighcurrent.Replacement ofthesevalveswithgreaseless typevalveswilleliminate theproblem.OPERATIONTheoperation oftheairdryerwillremainthesame-.Thevalvesarehandoperatedandutilizedwhenthedessicant bedsarebeingswitchedforregeneration.
SAFETYANALYSISTheinstrument airdryerisNon-Safety RelatedQualityGroupD.Itisnon-seismic a'ndhasnowind,flood,ormissilecriteria.
Failureoftheinstrument airdryerwillnotaffecta'ysafetyrelatedsystemssincetheinstrument airsystemcanoperatewithouttheinstrument airdryerandtheinstrument airsystemisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.
Theinstrument airdryerislocatedintheturbinebuildingsointheeventofacatastrophic failure,nosafetyrelatedequipment willbeaffected.
PCM040-182REACTORAUXILIARY BUILDINGJIBHOISTDESCRIPTION Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mpackagewillprovidea5toncapacityjibhoistin-theReactorAuxiliary Building(RAB).'Thehoistwillbelocatedeastofthehotmachineshopasdetailedonthelocationplan,JPE-C-40-82.-001, included.withthispackage.Thehoistwillbeusedtotransferequipment intheRABbetweenEl-0.5'ndEl19.5'.Theboomshallbeprovidedwithaholddownchaintolimitmovementwhennotinoperation.
Thisdesignpackageprimarily outlinesCivil'srequirements
.Electrical srequirements areincludedinAppendixCDSAFETYEVALUATION Thejibhoistwillbeusedtotransferequipment andmaterials intheRABbetweenEl0.5'ndEl19.5'.Thehoistperformsnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunctiontherefore thisPC/Misnon-nuclearsafetyrelated.~~~~~~~~Thedesignofthejibcraneattachments
'totheconcretewalloftheRABwillbeverifiedbasedonseismicloadsaswellasdeadandliveloads.Thiswillprecludedetachment duringaseismicevent.Therequirements ofNUREG0612willnotbeapplicable astherewillbenointeractions withsafetyrelatedequipment.
Allstructural steelandboltingmaterialwillberequired'tohaveCertificates ofCompliance withtheapplicable materialspecification.
Thiswillassurematerialintegrity.
Inaccordance withQISection3.2,nounreviewed safetyquestions havebeenintroduced.
PCM092-182DIESELGENERATOR UPGRADEABSTRACTPC/M92-'182wasgenerated toperformseveralmodifications recommended bythedieselgenerator vendortoupgradeourdieselswiththelatestdesignimprovements foroptimalreliability.
Themodifications included:
1)2)3)4)5)Vibration damperreplacement Idlergearstubshaft replacement Exhaustscreenmspection portadditionAirdryeradditionLubeoilmodification Items1tlwcagh4wereinstalled in1993perthePC/Mpackage.Item//wasneverinstalled duetodifficulty inprocuring partsandescalating cost.ex-ieaAsummaryofPC/M8&~isprovidedbelow.Supplement 0-Installed thevibration damper,idlergearstubshaft, andexhaustscreeninspection port.Engineering wasbyFPL.Supplement 1-Installed theElectrical, CIvilandINCportionoftheairdryeradditionandthelubeoilmodification.
Engineering wasbyEbasco.Supplement 2-Installed themechanical portionoftheairdryeraddition.
Engineering'as byFPL.Supplement 3-Transmitted thevendorwiringdiagramsforthe'irdryers.Engineering wasbyEbasco.Supplement 4-Installed themechanical portionoft5elubeoilmodification.
EngineetingwasbyFPL.Supplement 5-Revisedsupplement 4basedonadditional vendorsubmittals.
Engineering wasbyFPL.Supplements 0,2and3werefullyinstalled.
OnlyaportionofSupplement 1wasinstalled andnoneofsupplements 4and5waseverinstalled.
Supplements 0,1,2,and3wereappropriately as-built.
4Thescope,engineering andmaterials ofsupplement/
wereallincludedintheoriginallubeoilmodification.
Supplement 6breaksoutalloftheportionsrequiredtoimplement theturbocharger soakbacklowpressurealarmanddeletestheremainder ofthedrawingsnotyetas-built.
Whensupplement 6isinstalled, andas-built, thePC/Mcanbeclosedout.Thissupplement doesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyanalysis, doesnotrequireanytechnical specification changesanddoesnotcauseanychanges.totheoperation ofthedieselgenerator.
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PCM092-182.SAFETYANALYSISTheadditionofaturbocharger soakbacklowpressurealarmdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionsincethealarm=doesnotaffecttheoperation oroperability ofthedieselgenerators, itmerelyalertsoperators toalowpressurecondition intheturbocharger soakbacksystemwhiletheengineisinthestandbymode.Asaresult,itcanbeconcluded thattheprobability ofocccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.
Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethedieselgenerators arenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofaccidents andsincethealarmwasdesignedtotheappropriate codesanditdoesnotaffecttheoperation ofthedieselgenerators.
ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreducedsincethemodification doesnotaffecttheperformance oroperability oftheengine.~~
PCM100-182REMOVALOFSTEAMGENERATOR DELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERS SYSTENOESCRIPTIONThesystemwhichisbeingaffectedbythisaadificationistheSteamGenerator ReactorCoolantDifferentia1FlowInstr'umentat ionandControlSystem.ThissystemmonitorstheReactorCoolantflowacrosseachofthetwoSteamGenerators withthepurposeofprotectingthecoreagainstdepartur'e.
fromnucleateboil.ingONBintheeventofacoolantflowdecrease.
Flowmeasurement signalsareprovidedbysunningthe-outputofdifferential pressuretransmitters acrosseachsteamgenerator.
Thismeasurement ofdifferential pressureismodifiedbytwosignalcharacterizers ineachofthefourchannelstoprovide'square rootofdifferential pressuresignalswhichcorrespond toactualflow.Thelowflowreactortripisactuateddirectlybythesummedflowsignal.Itrequiresatwo-out-of-four coincidence logicfromthefourindependent channels(whentheflowfa11sbelowapreselectedvalue)toinitiateaReactortrip.InadditIon,fourseparateindicators (oneperchannel)receivesignalsfromeachinstrumentat ionloop.Bymeansofaselectorhandswitch theoperatorcanreadeitherthesumned,.averageflowsigna'Iofthetwosteamgenerators, asmeasuredfromthatchannel,ortheflowsignalofeithersteamgenerator byItself.Thepurposeofthismodification.
istoremovefromtheinstrumentation andcontrolloopstheeightsignalcharacterizers (twoperchannel).
Becausetechnical specificationsIimitplantoperations tofourReactorCoolantPumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizer function.
Thecharacterizer modifiesthedeltapinputsignalstoallowforoperation underconditions oflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumps.Thecharacter izerswi1Iremainphysicallyintheloops,butwiII'ebypassedelectrically sothattheywillservenofunction.
Theindicators wilIberecalibrated andtheirscaleswiIIbechangedtoreadthedeltapsignalsdirectlyratherthanthemodifiedflowsignals.Thewiringintheloopswillbealteredandseveralresistors willneedtobereplaced-withnewvaluestomaintaintherequiredvoltageranges.FuelResources hascompleted an'ngineering evaluation thatwillgeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpoints fortheSystem.
PCM100-182SAFETYANALYSISThismodification isNuclearSafetyrelatedbecausetheSteamGenerator ReactorCoolantOeItaFlowInstrumentat ionandControlsystemisNuclearSystemrelated,andtheequipment beingmodifiedispart.ofthissystem.ThisPC/Hproposestoremovethesignalcharacter izersfromthefourredundant loopsandmodifytheinstrument andcontrolcircuitssothattheloopcurrentandvoltagesignalsbecomeproportional tothedifferences inreactorprimarycoolantpressures, ratherthandirectlytotheflowacrossthesteamgenerators.
Inaccordance withtheFuelResources recommendations (Appendix C),"bothsteamgenerator deltapsignaisaresumnedandareactortripisinitiat'edwhenthesumneddeltapfa1isbelowaprese1ectedtripvalue."Accordingly, thetransmitters intheloopswillberecalibratedandtheindicators rescaledfortheprocessrangeof0to50psid.Thecharacterizers servedafunctionundercondition oflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpoperation.
However,becauseSt.LuciedlTechnical Specifications limitplantoperation whiieatpowertofourreactorcoolantpumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizer functions.
Combustion Engineering, theoriginalArchitect EngineerfortheReactorProtection System;hasrecommended removalofthecharacterizers becausetheremovalwi11reducethecalibration timeofthe'eltapsignalprocessing circuitry.
Thechangeisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.
FuelResources hascompleted anengineering evaluation thatwillbeusedtogeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpoints fortheReactorCoolantdeltapressureinputsfortheReactorProtection Systembasedonremovalofthecharacterizers.
Newvaluesofresistors willberequiredtomaintainthevoltagerangesrequiredbythecircuitry intheabsenceofthesignalcharacterizers.
Thenewresistors arebeingpurchased ascommercial gradeitemstoexactingstandards ofprecision andperformance.
Additionally, failureofthenewresistors wouid.havethesameconsequences ontheStreamGenerator delta~p.inputtotheReactorProtection Systemasfailureoftheexistingresistors.
Hence,nopossibi1Ityfor~naccidentormalfunction ofatypedifferent fromanyevaluated previously intheFSARhasbeencreatedbythismodification.Forthesamereasons,themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforthetechnical specifications hasnotbeendecreased.
Inconclusion, thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
PCM046-183REACTORBUILDINGUPPERCAVITYHANDRAILINTRODUCTION Thereactorbuildingrefueling cavityisastainless steellinedpoolwithasplitlevelbottomatElevations 36.0'nd21.5'Duringplantshutdown',
theuppercavityisoccupiedforvariousoperations including reactorheadremoval,headstuddetensioning, etc..Atthepresenttimethereisnopro-vision.alongtheedgeoftheuppercavitytopreventpersonnel fromfallingintothelowercavity.ThisPC/Mprovidesahandrailinthisarea.ISAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle,10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThehandrailprovidedbythisPC/Mhasbeendesignedtowithstand thoseloadingcombinations asspecified inFSARChapter3.Althoughthehand-railservesnosafetyrelatedfunction, seismicloadshavebeenconsidered inthedesign.Inordertoprecludepotential missilegeneration duringaLOCA,thehandrailhasbeendesignedtowithstand jetimpingement loads.Therearenounreviewed safetyquestions associated withthisPC/MandpriorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation.,
PCM078-183NITROGENSUPPLYSYSTEMSYSTEMDESCRIPTION Functions andDesinRuirements VFunctionTheNitrogenSystemsupplieslowandhighpressurenitrogentovarioussystemsandvesselswhichrequirecovergasforSt.Lucie-Unitsfland02.a)Lowpressurenitrogen(200psigandbelow)issuppliedtothefollowing foreachunit:SpentResinTankVolumeControlTankRefueling FailedFuelDetectorReactorDtainTankQuenchTankPressureReduction andSampleCabinetWasteConcentrator BoricAcidConcentrators Flash.TankHoldUpTanksb)Highpressurenitrogen(over200PSIG)is.suppliedsolelyascovergasforthesafetyinjection tanks.DesignRequirements The'system shallbecapableofsupplying bothunitswithhighandlowpressurenitrogenfor30dayswithoutrefilling.
Thehighpressurestoragevolumeshallbeofsufficient capactytorechargeallfoursafetyinjection tanksoneitherunit.Thenitrogencompressors shallbeofadequatesizetorechargethehighpressurestoragevolumewithin24hourseachor12hourscombined.
SAFETYA'NALYSISThenitrogensupplysystemprovidesahighpressuresourceandnormaloperating sourceofnitrogengasforplantuse.Thenitrogen.
systemservesnosafetyfunction.
Thenitrogen'upply systemislocatedoutdoorsadjacenttothegashouse.Failureofanyportionofthenitrogensupplysystemwillnotinhibittheabilitytomitigatetheconsequences ofapostulated
: accident, achievesafeshutdown, oradequately coolspentfueLThischangeistherefore notconsidered safetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Allpioinghasbeendesignedinaccordance withANSIB-31.1.Theconcretefoundations havebeendesignedinaccordance withallapplicable codes.Thepowersourcesforthenitrogencompressors arefromnonwafety relatedMCC's1A-3and1B-3.Allconduitsutilizedarebelowthe..allowable filLInaddition, qualified cablewillbeusedforthisinstallation.
PCM336-183INSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONTCTSYST-"MOESCRIPTIOH
~OerationThismodification addsonecheckvalvetothecross-tie linetoprevntaccidental bleed-down oftheIAsystem.ThisvalveperFormsitsfunctionautomatically andrequiresnooperatoraction.Thmodification alsoadds,adifferential pressureindicator tothecoalescing filter.Thedifferential pressureshouldbemonitored
.onaperiodic-basistodetermine whenfiltrelementreplacement isnecessry.(Thisshouldbedoneat10PSIO)Operating procedtressnouldbemodiriedtoindicatethislimitation.
FunctionThismodification willprovideadownortheIAsystembywayofUnit=-"I/Unit g2IAcrossconnetcross-tie isinuse.passivemeansofpreventirag bleed-lekagetotheSAsystemwhiteiheisinusortheUnitglSAtoIADesicnOesc.iotiond>rrerential SAFiTYcVALUATIGH ThismodiFication providsthedeailsForinstallation ofonecheckvalveintheUnit='1SA-toIAcross-conne tlineandadditionoFapressureindicator onthecoalscirgrilter.1.0,Thismodification isnon-seismic, non-safety rlatdanddoe"notinvolveanunreviewed saftyquestionbecause:1.1TheIA/SAcross-tie performsnosafety.unctionardisclassiried asnon-safety related.1.2Thesemodi,icationsdorointeractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemorcomponents.
1.3Hosafetyreletdequipment orccmponents areccmprcmis dbyanyeassumedrailureo-anyexistingornewecuipmntorcomponer.ts.
1.4HoTechnical Specificati nsaralteredoradversely affected.
2.0Carehasbentaknintndesigntoeliminatorcontrolaspectswhichcouicbha3rdoustoeqipm~ntand/orperson.ea.
PCM340-183CCWHEATEXCHANGER RETUBINGSYSTEMDESCRIPTION FunctionThecomponent coolingwater(CCW)heatexchangers areonesidemixed,onesideunmixedsinglepasshorizontal mountunitswithintakecoolingwater(ICW)onthetubesideandCCWontheshellside.ThebasicfunctionoftheCCWheatexchangers istorejectheatfromvariouscomponents associated withthereactorsupportandsafetyequipment (suchastheshutdownheatexchangers, containment fancoolersandRCPsealcoolers)totheICWsystem.DesiDescritionDuetothedeteriorated condition oftheexistingCCWheatexchanger Aluminum-Brass tubing,theseunitsaretoberetubedduringthenextrefueling outage.Thisdesignpackageincludesthespecification requiredfortheprocurementofthetubesandguidelines fortheretubingeffort.~Oeration Thecomponent coolingsystem(CCS)isarrangedastworedundant.
essential supplyheadersystems(designated A2B)eachwithapump'ndheatexchanger andthecapability tosupplytheminimumsafetyfeaturesrequirements duringplantshutdownorLOCAconditions.
SAFETYANALYSISla.Withrespecttotheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theprobability ofoccurrence'of anaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.b.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theconsequences ofFSARaccidentevaluations havenotbeenalteredsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.
PCM340-183c.Withrespecttotheprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theprobability ofanyequipment malfunction hasnotincreased forthereasonsoutlinedinla.d.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofmalfunciton ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theconsequences-*of anyequipment
'malfunction hasnotbeenincreased forthesamereasonoutlinedinlb.2a.Withrespecttothepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR:Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSARsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchangeoranewdesign.b.Withrespecttothepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR:Thereisnopossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethan,analyzedintheFSARforthesamereasonasgivenin2a.3.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification:
Nomarginofsafetyhasbeendecreased oralteredforthereasongivenin2a.
PCM383-183SECURITYCONSOLE-LEDGRAPHICDISPLAYINTRODUCTION TheNRChasdetermined thatannunciation oftheSecuritySystempowersuppliesisrequiredforcompliance with10CFRPart73(i.e.requirements forsecuritysystemsfornuclearpowerplants).Tomeettheintentofthisrequirement, statuslightsshall,beinstalled onthesecuritysystemalarmconsolestoindicatethe"athand"condition ofthepowerinputtothesecuritySUPSandtherefore, totheentiresecuritysystem.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasi.sforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thesecuritvsystemisanon-safety relatedplantsystem.TheCentralandSecondary AlarmStationsarecomponents ofthissystem.Themodifications presented inthisPC/Maffectbothsafetyandnon-safety relatedplantequipment.
Themodifications totheCAS'ndSAScontrolpanels,i.e.installation andwiringoftheannunciator circuitry, andtheinputstothese.annunciators arenon-safety related.ThealarmstationsarelocatedintheTurbineandSecurityBuilding, whicharenon-safety, non-seismic structures.
Thema)orityofrequiredcabletotheseareaswillberoutedinnon-safety relatedcabletrayintheTGBandthroughthededicated securityductbankstotheSecurityBuilding.
Thebalanceofcablewillberoutedthroughappropriately dedicated raceway.Dieselgenerator breakerpositionismonitored toprovideinputtothe"Normal"and"Diesel"annunciator circuits.
Thisportionofthed'ieselgenerator
'ontrolcircuitry issafetyrelated.Therefore, thissignalwillbeisolatedfromthenon-safety securityannunciation circuitry byinstalling safetyrelatedisolation relaysin4160Vswitchgears 1A3and1B3.Theserelayswerepurchased underRPA432953tobequalified totheapplicable industrystandards.
Thebalanceofthecontrolrelaysthatarerequiredinthismodification havebeenpurchased andwillbeinstal'ed asnon-safety relatedequipment.
J%Controlpowertoallrelaysisfromtheassociated plantpowertrain(safetytoisolation relays,non-safety tothenon-safety controlrelays).Allcableswillberoutedthroughtheappropriate racewayandtheracewaywillbeseismically supported asrequired(i.e.insidetheRAB).Thismodification hasnoimpactontheplantTechnical Specification".
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safety,question, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPC/M.
PCM412-183MICROWAVE DETECTORREPLACEMENT INTRODUCTION TheexistingMicrowave 700seriesIntrusion Detection Systemwhichisinstalled attheUnit1and2perimeter fence,willbereplacedwith.Stellar's Model682E-Field.Thereplacement oftheMicrowave 700seriesatUnits1and2willbecoveredbyPC/Ms412-183and54-283,respectively.
PC/M412-183addresses Zones25,30,31,and32.~asenoteFPLStart-Uphaspreviously installed theStellarE-FieldsystematZones31and32inatest-bedapplication.
PC/M412-183willdocumentthesezonesasapermanent installation.
Thereisnoconstruction impactforthesezones.Aspreviously agreed,thechangeoutfromMicrowave toE-FieldintheareaoftheDischarge Canalhasfirstpriority.
Thiswilleliminate theneedfortheexistingsecuritystation,whichismanned24hoursaday.Therefore, Supplement 0ofPC/M412-183addresses theUnit1perimeter zonesattheDischarge Canal(Zones30,31,and32).Zone25willbemodifiedviaSupplement 1toPC/M412-183.SAFETY'ANAL'YSIS WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, P~50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyques-tion:(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thesecuritysystemisnon-safety related.Furthermore, themodifications totheperimeter intrusion detection systempresented bythisPC/Mwillimprovetheoverallsecuritysystemoperation.
The,changeoutfrommicrowave toE-Fieldisrequiredinordertoeliminate theneedforasecuritystationattheDischarge Canalwhichismanned24-hoursaday.Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; therefore,'rior Commission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPC/M.
PCM008-984NON-MANUAL PARKINGLOTThisengineering packagecoverstherestoration andrepavingoftheNon-Manual ParkingLotwhichisontheeastsideoftheSt.LuciePlant.Alsoincludedinthe.packageistheremovaloftheconstruction firewatertankintheparkinglot,aswellastheadditionofanimprovedarealightingdesign.Theparkinglotislocatedoutsideoftheplantsecurityfenceperimeter.
Themodifications includedinthisdesignpackagewillnotaffectanyplantsafety-related systemandaretherefore classified asnon-nuclear-safety-related.
Inaddition, theremovalof'theconstruction firewatertankwQlnotaffecttheplantfireprotection system,sincethisworkcannotbestarteduntilPCM178-985isimplemented.
PCM178-985tiesthefirewaterpipingdownstream fromthetankintotheplantsystem.Therestoration andrepavingoftheNon-Manual ParkingLotandthetankremovaldonotposeanyunreviewed safetyquestions.
TheNon-Manual ParkingLotislocatedoutsideofthesecurityperimeter fenceandwQ1notbeinthevicinityofanyplantsafety-related structure orsystem.Itdoesnotinanywayperformoraffectaplantsafety-related function.
TheNon-Manual ParkingLotarealightingdoesnotperformoraffectanyplantsafety-related.
systemsorfunction.
ItisbeingsuppliedfromLP.260whichisanon-safety reIatedlightingpanelandisnotloadedontheemergency dieselgenerator.
Theremovaloftheconstr'uction firewatertank.andpipingdoesnotaffectanyplantsafety-related systemorfunctions.
Thecitywatertotheplantisnotasafety-related system.Thefirewatersupplyfromthetankisnotpartoftheplantfirewatersystemanddoesnotaffectthatsystem.Themodifications totheNon-Manual ParkingLotdonotchangeanyassumptions madeorconclusions drawnintheSt.LuciePSAR.Therepavingofthelotdoesnotadversely affectanysitetopographic features.
Portheabovereasonsthemodifications oftheNon-Manual ParkingLotwillnotincreasetheprobability of'ccurrence northeconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tothesafetyoftheplant.Additionally, therewQ1continuetobenopossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction different thanthosealreadyevaluated inthePSAR.PinaQy,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthePlantTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.Itistherefore concluded thatthismodification doesnotposeanunreviewed safetyquestions pursuantto10CPR50.59anddoesnotaffectanytechnical specifications.
'INOTE-THISPACKAGECONTAINSSAFEGUARD DRAWINGS.
PCM174-184MAENSTEAMSAPETYVALVELIPTLEVERREMOVALSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
 
==1.0 DesignDescription==
OnFebruary9,1984,aPSL-2planttripcausedactuation oftheMainSteamSafetyValves(MSSV's).
Following thetransient, oneoftheMSSV'sfailedtoreseatbecausetheabsenceofthespindle~ut caterpinallowedthespindlenuttorotatedownontotheforkedliftleverandprevented fulltravelofthespindlerod.Topreventthistypeofeventfromoccurring again,thisdesignpackageallowsther'emovaloftheliftlevercomponents (spindlenut,cotterpinandforklever).AnewvalvecapisrequiredtomaintainASMECoderequirements concerning capsealing.2.0FunctionTheliftleverassemblyprovidesthecapability tomanuallyexercisethesafetyvalvetofacilitate blowingoutlines.Whiletheoriginalcomponent designspecification requiredaliftinglever,theCoderequirement forliftleversonClass2valveshasbeeneliminated.
Thepurchaser ofthesafetyvalves,C-Eagreesthattheseliftleverscanberemoved.Theoriginalvalve"designutilizedtheliftingleverassemblytosealthevalvecapandpreventunauthorized
'adjustments ofthevalve'ssetpressure.
CapsealingisrequiredbytheCode.Inordertomaintainthisrequirement, newvalvecapswithanintegralsealingdevicearerequired.
 
==3.0 Operation==
Removaloftheliftleversoperation oftheMSSV's.'IheMSSV'ssecondary sideoverpressure events.manuallyexercisethevalve,thecapliftleversreinstalled.
willnotimpacttheintendedwillstillbecapableofrelieving However,iftheneedarisestowillhavetoberemovedandtheSAFETYANALYSIS&%-WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence orthecoymequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification aDowsfor.theremovaloftheMSSVliftleversandreplacestluteexistingvalvecapswithonesthatwillenableproperCoderequiredsealingofthevalveadjusting bolts.Thismodification willnotin.anywayimpactorjeopardize theintendedoperation oftheMSSV'sortheirabilitytoprovideoverpressure protection forthesecondary sideofthesteamgenerator.
PCM174-184Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR(excessive heatremovalfromthesteamgenerator causedbyastuckopensafetyvalve)willbesignificantly reducedbyremovingtheliftlever.components.
Alsotheprobability ofamalfunction ofequipment importanttosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisalsoreducedbythismodification.
Noothertypeofaccidentormalfunction notpreviously evaluated intheFSARiscreated.Inaddition, itdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specifications.
AchangetoplantTech.Specs.isnotrequired.
'Iheforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischange'doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.


IZFUELBUNDLEXmTlA9xzm4lV0OII0ch0I0C0OQmmI~rR4C)gZ4o40z0XmaOI0ZnOC 4.0MECHANICAL,MATERIAL,ANDSTRUCTURALCONSIDERATIONS4.1DESCRIPTIONOPSTRUCTURE4.1.1DescritionoftheFuelHandlingBuildingTheFuelHandlingBuilding(FHB)consistsofcast-in-placereinforcedconcreteinteriorandexteriorwalls.Itiscompletelyisolatedfromallotherstructures.Thefloorsandroofareofbeamandgirderconstructionsupportedbycolumns.AcompletedescriptionofthePHBisprovidedinSection3.8.1.1.2oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.TheFHBgeneralarrangementisshownonFSARFigures1.2-18and1.2-19.ThePHBhasbeendesignedasaseismicClassIstructureinaccordancewiththecriteriaoutlinedinSections3.8.1.1.2and3.8.1.4through3.8.1.7oftheupdatedPSAR.Thebuildingexteriorwalls,floorsandinteriorpartitionsaredesignedtoprovideplantpersonnelwiththenecessarybiologicalradiationshieldingandprotecttheequipmentinsidefromtheeffectsofadverseenvironmentalconditionsincludingtornadoandhurricanewinds,temperature,externalmissilesandflooding.Thespentfuelpoolisacast-in-placesteellinedreinforcedconcretetankstructurethatprovidesspaceforstorageofspentfuelassemblies,controlelementassemblies,newfuelduringinitialcoreloadingandaspentfuelshippingcask.ThefuelpoolportionofthePHBincludingthewallsandroofdirectlyabovethepoolisdesignedtowithstand,withoutpenetration,theimpactofhighvelocityexternalmissilesthatmightoccurduringthepassageofatornado.ThedesignmissilesarefurtherdiscussedinSection3.5oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.Thespentfuelhandlingsystemincludesinterlocks,travellimitsandotherprotectivedevicestominimizetheprobabilityofeithermishandlingorofequipmentmalfunctionthatcouldresultininadvertentdamagetoafuelassemblyandpotentialfissionproductrelease.Theinterlockspreventmovementintothewallswhilelimitswitchespreventthespentfuelhandlingmachinefromraisingthefuelaboveaheightwhere,lessthanninefeetseparatesthesurfaceofthewaterfromthetopoftheactivefuellength.Aleakdetectionsystemisprovidedinthespentfuelpooltomonitor100percentofthepoollinerplateweldseams.Thissystemconsistsofanetworkofstainlesssteelanglesattachedtotheoutsideofthepoollinerwallsandtheundersideofthepoollinerfloorbymeansofweldsandsealedwithepoxymaterial.Intheeventthatoneoftheweldseamsdevelopsaleak,theliquidentersthemonitorchannelsystemandflowstooneof19collectionpointsatthebaseofthepool,fromwhichtheleakcanbetracedbacktoaspecificpoolarea.4.1.2DescriptionofSpentFuelRacksThefunctionofthespentfuelstorageracksistoprovideforstorageofspentfuelassembliesinafloodedpool,whilemaintainingaeoolablegeometry,preventingcriticality,andprotectingthefuelassembliesfromexcessivemechanicalorthermalloadings.4-10077L/0011L 0eeo0~~1fl0l0~~
PCM187-184SUMMARYSTATEMENT
Alistofdesigncriteriaisgivenbelow:TheracksaredesignedinaccordancewiththeNRC,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978(asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979)andSRPSection3.8.4[1].2.TheracksaredesignedtomeetthenuclearrequirementsofANSIN210-1976.Theeffectivemultiplicationfactor,kff,inthespentfuelpoolislessthanorequalto0.95,incfutiingalluncertaintiesandunderallcredibleconditions.3~Theracksaredesignedtoallowcoolantflowsuchthatboilinginthewaterchannelsbetweenthefuelassembliesintherackdoesnotoccur.MaximumfuelcladdingtemperaturesarecalculatedforvariouspoolcoolingconditionsasdescribedinSection3.3.4~TheracksaredesignedtoseismicCategoryIrequirements,andareclassifiedasANSSafetyClass3andASMECodeClass3ComponentSupportStructures.ThestructuralevaluationandseismicanalysesareperformedusingthespecifiedloadsandloadcombinationsinSection4.4.Theracksaredesignedtowithstandloadswithoutviolatingthecriticalityacceptancecriteriawhichmayresultfromfuelhandlingaccidentsandfromthemaximumupliftforceofthespentfuelhandlingmachine.6.7~8.Eachstoragepositionintheracksisdesignedtosupportandguidethefuelassemblyinamannerthatwillminimizethepossibilityofapplicationofexcessivelateral,axialandbendingloadstofuelassembliesduringfuelassemblyhandlingandstorage.Theracksaredesignedtoprecludetheinsertionofafuelassemblyinotherthandesignlocationswithintherackarray.Thematerialsusedinconstructionoftheracksarecompatiblewiththestoragepoolenvironmentandwillnotcontaminatethefuelassemblies.4.1.2.1DesignofSpentFuelRacks4.1.2.1.1Region1TherackmoduleisfabricatedfromASMESA-240-304Lausteniticstainlesssteelsheetandplatematerial,andSA-351-CF3castingmaterialandSA-564-630precipitationhardenedstainlesssteel(to1100oF)forsupportsonly.TheweldfillermaterialutilizedinbodyweldsisASMESFA-5.9,ClassificationER308L.Boraflexservesastheneutronabsorbermaterial.AdditionalinformationonBorafiexmaybefoundinSection3.1.3.TheBoraflexeexperiencelistisgiveninTable4-1.4-20077L/0011L 0ll~~ElC~01 Atypicalmodulecontainsstoragecellswhichhavean8.65-inchnominalsquarecross-sectionalopening.Thisdimensionensuresthatfuelassemblieswithmaximumexpectedaxialbowcanbeinsertedandremovedfromthestoragecellswithoutanydamagetothefuelassembliesortherackmodules.Pigure4-7showsahorizontalcross-sectionofa3x3array.Thecellsprovideasmoothandcontinuoussurfaceforlateralcontactwiththefuelassembly.Theanatomyoftherackmodulesisbestexplainedbydescribingthecomponentsofthedesign,namely:InternalSquareTubeNeutronAbsorbermaterial(Boraflex)PoisonsheathingGapelementBaseplateSupportassemblyTopLead-In4.1.2.1.1.1InternalSquareTubeThiselementprovidesthelateralbearingsurfacetothefuelassembly.Itisfabricatedbyjoiningtwoformedchannels(Pigure4-1)usingacontrolledseamweldingoperation.Thiselementisan8.65-inchsquare(nominal)cross-sectionby169incheslong.4.1.2.1.1.2NeutronAbsorberMaterial(Boraflex)Boraflexisplacedonallfoursidesofasquaretubeoveralengthof143"(minimum),whichprovidestherequisiteB-10screenforallstoredassembliesincludingafour-inchshrinkageallowance.4.1.2.1.1.3AbsorberSheathingTheabsorbersheathing(coverplate),showninFigure4-2,servestopositionandretaintheabsorbermaterialinitsdesignatedspace.Thisisaccomplishedbyspotweldingthecoversheettothesquaretubealongtheformer'sedgesatnumerous(atleast20)locations.Thismannerofattachmentensuresthattheabsorbermaterialwillnotsagorlaterallydisplaceduringfabricationprocessesandunderanysubsequentloadingcondition.4.1.2.1.1.4GapElementGapelements,illustratedinPigure4-3,positiontwoinnerboxesatapredetermineddistancetomaintaintheminimumfluxtrapgaprequiredbetweentwoboxes.Thegapelementisweldedtotheinnerboxbyfilletwelds.AnarrayofcompositeboxassembliesweldedasindicatedinFigure4-7formsthehoneycombgridworkofcellswhichharnessesthestructuralstrengthofallsheetandplatetypemembersinanefficientmanner.Thearrayofcompositeboxeshasoverallbending,torsional,andaxialrigiditieswhichareanorderofmagnitudegreaterthanconfigurationsutilizinggridbartypeofconstruction.4-30077L/0011L
~Summar.EDGCPDRELAXREPLACEMENT ThisPC/Mprovidesthe.designforreplacement oftheexistingemergency dieselgenerator CFDcurrentdifferential relays.~fThisPC/Mimprovesthefragility leveloftheD/Gdifferential circuitbyreducingtheprobability ofrelaytripduetomechanical vibration.
~~ea0l0 e4.1.2.1.1.5BaseplateThebaseplateisa3/4&nchthickplatetypememberwhichhas6-inchdiameterholesconcentricallylocatedwithrespecttotheinternalsquaretube,exceptatsupportleglocations,wheretheholesizeis5inchesindiameter.Theseholesprovidetheprimarypathforcoolantflow.Secondaryflowpathsareavailablebetweenadjacentcellsviathelateralflowholes(1inchindiameter)neartherootofthehoneycomb(Figure4-4)whichprecludeflowblockages.Thehoneycombisweldedtothebaseplatewith3/32-inchfilletwelds.4.1.2.1.1.6SupportAssemblyEachmodulehasatleastfoursupportlegs.Allsupportsareadjustableinlengthtoenablelevelingoftherack.Thevariableheightsupportassemblyconsistsofaflat-footedspindlewhichridesintoaninternally-threadedcylindricalmember.Thecylindricalmemberisattachedtotheundersideofthebaseplatethroughfilletandpartialpenetrationwelds.Thebaseoftheflat-footedspindlesitsonthepoolfloor.Levelingoftherackmodulesisaccomplishedbyturningthesquaresprocketinthespindleusingalongarm(approximately46feetlong)squareheadwrench.Figure4-6showsaverticalcrossMectionoftheadjustablesupportassembly.Thesupportselevatethemodulebaseplateapproximately5-5/8inchesabovethepoolfloor,thuscreatingthewaterplenumforcoolantflow.Thelateralholesinthecylindricalmemberprovidethecoolantentrypathleadingintothebottomofthestoragelocations.4.1.2.1.1.7TopLead-InLead-insareprovidedoneachcelltofacilitatefuelassemblyinsertion.Contiguouswallsofadjacentcellsarestructurallyconnectedatthelead-inswithasuitableventopening.Theselead-injointsaidinreducingthelateraldeflectionoftheinnersquaretubeduetotheimpactoffuelassembliesduringthegroundmotion(postulatedseismicmotionspecifiedintheFSAR).Thistypeofconstructionleadstonaturalventinglocationsfortheintermellspacewheretheneutronabsorbermaterialislocated.4.1.2.1.2Region2DesignTherackmodulesinRegion2arefabricatedfromthesamematerialasthatusedforRegion1modules,i.e.,ASMESA-240-304Lausteniticstainlesssteel.As,showninFigure4-5atypicalRegion2modulestoragecellalsohasan8.65-inchnominalsquarecrossmectionalopening.Figure4Wshowsahorizontalcross-sectionofa3x3array.TherackconstructionvariesfromthatforRegion1inasmuchasthestainlesssteelcoverplates,gapelementsandtoplead-insareeliminated.Hence,thebasiccomponentsofthisdesignareasfollows:InnertubeNeutronabsorbermaterialSidestripsBaseplateSupportassembly0077L/0011LRevision1 mI'~e Inthisconstruction,twochannelelementsformthecellofan8.65-inchnominalsquarecross-sectionalopening.ThepoisonmaterialisplacedbetweentwoboxesasshowninFigure4-8.Stainlesssteelsidestripsareinsertedonbothsidesofthepoisonmaterialtofirmlylocateitinthelateraldirection.Thebottomstrippositionsthepoisonmaterialintheverticaldirectiontoenvelopetheentireactivefuellengthofafuelassembly(Figure4-5).TwoadjacentboxesandthesidestripbetweenboxesareweldedtogetherasshowninFigure4-8,toformthehoneycombrackmodule.ThebaseplateandsupportassembliesareincorporatedinexactlythesamemannerasdescribedforRegion1intheprecedingsection.4.1.2.2FuelHandlingThedesignofthespentfuelrackswillnotaffectthec'onclusionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentspresentedintheFSAR(Section15.4.3)andsummarizedbytheNRCintheSafetyEvaluationReport.Thatis,theradiologicaldosesforthepostulatedfuelcaskandfuelassemblydropaccidentsarewellwithinthe10CFR100criteria.4.2APPLICABLECODES,STANDARDS,ANDSPECIFICATIONSThedesignandfabricationofthespentfuelracksandtheanalysisofthespentfuelpoolhavebeenperformedinaccordancewiththeapplicableportionsofthefollowingNRCRegulatoryGuides,StandardReviewPlanSections,andpublishedstandards:~~~4.2.1NRCDocumentsa.April14,1978NRCOTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.b.StLuciePlantUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.C~NRCRegulatoryGuides1.13,Rev2SpentFuelStorageFacilityDesignBasisDec.1981(Draft)1.25March1972AssumptionsUsedforEvaluatingthePotentialRadiologicalConsequencesofaFuelHandlingAccidentintheFuelHandlingandStorageFacilityforBoilingandPressurizedWaterReactors0077L/0011L (l
Thismodification isaccomplished solelybyreplacing theexistingdifferential relaysandcases,whileimplementing nointernalorexternalwiringchangesinthedieselgenerator controlpanel.Thisthenprecludes anynewtypeofinteraction wkhothersafetyrelatedequipment.
1.26,Rev3Feb.1976QualityGroupClassificationsandStandardsforHater,SteamandRadioactiveWasteContainingComponentsofNuclearPowerPlants1.29,Rev3Sept.19781.31,Rev31.71,Rev01.85,Rev22SeismicDesignClassificationProposedControlofFerriteComponentinStainlessSteelHeldMaterialWelderQualificationforAreasofLimitedAccessibilityMaterialCodeCaseAcceptabilityASMESectionIIIDivisionI1.92,Rev11.124,Rev1Jan.19783.41,Rev1CombiningModalResponsesandSpatialComponentsinSeismicResponseAnalysisServiceLimitsandLoadCombinationsforClass1Linear-TypeComponentSupportsValidationofCalculationalMethodsforNuclearCriticalitySafety.NRCStandardReviewPlan-NUREG-0800Rev1,July1981Section3.7,SeismicDesignRev1,July1981Section3.8.4,OtherSeismicCategoryIStructures,AppendixDRev3,July1981Section9.1.2,SpentFuelStorageRev1,July1981Section9.1.3,SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemRev2,July1981NRCBranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,ResidualDecayEnergyforLightWaterReactorsforLongTermCoolingGeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlants,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title10,Part50,AppendixA(GDCNos.1,2,61,62and63)NUREG-0612ControlofHeavyloadsatNuclearPowerPlants.4-60077L/0011L no0 4.2.2IndustrCodesandStandardsANSIN14.6-1978AmericanNationalStandardforSpecialLiftingDevicesforShippingContainersWeighing10,000PoundsorMoreforNuclearMaterialsANSIN16.1-75NuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactorsANSIN16.9-75ANSIN18.2-1973ValidationofCalculationMethodsforNuclearCriticalitySafetyNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlantsANSIN45.2.2Packaging,Shipping,Receiving,StorageandHandlingofItemsforNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN45.2.1ANSIN45.2.11CleaningofFluidSystemsandAssociatedComponentsduringConstructionPhaseofNuclearPowerPlants1974QualityAssuranceRequirementsfortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlantsANSIANS-57.2-1983DesignRequirementsforLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilitiesatNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN210-76DesignObjectivesforLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilitiesatNuclearPowerStationsASMESectionIII(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984AddendaNuclearPowerPlantComponentspSubsectionNFACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2(1977Edition)CodeforConcreteReactorVesselsandContainmentsACI318-63AISC1980BuildingCodeRequirementsforReinforcedConcreteSpecificationfortheDesign,FabricationandErectionofStructuralSteelforBuildings,EighthEditionAWSDl.lASNT-TC-lAJune1980StructuralWeldingCodeAmericanSocietyforNondestructiveTesting(RecommendedPracticeforPersonnelQualification)4-70077L/0011L r
Therefore, thisPC/Misnuclearsafetyrelatedbutdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
ASMEIIPartA6C(1983EditionuptoandincludingSummer1984Addenda)MaterialSpecificationsPartAFerrous,PartCWeldingRods,ElectrodesandFillerMetalsASMEIX(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984Addenda)Welding&BrazingQualificationsASMEBoilerandPressureVessel,'ectionV,(1983EditionuptoandincludingSummer1984Addenda)Non-destructiveExamination4.3SEISMICANDIMPACTLOADSTheobjectiveoftheseismicanalysisofthespentfuelracksistodeterminethestructuralresponsesresultingfromthesimultaneousapplicationofthreeorthogonalseismicexcitations.Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetimehistorymethod.SeismicfloorresponsespectraforthespentfuelpoolfloorhavebeendevelopedusingthemethodsdescribedinSubsections3.7.1and3.7.2oftheStLucieUnitNo1UpdatedFSAR.TheparametersoftheoriginallumpedmassmodeloftheFuelHandlingBuildingwereadjustedtoreflecttheincreasedmasscorrespondingtothenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.TheresultingfloorresponsespectraareshowninFigure4-9.Thesespectrawerethenusedtogeneratestatisticallyindependenttimehistoryexcitations,oneforeachofthethreeorthogonaldirections.Sincethespentfuelrackshavenoconnectionwiththepoolwallsorwitheachother,thepoolfloortimehistoriesareusedasinputtothedynamicanalysisoftheracks,asdescribedinSubsection4.5.2.2.1.Fluidcouplingisalsoconsideredasdescribedtherein.DeflectionormovementsofracksunderearthquakeloadingislimitedbydesignsuchthatthenuclearparametersoutlinedinSection3.1arenotexceeded.ImpactloadshavebeenconsideredasdiscussedinSubsection4.6.4.Theinteractionbetweenthefuelassembliesandtherackhasbeenconsidered,particularlygapeffects.Theresultingimpactloadsareofsmallmagnitudessothereisnostructuraldamagetothefuelassemblies.Thespentfuelpoolstructurehasbeenreanalyzedfortheincreaseddead,thermalandseismicloadingresultingfromthestorageofadditionalfuelassembliesinthepool,asdescribedinSubsection4.5.1.4-80077L/0011L e~1f4 4.4LOADSANDLOADCOMBINATIONS4.4.1SentFuelPool4.4.1.1Loads*Thefollowingdesignloadswereconsideredinthespentfuelpoolanalysis:a)StructuralDeadLoad(D)Deadloadconsistsofthedeadweightofthespentfuelracks,thepoolwaterandtheconcretestructure,superstructure,wallsandmiscellaneousbuildingitemswithintheFuelHandlingBuilding.b)LiveLoad(L)Liveloadsarerandomtemporaryloadconditionsformaintenancewhichincludethespentfuelcaskdeadweight.c)SeismicLoads(SSEandOBE)SeismicloadsincludetheloadsinducedbySafeShutdownEarthquake(SSE)andOperatingBasisEarthquake(OBE).Thehydrodynamicloadduringtheearthquakeeventswasalsoconsidered.d)NormalOperatingThermalLoads(T)Theloadinducedbynormalthermalgradientsexistingbetweenthebuildinginteriorandtheambientexternalenvironmentwasconsidered.Theconditionsare:SummerInterior"watertemperature150PExteriorairtemperatureSoiltemperatureWinter93'P70'PInteriorwatertemperature150FExteriorairtemperatureSoiltemperature32'p70oPPorallcases,the"asconstructed"concretetemperaturewasassumedtobe70P.Alineargradientthroughthewallandmatwasassumed.4-90077L/0011L SII e)Accident(LossofFuelPoolCooling)ThermalLoad(TA)Thethermalaccidenttemperatureforthespentfuelpoolwateris217oFthroughoutthepool.Atthistemperature,theexteriorairtemperatureat40Fwasassumedforthecriticalthermalgradientthroughthewall.70Fsoiltemperaturewasused.Thethermalgradientwasassumedtobelinear.f)FuelCaskDropLoad(M)A25toncaskdropfromthemaximumheightof58feetabovethepoolfloor(Elevation79.50')wasconsidered.(ThecaskbottommustattainElevation77.00'orentryintothebuilding.)4.4.1.2LoadCombinationsInthespentfuelpoolanalysis,thefollowingloadcombinations,fromtheStLucreNo.1UpdatedFSAR,Section3.8.1.5,wereconsidered:a)NormalOperation1.5(D+T)+1.8Lb)OBECondition1.25(D+T+OBE+0.2L)c)SSECondition105(D+T+0.2L)+1.0SSEd)AccidentandCaskDrop105(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+T+0.2L)+1.0MFortheevaluationofthelinerandlineranchors,theaboveloadcombinationsareapplicableexceptthatloadfactorsforallcasesmaybetakenequalto1.0(inaccordancewithTableCC-3230-1ofACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2)inconjunctionwiththestructuralacceptancecriteriaofthisSARsubsection4.6.1.1.b.Linearanalyseswithoutiterationswereperformedinitiallytodeterminethecriticalloadcombinations.Asaresult,thefollowingloadingcaseswereselectedforthenon-linearconcretecrackinganalysis:i)ii)iii)iv)v)vi)vii)1.5D+1.8L1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+Tsummer+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0M105(D+0.2L)+1.0M4-100077L/0011L nJ05c0~,fI' 4.4.2SpentFuelRacks14.4.2.1LoadsThefollowingloadsDeadLoad(D)wereconsideredintherackdesign:Deadweight-inducedstresses(includingfuelassemblyweight).(D')=LiveLoad(L)Deadweightofemptyrack.0forthestructure,sincetherearenomovingobjectsintherackloadpath.FuelDropAccidentLoad(Fd)=Forcecausedbytheaccidentaldropoftheheaviestloadfromthemaximumpossibleheight.(SeeSection4.6.6.)CraneUpliftLoadUpwardforceontherackscausedbypostulatedstuckfuelassembly(4000lbs).SeismicLoads(E)OperatingBasisEarthquake.(E')=SafeShutdownEarthquake.Thermal(To)Loads(Ta)Differentialtemperatureinducedloads(normalcondition).Differentialtemperatureinducedloads(abnormaldesigncondition).Forupsetandemergencyconditions,Tisthedifferentialtemperatureforthefullycoreoffloadcondition,Forfaultedconditions,Taisthedifferentialtemperatureforthelossofcoolingcondition.TheconditionsTaandTocauselocalthermalstressestobeproduced.Theworstsituationwillbeobtainedwhenanisolatedstoragelocationhasafuelassemblywhichisgeneratingheatatthemaximumpostulatedrate.Thesurroundingstoragelocationsareassumedtocontainnofuel.Theheatedwatermakesunobstructedcontactwiththeinsideofthestoragewalls,therebyproducingthemaximumpossibletemperaturedifferencebetweentheadjacentcells.Thesecondarystressesthusproducedarelimitedtothebodyoftherack;thatis,thesupportlegsdonotexperiencethesecondary(thermal)stresses.4.4.2.2LoadCombinationsEachcomponentoperatingconditionhasbeenevaluatedfortheapplicableloadingcombinationslistedbelow:4-110077L/0011L C
SAFETYANALYSSThisPC/Mimprovesthevibrational fragility ofthedieselgenerator differential relaycircuit.Thisisaccomplished byreplacing theexistingCFDdifferential relayswithIJDdifferential relays.Thismakesthecircuitlesssusceptible tospurioustripscausedbycontrolpanelvibration.
0a)NormalConditionb)UpsetConditionc)EmergencyConditiond)FaultedConditionD+LD+L+TD+L+To+ED'TD+L+Ta+ED+L+Ta+PfD+Ta+FDD+T+Pf+ED+T+FD+ED+L+T+E'+L+FDD+L+Pf4.5DESIGNANDANALYSISPROCEDURES4.5.1DesignandAnalysisProceduresfortheSpentFuelPool4.5.1.1SpentFuelPoolStructureFiniteElementAnalysisInthisanalysis,theEBS/NASTRANprogram,developedbyEbascoandlinkedtothecommerciallyavailableNASTRANprogram,wasused.Variouslayersofconcreteandreinforcingbarswereusedtodeterminetheeffectsofconcretecracking.Thenonlinearanalysisschemebasedonthecombinationofstiffnessiterationandloaditerationmethods,whichwereavailableinEBS/NASTRANprogram,wasusedtoautomaticallydeterminethestressesintheconcreteandreinforcingbarsaftertheconcretecracks.Thefiniteelementmodelusedinthisanalysiscanbesummarizedasfollows:a)Sincetheeffectoftheadditionalfuelrackloadonthepoolfloorislimitedtothematinthepoolarea,theupperportionofthepoolwallsisnotrequiredforthere-evaluation.Therefore,thefiniteelementmodelincludedthelowerportionofwalls,thepoolfloor(mat)andtheunderlyingsoil.ThestructuralcomponentsincludedinthemodelareshownonFigure4-10.Thecut-offboundaryofthewallsisatEL.45.25ft.b)Thefollowingboundaryconditionswereusedatthemodelcut-offboundaries:i)Southendofthemat-Rotationalspringsrepresentingthebendingresistanceofthecut-offmatwereprovided.4-120077L/0011L IfIII ii)Topofthewalls-Therotationabouttheaxisparalleltotheedgeofthewallwasrestrainedtoconsidertheeffectofthecut-offwall.Thisassumedboundaryconditionhaslittleeffectontheresponseofthepoolmat,sincetheboundaryisfarabovethemat.Thiswasdemonstratedinthelinearanalysisresults.iii)Southendofeastandwestwalls-Sincetherigidityofthecut-offwallsisverysmall,afreeboundaryconditionwasassumed.AcomputerplotofthefiniteelementmodelispresentedinFigure4-11whichshowstheoverallviewofthemodelindicatingthecompositeofthefourexteriorandoneinteriorwalls.4.5.1.2LinerandAnchorageAnalysisThelineranditsanchorswereevaluatedforthetemperatureload,thestraininducedloadduetothedeformationofthefloor,andthehorizontalseismicload.TheprogramPOSBUKFdevelopedbyEbascowasusedforthelinerbucklinganalysisduetothetemperatureandstraininducedloads.Thisprogramiscapableofdeterminingthepost-bucklingstress/strainifthelinerplatebuckles.Theeffectofthehydrostaticpressurewasconsideredinthisanalysis.Incalculatingthein-planeshearduetothehorizontalseismicloadstransmittedfromthefuelracktotheliner,themaximumassumedfrictioncoefficientof0.8wasused.Thelineranchorswereevaluatedfortheunbalancedlinerin-planeforceduetothetemperatureandstraininducedloads,aswellasthehorizontalseismicin-planeshearforce.4.5.1.3FoundationStabilityandSoilBearingAdetailedsoilbearingevaluationwasperformedfortheincreasedfuelrackloading.Thesoilstresseswereobtainedateachmatcornerandcomparedtotheallowablevalue.Stabilitycalculationswereperformedforoverturningandsliding.4.5.2DesignandAnalysisProceduresforSpentFuelStorageRacksThepurposeofthissubsectionistodemonstratethestructuraladequacyofthespentfuelrackdesignundernormalandaccidentloadingconditions.Themethodofanalysispresentedhereinusesatime-historyintegrationmethodsimilartothatpreviouslyusedintheLicensingReportsonHighDensityFuelRacksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2(DocketNos50-254and50-265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),GrandGulfUnit1(DocketNo50-416),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),DiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323)andByronUnits1and2(DocketNos50-454and50-455).TheresultsshowthatthehighdensityspentfuelracksarestructurallyadequatetoresistthepostulatedstresscombinationsassociatedwithlevelA,B,CandDconditionsasdefinedinReferences1and2.4-130077L/0011L
Thismodification doesnotadversely affectthenormaloperation ofthedieselgenerator differential circuitoroperation ofthedieselgenerator.
~Il~Ie 4.5.2.1AnalysisOutlineThespentfuelstorageracksareseismicCategoryIequipment.Thus,theyarerequiredtoremainfunctionalduringandafteraSafeShutdownEarthquake().Asnotedpreviously,theseracksareneitheranchoredtothepoolfloornoraretheyattachedtothesidewalls.Theindividualrackmodulesarenotinterconnected.Furthermore,aparticularrackmaybecompletelyloadedwithfuelassemblies(whichcorrespondstogreatestrackinertia),oritmaybecompletelyempty.Thecoefficientoffriction,p,betweenthysupportsandpoolfloorisdeterminedasfollows.AccordingtoRabinowicz<"~theresultsof199testsperformedonausteniticstainlesssteelplatessubmergedinwatershowameanvalueofp,tobe0.503withastandarddeviationof0.125.Theupperandlowerbounds(basedontwicethestandarddeviation)arethus0.753and0.253,respectively.Twoseparateanalysesareperformedfortherackassemblieswithvaluesofthecoefficientoffrictionequalto0.2(lowerlimit)and0.8(upperlimit),respectively.Analysesperformedforthegeometricallylimitingrackmodulesfocusonlimitingvaluesofthecoefficientoffriction,andthenumberoffuelassembliesstored.Typicalcasesstudiedare:Fullyloadedrack(allstoragelocationsoccupied),p~0.8,0.2(p~coefficientoffricti.on)NearlyemptyrackP0.8,02RackhalffullP=0.2,0.8PoolfloorslabaccelerationdatadevelopedfortheSafeShutdownEarthquake(SSE)areshowninFigures4-12through4-14.Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetime-historymethod.Thepoolslabaccelerationdataweredevelopedfromthebuildingresponsespectra.Theobjectiveoftheseismicanalysisistodeterminethestructuralresponse(stresses,deformation,rigidbodymotion,etc)duetosimulataneousapplicationofthethreeindependent,orthogonalexcitations.Theseismicanalysisisperformedinthreesteps,namely:1.Developmentofanonlineardynamicmodelconsistingofinertialmasselementsandgapandfrictionelements.2.Generationoftheequationsofmotionandinertialcouplingandsolutionoftheequationsusingthe"componentelementtimeintegrationscheme">todeterminenodalforcesanddisplacements.3.Computationofthedetailedstressfieldintherack(atthecriticallocation)andinthesupportlegsusingthenodalforcescalculatedinthepreviousstep.ThesestressesarecheckedagainstthedesignlimitsgiveninSection4.6.2.2.Abriefdescriptionofthedynamicmodelfollows.4-140077L/0011L e~eeP~e0e 4.5.2.2FuelRack-FuelAssemblyModelSincetheracksarenotanchoredtothepoolslaborattachedtothepoolwallsortoeachother,theycanexecuteawidevarietyofrigidbodymotions.Forexample,therackmayslideonthepoolfloor(so-called"slidingcondition");oneormorelegsmaymomentarilylosecontactwiththeliner("tippingcondition");ortherackmayexperienceacombinationofslidingandtippingconditions.Thestructuralmodelshouldpermitsimulationofthesekinematiceventswithinherentbuilt-inconservatisms.Sincetheseracksareequippedwithgirdlebarstodissipateenergyduetointer-rackimpact(ifitoccurs),itisalsonecessarytomodeltheinter-rackimpactphenomenainaconservativemanner.Similarly,liftoffofthesupportlegsandsubsequentimpactsmustbemodelledusingappropriateimpactelements,andCoulombfrictionbetweentherackandthepoollinermustbesimulatedbyappropriatepiecewiselinearsprings.Thesespecialattributesoftherackdynamicsrequireastrongemphasisonthemodelingofthelinearandnonlinearsprings,dampers,andstopelements.Themodeloutlineintheremainderofthissection,andthemodeldescriptioninthefollowingsectiondescribethedetailedmodelingtechniquetosimulatetheseeffects,withemphasisplacedonthenonlinearityoftherackseismicresponse.4.5.2.2.1OutlineofModelaOThefuelrackstructureisafoldedmetalplateassemblageweldedtoabaseplateandsupportedonfourlegs.Therackstructureitselfisaveryrigidstructure.Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticellrackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructureiscapturedalmostcompletelybythebehaviorofasixdegrees-of-freedomstructure;therefore,themovementoftherackcross-sectionatanyheightis,describedintermsofthesixdegrees-of-freedomoftherackbase.b.Theseismicmotionofafuelrackischaracterizedbyrandomrattlingoffuelassembliesintheirindividualstoragelocations.Assumingthatallassembliesvibrateinphaseobviouslyexaggeratesthecomputeddynamicloadingontherackstructure.Thisassumption,however,greatlyreducestherequireddegrees-of-freedomneededtomodelthefuelassemblieswhicharerepresentedbyfivelumpedmasseslocatedatdifferentlevelsoftherack.Thecentroidofeachfuelassemblymasscanbelocated,relativetotherackstructurecentroidatthatlevel,soastosimulateapartiallyloadedrack.c.Thelocalflexibilityoftherack-supportinterfaceismodeledconservativelyintheanalysis.d.Therackbasesupportmayslideorliftoffthepoolfloor.e.Thepoolfloorandwallshaveaspecifiedtime-historyofseismicaccelerationsalongthethreeorthogonaldirections.Fluidcouplingbetweenrackandassemblies,andbetweenrackandadjacentracks,issimulatedbyintroducingappropriateinertialcouplingintothesystemkineticenergy,InclusionoftheseeffectsusesthemethodsofReferences4and6forrack/assemblycouplingandforrack/rackcoupling(seeSection4.5.2.2.3ofthisreport).4-150077L/0011L aoe g.Potentialimpactsbetweenrackandassembliesareaccountedforbyappropriate"compressiononly"gapelementsbetweenmassesinvolved.h.Fluiddampingbetweenrackandassemblies,andbetweenrackandadjacentrack,isconservativelyneglected.Thesupportsaremodeledas"compressiononly"elementsfortheverticaldirectionandas"rigidlinks"fordynamicanalysis.ThebottomofasupportlegisattachedtoafrictionalelementasdescribedinSection4.5.2.2.2.Thecrossmectioninertialpropertiesofthesupportlegsarecomputedandusedinthefinalcomputationstodeterminesupportlegstresses.Theeffectofsloshinghasbeenshowntobenegligibleatthebottomofapoolandhenceisneglected.k.Intermackimpact,ifitoccurs,issimulatedbyaseriesofgapelementsatthetopandbottomofoftherackinthetwohorizontaldirections.Themostconservativecaseofadjacentrackmovementisassumed;eachadjacentrackisassumedtomovecompletelyoutofphasewiththerackbeinganalyzed.1.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelassembliesinthestoragelocationsisconservativelyneglectedintheresultsreportedherein.m.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelrackinthewaterisalsoconservativelyneglectedintheresultsreportedherein.n.Therattlingofthefuelassembliesinsidethestoragelocationscausesthe"gap"betweenthefuelassembliesandthecellwalltochangefromamaximumoftwicethenominalgaptoatheoreticalzerogap.However,thefluidcouplingcoefficients(8)utilizedarebasedonlinearvibrationtheory(9).Studiesintheliteratureshowthatinclusionofthenonlineareffect(viz.,vibrationamplitudeofthesameorderofmagnitudeasthegap)drasticallylowerstheequipmentresponse(>0).Figure4-15showsaschematicofthemodel.Sixdegreesmf-freedomareusedtotrackthemotionoftherackstructure.Figures4-16and4-17,respectively,showtheintermackimpactspringsandfuelassembly/storagecellimpactsprings.Themodelforsimulatingfuelassemblymotionincorporatesfivelumpedmasses.Thelowermassisassumedtobeattachedtothebaseplateandtomovewiththebaseplate.Thefourrattlingmassesarelocatedatquarterheight,halfheight,threequarterheightandtopoftherack.Twodegrees-of-freedomareusedtotrackthemotionofeachrattlingmass.ThesolutionproceduredescribedinthefollowingisimplementedincomputercodeDYNARACK,whichisavalidatedcomputercodeunderHoltec'sQAprogram.0077L/0011L4-16Revision1 4vL1L' 4.5.2.2.2ModelDescription~~~~eabsolutedegrees-of-freedomassociatedwitheachofthemasslocationsareshowninFigure4-15.Asshown,thediscretemassfractionsarelocatedatheightsz=0,0.25H,0.5H,0.75HandHrespectively.Table4Wgivesthedegreesmf-freedomandtheassociatedgeneralizedcoordinates.Ui(t)isthepoolfloorslabdisplacementseismictime-history.1hus,astabulatedinTable4WandshowninFigure4-15,therearesixteendegreesmf-freedominthesystem.NotshowninFigure4-15arethegapelementsusedtomodelthesupportlegsandtheimpactswithadjacentracks.4.5.2.2.3FluidCouplingAneffectofsomesignificancerequiringcarefulmodelingistheso-called"fluidcouplingeffect".Ifonebodyofmass(m)vibratesadjacenttoanotherbody(massm),andbothbodiesaresubmergedinafrictionlessfluidmedium,thenNewton'sequationsofmotionforthetwobodieshavetheform:~~~~(ml+Mll)Xl-M12X2=appliedforcesonmassml~~~~M21Xl+(m2+M22)X2appliedforcesonmassm2~~~~Xl,X2denoteabsoluteaccelerationsofmassmlandm2,respectively.Mll,M12,M21andM22arefluidcouplingcoefficientswhichdependontheshapeoXthetwobodies,theirrelativedisposition,etc.Fritz(9)ivesdata<<rMijforvariousbodyshapesandarrangements.Itistobeotedthattheaboveequationindicatesthattheeffectofthefluidistoaddacertainamountofmasstothebody(Mlltobody1),andanexternalforcewhichisproportionaltotheaccelerationoftheadjacentbody(massm2),Ttlustheaccelerationoftheonebodyaffectstheforcefieldonanother.Thisforceisastrongfunctionoftheinterbodygap,reachinglargevaluesforverysmallgaps.Thisinertialcouplingiscalledfluidcoupling.Ithasanimportanteffectinrackdynamics.Thelateralmotionofafuelassemblyinsidethestoragelocationwillencounterthiseffect.Sowillthemotionofarackadjacenttoanotherrack.'theseeffectsareincludedintheequationsofmotion.1hefluidcouplingisbetweenfuelarraynodeiandcellwallinFigure4-17.Furthermore,therackequationscontaincouplingtermswhichmodeltheeffectoffluidinthegapsbetweenadjacentracks.Thecouplingtermsmodelingtheeffectsoffluidflowingbetweenadjacentracksarecomputedassumingthatalladjacentracksarevibrating180degreesoutofphasefromtherackbeinganalyzed.Therefore,onlyonerackisconsideredsurroundedbyahydrodynamicmasscomputedasiftherewereaplaneofsymmetrylocatedinthemiddleofthegapregion.Finally,fluidvirtualmassisincludedintheverticaldirectionvibrationequationsoftherack;virtualinertiaisalsoaddedtothegoverningequationcorespondingtotherotationaldegreemf-freedom,q(t).0077L/00llL4-17Revision1 444C4~/
Thereplacement differential relayshavebeenseismically testedbythevendorasstatedintheGeneralElectricMIL.NO.82-12.Theseismicresponsespectrum(TRS)for=theinstrument envelopes theSt.LucieUnit102EnvelopeResponseSpectrumfortheDieselGenerator Building(RRS)formasspoint53(elev.23.0')whichcorresponds totheinstrument location.
4.5.2.2.4DampingInreality,dampingoftherackmotionarisesfrommaterialhysteresis(materialdamping),relativeintercomponentmotioninstructures(structuraldamping),andfluiddrageffects(fluiddamping).Intheanalysis,amaximumof2XstructuraldampingisimposedonelementsoftherackstructureduringSSEseismicsimulations.ThisisinaccordancewiththeStLucieUnit1FSAR(13).Materialandfluiddampingareconservativelyneglected.Thedynamicmodelhastheprovisiontoincorporatefluiddampingeffects;however,nofluiddampinghasbeenusedforthisanalysis.4.5.2.2.5ImpactReferringtoFigure4-18,anyfuelassemblynodemayimpactthecorrespondingstructuralmassnode.Tosimulatethi.simpact,fourcompressionmnlygapelementsaroundeachrattlingfuelassemblynodeareprovided(seeFigure4-17).Asnotedpreviously,fluiddampersmayalsobeprovidedinparallelwiththesprings.Thecompressiveloadsdevelopedinthesespringsprovidethenecessarydatatoevaluatetheintegrityofthecellwallstructureandstoredarrayduringtheseismicevent.Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheimpactspringsusedtosimulateanypotentialforintermackimpacts.Section4.5.2.4.2givesmoredetailsontheseadditionalimpactsprings.4.5.2.3AssemblyoftheDynamicModelThecartesiancoordinatesystemassociatedwiththerackhasthefollowingnomenclature:ox~HorizontalcoordinatealongtheshortdirectionofrackrectangularplatformoyHorizontalcoordinatealongthelongdirectionoftherackrectangularplatformozVerticallyupwardAsdescribedintheprecedingsection,therack,alongwiththebase,supports,andstoredfuelassemblies,ismodeledforthegeneralthree-dimensional(3-D)motionsimulationbyafourteendegreemf-freedommodel.Tosimulatetheimpactandslidingphenomenaexpected,60nonlineargapelementsand16nonlinearfrictionelementsareused.Gapandfrictionelements,withtheirconnectivityandpurpose,arepresentedinTable4-7.Ifthesimulationmodelisrestrictedtotwodimensions(onehorizontalmotionplusverticalmotion,forexample)forthepurposesofmodelclarificationonly,thenadescriptivemodelofthesimulatedstructurewhichincludesgapandfrictionelementsisshowninFigure4-18.(Notethatonlythetoprattlingmassisshownforclarity.)Theimpactsbetweenfuelassembliesandrackshowupinthegapelement,havinglocalstiffnessKI,inFigure4-18.InTable4-7,gapelements5through8areforthevibratingmassatthetopoftherack.Thesupportleg~pringratesQaremodeledbyelements1through4inTable4-7.Notethat0077L/0011L4-18Revision1 (I4I thelocalcomplianceoftheconcretefloorisincludedinKd.Tosimulateslidingpotential,frictionelements1through8inTable4-7areemployed.Frictionelements2and8,and4and6(Table4-7)arerepresentedasKfinFigure4-18.Thefrictionofthesupport/linerinterfaceismodeledbyapiecewiselinearspringwithasuitablylargestiffnessKfuptothelimitinglateralload,N,whereNisthecurrentcompressionloadattheinterfacebetweensupportandliner.Ateverytimestepduringthetransientanalysis,thecurrentvalueofN(eitherzeroforliftoffcondition,oracompressivefinitevalue)iscomputed.Finally,thesupportrotationalfr<<t<<nspringsKRreflectanyrotationalrestraintthatmaybeofferedbythefoundation.ThisspringrateiscalculatedusingamodifiedBoussinesqequation(4)andisincludedtosimulatetheresistivemomentofthesupporttocounteractrotationoftherackleginaverticalplane.Thisrotationspringisalsononlinear,withazerospringconstantvalueassignedafteracertainlimitingconditionofslabmomentloadingisreached.Thenonlinearityofthesesprings(frictionelements9,11,13and15inTable4-7)reflectstheedginglimitationimposedonthebaseoftheracksupportlegs.Inthisanalysis,thiseffectisneglected;anysupportlegbending,inducedbyliner/baseplatefrictionforces,isresistedbythelegactingasabeamcantileveredfromtherackbaseplate.Forthe3Wsimulation,allsupportelements(listedinTable4-7)areincludedinthemodel.Couplingbetweenthetwohorizontalseismicmotionsisprovidedbothbytheoffsetofthefuelassemblygroupcentroidwhichcausestherotationoftheentirerackandbythepossibilityofliftoffofoneormoresupportlegs.Thepotentialexistsfortheracktobesupportedononeormoresupportlegsortoliftoffcompletelyduringanyinstantofacomplex3Wseismicevent.Allofthesepotentialeventsmaybesimulatedduringa3-Dmotionandhavebeenobservedintheresults.4.5.2.4TimeIntegrationoftheEquationsofMotion4.5.2.4.1Time-HistoryAnalysisUsing16DOFRackModelHavingassembledthestructuralmodel,thedynamicequationsofmotioncorrespondingtoeachdegree-of-freedomcanbewrittenbyusingNewton'ssecondlawofmotion;orbyusingLagrange'sequation.Thesystemofequationscanberepresentedinmatrixnotationas:~~[M](q)=(Q)+(G)wherethevector(Q)isafunctionofnodaldisplacementsandvelocities,and(G)dependsonthecouplinginertiaandthegroundacceleration.Premultiplyingtheaboveequationsby[M]1renderstheresultingequationuncoupledinmass.~~Wehave:(q)~[M]1(Q)+[M]1(G)Asnotedearlier,inthenumericalsimulationsruntoverifystructuralintegrityduringaseismicevent,allelementsofthefuelassembliesareassumedtomoveinphase.Thiswillprovidemaximumimpactforcelevel,andinduceadditionalconservatisminthetime-historyanalysis.0077L/0011L4-19Revision1 El4
Adampingfactorof5%wasusedintheTRSinaccordance withIEEEStd-344-1975.
'Ihisequationsetismassuncoupled,displacementcoupled,andisideallyuitedfornumericalsolutionusingacentraldifferencescheme.Thecomputerrogram"DYNARACK'"isutilizedforthispurpose.Stressesinvariousportionsofthestructurearecomputedfromknownelementforcesateachinstantoftime.Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticellrackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructureiscapturedalmostcompletelybythebehaviorofasixdegreemf-freedomstructure;therefore,inthisanalysismodel,themovementoftherackcrossmectionatanyheightisdescribedintermsoftherackbasedegreesmf-freedom(ql(t),"q6(t)).Theremainingdegrees-of-freedomareassociatedwithhorizontalmovementsofthefuelassemblymasses.Inthisdynamicmodel,fiverattlingmassesareusedtorepresentfuelassemblymovement.Therefore,thefinaldynamicmodelconsistsofsixdegreesmf-freedomfortherackplustenadditionalmassdegrees-of-freedomforthefiverattlingmasses.Theremainingportionofthefuelassemblyisassumedtomovewiththerackbase.Thus,thetotalityoffuelmassisincludedinthesimulation.4.5.2.4.2EvaluationofPotentialforInter-RackImpactSincetheracksarecloselyspaced,thesimulationincludesimpactspringstomodelthepotentialforintermackimpact,especiallyforlowvaluesofthefrictioncoefficientbetweenthesupportandthepoolliner.Toaccountforthispotential,fiveintermackgapelementswerelocatedateachsideoftherackatthetopandatthebaseplate.Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheseapelements.Loadsintheseelements,computedduringthedynamicanalysis,reusedtoassessrackintegrityifinter-rackimpactoccurs.4.6STRUCTURALEVALUATIONCRITERIA4.6.1StructuralAccetanceCriteriaforSentFuelPoolStructure4.6.1.1CriteriaThestresses/strainsresultingfromtheloadingcombinationsdescribedinSection4.4.1satisfythefollowingacceptancecriteria:a)SpentFuelPoolConcreteStructureThedesignstresslimitsdescribedinSection3.8.1.6ofStLucieUnitNo.1UpdatedFSARwereusedfortheevaluationofthespentfuelpoolreinforcedconcretestructuralcomponents.ThecapacityofallsectionswascomputedinaccordancewithACI318+3PartIV-B,UltimateStrengthDesign.*ThenumericalprocedureunderlyingDYNARACKhasbeenpreviouslyutilizedinicensingof'similarracksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2DocketNos50-254and265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),andDiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323).0077L/0011L4-20Revision1 thpIt~~1Ii(~~
Consequently, a4%dampingfactorwasconservatively usedintheRRSforcomparison ofacceleration values.Theacceleration valuesrequiredbytheRRSareaminimumof2.8timeslessatallfrequencies thanthoseoftheTRSinthenonmperate mode,and4.9timeslessfortheoperatemode.Thiswillsufficiently accountforanyacceleration amplification throughtherelaycabinet.Inaddition, thesize,weight,.mounting locationandmountingdetailsofthereplacement relayswillbethesameasthatoftheoriginalrelays.Therefore, theoriginalrelaysupportandcabinetdesigncriteriawillnotbeadversely affected.
Re:St.LuciePlantDocketNo.50-33510CFR50.59REPORTSt.LuciePlantUnit1ReportofChangesMadeUndertheProvisionsof10CFR50.59forthePeriodEndingJanuary22,~1988GRMATWS.RAI DOCUMENTSREVIEWEDFORFSARAMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITlE118-181848-182892-182188-182846-183878-183336-183348-183383-183412-183174-184187-184-1842-184815-185822-185824-185839-185847-185ceo-185873-185131-185142-185155-1858-18-18-28-18-18-18-18-18-28-18AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACENENTAUXILIARYBUILDINGJIBHOISTDIESELGENERATORUPGRADEREMOVALOFSTEAN6ENERATORDELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERSREACTORUPPERCAVITYHANDRAIL~NITR06ENSUPPLYSYSTEMINSTRUNENTAIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONCCMHEATEXCHANGERRETUBINGSECURITYCONSOLES-LEDHICROMAVEDETECTORREPLACEMENTHAINSTEANSAFETYVALVELIFTLEVERRENOVALED6CFDRELAYREPLACEMENTEX-CORENEUTRONFLUXMONITORINGSYSTEMUPGRADETRAVELINGMATERSCREENUPGRADEDIESEL6ENERATORAIRSTARTSYSTEHPIPINGMODIFICATIONINSTRUMENTAIRUPGRADETIEINSEPASINSTALLATIONDIESELGENERATORSUBSYSTEMFLOMDIAGRAMS6ESANRELAYPCCARDREPLACENEN1NSRRETUBINGNSRPERFORATEDPLATENODIFICATIONREPLACEMENTOFRISDEVICESAPPENDIXRCONTROLROONINDEPENDENCEFORALlERNATESHUTDOMNREACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFITNGRIGPIPEASSENBLYTURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEHNODIFICATION DOCUMENTSREVIEWEDFORFSAR-AMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITLE174-185179-185282-185884-186887-186823-186832-186837-186843-186871-186874-186882-186186-186888-186898-186893-186895-186898-186186-186116-186117-186118-186119-1868-188-18-18-1RCPOILLIFTSYSTENPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENTDIESEL6ENERATORCOOLIN6SYSTENVALVEREPLACENENTCGMSTRAINERBACKFl.USHDRAINLUBEOILCENTRIFUGEANNUNCIATIONNRVACTUATIONSOLENOIOSNAINFEEDMATERPUNPLUBEOILPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENTEXCITERCOOLERVENTSANODRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEPCBTRANSFORNERREPLACENENTNON-SAFETYRELATEDNISGELLANEOUSPIPINGSYSTENSNOOIFIGATIONSFHBHVACPENETRATIONBARRIERSHEATERDRAINPUNPDENINERALIZEOMATERSUPPLY.HAINSTEANPIPIN6NODIFICATIONLOMPOWERFEED'MATERCONTROLSYSTEMNISAPPLICATIONOFLINITORQUEOPERATORISOLATEDPHASEBUSDUCTJUNPERNOOIFICATIONCLOSEINTERCEPTVALVECIRCUITNODIFICATIONRTGBANNUNCIATOR6ROUNDDETECTIONREPLACENENTOFINSTRUNENTSCALESHYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONS:REPLACEOFVLVSI-V-25-1113.15HIREXCITATIONSYSTENTURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIREXTRACTIONSTEANPIPIN6ANOFITTIN6NATERIALUP6RADEREACTORCAVITYSEALRING18CFR58.49ENVIRONNENTALQUALlFICAT'IONLISTREVISIONPRESSURIZERNISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCA6E DOCUMENTSREVIEVEDFORFSARAMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITLE126-186132-186136-186139-186148-186141-186143-186146-186148-186151-186153-18688.1-187-187-187818-187811-187.812-187817-187827-187828-187832-187..-834-187835-187844-187846-1878-18-18-18-18-1AFASDVNHODIFICATIONEXCESSIVEAC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPREPLACEMENTOFSGLEVELTRANSMITTERSMASONRYMALLHODIFICATIONSANNUNCIATOR-NUISANCEALARNSPRESSURIZERLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONHODIFICATIONPASSDISSOLVEDHYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSl1ISCELLANEOUSICMSYSTEHMODIFICATIONSICMISOlATIONVALVEREPLACEMENT488VOLTACLOADCENTER18-2TRANSFORMERCOOLINGROSEHOUNTANDVALCOREQENHANCEHENTIEBULLETIN85-83HOVSMITCHSETTINGSNRCIEBULLETING85-83HOVPOSITIONINDICATIONOVERPRESSUREMITIGATIONSYSTEMHODIFICATIONPROTECTIVECOATINGSREPAIR/REPLINREACTORCONTAINHENTBLDGCONDENSERHOTMELDNITROGENINJECTIONCONNECTIONSFEEDMATERHEATERANDEXTRACTIONPIPESHIELDINGCCMHEATEXCHANGERSHElLSIDEDRAINADDITIONNISCELLANEOUSSNUBBERMODIFICATIONREPLACEMENTOFRMTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46PRESSURIZERSURGELINESAHPLEVALVEV1218REPLACEMENTCONDENSEROUTLETTUBESHEETANDMATERBOXCOATINGSREPLACEMENTOFRAYCHEHSPLICESNSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATIONCONTAINMENTBLDGTELESCOPINGJIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTS DOCUMENTSREVIEWEDEORESARAMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITLE887-187897-187188-187888-984227-984178-98519S-S85815-986112-986138-9868-18'8CODEBOUNDRYORAMIN6REVISIONTSCBLOCKMALL287AMODIFICATIONSTURBINE6ANTRYCRANEHAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADENON-HANUALPARKINGLOTTURBINEGANTRYCRANESEPARATIONREQUIREMENTSTIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTIONFIREHAINANOPLANTFIREl.OOPMATERTREATMENTPLANTCAUSTICDILUTIONMATERBOOSTERPUNPTELEPHONESYSTEMUPGRADETURBINEBUILONGGANTRYCRANEGIRDERINSPECTIONANOTBISOLNEUTRALIZATIONBASINCLOSUREtlONITORMELLSN/ASTLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYEVALUATIONREVIEW PCM118-181AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACEMENTSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONFUNCTIONThepurposeofthismodificationistoreplacethelubricatedplugvalvesontheinstrumentairdryerwithnon-lubricatedtype'stopreventgreaseintrusionintotheinstrumentairsystem.DESIGNDESCRIPTIONThegreasesealedplugvalvesoriginallyinstalledontheinstrumentairdryerallowgreasetocontaminatethesystemandplugupthecoolercausingtheblowertotriponhighcurrent.Replacementofthesevalveswithgreaselesstypevalveswilleliminatetheproblem.OPERATIONTheoperationoftheairdryerwillremainthesame-.Thevalvesarehandoperatedandutilizedwhenthedessicantbedsarebeingswitchedforregeneration.SAFETYANALYSISTheinstrumentairdryerisNon-SafetyRelatedQualityGroupD.Itisnon-seismica'ndhasnowind,flood,ormissilecriteria.Failureoftheinstrumentairdryerwillnotaffecta'ysafetyrelatedsystemssincetheinstrumentairsystemcanoperatewithouttheinstrumentairdryerandtheinstrumentairsystemisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.Theinstrumentairdryerislocatedintheturbinebuildingsointheeventofacatastrophicfailure,nosafetyrelatedequipmentwillbeaffected.
Thismodification doesnotaffectanycabletrayanalysis, Appendix"R"analysisoranyothersafety,relatedequipment asitonlyinvolvesreplacement ofrelaysonthedieselgenerator controlpaneLWithrespecttotheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheFSAR:ThePC/Msimplyinvolvesreplacing theCFDdifferential relaysandcases,Whichmeansonlyaslight'change ofinternalrelaycontactswithoutchangingtherelays'unction orexternalwiring.ThisPC/Mdoesnotaffecttheoperation oftheemergency dieselgenerator as.discussed'n FSAR8.0.,nordoesitadversely affecttheoperation oftheD/Goranyothersafetyrelatedequipment ThedesignbasisintheFSAR(Chapters 8and15).whichaddresses theoperation oftheD/G,isaneventinvolving thelossmfmffsite power.Theevaluation ofthisdesignbasisisnotaffectedbythisPC/M.
PCM040-182REACTORAUXILIARYBUILDINGJIBHOISTDESCRIPTIONTheimplementationofthisPC/Mpackagewillprovidea5toncapacityjibhoistin-theReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB).'Thehoistwillbelocatedeastofthehotmachineshopasdetailedonthelocationplan,JPE-C-40-82.-001,included.withthispackage.ThehoistwillbeusedtotransferequipmentintheRABbetweenEl-0.5'ndEl19.5'.Theboomshallbeprovidedwithaholddownchaintolimitmovementwhennotinoperation.ThisdesignpackageprimarilyoutlinesCivil'srequirements.ElectricalsrequirementsareincludedinAppendixCDSAFETYEVALUATIONThejibhoistwillbeusedtotransferequipmentandmaterialsintheRABbetweenEl0.5'ndEl19.5'.ThehoistperformsnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunctionthereforethisPC/Misnon-nuclearsafetyrelated.~~~~~~~~Thedesignofthejibcraneattachments'totheconcretewalloftheRABwillbeverifiedbasedonseismicloadsaswellasdeadandliveloads.Thiswillprecludedetachmentduringaseismicevent.TherequirementsofNUREG0612willnotbeapplicableastherewillbenointeractionswithsafetyrelatedequipment.Allstructuralsteelandboltingmaterialwillberequired'tohaveCertificatesofCompliancewiththeapplicablematerialspecification.Thiswillassurematerialintegrity.InaccordancewithQISection3.2,nounreviewedsafetyquestionshavebeenintroduced.
PCM187-184Withrespecttothepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSAR:ThisPC/Mjustinvolvesreplacing theexistingdieselgenerator differential relayswithanothermodeltoimprovethevibrational fragility ofthedifferential circuitandtherefore, doesnotcreatethepossibility oftheabove.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforaTechnical Specification:
PCM092-182DIESELGENERATORUPGRADEABSTRACTPC/M92-'182wasgeneratedtoperformseveralmodificationsrecommendedbythedieselgeneratorvendortoupgradeourdieselswiththelatestdesignimprovementsforoptimalreliability.Themodificationsincluded:1)2)3)4)5)VibrationdamperreplacementIdlergearstubshaftreplacementExhaustscreenmspectionportadditionAirdryeradditionLubeoilmodificationItems1tlwcagh4wereinstalledin1993perthePC/Mpackage.Item//wasneverinstalledduetodifficultyinprocuringpartsandescalatingcost.ex-ieaAsummaryofPC/M8&~isprovidedbelow.Supplement0-Installedthevibrationdamper,idlergearstubshaft,andexhaustscreeninspectionport.EngineeringwasbyFPL.Supplement1-InstalledtheElectrical,CIvilandINCportionoftheairdryeradditionandthelubeoilmodification.EngineeringwasbyEbasco.Supplement2-Installedthemechanicalportionoftheairdryeraddition.Engineering'asbyFPL.Supplement3-Transmittedthevendorwiringdiagramsforthe'irdryers.EngineeringwasbyEbasco.Supplement4-Installedthemechanicalportionoft5elubeoilmodification.EngineetingwasbyFPL.Supplement5-Revisedsupplement4basedonadditionalvendorsubmittals.EngineeringwasbyFPL.Supplements0,2and3werefullyinstalled.OnlyaportionofSupplement1wasinstalledandnoneofsupplements4and5waseverinstalled.Supplements0,1,2,and3wereappropriatelyas-built.4Thescope,engineeringandmaterialsofsupplement/wereallincludedintheoriginallubeoilmodification.Supplement6breaksoutalloftheportionsrequiredtoimplementtheturbochargersoakbacklowpressurealarmanddeletestheremainderofthedrawingsnotyetas-built.Whensupplement6isinstalled,andas-built,thePC/Mcanbeclosedout.Thissupplementdoesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyanalysis,doesnotrequireanytechnicalspecificationchangesanddoesnotcauseanychanges.totheoperationofthedieselgenerator.fgcgerci'.C[Itic'~ppgcvialgeoTr.rquii.CPFg,i,wig~egimgivwoisEF'.
AsthisPC/M'does notnotadversely affectoperation oftheemergency, diesel'generator, itdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheDieselGenerator Technical Specification 4.8.Additionally thisPC/MdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification asitonlyinvolveschangesinthedieselgenerator controlpanel.Therefore itcanbeconcluded thatthisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
PCM092-182.SAFETYANALYSISTheadditionofaturbochargersoakbacklowpressurealarmdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionsincethealarm=doesnotaffecttheoperationoroperabilityofthedieselgenerators,itmerelyalertsoperatorstoalowpressureconditionintheturbochargersoakbacksystemwhiletheengineisinthestandbymode.Asaresult,itcanbeconcludedthattheprobabilityofocccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethedieselgeneratorsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofaccidentsandsincethealarmwasdesignedtotheappropriatecodesanditdoesnotaffecttheoperationofthedieselgenerators.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreducedsincethemodificationdoesnotaffecttheperformanceoroperabilityoftheengine.~~
PCM227-984TURBINEGANTRYCRANEPROXIMITY RESTRICTIONS INTRODUCTION ThisPCMprovidesrestrictions ontheproximity oftheUnits1and2tur-binegantrycranestoeachotherinordertopreventpotential overstress-ingoftheturbinebuildingstructure.
PCM100-182REMOVALOFSTEAMGENERATORDELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERSSYSTENOESCRIPTIONThesystemwhichisbeingaffectedbythisaadificationistheSteamGeneratorReactorCoolantDifferentia1FlowInstr'umentationandControlSystem.ThissystemmonitorstheReactorCoolantflowacrosseachofthetwoSteamGeneratorswiththepurposeofprotectingthecoreagainstdepartur'e.fromnucleateboil.ingONBintheeventofacoolantflowdecrease.Flowmeasurementsignalsareprovidedbysunningthe-outputofdifferentialpressuretransmittersacrosseachsteamgenerator.Thismeasurementofdifferentialpressureismodifiedbytwosignalcharacterizersineachofthefourchannelstoprovide'squarerootofdifferentialpressuresignalswhichcorrespondtoactualflow.Thelowflowreactortripisactuateddirectlybythesummedflowsignal.Itrequiresatwo-out-of-fourcoincidencelogicfromthefourindependentchannels(whentheflowfa11sbelowapreselectedvalue)toinitiateaReactortrip.InadditIon,fourseparateindicators(oneperchannel)receivesignalsfromeachinstrumentationloop.Bymeansofaselectorhandswitchtheoperatorcanreadeitherthesumned,.averageflowsigna'Iofthetwosteamgenerators,asmeasuredfromthatchannel,ortheflowsignalofeithersteamgeneratorbyItself.Thepurposeofthismodification.istoremovefromtheinstrumentationandcontrolloopstheeightsignalcharacterizers(twoperchannel).BecausetechnicalspecificationsIimitplantoperationstofourReactorCoolantPumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizerfunction.Thecharacterizermodifiesthedeltapinputsignalstoallowforoperationunderconditionsoflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumps.Thecharacterizerswi1Iremainphysicallyintheloops,butwiII'ebypassedelectricallysothattheywillservenofunction.TheindicatorswilIberecalibratedandtheirscaleswiIIbechangedtoreadthedeltapsignalsdirectlyratherthanthemodifiedflowsignals.Thewiringintheloopswillbealteredandseveralresistorswillneedtobereplaced-withnewvaluestomaintaintherequiredvoltageranges.FuelResourceshascompletedan'ngineeringevaluationthatwillgeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpointsfortheSystem.
SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyques-tion;(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanacci-dentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated
PCM100-182SAFETYANALYSISThismodificationisNuclearSafetyrelatedbecausetheSteamGeneratorReactorCoolantOeItaFlowInstrumentationandControlsystemisNuclearSystemrelated,andtheequipmentbeingmodifiedispart.ofthissystem.ThisPC/Hproposestoremovethesignalcharacterizersfromthefourredundantloopsandmodifytheinstrumentandcontrolcircuitssothattheloopcurrentandvoltagesignalsbecomeproportionaltothedifferencesinreactorprimarycoolantpressures,ratherthandirectlytotheflowacrossthesteamgenerators.InaccordancewiththeFuelResourcesrecommendations(AppendixC),"bothsteamgeneratordeltapsignaisaresumnedandareactortripisinitiat'edwhenthesumneddeltapfa1isbelowaprese1ectedtripvalue."Accordingly,thetransmittersintheloopswillberecalibratedandtheindicatorsrescaledfortheprocessrangeof0to50psid.Thecharacterizersservedafunctionunderconditionoflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpoperation.However,becauseSt.LuciedlTechnicalSpecificationslimitplantoperationwhiieatpowertofourreactorcoolantpumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizerfunctions.CombustionEngineering,theoriginalArchitectEngineerfortheReactorProtectionSystem;hasrecommendedremovalofthecharacterizersbecausetheremovalwi11reducethecalibrationtimeofthe'eltapsignalprocessingcircuitry.Thechangeisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.FuelResourceshascompletedanengineeringevaluationthatwillbeusedtogeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpointsfortheReactorCoolantdeltapressureinputsfortheReactorProtectionSystembasedonremovalofthecharacterizers.Newvaluesofresistorswillberequiredtomaintainthevoltagerangesrequiredbythecircuitryintheabsenceofthesignalcharacterizers.Thenewresistorsarebeingpurchasedascommercialgradeitemstoexactingstandardsofprecisionandperformance.Additionally,failureofthenewresistorswouid.havethesameconsequencesontheStreamGeneratordelta~p.inputtotheReactorProtectionSystemasfailureoftheexistingresistors.Hence,nopossibi1Ityfor~naccidentormalfunctionofatypedifferentfromanyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasbeencreatedbythismodification.Forthesamereasons,themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforthetechnicalspecificationshasnotbeendecreased.Inconclusion,thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.
.pre-viouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreat@8;or(iii)ifthemar-ginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theturbinebuildingisanon-Category Istructure andcontainsnosafetyrelatedequipment.
PCM046-183REACTORBUILDINGUPPERCAVITYHANDRAILINTRODUCTIONThereactorbuildingrefuelingcavityisastainlesssteellinedpoolwithasplitlevelbottomatElevations36.0'nd21.5'Duringplantshutdown',theuppercavityisoccupiedforvariousoperationsincludingreactorheadremoval,headstuddetensioning,etc..Atthepresenttimethereisnopro-vision.alongtheedgeoftheuppercavitytopreventpersonnelfromfallingintothelowercavity.ThisPC/Mprovidesahandrailinthisarea.ISAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle,10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThehandrailprovidedbythisPC/MhasbeendesignedtowithstandthoseloadingcombinationsasspecifiedinFSARChapter3.Althoughthehand-railservesnosafetyrelatedfunction,seismicloadshavebeenconsideredinthedesign.InordertoprecludepotentialmissilegenerationduringaLOCA,thehandrailhasbeendesignedtowithstandjetimpingementloads.TherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsassociatedwiththisPC/MandpriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.,
ThisPCMimposesarestriction oftheproximity oftheturbinebuildinggantrycranetoeachother.Thisrestriction assuresthattheassumptions usedinthebuildingdesignremainvalid.Ther'efore theimplementation ofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheprobability ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
PCM078-183NITROGENSUPPLYSYSTEMSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONFunctionsandDesinRuirementsVFunctionTheNitrogenSystemsupplieslowandhighpressurenitrogentovarioussystemsandvesselswhichrequirecovergasforSt.Lucie-Unitsfland02.a)Lowpressurenitrogen(200psigandbelow)issuppliedtothefollowingforeachunit:SpentResinTankVolumeControlTankRefuelingFailedFuelDetectorReactorDtainTankQuenchTankPressureReductionandSampleCabinetWasteConcentratorBoricAcidConcentratorsFlash.TankHoldUpTanksb)Highpressurenitrogen(over200PSIG)is.suppliedsolelyascovergasforthesafetyinjectiontanks.DesignRequirementsThe'systemshallbecapableofsupplyingbothunitswithhighandlowpressurenitrogenfor30dayswithoutrefilling.Thehighpressurestoragevolumeshallbeofsufficientcapactytorechargeallfoursafetyinjectiontanksoneitherunit.Thenitrogencompressorsshallbeofadequatesizetorechargethehighpressurestoragevolumewithin24hourseachor12hourscombined.SAFETYA'NALYSISThenitrogensupplysystemprovidesahighpressuresourceandnormaloperatingsourceofnitrogengasforplantuse.Thenitrogen.systemservesnosafetyfunction.Thenitrogen'upplysystemislocatedoutdoorsadjacenttothegashouse.Failureofanyportionofthenitrogensupplysystemwillnotinhibittheabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofapostulatedaccident,achievesafeshutdown,oradequatelycoolspentfueLThischangeisthereforenotconsideredsafetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.AllpioinghasbeendesignedinaccordancewithANSIB-31.1.Theconcretefoundationshavebeendesignedinaccordancewithallapplicablecodes.ThepowersourcesforthenitrogencompressorsarefromnonwafetyrelatedMCC's1A-3and1B-3.Allconduitsutilizedarebelowthe..allowablefilLInaddition,qualifiedcablewillbeusedforthisinstallation.
Implementation ofthis-PCMdoesnotinvolveachangetotheStLucieUnit2Technical Specifications.
PCM336-183INSTRUMENTAIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONTCTSYST-"MOESCRIPTIOH~OerationThismodificationaddsonecheckvalvetothecross-tielinetoprevntaccidentalbleed-downoftheIAsystem.ThisvalveperFormsitsfunctionautomaticallyandrequiresnooperatoraction.Thmodificationalsoadds,adifferentialpressureindicatortothecoalescingfilter.Thedifferentialpressureshouldbemonitored.onaperiodic-basistodeterminewhenfiltrelementreplacementisnecessry.(Thisshouldbedoneat10PSIO)Operatingprocedtressnouldbemodiriedtoindicatethislimitation.FunctionThismodificationwillprovideadownortheIAsystembywayofUnit=-"I/Unitg2IAcrossconnetcross-tieisinuse.passivemeansofpreventiragbleed-lekagetotheSAsystemwhiteiheisinusortheUnitglSAtoIADesicnOesc.iotiond>rrerentialSAFiTYcVALUATIGHThismodiFicationprovidsthedeailsForinstallationofonecheckvalveintheUnit='1SA-toIAcross-connetlineandadditionoFapressureindicatoronthecoalscirgrilter.1.0,Thismodificationisnon-seismic,non-safetyrlatdanddoe"notinvolveanunreviewedsaftyquestionbecause:1.1TheIA/SAcross-tieperformsnosafety.unctionardisclassiriedasnon-safetyrelated.1.2Thesemodi,icationsdorointeractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemorcomponents.1.3Hosafetyreletdequipmentorccmponentsareccmprcmisdbyanyeassumedrailureo-anyexistingornewecuipmntorcomponer.ts.1.4HoTechnicalSpecificatinsaralteredoradverselyaffected.2.0Carehasbentaknintndesigntoeliminatorcontrolaspectswhichcouicbha3rdoustoeqipm~ntand/orperson.ea.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
PCM340-183CCWHEATEXCHANGERRETUBINGSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONFunctionThecomponentcoolingwater(CCW)heatexchangersareonesidemixed,onesideunmixedsinglepasshorizontalmountunitswithintakecoolingwater(ICW)onthetubesideandCCWontheshellside.ThebasicfunctionoftheCCWheatexchangersistorejectheatfromvariouscomponentsassociatedwiththereactorsupportandsafetyequipment(suchastheshutdownheatexchangers,containmentfancoolersandRCPsealcoolers)totheICWsystem.DesiDescritionDuetothedeterioratedconditionoftheexistingCCWheatexchangerAluminum-Brasstubing,theseunitsaretoberetubedduringthenextrefuelingoutage.Thisdesignpackageincludesthespecificationrequiredfortheprocurementofthetubesandguidelinesfortheretubingeffort.~OerationThecomponentcoolingsystem(CCS)isarrangedastworedundant.essentialsupplyheadersystems(designatedA2B)eachwithapump'ndheatexchangerandthecapabilitytosupplytheminimumsafetyfeaturesrequirementsduringplantshutdownorLOCAconditions.SAFETYANALYSISla.WithrespecttotheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Theprobabilityofoccurrence'ofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.b.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:TheconsequencesofFSARaccidentevaluationshavenotbeenalteredsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.
thewrittensafetyevalua-tionwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveany'nre-viewedsafetyquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequir-edfortheimplement'ation ofthisPCM.
PCM340-183c.WithrespecttotheprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Theprobabilityofanyequipmentmalfunctionhasnotincreasedforthereasonsoutlinedinla.d.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofmalfuncitonofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Theconsequences-*ofanyequipment'malfunctionhasnotbeenincreasedforthesamereasonoutlinedinlb.2a.WithrespecttothepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR:ThereisnopossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSARsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchangeoranewdesign.b.WithrespecttothepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR:Thereisnopossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethan,analyzedintheFSARforthesamereasonasgivenin2a.3.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification:Nomarginofsafetyhasbeendecreasedoralteredforthereasongivenin2a.
PCM228-184EXCORENEUTRON-FLUXMONITORING SYSTEMINTRODUCTION PC/M228-184providesthemethodtoinstalltheEx-CoreNeutronFluxMonitoring Systemthatmonitorswideandsourcerangesneutronfluxwithindependent displaysintheControlRooma'ndHotShutdownPanel(HSP).=ThissystemmeetstheFPSLcommitment totheNRCbyproviding widerangeneutronfluxmonitoring inthehotshutdownpanelwhichisindependent oftheControlRoomandrequiredby18CFR50AppendixR.Italsosatisfies theguidelines ofRegulatory Guide1.97Rev.3byproviding aneutronmonitoring systemtomeetthedefinition andrequirements forcategary1variables asindicated intheRegulatory Guide.Inadditionthissystempermitsthecontinuity ofrefueling activities intheeventofafailureoftheexistingstart-upexcoredetectors duringrefueling.
PCM383-183SECURITYCONSOLE-LEDGRAPHICDISPLAYINTRODUCTIONTheNRChasdeterminedthatannunciationoftheSecuritySystempowersuppliesisrequiredforcompliancewith10CFRPart73(i.e.requirementsforsecuritysystemsfornuclearpowerplants).Tomeettheintentofthisrequirement,statuslightsshall,beinstalledonthesecuritysystemalarmconsolestoindicatethe"athand"conditionofthepowerinputtothesecuritySUPSandtherefore,totheentiresecuritysystem.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasi.sforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thesecuritvsystemisanon-safetyrelatedplantsystem.TheCentralandSecondaryAlarmStationsarecomponentsofthissystem.ThemodificationspresentedinthisPC/Maffectbothsafetyandnon-safetyrelatedplantequipment.ThemodificationstotheCAS'ndSAScontrolpanels,i.e.installationandwiringoftheannunciatorcircuitry,andtheinputstothese.annunciatorsarenon-safetyrelated.ThealarmstationsarelocatedintheTurbineandSecurityBuilding,whicharenon-safety,non-seismicstructures.Thema)orityofrequiredcabletotheseareaswillberoutedinnon-safetyrelatedcabletrayintheTGBandthroughthededicatedsecurityductbankstotheSecurityBuilding.Thebalanceofcablewillberoutedthroughappropriatelydedicatedraceway.Dieselgeneratorbreakerpositionismonitoredtoprovideinputtothe"Normal"and"Diesel"annunciatorcircuits.Thisportionofthed'ieselgenerator'ontrolcircuitryissafetyrelated.Therefore,thissignalwillbeisolatedfromthenon-safetysecurityannunciationcircuitrybyinstallingsafetyrelatedisolationrelaysin4160Vswitchgears1A3and1B3.TheserelayswerepurchasedunderRPA432953tobequalifiedtotheapplicableindustrystandards.Thebalanceofthecontrolrelaysthatarerequiredinthismodificationhavebeenpurchasedandwillbeinstal'edasnon-safetyrelatedequipment.J%Controlpowertoallrelaysisfromtheassociatedplantpowertrain(safetytoisolationrelays,non-safetytothenon-safetycontrolrelays).Allcableswillberoutedthroughtheappropriateracewayandtheracewaywillbeseismicallysupportedasrequired(i.e.insidetheRAB).ThismodificationhasnoimpactontheplantTechnicalSpecification".Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafety,question,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPC/M.
Technical Specifications 3/4.9.3Refueling Operations, requiresthesuspension ofoperations involving corealterations orpositivereactivity changesifatleasttwostart~pdetectors arenotoperational.
PCM412-183MICROWAVEDETECTORREPLACEMENTINTRODUCTIONTheexistingMicrowave700seriesIntrusionDetectionSystemwhichisinstalledattheUnit1and2perimeterfence,willbereplacedwith.Stellar'sModel682E-Field.ThereplacementoftheMicrowave700seriesatUnits1and2willbecoveredbyPC/Ms412-183and54-283,respectively.PC/M412-183addressesZones25,30,31,and32.~asenoteFPLStart-UphaspreviouslyinstalledtheStellarE-FieldsystematZones31and32inatest-bedapplication.PC/M412-183willdocumentthesezonesasapermanentinstallation.Thereisnoconstructionimpactforthesezones.Aspreviouslyagreed,thechangeoutfromMicrowavetoE-FieldintheareaoftheDischargeCanalhasfirstpriority.Thiswilleliminatetheneedfortheexistingsecuritystation,whichismanned24hoursaday.Therefore,Supplement0ofPC/M412-183addressestheUnit1perimeterzonesattheDischargeCanal(Zones30,31,and32).Zone25willbemodifiedviaSupplement1toPC/M412-183.SAFETY'ANAL'YSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,P~50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyques-tion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thesecuritysystemisnon-safetyrelated.Furthermore,themodificationstotheperimeterintrusiondetectionsystempresentedbythisPC/Mwillimprovetheoverallsecuritysystemoperation.The,changeoutfrommicrowavetoE-FieldisrequiredinordertoeliminatetheneedforasecuritystationattheDischargeCanalwhichismanned24-hoursaday.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;therefore,'riorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPC/M.
Asaresultofamalfunction ofoneofthetwofissionchambersintheNeutronDetectorAssemblyChannelSB,duringthesystemcommissioning, itisneces'sary toreplacethemalfunctioning detector.
PCM008-984NON-MANUALPARKINGLOTThisengineeringpackagecoverstherestorationandrepavingoftheNon-ManualParkingLotwhichisontheeastsideoftheSt.LuciePlant.Alsoincludedinthe.packageistheremovaloftheconstructionfirewatertankintheparkinglot,aswellastheadditionofanimprovedarealightingdesign.Theparkinglotislocatedoutsideoftheplantsecurityfenceperimeter.Themodificationsincludedinthisdesignpackagewillnotaffectanyplantsafety-relatedsystemandarethereforeclassifiedasnon-nuclear-safety-related.Inaddition,theremovalof'theconstructionfirewatertankwQlnotaffecttheplantfireprotectionsystem,sincethisworkcannotbestarteduntilPCM178-985isimplemented.PCM178-985tiesthefirewaterpipingdownstreamfromthetankintotheplantsystem.TherestorationandrepavingoftheNon-ManualParkingLotandthetankremovaldonotposeanyunreviewedsafetyquestions.TheNon-ManualParkingLotislocatedoutsideofthesecurityperimeterfenceandwQ1notbeinthevicinityofanyplantsafety-relatedstructureorsystem.Itdoesnotinanywayperformoraffectaplantsafety-relatedfunction.TheNon-ManualParkingLotarealightingdoesnotperformoraffectanyplantsafety-related.systemsorfunction.ItisbeingsuppliedfromLP.260whichisanon-safetyreIatedlightingpanelandisnotloadedontheemergencydieselgenerator.Theremovaloftheconstr'uctionfirewatertank.andpipingdoesnotaffectanyplantsafety-relatedsystemorfunctions.Thecitywatertotheplantisnotasafety-relatedsystem.Thefirewatersupplyfromthetankisnotpartoftheplantfirewatersystemanddoesnotaffectthatsystem.ThemodificationstotheNon-ManualParkingLotdonotchangeanyassumptionsmadeorconclusionsdrawnintheSt.LuciePSAR.Therepavingofthelotdoesnotadverselyaffectanysitetopographicfeatures.PortheabovereasonsthemodificationsoftheNon-ManualParkingLotwillnotincreasetheprobabilityof'ccurrencenortheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttothesafetyoftheplant.Additionally,therewQ1continuetobenopossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctiondifferentthanthosealreadyevaluatedinthePSAR.PinaQy,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.Itisthereforeconcludedthatthismodificationdoesnotposeanunreviewedsafetyquestionspursuantto10CPR50.59anddoesnotaffectanytechnicalspecifications.'INOTE-THISPACKAGECONTAINSSAFEGUARDDRAWINGS.
Thereplacement detectorissimilartotheonereplacedexceptthatitisenvironmentally qualified for10yearlifeplusDesignBasisAccident.
PCM174-184MAENSTEAMSAPETYVALVELIPTLEVERREMOVALSYSTEMDESCRIPTION1.0DesignDescriptionOnFebruary9,1984,aPSL-2planttripcausedactuationoftheMainSteamSafetyValves(MSSV's).Followingthetransient,oneoftheMSSV'sfailedtoreseatbecausetheabsenceofthespindle~utcaterpinallowedthespindlenuttorotatedownontotheforkedliftleverandpreventedfulltravelofthespindlerod.Topreventthistypeofeventfromoccurringagain,thisdesignpackageallowsther'emovaloftheliftlevercomponents(spindlenut,cotterpinandforklever).AnewvalvecapisrequiredtomaintainASMECoderequirementsconcerningcapsealing.2.0FunctionTheliftleverassemblyprovidesthecapabilitytomanuallyexercisethesafetyvalvetofacilitateblowingoutlines.Whiletheoriginalcomponentdesignspecificationrequiredaliftinglever,theCoderequirementforliftleversonClass2valveshasbeeneliminated.Thepurchaserofthesafetyvalves,C-Eagreesthattheseliftleverscanberemoved.Theoriginalvalve"designutilizedtheliftingleverassemblytosealthevalvecapandpreventunauthorized'adjustmentsofthevalve'ssetpressure.CapsealingisrequiredbytheCode.Inordertomaintainthisrequirement,newvalvecapswithanintegralsealingdevicearerequired.3.0OperationRemovaloftheliftleversoperationoftheMSSV's.'IheMSSV'ssecondarysideoverpressureevents.manuallyexercisethevalve,thecapliftleversreinstalled.willnotimpacttheintendedwillstillbecapableofrelievingHowever,iftheneedarisestowillhavetoberemovedandtheSAFETYANALYSIS&%-WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceorthecoymequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThismodificationaDowsfor.theremovaloftheMSSVliftleversandreplacestluteexistingvalvecapswithonesthatwillenableproperCoderequiredsealingofthevalveadjustingbolts.Thismodificationwillnotin.anywayimpactorjeopardizetheintendedoperationoftheMSSV'sortheirabilitytoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerator.
'TYANALYSISpithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,proposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences
PCM174-184TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR(excessiveheatremovalfromthesteamgeneratorcausedbyastuckopensafetyvalve)willbesignificantlyreducedbyremovingtheliftlever.components.AlsotheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisalsoreducedbythismodification.NoothertypeofaccidentormalfunctionnotpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARiscreated.Inaddition,itdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecifications.AchangetoplantTech.Specs.isnotrequired.'Iheforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischange'doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.  
'ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foraniccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.TheExcoreNeutronMonitoring SystemisaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemdesignedtomeettherequirements of)OCFR50AppendixRbyproviding independent sourcerangeandwiderangeneutronfluxmonitoring intheControlRoomandHSP.Italsosatisfies theguidelines ofRegulatory Guide1.97Rev3forcategory1variables.
Thesecomponents areseismically andenvironmentally qualified totherequirements ofIEEE323-1974and344-1975.
Theinsideandoutsidecontainment cableisqualified toIEEE'-383-1974.
Thereplacement detectoranditsintegralcableassembly, ofthefaileddetector, isalsoqualified toIEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1975 andIEEE383-1974, howeveritsqualified lifeis10yearsnormaloperation plusDesignBasisAccident, therefore thisreplacement detectorisconsidered onlyatemporary replacement.
PCM228-184TheExcoreNeutronMonitoring Systemisapost-accident monitoring systemthatprovidesaneutronsourcerangemonitoring signalwhichisredundant totheexistingnon-postaccidentqualified excoreneutrondetectorsystem.Theinstallation oftheExcoreNeutronMonitoring Systemdoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence of;anaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated sincethesystemperformsonlymonitoring functions, itisseismically andenvironmentally qualified; anditisnotinterlocked withanysafeguards system.Itdoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously sinceitisanindependent/redundant systemdesignedtomeettherequirements ofRegulatory Guidel.75.Theinstrumentation addedtotheexistingboards(RTGB-104, PACBandESP)hasbeenevaluated byEbascoanddoesnothaveanysignificant impactonthepreviousseismicqualification oftheboards.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthetechnical specifications isnotreduced.Infacttheadditional sourcerangeinstrumentation addedintheControlRoomwillpermitcontinuity inrefueling operations intheeventoffailureoftheexistingexcoredetectors bysatisfying therequirements ofTechnical Specification 3.49.2.Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafety'valuation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPC/M-PCM252-184INTRODUCTION TRAVELING WATERSCREENUPGRADERecentexperiences ofexcessive jellyfish runshavecauseddamagecotheintaketraveling waterscreens.,
ThisPCMreplacestheexistingtraveling waterscreenframesandbasketswithnew,highstrength, braced,sectionsthatwillincreasethestrengthofthescreenstoadifferential pressureheadcapacityof15feet.Inaddition, thereplacement basketswillbefurnished withintermediate andlowerliftinglipshavingserratededgestoimpaledebriswhichmayslipoucofthebasketsontheirupwardtravel.Asaresultofthesechanges,thescreenswillhaveanimprovedM>anceofsurviving afutureinfluxofjellyfish.
Theheadsections, footshaft assemblies andcarryingchainshavealsobeenreplacedwithupgradedcomponents tofurtherextendtheusefullifeofthescreens.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbeaeemedtoinvolveanunrevieweu safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobabilicy ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important cosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction o:adifferenctypethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysiReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety-asdefinedi:.thebasisforanytechrical specification isreduced.'ThisPCi".providesthedetailsformodificationslimprovemencs tocheexistingintaketraveling waterscreens.Thescreensarefabricate-'nd designedbyEnvirexIncorporated inaccordance witnEbas-cSpecification FLO8770.760, whichrequiresthatthescreenbenon-seismic andnon-safety related.ThisPCMincreases thescreng.nofthescreenstoadifferential pressureheadcapacityof15feet.Thestrengthening ofthescreensdoesnotaltertheconditions towhichtheymaybesubjected butwillreducethedamagetothescreensintheeventofanexcessive differential pressurecondition.
Thenewloadsimposedontheexistingembeddedguideslotsasaresultofthescreenredesignhavebeenreviewedandareacceptable.
Eachtraveling screenispresently furnished withapneumatic differential waterlevelcontroller forautomatic operation.
Initially, thescreenwashpumpandrotationofthescreer.willautomatically startwhenaspecified differential pressureheadlossisreached.Whenthedifferential pressureincreases beyond'his point,thecontrolroomisalertedviaanannunciator whichreceivesitsinputfromdifferential pressureindicator transmitters.
Tnemodifications issuedviathisPCMdonotalterinanywaytneoperation oftheexistingcontrolsystem.Modification issuecviachisPCMsubmergence 1eve1sfromtheIntakeCirculatingWater(CW)pu&#x17d;p.Incomipromise theoperation orsaeyofwi11notimpacttheminimu-..
CoolingWater(ICW)pumportneaddir,ion, thisPCMwillno:these-pumps.
PCM252-184Therefore, theimplementation probability orconsequences ofdoesitcreateanynewtvpesofdoesnotinvolveacnangeSpecifications.
ofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheanyaccidentpreviously evaluated noraccidents.
lmplementatior.
ofthisPD:totneStLucieUnit1Technics1Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvclveanunreviewed safetvquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimpi.ementation of'hisPCH.
PCM015-185DIESELGENERATOR AIRSTARTSYSTEMPIPINGMODIPICATION PC/MSCONCESystemDescription Ea'chdieselgenerator (D/G)setatSt.LucieUnit//1hasanindependent airstartingsystem.Eachsystemhasfourskidmountedairreceivers whichprovidesufficient airchargefortenstartsperdieselgenerator set.Theairreceivers arepressurized byanelectrically drivencompressor viaanairdryer.Adieseldrivenaircompressor isusedasabackuptotheelectricdriven"compressor.
Thechargingairflowstothenumber3and0airreceivers inparallelandthentothenumber1and2"airreceivers throughtheoutletairheader.DesignDescription Theairreceiverchargingconfiguration willbemodifiedbyinstalling abranchofftheairdryeroutletpipingtothenumber1and2airreceivers (1Al,1A2,IB1and1B2).Thenewlinewillenablethecompressors tochargethenumber1and2airreceivers inparallelwiththenumber3and0airreceivers.
Theexistingdieseldrivenaircompressor discharge checkvalves(V-17355A) willberelocated tobeinthenewchargingline.Newcheckvalveswillbeinstalled atthedischarge ofalltheaircompressors.
Aflexibleconnector willbeinstalled inthecharginglinetoalltheairreceivers inordertolimittheboundaryoftheseismicstressanalysis.
Drawings3PE-15-185.001,.002,.003and.000showthebeforeandafterD/Gairstartschematics.
SAFETYANALYSISTheproposedchangeisolatesthetwoairreceiversets(andassociated airstartmotorsets)perD/Genginebymodifying theinletairheadersandclosingtheoutletairheadercross-connect valve.Themodificationprovidesfurtherseparation andredundancy thanrequiredbytheSt.LucieUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).Eachemergency dieselenginestartingsystemmustbeindependent andphysically separated fromothersystemsservingtheredundant dieselgenerator, suchthatasinglefailureinanyoneofthesystemswillaffectonlytheassociated dieselgenerator.
Thismodification willmakeeachD/Gengineairstartmotorsetsindependent andphysically separated.
Therefore, afailureassociated withoneofthetwoairreceiversetsperD/GenginewillnotdisabletheairstartsystemforthethatD/Gengine.Thisredundancy isaboveandbeyondwhatisrequiredbytheFSAR,Reg.GuidesorGeneralDesignCriteriaforSt.LucieUnit5/1.Themodification doesnotinvolveanUnreviewed SafetyQuestionbecause:1)Theprobabilityofoccurrence ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisdecreased b'ecausetheairstartmotorsetsandassociated airreceivers andpipingareindependent andseparated.
~t PCM015-185Theconsequence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisdecreased becauseasingleequipment malfunction willnotdisablebothairstartmotorsetsonaD/Gengine.3)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethatanypreciously evaluated intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausetheairstartsystemoperatesfunctionally thesameasbeforewithoutintedependence betweenairmotorsets.0)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnical Specification isincreased, notreduced,becausegreater'reliability tostartbothD/G'sisprovided.
ThisPC/Misclassified asaNuclearSafetyRelatedchangebecausetheairreceiverinletheadersuptothecheckvalvearerequiredtowithstand alldesignbasisevents,toprecludeanairreceiversetfromlosingsufficient airpressurefortencoldstartsofaDieselGenerator.
ThepipingupstreamoftheairreceiverinletheadercheckvalveisnotNuclearSafetyRelatedbecausetheabilitytochargetheairreceivers duringorafteradesignbasiseventisnotrequiredpertheFSAR.Thespecificpipeswhichareattachedtothenewsupportsarenon-safety related.Assuch,thesesupportsareclassified non-safety related,QA/QCrequired.
Thepipesupportshavebeen-seismically designedsothattheywillnotinteractwithnearbysafetyrelatedequipment orpipingintheeventofanearthquake.
PCM022-185INSTRUMENT AIRUPGRADETIE-INSSYSTEMDESCRIPTION t.0~Oeratinn TheInstrument Air(IA)tie-insprovidedbythismodification willhaveisolation valveswhichshouldremainclosedatalltimesuntilthebalanceoftheinstrument airmodification isimplemented.
Thesevalvesshouldbeincludedinthevalvealignment tableinOperating Procedure 1-1010020.


PCM187-184SUMMARYSTATEMENT~Summar.EDGCPDRELAXREPLACEMENTThisPC/Mprovidesthe.designforreplacementoftheexistingemergencydieselgeneratorCFDcurrentdifferentialrelays.~fThisPC/MimprovesthefragilityleveloftheD/Gdifferentialcircuitbyreducingtheprobabilityofrelaytripduetomechanicalvibration.Thismodificationisaccomplishedsolelybyreplacingtheexistingdifferentialrelaysandcases,whileimplementingnointernalorexternalwiringchangesinthedieselgeneratorcontrolpanel.Thisthenprecludesanynewtypeofinteractionwkhothersafetyrelatedequipment.Therefore,thisPC/Misnuclearsafetyrelatedbutdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYANALYSSThisPC/Mimprovesthevibrationalfragilityofthedieselgeneratordifferentialrelaycircuit.ThisisaccomplishedbyreplacingtheexistingCFDdifferentialrelayswithIJDdifferentialrelays.Thismakesthecircuitlesssusceptibletospurioustripscausedbycontrolpanelvibration.Thismodificationdoesnotadverselyaffectthenormaloperationofthedieselgeneratordifferentialcircuitoroperationofthedieselgenerator.ThereplacementdifferentialrelayshavebeenseismicallytestedbythevendorasstatedintheGeneralElectricMIL.NO.82-12.Theseismicresponsespectrum(TRS)for=theinstrumentenvelopestheSt.LucieUnit102EnvelopeResponseSpectrumfortheDieselGeneratorBuilding(RRS)formasspoint53(elev.23.0')whichcorrespondstotheinstrumentlocation.Adampingfactorof5%wasusedintheTRSinaccordancewithIEEEStd-344-1975.Consequently,a4%dampingfactorwasconservativelyusedintheRRSforcomparisonofaccelerationvalues.TheaccelerationvaluesrequiredbytheRRSareaminimumof2.8timeslessatallfrequenciesthanthoseoftheTRSinthenonmperatemode,and4.9timeslessfortheoperatemode.Thiswillsufficientlyaccountforanyaccelerationamplificationthroughtherelaycabinet.Inaddition,thesize,weight,.mountinglocationandmountingdetailsofthereplacementrelayswillbethesameasthatoftheoriginalrelays.Therefore,theoriginalrelaysupportandcabinetdesigncriteriawillnotbeadverselyaffected.Thismodificationdoesnotaffectanycabletrayanalysis,Appendix"R"analysisoranyothersafety,relatedequipmentasitonlyinvolvesreplacementofrelaysonthedieselgeneratorcontrolpaneLWithrespecttotheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:ThePC/MsimplyinvolvesreplacingtheCFDdifferentialrelaysandcases,Whichmeansonlyaslight'changeofinternalrelaycontactswithoutchangingtherelays'unctionorexternalwiring.ThisPC/Mdoesnotaffecttheoperationoftheemergencydieselgeneratoras.discussed'nFSAR8.0.,nordoesitadverselyaffecttheoperationoftheD/GoranyothersafetyrelatedequipmentThedesignbasisintheFSAR(Chapters8and15).whichaddressestheoperationoftheD/G,isaneventinvolvingthelossmfmffsitepower.TheevaluationofthisdesignbasisisnotaffectedbythisPC/M.
==2.0 FunctionThismodification==
PCM187-184WithrespecttothepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSAR:ThisPC/Mjustinvolvesreplacingtheexistingdieselgeneratordifferentialrelayswithanothermodeltoimprovethevibrationalfragilityofthedifferentialcircuitandtherefore,doesnotcreatethepossibilityoftheabove.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforaTechnicalSpecification:AsthisPC/M'doesnotnotadverselyaffectoperationoftheemergency,diesel'generator,itdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheDieselGeneratorTechnicalSpecification4.8.AdditionallythisPC/MdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationasitonlyinvolveschangesinthedieselgeneratorcontrolpanel.ThereforeitcanbeconcludedthatthisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.
functions toprovidealloutagerelatedtie-instotheIASystemsothatinstallation ofnewcompressors anddryerscanbecompleted duringplantoperations.
PCM227-984TURBINEGANTRYCRANEPROXIMITYRESTRICTIONSINTRODUCTIONThisPCMprovidesrestrictionsontheproximityoftheUnits1and2tur-binegantrycranestoeachotherinordertopreventpotentialoverstress-ingoftheturbinebuildingstructure.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyques-tion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanacci-dentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluated.pre-viouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreat@8;or(iii)ifthemar-ginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theturbinebuildingisanon-CategoryIstructureandcontainsnosafetyrelatedequipment.ThisPCMimposesarestrictionoftheproximityoftheturbinebuildinggantrycranetoeachother.Thisrestrictionassuresthattheassumptionsusedinthebuildingdesignremainvalid.Ther'eforetheimplementationofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Implementationofthis-PCMdoesnotinvolveachangetotheStLucieUnit2TechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevalua-tionwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveany'nre-viewedsafetyquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequir-edfortheimplement'ationofthisPCM.
Notethatelectrical tie-inscanbeinstalled duringanyplantoperating mode.3.0DesinDescritionThismodification providestie-insforcoolingwatertothenewcompressors.
PCM228-184EXCORENEUTRON-FLUXMONITORINGSYSTEMINTRODUCTIONPC/M228-184providesthemethodtoinstalltheEx-CoreNeutronFluxMonitoringSystemthatmonitorswideandsourcerangesneutronfluxwithindependentdisplaysintheControlRooma'ndHotShutdownPanel(HSP).=ThissystemmeetstheFPSLcommitmenttotheNRCbyprovidingwiderangeneutronfluxmonitoringinthehotshutdownpanelwhichisindependentoftheControlRoomandrequiredby18CFR50AppendixR.ItalsosatisfiestheguidelinesofRegulatoryGuide1.97Rev.3byprovidinganeutronmonitoringsystemtomeetthedefinitionandrequirementsforcategary1variablesasindicatedintheRegulatoryGuide.Inadditionthissystempermitsthecontinuityofrefuelingactivitiesintheeventofafailureoftheexistingstart-upexcoredetectorsduringrefueling.TechnicalSpecifications3/4.9.3RefuelingOperations,requiresthesuspensionofoperationsinvolvingcorealterationsorpositivereactivitychangesifatleasttwostart~pdetectorsarenotoperational.AsaresultofamalfunctionofoneofthetwofissionchambersintheNeutronDetectorAssemblyChannelSB,duringthesystemcommissioning,itisneces'sarytoreplacethemalfunctioningdetector.Thereplacementdetectorissimilartotheonereplacedexceptthatitisenvironmentallyqualifiedfor10yearlifeplusDesignBasisAccident.'TYANALYSISpithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,proposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequences'ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforaniccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheExcoreNeutronMonitoringSystemisaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemdesignedtomeettherequirementsof)OCFR50AppendixRbyprovidingindependentsourcerangeandwiderangeneutronfluxmonitoringintheControlRoomandHSP.ItalsosatisfiestheguidelinesofRegulatoryGuide1.97Rev3forcategory1variables.ThesecomponentsareseismicallyandenvironmentallyqualifiedtotherequirementsofIEEE323-1974and344-1975.TheinsideandoutsidecontainmentcableisqualifiedtoIEEE'-383-1974.Thereplacementdetectoranditsintegralcableassembly,ofthefaileddetector,isalsoqualifiedtoIEEE-323-1974,IEEE-344-1975andIEEE383-1974,howeveritsqualifiedlifeis10yearsnormaloperationplusDesignBasisAccident,thereforethisreplacementdetectorisconsideredonlyatemporaryreplacement.
ThecoolingwaterwillbefromthelocalTurbineCoolingWater(TCW)Systemsupplyandreturnheaders.Themodification alsoprovidestie-instotheIASystemjustupstreamoftheexistingairreceiver.
PCM228-184TheExcoreNeutronMonitoringSystemisapost-accidentmonitoringsystemthatprovidesaneutronsourcerangemonitoringsignalwhichisredundanttotheexistingnon-postaccidentqualifiedexcoreneutrondetectorsystem.TheinstallationoftheExcoreNeutronMonitoringSystemdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceof;anaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedsincethesystemperformsonlymonitoringfunctions,itisseismicallyandenvironmentallyqualified;anditisnotinterlockedwithanysafeguardssystem.Itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslysinceitisanindependent/redundantsystemdesignedtomeettherequirementsofRegulatoryGuidel.75.Theinstrumentationaddedtotheexistingboards(RTGB-104,PACBandESP)hasbeenevaluatedbyEbascoanddoesnothaveanysignificantimpactonthepreviousseismicqualificationoftheboards.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthetechnicalspecificationsisnotreduced.InfacttheadditionalsourcerangeinstrumentationaddedintheControlRoomwillpermitcontinuityinrefuelingoperationsintheeventoffailureoftheexistingexcoredetectorsbysatisfyingtherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.49.2.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafety'valuationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPC/M-PCM252-184INTRODUCTIONTRAVELINGWATERSCREENUPGRADERecentexperiencesofexcessivejellyfishrunshavecauseddamagecotheintaketravelingwaterscreens.,ThisPCMreplacestheexistingtravelingwaterscreenframesandbasketswithnew,highstrength,braced,sectionsthatwillincreasethestrengthofthescreenstoadifferentialpressureheadcapacityof15feet.Inaddition,thereplacementbasketswillbefurnishedwithintermediateandlowerliftinglipshavingserratededgestoimpaledebriswhichmayslipoucofthebasketsontheirupwardtravel.Asaresultofthesechanges,thescreenswillhaveanimprovedM>anceofsurvivingafutureinfluxofjellyfish.Theheadsections,footshaftassembliesandcarryingchainshavealsobeenreplacedwithupgradedcomponentstofurtherextendtheusefullifeofthescreens.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbeaeemedtoinvolveanunrevieweusafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilicyofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportantcosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctiono:adifferenctypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysiReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety-asdefinedi:.thebasisforanytechricalspecificationisreduced.'ThisPCi".providesthedetailsformodificationslimprovemencstocheexistingintaketravelingwaterscreens.Thescreensarefabricate-'nddesignedbyEnvirexIncorporatedinaccordancewitnEbas-cSpecificationFLO8770.760,whichrequiresthatthescreenbenon-seismicandnon-safetyrelated.ThisPCMincreasesthescreng.nofthescreenstoadifferentialpressureheadcapacityof15feet.Thestrengtheningofthescreensdoesnotaltertheconditionstowhichtheymaybesubjectedbutwillreducethedamagetothescreensintheeventofanexcessivedifferentialpressurecondition.Thenewloadsimposedontheexistingembeddedguideslotsasaresultofthescreenredesignhavebeenreviewedandareacceptable.Eachtravelingscreenispresentlyfurnishedwithapneumaticdifferentialwaterlevelcontrollerforautomaticoperation.Initially,thescreenwashpumpandrotationofthescreer.willautomaticallystartwhenaspecifieddifferentialpressureheadlossisreached.Whenthedifferentialpressureincreasesbeyond'hispoint,thecontrolroomisalertedviaanannunciatorwhichreceivesitsinputfromdifferentialpressureindicatortransmitters.TnemodificationsissuedviathisPCMdonotalterinanywaytneoperationoftheexistingcontrolsystem.ModificationissuecviachisPCMsubmergence1eve1sfromtheIntakeCirculatingWater(CW)pu&#x17d;p.Incomipromisetheoperationorsaeyofwi11notimpacttheminimu-..CoolingWater(ICW)pumportneaddir,ion,thisPCMwillno:these-pumps.
Eachtie-inwillconsistofanisolation valve,piping,pipecapandthenecessary materials to.tieintotheexistingpiping.SAFETYEVALUATION le0Thismodification isnon-seismic, non-safety relatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:1.2TheTCWandIASystemsperformnosafetyfunctionandareclassified asnon-safety, non-seismic QualityGroupD.Thesemodifications donotinteractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.
PCM252-184Therefore,theimplementationprobabilityorconsequencesofdoesitcreateanynewtvpesofdoesnotinvolveacnangeSpecifications.ofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatednoraccidents.lmplementatior.ofthisPD:totneStLucieUnit1Technics1Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvclveanunreviewedsafetvquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimpi.ementationof'hisPCH.
le3Nosafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents arecompromised
PCM015-185DIESELGENERATORAIRSTARTSYSTEMPIPINGMODIPICATIONPC/MSCONCESystemDescriptionEa'chdieselgenerator(D/G)setatSt.LucieUnit//1hasanindependentairstartingsystem.Eachsystemhasfourskidmountedairreceiverswhichprovidesufficientairchargefortenstartsperdieselgeneratorset.Theairreceiversarepressurizedbyanelectricallydrivencompressorviaanairdryer.Adieseldrivenaircompressorisusedasabackuptotheelectricdriven"compressor.Thechargingairflowstothenumber3and0airreceiversinparallelandthentothenumber1and2"airreceiversthroughtheoutletairheader.DesignDescriptionTheairreceiverchargingconfigurationwillbemodifiedbyinstallingabranchofftheairdryeroutletpipingtothenumber1and2airreceivers(1Al,1A2,IB1and1B2).Thenewlinewillenablethecompressorstochargethenumber1and2airreceiversinparallelwiththenumber3and0airreceivers.Theexistingdieseldrivenaircompressordischargecheckvalves(V-17355A)willberelocatedtobeinthenewchargingline.Newcheckvalveswillbeinstalledatthedischargeofalltheaircompressors.Aflexibleconnectorwillbeinstalledinthecharginglinetoalltheairreceiversinordertolimittheboundaryoftheseismicstressanalysis.Drawings3PE-15-185.001,.002,.003and.000showthebeforeandafterD/Gairstartschematics.SAFETYANALYSISTheproposedchangeisolatesthetwoairreceiversets(andassociatedairstartmotorsets)perD/Genginebymodifyingtheinletairheadersandclosingtheoutletairheadercross-connectvalve.ThemodificationprovidesfurtherseparationandredundancythanrequiredbytheSt.LucieUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).Eachemergencydieselenginestartingsystemmustbeindependentandphysicallyseparatedfromothersystemsservingtheredundantdieselgenerator,suchthatasinglefailureinanyoneofthesystemswillaffectonlytheassociateddieselgenerator.ThismodificationwillmakeeachD/Gengineairstartmotorsetsindependentandphysicallyseparated.Therefore,afailureassociatedwithoneofthetwoairreceiversetsperD/GenginewillnotdisabletheairstartsystemforthethatD/Gengine.ThisredundancyisaboveandbeyondwhatisrequiredbytheFSAR,Reg.GuidesorGeneralDesignCriteriaforSt.LucieUnit5/1.ThemodificationdoesnotinvolveanUnreviewedSafetyQuestionbecause:1)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisdecreasedb'ecausetheairstartmotorsetsandassociatedairreceiversandpipingareindependentandseparated.~t PCM015-185TheconsequenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisdecreasedbecauseasingleequipmentmalfunctionwillnotdisablebothairstartmotorsetsonaD/Gengine.3)ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethatanypreciouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotcreatedbecausetheairstartsystemoperatesfunctionallythesameasbeforewithoutintedependencebetweenairmotorsets.0)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnicalSpecificationisincreased,notreduced,becausegreater'reliabilitytostartbothD/G'sisprovided.ThisPC/MisclassifiedasaNuclearSafetyRelatedchangebecausetheairreceiverinletheadersuptothecheckvalvearerequiredtowithstandalldesignbasisevents,toprecludeanairreceiversetfromlosingsufficientairpressurefortencoldstartsofaDieselGenerator.ThepipingupstreamoftheairreceiverinletheadercheckvalveisnotNuclearSafetyRelatedbecausetheabilitytochargetheairreceiversduringorafteradesignbasiseventisnotrequiredpertheFSAR.Thespecificpipeswhichareattachedtothenewsupportsarenon-safetyrelated.Assuch,thesesupportsareclassifiednon-safetyrelated,QA/QCrequired.Thepipesupportshavebeen-seismicallydesignedsothattheywillnotinteractwithnearbysafetyrelatedequipmentorpipingintheeventofanearthquake.
.byanyassumedfailureofanyexistingornewequipment orcomponents.
PCM022-185INSTRUMENTAIRUPGRADETIE-INSSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONt.0~OeratinnTheInstrumentAir(IA)tie-insprovidedbythismodificationwillhaveisolationvalveswhichshouldremainclosedatalltimesuntilthebalanceoftheinstrumentairmodificationisimplemented.ThesevalvesshouldbeincludedinthevalvealignmenttableinOperatingProcedure1-1010020.2.0FunctionThismodificationfunctionstoprovidealloutagerelatedtie-instotheIASystemsothatinstallationofnewcompressorsanddryerscanbecompletedduringplantoperations.Notethatelectricaltie-inscanbeinstalledduringanyplantoperatingmode.3.0DesinDescritionThismodificationprovidestie-insforcoolingwatertothenewcompressors.ThecoolingwaterwillbefromthelocalTurbineCoolingWater(TCW)Systemsupplyandreturnheaders.Themodificationalsoprovidestie-instotheIASystemjustupstreamoftheexistingairreceiver.Eachtie-inwillconsistofanisolationvalve,piping,pipecapandthenecessarymaterialsto.tieintotheexistingpiping.SAFETYEVALUATIONle0Thismodificationisnon-seismic,non-safetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:1.2TheTCWandIASystemsperformnosafetyfunctionandareclassifiedasnon-safety,non-seismicQualityGroupD.Thesemodificationsdonotinteractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.le3Nosafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponentsarecompromised.byanyassumedfailureofanyexistingornewequipmentorcomponents.IANoTechnicalSpecificationsarealteredora'dverselyaffected.2.0Carehasbeentakeninthedesignto'eliminateorcontrolaspectswhichcouldbehazardoustoequipmentand/orpersonnel.
IANoTechnical Specifications arealteredora'dversely affected.
PCM024-,185ELECTRICPENETRATIONASSEMBLIES'NSTALLATIONABSTRACTThisengineeringpackagecoversreplacementofcertainEgectricPenetrationAssemblies(EPAs)attheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1.Thesemodificationsconsistof:l.RemovaloffiveexistingEPAsmanufacturedbyGulfGeneralAtomicCompany,EPADesignationNosC8,Dl,D2,D3andD9.TheseEPAsareusedforlowvoltagepowerandcontrolcircuits.2.InstallationofsixnewEPAsmanufacturedbyConaxBuffaloCorporation.TnesenewEPAswillbeinstalledinthecontainmentnozzlesitemizedaboveandsparecontainmentnozzleC9.3.RecircuitingofallcircuitspresentlyconnectedtoNo4,No8andNo12AWGmodulesassociatedwithalltheGulfGeneralAtomicCompanyEPAsinstalledatUnitNo1.InadditiontothefiveremovedEPAs,tnismodificationaffectsnineotherexisting'ulfGeneralAtomicEPAs,totallingapproximately400-circuits.The'ffectedcircuitshavebeenprovidedinAttachments4and5.TheEPAsareclassifiedasSafetyClass2(gualityGroupB),Class1E,seismicCategoryIcomponentsandperformasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,.thisPC/Misconsiderednuclearsafetyrelated.TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.The,modificationsdonotinvolve-anunreviewedsafetyquestionandprior'ommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction.ofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequences.ofanaccidentormalfunctionisnotincreasedsince:EPAsarebeingsuppliedbyConaxBuffaloCorporation,whohassuppliedpreviouslyfiveEPAsinstalledintheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1,aswellasalltheEPAsforUnitNo2.TheseEPAshavebeenenvironmentallyandseismicallyqualifiedin,accordancewithIEEE317-1976forapplicationinbothStLuciePlants.Tnedesign,fabrication,test,inspection,installation,and~~qualificationoftheEPAsareinaccordancewithIEEE317-1976andtheASIDEBGPVCode,SectionIII,SubsectionNEfarClassMCComponents.AsdiscussedintheDesignAnalysis,allratingsassociatedwiththenewequipmentmeetorexceedtherequirementsfortheapplication.
2.0Carehasbeentakeninthedesignto'eliminate orcontrolaspectswhichcouldbehazardous toequipment and/orpersonnel.
PCM024-185NewwirewayismanufacturedbyHoffman,vendoroftheexistingEPAwirewaysystem.Wirewayins"allationhasbeenanalyzedassuitablefortheapplicationasdiscussedintheDesignAnalysis.AllnewcablesarequalifiedtotheflametestrequirementsofIEEE3S3-1974'and,exceptforafewCEDMcircuitjumpers,aresuitableforClass1Euse,asistheRaychemsplicematerial.AsdiscussedintheDesignAnalysis,theCEDMjumpercableissuitableforuseundertheStLuciePlantnormalconditionsandisde-energizedimmediatelyuponreactortrip.SpecialconsiderationoftheCEDMcircuitconductorsisconsistentwiththepresentStLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR(ReferenceSection3.11.5.4).The.possibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyanalyzedisnotcreatedsince:ThenewEPAsarequalifiedtotherequiredenvironmentandwillbeabletoperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionpostDBA.TheonlymodificationtoplantcomponentsisrecircuitingtothenewEPAs.Thecomponentsbeingthusmodifiedhavebeenreviewedtoassurethattheirremovalfromserviceforrecircuiting-~esnotviolatetechnicalspecificationsnorimpactrequiredplantsystems.Containmentvesselstructuralintegrityisunaffectedbythismodification,asdiscussedintheDesignAna1ysis.AftertheinstallationoftheEPAs,theoverallcontainmentboundary.integritywillbeverifiedviaa10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeAleakratetest.'Inaddition,alocalTypeBleaktestwillbeperformedoneachEPAtoverifytheintegrityoftheelectricfeedthroughseals.Configurationoftheinterfacebetweentheexistingplantcableandthenewequipmentisconsistentwiththedesignbasesestablishedinthe.StLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR.Tnisinsuresthattheconsequencesofallanalyzedaccidentsremainunchanged.Also,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionsareintroducedbythismodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsinceSpecialInstructionshavebeenprovidedinSection9.0sotheimplementationofthismodificationdoesnotviolatetheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1TechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,theimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'plant'sTechnicalSpecifications.AholdpointhasbeenestablishedforthereworkofEPAC3conduitsandtheterminationlocationsintheRCBverticalterminationboxes.ThisholdpointwillberemoveduponaccesstotheRCBandfield'erificationoftheexistinginstallation.Pendingthereleaseoftnehold,arevisedsafetyevaluationwillbeprovided.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewritte"safetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesno"involveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM024-,185ELECTRICPENETRATION ASSEMBLIES'NSTALLATION ABSTRACTThisengineering packagecoversreplacement ofcertainEgectricPenetration Assemblies (EPAs)attheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1.Thesemodifications consistof:l.RemovaloffiveexistingEPAsmanufactured byGulfGeneralAtomicCompany,EPADesignation NosC8,Dl,D2,D3andD9.TheseEPAsareusedforlowvoltagepowerandcontrolcircuits.
PCM039-185DIESELGENERATORSUBSYSTEMFLOWDIAGRAMSModificationDescriptionAllvalvesandinstrumentsmustbetaggedinthefieldasperthenewflowdiagrams.L2.)AffectedoperatingproceduresmustbereviewedtodetermineifrevisionisrequiredtoreQectth~ewtagnumbersorQowdiagramnumbers.IIIla.WithrespecttotheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedinthePSAR:ThisPC/MreleasesthenewDieselGeneratorSubsystemFlowDiagramstothesiteThefoll'owingactivitiesmustbecompletedbeforethenewfiowdiagramscanbeissuedaspermanentplantdrawings:FlowdiagramsarenotconsideredinevaluatingFSARaccidents.lb.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:FlowdiagramsarenotconsideredinevaluatingFSARaccidents.1c.Withrespecttotheprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportant-tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinFSAR:Flowdiagramsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.1d.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttonuclearsafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Plowdiagramsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.2a.WithrespecttothepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR'-FlowdiagramsarenotconsideredinevaluatingFSARaccidents.2b.WithrespecttothepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR-'lowdiagramsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.3..Withrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytchnicalspecification:Flowdiagramsdonotimpacttechnicalspecificationsafetymargins.Basedonthe'above,thenewQowdiagramsandthetagging/retaggingofdieselgeneratorvalvesandinstrumentsaredetermineQnottoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Therearenosystemmodificationsinvolved.
2.Installation ofsixnewEPAsmanufactured byConaxBuffaloCorporation.
PCM047-185G.E.SAMRELAYSP.C.CARDREPLACEMENTIntroductionTheGeneralElectrictype.Sam11ButilizedatSt.LuciePlantare~operatedtimingrelaysthatemploysolidwtatecomponentstoprovideanextremelystabletimedehyfunction.Thisrelayfindsapplication,wherevershort9.C.operatedtimingfunctionsarerequired.SpecificallythisrelayisusedforcircuitbreakerfaQureback~protectionschemeswhereaccurateandrepeatabletimesettingsare.essentiaLIthasbeendeterminedthatitispossibleforthistyperelaytooperateinlessthanthesettimedelayiftheinitiatingcontactexperiencesaveryspecificmodeofcontactbounce.Theforeshortenedoperatingtimehasbeenobservedbyotherusersandhasbeendemonstratedinthefactoryundercarefullycontrolledtestconditions.Althoughtheactualoccurrenceofthisparticularmodeofinitiatingcontactbounceappearstoberatherunlikely,aminordesignchangeinternaltotherelayhasbeenrecommendedbythemanufacturer.ItistheintentofthisPC/Mtoincorporatethedesigncha~ewhichreplacestheexistingprintedcircuitboardintherelaytoeliminatethepossibilityofsuchforeshortenedtimingbytheSAMrelay..ThismodificationhasbeenreviewedwithrespecttoTitle'10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,whichstatesthataproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed'safetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevahiatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis.foranytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationbeingperformedunderthisPC/MwillenhancetheoperationoftheG.FSam1IBrelayassuringthatiftheunlikelyeventofaninitiatingcontactbounceoccurred,therelaywilltimeoutappropriately.TheG.ESam11Brelayaffectedareutilizedforcircuitbreakerfaourebackupprotectionschemesandarenotinanysafetyrelatedcircuitorperformedasafetyrelatedfunction.EnvironmentalqualificationisjustifiedbythefactthattheserelaysandthustheirinternalPCcards'arelocatedinamildenvironment.Thereisnoseismicconcernsaffectedbythismodification,therelays.havenoseismicrequirementsassociatedwiththem.Therefoie,theprobabilityofapreviouslyreviewedaccidentisnotincreased,thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypehasnotbeencreatedandthemarginofsafetyhasnotbeenreduced.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'pla'nt'echnicalspecification.'Iheforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevahationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,therefore,priorCommissionapprovalforimplementationofthisPC/Misnotnecessary.
TnesenewEPAswillbeinstalled inthecontainment nozzlesitemizedaboveandsparecontainment nozzleC9.3.Recircuiting ofallcircuitspresently connected toNo4,No8andNo12AWGmodulesassociated withalltheGulfGeneralAtomicCompanyEPAsinstalled atUnitNo1.InadditiontothefiveremovedEPAs,tnismodification affectsnineotherexisting'ulf GeneralAtomicEPAs,totalling approximately 400-circuits.
PCM064-185MSRRETUBINGThisEngineeringPackagecoversthemodificationstotheMoistureSeparator'eheaters(MSRs)andtotheScavengingSteamVentCondenser(SSVC)System.Th'ema)orfeatureofthispackageisBieinstallationofnewtubebundlesintheMSRswhichwillprovideimprovedthermalperformanceoftheplantsecondaryside.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedagainsttherequirementsoflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,theseMSRandSSVCmodificationsareclass1fiedasnon-safetyrelated,donotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquest1on,andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressedinSection3,"SafetyEvaluation").However,theMSROperatingProceduremustberevisedpriortoplant.startup.SAFETYEVALUATIONMithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposed.changeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant'tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionefadifferenttypethananyevaluatedprev1ously1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)1fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunrevi,ewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ1pmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalys1sreportisnotincreased.TheMSRs,theportionofMainSteamassociatedwiththeMSRsandtheHeaterDrainSystempipingarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.0Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionof-adifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated..The.componentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.
The'ffectedcircuitshavebeenprovidedinAttachments 4and5.TheEPAsareclassified asSafetyClass2(gualityGroupB),Class1E,seismicCategoryIcomponents andperformasafetyrelatedfunction.
PCM064-185iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,'incethecomponentinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.Theimpl'ementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolve'nunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
Therefore,.
PCM073-185ABSTRACTMSRPERFORATEDPLATEMODIFICATIONThisEngineeringPackagecoversthemodificationstotheMoistureSeparatorReheaters(MSRs).Thispackageisfortheinstallationofperforated'lates1ntheMSRswhichwillprovidebettersteamflowdistribution.Thiswillimprovethermalperformanceoftheplantsecondarysideandreduceerosion/corrosionofthemoistureseparatorvanesandsupports.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedaga1nsttherequirementsoflOCFR50.59;Asaresult,thisMSRmodificationisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated,doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion,doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecification,andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressedinSection3,"SafetyEvaluation").However,theMSROperatingProceduremustberevisedpriortoplantstartupasindicatedinPCM064-185.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)1$apossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanany'valuatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanytechnicalspecification1sreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:1)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluated1nthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincetheMSRsarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshas'eenmadetothe~operationaldesignofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificat1onarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecificationTheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidethebasesthat.thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
thisPC/Misconsidered nuclearsafetyrelated.Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
PCM131-185REPLACEMENTOFRISDEVICESINTRODUCTIONThisPC/Misfortheinstallationoffourteen(14)newtransmittersbyRochesterInstrumentSystemsmodelSC-1302-323toreplaceexistingunits.Theexistingtransmittersarereachingtheirqualifiedlifeexpectancy.Therefore,anewre-placementunitisrequiredtosatisfythe'ifeexpectancyrequirement.SAFETYANALYSIS'VithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbe,deemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe'afetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibil'itvforanacci-dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalvsisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthom>>>>~nf~~<atv~~definedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Th'mod'icationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollow-ingprov'desthebasesforthisconclusion.~~~ThesenewtransmittersbyRISarequalifiedenvironmentallytoIEEE-323-1974a'ndseismicallytoIEEE-344-1975.ThisPC/Mreplacesex'tingRIStrans=ittesw'hnewunitsthussatisfy'gthelifeexpectancyrequirement.These'-'qualificationofthesedeviceshavebeenpreviouslyreviewedforthepart'u'armountinglocationandfoundacceptable.TheseismicintegrityoftheRTGB,PostAccidentPanel'AandRadiationMonitor'ngCabinet"E"arenotaffec:edsincethedeviceisareplacementforanexisting,identica'eviceatthesamelocation.'herefor--"'smod'ficationwillnotofanyaccident,whetherprevious'yevalua:edof'd''fere".evaluatedandwillnotreducethesafetyoftheplan:.t4aqsiei4ni~r~~CThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoenotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecificat'ons.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvdlveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
The,modifications donotinvolve-anunreviewed safetyquestionandprior'ommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM142-185APPENDIXRCONTROLROOMINDEPENDENCEFORALTERNATESHUTDOWNINTRODUCTIONSincetheseparationdefinedinAppendix"R"SectionIII.G.2cannotbeprovidedforessentialcomponentsandcircuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom,alternativeshutdowncapabilityisprovided.ThisensuresthatintheunlikelyeventafiremakestheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroomuninhabitableorrendersequipmentineitherroominoperable;-theplantcanbesafelysakentocoldshutdownfromremotelocationsandHotShutdownControlPanel(HSCP)ThisPC/Minstallsredundantfuses,.isolationswitchesandfuseblockstovariouscontrolcircuitsasidentifiedbythe"EssentialEquipmentListforAlternateShutdown"transmittedbyEbascoletterP-M-SL-85-0325datedFebruary28,1985.ThemodificationstothecontrolcircuitswillassuresafeshutdownfromtheHotShutdownPanelandotherlocalcontrolstationsshouldafiredisabletheessentialcircuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreadingroom.TheaddedcomponentsarelocatedoutsidetheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclusion.Thematerial,devicesassociatedwiththismodification,willbeClass1Ewhereconnectedto.safetygradeequipment.SafetygradedevicesshallconformtoIEEE-323-1974andIEEE-344-1975'hismodificationprovidesthemeansforanalternateplantshutdownbytheinstallationofadditionalswitchesandredundantfusestoisolatetheControlRoomintheunlikelyeventofafire.Thenewcableroutingisbeingdoneinaccordancew'ithStLucieUnitNo1ampacityandtrayfillcriteria.Thesafetyrelatedswitchgears,MCC,and'ieselGeneratorpanelhavebeenreviewedtoaccountfortheeffectoftheweightsoftheaddeddevices.Basedontheinsignificantaddedweight,weconcludethereisnoimpact.totheexistingequipmentseismicqualifications.Therefore,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofanaccident,whetherpreviouslyevaluatedorofadifferenttypethenpreviouslyevaluatedandwill~otreduce,thesafetyoftheplant.
SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction
PCM142-185ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical-specifications,nordoesitrequirearevisionof,atechnicalspecification.ThismodificationwillbeperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecificationTS-3.4.3andTS-3.4.4.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorcommission'approvalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
.ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences
PCM155-185REACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGPIPEASSEMBLYTHECLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGASSEMBLYCONSISTSOFTHREEMAJORASSEM-BLIESNAMELYr'(1)THELIFTINGFRAMEASSEMBLY>>(Z)THElINKASSEMBLYWHICHINCLUDESTHEBOXGIRDERASSEMBLYANDTHEPIPEASSEMBLYrAND(3)THEPLATFORMASSEMBLY>>THEPIPEASSEMBLY.IS"ATTACHEDTOTHETRAMRAILANDTHETRAMRAILISATTACHEDTOTHEHOISTWHICHISATTACHEDTOTHEPIPE'SSEMBLY+THEASSEMBLYROTATESVIATHETRAMRAILANDALLOWSTHETENSIONINGDEVICESTOBEINPOSITION>THEINTENTOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOUTILIZETHEPIPERINGOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYASANAXRDISTRIBUTIONHEADERFORTHEPNEUMATICTUGGERSFOMHESTUDTENSIONINGDEVICES'HISENTAILSTHEINSTAILATIONOFAZ'IAMETERAXRSUPPLYNOZZLEANDTHREE1'IAMETEROUTLETNOZZLESFORTHEPNEUMATICTUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES>>THISWILLELIMINATETHEUSEOFXNDIVXDUAlSUPPLYLINESTOTHETUGGERSANDWILLREDUCEPERSONNELRADI-ATIONEXPOSUREANDHIlLALSOPROVIDEEASEINRIGGINGANDREMOVALOFTHETUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES.OVERALL>>THISMODIFICATIONWILLEASEUPTHEENTIRESTUDTENSIONINGOPERATIONSSAFETYANALYSISWITHRFSPECTTOTITLEleOFTHFCODEOFFEDERALRfGULATION>>PART5859>>APROPOSEDCHANGESHALLBEDEEMEDTOINVOlVEANUNREVIEHEDSAFETYQUESTION>>(1)IFTHEPROBABILITYOFOGCURENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTXMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVI-OUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBEINCREASED>>OR(II)IFAPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBECREATED>>OR(III)IFTHEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATXONISREDUCEDTHEPROBABILITYORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOF.EQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANAL-YSISREPORTISNOTINCREASEDBECAUSETHEPIPERINGASSEMBLYTHATISBEINGMODIFIEDDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTIONANDDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFE%SHUTDOWNCAPABILXTYOFTHEUNIT>>THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTCREATEANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPCVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTBECAUSETHEADDEDNOZZLESAREWELDEDANDMADEASPARTOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYWHICHDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFt)RANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSISNOTREDUCEDSINCETHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTREQUIREANYREVISIONTOANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSiTHEFOREGOINGCONSTITUTES>>PER16CFR56o55'B)rTHEWRXTTENSAFETYEVALUATIONHHICHPROVIDESTHEBASISTHATTHISCHANGEDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION>>THEREFORE>>PRIORCOMMISSIONAPPROVALISNOTREQUIREDFORTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISPC/Mo PCM169-185'ZURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEM.ABSTRACTREASLN-85-72requestedengineeringtobeprovidedtoupgradetheUnitIturbinegantrycranebrakesystemtomeetthe"operatingcapabilitiesoftheexistingUnit2turbinegantrycranebrakesystem.Baseduponthedesignandhardware"providedbythecranevendor(Indusco),apneumatichydraulicsystemfunctionallyequivalenttothatutilizedontheUnit2turbinegantrycranewasimplemented.Tosupportthismodification,a10CFR50.59reviewwascompletedandtherespectivesafetyanalysiswhichisnowpartofthisdocumentwastransmittedbyRef.3.Thisdesignpackagefunctionstoendorsethebrakemodificationimplementedbythevendor.ThemodificationisconsideredNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedanddoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.RevisionIprovides'changestothedrawinglisttoreferenceattachedinstructionmanualsnotaddressedbyRevision0.Thisrevisiondoesnotchangetheoriginalscopeofwork.The10CFR50.59reviewandsafetyevaluationasprovidedbyRevision0,therefore,remainsvalidandisacceptable.Inaddition,nochangesto.theTechnicalSpecificationswererequiredbyRevision0orarerequiredbyRevisionlofthisdesignpackage.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheUnit1turbinebuildinggantrycraneislocatedontheturbinebuildingandassuchisnotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.Therefore,thismodificationaffectsonlyNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedQualityGroupDequipment.ThecranedesignrequirementsofNUREG0612"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"arenotapplicabletotheSt.Lucie1TurbineGantryCrane(FPLLetterL-81-276fromR.E.UhrigtoD.EisenhutdatedJuly2,1978).Basedonafailuremodeanalysis,failureoftheturbinegantrycranebrakingsystemasprovidedbythismodificationwillnotinhibittheoperationofanyexistingsafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Thenewbrakingsystemprovidesahydraulicbrakeforeachcranemotorthusprovidingcontroloflateralmovementofthecranealongitsrails.Failuretoprovidethisbreakingactionwillresultinaninabilitytoadequatelycontrollateralmovementofthecrane.Additionally,allnewelectricalcomponentsaddedbythismodificationarepoweredfromthecraneelectricalsystemwhich.ispoweredfromanonvitalsource.Thereforeanyfailuremodeanalyzedforthenewbrakingsystemwillnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Basedonthisinformationitcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexistsincetheconsequencesofallanalyzedaccidentsremainsunchanged.Additionally,withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionsareintroducedasaresultofusingthenewbrakesystem.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreducednorhavechanges'otheTechnicalSpecificationsbeenrequired.Inconclusion,thismodificationisacceptable-fromthestandpointof'uclearsafetysinceitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequirechangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.ThereforeimplementationofthismodificationwithoutpriorNRCapprovalisacceptable.
.ofanaccidentormalfunction isnotincreased since:EPAsarebeingsuppliedbyConaxBuffaloCorporation, whohassuppliedpreviously fiveEPAsinstalled intheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1,aswellasalltheEPAsforUnitNo2.TheseEPAshavebeenenvironmentally andseismically qualified in,accordance withIEEE317-1976forapplication inbothStLuciePlants.Tnedesign,fabrication, test,inspection, installation, and~~qualification oftheEPAsareinaccordance withIEEE317-1976andtheASIDEBGPVCode,SectionIII,Subsection NEfarClassMCComponents.
PCM174-185RCPOILLIFTSYSTEMPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENTINTRODUCTIONThisPC/Misfortheinstallationoftwenty(20)pressuresw'tchesbyBarksdaleModelB1T-A48SStoreplacetheexistingBarksdaleModel9048-4.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshal'edeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyouestion;(i)iftheprobab1'yofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanacc'dentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluateointheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossb-liryforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafety,AnalysisReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecif'ationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesfor'hisconclusion.Thenewswitcheswillbemountedinthesameplaceandmannerastheexist-ingswitches,whicharemountedseismically.Bothswitcheshavethesameweight2.5lbs.Theydonotperformanysafetyfunctionandarenon-safetyrelated.ThisPC/Mdoes'otreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnicalspecifications.jTheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspeci'fica'tions.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthipPC/Misnotrequired.
Asdiscussed intheDesignAnalysis, allratingsassociated withthenewequipment meetorexceedtherequirements fortheapplication.
PCM178-985TIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTIONPIREMAINANDPLANTPIRELOOPAbstractThisPlantChange/ModificationisfortheconnectionoftheBackfitConstructionFireHaintotheStLucieUnits1and2FireWaterLoop-Thl.sconnectionconsistsoftwoseparatetie-insbetweenthefiremainandthefireloop.Thl.sPCMI.snotclassifiedasSafetyRelatedsincethefiremainandthefireloopdonotperformanysafetyfunction.Sincethefireloopprovidesprotectionforsafetyrelatedequipment,thisPCMisclassifiedasQualityRelated.Thl.sPCHprovidesadditionalfireprotectiontotheplantsincethesetie-l.nscreateanadditionalfirewatersupplytootherportionsofthePlant.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethefiremain/firelooptie-inisqualityrelatedandthismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentperformingasafetyfunction.Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincethefiremain/firelooptie-inhasno'afetyfunction.andnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.iiiThismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCHisnotrequired.
PCM024-185Newwirewayismanufactured byHoffman,vendoroftheexistingEPAwirewaysystem.Wirewayins"allation hasbeenanalyzedassuitablefortheapplication asdiscussed intheDesignAnalysis.
PCM179-185DIESELGENERATORCOOLINGSYSTEMVALVEREPLACEMENTABSTRACTThisengineeringpackagecoversthereplacementofseveralvalvesintheDieselGeneratorCoolingSystemandDemineralizedNakeUpWaterSystem.ThereplacementoftheDieselGeneratorCoolingSystemValvesisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedanddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.ThereplacementofthevalvesintheDemineralizedMakeUpWaterSystemisclassifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelated.SAFETYEVALUATIONThereplacementofvalvesintheDieselGeneratorCoolingWater'SystemandtheDemineralizedMake'pWaterSystemdoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59.ThereplacementofvalvesintheDemineralizedMakeUpWaterSystemhasnoeffectonnuclearsafetysincetheD.LWaterSystemisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentpreventionormitigationandfailureofthesystemwouldnotresultinareleaseofradioactivemateriaLThereplacementof.valvesintheDieselGeneratorCoolingSystemdoesnotincreasetheprobability'previouslyanalyzedaccidentssincetheD/Gsarenotutilizedindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofaccidents.Sincethevalvereplacementdoesnotchangetheoperationoroperabilityofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipmentimportanttosafety,theconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,theprobabilityofandconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyanalyzedhavenotchanged.Likewise,thepossibilityofanewaccidentoranewmalfunctionhasnotbeencreatedsincetheoperationoroperabilityofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipmentimportanttosafetyhasnotchanged.Inaddition,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenchangedsincethismodificationdoesnotchangetheperformance,loadcapabilities,oroperatingcharacteristicsofthedieselgenerators.
Allnewcablesarequalified totheflametestrequirements ofIEEE3S3-1974'and,exceptforafewCEDMcircuitjumpers,aresuitableforClass1Euse,asistheRaychemsplicematerial.
PCM199-985WATERTREATMENTI'LANTREGENERATXONWASTENEUTRALIZATIONTANKMODIPICATIONABSTRACTThesubjectREArequestedaneutralizationtankbeaddedtotheWaterTreatmentPlant(WTP)tomeetcurrentDepartmentofEnvironmentalRegulation(DER)regula'tionsgoverningdischargeofhazardouswastes.Theneutralizationtankmodification(PC/M116-985)providesthenecessarydetailsforinstallationofthistankandtheassociatedpiping,equipmentandcomponentsnecessarytoallowforregenerationwastestobeautomaticallydirectedtothetankduring'theappropriatetimesintheregenerationprocess.Duringthecausticinjectionstepsofregeneration,causticsolutionsmustbedirectedtothetank.Theexistingsystem,however,isunabletoprovidethenecessaryflowsandpressuresrequiredtoaccommodatetheseregenerationstepsduetotheadditionalheadlossinthenewpipingruns.Thus,toaccommodatethenewarrangement,aboosterpumpmustbeaddedtothecausticdilutionwaterdemineralizedwatersupply.Inaddition,thecausticdilutionwaterflowcontrolvalveandflowindicator/transmittermustbereplacedtoaccommodatetheflowrequirements.Thissystemisnotrequiredforplantsafeshutdown;thereforethismodificationisnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedanditsimplementationdoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFEFYEVALUATIONThesubjectmodificationprovidesforadditionofaboosterpumpandflowcontrolvalveinthecausticdilutionwatersupplytotheWTP.Inaddition,themodificationprovidesforreplacementofcertaincausticdilutionwaterflowtransmittercomponentstoaccommodatetherequiredflowrates.AsdefinedinSection9oftheUnit1PSAR,theWTPanditsassociatedsystemsareclassifiedasnon-nuclearsafetyielatedandarenotrequiredtoperformasafetyfunction.Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis,asaddressedintheDesignAnalysis,themodificationhasnoaffectonnuclearsafety.Therefore,themodificationisadequatelyclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedQualityGroupD.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysh,itcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59isnotcreated.SincethemodificationaffectsonlytheWTPwhichisclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedandcannotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponentsasaddressedinthefailuremodeanalysis,theconsequencesofallanalyzedaccidentsremainsunchanged.Also,withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionsareintroducedasaresultofthis.designchange.Additionally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.Therefore,anunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexist.Sincethismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,norrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications,thismodificationisacceptablewithrespecttonuclearsafetythuspriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthemodification.
Asdiscussed intheDesignAnalysis, theCEDMjumpercableissuitableforuseundertheStLuciePlantnormalconditions andisde-energized immediately uponreactortrip.Specialconsideration oftheCEDMcircuitconductors isconsistent withthepresentStLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR(Reference Section3.11.5.4).
PCH202-185CCWSTRAINERBACKFLUSHDRAINAbstractThisengineeringdesignpackage(EDP)modifiestheCCWStrainerBackflushDrainpiping.Existingcastiron-andfiberglassdrainpiping,whichisrouteatotheCCWsump,willbereplacedwithstainlesssteelpipingwhichtiesintotheICWdischargeline.ThiswilleliminatethefloodingproblemintheCCWpitarea,whichiscausingcorrosionof=structuralsteelandpipingsupportsmountedonornearthefloor.~~ThisEDPisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthatthisEDP-doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59',aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviously'valuatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Themodificationincludedinthisengineeringdesignpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincetheconnectionofaCCWstrainerbackflushdrainlinetotheICWdischargelinewillhavenoeffectonthesafetyperformanceoftheICWorCCWsystemsoranyoftheircomponents.(ii)ThereisnopossiblityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevalutedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignoftheCCWstrainerbackflushsystem.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefined.inthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Implementationofthisengineeringdesignpackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommxsszonapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCSisnotrequired~
The.possibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously analyzedisnotcreatedsince:ThenewEPAsarequalified totherequiredenvironment andwillbeabletoperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionpostDBA.Theonlymodification toplantcomponents isrecircuiting tothenewEPAs.Thecomponents beingthusmodifiedhavebeenreviewedtoassurethattheirremovalfromserviceforrecircuiting
PCM004-186LUBEOILCENTRIFUGEANNUNCIATIONINTRODUCTIONModificationisrequiredtotheexistingTurbineLubeOilCentrifugecircuit.Atpresent,onlylocalannunciationisprovidedforTurbineLubeOilabnormalconditions.Amodificationtothepresentdesignisrequiredtotie-inthislocalsignaltotheannunciatorattheRTGB.Thiswillprovideinformationtoalerttheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressureorlowoiltemperature.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation,Part50.59,a'proposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunc~nofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifa'ossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnot.involveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclusion.TheadditionalsignalprovidedattheRTGBenhancesthepresentsystembyprovidingturbinelubeoilcentrifugeannunciationunderabnormalconditions.Thisinformationalertstheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressure.orlovoiltemperature.Inaddition,therearenosafetyconcernsassociatedviththecircuitrychangesandnevcablerouting,forthefollowingreasons:1~The~urbinelubeoilcircuitryisnon-safetyrelated.2.Thelocationofthecableroutingspecifiedinthebackfitsketchesvillnotdamageanysafetyrelatedequipment.Therefore,thismodificationvillnotincreasetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofanyaccident,vhetherpreviouslyevaluatedofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedandvillnotreducethesafetyoftheplant.~ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotreq'reachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,andpriorCommissionapproval'fortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
-~esnotviolatetechnical specifications norimpactrequiredplantsystems.Containment vesselstructural integrity isunaffected bythismodification, asdiscussed intheDesignAna1ysis.
PCM007-186NONRETURNVALVESACTUATIONSOLENOIDSABS1'RACfZnisengineeringpackagecoversthemodificationstoimprovetheperformanceoftheTurbineExtractionSteamReverseCurrentValves(NR4)onoverspeedturbinetrip.TnemodificationsanddetailsconsistoftheadditionofapressureswitchintheturbineOverspeedProtectionControl(OPC)headerinterlockedwithsix(6)NRV'sactuationsolenoidsandthereplacementofthepneumaticHRVtestvalveswitnelectric'estpushouttons.Presentlytheindividualsolenoidsareactuatedbyhighlevelswitcnesinstalledinthecorrespondingfeedwaterneaters.BasedonthedesignoftheMainTurbineanditsSubsystemsandtheextractionsteamlinesNRV's,thisEngineeringPackagehasbeenclassifiednon-safetyrelated.Primarily,theNRl'swillimprovetheclosingtimeonturbineoverspeedtrip.ThisisthemainobjectiveoftnisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10of.theCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanun''eviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysis'eportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.'heSteamTurbineandReverseCurrentValvesarenonsafetyrelated.Theinstrumentationadditionsandchangestobeperformedhavenoimpactonanysafetyrelatedplantsystemsand/oroperations.Themodificationsimprovetheequipmentoperationwithoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.The,additionofthepressureswitch,thelocalelectrictestpushouttonandthedeletionofthepneumatictestvalvewillimprovetheturbineprotectionincaseofoverspeedtrip.Themodificationtothispackagewi'llnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.Tnissystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigationscenarioandthereforethesystemsfailurewillhavenoimpactonplantsafeshutdown.TnismodificatonisnotdescribedinthetechnicalSpecificationsandtherefore,theimplementationoithisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoin~constitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwnicnprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapproval;for'the.implementationofthisPCHisnotrequired.Theturoinemi.ssilecriterionspecifiedinSe"tion3.5oftheOnit1FSARisno-applicabletothecomponentsaddedbythisPCM.
Aftertheinstallation oftheEPAs,theoverallcontainment boundary.
PCM015-986TELEPHONESYSTEMUPGRADEABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversthemodificationsanddetailsrequiredtosupporttheinstallation(byAT&T)ofanewA'T&TSystem85PBXTelephoneSystem.ThecentralequipmentforSystem85wil'1belocaedintheTelecommunicationEquipmentRoomsintheUnit1ServiceBuildingandUnit2D-13Building.Themodificationsanddetailsconsistofenlargementofthetelecommunicationroomstoaccommodatethenewequipment;installationofredundantairconditionerunitsforeachroomtosatisfyequipmentenvironmental-requirements;powersupplieswithemergencyback"up;racewaybetweenthetwotelecommunicationroomstoinstalltheAT&Tsuppliedfiberopticscable,andracewaybetweentheD-13Building,G-3BuildingandStart-upTrailerstoaccommodatetheAT&Tsuppliedmultipairtelephonecables.Basedontheimportanceofthetelephonesystemasoneoftheplantcommunicationmeans,th'isEngineeringPackagehasbeenclassifiedQualityRelatedtoenhancethesystemdesignandinstallationconfidence.Thenew"System85"willreplacetheexistingDimension600ElectronicStoredProgramPBXlocatedintheUnit1ServiceBuildingTelecommunicationsRoomandthePrivateAutomaticTelephoneExchange(PAX)locatedinUnit1ReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(Elev43'-0).Thisreplacementwillrequire.modificationofSection9.5.2"CommunicationSystems"oftheUnit1andUnit2FUSAR,Figures9.5-1and9.5-4,Table9.5-6oftheUnit2FUSARandSection3.8oftheUnit1andUnit2NuclearFireProtectionProgram.ToenergizetheSystem85telephoneequipmentandairconditionerslocatedintheUnitgServiceBuildinguponlossofnormaloff-sitepowerwillrequiremanualswitchingatPowerPanelPP-135locatedintheSecurityandRecordsBuilding.Resettingwillalsoberequireduponreturningofnormaloff-.sitepower.TheSysem85telephoneequipmentmodulesandairconditionerslocated'ntheUnit2D-13BuildingwillbeautomaticallysuppliedbytheNon-ClasslEdieselsupplyingtheD-13Buildinguponloss-ofnormalpower.
integrity willbeverifiedviaa10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeAleakratetest.'Inaddition, alocalTypeBleaktestwillbeperformed oneachEPAtoverifytheintegrity oftheelectricfeedthrough seals.Configuration oftheinterface betweentheexistingplantcableandthenewequipment isconsistent withthedesignbasesestablished inthe.StLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR.Tnisinsuresthattheconsequences ofallanalyzedaccidents remainunchanged.
PCM023-186MAINFEEDWATERPUMPOILPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENTTheexistingMainFeedwaterPumplubeoilpressureswitchesareUnitedElectricSeries300.Themodel300hasbeendiscontinuedbythemanufacturerandsparepartsareveryscarceandareessentiallynot'vailable.Thisengineeringpackagecoversthereplacement,of(2)twopressureswitchesperpump(foratotalof(4)four)withnewupgradedseries400bythesamemanufacturerFBothoftheabovemodelshavecomparableoveralldimensions,weightandmountingfacilities,therefore,noothermodificationisneeded.Thefunctionofeachpressureswitchwillremainunchanged.Allswitcheswillhavead5ustabledifferentials.BasedonthedesignoftheMainFeedwaterPumpsanditssubsystems,thisEngineeringPackagehasbeenclassifiedasslatyRelated.SeeSection2.1.1foradditionalinformation.ThisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Thereplacementofthesepressureswitcheshasnaimpactonplantoperationanddoesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe.safetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreased,sincetheFeedwaterPumpanditssubsystemsarenon-safetyrelated.Thereforethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentperforminganysafetyfunction.TheFeedwaterPumpLubeOilSystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigationscenario,thereforethereisnopossibilityforcreatinganaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreport.Itsfailurewillhavenoimpactontheplantsafeshutdown.
Also,nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areintroduced bythismodification.
PCM023-186ThismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsincethereplacementoftheMainFeedwaterPumplubeoilpressureswitchesimprovestheiroperationalqualitywithoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.TheTechnicalSpecificationsdonotaddresstheMFWpump/systemsurveillance.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsinceSpecialInstructions havebeenprovidedinSection9.0sotheimplementation ofthismodification doesnotviolatetheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1Technical Specifications.
PCM032-186EXCITERCOOLERVENTS&.DRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEThisEngineeringDesignPackagecoversthereplac'ementoftheExciterCoolerVentsandDrainsTubing.Theoriginaldesignprovidedfor1/2"coppertubingwhichissusceptibletodamageduetoabrasionandvibration.Thisdesignp~akac}eprovidesfortheinstallationof1/2"StainlessSteelTubingandoneadditionaltubers,supporttofirmlylocatethetubingawayfrompipecouplings.AlloftheeighttubingrunsinvolvedarelocatedinsidetheExciterHousing,eachrunapproximately12feetinlength.TheExciter,itscoolers,andthetubinginvolvedinthismodificationareallnonnuclearsafetyrelated,nonmeismic,andtheimplementationofthisdesignpackagedoesnotcreateanyfailuremodeswhichcouldadverselyaffectanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Theclassificationofthisdesignpackageisthereforenonnuclearsafetyrelated.TheDesignPackagewasreviewedusingthe10CFR50.59criteriaanditwasfoundthatthechangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionnorisaTechSpecchangerequired.ThereforepriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplementthisPC/M.Thesubjectmodificationinvolvesthereplacementof1/2"coppertubingwith1/2"stainlesssteeltubingcontainingTurbineCoolingWaterfromtheExciterCoolers.BoththeMainGeneratorExciterandtheTurbineCoolingWaterSystemareno~afety.related,no~eismicsystemswhichperformnoSafetyRelatedfunctions.AfailuremodesaneffectsevaluationwasperformedtodetermineifanysafetyrelatedcomponentsFrouldbeaffectedbythecomponentsmodifiedb~thischange.AfailureofhardwarefailureofthetubingwouldresultinpossiblemechanicaldamagetotheExciterfromhardwareimpactorwaterdamageduetoleakage.Afunctionalfailurewouldresultineithertheinabilitytoventordrainthecoolers,oracontainedlossofTurbineCoolingWaterfromtheCoolers.Noneoftheabovefailureswouldinanywayadverselyaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.BasedupontheSafetyclassificationoftheaffectedsystems,andtheresultsofthefailuremodeevaluation,theimplementationofthismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59because:1)Theconsequencesofanalyzedaccidentsarenotaffectedbecausenoequipmentrequiredtomitigateanalyzedaccidentsareinvolvedinthismodification.2)TheprobabilityofananalyzedaccidentorthepossibilityofanunanalyzedaccidentisnotincreasedbecausefailureoftheinvolvedcomponentsdoesnotaffectanyDBArequiredcomponents.3)TheTechSpecmarginofsafetyisnotdecreasedbecausenoTechSpecLimitsorequipmentareaffected.Sincethismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications,itmaybeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapproval.
Therefore, theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'plant'sTechnical Specifications.
PCM037-186PCBTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTDuetopendingEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyrulesoncontrolofPolychlorinatedBephenyls(PCB)thesematerialswillberemovedfromalloilfilledtransformers.TheMainNeutralGroundingTransformeratStLucieUnitNo1has-beenidentifiedascontainingPCB.ThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)coversthemodificationsanddetailsnecessarytoreplacetheexistingPCBfI.liedMa1nGeneratorNeutralGroundingTransformerwithasiliconfilledtransformer.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59asindicatedinSection3.0ofthisEDP.ThisPCMdoesnot1nvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,willnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation,nordoesitrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.Th1sEDPisnonmafetyrelatedinthattheGeneratorNeutralGrounding'ransformerprovidesnosafetymelatedfunctionandasthetiansformerislocatedintheTurbineBuilding,itdoesnothaveany1mpactorinteractionswithanysafetyrelatedequipment.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPedezalRegulat1ons,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveaaunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment-Importanttosafetyprev1ouslyevaluated1ntheanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysismportmaybecrPeted;or(111)1'fthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThismodificationconsistsofreplacementoftheexistingPCBfilledMaiaGeneratorNeutralGroundingTransformerw1thasiliconfilledtraasformer.Znallotheraspectsthereplacementtransformerisidenticalinsizeandelectricalcharacteristicsastheexistingtransformer-TheMainGeneratorNeutralGroundingTransformerispartofthehighresistancegroundingsystemconnectedby2500ampselfmooledbustotheMainGeneratorNeutrals.-TheNeutralGroundiagTransformer,locatedintheTurbineBu1lding,doesnotInteractwithanysafetyrelatedequipmeatorprov1deanysafetyrelatedfunction.Asanonmafetyrelatedsystem,theNeutralGroundingTransformerdoesnotI.ncreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Noaccidentevaluated1ntheFUSARtakescredI.tfortheNeutralGroundingTransformerandthismodificat1ondoesnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluated.
Aholdpoint hasbeenestablished forthereworkofEPAC3conduitsandthetermination locations intheRCBverticaltermination boxes.Thisholdpoint willberemoveduponaccesstotheRCBandfield'erification oftheexistinginstallation.
PCM037-186TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotmodifytheoperationofanyplantsystemorfunction.Therefore,itsmarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequi'reachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10'CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestion,andpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
Pendingthereleaseoftnehold,arevisedsafetyevaluation willbeprovided.
PCM043-186MISCELLANEOUSPIPING'SYSTEMSMODIFICATIONSThisEngineeringPackageisissuedforthepurposeofdocumentation(i.e..as-building)ofminormodificationsmadetovariouspipingsystem/supportsasaresultofdisassembly,inspection,repair,andreassemblyduringthe1985fallrefuelingoutage.ThemodificationswereinitiatedviatheFieldChangeRequestPHoticeformwhichwereWeviewedandapprovedbyEngineering.Themodificationsareclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedanddonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.NOTE:ThisPCMisfordocumentation{as&uilding)purposesonly.ThemodificationstotheessentialportionsoftheCCW,Sl,AFWandILRTsystems,asdescribedintheProjectScope,areclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedbecausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponent,inconjunctionwithaworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedbycorrespondingsectionsoftheFSAR,wouldresultintheinabilityoftheparticularsystemtoachieveitsdesignedsafetyfunction.AsdescribedintheDesignAnalysis,thesafetyrelatedmodificationswereperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofASMESectionillforClass2and3componentsandaredeemednottoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionforthefollowingreasons:i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR~y*environmentsincetherepairsincludedhereindidnotalterthefunctionofanyaffectedsystem,createnewsystemsorreducethedesignmarginofaffectedsystems.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsinceallrepairsandreplacementswereperformedinstrictaccordancewithalloriginaldesignbasesandapplicablecoderequirements.Sinceallpossibleaccidentsandmalfunctionsresultingfromthesesystemshave,previouslybeenanalyzed,therepairand/orreplacementofdegradedportionsofthesesystemsis~~~~rn~anydifferenttypesoffailures.iii)Themarginofsafetyforanytechnicalspecificationsdduetorepairand/orreplacementofpartsandcomponents,sincetheaffecteditemswererestoredtotheiroriginaldesignsafetymargin,asaminimum,ineverycase.iv)Allrepairs,replacements,andmodificationshavebeendeterminedtobethantheexistingcomponentsintermsofdesign,procurement,andinstallation.Thusthereliabilityoftheaffectedsystemshasnotdecreased..'IBasedontheaboveevaluations,andpursuantto10CFR50.59,theforgoingconstitutesthewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthesechangesvconsequentlypriorapprovalfrom-NRCfortheimplementationofthesemodificationsisnotrequired.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
PCM071-186FHBHVACPENETRATIONBARRIERSABSTRACTIthasbeendeterminedthatsteelbarriersarerequiredfortnetwo(2)HVACpenetrationslocatedatelevation48ftoftheFuelHandlingBuilding(westexteriorwall).The.barriersarerequiredinordertopreventunauthorizedaccessintotheFHB.BothHVACpenetrationsareprotectedbyacontinuousL-shapedconcretetornadomissilebarrier,.cantileveredtwo(2)feetfromtheFHBexteriorwallandextendingdowntoapproximatelyone(1)footbelowthebottomofthepenetration.Foreaseofconstruction,theaccessbarrierswillbelocatedatthebottomofthetwo(2)'footopening"whichexistsbetweenthemissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall.TheexistingHVACsystemhasnotbeenaffectedbythismodification.BasedonthereviewoftheexistingHVACsystem,a40'eductionofthemissilebarrieropeningisacceptable.Asaresultoftheadditionoftheaccessbarriers,themissilebarrieropeningshavebeenreducedbyonly17K.Failureoftheaccessbarrierswillnotadverselyaffectthefunctionofanysafety-relatedsystemsorcomponents.However,since,tnebarriersarebeinginstalledinatornadomissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall,thisPCMhasbeenclassifiedasQualityRelated.TnismodificationdoesnotaffectthestructuralcapabilityofthemissilebarrierortheFHBwall,nordoesitposeanysafetyhazards.ThisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Tneadditionoftneaccessbarriershasnoimpactonplantoperationanddoesnot'ffectanysafety'elatedequipment~SAFETYEVAlUATIONWithrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityof.occurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe.marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforany'technicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionaecause:Theprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsince:a-Thefailureoftheaccessbarriersforthetwo(2)HVACpenetrationslocatedatelevation48ftoftneFuelHandlingBuildingwillnotadverselyaffectthestructural.capacity.ofthe.-.missilebarriernortheFHBwall,forwhichcertainqualitycontrolinspections(e.g.holesizeandverificationthatnorebariscut)willbeperformed.
thewritte"safetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesno"involveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCN071-186b-Noeffectonequipmentorcomponentsperformingasafetyfunctionarelocatedbeneaththisaccessbarrier.c-TneHVACventilationsystemoperationhasnotbeenaffectedbythereductioninthemissilebarrieropening.Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincethismodificationwillhavenoimpa"tontheplansafeshutdown.LTnismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbytheadditionoftheseaccessbarriers.Tnereisnochangeontneexistingtechnicalspe"ificationduetotheimplementationofthisPCH.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwnicnprovidesthebasistnatthiscnangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPCN.
PCM039-185DIESELGENERATOR SUBSYSTEM FLOWDIAGRAMSModification Description Allvalvesandinstruments mustbetaggedinthefieldasperthenewflowdiagrams.
PCM074-186HEATERDRAINPUMPDEMINERALIZEDMATERSUPPLYABSTRACTThisdesignpackagepaovidestherequiredengineeringfor,addingpermanentpipingfromthedemineralizedwatersystemtotheUnit1heaterdrainpumps'echanicalseals.Thepipingwillmakeavailabletothesealsthenecessarybackupflushingwatermeetingtheappropriatechemistryrequirements.Thebackupwatersourceisrequiredduringinitialplantstartupwheneverthepumpssitidle.Basedonthefailuremodesanalysis.and10CFR50.59review,thismodificationdoesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipmentandisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentpreventionormitigation.ThusitdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandiscorrectlyclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelated.Implementationofthismodification,therefore,doesnotrequirepriorNRCapproyal.Sulement1ThispackagerevisionprovidesvalvedrawingsforvalvesaddedbythisPC/MandmocQfiestheexpirationdatetoreflectthecorrectformat.ThescopeofworkspecifiedbythisEngineeringPackagehasnotbeenaffectedbythisrevision'.Thesafetyclassificationandthesafetyevaluationasstatediscorrectandisnotimpacted.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheUnit1HeaterDrainPumpsarelocatedinaNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedsystemandassucharenotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.Therefore,modificationstothesepumpsaffectonlyNon-.NuclearSafetyRelated,QualityGroupDequipment.Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis,failureofthedemineralizedwatersupplypipingcouldresultonlyinfailureoftheheaterdrainpumps.Sincethepipingandcomponentsarelocatedremotefromanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents,failureofthisequipmentwillnotinhibitoperationofanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59doesnotexist.oTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Sincethisdesignchangedoesnotalteroraffectequipmentusedtomitigateaccidents,theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanalyzedaccidentsremainsunchanged.oThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.ThereisnonewfailuremodeintroducedbythischangethathasnotbeenevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSAR.oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.ThischangehasnoaffectonanyexistingTechnicalSpecifications.
L2.)Affectedoperating procedures mustbereviewedtodetermine ifrevisionisrequiredtoreQectth~ewtagnumbersorQowdiagramnumbers.IIIla.Withrespecttotheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated inthePSAR:ThisPC/MreleasesthenewDieselGenerator Subsystem FlowDiagramstothesiteThefoll'owing activities mustbecompleted beforethenewfiowdiagramscanbeissuedaspermanent plantdrawings:
PCM082-186MAINSTEAMPIPINGMODIFICATIONABSTRACTDuringtheas-buildingofPCM580-79,theas-builtinformationandfieldwalkdowasindicatedthatsomeoQtherestra1ntsonMSdrainlinesdidnotconformtothedes1gnanalys1s.Thestressanalysisperformedincorporatingtheas-builtinformationindicatedstressesinthepipingfortwostresscalculationsexceededtheallowablestresslimitsfortheOperat1onalBasesEarthquake(OBE)conditionwhilethestresslimitsfortheDesignBasesEarthquake.(DBE)coaditionweremet.Inordertocorrect,theoverstressconditioniathepip1ng,tworestraintsareaddedandtwoexistingrestraintsaremodifiedthroughthisengineeringdesignpackage(EDP).Thisissuewas,presentedtoPlantPersonnelviaFFLPowerPlaatEngineeriagMemoEPO86-1237.Thismemoaddressesthe"functionality"aspectsoftheMainSteamdra1npipingiaitspresentconfiguration.ThepipingsystemconsideredinthisEDPisNuclearSafetyClass2,QualityGroupBandSe1smicCategoryIpipingandhencethesupport/restraintsforthispipiagareclassifiedasNuclearSafetyClass2andSeismicCategoryI'.ThesafetyevaluationhasshowathatthisEDPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.SafetAnalsesWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto1nvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportaattosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafeeyanalys1sreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanacc1dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviously1nthesafetyanalysisreport-maybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesaotinvolveanunrev1ewedsafetyquestionand.thefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclus1on:Thismodificat1onprovidestwonewrestraintsandadditionalrestraintfunctiontothetwoexistingrestraintsontheMSdrainlines.Thesemod1ficationswhenimplementedwillreducethestresslevelsinthepip1ngtotheacceptablestresslimitsestab11shedintheUSASB31.7Code,1969Edition.Theintegralattachments(lugs)weldedtothepipingcreateadditionalstressesinthepiping.However,thetotalpipingstressesincludingthoseduetotheweldedattachmenthavebeenshowatobewithinallowablestresslimits.Hence,theintegrityofthepressureboundaryofthe.pipinghasnotbeencompromisedandnonewfailuremechanismhasbeenintroduced.Therefore.,the.implementationofthisPCMdoesnot1acreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceorthe,consequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysesReport; PCM082-186(ii)Sincethepipestressesremainwithinthecodeallowablelimits,thismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossiblityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluated~previouslyintheSafetyAnalysesReport.(111)Themainsteamsystemasawholehasbeenconsideredinestablishingthebasesforseveraltechnicalspecifications.SincetheMSdrainlinepressureboundary1ntegrityhasnotbeenaffected,theimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecif1cation.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluat1onwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorcommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofth1sPCM1snotrequired.
Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered inevaluating FSARaccidents.
PCM083-186LOWPOWERPEEDWATERCONTROLSYSTEMTheStLucieUnitNo1PeedwaterControlSystemconsistsoftwo(2)feedvaterregulatorswhichoperateInparallel.ThemainfeedvaterregulatorIBautomaticallycontrolledbyathree-elementfeedwatercontrolsystemandisresponsiveintherangeof15-100Xpoveroperation.By~assfeedvaterregulatorsaremanuallyoperatedduringplantstartmpintherangeof0-15Xpoveropera~on.Thezmodynamiccharacteristicsofthesteamgeneratorsatlovpowerloadsaresuchthatincreasedfeedwaterflowwilltendtoshrinkorlowerthesteamgeneratorlevel.Atthetimethermalequilibriumhasbeenze-establishedthelevelwilltendtoincreaseduetoswellingcharacteristics.Reactortripsthereforecouldresultfromeitherahighorlowsteamgeneratorlevel.ThenewLowPowerPeedvaterControlSystem(onefortheLCV-9005andoneforLCV-9006),vhichismicroprocessorbased,isdesignedtoprovidestableandautomaticcontroloftheby~assfeedvaterregulatorsatlovpowerloadsIntherangeof2-15X.Thesystemwill.receiveandprocesssystemvariablessuchassteamgeneratorlevel,feedvaterflow/temperatureandneutronfluxinordertoprovideforasmoothandsteadyoutputforautomaticcontroloftheby-passregulatorsandtosignifIcaatlyreducethefrequencyofreactortripsdurIngunitstart~p.ThisnewsystemIsconsideredtobeanextensionofthepresentPeedwaterRegulatingSystem,doesnotaffectothersafetyrelatedequipmentandassuchprovidesnosafetyrelatedfunctions.ArevievofthechangestobeimplementedbythIsPCMwasperfozmedagainsttherequirementsof10CPR50.59.AsindicatedinSection3.0ofthisPCH,thisPCMdoesnotInvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesItrequirearevisiontothetechnicalspecification;therefore,'priorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPCM.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrenewedsafetyquestion;(I)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentozmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethenanyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeczeated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationIsreduced.1)TheprobabilityofoccurenceorthecoasequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportaattosafetypreviouslyevaluatediatheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreasedsincethisnevLowPowerPeedvaterControlSystem(LPPCS)IsaaextensionofthePeedvaterRegulatingSystemandasdescribedinPUSARSubsection7.7.1thIssystemsfunctionienotessential,forthesafetyoftheplant.TheinstallationoftheLPPCS'willprovidecontrolimprovementstomaintainsteamgeneratorvaterlevelatsetpointvalueduringunitstartswithsignificant..reductionInthenumberofreactortripeduetosteamgeneratorlevelexcursions.
lb.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered inevaluating FSARaccidents.
PCM083-18611)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyin.thesafetyanalys1sreportisnotcreatedsince:ThisinstallationisinaccordancewiththeCodeofFederalRegulation'10CFR50.48andnoimpactisincurredbythisinstallation.ThenewequipmentmountingsandaddedcomponentshavebeenseismicallyanalyizedforadditionalloadingandithasbeenconcludedthattheseadditionsvillnotaltertheoriginalstressconditionsorthefundamentalfrequencyoftheRTGBBoards.Consequently,theseismicqualificationoftheRTGBoardsvillnotbeadverselyaffected.ModificationtotheRTGBoardshavebeendesignedinaccordancewithNUREG0700.Thisinstallation'isinaccordancewiththeCodeofFederalRegulation10CFR50.49andhasbeendeterminedtohavenoimpactontheEnvrionmentalQualificationcriteriabecausetheequipmentislocatedintheControlRoomwhichisamildenvironment.eTheLPFCS,whichisanextensionoftheFeedwaterRegulationSystemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnorformitigatingtheconsequencesofanaccident.111)Themarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationsisnotaffectedbythisPC/MsincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.The1mplementationofth1sPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischange.doesnotinvolve..anunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
1c.Withrespecttotheprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important-tosafetypreviously evaluated inFSAR:Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.
PCM086-186MISAPPLICATIONOFLIMITORQUEOPERATORSABSTRACTThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)replacesthemotorsfortheMainFeedwaterPlowControlStati~by-passvalves(MV-09-3andMV-09-4)motoroperators.ThereplacementoftheexistingmotorswithmotorshavinglowerRPMisrequiredtoreducethevalvestemspeed,tobewithinthelimitsrecommendedbythevalveoperatormanufacturer(Limitorque)forthetypeofoperator(SMB)involved.ThisEDPisclassifiednon-safetyrelatedsincetheMainFeedwaterFlowControlStations,wheretheaffectedvalvesareinstalled,doesnotperformanysafetyfunctionandareinthenon-safetyclassportionoftheMainFeedwaterSystem.ThesafetyanalysishascorrectlyconcludedthatnounreviewedsafetyconcernexistandnochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarerequiredasaresultofthismodification.Therefore,previousNRCapprovalfortheimplementationofthismodificationisnot'equired.ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyand/oroperation.Revision1wasfo"theremovalofParagraph9.1whichrequiredaLimitorquerepresentativetoprovidetechnicalassistancefor'theimplementationofthisEP.Revision2addedtheRevision1descriptiontotheabstractandtheEngineeringapprovalsignaturetopageIII-i.Revisions1and2donothaveanimpactonthesafetyclassificationand/o"theresultsofthesafetyevaluationofthisEP.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchange'shallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanany.aevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanaIysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.isreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Theportionsofthefeedwatersystemwherethismodificationwillbeimplementedarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.
1d.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tonuclearsafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Plowdiagramsarenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofsafetyrelatedequipment malfunctions.
PCM086-186ii)Thepossiblityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpeificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.TheimplementationofthisPCNdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotnecessary.
2a.Withrespecttothepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR'-Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered inevaluating FSARaccidents.
PCM088-186ISOPHASEBUSDUCTJUMPERMODIFICATIONTheStLucieUnit1Isolate~aseBussuppliedbyWestinghousemakesuseofcablejumperstoprovideelectricalcontinuityateachhousingjointsothatthelongitudinalcurrentsflowingintheenclosureswillflowinaclosedloop.Thesecablesarecontinuouslyexposedtoweatherresultinginheating,overloadingandfurtherinsulationdegradation.Thishasresultedinreducedloadingontheunitwhilerepairs/cleaningtakeplace.ThisEPprovidesforthereplacementoftheexistingcablejumperswithlaminatedshunts,weldingadaptorbrackets(forcovers)ontothebusenclosureandinstallingcoversovertheshuntstoshieldthemfromtheweather.Thisengineeringpackageisconsiderednon-safetyrelatedinthattheequipmentbeingmodifieddoesnotinterfacewithanysafetyrelatedcomponentorfunction.Areviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythiswasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59.AsindicatedinSection3.0ofthisEngineeringpackage,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnicalspecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.-ISAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveandunreviewedsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheanalysisreportmaybeincr'eased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ITheIsolatedPhaseBusisdescribedinFSARSection8.2.Thiscomponenti.spartoftheoffsitepowersystemandisnotrequiredtomitigateanyaccident.ThelossofACpowerhasbeenaddressedinFSARSection15.2.9.'heresultsreachedinthatsection,namelythattheplantcanbesafelyshutdownandmaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition,isnotaffected.Infact,withtheadditionofthismodificationthereliabilit;yoftheoffsitepowersystemwillbeincreased.TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Thereplacementofthecablejumpershasnoimpactonanyplantsystemsandoperations.TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotnecessarytomitigateormonitoranyresultofanaccident.Failureofthiscomponenthasnoimpact.,on.previouslygeneratedsafetyanalysisrepoits.Themarginofs'afetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotimpacted.
2b.Withrespecttothepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR-'low diagramsarenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofsafetyrelatedequipment malfunctions.
PCM088-186TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,Noaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedtakescreditfo"theisolate"PhaseBus.,Taismodification,toimproveoperabilitvandreliabilityo.tneIsolatedPhaseBus,doesnotaffectanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Assuch,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityooccu"enceortheconsequencesofanaccidento"malunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.TheIsolatedPhaseBus,aspartoftheoffsitepowersystem,isno-requiredtomitigateanyaccidentanddoesnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethenpreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificationdoesnotimpactanytechnicalspecificationandassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59,thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestions,andpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
3..Withrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytchnicalspecification:
PCM090-186CLOSEINTERCEPTVALVE-CONTROLCIRCUITMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)providesfortheremovaloftheCloseInterceptValve(CIV)anticipatorycontrolcircuitfromtheWestinghouseDigitalElectro-hydrauli,c(DEH}turbinecontrolsystem.TheoriginalintentoftheCIVanticipatorycircuitwastoprovideatemporaryclosureoftheInterceptorValvesintheeventofaloadmismatchbetweenturbinesteamflowandgeneratedelectricaloutput.Thisparticularcircuitdoesnottakeintoaccountthedynamicresponseoftheturbinesteamcycles,'ordoestheDEHmodelP-2000containthenecessary'rogrammingsoftwaretoperformtherequiredcalculationstoautomaticallyad)usttheturbinegovernorvalvestothenewthermodynamicvalues.Thesefeatures,therefore,will,inmostcases,maintaintheInterceptorValvesclosedwitharesultanttripofboththeturbineandthereactor.TheCIVcontrolcircu1t1sadownstreamextensi.onoftheDEHoverspeedc'ontrolchannel.Systemfailurewouldnotimpactplantsafety,sincethissystemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnordoesitperformanysafetyrelatedfunctions.HowevertheDEHControlSystemisrequiredtobeoperablebytheTechnicalSpecifications.Sincethismodif1cationimpactsthesubjectcontrolcircuit,thisengineeringdesignpackageshallbeclassifiedasanalityRelated.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPC/Mwasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59.AsindicatedinSection3.0ofthisPC/M,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoes.itrequirearevisi'ontothetechnicalspecification;therefore,priorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTi.tie10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment1mportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilStyforanaccidentormalfunct1onofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreatd;or(ii.i)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced;TheprobabilityofoccurrenceastheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalys1sReportisnotincreasedbythisPC/M.ThismodificationtotheCIVcontrolcircuitdoesnotchangeoraltertheturbine-generatormonitoringandcontrolsystem.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofatypedifferentthanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:
Flowdiagramsdonotimpacttechnical specification safetymargins.Basedonthe'above,thenewQowdiagramsandthetagging/retagging ofdieselgenerator valvesandinstruments aredetermineQ nottoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
PCM090-186TheCIVcontrolcircuitisanindependentfunctiongeneratedbytheDEHcontrolsystemsoftware.Theremovalofthe,CIVanticipatoryfunctiondoesnotaltertheoperationoftheDEHcontrolsystem.Thismodification,whichwillremovethepartialloadmismatchcircuit,willreducethenumberofspuriousreactortripswhichwilloccurshouldtheInterceptorValvesfailtore-open.TheturbineoverspeedprotectionchannelstoboththeReheaterStopvalvesandtheInterceptvalvesandthemechanicaloverspeedprotectionchannelsarenotalteredbyimplementationofthiscircuitmodification.Therefore,themarginofsafetyforturbineruptureduetotheprobabilityofturbineoverspeedisnotreduced.The'mplementationofthis.PC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheStLucieUnit1TechnicalSpecifications."Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebases.thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired."
Therearenosystemmodifications involved.
PCM093-186RTGBANNUNCIATORGROUNDDETECTIONABSTRACTPrimarypowerfortheRTGBAnnuniciatoractuationcircuitsisprovidedbytheplant125VDCungroundedpowersupply.Althoughtheplant125VDCungroundedpowersupplyisfurnishedwithagroundfaultdetectionsystem,thesegroundfaultdetectormodulesareineffectiveindetectingagroundfaultontheannunciator125VDCactuationsystem.TheRTGBannunciatorscontainaDCisolationcircuitwhichessentiallyseparatestheplant125VDCsyst:emfromtheannunciator125VDCactuationcircuit.Asingle'groundfaultoneitherthepositiveornegativeterminalofanungroundedsystemwillremainundetectedandthesystemwilloperatenormally.Intheeventofasecondgroundontheoppositepolarityline,ashortcircuitwillbecreatedcausinglineinterruptionbywayofthefuseswithresultantlossofthesystem.Correctiveactionfollowingacatastropicfailureisextremelydifficultsinceafaultwillnowexistonbothlines.Itisextremelyimportantthereforethatgroundfaultbedetectedandclearedassoonaspractical.EachRTGBAnnunciator(totalof6)willbefurnishedwithanindividualgrounddetector.Thesegrounddetectorswillmonitortheannunciator125VDCactuationsy'temforexcesscurrentleakagelevelstoground.Groundfaultindicationwillbeprovidedviaindicatinglampslocatedonthefrontofeachoftheground-detectormodules.Inordertoincreaseefficiencyintroubleshootingandlocatinggroundfaults,atotalofsixgrounddetectormoduleswillbeinstalledintheRTGboard101.Eachgroundfaultdetectorshalldetectthosegroundlevelleakagecurrentswhichmayexceedpresetvalues.Thismodi=icationwillim"roveboththeoperabilityandtheavailabil'tyoftheRTGBannunciatorsystem.Theannuncietorsservenoszetyre'ate"function.Howevesincethispackageinvolvesmodificationtothemair.co"t"o'oard,itmayrequireworkinandaroundsafetyrelatedsub-panels,compartments,etc.Therefore,thispackageisconsideredtobeQualityRelated.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59.AsindicatecinSection3.0ofthisPCM,this"PCMdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnicalspecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisP&i.  
PCM047-185G.E.SAMRELAYSP.C.CARDREPLACEMENT IntroductionTheGeneralElectrictype.Sam11ButilizedatSt.LuciePlantare~operatedtimingrelaysthatemploysolidwtate components toprovideanextremely stabletimedehyfunction.
Thisrelayfindsapplication, wherevershort9.C.operatedtimingfunctions arerequired.
Specifically thisrelayisusedforcircuitbreakerfaQureback~protection schemeswhereaccurateandrepeatable timesettingsare.essentiaL Ithasbeendetermined thatitispossibleforthistyperelaytooperateinlessthanthesettimedelayiftheinitiating contactexperiences averyspecificmodeofcontactbounce.Theforeshortened operating timehasbeenobservedbyotherusersandhasbeendemonstrated inthefactoryundercarefully controlled testconditions.
Althoughtheactualoccurrence ofthisparticular modeofinitiating contactbounceappearstoberatherunlikely, aminordesignchangeinternaltotherelayhasbeenrecommended bythemanufacturer.
ItistheintentofthisPC/Mtoincorporate thedesigncha~ewhichreplacestheexistingprintedcircuitboardintherelaytoeliminate thepossibility ofsuchforeshortened timingbytheSAMrelay..Thismodification hasbeenreviewedwithrespecttoTitle'10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,whichstatesthataproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed
'safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evahiated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis.foranytechnical specification isreduced.Themodification beingperformed underthisPC/Mwillenhancetheoperation oftheG.FSam1IBrelayassuringthatiftheunlikelyeventofaninitiating contactbounceoccurred, therelaywilltimeoutappropriately.
TheG.ESam11Brelayaffectedareutilizedforcircuitbreakerfaourebackupprotection schemesandarenotinanysafetyrelatedcircuitorperformed asafetyrelatedfunction.
Environmental qualification isjustified bythefactthattheserelaysandthustheirinternalPCcards'arelocatedinamildenvironment.
Thereisnoseismicconcernsaffectedbythismodification, therelays.havenoseismicrequirements associated withthem.Therefoie, theprobability ofapreviously reviewedaccidentisnotincreased, thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typehasnotbeencreatedandthemarginofsafetyhasnotbeenreduced.Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'pla'nt'echnical specification.
'Iheforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevahation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore, priorCommission approvalforimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotnecessary.
PCM064-185MSRRETUBINGThisEngineering Packagecoversthemodifications totheMoistureSeparator'eheaters (MSRs)andtotheScavenging SteamVentCondenser (SSVC)System.Th'ema)orfeatureofthispackageisBieinstallation ofnewtubebundlesintheMSRswhichwillprovideimprovedthermalperformance oftheplantsecondary side.Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed againsttherequirements oflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,theseMSRandSSVCmodifications areclass1fied asnon-safety related,donotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquest1on, andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressed inSection3,"SafetyEvaluation"
).However,theMSROperating Procedure mustberevisedpriortoplant.startup.SAFETYEVALUATION MithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposed.
changeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important'to safetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction efadifferent typethananyevaluated prev1ously 1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)1fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunrevi,ewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ1pment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalys1sreportisnotincreased.
TheMSRs,theportionofMainSteamassociated withtheMSRsandtheHeaterDrainSystempipingarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.0Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction of-adifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated..
The.components involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.
PCM064-185iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,'ince thecomponent involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.
Theimpl'ementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolve'nunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM073-185ABSTRACTMSRPERFORATED PLATEMODIFICATION ThisEngineering Packagecoversthemodifications totheMoistureSeparator Reheaters (MSRs).Thispackageisfortheinstallation ofperforated'lates 1ntheMSRswhichwillprovidebettersteamflowdistribution.
Thiswillimprovethermalperformance oftheplantsecondary sideandreduceerosion/corrosion ofthemoistureseparator vanesandsupports.
Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed aga1nsttherequirements oflOCFR50.59; Asaresult,thisMSRmodification isclassified asnon-safety related,doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion, doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification, andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressed inSection3,"SafetyEvaluation"
).However,theMSROperating Procedure mustberevisedpriortoplantstartupasindicated inPCM064-185.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)1$apossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanany'valuated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanytechnical specification 1sreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated 1nthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincetheMSRsarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshas'eenmadetothe~operational designofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodificat1on arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidethebasesthat.thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM131-185REPLACEMENT OFRISDEVICESINTRODUCTION ThisPC/Misfortheinstallation offourteen(14)newtransmitters byRochester Instrument SystemsmodelSC-1302-323 toreplaceexistingunits.Theexistingtransmitters arereachingtheirqualified lifeexpectancy.
Therefore, anewre-placement unitisrequiredtosatisfythe'ifeexpectancy requirement.
SAFETYANALYSIS'VithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbe,deemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe'afety analysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibil'itv foranacci-dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalvsisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthom>>>>~nf~~<atv~~definedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Th'mod'ication doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollow-ingprov'desthebasesforthisconclusion.
~~~Thesenewtransmitters byRISarequalified environmentally toIEEE-323-1974 a'ndseismically toIEEE-344-1975.
ThisPC/Mreplacesex'tingRIStrans=itte sw'hnewunitsthussatisfy'g thelifeexpectancy requirement.
These'-'qualification ofthesedeviceshavebeenpreviously reviewedforthepart'u'ar mountinglocationandfoundacceptable.
Theseismicintegrity oftheRTGB,PostAccidentPanel'AandRadiation Monitor'ng Cabinet"E"arenotaffec:edsincethedeviceisareplacement foranexisting, identica'evice atthesamelocation.'herefor-
-"'smod'fication willnotofanyaccident, whetherprevious'y evalua:ed of'd''fere".evaluated andwillnotreducethesafetyoftheplan:.t4aqsiei4ni~r~~CThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoenotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specificat'ons.
Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvdlveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM142-185APPENDIXRCONTROLROOMINDEPENDENCE FORALTERNATE SHUTDOWNINTRODUCTION Sincetheseparation definedinAppendix"R"SectionIII.G.2cannotbeprovidedforessential components andcircuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom,alternative shutdowncapability isprovided.
ThisensuresthatintheunlikelyeventafiremakestheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroomuninhabitable orrendersequipment ineitherroominoperable;-
theplantcanbesafelysakentocoldshutdownfromremotelocations andHotShutdownControlPanel(HSCP)ThisPC/Minstallsredundant fuses,.isolation switchesandfuseblockstovariouscontrolcircuitsasidentified bythe"Essential Equipment ListforAlternate Shutdown" transmitted byEbascoletterP-M-SL-85-0325 datedFebruary28,1985.Themodifications tothecontrolcircuitswillassuresafeshutdownfromtheHotShutdownPanelandotherlocalcontrolstationsshouldafiredisabletheessential circuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreading room.Theaddedcomponents arelocatedoutsidetheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclusion.
Thematerial, devicesassociated withthismodification, willbeClass1Ewhereconnected to.safetygradeequipment.
SafetygradedevicesshallconformtoIEEE-323-1974 andIEEE-344-1975
'hismodification providesthemeansforanalternate plantshutdownbytheinstallation ofadditional switchesandredundant fusestoisolatetheControlRoomintheunlikelyeventofafire.Thenewcableroutingisbeingdoneinaccordance w'ithStLucieUnitNo1ampacityandtrayfillcriteria.
Thesafetyrelatedswitchgears, MCC,and'iesel Generator panelhavebeenreviewedtoaccountfortheeffectoftheweightsoftheaddeddevices.Basedontheinsignificant addedweight,weconcludethereisnoimpact.to theexistingequipment seismicqualifications.
Therefore, thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability oftheoccurrence ofanaccident, whetherpreviously evaluated orofadifferent typethenpreviously evaluated andwill~otreduce,thesafetyoftheplant.
PCM142-185ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical-specifications, nordoesitrequirearevisionof,atechnical specification.
Thismodification willbeperformed inaccordance withtherequirements ofTechnical Specification TS-3.4.3andTS-3.4.4.
Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorcommission
'approval fortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM155-185REACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGPIPEASSEMBLYTHECLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGASSEMBLYCONSISTSOFTHREEMAJORASSEM-BLIESNAMELYr'(1)THELIFTINGFRAMEASSEMBLY>>
(Z)THElINKASSEMBLYWHICHINCLUDESTHEBOXGIRDERASSEMBLYANDTHEPIPEASSEMBLYr AND(3)THEPLATFORMASSEMBLY>>
THEPIPEASSEMBLY.
IS"ATTACHEDTOTHETRAMRAILANDTHETRAMRAILISATTACHEDTOTHEHOISTWHICHISATTACHEDTOTHEPIPE'SSEMBLY+
THEASSEMBLYROTATESVIATHETRAMRAILANDALLOWSTHETENSIONING DEVICESTOBEINPOSITION>
THEINTENTOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOUTILIZETHEPIPERINGOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYASANAXRDISTRIBUTION HEADERFORTHEPNEUMATIC TUGGERSFOMHESTUDTENSIONING DEVICES'HIS ENTAILSTHEINSTAILATIONOFAZ'IAMETER AXRSUPPLYNOZZLEANDTHREE1'IAMETER OUTLETNOZZLESFORTHEPNEUMATIC TUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES>>THISWILLELIMINATE THEUSEOFXNDIVXDUAl SUPPLYLINESTOTHETUGGERSANDWILLREDUCEPERSONNEL RADI-ATIONEXPOSUREANDHIlLALSOPROVIDEEASEINRIGGINGANDREMOVALOFTHETUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES.OVERALL>>THISMODIFICATION WILLEASEUPTHEENTIRESTUDTENSIONING OPERATIONS SAFETYANALYSISWITHRFSPECTTOTITLEleOFTHFCODEOFFEDERALRfGULATION>>
PART5859>>APROPOSEDCHANGESHALLBEDEEMEDTOINVOlVEANUNREVIEHED SAFETYQUESTION>>
(1)IFTHEPROBABILITY OFOGCURENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT XMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVI-OUSLYEVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBEINCREASED>>
OR(II)IFAPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBECREATED>>OR(III)IFTHEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATXON ISREDUCEDTHEPROBABILITY ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OF.EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANAL-YSISREPORTISNOTINCREASED BECAUSETHEPIPERINGASSEMBLYTHATISBEINGMODIFIEDDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTIONANDDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFE%SHUTDOWNCAPABILXTY OFTHEUNIT>>THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTCREATEANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PCVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTBECAUSETHEADDEDNOZZLESAREWELDEDANDMADEASPARTOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYWHICHDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTION.
THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFt)RANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ISNOTREDUCEDSINCETHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTREQUIREANYREVISIONTOANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS iTHEFOREGOING CONSTITUTES>>
PER16CFR56o55'B)r THEWRXTTENSAFETYEVALUATION HHICHPROVIDESTHEBASISTHATTHISCHANGEDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION>>
THEREFORE>>
PRIORCOMMISSION APPROVALISNOTREQUIREDFORTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISPC/Mo PCM169-185'ZURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEM.ABSTRACT REASLN-85-72 requested engineering tobeprovidedtoupgradetheUnitIturbinegantrycranebrakesystemtomeetthe"operating capabilities oftheexistingUnit2turbinegantrycranebrakesystem.Baseduponthedesignandhardware" providedbythecranevendor(Indusco),
apneumatic hydraulic systemfunctionally equivalent tothatutilizedontheUnit2turbinegantrycranewasimplemented.
Tosupportthismodification, a10CFR50.59reviewwascompleted andtherespective safetyanalysiswhichisnowpartofthisdocumentwastransmitted byRef.3.Thisdesignpackagefunctions toendorsethebrakemodification implemented bythevendor.Themodification isconsidered Non-NuclearSafetyRelatedanddoesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.
RevisionIprovides'changes tothedrawinglisttoreference attachedinstruction manualsnotaddressed byRevision0.Thisrevisiondoesnotchangetheoriginalscopeofwork.The10CFR50.59reviewandsafetyevaluation asprovidedbyRevision0,therefore, remainsvalidandisacceptable.
Inaddition, nochangesto.theTechnical Specifications wererequiredbyRevision0orarerequiredbyRevisionlofthisdesignpackage.SAFETYEVALUATION TheUnit1turbinebuildinggantrycraneislocatedontheturbinebuildingandassuchisnotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.
Therefore, thismodification affectsonlyNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedQualityGroupDequipment.
Thecranedesignrequirements ofNUREG0612"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"arenotapplicable totheSt.Lucie1TurbineGantryCrane(FPLLetterL-81-276fromR.E.UhrigtoD.EisenhutdatedJuly2,1978).Basedonafailuremodeanalysis, failureoftheturbinegantrycranebrakingsystemasprovidedbythismodification willnotinhibittheoperation ofanyexistingsafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.
Thenewbrakingsystemprovidesahydraulic brakeforeachcranemotorthusproviding controloflateralmovementofthecranealongitsrails.Failuretoprovidethisbreakingactionwillresultinaninability toadequately controllateralmovementofthecrane.Additionally, allnewelectrical components addedbythismodification arepoweredfromthecraneelectrical systemwhich.ispoweredfromanonvitalsource.Therefore anyfailuremodeanalyzedforthenewbrakingsystemwillnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.
Basedonthisinformation itcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59 doesnotexistsincetheconsequences ofallanalyzedaccidents remainsunchanged.
Additionally, withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areintroduced asaresultofusingthenewbrakesystem.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreducednorhavechanges'o theTechnical Specifications beenrequired.
Inconclusion, thismodification isacceptable
-fromthestandpointof'uclearsafetysinceitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequirechangestotheTechnical Specifications.
Therefore implementation ofthismodification withoutpriorNRCapprovalisacceptable.
PCM174-185RCPOILLIFTSYSTEMPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENT INTRODUCTION ThisPC/Misfortheinstallation oftwenty(20)pressuresw'tchesbyBarksdale ModelB1T-A48SS toreplacetheexistingBarksdale Model9048-4.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshal'edeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyouestion; (i)iftheprobab1'yofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanacc'dentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluateo intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossb-liryforanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafety,AnalysisReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specif'ation isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesfor'hisconclusion.
Thenewswitcheswillbemountedinthesameplaceandmannerastheexist-ingswitches, whicharemountedseismically.
Bothswitcheshavethesameweight2.5lbs.Theydonotperformanysafetyfunctionandarenon-safety related.ThisPC/Mdoes'otreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnical specifications.
jTheimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical speci'fica'tions.
Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthipPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM178-985TIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTION PIREMAINANDPLANTPIRELOOPAbstractThisPlantChange/Modification isfortheconnection oftheBackfitConstruction FireHaintotheStLucieUnits1and2FireWaterLoop-Thl.sconnection consistsoftwoseparatetie-insbetweenthefiremainandthefireloop.Thl.sPCMI.snotclassified asSafetyRelatedsincethefiremainandthefireloopdonotperformanysafetyfunction.
Sincethefireloopprovidesprotection forsafetyrelatedequipment, thisPCMisclassified asQualityRelated.Thl.sPCHprovidesadditional fireprotection totheplantsincethesetie-l.nscreateanadditional firewatersupplytootherportionsofthePlant.SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethefiremain/fire looptie-inisqualityrelatedandthismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment performing asafetyfunction.
Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincethefiremain/fire looptie-inhasno'afetyfunction.
andnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.iiiThismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specification.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCHisnotrequired.
PCM179-185DIESELGENERATOR COOLINGSYSTEMVALVEREPLACEMENT ABSTRACTThisengineering packagecoversthereplacement ofseveralvalvesintheDieselGenerator CoolingSystemandDemineralized NakeUpWaterSystem.Thereplacement oftheDieselGenerator CoolingSystemValvesisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedanddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Thereplacement ofthevalvesintheDemineralized MakeUpWaterSystemisclassified asnonnuclearsafetyrelated.SAFETYEVALUATION Thereplacement ofvalvesintheDieselGenerator CoolingWater'System andtheDemineralized Make'pWaterSystemdoesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59.Thereplacement ofvalvesintheDemineralized MakeUpWaterSystemhasnoeffectonnuclearsafetysincetheD.LWaterSystemisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentprevention ormitigation andfailureofthesystemwouldnotresultinareleaseofradioactive materiaLThereplacement of.valvesintheDieselGenerator CoolingSystemdoesnotincreasetheprobability'previously analyzedaccidents sincetheD/Gsarenotutilizedindetermining theprobabilities ofaccidents.
Sincethevalvereplacement doesnotchangetheoperation oroperability ofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipment important tosafety,theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
: analyzed, theprobability ofandconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviouslyanalyzedhavenotchanged.Likewise, thepossibility ofanewaccidentoranewmalfunction hasnotbeencreatedsincetheoperation oroperability ofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipment important tosafetyhasnotchanged.Inaddition, themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenchangedsincethismodification doesnotchangetheperformance, loadcapabilities, oroperating characteristics ofthedieselgenerators.
PCM199-985WATERTREATMENT I'LANTREGENERATXON WASTENEUTRALIZATION TANKMODIPICATION ABSTRACTThesubjectREArequested aneutralization tankbeaddedtotheWaterTreatment Plant(WTP)tomeetcurrentDepartment ofEnvironmental Regulation (DER)regula'tions governing discharge ofhazardous wastes.Theneutralization tankmodification (PC/M116-985)providesthenecessary detailsforinstallation ofthistankandtheassociated piping,equipment andcomponents necessary toallowforregeneration wastestobeautomatically directedtothetankduring'the appropriate timesintheregeneration process.Duringthecausticinjection stepsofregeneration, causticsolutions mustbedirectedtothetank.Theexistingsystem,however,isunabletoprovidethenecessary flowsandpressures requiredtoaccommodate theseregeneration stepsduetotheadditional headlossinthenewpipingruns.Thus,toaccommodate thenewarrangement, aboosterpumpmustbeaddedtothecausticdilutionwaterdemineralized watersupply.Inaddition, thecausticdilutionwaterflowcontrolvalveandflowindicator/transmitter mustbereplacedtoaccommodate theflowrequirements.
Thissystemisnotrequiredforplantsafeshutdown; therefore thismodification isnon-nuclear safetyrelatedanditsimplementation doesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SAFEFYEVALUATION Thesubjectmodification providesforadditionofaboosterpumpandflowcontrolvalveinthecausticdilutionwatersupplytotheWTP.Inaddition, themodification providesforreplacement ofcertaincausticdilutionwaterflowtransmitter components toaccommodate therequiredflowrates.AsdefinedinSection9oftheUnit1PSAR,theWTPanditsassociated systemsareclassified asnon-nuclear safetyielatedandarenotrequiredtoperformasafetyfunction.
Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis, asaddressed intheDesignAnalysis, themodification hasnoaffectonnuclearsafety.Therefore, themodification isadequately classified asNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedQualityGroupD.Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysh,itcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59isnotcreated.Sincethemodification affectsonlytheWTPwhichisclassified asNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedandcannotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents asaddressed inthefailuremodeanalysis, theconsequences ofallanalyzedaccidents remainsunchanged.
Also,withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areintroduced asaresultofthis.designchange.Additionally, themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.Therefore, anunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexist.Sincethismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, norrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications, thismodification isacceptable withrespecttonuclearsafetythuspriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthemodification.
PCH202-185CCWSTRAINERBACKFLUSH DRAINAbstractThisengineering designpackage(EDP)modifiestheCCWStrainerBackflush Drainpiping.Existingcastiron-andfiberglass drainpiping,whichisrouteatotheCCWsump,willbereplacedwithstainless steelpipingwhichtiesintotheICWdischarge line.Thiswilleliminate thefloodingproblemintheCCWpitarea,whichiscausingcorrosion of=structural steelandpipingsupportsmountedonornearthefloor.~~ThisEDPisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthatthisEDP-doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59',aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously
'valuated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodification includedinthisengineering designpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincetheconnection ofaCCWstrainerbackflush drainlinetotheICWdischarge linewillhavenoeffectonthesafetyperformance oftheICWorCCWsystemsoranyoftheircomponents.
(ii)Thereisnopossiblity foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evalutedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designoftheCCWstrainerbackflush system.(iii)This modification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefined.inthebasisforanytechnical specification.
Implementation ofthisengineering designpackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommxsszon approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCSisnotrequired~
PCM004-186LUBEOILCENTRIFUGE ANNUNCIATION INTRODUCTION Modification isrequiredtotheexistingTurbineLubeOilCentrifuge circuit.Atpresent,onlylocalannunciation isprovidedforTurbineLubeOilabnormalconditions.
Amodification tothepresentdesignisrequiredtotie-inthislocalsignaltotheannunciator attheRTGB.Thiswillprovideinformation toalerttheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressureorlowoiltemperature.
SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation, Part50.59,a'proposed changeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunc~nofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifa'ossibility foranaccidentormalfunctionofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnot.involveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclusion.
Theadditional signalprovidedattheRTGBenhancesthepresentsystembyproviding turbinelubeoilcentrifuge annunciation underabnormalconditions.
Thisinformation alertstheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressure.
orlovoiltemperature.
Inaddition, therearenosafetyconcernsassociated viththecircuitry changesandnevcablerouting,forthefollowing reasons:1~The~urbine lubeoilcircuitry isnon-safety related.2.Thelocationofthecableroutingspecified inthebackfitsketchesvillnotdamageanysafetyrelatedequipment.
Therefore, thismodification villnotincreasetheprobability oftheoccurrence ofanyaccident, vhetherpreviously evaluated ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated andvillnotreducethesafetyoftheplant.~ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotreq'reachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, andpriorCommission approval'fortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM007-186NONRETURNVALVESACTUATION SOLENOIDS ABS1'RACfZnisengineering packagecoversthemodifications toimprovetheperformance oftheTurbineExtraction SteamReverseCurrentValves(NR4)onoverspeed turbinetrip.Tnemodifications anddetailsconsistoftheadditionofapressureswitchintheturbineOverspeed Protection Control(OPC)headerinterlocked withsix(6)NRV'sactuation solenoids andthereplacement ofthepneumatic HRVtestvalveswitnelectric'est pushouttons.
Presently theindividual solenoids areactuatedbyhighlevelswitcnesinstalled inthecorresponding feedwater neaters.BasedonthedesignoftheMainTurbineanditsSubsystems andtheextraction steamlinesNRV's,thisEngineering Packagehasbeenclassifiednon-safetyrelated.Primarily, theNRl'swillimprovetheclosingtimeonturbineoverspeed trip.Thisisthemainobjective oftnisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10of.theCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanun''eviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysis'eport maybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.'he SteamTurbineandReverseCurrentValvesarenonsafety related.Theinstrumentation additions andchangestobeperformed havenoimpactonanysafetyrelatedplantsystemsand/oroperations.
Themodifications improvetheequipment operation withoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.The,additionofthepressureswitch,thelocalelectrictestpushoutton andthedeletionofthepneumatic testvalvewillimprovetheturbineprotection incaseofoverspeed trip.Themodification tothispackagewi'llnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.
Tnissystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigation scenarioandtherefore thesystemsfailurewillhavenoimpactonplantsafeshutdown.
Tnismodificaton isnotdescribed inthetechnical Specifications andtherefore, theimplementation oithisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoin~
constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation wnicnprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approval; for'the.implementation ofthisPCHisnotrequired.
Theturoinemi.ssilecriterion specified inSe"tion3.5oftheOnit1FSARisno-applicable tothecomponents addedbythisPCM.
PCM015-986TELEPHONE SYSTEMUPGRADEABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversthemodifications anddetailsrequiredtosupporttheinstallation (byAT&T)ofanewA'T&TSystem85PBXTelephone System.Thecentralequipment forSystem85wil'1belocaedintheTelecommunication Equipment RoomsintheUnit1ServiceBuildingandUnit2D-13Building.
Themodifications anddetailsconsistofenlargement ofthetelecommunication roomstoaccommodate thenewequipment; installation ofredundant airconditioner unitsforeachroomtosatisfyequipment environmental
-requirements; powersupplieswithemergency back"up;racewaybetweenthetwotelecommunication roomstoinstalltheAT&Tsuppliedfiberoptics cable,andracewaybetweentheD-13Building, G-3BuildingandStart-upTrailerstoaccommodate theAT&Tsuppliedmultipair telephone cables.Basedontheimportance ofthetelephone systemasoneoftheplantcommunication means,th'isEngineering Packagehasbeenclassified QualityRelatedtoenhancethesystemdesignandinstallation confidence.
Thenew"System85"willreplacetheexistingDimension 600Electronic StoredProgramPBXlocatedintheUnit1ServiceBuildingTelecommunications RoomandthePrivateAutomatic Telephone Exchange(PAX)locatedinUnit1ReactorAuxiliary Building(Elev43'-0).Thisreplacement willrequire.modification ofSection9.5.2"Communication Systems"oftheUnit1andUnit2FUSAR,Figures9.5-1and9.5-4,Table9.5-6oftheUnit2FUSARandSection3.8oftheUnit1andUnit2NuclearFireProtection Program.ToenergizetheSystem85telephone equipment andairconditioners locatedintheUnitgServiceBuildinguponlossofnormaloff-sitepowerwillrequiremanualswitching atPowerPanelPP-135locatedintheSecurityandRecordsBuilding.
Resetting willalsoberequireduponreturning ofnormaloff-.site power.TheSysem85telephone equipment modulesandairconditioners located'n theUnit2D-13Buildingwillbeautomatically suppliedbytheNon-Class lEdieselsupplying theD-13Buildinguponloss-ofnormalpower.
PCM023-186MAINFEEDWATER PUMPOILPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENT TheexistingMainFeedwater PumplubeoilpressureswitchesareUnitedElectricSeries300.Themodel300hasbeendiscontinued bythemanufacturer andsparepartsareveryscarceandareessentially not'vailable.
Thisengineering packagecoversthereplacement, of(2)twopressureswitchesperpump(foratotalof(4)four)withnewupgradedseries400bythesamemanufacturer FBothoftheabovemodelshavecomparable overalldimensions, weightandmountingfacilities, therefore, noothermodification isneeded.Thefunctionofeachpressureswitchwillremainunchanged.
Allswitcheswillhavead5ustable differentials.
BasedonthedesignoftheMainFeedwater Pumpsanditssubsystems, thisEngineering Packagehasbeenclassified asslatyRelated.SeeSection2.1.1foradditional information.
ThisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Thereplacement ofthesepressureswitcheshasnaimpactonplantoperation anddoesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.
SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe.safetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased, sincetheFeedwater Pumpanditssubsystems arenon-safety related.Therefore thismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment performing anysafetyfunction.
TheFeedwater PumpLubeOilSystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigation
: scenario, therefore thereisnopossibility forcreatinganaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreport.Itsfailurewillhavenoimpactontheplantsafeshutdown.
PCM023-186Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification sincethereplacement oftheMainFeedwater Pumplubeoilpressureswitchesimprovestheiroperational qualitywithoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.TheTechnical Specifications donotaddresstheMFWpump/system surveillance.
Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM032-186EXCITERCOOLERVENTS&.DRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEThisEngineering DesignPackagecoversthereplac'ement oftheExciterCoolerVentsandDrainsTubing.Theoriginaldesignprovidedfor1/2"coppertubingwhichissusceptible todamageduetoabrasionandvibration.
Thisdesignp~akac}eprovidesfortheinstallation of1/2"Stainless SteelTubingandoneadditional tubers,support tofirmlylocatethetubingawayfrompipecouplings.
AlloftheeighttubingrunsinvolvedarelocatedinsidetheExciterHousing,eachrunapproximately 12feetinlength.TheExciter,itscoolers,andthetubinginvolvedinthismodification areallnonnuclear safetyrelated,nonmeismic, andtheimplementation ofthisdesignpackagedoesnotcreateanyfailuremodeswhichcouldadversely affectanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.
Theclassification ofthisdesignpackageistherefore nonnuclear safetyrelated.TheDesignPackagewasreviewedusingthe10CFR50.59criteriaanditwasfoundthatthechangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionnorisaTechSpecchangerequired.
Therefore priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplement thisPC/M.Thesubjectmodification involvesthereplacement of1/2"coppertubingwith1/2"stainless steeltubingcontaining TurbineCoolingWaterfromtheExciterCoolers.BoththeMainGenerator ExciterandtheTurbineCoolingWaterSystemareno~afety.related,no~eismic systemswhichperformnoSafetyRelatedfunctions.
Afailuremodesaneffectsevaluation wasperformed todetermine ifanysafetyrelatedcomponents Frouldbeaffectedbythecomponents modifiedb~thischange.Afailureofhardwarefailureofthetubingwouldresultinpossiblemechanical damagetotheExciterfromhardwareimpactorwaterdamageduetoleakage.Afunctional failurewouldresultineithertheinability toventordrainthecoolers,oracontained lossofTurbineCoolingWaterfromtheCoolers.Noneoftheabovefailureswouldinanywayadversely affectanysafetyrelatedequipment.
BasedupontheSafetyclassification oftheaffectedsystems,andtheresultsofthefailuremodeevaluation, theimplementation ofthismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59because:1)Theconsequences ofanalyzedaccidents arenotaffectedbecausenoequipment requiredtomitigateanalyzedaccidents areinvolvedinthismodification.
2)Theprobability ofananalyzedaccidentorthepossibility ofanunanalyzed accidentisnotincreased becausefailureoftheinvolvedcomponents doesnotaffectanyDBArequiredcomponents.
3)TheTechSpecmarginofsafetyisnotdecreased becausenoTechSpecLimitsorequipment areaffected.
Sincethismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications, itmaybeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapproval.
PCM037-186PCBTRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT DuetopendingEnvironmental Protection AgencyrulesoncontrolofPolychlorinated Bephenyls (PCB)thesematerials willberemovedfromalloilfilledtransformers.
TheMainNeutralGrounding Transformer atStLucieUnitNo1has-beenidentified ascontaining PCB.ThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)coversthemodifications anddetailsnecessary toreplacetheexistingPCBfI.liedMa1nGenerator NeutralGrounding Transformer withasiliconfilledtransformer.
Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59asindicated inSection3.0ofthisEDP.ThisPCMdoesnot1nvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, willnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation, nordoesitrequireachangetotheTechnical Specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.Th1sEDPisnonmafety relatedinthattheGenerator NeutralGrounding
'ransformer providesnosafetymelated functionandasthetiansformer islocatedintheTurbineBuilding, itdoesnothaveany1mpactorinteractions withanysafetyrelatedequipment.
SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPedezalRegulat1ons, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveaaunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment
-Important tosafetyprev1ously evaluated 1ntheanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysismportmaybecrPeted;or(111)1'fthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification consistsofreplacement oftheexistingPCBfilledMaiaGenerator NeutralGrounding Transformer w1thasiliconfilledtraasformer.
Znallotheraspectsthereplacement transformer isidentical insizeandelectrical characteristics astheexistingtransformer-TheMainGenerator NeutralGrounding Transformer ispartofthehighresistance grounding systemconnected by2500ampselfmooled bustotheMainGenerator Neutrals.
-TheNeutralGroundiag Transformer, locatedintheTurbineBu1lding, doesnotInteractwithanysafetyrelatedequipmeat orprov1deanysafetyrelatedfunction.
Asanonmafety relatedsystem,theNeutralGrounding Transformer doesnotI.ncrease theprobability ofoccurrence ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.Noaccidentevaluated 1ntheFUSARtakescredI.tfortheNeutralGrounding Transformer andthismodificat1on doesnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated.
PCM037-186Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotmodifytheoperation ofanyplantsystemorfunction.
Therefore, itsmarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequi'reachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10'CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestion, andpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM043-186MISCELLANEOUS PIPING'SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS ThisEngineering Packageisissuedforthepurposeofdocumentation (i.e..as-building) ofminormodifications madetovariouspipingsystem/supports asaresultofdisassembly, inspection, repair,andreassembly duringthe1985fallrefueling outage.Themodifications wereinitiated viatheFieldChangeRequestPHotice formwhichwereWeviewedandapprovedbyEngineering.
Themodifications areclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedanddonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
NOTE:ThisPCMisfordocumentation
{as&uilding) purposesonly.Themodifications totheessential portionsoftheCCW,Sl,AFWandILRTsystems,asdescribed intheProjectScope,areclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedbecausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponent, inconjunction withaworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedbycorresponding sectionsoftheFSAR,wouldresultintheinability oftheparticular systemtoachieveitsdesignedsafetyfunction.
Asdescribed intheDesignAnalysis, thesafetyrelatedmodifications wereperformed inaccordance withtherequirements ofASMESectionillforClass2and3components andaredeemednottoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionforthefollowing reasons:i)Theprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR~y*environment sincetherepairsincludedhereindidnotalterthefunctionofanyaffectedsystem,createnewsystemsorreducethedesignmarginofaffectedsystems.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsinceallrepairsandreplacements wereperformed instrictaccordance withalloriginaldesignbasesandapplicable coderequirements.
Sinceallpossibleaccidents andmalfunctions resulting fromthesesystemshave,previously beenanalyzed, therepairand/orreplacement ofdegradedportionsofthesesystemsis~~~~rn~
anydifferent typesoffailures.
iii)Themarginofsafetyforanytechnical specifications dduetorepairand/orreplacement ofpartsandcomponents, sincetheaffecteditemswererestoredtotheiroriginaldesignsafetymargin,asaminimum,ineverycase.iv)Allrepairs,replacements, andmodifications havebeendetermined tobethantheexistingcomponents intermsofdesign,procurement, andinstallation.
Thusthereliability oftheaffectedsystemshasnotdecreased.
.'IBasedontheaboveevaluations, andpursuantto10CFR50.59,theforgoingconstitutes thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthesechangesvconsequently priorapprovalfrom-NRCfortheimplementation ofthesemodifications isnotrequired.
PCM071-186FHBHVACPENETRATION BARRIERSABSTRACTIthasbeendetermined thatsteelbarriersarerequiredfortnetwo(2)HVACpenetrations locatedatelevation 48ftoftheFuelHandlingBuilding(westexteriorwall).The.barriersarerequiredinordertopreventunauthorized accessintotheFHB.BothHVACpenetrations areprotected byacontinuous L-shapedconcretetornadomissilebarrier,.
cantilevered two(2)feetfromtheFHBexteriorwallandextending downtoapproximately one(1)footbelowthebottomofthepenetration.
Foreaseofconstruction, theaccessbarrierswillbelocatedatthebottomofthetwo(2)'footopening"whichexistsbetweenthemissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall.TheexistingHVACsystemhasnotbeenaffectedbythismodification.
BasedonthereviewoftheexistingHVACsystem,a40'eduction ofthemissilebarrieropeningisacceptable.
Asaresultoftheadditionoftheaccessbarriers, themissilebarrieropeningshavebeenreducedbyonly17K.Failureoftheaccessbarrierswillnotadversely affectthefunctionofanysafety-related systemsorcomponents.
However,since,tnebarriersarebeinginstalled inatornadomissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall,thisPCMhasbeenclassified asQualityRelated.Tnismodification doesnotaffectthestructural capability ofthemissilebarrierortheFHBwall,nordoesitposeanysafetyhazards.ThisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Tneadditionoftneaccessbarriershasnoimpactonplantoperation anddoesnot'ffect anysafety'elatedequipment
~SAFETYEVAlUATION Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability of.occurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe.marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforany'technical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionaecause:Theprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased since:a-Thefailureoftheaccessbarriersforthetwo(2)HVACpenetrations locatedatelevation 48ftoftneFuelHandlingBuildingwillnotadversely affectthestructural
.capacity.
ofthe.-.missilebarriernortheFHBwall,forwhichcertainqualitycontrolinspections (e.g.holesizeandverification thatnorebariscut)willbeperformed.
PCN071-186b-Noeffectonequipment orcomponents performing asafetyfunctionarelocatedbeneaththisaccessbarrier.c-TneHVACventilation systemoperation hasnotbeenaffectedbythereduction inthemissilebarrieropening.Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincethismodification willhavenoimpa"tontheplansafeshutdown.
LTnismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification bytheadditionoftheseaccessbarriers.
Tnereisnochangeontneexistingtechnical spe"ification duetotheimplementation ofthisPCH.Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation wnicnprovidesthebasistnatthiscnangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPCN.
PCM074-186HEATERDRAINPUMPDEMINERALIZED MATERSUPPLYABSTRACTThisdesignpackagepaovidestherequiredengineering for,addingpermanent pipingfromthedemineralized watersystemtotheUnit1heaterdrainpumps'echanical seals.Thepipingwillmakeavailable tothesealsthenecessary backupflushingwatermeetingtheappropriate chemistry requirements.
Thebackupwatersourceisrequiredduringinitialplantstartupwheneverthepumpssitidle.Basedonthefailuremodesanalysis.and 10CFR50.59review,thismodification doesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipment andisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentprevention ormitigation.
Thusitdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandiscorrectly classified asNon-Nuclear SafetyRelated.Implementation ofthismodification, therefore, doesnotrequirepriorNRCapproyal.
Sulement1ThispackagerevisionprovidesvalvedrawingsforvalvesaddedbythisPC/MandmocQfiestheexpiration datetoreflectthecorrectformat.Thescopeofworkspecified bythisEngineering Packagehasnotbeenaffectedbythisrevision'.
Thesafetyclassification andthesafetyevaluation asstatediscorrectandisnotimpacted.
SAFETYEVALUATION TheUnit1HeaterDrainPumpsarelocatedinaNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedsystemandassucharenotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.
Therefore, modifications tothesepumpsaffectonlyNon-.NuclearSafetyRelated,QualityGroupDequipment.
Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis, failureofthedemineralized watersupplypipingcouldresultonlyinfailureoftheheaterdrainpumps.Sincethepipingandcomponents arelocatedremotefromanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents, failureofthisequipment willnotinhibitoperation ofanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.
Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59 doesnotexist.oTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.
Sincethisdesignchangedoesnotalteroraffectequipment usedtomitigateaccidents, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanalyzedaccidents remainsunchanged.
oThepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Thereisnonewfailuremodeintroduced bythischangethathasnotbeenevaluated previously intheFSAR.oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.ThischangehasnoaffectonanyexistingTechnical Specifications.
PCM082-186MAINSTEAMPIPINGMODIFICATION ABSTRACTDuringtheas-building ofPCM580-79,theas-builtinformation andfieldwalkdowas indicated thatsomeoQtherestra1nts onMSdrainlinesdidnotconformtothedes1gnanalys1s.
Thestressanalysisperformed incorporating theas-builtinformation indicated stressesinthepipingfortwostresscalculations exceededtheallowable stresslimitsfortheOperat1onal BasesEarthquake (OBE)condition whilethestresslimitsfortheDesignBasesEarthquake
.(DBE)coadition weremet.Inordertocorrect,theoverstress condition iathepip1ng,tworestraints areaddedandtwoexistingrestraints aremodifiedthroughthisengineering designpackage(EDP).Thisissuewas,presented toPlantPersonnel viaFFLPowerPlaatEngineeriag MemoEPO86-1237.Thismemoaddresses the"functionality" aspectsoftheMainSteamdra1npipingiaitspresentconfiguration.
Thepipingsystemconsidered inthisEDPisNuclearSafetyClass2,QualityGroupBandSe1smicCategoryIpipingandhencethesupport/restraints forthispipiagareclassified asNuclearSafetyClass2andSeismicCategoryI'.Thesafetyevaluation hasshowathatthisEDPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.
SafetAnalsesWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto1nvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment importaat tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafeeyanalys1sreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranacc1dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously 1nthesafetyanalysisreport-may becreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesaotinvolveanunrev1ewed safetyquestionand.thefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclus1on:
Thismodificat1on providestwonewrestraints andadditional restraint functiontothetwoexistingrestraints ontheMSdrainlines.Thesemod1fications whenimplemented willreducethestresslevelsinthepip1ngtotheacceptable stresslimitsestab11shed intheUSASB31.7Code,1969Edition.Theintegralattachments (lugs)weldedtothepipingcreateadditional stressesinthepiping.However,thetotalpipingstressesincluding thoseduetotheweldedattachment havebeenshowatobewithinallowable stresslimits.Hence,theintegrity ofthepressureboundaryofthe.pipinghasnotbeencompromised andnonewfailuremechanism hasbeenintroduced.
Therefore.,
the.implementation ofthisPCMdoesnot1acreasetheprobability ofoccurrence orthe,consequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysesReport; PCM082-186(ii)Sincethepipestressesremainwithinthecodeallowable limits,thismodification doesnotcreatethepossiblity foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated
~previously intheSafetyAnalysesReport.(111)Themainsteamsystemasawholehasbeenconsidered inestablishing thebasesforseveraltechnical specifications.
SincetheMSdrainlinepressureboundary1ntegrity hasnotbeenaffected, theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specif1cation.
Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specification.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluat1on whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorcommission approvalfortheimplementation ofth1sPCM1snotrequired.
PCM083-186LOWPOWERPEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEMTheStLucieUnitNo1Peedwater ControlSystemconsistsoftwo(2)feedvater regulators whichoperateInparallel.
Themainfeedvater regulator IBautomatically controlled byathree-element feedwater controlsystemandisresponsive intherangeof15-100Xpoveroperation.
By~assfeedvater regulators aremanuallyoperatedduringplantstartmpintherangeof0-15Xpoveropera~on.
Thezmodynamic characteristics ofthesteamgenerators atlovpowerloadsaresuchthatincreased feedwater flowwilltendtoshrinkorlowerthesteamgenerator level.Atthetimethermalequilibrium hasbeenze-established thelevelwilltendtoincreaseduetoswellingcharacteristics.
Reactortripstherefore couldresultfromeitherahighorlowsteamgenerator level.ThenewLowPowerPeedvater ControlSystem(onefortheLCV-9005andoneforLCV-9006),
vhichismicroprocessor based,isdesignedtoprovidestableandautomatic controloftheby~assfeedvater regulators atlovpowerloadsIntherangeof2-15X.Thesystemwill.receiveandprocesssystemvariables suchassteamgenerator level,feedvater flow/temperature andneutronfluxinordertoprovideforasmoothandsteadyoutputforautomatic controloftheby-passregulators andtosignifIcaatly reducethefrequency ofreactortripsdurIngunitstart~p.ThisnewsystemIsconsidered tobeanextension ofthepresentPeedwater Regulating System,doesnotaffectothersafetyrelatedequipment andassuchprovidesnosafetyrelatedfunctions.
Arevievofthechangestobeimplemented bythIsPCMwasperfozmed againsttherequirements of10CPR50.59.
Asindicated inSection3.0ofthisPCH,thisPCMdoesnotInvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesItrequirearevisiontothetechnical specification; therefore,
'priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPCM.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrenewed safetyquestion; (I)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentozmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethenanyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeczeated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification Isreduced.1)Theprobability ofoccurence orthecoasequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment importaat tosafetypreviously evaluated iatheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreased sincethisnevLowPowerPeedvater ControlSystem(LPPCS)Isaaextension ofthePeedvater Regulating Systemandasdescribed inPUSARSubsection 7.7.1thIssystemsfunctionienotessential, forthesafetyoftheplant.Theinstallation oftheLPPCS'will providecontrolimprovements tomaintainsteamgenerator vaterlevelatsetpointvalueduringunitstartswithsignificant..
reduction Inthenumberofreactortripeduetosteamgenerator levelexcursions.
PCM083-18611)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously in.thesafetyanalys1sreportisnotcreatedsince:Thisinstallation isinaccordance withtheCodeofFederalRegulation'10 CFR50.48andnoimpactisincurredbythisinstallation.
Thenewequipment mountings andaddedcomponents havebeenseismically analyized foradditional loadingandithasbeenconcluded thattheseadditions villnotaltertheoriginalstressconditions orthefundamental frequency oftheRTGBBoards.Consequently, theseismicqualification oftheRTGBoardsvillnotbeadversely affected.
Modification totheRTGBoardshavebeendesignedinaccordance withNUREG0700.Thisinstallation
'isinaccordance withtheCodeofFederalRegulation 10CFR50.49andhasbeendetermined tohavenoimpactontheEnvrionmental Qualification criteriabecausetheequipment islocatedintheControlRoomwhichisamildenvironment.
eTheLPFCS,whichisanextension oftheFeedwater Regulation Systemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnorformitigating theconsequences ofanaccident.
111)Themarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnical Specifications isnotaffectedbythisPC/Msincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.
The1mplementation ofth1sPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischange.doesnotinvolve..
anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM086-186MISAPPLICATION OFLIMITORQUE OPERATORS ABSTRACTThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)replacesthemotorsfortheMainFeedwater PlowControlStati~by-passvalves(MV-09-3andMV-09-4)motoroperators.
Thereplacement oftheexistingmotorswithmotorshavinglowerRPMisrequiredtoreducethevalvestemspeed,tobewithinthelimitsrecommended bythevalveoperatormanufacturer (Limitorque) forthetypeofoperator(SMB)involved.
ThisEDPisclassified non-safety relatedsincetheMainFeedwater FlowControlStations, wheretheaffectedvalvesareinstalled, doesnotperformanysafetyfunctionandareinthenon-safety classportionoftheMainFeedwater System.Thesafetyanalysishascorrectly concluded thatnounreviewed safetyconcernexistandnochangestotheTechnical Specifications arerequiredasaresultofthismodification.
Therefore, previousNRCapprovalfortheimplementation ofthismodification isnot'equired.
ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyand/oroperation.
Revision1wasfo"theremovalofParagraph 9.1whichrequiredaLimitorque representative toprovidetechnical assistance for'theimplementation ofthisEP.Revision2addedtheRevision1description totheabstractandtheEngineering approvalsignature topageIII-i.Revisions 1and2donothaveanimpactonthesafetyclassification and/o"theresultsofthesafetyevaluation ofthisEP.SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchange'shallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanany.aevaluated previously inthesafetyanaIysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.
isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.
Theportionsofthefeedwater systemwherethismodification willbeimplemented arenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.
PCM086-186ii)Thepossiblity foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Speification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponent involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPCNdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotnecessary.
PCM088-186ISOPHASEBUSDUCTJUMPERMODIFICATION TheStLucieUnit1Isolate~ase BussuppliedbyWestinghouse makesuseofcablejumperstoprovideelectrical continuity ateachhousingjointsothatthelongitudinal currentsflowingintheenclosures willflowinaclosedloop.Thesecablesarecontinuously exposedtoweatherresulting inheating,overloading andfurtherinsulation degradation.
Thishasresultedinreducedloadingontheunitwhilerepairs/cleaning takeplace.ThisEPprovidesforthereplacement oftheexistingcablejumperswithlaminated shunts,weldingadaptorbrackets(forcovers)ontothebusenclosure andinstalling coversovertheshuntstoshieldthemfromtheweather.Thisengineering packageisconsidered non-safety relatedinthattheequipment beingmodifieddoesnotinterface withanysafetyrelatedcomponent orfunction.
Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythiswasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59.
Asindicated inSection3.0ofthisEngineering package,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnical specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.-ISAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveandunreviewed safetyquestion:
(1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheanalysisreportmaybeincr'eased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.ITheIsolatedPhaseBusisdescribed inFSARSection8.2.Thiscomponent i.spartoftheoffsitepowersystemandisnotrequiredtomitigateanyaccident.
ThelossofACpowerhasbeenaddressed inFSARSection15.2.9.'he resultsreachedinthatsection,namelythattheplantcanbesafelyshutdownandmaintained inasafeshutdowncondition, isnotaffected.
Infact,withtheadditionofthismodification thereliabilit;y oftheoffsitepowersystemwillbeincreased.
TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Thereplacement ofthecablejumpershasnoimpactonanyplantsystemsandoperations.
TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotnecessary tomitigateormonitoranyresultofanaccident.
Failureofthiscomponent hasnoimpact.,on
.previously generated safetyanalysisrepoits.Themarginofs'afetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotimpacted.
PCM088-186Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, Noaccidentpreviously evaluated takescreditfo"theisolate"PhaseBus.,Taismodification, toimproveoperabilitv andreliability o.tneIsolatedPhaseBus,doesnotaffectanyequipment important tosafety.Assuch,thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability ooccu"enceortheconsequences ofanaccidento"malunctionofequipment important tosafety.TheIsolatedPhaseBus,aspartoftheoffsitepowersystem,isno-requiredtomitigateanyaccidentanddoesnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethenpreviously evaluated.
Thismodification doesnotimpactanytechnical specification andassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreduced.Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59, thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions, andpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM090-186CLOSEINTERCEPT VALVE-CONTROLCIRCUITMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)providesfortheremovaloftheCloseIntercept Valve(CIV)anticipatory controlcircuitfromtheWestinghouse DigitalElectro-hydrauli,c (DEH}turbinecontrolsystem.TheoriginalintentoftheCIVanticipatory circuitwastoprovideatemporary closureoftheInterceptor Valvesintheeventofaloadmismatchbetweenturbinesteamflowandgenerated electrical output.Thisparticular circuitdoesnottakeintoaccountthedynamicresponseoftheturbinesteamcycles,'or doestheDEHmodelP-2000containthenecessary
'rogramming softwaretoperformtherequiredcalculations toautomatically ad)usttheturbinegovernorvalvestothenewthermodynamic values.Thesefeatures, therefore, will,inmostcases,maintaintheInterceptor Valvesclosedwitharesultant tripofboththeturbineandthereactor.TheCIVcontrolcircu1t1sadownstream extensi.on oftheDEHoverspeed c'ontrolchannel.Systemfailurewouldnotimpactplantsafety,sincethissystemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnordoesitperformanysafetyrelatedfunctions.
HowevertheDEHControlSystemisrequiredtobeoperablebytheTechnical Specifications.
Sincethismodif1cation impactsthesubjectcontrolcircuit,thisengineering designpackageshallbeclassified asanalityRelated.Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPC/Mwasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59.
Asindicated inSection3.0ofthisPC/M,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoes.itrequirearevisi'on tothetechnical specification; therefore, priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTi.tie10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence oftheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment 1mportant tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibilSty foranaccidentormalfunct1on ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreatd;or(ii.i)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced;Theprobability ofoccurrence astheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalys1sReportisnotincreased bythisPC/M.Thismodification totheCIVcontrolcircuitdoesnotchangeoraltertheturbine-generator monitoring andcontrolsystem.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofatypedifferent thanpreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:
PCM090-186TheCIVcontrolcircuitisanindependent functiongenerated bytheDEHcontrolsystemsoftware.
Theremovalofthe,CIVanticipatory functiondoesnotaltertheoperation oftheDEHcontrolsystem.Thismodification, whichwillremovethepartialloadmismatchcircuit,willreducethenumberofspuriousreactortripswhichwilloccurshouldtheInterceptor Valvesfailtore-open.Theturbineoverspeed protection channelstoboththeReheaterStopvalvesandtheIntercept valvesandthemechanical overspeed protection channelsarenotalteredbyimplementation ofthiscircuitmodification.
Therefore, themarginofsafetyforturbineruptureduetotheprobability ofturbineoverspeed isnotreduced.The'mplementation ofthis.PC/M doesnotrequireachangetotheStLucieUnit1Technical Specifications.
"Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebases.thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired."
PCM093-186RTGBANNUNCIATOR GROUNDDETECTION ABSTRACTPrimarypowerfortheRTGBAnnuniciator actuation circuitsisprovidedbytheplant125VDCungrounded powersupply.Althoughtheplant125VDCungrounded powersupplyisfurnished withagroundfaultdetection system,thesegroundfaultdetectormodulesareineffective indetecting agroundfaultontheannunciator 125VDCactuation system.TheRTGBannunciators containaDCisolation circuitwhichessentially separates theplant125VDCsyst:emfromtheannunciator 125VDCactuation circuit.Asingle'ground faultoneitherthepositiveornegativeterminalofanungrounded systemwillremainundetected andthesystemwilloperatenormally.
Intheeventofasecondgroundontheoppositepolarityline,ashortcircuitwillbecreatedcausinglineinterruption bywayofthefuseswithresultant lossofthesystem.Corrective actionfollowing acatastropic failureisextremely difficult sinceafaultwillnowexistonbothlines.Itisextremely important therefore thatgroundfaultbedetectedandclearedassoonaspractical.
EachRTGBAnnunciator (totalof6)willbefurnished withanindividual grounddetector.
Thesegrounddetectors willmonitortheannunciator 125VDCactuation sy'temforexcesscurrentleakagelevelstoground.Groundfaultindication willbeprovidedviaindicating lampslocatedonthefrontofeachoftheground-detector modules.Inordertoincreaseefficiency introubleshootingandlocatinggroundfaults,atotalofsixgrounddetectormoduleswillbeinstalled intheRTGboard101.Eachgroundfaultdetectorshalldetectthosegroundlevelleakagecurrentswhichmayexceedpresetvalues.Thismodi=ication willim"roveboththeoperability andtheavailabil'ty oftheRTGBannunciator system.Theannuncietors servenoszetyre'ate"function.
Howevesincethispackageinvolvesmodification tothemair.co"t"o'oard, itmayrequireworkinandaroundsafetyrelatedsub-panels, compartments, etc.Therefore, thispackageisconsidered tobeQualityRelated.Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59.
Asindicatec inSection3.0ofthisPCM,this"PCMdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnical specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisP&i.  


PCM093-186SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfucntionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe'marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ITheprobabilityofoccurrenceastheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreasedbythisPCM.TheimplementationofgroundfaultdetectorsdoesnotchangeoraltertheoperationoftheRTGBannunicatorsystem.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofatypedifferentthanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince.Thenew'quipmentmountinghasbeenseismicallyanalyzedforadditionalloadinginaccordancewithSt.LucieDesignCriteriaManual,SectionIandfoundnottohaveanyimpactontheseismicqualificationoftheboards.ThegrouncfaultdetectorswillbelocatedintheControlRoom,whichisconsideredtobeamileenvironment.Tneadd.zionofgroundrau'deecto"stotheannunciator125VDCsvstemwillenhancebot.".theoperab'lityactheavai'labilityoftheRTGBannunicatorsystem.Tneuseoffusesonthe125VDCcircuitprovidesforisolatingnon-classlEcircuitsfromClasslEandassociatedcircuits.IThegrounddetectormodulesandtheirmountingdeviceswereanalyzedanditwasdeterminedthattheywillretaintheirstructuralintegrityduringandfollowinganSS"".TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequire'achangetotnePlantTechnicalSpecifications."Theforgoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired."hy PCM095-186REPLACEMENTOFINSTRUMENTSCALESABSTRACTThisEngineeringDesignPackagecoversthereplacementofthescalesforthefollowinginstruments;indicatorTIA-1116,"QuenchTankTemperature,indicatorsPI-09-2A,2BandrecordersFR-09-2A,2B"Aux.F.W.Pumps2A42Bdischarge/TheindicatorsarelocatedontheRTGBoardwhiletherecordersarelocatedonthePostAccidentPanel-(PAP).Thepresentscalerangesontheseindicatorsandrecotdersdonotagreewiththeinstrumentranges.listedintheOctober1985RG1.97Rev.3,"ParameterSummarySheet"TypeDvariables.NonconformanceReports5287and0288(Attachments7.1and7.2)identifythediscrepanciesbetweentheexistingandtherequiredscaleranges.Asa.resultofthescalereplacementtheassociatedtransmittersFT-09-2AandFT-09-2BwiQrequirerecalibrationinordertoaccommodatetheextendedranges.ThisPCMisclassifiedasnuclear.safetyrelatedsincesomeoftheindicatorsandrecordersaremonitoringasafetyrelatedsystem.However,themodificationinitiatedbythisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAPETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclusion:(i)Thismodificationprovidesnewscalesforexistinginstrumentsinordertoincreasetheviewingrangeoftheparameters,whileallthecomponentsandcircuitryremainunchanged.Therefore,theimplementationofthisPCMhasnoeffectonsafetyanddoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysesReport.(ii)Sincethecomponentsandcircuitryremain'nchanged,thismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccident'ormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysesReport.(iii)TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification,forthereasonsstatedabove.Theimplementa!ono:hisPCY.doesno";requireachangetoplanttechncialspecifica:!on.Theforgoingcons:itutes,per10CFR50.59(b),tnewrittensafetyevaluationwhichp!ovidesthebasesthe-.th!schangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyques-.ionandpriorNRCapp!ovalfortheimplementationoithisPMinotrequired.
PCM093-186SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence oftheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfucntion ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe'margin ofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ITheprobability ofoccurrence astheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreased bythisPCM.Theimplementation ofgroundfaultdetectors doesnotchangeoraltertheoperation oftheRTGBannunicator system.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofatypedifferent thanpreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince.Thenew'quipment mountinghasbeenseismically analyzedforadditional loadinginaccordance withSt.LucieDesignCriteriaManual,SectionIandfoundnottohaveanyimpactontheseismicqualification oftheboards.Thegrouncfaultdetectors willbelocatedintheControlRoom,whichisconsidered tobeamileenvironment.
PCM098-186HYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONSThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)allowsforthereplacementoftheinboardvalve(valveclosesttotheReactorContainmentVessel)onContainmentPenetrationsP-56,P-57andP-58,Theexistingvalveshaveflangedendsandthenewvalvesarebuttwelded.ThismodificationisbeingimplementedtoimprovetheContainmentVesselintegritywithrespecttopostaccidentleakageratesbyreplacingflangedconnectionswithweldedconnections.ThisEDPisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem,ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthatthisEDPdoesnotconstituteanyunreviewedsafetyquestions,nordoesitrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange,Therefoze,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunzeviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentozmalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.ThereplacementvalvesforthismodificationareclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated,ASMESectionIII,Class2,QualityGroupB,becausetheyareReactorContainmentBuildingisolationvalves.Themodificationsincludedinthisengineeringdesignpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedispotincreasedsincereplacementofthehydzogenpurgepenetrationsisolationvalvesdoes'otaffecttheirdualperfonnancerequirements.TheperformancerequirementforcontainmentisolationremainsintactandisperiodicallyverifiedbytestinginaccordancewithlOCFR50,AppendixJ.Theperformancerequirementforhydrogenpurgehasbeenverifiedasremainingacceptable.Thereisnopossib'itdfferenttvpethananmod'atiodoesnoOperatingP"o"edureo"modificationisaoeyforanaccidentormalfunctionoaypreviouslyevaluated.Taisc'nangaa"yex't'ngDesignCr'ez'a,Teen"ica'pe"'fice"'on.Thisfo"one=e=acme"..:o=exstingequipment.
Tneadd.zionofgroundrau'deecto"stotheannunciator 125VDCsvstemwillenhancebot.".theoperab'lity actheavai'lability oftheRTGBannunicator system.Tneuseoffusesonthe125VDCcircuitprovidesforisolating non-class lEcircuitsfromClasslEandassociated circuits.
PCM098-186(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotaffectthebas's=oranyTechnicalSpeci'ation,andthereforedoesnot"educethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisfo=an~~echricalSpecifications.ImplementationofthisEnginee'ngDesignPackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTec'nnica'pecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFP50.59(b),'thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorachangetotheTechnicalSpecificaion;thuspriorCommissionapprovaifortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
IThegrounddetectormodulesandtheirmountingdeviceswereanalyzedanditwasdetermined thattheywillretaintheirstructural integrity duringandfollowing anSS"".Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequire'achangetotnePlantTechnical Specifications.
PCM106-186HIREXCITATIONSYSTEMABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationstotheTurbine-Generatorbrushlessexcitationsystem.ThebrushlessexcitationsystemwillbeupgradedtoaHighInitialResponse(HIR)BrushlessExcitationSystemwhichwillallowthegenerato~orespondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.A1argerpermanentmagnetgenerator,anewstatorcoilinbrushlessexciter,anewvoltageregulatorandanewvoltageregulatorenclosurewillberequiredtomodifythissystem.TheTurbineWeneratordoesnotperformasafetyrelatedfunction.ThemodificationstotheTurbineGeneratorareclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated.However,sincetherewillbemodificationstotheRTGBoards,thispackageisclassifiedasQualityRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionsincethemodificationsdescribedabovewillhavenoimpactonplantoperationsorsafetyrelatedequipment.Sulement1ThissupplementrevisedtheAbstractandProjectScopepages.Theoriginalsafetyevaiuationisnotaffectedbyth'supplement.Suelement2Th'ssupp'ementincorporatesthevendorietterdocumentingtheexcitercomponen.seria'umber>dawngsfc"irstaiiationofvoltageregulatorenciosure;fabrietiodrawngsfc"theHVAduct;testingandprotectionrequ'ementsfortheconcreteinsulationbeneaththevoitagereguiato"andreguiato"enciosure;revisiontodrawinglist.Theoriginalsaetyevaluationisno-affectecbythissuppiement.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysTsreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheTurbineGeneratorHighInitialResponse(HIR)brushlessexcitationsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Alargerpermanentmagnetgenerator(PMG),statorcoilinbrushlessexciterandvoltageregulatorwillreplacetheexistingequipmentandhaveno.impactonanyplantsystemoroperation.The.HWexcitationsystemallowsthegeneratortorespondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.
"Theforgoingconstitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
PCM106-186Subsection3.5.3.2oftheFSARaddressesExternalMissileswithsubpart(b)addressingTurbineMissiles,specifically,missilesgeneratedbythehighpressureturbinerotorandthelowpressureturbinediscs.Therearenochangestothehighpressureturbinerotor'northelowpressureturbinediscs.Themodificationsrequiredto'pgradethesystemincludeanewPMGrotor,PMGstatorandexciterstatorwhicharelocatedattheexciterend.Theconsequencesofturbinefailureandthepotentialfordamagetocriticalplantstructures,systems,andcomponentsfromtheresultingmissileshasnotbeenincreasedbythismod'fication.ThemodificatonstotheTubineGenerator,thevoltageregulator,thevoltag'eregulatorenclosu"eancthoHVACsvstemIntheTurb'neBuildingarenotsafetyrelatedandccnotaf=ectanyplantsystems.Thecablesforthelighting,receptaclesandpowe"feecsinthevoltagereguatorenclosureareroutedincabletrayandconduitintheTubineBuilding.Tneydonotrequireseism'csupportancdonotaffectsafetyrelatedeouipment.ThemodificationstotheRTGBoardswillinvolvethereplacemento:selectorswitcheswithanupdatedversion,thatisthesamesizeandhasanegligibleweightdifreentialastheexistingswitches,therelablingofannunciatorwindowsandtheactuationo.anexistingsparerelay,thatwillhavethesamecharacteristicsastheex'tingequipment.ThesemodificationsdonoteffectthesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheaffectedRTGBoards.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes~per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommi.ssionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired."
PCM112-986TURBINEBUILDINGCRANEGURDERCONNECTIONANGLEMODIFICATIONSRecently,crackingandexcessivepryingdeformationwerenotedatsomeofthecranegirderconnectionsinthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1and2turbinebuildings.kn,evaluationoftheconditionconcludedthatthefailureswereattributabl'etotheinabilityoftheconnectionsatcolumnline20toslideasoriginallydesigned.=ThisPC/Mw111providemodificationstothecranegirderconnectionsatcolumnline20torestoreindependentthermalmovementbetweentheunits.Modificationswillalsobeimplementedattheothercranegirderconnectionsinthelaydownareatoprovidereinforcementforthoseconnectionswhichmayhavebeensub)ectedtooverstressasaresultofthethermalrestraintofthecranegirders.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Theturbinebuildingsareclassifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelatedstructuresandthereforethemodificationdoesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment..Theconnectionmodificationshavenoimpactonplantoperationexceptforrestrict1onsonthemovementoftheturbinegantrycraneswhilethemodificationsareinprogress.The'urbinebuildingshavebeendesignedforseismicloadingtopreclude-interactionwithad)scentSeismicCategoryIstructuresduringaseismicevent.Consequently,thisPC/HisclassifiedasQualityRelated.
hy PCM095-186REPLACEMENT OFINSTRUMENT SCALESABSTRACTThisEngineering DesignPackagecoversthereplacement ofthescalesforthefollowing instruments; indicator TIA-1116, "QuenchTankTemperature, indicators PI-09-2A, 2Bandrecorders FR-09-2A, 2B"Aux.F.W.Pumps2A42Bdischarge/
PCMI'12-986SAFETYEVALUATIONSafetAnalsisWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshillbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisPC/MprovidesmodificationstothecranegirderconnectionsinthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1andUnit2turbinebuildingstorestoreindependentthermalmovementbetweentheunits.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thefollowingarethebasesforthisconclusion:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillbeperformedinaccordancewithQualityRelatedrequirements,hencetheseismiccapabilityoftheturbinebuildingsisnotcompromisedandtherecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentSeismicCategoryIstructures,systems,orequipment.(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslvsincetheturbinebuildingsarenon-safetyrelatedstructurescontain'ngnosafety-relatedequipment,hencethismodificationcanhavenoimpactonanysafety-relatedsystem.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed'safetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.  
Theindicators arelocatedontheRTGBoardwhiletherecorders arelocatedonthePostAccidentPanel-(PAP).
Thepresentscalerangesontheseindicators andrecotders donotagreewiththeinstrument ranges.listedintheOctober1985RG1.97Rev.3,"Parameter SummarySheet"TypeDvariables.
Nonconformance Reports5287and0288(Attachments 7.1and7.2)identifythediscrepancies betweentheexistingandtherequiredscaleranges.Asa.resultofthescalereplacement theassociated transmitters FT-09-2AandFT-09-2BwiQrequirerecalibration inordertoaccommodate theextendedranges.ThisPCMisclassified asnuclear.safetyrelatedsincesomeoftheindicators andrecorders aremonitoring asafetyrelatedsystem.However,themodification initiated bythisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
SAPETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclusion:
(i)Thismodification providesnewscalesforexistinginstruments inordertoincreasetheviewingrangeoftheparameters, whileallthecomponents andcircuitry remainunchanged.
Therefore, theimplementation ofthisPCMhasnoeffectonsafetyanddoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysesReport.(ii)Sincethecomponents andcircuitry remain'nchanged, thismodification doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccident'ormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysesReport.(iii)Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification, forthereasonsstatedabove.Theimplementa!on o:hisPCY.doesno";requireachangetoplanttechncial specifica:!
on.Theforgoingcons:itutes, per10CFR50.59 (b),tnewrittensafetyevaluation whichp!ovidesthebasesthe-.th!schangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyques-.ion andpriorNRCapp!ovalfortheimplementation oithisPMinotrequired.
PCM098-186HYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONS ThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)allowsforthereplacement oftheinboardvalve(valveclosesttotheReactorContainment Vessel)onContainment Penetrations P-56,P-57andP-58,Theexistingvalveshaveflangedendsandthenewvalvesarebuttwelded.Thismodification isbeingimplemented toimprovetheContainment Vesselintegrity withrespecttopostaccidentleakageratesbyreplacing flangedconnections withweldedconnections.
ThisEDPisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem,Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthatthisEDPdoesnotconstitute anyunreviewed safetyquestions, nordoesitrequireaTechnical Specification change,Therefoze, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunzeviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentozmalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.Thereplacement valvesforthismodification areclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated,ASMESectionIII,Class2,QualityGroupB,becausetheyareReactorContainment Buildingisolation valves.Themodifications includedinthisengineering designpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated ispotincreased sincereplacement ofthehydzogenpurgepenetrations isolation valvesdoes'otaffecttheirdualperfonnance requirements.
Theperformance requirement forcontainment isolation remainsintactandisperiodically verifiedbytestinginaccordance withlOCFR50,AppendixJ.Theperformance requirement forhydrogenpurgehasbeenverifiedasremaining acceptable.
Thereisnopossib'it dfferenttvpethananmod'atiodoesnoOperating P"o"edure o"modification isaoeyforanaccidentormalfunction oaypreviously evaluated.
Taisc'nangaa"yex't'ngDesignCr'ez'a,Teen"ica'pe"'fice"'on.
Thisfo"one=e=acme"..:o=exstingequipment.
PCM098-186(iii)Thismodification doesnotaffectthebas's=oranyTechnical Speci'ation,andtherefore doesnot"educethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisfo=an~~echricalSpecifications.
Implementation ofthisEnginee'ngDesignPackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTec'nnica'pecification.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFP50.59 (b),'thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorachangetotheTechnical Specifica ion;thuspriorCommission approvaifortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM106-186HIREXCITATION SYSTEMABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodifications totheTurbine-Generator brushless excitation system.Thebrushless excitation systemwillbeupgradedtoaHighInitialResponse(HIR)Brushless Excitation Systemwhichwillallowthegenerato~o respondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.A1argerpermanent magnetgenerator, anewstatorcoilinbrushless exciter,anewvoltageregulator andanewvoltageregulator enclosure willberequiredtomodifythissystem.TheTurbineWenerator doesnotperformasafetyrelatedfunction.
Themodifications totheTurbineGenerator areclassified asnonsafetyrelated.However,sincetherewillbemodifications totheRTGBoards,thispackageisclassified asQualityRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionsincethemodifications described abovewillhavenoimpactonplantoperations orsafetyrelatedequipment.
Sulement1Thissupplement revisedtheAbstractandProjectScopepages.Theoriginalsafetyevaiuation isnotaffectedbyth'supplement.
Suelement2Th'ssupp'ement incorporates thevendorietterdocumenting theexcitercomponen.
seria'umber
>dawngsfc"irstaiiation ofvoltageregulator enciosure; fabrietiodrawngsfc"theHVAduct;testingandprotection requ'ements fortheconcreteinsulation beneaththevoitagereguiato" andreguiato" enciosure; revisiontodrawinglist.Theoriginalsaetyevaluation isno-affectecbythissuppiement.
SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysTsreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.TheTurbineGenerator HighInitialResponse(HIR)brushless excitation systemisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Alargerpermanent magnetgenerator (PMG),statorcoilinbrushless exciterandvoltageregulator willreplacetheexistingequipment andhaveno.impactonanyplantsystemoroperation.
The.HWexcitation systemallowsthegenerator torespondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.
PCM106-186Subsection 3.5.3.2oftheFSARaddresses ExternalMissileswithsubpart(b)addressing TurbineMissiles, specifically, missilesgenerated bythehighpressureturbinerotorandthelowpressureturbinediscs.Therearenochangestothehighpressureturbinerotor'nor thelowpressureturbinediscs.Themodifications requiredto'pgrade thesystemincludeanewPMGrotor,PMGstatorandexciterstatorwhicharelocatedattheexciterend.Theconsequences ofturbinefailureandthepotential fordamagetocriticalplantstructures, systems,andcomponents fromtheresulting missileshasnotbeenincreased bythismod'fication.
Themodificatons totheTubineGenerator, thevoltageregulator, thevoltag'eregulator enclosu"e ancthoHVACsvstemIntheTurb'neBuildingarenotsafetyrelatedandccnotaf=ectanyplantsystems.Thecablesforthelighting, receptacles andpowe"feecsinthevoltagereguatorenclosure areroutedincabletrayandconduitintheTubineBuilding.
Tneydonotrequireseism'csupportancdonotaffectsafetyrelatedeouipment.
Themodifications totheRTGBoardswillinvolvethereplacement o:selectorswitcheswithanupdatedversion,thatisthesamesizeandhasanegligible weightdifreentialastheexistingswitches, therelabling ofannunciator windowsandtheactuation o.anexistingsparerelay,thatwillhavethesamecharacteristics astheex'tingequipment.
Thesemodifications donoteffectthesafetyrelatedfunctions oftheaffectedRTGBoards.Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes~
per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommi.ssion approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM112-986TURBINEBUILDINGCRANEGURDERCONNECTIONANGLE MODIFICATIONS
: Recently, crackingandexcessive pryingdeformation werenotedatsomeofthecranegirderconnections inthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1and2turbinebuildings.
kn,evaluation ofthecondition concluded thatthefailureswereattributabl'e totheinability oftheconnections atcolumnline20toslideasoriginally designed.
=ThisPC/Mw111providemodifications tothecranegirderconnections atcolumnline20torestoreindependent thermalmovementbetweentheunits.Modifications willalsobeimplemented attheothercranegirderconnections inthelaydownareatoprovidereinforcement forthoseconnections whichmayhavebeensub)ected tooverstress asaresultofthethermalrestraint ofthecranegirders.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Theturbinebuildings areclassified asnonnuclear safetyrelatedstructures andtherefore themodification doesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.
.Theconnection modifications havenoimpactonplantoperation exceptforrestrict1ons onthemovementoftheturbinegantrycraneswhilethemodifications areinprogress.
The'urbine buildings havebeendesignedforseismicloadingtopreclude-interaction withad)scentSeismicCategoryIstructures duringaseismicevent.Consequently, thisPC/Hisclassified asQualityRelated.
PCMI'12-986SAFETYEVALUATION SafetAnalsisWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshillbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisPC/Mprovidesmodifications tothecranegirderconnections inthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1andUnit2turbinebuildings torestoreindependent thermalmovementbetweentheunits.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Thefollowing arethebasesforthisconclusion:
Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willbeperformed inaccordance withQualityRelatedrequirements, hencetheseismiccapability oftheturbinebuildings isnotcompromised andtherecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentSeismicCategoryIstructures, systems,orequipment.
(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previouslv sincetheturbinebuildings arenon-safety relatedstructures contain'ng nosafety-related equipment, hencethismodification canhavenoimpactonanysafety-related system.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed
'safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.  


PCM116-1860TURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIRThisEngineeringDesignPackagecoversvariousrepairsnecessarytobeperformedintheHPturbineexhaustpipes.Theserepairsarenecessitatedbydamageduetowetsteamerosionofturningvanebracingbars,backingringsofcircumferentialwelds,andpipewali.Thecarbonsteelbracingbarswillbereplacedwithstainlesssteelbarswhicharemoreresistanttoerosionlcorrosiondamage.Thebackingringswillberemovedandanypipewalldamagewillberepairedt'orestorethe'crossunderpipetoacceptablethickness.Thismodificationisclassifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelatedanddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.OperationoftheHPturbineexhaustlineshasnotbeenaffected.Basedonfailuremodeevaluationand10CFR50.59reviews,ithasbeendeterminedthatnounreviewedsafetyquestionexistsasaresultofthischange.Therefore,priorNRCapprovaifortheimplementationofthismodificationisnotrequired.ThissupplementincorporatedY/estinghouseElectricCorp.commentsregardingtheuseofadifferen.typeofstainlesssteelmate.ialfortheturningvanebracingbars.Thi<<<pp1e"mentdoesnota=rectthesafetyeva1uatior..<VAThep.opose'ociica.ions.otheturbinecrossunderpipewil!resto.ethecomponen:stcoricinaldesicr:cn;igurationancprovideincreasecmarginagainstpre..atureerosionwearduetotheserviceconditions.Basedonthemostrecentinspectionthecarbonstee!bracingbarsor:theturningvanesmustbereplacedduetoextremeerosion.Theremai..ingnumberofbackingringsmustalsoberemovedtopreventturbulenceinsteamflowandsubsequentpipewallerosior,.Anyexistingpipewallerosionwillberepairedtorestorewailthicknesstothenominalvalue.TheSt.LucieUnit1HPturbinecrossunderpipeisdesignatedasnonnuclearsafetyrelated,QualityGroupD.Accordingly,themodificationstothecrossunderpipehavebeendesignatedasnon-nuclearsafetyrelated,QualityGroupD-Afailuremodeanalysishasdemonstratedthatthemodificationstothecrossunderpipeoranyofitscomponentswillhavenoeffecton,orinhibittheoperationof,anysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.Thecrossunderpipeislocatedremotelyfromanysafetyrelatedequipmentandcannot.fallon,hit,orotherwiseaffectanysuchequipment.
PCM116-1860TURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIRThisEngineering DesignPackagecoversvariousrepairsnecessary tobeperformed intheHPturbineexhaustpipes.Theserepairsarenecessitated bydamageduetowetsteamerosionofturningvanebracingbars,backingringsofcircumferential welds,andpipewali.Thecarbonsteelbracingbarswillbereplacedwithstainless steelbarswhicharemoreresistant toerosionlcorrosion damage.Thebackingringswillberemovedandanypipewalldamagewillberepairedt'orestorethe'cross underpipetoacceptable thickness.
PCM117-186EXTRACTIONSTEANPIPINGANDPITTING-NATERIALUPGRADEABSTRACTAruptureofane:<tracionsearnlineonunit1duringcycle7resultedinaforcedoutageandalossofappro:cimately~'Pfullpowerhours.Ane::aminationofthefailedpipeandafolio~-upengineeringevaluationconcludedthatErosion/Corrosionwas'hefailuremechanism.Erosion/Corrosionisanindustrywideproblemthatisuniqueto<<etsteampipingsystems.Erosion/Corrosionisanaceleratedformofcorrosioninducedbyflewduetothebreakdownofaprotectiveocidefilmfromthematerial'ssurface.ThisPC/MprovidesdetailsandinstrucionsforplantpersonneltoreplaceerodedcarbonsteelpipingandfittingsintheE::tractionSteamsystemsonan"as-needed"basis.Thefittingstobereplacedwill.be'dentfiedfollowingreviewofultrasonicinspectondataduringthe1<C7refuelingcutage.Thenewma'r''alsspecifiedASTMP.-.a<NP'22(fIttings)andASTMA-~'(P22(piping)a.e,chromium-molybdenumalloysandwillprcvidesuperiorresstancetccorrosion/erosioneffects.Addi"iona'y.thenewma~eri=-;=canbewe'dedintathee::istincA-10~andA-1V~pip'ncanc-.t"ines.Theetentcfthereplacementrec''receachs'tua-iorwi'bebaseconinscec-'ndatareviewbyPower~lan=Enoiner.nc.T'~ee.'tentofthereplacemen-requ'.eandGea'scft.aeseeepacemeltsw'eaodedtcthepackagevatet'ploess~ThisPC/M'sSa-.etyRe'tedc~ass''cncnsesmic)sl.'s<<ems~as."Ncn-Nuc1ea.Safe-yRc1a-ed"snceQua'-yC.ourDpipinginNon-Nuclea.Basedonthe-.ai'remocesana'si5nd10CFR50'Prev'"ew"5smodificationdoesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipmentanc'snctrel'd~uponfo.anyaccidentpreventionormitiga'on.Thusitdoesnctco,.s-'."uteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Sincetherearenounrev'ewedsafetyquestions,andsincenochance>>iotechnica'pecificationsareinvo)ved,thisPC/Mmaybe'mplementedwithcutproirNRCapproval.SAFETYEUALL'P7IONTheUnit1E::rect'onSteamSystemisaNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedsystenandassuch'notrequiredtofunc"'r.duringanye>:istinganaly"edacc'dentscenario.Therefore,mod''aticnstothese,pipesaffectonlyNon-NuclearSafetyRela"ed,QualityC.oupDequipment.Themcdfica-'or,isamaterialupgradeonly.Thenewmateralhasbeer.shcwn,intheDesignAnalysis,cmeetalldesigr,requ,'rementsc<tneprevousmaterial.
Thismodification isclassified asnonnuclear safetyrelatedanddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
PCM117-186Postul'atedfailuresoftheextractionsteamlinewouldhavenoimpactonsafeshutdownof-theplant,orsafetyrelatedsystems.Theextractionsteamlinesarenotusedtopreventpostulatedacidents,mitigatetheconsequencesofsuchacc.dents,maintainsafeshutdownconditions,or'adequatelystorespentfuel.Thefollowing,statementsdemonstratethatanunreviewedsafetyques"ion,asdefinedby10CFR50.59,does.notexist:Theprobablityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.importantosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport,hasnotbeenincreased.Failureofanextractionsteamlineisnotconside.edasanaccidentinitiat'geventorconsideredindetermining*theprobabilityofanaccident.Also,sincethisdesign.changedoesnotalteroraffectequipmentusedtomitigateaccidents,theprobabilityofmalfunc'.'onofequipmentimportanttosafetyrema'sunchangedThepcsibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferen"typethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetvan-lysisreporthasnotbeencreated;Thereisncnewfa'hathasno-beenAdd'ona'yonofailurmodeintrodcedbythischangeeva'ua"edprev'ouslyintheFSA.-",.'.uremodesana'=edytheFS.-".Rare~MIweI~Themare'cfsafetyasce!inedinthebasis(ehncapeelf:cationshasnotbeenreouced.fcranyThischangehasnoeffec"'nanyexisiinoSpec.-.icataonsanadoeno=requireanychangTechn'a'oecificaticns.Tehni.ca1esto.theSincencunreviewedsafteycuestionshavebeendeterninedtoexis,andsincenorevisionstotheTechnicalSpec''fiat''cnsa.erequired,NRCapprovalisnotrequiredpriortomp'mentaion.
Operation oftheHPturbineexhaustlineshasnotbeenaffected.
PCM118-186REACTORCAVITYSEALRINGABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagemodifiestheSt.LucieUnit1ReactorCavitySealRing.Themodificationsconsistofenlargingthepenetrationsinthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallationandaddingpenetrationsandpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.'hiswaterprovidesadditionalshieldingwhiletheringisinplace.Thewatershallberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusionoftheoutage.Also,thecavitysea)ringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetoastainlesssteelbraidhose.ThecavitysealringbasedontheFSARisnon-nuclearsafetyrelated.SomequalityrequirementsareassignedtoassurethattheReactorCavitySealRingwillperformitsintendedfunction.Basedonafailuremodeevaluationanda10CFR50.59review,thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,norrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisengineeringpackage.SAFETYEVALUATIONThisEngineeringPackagemodifiedtheSt.LucieUnit1ReactoiCavitySealRing.Themodificationsconsistofenlargingthepenetrationsinthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallationandaddingpenetrationsandpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.Thiswaterpiovidesadditionalshieldingwhiletheringisinplace.ThewatershaQberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusionoftheoutage.Also,thecavitysealringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetostainlesssteelbiaidhose.Basedontheaboveandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.oTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.SincethereactorcavitysealringisnotconsideredbytheFSARindeterminingtheprobabilityofaccidents,possibletypesofaccidents,orintheevaluationofconsequencesofaccidents,itcanbeconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaccidentspreviouslyaddressedintheFSARremainsunchanged.
Basedonfailuremodeevaluation and10CFR50.59 reviews,ithasbeendetermined thatnounreviewed safetyquestionexistsasaresultofthischange.Therefore, priorNRCapprovaifortheimplementation ofthismodification isnotrequired.
PCM118-186oThepossibQtyofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Sincethesealingportionofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,thepossibilityofanacidentofadifferenttypehasnotbeencreated,oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeen."educed.Again,sincethesealingpor'r,ofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.10CFR50.59allowschangestoafacilityasdescribedintheFSARifanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationisnotrequired.Asshownintheprecedingsection=-,thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59thatpertainstoanunreviewedsafetyquestioncanbepositivelyanswered.Also,nochangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisrequiredbasedontheaboveevaluation.Inconclusion,thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptablefromthestandpointofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,anddoesnotrequireanychangetoTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthemodification.
Thissupplement incorporated Y/estinghouse ElectricCorp.commentsregarding theuseofadifferen.
PCM119-18610CFR50.49ENVIRONMENTALQUALIFICATIONLISTREVISIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackageprovidesthevehicleforupdatingseveralareasofequipmentqualification.Thispackageincludescorrectionstothe10CFR50.49list,changesinmaintenancerequirements,andvariousdocumentationpackagecorrections.ThisEngineeringPackage(EP)isconsideredNuclearSafetyRelatedbecauseitaffectsequipment'fallingunderthescopeof10CFR50.49.ThispackagedoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestionsinceitdealsstrictlywithenhancingthepresentdocumentationusedtoqualifyequipmentatStLucieUnitNo1andnophysicalplantmodificationsarerequiredbytheEP.ThesafetyevaluationofthispackageindicatesthatachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.Removalofequipmentfromthe10CFR50.49listdoesnotaffectplantsafetyandoperation.Sulement1ThisEPrevisionaddsterminalblockstothe10CFR50.49listandtheirassociatedEquipmentQualificationDocumentationPackage8770-A-451-17.0"AmeraceTerminalBlocks".TheequipmentandEQDocumentationPackagedoesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisEngineeringPackageprovidesforseveralchangestothepresentStLucieUnitNo.1's10CFR50.49list.Thisdocumentationwillaffectthefutureprocurementofvarioussafetyrelatedcomponentsandassistinvalidatingthecomponents'bilitytofunctionbefore,duringandafteradesignbasisaccident.Therefore,thisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.0Thedocumentationchangesaddressedinthispackagerangefromcorrectionsoftypographicalerrorsonthe10CFR50.49listtoadditionsanddeletionsofequipmentasaresultofEQdocumentationpackagesreviews.Noneofthechangesrequirephysicalmodificationtoanyplantsystem.Theydo,however,affectthefuturemaintenanceofvariousequipment.ThepossibilityofnewDesignBasisEvents(DBEs)notconsideredintheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethischangedoesnot-alteranyequipmentusedtomitigateaccidents.Thismodificationisanenhancementoftheenvironmentalqualificationdocumentationofvariousequipmentandinnowayaffectstheplantdesign.
typeofstainless steelmate.ialfortheturningvanebracingbars.Thi<<<pp1e" mentdoesnota=rectthesafetyeva1uatior..
PCM119-186DuetothefactthatthisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessentialtosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociatedwithachievingandmaintainingshutdowns,thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirements.ThereforetheproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandUFSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.Sincethismodificationinvolvesnophysicalmodificationstosafetyrelatedequipmentandchangesinthemaintenancescheduleswillnotresultinfailureofequipment,thedegreeofprotectionprovidedtoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipmentisunchanged.Removalofequipmentfromthe10CFR50.49listdoesnotaffectthe.plant'ssafety."Theprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentisunchanged.Theprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviously,evaluatedintheUFSARremainsunchanged.TheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARareunchanged.ThepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyzedintheUFSARisnotcreated.Basedontheabove,themodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseofthefollowingreasons:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceandtheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysis'eportwillnotbe'ncreasedbythismodificationbecauseit'oesnotaffecttheavailability,redundancy,capacity,orfunctionofanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.(ii)ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification..Function,mountingandtheabilitytowithstandharshenvironmentalconditionshavenotbeenalteredandthismodificationdoesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsincethismodificationdoesnotchangetherequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecifications.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
<VAThep.opose'ociica.ions.otheturbinecrossunderpipewil!resto.ethecomponen:s tcoricinaldesicr:cn;iguration ancprovideincreasec marginagainstpre..atureerosionwearduetotheserviceconditions.
PCM122-186PRESSURIZERMISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCAGEThisdesignpackageconsistsofthefabricationandinstallationofapersonnelsafetycageforthepressurizermissileshieldaccessladderandmodificationoftheladder.Thesafetycagewillbeattached.totheladder.Themodificationoftheladderisrequiredtoprovidesafeaccesstothetopofthepressurizerwallaswellastothemissileshield.Thepersonnelsafetycagedoesn'tperformoraffectasafetymelatedfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedsincethereisapotentialthat,duringaseismicevent,thepersonnelsafetycagecoulddamagesafety-relateditemsthatareinthevicinity.QualityRelatedrequirementsareappliedtothisdesignThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmen&important.tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thepressurizermissileshieldaccessladderandsafetycagedonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedsystemorfunction.,However,thisPC/MisclassifiedasQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheaccessladderorsafetycageduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake)couldpotentiallyaffectasafetymelatedsystemorequipment,sincetheladderandcagearelocatedinthecontainmentbuildingwhichcontainssafetymelatedsystems.Consequently,theladderandsafetycagehavebeendesignedforthedesignbasisconditionsspecifiedintheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirementshavebeenimplemented,thusassuringtheintegrityoftheinstallationduringanydesignbasisevent.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ'pme-importanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreaseds'ncethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentrequiredtosnu-downtheplantancmonitortheplantinasafesnutdow"condit'on.
Basedonthemostrecentinspection thecarbonstee!bracingbarsor:theturningvanesmustbereplacedduetoextremeerosion.Theremai..ing numberofbackingringsmustalsoberemovedtopreventturbulence insteamflowandsubsequent pipewallerosior,.
PCM122-186(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanacc'dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevauatecsincetheladderandcageperformnosafetyfunctionancnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperationaldesign.Failueoftheladderandcagecouldnotoccursincethemodificationhasbeen,designedforthedesignbasisconditions.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachange.toplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapproval.fortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
Anyexistingpipewallerosionwillberepairedtorestorewailthickness tothenominalvalue.TheSt.LucieUnit1HPturbinecrossunderpipeisdesignated asnonnuclear safetyrelated,QualityGroupD.Accordingly, themodifications tothecrossunderpipehavebeendesignated asnon-nuclear safetyrelated,QualityGroupD-Afailuremodeanalysishasdemonstrated thatthemodifications tothecrossunderpipeoranyofitscomponents willhavenoeffecton,orinhibittheoperation of,anysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.
PCM126-1860ABSTRACTAUXILIARYFEEDWATERACTUATIONSYSTEMDVMCIRCUITMODIFICATIONThisengineeringpackagecoversmodificationstotheSt.LucieUnit2AuxiliaryFeedwater.ActuationSystem(AFAS)thatwillallowtheuseofanexternalmetertomonitorthevariousinputsignals,pretripsetpoint,andtripsetpointvoltages.ThecurrentAFASsystemhasabuiltinDigitalVoltmeter(DVM)thatmonitorsvariousinputvoltages.HoweverthisDVMhasbecomeobsolete.ThemodificationdescribedinthisengineeringpackagewillallowtheuseofaportableexternalmetertobeusedinplaceofthebuiltinDigitalVoltmeter.ThisPC/MisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitmodifiesthesafetyrelatedAFAS.Themodificationshavebeenreviewedinaccordancewith10CFR50.59andhavebeenfoundtoneitherinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionnorrequireatechnicalspecificationchange.ThereforepriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplementthisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheAuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystem(AFAS)cabinetcontains'llfoursafetychannelsofequipmentthatautomaticallyinitiateauxiliaryfeedwaterflowtoeitherorbothNSSSSteamGenerators.TheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemisactuatedbytheAFASwhenlossofnormalsteamgeneratorflowwouldcauseareactortripbytheRPSduetolowsteamgeneratorwaterlevel.TheDVMcircuitmodification.involvestheadditionoffuses,fuseholders,resistors,andanameplatetothetestcircuitinordertoprovideanexternaltestjackformonitoring.testfunctionsusinga.portableDVMinsteadofthebuiltinDVMthatcurrentlyexists.Thetestcircuitisdisconnectedfromtheoperating'circuitinnormaloperatingconditions.ThereforeanyfaultoccuringinthetestcircuitwhentheAFASisinnormaloperationwillhavenoaffectonthecapabilityof'theAFAStoperformitssafeguardfunction.ThefunctionalcapabilityoftheAFASwillremainthesameaf+erthemodificationthereforenochange,inthesafetymarginwilloccur.Thismodificationwillresultinnonewmalfuncti,ons.oraccidentstothesafetysystemsinceallthemodificationsaretothetestcircuitwhichwasp'reviouslyanalyzedtobedisconnctedfromthesafetyfunctionoperatingcircuitdurinonormalopera;ion.
Thecrossunderpipeislocatedremotelyfromanysafetyrelatedequipment andcannot.fallon,hit,orotherwise affectanysuchequipment.
PCM126'-186TheAFAS.es:circuitinconside.ednotobesafe.yrelatecsinceitdoesnotperformanysafetyfun".ior,.Howeverit15designedasanassociatedClassI"-circui.inordernottcdegadcthequalfice'onofthesafetyfunctioncircuitoftheAFAS.10CFR50.59allowschangestoafacilityifanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysis,itcanbesta.edthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10.CFR50.59doesnotexistsince:(1)Thechangedescribedhereindoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport,(2)Thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreport,(3)Thechangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Inconclusion,thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptablefromthestandpointofnuclearsafetyasitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotchangetheTechnicalSpecifications.ThereforepriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplementthisprocedure.
PCM117-186EXTRACTION STEANPIPINGANDPITTING-NATERIALUPGRADEABSTRACTAruptureofane:<tracionsearnlineonunit1duringcycle7resultedinaforcedoutageandalossofappro:cimately
IIPCM130-986NEUTRALIZATIONBASINCLOSUREMONITORINGWELLSABSTRACTThisengineeringpackagecovers.theinstallationoftwotemporarygroundwatermonitoringwellsinthevicinityoftheSt.LucieWaterTreatmentPlant.ThesewellswillbeusedtodemonstratetotheStateDepartmentofEnvironmentalRegulation(DER)thattheoperationofouracid/causticneutralizationbasinhasnotresultedinanygroundwatercontamination.Thetemporarymonitorwellsperformnosafetyrelatedfunctionandarelocatedawayfrom,andhavenoeffecton,anysafetyrelatedsystem.ThisPC/Misnon-safetyrelated,buthasbeenclassifiedas'QualityRelated'oensurethewellsarelocatedasspecifiedbytheencloseddesigndrawings.Theadditionofthesewellsdoesnotposeanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheNeutralizationBasingroundwatermonitoringwellsdonotperformanyplantsafety-relatedfunction.Theywillnotbelocatedinthevicinityofanysafety-relatedequipmentandtherefor'ewelldrillingoperationscannotadverselyimpact,safety-relatedfunctions.Acompletewellfailureorcollapsewillnotimpairthestructuralintegrityofplantfillmaterial;accordingly,safety-relatedstructuresorequipmentsupportedbytheplantfillwillnotbeaffected.Basedontheaboveevaluationandtheinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalyisit'canbed'emonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobabilityofoccurence'ortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfuntionofadifferenttypethananyevaluate'dpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.
~'Pfullpowerhours.Ane::amination ofthefailedpipeandafolio~-upengineering evaluation concluded thatErosion/Corrosion was'hefailuremechanism.
PCM132-186EXCESSIVEAC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPABSTRACTAstudywasperformedbyEbascooatheStLuciePlantUnit1toaddresstheconcern(perINPOSER80-83)thatexcessiveAC/DCcontrolcircuitvoltagedropsatthecontrolpower'erminalsofthebreaker/combinationstareersmayleadtothefailureoftheequipmentccntactormechanism"tooperate.Thestudyidentifieddeficienciesinfour(4)controlcircuitloopswherethecalculatedcontrolcircuitloopresistancesexceedthemaximumallowableloopresistances.However,thestudyfoundthatduetoconservatismiathedesignofthecontrolcircuitcompoaents,therewillbesufficientvoltageatthemotorstartercoiltermiaalstoallowproperoperationofthevalvesduringundervoltageanddegradedgridvoltageconditions.Nevertheless,FPLhasdecidedtoimplementtherecommendatioasofthestudytoassurethereliabilityofthesecontrolcircuitloops.Thiseagineeringpackage(EP)providesfortheimplementationoftherecommendationsoftheEbascostudy.Theseconsistofreplacementofcontroltransformersfortwoofthefouraffectedcoatrolcircuitloopsandparallelingconductorsforselectedportionsofallfourcontrolcircuitloops.Thesemodificationswillensurethatthecalculatedloopresistanceswillbelessthanthemaximumallowableloopresistances.Thise"-gineeringpackageisconsideredsafetyrelatedinthatthecontrolcircuitloopsbeingmodifiedareforequipmentrequiredformitigat'oaofaaacideat;MainFeedwaterPumpDischageIsolatiorValvesMV<91}MV<9-2aa"Ma'r.FeedwaterIsolationValves,MV-09-7,MV&9-8~reviewofthechangestobeimplemeatedbyth's2'asperformedagainsttherequiremptsof10CFR50.59~AsindicatedinSectio"3.0ofthisEag'neer'ngPackage,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewecsafetyquestion.hasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation,aordoesitrequirearevisior.totnetechnicalspecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequ'recfo=implementationoit'nisPC/M.Supplement1AddendumTaissupplementincorporatedseismicandenvironmentalqualificationforreplacementtransformerandfuseblock.Theholdpointestablished.forthisinstallationhasbeenremovedandtheoriginalsafetyevaluationhasnotbeenaffectedbythissupplement.
Erosion/Corrosion isanindustrywideproblemthatisuniqueto<<etsteampipingsystems.Erosion/Corrosion isanaceleratedformofcorrosion inducedbyflewduetothebreakdown ofaprotective ocidefilmfromthematerial'ssurface.ThisPC/Mprovidesdetailsandinstrucionsforplantpersonnel toreplaceerodedcarbonsteelpipingandfittingsintheE::traction Steamsystemsonan"as-needed" basis.Thefittingstobereplacedwill.be'dentfiedfollowing reviewofultrasonic inspectondataduringthe1<C7refuelingcutage.Thenewma'r''alsspecifiedASTMP.-.a<NP'22(fIttings)andASTMA-~'(P22(piping)a.e,chromium-molybdenum alloysandwillprcvidesuperiorresstancetccorrosion/erosion effects.Addi"iona'y.thenewma~eri=-;
PCM132-1863.0SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.AsaresultoftheAC/DCControlCircuitVoltageDropStudy(FLO62-8.5000Rl),itwasdeterminedthatthecalculatedactualcontrolloopcableresistanceforeachisolationvalveexceedsthemaximumallowablecontrolloopcableresistance.Althoughthisconditionexists,theconservatismofthecontrolcircuitcomponentsallows'hevalvestooperateduringundervoltageanddegradedgzidvoltageconditions.Thismodificationconsistsofimplementingtherecommendationofthestudywhichinclude;(1)replacingthe150VAcontroltransformerswitha500VAtransformerforMV-09-16MV-09-2controlcircuitloop,(2)parallelingconductorsforselectedportionsofthecontrolcircuitloopsforMV<9-1,MV-09-2,MV-09-7,andMV-09-8.Althoughthecalculatedvaluesindicatedinsufficientvoltagemayexistatthemotorstartercoils,.fieldtestswereperformedtodetermineifanactualdeficientconditionexisted.Theresultsofthesetests,documentedinAttachment8.3ofthevoltagedropstudy,concludedthatduetoconservatisminthedesignofthecontrolcircuitcomponents,therewillbesufficientvoltageatthemotorstartercoilterminalstoallowproperoperationofthevalvesduringundervoltageanddegradedgridvoltageconditions.TheoperationofthesevalvesasdescribedinUFSAP.Amendment4Section7.3.1.1.12and15.4.6.1isnotaffectedbythismodification.Infact,withtheimplementationofthismodification,thereliabilityoftheoperationofthesevalveswillbeincreased.Assuch,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyanddoesnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificationdoesnotimpactanytechnicalspecificationandassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesfozanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CPR50.59thewrittensafety,evaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestions,andpriorCommisionapprovalofthisPCMisnotrequired.
=canbewe'dedintathee::istinc A-10~andA-1V~pip'ncanc-.t"ines.Theetentcfthereplacement rec''receachs'tua-ior wi'bebaseconinscec-'n datareviewbyPower~lan=Enoiner.nc.T'~ee.'tentofthereplacemen
PCM136-186REPLACEMENTOFSTEAMGENERATORLEVELTRANSMITTERSThisEngineeringPackagecoversthereplacementofthesteamgeneratorleveltransmitters.ThetransmittersprovideinputsignalstotheReactorProtectionSystem,AuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystem,SteamGeneratorLevelIndicatingControllerandHighSteamGeneratorTurbineProtectionCircuitry.TheexistingtransmittersarepartoftheReactorProtectionSystemandclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodificationisaone-for-onereplacementoftheexistingtransmitterswithRosemountModel1154DP4RAN0026transmitter,thesameclassificationapplies.Theexisting~iringisnotaffectedbythischange.Plantsafetyandoperationarenotaffected.Thesafetyevaluationofthispackageindicatesthatthetransmitters'eplacementdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,anddoesnotrequireachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecifications.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseofthefollowingreasons:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceandtheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreasedbythismodificationbecauseitdoesnotaffecttheavailability,redundance,capacity,orfunctionofanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification.Function,mountingandtheabilitytowithstandharshenvironmentalconditionshavenotbeenalteredandthismodificationdoesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.
-requ'.eandGea'scft.aeseeepacemeltsw'eaodedtcthepackagevatet'ploess~ThisPC/M'sSa-.etyRe'tedc~ass''cncnsesmic)sl.'s<<ems~as."Ncn-Nuc1 ea.Safe-yRc1a-ed"snceQua'-yC.ourDpipinginNon-Nuclea.
PCM136-186(iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsinceth'modificationinstalls"transmitterswithimprovedaccuracyandacceptableresponsetimewhichareseismicallyandenvironmentallyqualifiedtowithstandthenormalandaccidentcond'ionswhichareanticipated.ThepossibilitvofnewDesignBas'sEvents(DBEs)notconsideredintheFUSAP.isnotcreateds'ncethedesignphilosophyotheRPShasbeenpreviouslydiscussedintheFUSA"-.andisnotchangedbythereplacementoftheeight(8)leveltransmitters(LT-9013A,B,C,DandLT-9023A,B,C,D).Thismodificationisanenhancementofanexistingsystemasitfurnishesreplacementtransmitterswhichcoverboththenormalandhightransientlevelresponsesofthesteamgeneratorswithimprovedaccuracyandreliability.Duetothefactthat.thisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessentialtosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociatedwithachievingandmaintainingshutdowns,thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirements.ThereforetheproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandFUSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.AccordingtotheFUSARSections7.1.1and7.2.1,theRPSisidentifiedhsaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemsinceitmonitorsthesteamsupplysystemandeffectsreliableandrapidreactorshutdownifanyoneofacombinationofparametersdeviatesfromapreselectedopezatingrange.Hence,thisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodificationprovidesforaone-for-onereplacementofexistingleveltransmitterswithmorereliableandaccurateequipmentandinvolvesnoothermodificationstosafetyrelatedequipment,thedegreeofprotectionprovidedtonuclearsafetyrelatedequipmentisunchanged.TheprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARremainsunchanged.TheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARareunchanged.ThepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyzedintheFUSARisnotcreated.TheimplementationofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM136-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,nordoesitcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewritten.safetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
Basedonthe-.ai'remocesana'si5nd10CFR50'Prev'"ew"5smodification doesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipment anc'snctrel'd~uponfo.anyaccidentprevention ormitiga'on.Thusitdoesnctco,.s-'."ute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
PCM139-186MASONRYWALLMODIFICATIONSCertainmasonrywallsrequireaclassificationupgradeasaresultoftheinstallationofsafetyrelatedequipmentintheirvicinity.23suchwallshavebeenidentified.ThisPCM,issuedinresponsetoJCOJPE-LR-87-001,Revis1on0,willprovidemodificationsto10oftheseupgradedwallstoenablethemtosatisfythestructuralacceptancecriteriaforsafetyrelatedwalls-ThisPCMdoes"motconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Themodificationwillensurethattheaffectedwallswillhaveno1nteractionwithsafetyrelatedequipmentandthereforehasnoeffectonplantsafety.Themodificationhasnoimpactonplantoperation.TheaffectedmasonrywallsandthestructuralmodificationstheretobeingimplementedbythisPCMhavebeenseismicallydesigned.Consequently,thisPCMisclassifiedasQualityRelated.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityof.occurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunct1onofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisPC/Mprovidesmodificationsto10masonrywallstoimprovethelateralloadcarryingcapabilitiesof.thesewalls.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thefollowingarethebasesforthisconclusion:(1)Theprobab1lityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillbeperformedinaccordancewithQualityRelatedrequirements,hencetheseismiccapabilityofthe.affectedmasonrywallsisnotcompromised.Therefore,therecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentsafetyrelatedstructures,systems,orequipment.  
Sincetherearenounrev'ewed safetyquestions, andsincenochance>>iotechnica'pecifications areinvo)ved, thisPC/Mmaybe'mplemented withcutproirNRCapproval.
SAFETYEUALL'P7IONTheUnit1E::rect'onSteamSystemisaNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedsystenandassuch'notrequiredtofunc"'r.duringanye>:isting analy"edacc'dentscenario.
Therefore, mod''aticnstothese,pipesaffectonlyNon-Nuclear SafetyRela"ed,QualityC.oupDequipment.
Themcdfica-'or, isamaterialupgradeonly.Thenewmateralhasbeer.shcwn,intheDesignAnalysis, cmeetalldesigr,requ,'rements c<tneprevousmaterial.
PCM117-186Postul'ated failuresoftheextraction steamlinewouldhavenoimpactonsafeshutdownof-theplant,orsafetyrelatedsystems.Theextraction steamlinesarenotusedtopreventpostulated acidents,mitigatetheconsequences ofsuchacc.dents,maintainsafeshutdownconditions, or'adequately storespentfuel.Thefollowing, statements demonstrate thatanunreviewed safetyques"ion,asdefinedby10CFR50.59,does.notexist:Theprobablity ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.
importantosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport,hasnotbeenincreased.
Failureofanextraction steamlineisnotconside.edasanaccidentinitiat'g eventorconsidered indetermining
*theprobability ofanaccident.
Also,sincethisdesign.changedoesnotalteroraffectequipment usedtomitigateaccidents, theprobability ofmalfunc'.'onofequipmentimportant tosafetyrema'sunchanged Thepcsibilityofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferen" typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetvan-lysisreporthasnotbeencreated;Thereisncnewfa'hathasno-beenAdd'ona'yonofailurmodeintrodcedbythischangeeva'ua"ed prev'ouslyintheFSA.-",.'.uremodesana'=edytheFS.-".Rare~MIweI~Themare'cfsafetyasce!inedinthebasis(ehncapeelf:cations hasnotbeenreouced.fcranyThischangehasnoeffec"'nanyexisiinoSpec.-.icataonsanadoeno=requireanychangTechn'a'oeci ficaticns.Tehni.ca1esto.theSincencunreviewed safteycuestions havebeendeternined toexis,andsincenorevisions totheTechnical Spec''fiat''cnsa.erequired, NRCapprovalisnotrequiredpriortomp'mentaion.
PCM118-186REACTORCAVITYSEALRINGABSTRACTThisEngineering PackagemodifiestheSt.LucieUnit1ReactorCavitySealRing.Themodifications consistofenlarging thepenetrations inthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallation andaddingpenetrations andpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.'his waterprovidesadditional shielding whiletheringisinplace.Thewatershallberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusion oftheoutage.Also,thecavitysea)ringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetoastainless steelbraidhose.ThecavitysealringbasedontheFSARisnon-nuclear safetyrelated.Somequalityrequirements areassignedtoassurethattheReactorCavitySealRingwillperformitsintendedfunction.
Basedonafailuremodeevaluation anda10CFR50.59review,thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, norrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications.
Therefore, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisengineering package.SAFETYEVALUATION ThisEngineering PackagemodifiedtheSt.LucieUnit1ReactoiCavitySealRing.Themodifications consistofenlarging thepenetrations inthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallation andaddingpenetrations andpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.Thiswaterpiovidesadditional shielding whiletheringisinplace.ThewatershaQberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusion oftheoutage.Also,thecavitysealringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetostainless steelbiaidhose.Basedontheaboveandinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.oTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.
Sincethereactorcavitysealringisnotconsidered bytheFSARindetermining theprobability ofaccidents, possibletypesofaccidents, orintheevaluation ofconsequences ofaccidents, itcanbeconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofaccidents previously addressed intheFSARremainsunchanged.
PCM118-186oThepossibQty ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Sincethesealingportionofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,thepossibility ofanacidentofadifferent typehasnotbeencreated,oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeen."educed.
Again,sincethesealingpor'r,ofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.10CFR50.59allowschangestoafacilityasdescribed intheFSARifanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnical Specification isnotrequired.
Asshowninthepreceding section=-,
thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59thatpertainstoanunreviewed safetyquestioncanbepositively answered.
Also,nochangetotheTechnical Specifications isrequiredbasedontheaboveevaluation.
Inconclusion, thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptable fromthestandpoint ofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, anddoesnotrequireanychangetoTechnical Specifications.
Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthemodification.
PCM119-18610CFR50.49ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION LISTREVISIONABSTRACTThisEngineering Packageprovidesthevehicleforupdatingseveralareasofequipment qualification.
Thispackageincludescorrections tothe10CFR50.49 list,changesinmaintenance requirements, andvariousdocumentation packagecorrections.
ThisEngineering Package(EP)isconsidered NuclearSafetyRelatedbecauseitaffectsequipment'falling underthescopeof10CFR50.49.
Thispackagedoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionsinceitdealsstrictlywithenhancing thepresentdocumentation usedtoqualifyequipment atStLucieUnitNo1andnophysicalplantmodifications arerequiredbytheEP.Thesafetyevaluation ofthispackageindicates thatachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.
Removalofequipment fromthe10CFR50.49 listdoesnotaffectplantsafetyandoperation.
Sulement1ThisEPrevisionaddsterminalblockstothe10CFR50.49 listandtheirassociated Equipment Qualification Documentation Package8770-A-451-17.0 "AmeraceTerminalBlocks".Theequipment andEQDocumentation Packagedoesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisEngineering PackageprovidesforseveralchangestothepresentStLucieUnitNo.1's10CFR50.49 list.Thisdocumentation willaffectthefutureprocurement ofvarioussafetyrelatedcomponents andassistinvalidating thecomponents'bility tofunctionbefore,duringandafteradesignbasisaccident.
Therefore, thisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.0Thedocumentation changesaddressed inthispackagerangefromcorrections oftypographical errorsonthe10CFR50.49 listtoadditions anddeletions ofequipment asaresultofEQdocumentation packagesreviews.Noneofthechangesrequirephysicalmodification toanyplantsystem.Theydo,however,affectthefuturemaintenance ofvariousequipment.
Thepossibility ofnewDesignBasisEvents(DBEs)notconsidered intheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethischangedoesnot-alter anyequipment usedtomitigateaccidents.
Thismodification isanenhancement oftheenvironmental qualification documentation ofvariousequipment andinnowayaffectstheplantdesign.
PCM119-186DuetothefactthatthisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessential tosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociated withachieving andmaintaining shutdowns, thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements.
Therefore theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandUFSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.
Sincethismodification involvesnophysicalmodifications tosafetyrelatedequipment andchangesinthemaintenance schedules willnotresultinfailureofequipment, thedegreeofprotection providedtoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment isunchanged.
Removalofequipment fromthe10CFR50.49 listdoesnotaffectthe.plant'ssafety."Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment isunchanged.
Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously, evaluated intheUFSARremainsunchanged.
Theconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARareunchanged.
Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyzedintheUFSARisnotcreated.Basedontheabove,themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseofthefollowing reasons:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence andtheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysis'eport willnotbe'ncreased bythismodification becauseit'oesnotaffecttheavailability, redundancy,
: capacity, orfunctionofanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.
(ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification..
: Function, mountingandtheabilitytowithstand harshenvironmental conditions havenotbeenalteredandthismodification doesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.
(iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsincethismodification doesnotchangetherequirements oftheTechnical Specifications.
Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM122-186PRESSURIZER MISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCAGEThisdesignpackageconsistsofthefabrication andinstallation ofapersonnel safetycageforthepressurizer missileshieldaccessladderandmodification oftheladder.Thesafetycagewillbeattached.totheladder.Themodification oftheladderisrequiredtoprovidesafeaccesstothetopofthepressurizer wallaswellastothemissileshield.Thepersonnel safetycagedoesn'tperformoraffectasafetymelated function.
However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedsincethereisapotential that,duringaseismicevent,thepersonnel safetycagecoulddamagesafety-related itemsthatareinthevicinity.
QualityRelatedrequirements areappliedtothisdesignThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
SAFETYEVALUATION Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipmen&
important.
tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thepressurizer missileshieldaccessladderandsafetycagedonotperformoraffectanysafety-related systemorfunction.,
However,thisPC/Misclassified asQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheaccessladderorsafetycageduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake) couldpotentially affectasafetymelated systemorequipment, sincetheladderandcagearelocatedinthecontainment buildingwhichcontainssafetymelated systems.Consequently, theladderandsafetycagehavebeendesignedforthedesignbasisconditions specified intheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirements havebeenimplemented, thusassuringtheintegrity oftheinstallation duringanydesignbasisevent.Themodifications includedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions because:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ'pme-important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased s'ncethismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment requiredtosnu-downtheplantancmonitortheplantinasafesnutdow"condit'on.
PCM122-186(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranacc'dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evauatecsincetheladderandcageperformnosafetyfunctionancnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperational design.Failueoftheladderandcagecouldnotoccursincethemodification hasbeen,designedforthedesignbasisconditions.
(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachange.toplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approval.fortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM126-1860ABSTRACTAUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEMDVMCIRCUITMODIFICATION Thisengineering packagecoversmodifications totheSt.LucieUnit2Auxiliary Feedwater.Actuation System(AFAS)thatwillallowtheuseofanexternalmetertomonitorthevariousinputsignals,pretripsetpoint, andtripsetpointvoltages.
ThecurrentAFASsystemhasabuiltinDigitalVoltmeter (DVM)thatmonitorsvariousinputvoltages.
HoweverthisDVMhasbecomeobsolete.
Themodification described inthisengineering packagewillallowtheuseofaportableexternalmetertobeusedinplaceofthebuiltinDigitalVoltmeter.
ThisPC/Misclassified asNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitmodifiesthesafetyrelatedAFAS.Themodifications havebeenreviewedinaccordance with10CFR50.59 andhavebeenfoundtoneitherinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionnorrequireatechnical specification change.Therefore priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplement thisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATION TheAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation System(AFAS)cabinetcontains'llfoursafetychannelsofequipment thatautomatically initiateauxiliary feedwater flowtoeitherorbothNSSSSteamGenerators.
TheAuxiliary Feedwater SystemisactuatedbytheAFASwhenlossofnormalsteamgenerator flowwouldcauseareactortripbytheRPSduetolowsteamgenerator waterlevel.TheDVMcircuitmodification.
involvestheadditionoffuses,fuseholders, resistors, andanameplate tothetestcircuitinordertoprovideanexternaltestjackformonitoring
.testfunctions usinga.portableDVMinsteadofthebuiltinDVMthatcurrently exists.Thetestcircuitisdisconnected fromtheoperating
'circuitinnormaloperating conditions.
Therefore anyfaultoccuringinthetestcircuitwhentheAFASisinnormaloperation willhavenoaffectonthecapability of'theAFAStoperformitssafeguard function.
Thefunctional capability oftheAFASwillremainthesameaf+erthemodification therefore nochange,inthesafetymarginwilloccur.Thismodification willresultinnonewmalfuncti,ons.
oraccidents tothesafetysystemsinceallthemodifications aretothetestcircuitwhichwasp'reviously analyzedtobedisconnctedfromthesafetyfunctionoperating circuitdurinonormalopera;ion.
PCM126'-186TheAFAS.es:circuitinconside.ednotobesafe.yrelatecsinceitdoesnotperformanysafetyfun".ior,.Howeverit15designedasanassociated ClassI"-circui.inordernottcdegadcthequalfice'onofthesafetyfunctioncircuitoftheAFAS.10CFR50.59 allowschangestoafacilityifanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.
Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysis, itcanbesta.edthatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10.CFR50.59 doesnotexistsince:(1)Thechangedescribed hereindoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport,(2)Thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreport,(3)Thechangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.
Inconclusion, thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptable fromthestandpoint ofnuclearsafetyasitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotchangetheTechnical Specifications.
Therefore priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplement thisprocedure.
IIPCM130-986NEUTRALIZATION BASINCLOSUREMONITORING WELLSABSTRACTThisengineering packagecovers.theinstallation oftwotemporary groundwatermonitoring wellsinthevicinityoftheSt.LucieWaterTreatment Plant.Thesewellswillbeusedtodemonstrate totheStateDepartment ofEnvironmental Regulation (DER)thattheoperation ofouracid/caustic neutralization basinhasnotresultedinanygroundwatercontamination.
Thetemporary monitorwellsperformnosafetyrelatedfunctionandarelocatedawayfrom,andhavenoeffecton,anysafetyrelatedsystem.ThisPC/Misnon-safety related,buthasbeenclassified as'QualityRelated'o ensurethewellsarelocatedasspecified bytheencloseddesigndrawings.
Theadditionofthesewellsdoesnotposeanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SAFETYEVALUATION TheNeutralization Basingroundwatermonitoring wellsdonotperformanyplantsafety-relatedfunction.
Theywillnotbelocatedinthevicinityofanysafety-relatedequipment andtherefor'e welldrillingoperations cannotadversely impact,safety-relatedfunctions.
Acompletewellfailureorcollapsewillnotimpairthestructural integrity ofplantfillmaterial; accordingly, safety-relatedstructures orequipment supported bytheplantfillwillnotbeaffected.
Basedontheaboveevaluation andtheinformation suppliedinthedesignanalyisit'canbed'emonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobability ofoccurence
'ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.
Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfuntion ofadifferent typethananyevaluate'd previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.
PCM132-186EXCESSIVE AC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPABSTRACTAstudywasperformed byEbascooatheStLuciePlantUnit1toaddresstheconcern(perINPOSER80-83)thatexcessive AC/DCcontrolcircuitvoltagedropsatthecontrolpower'erminals ofthebreaker/combination stareersmayleadtothefailureoftheequipment ccntactor mechanism" tooperate.Thestudyidentified deficiencies infour(4)controlcircuitloopswherethecalculated controlcircuitloopresistances exceedthemaximumallowable loopresistances.
However,thestudyfoundthatduetoconservatism iathedesignofthecontrolcircuitcompoaents, therewillbesufficient voltageatthemotorstartercoiltermiaals toallowproperoperation ofthevalvesduringundervoltageanddegradedgridvoltageconditions.
Nevertheless, FPLhasdecidedtoimplement therecommendatioas ofthestudytoassurethereliability ofthesecontrolcircuitloops.Thiseagineering package(EP)providesfortheimplementation oftherecommendations oftheEbascostudy.Theseconsistofreplacement ofcontroltransformers fortwoofthefouraffectedcoatrolcircuitloopsandparalleling conductors forselectedportionsofallfourcontrolcircuitloops.Thesemodifications willensurethatthecalculated loopresistances willbelessthanthemaximumallowable loopresistances.
Thise"-gineering packageisconsidered safetyrelatedinthatthecontrolcircuitloopsbeingmodifiedareforequipment requiredformitigat'oa ofaaacideat;MainFeedwater PumpDischageIsolatior ValvesMV<91}MV<9-2aa"Ma'r.Feedwater Isolation Valves,MV-09-7,MV&9-8~reviewofthechangestobeimplemeated byth's2'asperformed againsttherequirempts of10CFR50.59
~Asindicated inSectio"3.0ofthisEag'neer'ng Package,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewec safetyquestion.
hasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation, aordoesitrequirearevisior.
totnetechnical specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequ'recfo=implementation oit'nisPC/M.Supplement 1AddendumTaissupplement incorporated seismicandenvironmental qualification forreplacement transformer andfuseblock.Theholdpoint established.
forthisinstallation hasbeenremovedandtheoriginalsafetyevaluation hasnotbeenaffectedbythissupplement.
PCM132-1863.0SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.AsaresultoftheAC/DCControlCircuitVoltageDropStudy(FLO62-8.5000 Rl),itwasdetermined thatthecalculated actualcontrolloopcableresistance foreachisolation valveexceedsthemaximumallowable controlloopcableresistance.
Althoughthiscondition exists,theconservatism ofthecontrolcircuitcomponents allows'hevalvestooperateduringundervoltage anddegradedgzidvoltageconditions.
Thismodification consistsofimplementing therecommendation ofthestudywhichinclude;(1)replacing the150VAcontroltransformers witha500VAtransformer forMV-09-16MV-09-2controlcircuitloop,(2)paralleling conductors forselectedportionsofthecontrolcircuitloopsforMV<9-1,MV-09-2,MV-09-7,andMV-09-8.Althoughthecalculated valuesindicated insufficient voltagemayexistatthemotorstartercoils,.fieldtestswereperformed todetermine ifanactualdeficient condition existed.Theresultsofthesetests,documented inAttachment 8.3ofthevoltagedropstudy,concluded thatduetoconservatism inthedesignofthecontrolcircuitcomponents, therewillbesufficient voltageatthemotorstartercoilterminals toallowproperoperation ofthevalvesduringundervoltage anddegradedgridvoltageconditions.
Theoperation ofthesevalvesasdescribed inUFSAP.Amendment 4Section7.3.1.1.12 and15.4.6.1isnotaffectedbythismodification.
Infact,withtheimplementation ofthismodification, thereliability oftheoperation ofthesevalveswillbeincreased.
Assuch,thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyanddoesnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated.
Thismodification doesnotimpactanytechnical specification andassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesfozanytechnical specification isnotreduced.Theforegoing constitutes, per10CPR50.59 thewrittensafety,evaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions, andpriorCommision approvalofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM136-186REPLACEMENT OFSTEAMGENERATOR LEVELTRANSMITTERS ThisEngineering Packagecoversthereplacement ofthesteamgenerator leveltransmitters.
Thetransmitters provideinputsignalstotheReactorProtection System,Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System,SteamGenerator LevelIndicating Controller andHighSteamGenerator TurbineProtection Circuitry.
Theexistingtransmitters arepartoftheReactorProtection Systemandclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodification isaone-for-one replacement oftheexistingtransmitters withRosemount Model1154DP4RAN0026 transmitter, thesameclassification applies.Theexisting~iringisnotaffectedbythischange.Plantsafetyandoperation arenotaffected.
Thesafetyevaluation ofthispackageindicates thatthetransmitters'eplacement doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, anddoesnotrequireachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseofthefollowing reasons:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence andtheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreased bythismodification becauseitdoesnotaffecttheavailability, redundance,
: capacity, orfunctionofanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.
Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification.
: Function, mountingandtheabilitytowithstand harshenvironmental conditions havenotbeenalteredandthismodification doesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.
PCM136-186(iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsinceth'modification installs"transmitters withimprovedaccuracyandacceptable responsetimewhichareseismically andenvironmentally qualified towithstand thenormalandaccidentcond'ions whichareanticipated.
Thepossibilitv ofnewDesignBas'sEvents(DBEs)notconsidered intheFUSAP.isnotcreateds'ncethedesignphilosophy otheRPShasbeenpreviously discussed intheFUSA"-.andisnotchangedbythereplacement oftheeight(8)leveltransmitters (LT-9013A,B,C,D andLT-9023A,B,C,D).
Thismodification isanenhancement ofanexistingsystemasitfurnishes replacement transmitters whichcoverboththenormalandhightransient levelresponses ofthesteamgenerators withimprovedaccuracyandreliability.
Duetothefactthat.thisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessential tosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociated withachieving andmaintaining shutdowns, thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements.
Therefore theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandFUSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.
According totheFUSARSections7.1.1and7.2.1,theRPSisidentified hsaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemsinceitmonitorsthesteamsupplysystemandeffectsreliableandrapidreactorshutdownifanyoneofacombination ofparameters deviatesfromapreselected opezating range.Hence,thisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodification providesforaone-for-one replacement ofexistingleveltransmitters withmorereliableandaccurateequipment andinvolvesnoothermodifications tosafetyrelatedequipment, thedegreeofprotection providedtonuclearsafetyrelatedequipment isunchanged.
Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARremainsunchanged.
Theconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARareunchanged.
Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyzedintheFUSARisnotcreated.Theimplementation ofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM136-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, nordoesitcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewritten.safetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM139-186MASONRYWALLMODIFICATIONS Certainmasonrywallsrequireaclassification upgradeasaresultoftheinstallation ofsafetyrelatedequipment intheirvicinity.
23suchwallshavebeenidentified.
ThisPCM,issuedinresponse toJCOJPE-LR-87-001, Revis1on0,willprovidemodifications to10oftheseupgradedwallstoenablethemtosatisfythestructural acceptance criteriaforsafetyrelatedwalls-ThisPCMdoes"motconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Themodification willensurethattheaffectedwallswillhaveno1nteraction withsafetyrelatedequipment andtherefore hasnoeffectonplantsafety.Themodification hasnoimpactonplantoperation.
Theaffectedmasonrywallsandthestructural modifications theretobeingimplemented bythisPCMhavebeenseismically designed.
Consequently, thisPCMisclassified asQualityRelated.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability of.occurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunct1on ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisPC/Mprovidesmodifications to10masonrywallstoimprovethelateralloadcarryingcapabilities of.thesewalls.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Thefollowing arethebasesforthisconclusion:
(1)Theprobab1lity ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willbeperformed inaccordance withQualityRelatedrequirements, hencetheseismiccapability ofthe.affected masonrywallsisnotcompromised.
Therefore, therecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentsafetyrelatedstructures, systems,orequipment.  


PCM139-186(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferent'ypethananyevaluatedpreviouslysincethe.modificationwillensurethattheaffectedwallswil'avenointeractionwithsafetyrelatedequipmentandhencewillhavenoefrectonplantsafety.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyadefine"inthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Theimplementatio-ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetcplanttechnicalspecificat'ns.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CPR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Hisnotrequired.
PCM139-186(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent
PCM140-186ANNUNCIATORNUISANCEALARMSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)coversthemodificationsoffiveannunciatorcircuitsintheMainControlRoom.Existinglogic,circuitconfigurationandcomponentswillbechangedintheReactorTurbineGenerator..Boards(RTGBs)soastoeliminateexistingnuisanceconditionscausedbyerroneousalarmindicationofthesefiveannunciatorcircuits.ByimplementingthisEP,thesecircuitswillbeconsistentwiththe"DarkAnnunciator"conceptwhichallowsforlightedannunciatorsduringoff-normalconditionsonly.ThisEPisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvestheinterposingofacontrolrelayinasafetyrelatedcircuit(hydrogenanalyzer)andtheextensionofsafetyrelatedpowersupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H).ThesafetyevaluationhasdeterminedthatthisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangeintheplanttechnicalspecifications.ThisPCMmaybeimplementedwithoutpriorCommissionapproval.ThisEngineeringPackageRevisioncoversmodificationofthesixannunciatorcircuitsassociatedwithannunciatedwindowsP-30,P-35,P-36,P-42,9-40andX-5intheControlRoom.Thesemodifications,whichincluderelocationoflocalresetswitches,installationofreflashersandlogicmodifications,willeliminatethe;nuisancealarmstatusofthesixannunciators.ByimplementingthisPCMSupplement,thesesixannunciatorswillbebroughtintocompliancewiththe"DarkAnnunciator"conceptofNUREG0700"GuidelinesforControlRoomDesignReview"..TheoriginalSafetyEvaluationhasbeenrevised.TheSafetyEvaluationstillconcludes,however,thatthisEPdoesnot,involveandunreviewedsafetyquestion,orachangetothetechnicalspecifications.Therefore,priorcommissi'onapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthePCM.TheintentoftheoriginalSafetyEvaluationisnotaffectedbythissupplement.SAFETYEVALUATIONPithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59;aproposedchangedshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.
'ypethananyevaluated previously sincethe.modification willensurethattheaffectedwallswil'avenointeraction withsafetyrelatedequipment andhencewillhavenoefrectonplantsafety.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyadefine"inthebasisforanytechnical specification.
PCM140-186ThemodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincetheannunciatorsservenofunctioninthecontrolofplantoperat'ionsorsafeshutdown.Electricalseparationisprovidedbetweenredundantsafetyrelatedwiringandcomponentsandannunciatorlogicwhichisseparatedtoprotectcontrolfunctionsfrombeingaffectedbyannunciationcircuitfailure.(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofanycontrolcircuitsorassociatedsystems.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafety.asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.SincethisEPaffectsequipmentthatisidentifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated(HydrogenAnalyzer)andrequirestheextentionofNuclearSafetyRelatedpowe'rsupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H),itisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.DuetothefactthattheFPdoesnot'nvolveanycablesessentialtosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociatedwithachievingandmaintainingsafeshutdownconditions,thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirements.Therefore,theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandStLucie-Unit1FSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.ImplementationofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM140-186andSupplement1tothesamePCMdonotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical'pecificationsandmaybeimplementedwithoutpriorcommissionapproval.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMandSupplement1tothesameisnotrequired.
Theimplementatio-ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetcplanttechnical specificat'ns.
PCM14D-186PRESSURIZERLEVELINSTRUMFNTATIONMODIFICATIONREA-SLN-86-076ABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)modifiesthePressurizerLevelInstrumentationtoprovidetworedundantqualifiedchannelsofControlRoomindication(Sigmameters).Electricalisolatorswillbeinstalledsoastoseparatethenon-safety(control)loopfromtheupgradedNuclearSafetyRelatedPressurizerLevelInstrumentationloops.Existingpressurizerpressureandpressurizerlevelrecorderswillbereplacedwithnarrowcaseequivalentequipmentinordertoallowspacefortheinstallation,,ofnewSigmaindicators,inthefrontpanelofRTGB-103.Cable,conduit,penetrationsandcomponentswhichwillbepartoftheNuclearSafetyRelatedloopwillbere-taggedtoindicatethisupgrade.ThetwoupgradedchannelsofpressurizerlevelinstrumentationwillmeettherequirementsofRegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev3forVariableDCategory10ThisEPisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitprovidesanupgradeofanexistingsystemtoNuclearSafetyRelatedstatus.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthattheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforitsimplementationisnotrequired.ThisEPdoesnotadverselyaffectplantsafetyandoperationorimpactPlantTechnicalSpecifications.Supplement1tothisPCMisthevehiclefortheissuanceofarevisiontotheEnvironmentalQualificationDocumentationPackageandupdatingthe10CFR'0.49listtoaddresstheSafetyInjectionTanksamplelinecontainmentisolationvalves,FCV&3-1EandFCV-03-1F.ThesesolenoidvalveswereinstalledaspartofPCM314-77whichmovedtheSafetyInjectionTanksamplepointfrominsidetooutsidethecontainment.Thesecontainmentisolationvalvescontainlimitswitches(inthesolenoidassembly)asrequiredbyRegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev3forVariableBCategoryl.Theisolationvalvesarelocatedinapotentiallyharshenvironment,thustheyrequireEnvironmentalQualificationasrequiredby10CFR50.49.Nophysicalchanges'areneededtoaddressSupplement1ofthisPCMsincethequalifiedlimitswitcheswereinstalledaspartofPCM314-77.Revision1doesnotaltertheNuclearSafetyRelatedstatusof.thisEPsinceitonlyaffectsaNuclearSafetyRelatedEnvironmentalQualificationDocumentationPackage.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthattheimplementationofthePCMsupplementdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforitsimplementationisnotrequired'hisEPrevisiondoesnotadverselyaffectplantsafetyandoperationorimpactPlantTechnicalSpecifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CPR50.59(b),
PCM141-186SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction'fequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeinczeased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.4TheproposedmodificationaffectsthePressurizerLevelInstrumentationandcontrolloopsinthatitprovidesfortheestablishment'ftworedundantNuclearSafetyRelatedpressurizerlevelindicationchannelsintheControlRoomsoastomeettherequirementsofRegGuide1;97.InaccordancewithRegGuide1.75,physicalseparationisprovidedbetweenthenonsafety(control)andthesafetyrelatedsegmentsoftheloop.Supplement1ofthisPCMisthevehicleforissuanceofarevisiontotheEgDocumentationPackageforValcorSolenoidvalvestoincludeSafetyInjectionTankSampleLineContainmentIsolationValvesinaccordancewith10CFR50.49.Supplement1servestoaddtheenvironmentqualificationoftheisolationvalvesintothedocumentsystemandhasnoimpactonplanthardwareorproceduresasdescribedintheUFSAR.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDBEpreviouslyaddressedintheUFSARisnotaffectedbythismodification.ThisEPwillinfactdecreasetheprobabilityofpressurizexlevelinstrumentationfailuresinceitprovidesforincreasedreliabilityintheeventasinglefailurebyfurnishingtworedundant,qualifiedchannels.ThepossibilityofnewDBEsnotconsideredintheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophyhasbeenpreviouslydiscussedintheUFSAR.Thismodificationisanenhancementtoapre-existingsystemandisbeingperformedtoprovideincreasedxeliabilityintheeventofasinglefailure.PressurizerLevelInstrumentationisidentifiedasPostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationandisrequiredtobeNuclearSafetyRelatedperRegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev3asitpertainstoCategory',TypeDvariables.Asthismodificationinvolvescablesessentia1toreactorsafeshutdown(EssentialEquipmentList8770-B-049,Rev0)andPostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentation(PAMI),allapplicable10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirementshavebeenidentifiedandaresatisfiedbythispackage(Section2.1.4).ThereforetheproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandUFSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.SincethispackagemeetstherequirementsofRegGuide1.97asitprovidesfortwoindependent,redundantNuclearSafetyRelatedchannelsofpressurizerlevelinstrumentation,thisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.Astheevaluationofsystemfailuremode(Section2.1.17)indicates,thispackageupgradesexistingredundant,independentpressurizerlevelinstrumentationloopsfromIA/IB(importanttosafety)toSA/SB(NuclearSafetyRelated)andprovidesadequateelectricalandphysicalseparation.Hence,thisisanenhancementtothepressuzizerlevelinstrumentationandincreasesthedegreeofprotectiontonuclearsafetyrelatedsystemsandequipment.Theprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,remainsunchanged.Thepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyz'edintheUFSARisnotcreated.
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Hisnotrequired.
PCM143-186PASSDISSOLVEDHYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSAbstractThisEngineeringPackage(EP)coverstheinstallationoftie-instotheexistingUnitNo1PostAccidentSamplingSystem(PASS)foradissolvedhydr~oenanalyzer.lAreviewofthechangetobeimplementedbythisEPwasperformedagainsttherequirementsoi10CFR50.59.AsaresulttheinstallationofadisssolvedhydrogenanalyzerinthePASSisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated,doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion,doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecificationandwillnotaffectplantsafety(asaddressedinSection3,"SafetyEvaluation").However,thismodificationisqualityrelated,becauseitisrequiredbyNUREG0737formonitoringReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)chemistryandactivityresultingfromadesignbasisaccident.Thischangewillnotaffectplantoperations.PriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEP.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)if'theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisrepormaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanvTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.Thismodificationinvolvesthenecessarytie-instotheexist'ngsystemincludingtubingandvalves.ThisE""ionlyfo=prov'sionstoinstallthedissolvedhydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated.ThisEPisclassifiedqualityrelatedbecauseitisrequiredbvNUP.EG0737formonitoringReactorCoolantSystemchemistryandactivityresultingfromadesignbasisaccident.Basedontheabove,thisengineeringdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincethisEPisonlyforprovisionstoinstallthedissolvedhydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisnon-safetyrelatedanditsnormalperformancerequirementshavenotbeenaffectedbythesetie-ins.Thereisnopotentialforthismodificationtointeractwith'afetyrelatedsystemfunctions.I~
PCM140-186ANNUNCIATOR NUISANCEALARMSABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)coversthemodifications offiveannunciator circuitsintheMainControlRoom.Existinglogic,circuitconfiguration andcomponents willbechangedintheReactorTurbineGenerator..Boards (RTGBs)soastoeliminate existingnuisanceconditions causedbyerroneous alarmindication ofthesefiveannunciator circuits.
PCM143-186(ii)The-possibilityforanaccidgntormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisEP,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.ImplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.r PCM146-186MISCELLANEOUSICWSYSTEMMODIPICATIONSABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageenablesminormodificationstobemadetotheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)systemresultingfromdisassembly,inspection,repairandreassemblvduringthe1987refuelingoutage.ThosemodificationsthatmeetthecriteriaestablishedbythisdesignpackageshallbeinitiatedviatheChangeRequest/Noticeformanddispositionedbyengineering.Thosemodificationswhichdonotmeetthecriteriaestablishedbythisdesignpackageshallbeimplementedunderseparatedesignpackages.ThosemodificationstotheessentialportionoftheICWSystemareclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelated,thereforethePC/Misclassifiedassafetyrelated.Modificationstothenon-essentialportionoftheICKSystemareclassifiedasnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedunlessthefailuremodeanalysisdeterminesanintelactionwithequipmentimportanttosafety.Ifso,qualityrequirementswillbeappliedandthemodificationclassifiedasQualityRelated.SincethePC/Mwillrestorethesystemtoitsoriginaldesignconfiguration,itdoesnotresultinanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYEVALUATIONThemodificationstotheessentialportionoftheICWsystemdescribedintheprojectscopeareclassifiedasnuclearsafety-relatedbecausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponentinconjunctionwiththeworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedperFSARTable9.2.2wouldresultintheinabilityoftheICWsystemtoachieveitsdesignbasissafetyfunction.HistoricaGy,thetypesofmodificationstotheICWSystemresultingfromthedisassemblyandreassemblyofthepipingsystemforinspectionandrepairhavebeen:1.Modificationstopipeventanddrainlines(e.g.,replacementofcorrodedmaterial).2.Modificationstosupport/restraints(e.g.,documentationofweldsymbolsrequiredtoreassembleS/R's,excessivegapatS/Rbaseplates,replacementofcorrodedmaterial).3.WeldrepairtoICWpipe(e.g.,documentationofpipewelds).4.Pipeflangeboltingmaterialchangesorbolttorquevalvedocumentation.Asdescribedinthedesignbases,thesenuclearsafety-relatedmodificationsshallbemadeinaccordancewiththedesigncoderequirementsforSafetyClass3pipeandpipecomponentsandforSeismicClassIsupport/restraints.
Byimplementing thisEP,thesecircuitswillbeconsistent withthe"DarkAnnunciator" conceptwhichallowsforlightedannunciators duringoff-normal conditions only.ThisEPisclassified asNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvestheinterposing ofacontrolrelayinasafetyrelatedcircuit(hydrogen analyzer) andtheextension ofsafetyrelatedpowersupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H).Thesafetyevaluation hasdetermined thatthisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangeintheplanttechnical specifications.
PCM146-186Inaccordancewiththerequirementsspecifiedinthedesignbases.eachmodificationtnthenon-nuclearsafety-relatedportionoftheICIUsystemsnal'ave>fa!luremod=evaluationperformedtodetermineifthereareanyinterac'.ionswithsafty-relatedequipmentorfunctions.Sine=thenon-nuclearsafe~relatedportionoitheICYsystemisnotreliedupo:;.'oranyaccidentpreventionormitigation,failureswhicharedeterminedtcnotimpactthefunctionofthenuclearsafety-relatedportionoftheI:"4systemareacceptablevithregardtonuclearsafety.NoQualityRelatedrequirementswillbeappliedto.thedesignofthesemodifications.However,ifamodificationtothenon-nuclearsafetyrelatedportionoftheICLUsystemisdeterminedbythefailuremodeevaluationtointeractwithNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment,QualityRelated!equi!'ementswilloeappliedtothedesignofthesemodifications.Basedontheabove,itcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)evaluatedintheFSARisnotincreasedbecausenoDBA'sdealwithspecificICWcomponentfailures.ThemodificationsrestoretheICWsystemando!iginaldesignconditionandensureitssafetyfunctionwillbeperformed.ii)'TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreasedbecausethemodificationsproposedbythisdesignpackagearetopassivecomponentsonlyandtheywillbedesigned/implementedinaccordancewithsafetyclass/FSARrequirements.TheFSARdoesnotevaluatepassivecomponentfailures.iii)ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethemodificationspermittedbythisdesignpackagedonotaltertheICWsystemfunctionormodeofoperation.TheFSARevaluationoftheICWsystemenvelopesthefailureofthedescribedmodifiedcomponents.iv)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforatechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Themodificationspermittedbythisdesignpackagehavebeenreviewedandfoundacceptable.Nochangestothedesignbasis,function,ormodeofoperationoftheICWsystemisproposed10CFR50.59allows'hangestoafacilityasdescribedintheFSARifan.unreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangeto.theTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.Asshovninthepreceedingsections,thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59thatpertainstoanunreviewedsafetyquestioncanbepos!tivelyansweredsincethePC/i'eturnstheICWsystemtoitsdesignconditionandnoTechnicalSpecificationchangeisrequired.Inconclusion,thechangesproposedinthisdesignpackaage"areacceptablefromthestardpointofnuclearsafety,donotinvolveanunreviewe"safe'.yquestion.donotrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpec!fica'.!onsanddonotrequirepriorNRCapprovalpriortoin;plmen:a'.ion.
ThisPCMmaybeimplemented withoutpriorCommission approval.
PCM148-186ICWISOLATIONVALVEREPLACEMENTABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageisissuedtoprovidedirectionforthereplacementofanyofthe30-inchand36-inchnormallyopenisolationvalvesintheIntakeCoolingNate."(ICN)system,asrequired.Theisolationvalvereplacementisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelated,anddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion."Normallyclosed"isolationvalvesmustbereplacdwithrubberlinedvalvesandarenotwithinthescopeofthisdesignoackage.SpecificationMN2.57whichisinaccordancewiththeorocurementspeciricationusedtoprocuretheoriginalvalves.Thenewvalveshavecaststainlesssteelbodies{ASI<IZoA-351GradeCF3M)whichprecludedete.iorationseenintheevistin~carbonsteI/rubberlinedvalves.Theprocurementspecificationspecifiedtherequi<rementthatthevalvesandextensionmustbecomcatiblewiththeexstingoperatars.Pressmeboundarycomponents!nstaQedaspartoitheintakeCooli'ngWatersyste<v:veredesi=..ed'fortheoilowin~:sfPesicHDassure2~i90Design<Tmcerat",."-<n5Chemistry:Seawaterwith"..0mavimumdisso.'vedchlorinePerFPLP.OC83918~<814PandPowerPlantEngineeringSpecificationMN2.57evisicn0,thevalves,vereboughttot<".erequirementsofAS'.<IESecL<onIIIforClass3components.Approoriateseismicrequirem<ents.veralsospecified.Thenewvalveswe.edesignediorthefollowingexternalenvironmentalconditions:Temperature,FPressure,psig30-120Atmosoheric100%Humidity,SaltLadenAtmosphereAQualityControlholdoointhasbeenassignedintheConstructionScopesectionfortheverificationthattheextensionbcnnetsupportingdetailsareapprovedbyengineeringpriortosystemturnoverinordertocomelywiththerequirementsofparagraph1.3.5.
ThisEngineering PackageRevisioncoversmodification ofthesixannunciator circuitsassociated withannunciated windowsP-30,P-35,P-36,P-42,9-40andX-5intheControlRoom.Thesemodifications, whichincluderelocation oflocalresetswitches, installation ofreflashers andlogicmodifications, willeliminate the;nuisance alarmstatusofthesixannunciators.
PCM148-186SAFETYEVALUATIONThereplacementofisolationvalvesasdescribedintheProjectScopeisaNuclearSafetyRelatedmodificationbecauseitchangesvalveswhichformapartofthepressureretainingboundaryofaSafetyClass3/QualityGroupCsystem.Basedupontherequirementsof10CFR50.59,anunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistbecause:1.TheICNsystemisnotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilityofdesignbasisaccidents(i.e.,LOCA,AISLB,LOOP,etc.).2.TheconsequenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttonuclearsafetyisnotmademoreseriousduetothedesignredundancyoftheICNsystem.TheseparationcriteriaismaintainedbythevalvesdesignedinaccordancewithASVlESectionIIIrequirements.3.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethefailureofanyofthesevalvesisapassivefailurewhichisenvelopedbytheevaluationsoftheFSAR.4.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnicalSpecificationremainsunchangedbecausetheredundancyoftheICWsystemismaintained.BasedontheaboveevaluationandinformationcontainedintheDesignAnalysis,themodificationcanbeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapprovalbecauseanUnreviewedSafetyQuest!ondoesnotexistandachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.
Byimplementing thisPCMSupplement, thesesixannunciators willbebroughtintocompliance withthe"DarkAnnunciator" conceptofNUREG0700"Guidelines forControlRoomDesignReview"..
PCM151-186480VACLOADCENTER1B~2TRANSFORMERCOOLINGABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationtothe480Vac,1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanentsourceof240Vac,ClasslEpower-forthestationservicetransformer'scoolingfans.Thismodificationconsistsofinstallinganew,controlpowertransformer,completewithprimaryandsecondaryovercurrentprotection,intheexistingtransitioncompartmentof1B-2LoadCenterandtheinterconnectionofthispowersourceto-theexistingautomatic/manualcontrolschemeassociatedwiththecoolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassfiedasClasslE,seismicCategoryIequipmentandperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,thisPlantChange/Modification(PC/M)isclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelated.TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.ThemodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyin=-thesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationtothe480Vacua1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanentsourceof240Vac,Class1Epowerforthestationservicetransformer'scoolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassifiedasClass1E,seismicCategoryIequipmentandperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,thisPC/Mhasbeenclassifiednuclearsafetyrelated'ndnuclearsafetyrelateddesignrequirementswereappliedtothisEP.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsince:Allmodificationsarebeingperformedonthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter.Theonlymodificationistorestoretheinstallationsimilartoitsoriginalcondition.Newcomponentsinstalledbythismodificationincludecurrentlimitingprimaryfusesandasecondarycircuitbreaker,whichprovideovercurrentprotectionofthenewcontrolpowertransformeranditssecondarycircuit.Shoul'dfailureofthenewcomponetsoccur,theywillberemovedfromtheirpowersourcebytheseprotect'vedeviceswithoutaffectingtherestofthe."B"electricalsyste=.A:sc,newcompone"tsareev'onme"tallyandseismicallyqua''ie'ctherequiredenviroxaetandw'-'1remainfunctionalduringprev'uslyevaluatedaccidents.'Theefore,the''probabilityofoccu=enceortheconsequencesofpreviouslyevaluatedaccidentsarenotincrease".
TheoriginalSafetyEvaluation hasbeenrevised.TheSafetyEvaluation stillconcludes, however,thatthisEPdoesnot,involve andunreviewed safetyquestion, orachangetothetechnical specifications.
PCM151-186NewcomponentsarebeingprovidedbyBrownBoveri,formallvITE,theoriginalmanufacture-oftne1B-2LoadCenter.Inaddition,themannerinwhichthecomponentsaremountedispeBrownBoveri/industrystandardinstallationdetails.TheBrownBoveriAddendumtothe1B-2LoadCenterCertificateofConformance(ReferenceAttachment4)hasbeenreviewedandithasbeenverifiedthattheadditionofthenewcomponentsdoesnotaffecttheexistingequipment'senvironmentalorseismicqualification.Thus,thismodificationdoesnotcompromisetheoperation/reliabilityoftheexistinginstallationandtheequipmentwillfunctionduringaccidentsaspreviouslyevaluated.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:Allmodificationsarebeingperformedonaauxiliarysupportingfeatureofthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter,1B-2,withnomodificationsrequiredtotheindependent,redundant"A"loadgroupLoadCenter,lA-2..Primaryandsecondaryovercurrentprotectionhavebeenprovidedforthenewcontrolpowertransformer.Allnewcomponentsandtheinterconnectingwiringareenvironmentallyandseismicallyqualifiedtotherequiredenvironmentandwillbeabletoprovidepowertothe1B-2LoadCenterstationservice'transformercoolingfanspostDesignBasisAccident.BasedonthisandParagraph3.3.3.,noaccidents/malfunctionsdifferent.thanthoseevaluatedpreviouslyarecreatedbythismodification.'hemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsincethemodificationensuresthattheequipmentwillfunctionaspreviouslyevaluatedduringoperation/accidents.Also,as1B-2LoadCentermustbedeenergizedpriortoperforminganywork,implementationofthisPC/MwillbecoordinatedwithPlantOperationssothecriteriaestablishedbytheplantTechnicalSpecifications,eg,Specification3/4.8,arenotviolated(ReferenceSection9.0).Therefore,theimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),'thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionand.priorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
Therefore, priorcommissi'on approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthePCM.TheintentoftheoriginalSafetyEvaluation isnotaffectedbythissupplement.
PCM153-186ROSEMOUNTANDVALCOREQENHANCEMENTSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)providesforthemodificationofseven(7)ValcorEngineeringCorporationsolenoidvalvesandtherelocationofone(1)Rosemount'leveltransmitter.ThesemodificationseliminatetheneedtoPatomeEPqualification(EQ)analysisonthisequipmentwhilebolsteringtheapplicablequal1f1cat1ondocumentationpackages.Th1sisaccomplishedbyraisingthetransmitterontheInstrumentRack50.1abovefloodlevelandaddingNAMCOControlsconduitsealassembliestotheelectricalpowerleadsofseven(7)Valcorsolenoidvalvestoprotectagainstingressofcontainmentchemicalsprayintothevalvecontrols.ThismodificationprovidesforincreasedprotectiontoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipmentandimprovesthemarginofsafetyofthepressurizerlevelinstrumentationandthehydrogensamplingsystem.TheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areunchanged.ThisPCMisclassifiedNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvesequipmentthatservestomitigatetheconsequencesofaDes1gnBasesEvent(DBE).EvaluationTheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireanychangetotheStLucie-UnitlTechnicalSpecifications.Themodifications,asprovidedbythispackage,donotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforthe1mplementationofthispackageisnotrequired.Plantsafetyandoperationarenotaffected.SafetWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionoftheequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased,or(11)ifapossibililityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviously1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebseesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheproposedmodificationaffectsthelocationofRosemountleveltransmitterLT-lllOXandtheelectricalcondu1tconnectiontoseven(7)Valcorisolationsolenoidvalvesinthehydrogensamplingsystem.TheprobabilityofoccurenceofanaccidentpreviouslyaddressedintheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedF1nalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)isnotincreasedbythismodification.ThisEPinfactdecreasesthepossibilityofRosemountleveltransmitters'ailurebyreducingtheprobabilityoffailureduetoflooding.ProbabilityoffailureoftheValcorsolenoidvalvesisreducedbyeliminating'helikelihoodoftheintrusionofchemicalsprayintheelectricalconduit.ThepossibilityofnewDBEsnotconsideredintheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophiesofpressurizerlevelandhydrogenanalyzerhavebeenpreviouslyaddressedintheUFSAR.ThismodificationisanenhancementtoexistinghydrogenanalyzerisolationvalvesaswellaspressurizerleveltransmitterLT-lllOX.
SAFETYEVALUATION PithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59;aproposedchangedshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
PCM153-186DuetothefactthatthisEPinvolvescablesidentifiedasessentialtosafereactorshutdown(pressurizerleveltransmitterLT-1110X),Appendix"R"requirementshavebeenconsideredandaddressedinthispackage(Section2.1.6).Assuch,thedesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandUPSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.ThisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvespressurizerlevelinstrumentation(usedforsafereactorshutdown)andhydrogensampling/analyzer(usedforthemitigationof'adesignbasesevent).Astheevaluationoffailuremode(Section2.2.8)indicates,thedegreeofprotectiontoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment(marginofsafety)isincreasedandtheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUPSARareunchanged.ThepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyzedintheUPSARisnotcreated.TheimplementationofNuclearSafetyRelatedPC/M153-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,nordoesitcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Theforegoingconsitutes,per10CPR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.
PCM001-187IEBULLETIN85-03MOVSWITCHSETTINGSABSTRACTNRCIEBulletin85-03requiresthatoperatingnuclearplantsdevelopandimplementaprogramtoensure'.thatswitchsettingsonselectedsafety-relatedmotor-operatedvalves(MOV's)arecorrectlyselected,setandmaintainedtoaccommodatethemaximumdifferentialpressuresexpectedonthesevalvesduringallpostulatedeventswithinthedesignbasis.Itema)ofthebulletinrequiresthatthedesignbasisforthosehlOV'slocatedinAFC'ndHPSIsystemsbereviewedtodeterminethemaximumdifferentialpressureexpectedduringbothopeningandclosingstrokesforallpostulatedevents.ThiseffortwasperformedforSt.LucieUnitsIand2byCombustionEngineeringaspartoftheCEOwner'sGroup(CEOG)Tasks528and531.TheresultsoftheItema)weresubsequentlytransmittedtotheNRCviaFPLletterL-86-200,datedMay15,1986.Itemb)ofBulletin85-03requiresthatthelicenseeestablishthecorrectMCVswitchsettingsbasedonthepreviouslydeterminedmaximumdifferentialpressure.Allswitches,includingtorcueswitches,torquebypassswitches,positionlimit,positionindication,overloads,etc.,shallbe'onsidered.ThisdesignpackageprovidestheoverallswitchsettingguidelinesforeachV>OY,inadditiontothespecificdesigninformationnecessary.tosetboththeopenandclosetorquesvitchesandmet:herequirementsofBulietin85-03.OncethecorrectswitchsettingshavebeenincorporatedintotherespectiveAIC'V,Itemc)ofIEBu!letin85-03requiresthateachK!OYbestroketestedagainstthemaximumdifferentialpressureestablishedinItema)toverify'.'perability,Becauseallofthe%1OY'sassociatedwithBulletin85-"3aresafety-relatedthisengineringpackagehasbeenclassifieasnuclearsafty-re!ated.Areviewofthsw'tchsettingcangestobimpierne..tedbythisPC/illwasper'ormecagainsttherequirementsofIGCFR5~.59,.anditwasconciudedthatthesemodiiic-tionsdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetycuestionanddonotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.ThissupplementrevisesthetorqueswitchsettingsforvalveV-3650toaccountforactualfieldtesting.ThisconditionhadbeenpreviouslyjustifiedviaSafetyEvaluation3PE-Al-87-038,Pev.i.TheEngineeringPackagesafetyclassificationandsafetyevaluationareunaffected.SAFETYEVALUATIONlUithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalReulations,Part50.59,themodificationdescribedinthisengineeringpackagedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreased.ThisengineeringpackageonlyprovidesthenecessarydesigninformationrequiredtosetMOVswitchsettingsutilizingAIOVATSsignatureanalysistechniques.Therecommendedswitchsettingsareconsideredenhancementstotheexistingsettingstofurtherensurevalveoperability.Also;FSAR'designbaseswere PCM001-187reviewedtodeterminethemaximumloadingconditionsoneachMOVtoensuretheswitchsettingswereproperlyselected.Furthermore,Itemc)ofBulletin85<3requiresthateachMOVbestroketestedundermaximumdifferentialpressureconditionstoensurevalveoperability.ii)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcrested.Nohardwaremodificationsareperformed-aspartofthisPC/M.TheproposedMOVswitchsettingsalteraccidentmitigatingequipmenttofurtherenhanceoperability.However,malfunctionsoftheseNOV'sdonotinthemselvesinitiateanaccident.Therefore,nonewaccidentshavebeencreated.Additionally,thespecifiedmodificationsdonotintroduceanynewfailuremodesfortheequipment.Therefore,nodifferentmalfunctionsoftheequipmentthanthosepreviouslyanalyzedareintroduced.iii)Themarginofsafetyas=definedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotimpact.theTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsfortheassociatedequipment.Valvestroketimesarenotimpacted.Therefore,themarginofsafetycontrolledbytheTechnicalSpecificationsispreserved.~~Inconclusion,thechangeproposedinthisengineeringpackageis.acceptablefromthestandpointofnuclearsafetydoesnotinvolveanunreviewecsafetyquestionandprior':RCapprovalforimplementationisnotrequired.
PCM140-186Themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincetheannunciators servenofunctioninthecontrolofplantoperat'ions orsafeshutdown.
PCM005-187.NRCIEBULLETIN85-03-MOVPOSITIONINDICATIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationstothesafetyrelatedMotorOperatedValves(MOV's)in.theAux1liaryFeedwater(AFW)andtheHighPressureSafetyInfection(HPSI)systems.ThisEngineeringPackagewillprovidetheengineeringanddesigndeta1lsrequiredto1mplementtheclosetoopentorquebypassswitchandclosedpositionindicationwiringmodifications.TheMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystemsarerequiredforplantsafeshutdownandclassifiedasClass1E,areseismicallyqual1fiedandperformasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,thisPC/MisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionsincethemodificationsdescribedabovewillnothaveanadverseimpactonplantoperationsorsafetyrelatedequipment.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrev1ewedsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ1pmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionof"a-differenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalys1sreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.Th1sEng1neeringPackageprovidestheengineeringanddesigndetailsrequiredtoinstalladditionalrotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestoMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystems.PC/M001-187increasestheclosedtoopentorquebypassswitchsettingswhich1mpacttheclosedpositionind1cat1nglight.Increasingthenumberofrotorsfromtwotofourvillallovthelimitswitchfortheclosedpositionindicating11ghttobelocatedonarotorotherthanthatusedforthetorquebypassswitch.Motormperatedvalvesthathavefourrotorswillonlyrequireinternalwiringchanges.Theadditionofthenewrotorsdoesnotaffecttheexistingequipmentqualifications.TheimplementationofthisEngineeringPackageincreasestheavailabilityoftheMOV'sduringsafeshutdownconditionsandimprovestheMOVpositionindicationprovidedtothecontrolroomoperators.TheMOV'sthatarebeingmodifiedperformsafetyrelatedfunctionsvithintheAFWandHPSIsystemsandaredesignedforoperationunderconditionsthatcouldbeimposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThisEPhasbeenclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.
Electrical separation isprovidedbetweenredundant safetyrelatedwiringandcomponents andannunciator logicwhichisseparated toprotectcontrolfunctions frombeingaffectedbyannunciation circuitfailure.(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofanycontrolcircuitsorassociated systems.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafety.asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.
PCM005-187Basedonthepreceeding,thefollowingconclusionscanbemade:(1)TherobabilitofoccurrenceortheconseuencesofanaPqccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety'reviously,evaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased,sincethemodificationstotheMOV'senhan'eestheoperabilityoftheequipment.Theadditionofrotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestothevalveswillpreventthepossibilityofinaccurateremoteclosedpositionindicationresultingfromtheincreasedbypass11mitswitchsettings.(11)Asaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibilityforaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificat1onaltersaccidentmitigat1ngequipmenttoenhancetheiroperation.Therewasnointroductionofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.(111)Th1smodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.ThesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolledbythevariousapplicableTechnicalSpecificationsismaintainedbythischange.TheproposeddesignensuresthattheMOV'swillfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnicalSpecificat1onsispreserved.ETheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
SincethisEPaffectsequipment thatisidentified asNuclearSafetyRelated(Hydrogen Analyzer) andrequirestheextention ofNuclearSafetyRelatedpowe'rsupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H),itisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.DuetothefactthattheFPdoesnot'nvolve anycablesessential tosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociated withachieving andmaintaining safeshutdownconditions, thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements.
PCM009-187OVERPRESSUREMITIGATIONSYSTEMMODIFICATIONSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)detailsthemodificationsrequiredontheOverpressureMitigationSystem(OMS)toprovidechangestothePowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)setpoints.ThenewsetpointsarederivedfromC~ustionEngineering'sreportonPressure/Temperature(F7T)limitsandLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)for10EffectiveFullPowerYears(EFPY).There-analysisoftheOMSsetpointsensuresthattheReactorCoolantSystemsPressurewillbemaintainedbelowtheapplicableP/Tlimitsduringtheoperatingperiodendingat10EFPY.ThenewP/Tlimitsareidentifiedtoprovideadequateprotectionagainstrapidpropogationofaflawinther'eactorvesselwithconsiderationgiventotheoptimizationofheatupandcooldownrates.TheOMSsetpointmodificationsareclassifiedQualityRelatedbecauseany'a1luretotheOMSsetpointb1stablealarmsundernormaloperatingconditionsoranticipatedtransientscanresultinexceedingasafetylimitspecifiedinsection3/4.4.13and3/4.4.14oftheTechnicalSpecifications.Furthermore,theOMSsetpointmodificationsaffecttheRTGBoardslocated1nthecontrolroom.ThisEPchangewillnotimpa1rtheeffic1entoperation.oftheOMS,nordoesitcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion,therefore,priorCommissionapprovalforitsimplementationisnotrequired.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreview'edsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyprev1ouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafet~hnalyiksReportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheOMSprotectstheRCSfrombeingpressur1zedbeyondthecurvesdefinedbytheminimumpressur1zationtemperaturecurvesoftheTechnicalSpecifications,whiletheRCSisatlowtemperatures.TheOMSachievesitspurposeofprotectingtheRCSfromoverpressur1zationatIow,non-ductiletemperaturesbycontinuouslycomparingactualpressurizerpressuretotwo(2)pressuresetpo1ntsandcorrespondingtemperaturesetpointsandbyactuatingthePORVswhenactualpressureapproachesthesesetpoints.ThepressureandtemperaturecomparisonsandPORVactuationarebothaccomplishedintwoindependentredundantOMStrainsponeforeachPORV.
Therefore, theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandStLucie-Unit1FSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.
PCM009-187TheP/TsetpointchangesoutlinedperthisEPpackageareclassifiedQualityRelatedbecauseanyfailuretotheOMSsetpointalarmsundernormaloperatingconditionsoranticipatedtransientscanresultinexceedingasafetylimitspecifiedinSection3/4.4.13and-3/4.4.14ofthe.TechnicalSpecifications.Inaddition,thesechangesalsoaffecttheRTGBoardslocatedinthe-ControlRoom.ThefollowingprovidestheJustificationthatanunreyiewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexist.i.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceozheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportantzosafetypreviouslvevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedbecausetheOMSmodificationservesonlytochangethesetpoinzsforthePORVswheneveranoverpressurizazioneventoccursinlowtemperaturemodeswhentheRCSmaybewatermolid.ThenewsezpoinzsforoverpressureprotectioninlowtemperaturemodesmaintainzhedesignphilosophyoftheOMSsyszem.iiThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreatedbecausethenewsetpointsallowbettercontroloverOMSeventsandpreventviolationofthe10CFRAppendixGpressure/temperaturelimitsduringtheoperatingperiodendingat10EFPY.TheCEreportprovidesassurancethatthesystemisabletoperformitsfunctionassuminganysingleactivecomponentfailureinadditionzothefailurethatinitiatedthe.pressuretransient.iiiThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsince.thisOMSmodificationrevisesthesetpointsforthePORVstoactuatewheneveranoverpressurizationeventoccursinlowtemperaturemodesofoperationwhenzheRCSmaybewater-solid.TheproposedsystempreventsviolationoftheAppendixGpressure/temperaturelimitsduringanoperatingperiodendingaz10EFPY.TheimplementationofzheproposedLTOPsystemdoesnotresultinthereductioninamarginofsafety;instead,izprovidesadditionalsetpointsandtherebyincreasesthemarginofsafezy.ThisEPchangewillnotimpairtheefficientoperationoftheOMS.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequiredachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.AlthoughnewP/Tlimitsforreactoroperationarebeingdeveloped,thoseTechnicalSpecificationchangesapplytooperationbeyond7.4EFPY,andarenotdirectlyrelatedzothesetpointchangesaccomplishedbythisEP.Theforegoingconszituzes,per10CFR50.59(b),zhewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovideszhebasesthatthischangedoesnozinvolveanunreviewedsafezyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofzhisEPis.notrequiredonthatbasis..
Implementation ofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM140-186andSupplement 1tothesamePCMdonotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical
PCM010-187PROTECTIVECOATINGSREPAIRAND/ORREPLACEMENTINREACTORCONTAINMENTBUILDINGJIBR1MCZThisengineeringpackagecoversthemaintenanceofServiceLevell~rotectivecoatingsonconcreteandsteelsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainmentBuilding.ThisproJectisclassifiedasqualityrelatedanddoes-notconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.F1NThefunctionofthecoatingsusedinsidetheRCBistoprovideprotectionagainstcorrosionandcontamination.Theonlysafetyrelatedaspect.isforthecoatingstoremainintactthroughoutadesignbasisaccidenttoinsurethatnoengineeredsafetyfeaturesareinterferedwith;ThecoatingstobeusedareDBAtestedandtheircomposition,functionalandtestingrequirementsareaddressedintheUnit1FSAR.Forthesereasonstheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttothesafetyoftheplanthasnotbeenincreased.lnaddition,therewillcontinuetobenopossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctiondifferentthanthosepreviouslyevaluatedintheUnitIFSAR.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheplanttechnicalspecificationshasnotbeenreduced.Itisthereforeconcludedthattherepairand/orreplacementofprotectivecoatingsonsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainmentBuildingasoutlinedinthispackagedoesnotposeanunreviewedsafetyquestionpursuantto10CFR50.59.
'pecifications andmaybeimplemented withoutpriorcommission approval.
PCM011-187CONDENSERHOTWELLNITROGENINJECTIONCONNECTIONSThisEngineeringPackage1stoprovideconnectionstothecondenserstoinfectnitrogenintotheco~denserhotwells.Testhaveshownthatinfectinglcfmofnitrogenintoacondensershellreducesthed1ssolvedoxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensatebyapproximately2ppb.ItistheorizedthatbecauseWolowair1n-leakageintothecondensers(condensersaredesignedbaseduponthefacttherewillbeairin-leakage),theflowofthenon-condensiblesintheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished;Therefore,oxygenisentrainedasthe'condensatedripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.Theinjectionofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondensertoestablishtheflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibleswithoutintroducingoxygenintothesystem.Areviewofthechangestobe1mplementedbythisEng1neeringPackagewasperformedagainsttherequirementsoflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,thesecondensermodificationsareclassifiedasnonmafetyrelated,donotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandwillnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation(asaddressedinSection3"SafetyEvaluation").SafetEvaluationMithrespecttoT1tle10oftheCodeofPederalRegualtion,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquest1on;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificat1onisr8fuced.ThisEngineeringPackageistoprovideconnectionstothecondenserstoin)ectnitrogenintothecondenserhotwells.Testshaveshownthatinfecting1cfmofnitrogenintoacondensershellreducesthedissolvedoxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensatebyapproximately2.ppb.Itistheorizedthatbecauseoflowairin-leakageintothecondensers(condensersaredesignedbasedupon-thefacttherew111beairin-leakage),theflowofthenon-condensiblesintheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished.Therefore,oxygenisentrainedasthecondensatedripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.Theinfectionofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondensertoestablishtheflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibleswithoutintroducingoxygenintothesystem.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMandSupplement 1tothesameisnotrequired.
PCM011-1.87Basedontheabovedescription,themodificationincludedinthisEngineeringPackage(EP)18consideredtobenon-'safetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveonunreviewedsafetyquestion,'ndthefollowingarebasesfor.thisJustification:1)'heprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequences.ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Thecondensersarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibilityforanacc1dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprov1desthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofth1sPCMisnotrequired.
PCM14D-186PRESSURIZER LEVELINSTRUMFNTATION MODIFICATION REA-SLN-86-076 ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)modifiesthePressurizer LevelInstrumentation toprovidetworedundant qualified channelsofControlRoomindication (Sigmameters).Electrical isolators willbeinstalled soastoseparatethenon-safety (control) loopfromtheupgradedNuclearSafetyRelatedPressurizer LevelInstrumentation loops.Existingpressurizer pressureandpressurizer levelrecorders willbereplacedwithnarrowcaseequivalent equipment inordertoallowspacefortheinstallation,,
PCM012-187ONEANDTWOFEEDWATERHEATERANDEXTRACTIONPIPESHIELDINGThisEngineeringPackageprovidesgenericdetailsfortherepa1rorreplacementofdamagedshielding'fortheExtractionStre'ssPipeandExpansionJointsandtheFeedwaterHeatersinsidetheCondenser..TheEngineeringPackageisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelatedsinceitisamodificationtoanon-safetyrelatedsystem.ThesafetyevaluationhasshovnthatthisEPdoesnotconstituteanyunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thissystemisnon-safetyrelatedandvillhavenoeffecton"equipmentvitaltoplantsafety.SafetEvaluationWithrespect.toTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofan~cidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanzkysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpeciificationisreduced.ThisPCM1nvolvestherepairandreplacementoftheshieldingfortheextractionp1pingandfeedwaterheaterslocatedinthecondenser.Ithasbeenclassifiedasnon-safetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ1pmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportsnot1ncreased.TheStLuci~UnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4readsasfollows:Exceptforaportionofthefeedwatersystempiping,thefeatures,componentsandsystemdescribedinthissectionservenosafetyfunctions1ncetheyarenotrequiredforsafeshutdownortomitigatetheeffectsofaLOCAandtheirfailurewillnotresultinthereleaseofsignificantuncontrolledradioactivity.TheStLucieUnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4.1describesthecondenserwheretheextractionpipingandlowpressureFeedwaterheaters1and2arelocated;Thissystemisnon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.(11)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationdonotperformanysafetyrelatedfunction.Nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthecondenserortheextractionpiping.(111)Themargin.ofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotdirectlyincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.
ofnewSigmaindicators, inthefrontpanelofRTGB-103.
PCM012-187TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnica'pecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per'10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
Cable,conduit,penetrations andcomponents whichwillbepartoftheNuclearSafetyRelatedloopwillbere-tagged toindicatethisupgrade.Thetwoupgradedchannelsofpressurizer levelinstrumentation willmeettherequirements ofRegulatory Guide1.97,Rev3forVariableDCategory10ThisEPisclassified asNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitprovidesanupgradeofanexistingsystemtoNuclearSafetyRelatedstatus.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthattheimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforitsimplementation isnotrequired.
PCM017-187eABSTRACTCCWHEATEXCHANGERS-SHELLSIDEDRAINADDITIONTHISENGINEERINGPACKAGEPRQViDESDETAILSFORTHEADDITIONOFTWOFLANGFDSIXINCHSHELLSIDEDRAINCONNECTIONSTOTHFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.THEDRAINSAREDESIREDTOIMPROVEFLUSHENGEFFECTIVENESSANDTOREDUCECRITICALF'ATHDRAINTINEBETWEENFLUSHESFOLLOWINGRETUBINGUNDERPC/M~40-183DURINGTHE1987UNIT1REFUELENSOUTAGE.THISMODIFICATIONIBCLASSIFIEDASNUCLEAP,SAFFTYRELATEDSiNCEiTAFFECTSTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYOFTHE=CONPONENTCOOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.THECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANSERSFGRNAPOF;TIONOFTHECQI'1POh!ENTCOOLINGWATERANDINTAKECOGLINGWATFRSYSTEllSWHICHARECLASSIFIEDASQUALITYGROUPC,SEISNICBYSTEt'1S.THISPC/r'iHABBEENRFVEEWEDTGTHECRETER1ASETFOf'THErVIi>CFR50.59ANDHABBEENDF'TERMINEDNGTTQINVOLVEANUtVREVIE!VEDSAFETYQUESTION,NGRDGEBI7REQUIRFCl!ANSESTQTHFTCHtiiCALBF'ECIFICATIOt!B.'F;IGRCOMMIBSION"F'F'FOVALIBNGTREQUIREDORIMPLEMENTATIONGFTHISMODIFICATION.SAFETYEVALiJAT1GhlTHISi~1ODEF"ATIONCONSISTSONLYOFTHEADDITIONQFTWOSIXINCHF!ANGEDPEF'BT!iBDRAiNSTOTHEUhlDEFBIDEOFEACHCOt'IPONFh!7COOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGERSHcLLTOREDUCEDRAINAGETIt!cEANDTGENPROVEFLUSHINGEFFECTIVENFBS.TH"NE4!DRAI!V1'!IL'ERFORtiNG"ACTIVc"SAFETYRELAT-DFUNCTIrtV.ON'TH=.='A:8IV=FJN~CTEONOFRETAININSTHEF'RESBJf>EBGUluDARYi!VTEPF'YQrTHECG!'1PONENTCOQ'k!SiVATERS.STEM.TH:St'1QD'~AiIGl<INUCLEARSAF7YRE'T"''B~hiCE7AFr7>7HE,PRE:-8'JF:EPGUNDAr,'YOFTHECCWHEATEXHANGERSWHi:HAR=QUA'YSRQUc',BEESNICCO!'!PGNENTS'.REFFRENCEUNi71F.ARTABLE.:.:--2).BASEDQtTHEpOLLOWINGARGL'ENENTS,iiISDEMONSTRATEDTHATNQUNREVIEW"DBAFETYQUFSTIONSEXISTANDTHATTHEMGDi;ICATIONNAYBEINcLEMhlTEDWITHOUTPR>QRCONN>cSIONAPcROVALTHPROBABELITYOFOCCUR=filCEOF;THECONBEQUcNCcSOFANACCIDENTGFNALFUNCTEONOFEQ>JIPMENTIMPORTANTTGSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSIBRErORTHASNOTBEENINCREASED.THISMODIrECATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHEPROBABILITYOFOCCURcNCEOFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLYFVALUATEDSINCETHECCWHEATEXCHANSERSARENOTCONSIDEREDINDETERNININSTHEPROBABILETIc.SOFACCIDENTS.
ThisEPdoesnotadversely affectplantsafetyandoperation orimpactPlantTechnical Specifications.
THECONSEQUENCESOFPOSTULATEDACCiDENTSHAVENOTBEENMADc.MORESEVERESINCETHISMODIFICATIONDOESNQTAFFECTTHEFUNCTiONALPERFORMANCEOFTHECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERSANDDOESNQTAFFECTANYOTHEREQUIPMENTWHICHWOULDMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCESOFPOSTULATEDACCIDENTS.-THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANPREVIOUSL'YEVALUATEDINTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSiSREPORTHASNOTBEENCREATED.THENEWFLANGEDDRAINCONNECTIONSARETYPICALINTERMSOFDcSIGNCODES70THEOTHERFLANGEDPIPINGINTHECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMTHEREFORENONEWACCIDENTSQRMALFUNCTIONSAREINTRODUCED.-THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDiNTHEBASISFOR.ANYTECHNICALSPECIFiCATIQNHASNOTBEENREDUCED.THEMQDIFICATiONDESCRIBEDHEREININNOWAYAFFECTSANYTECHNICALSP"CIFICATIQN.10CFR50.5c'LLOlJSMODIDESCRIBEDiNTHEFSARWIUNREN'IEWED3'AFETYQUESTIFTECHNICALSPECIFICATARGUcMENTSDEMONTRATENQTRc(UIREDiTHEREFORc.WITHOUTPRIQcCQMMISSIONFICATIONSTONUCLEARFACILITIESASTHOUTPRIORCQtlMISSIOh)APPc,'OVALIFANIQhlISDEMONSTRATEDNOTTOEXISTAiv'DiQNSAREUt'jAF."ECTED.THEPRECEDt'lGTHATNOUNREViWEDSAFETYC!UESTiON=TQTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSTHISMQDFI'TIONMAYBEIt'iPLEMENTEDAPPROVAL.
Supplement 1tothisPCMisthevehiclefortheissuanceofarevisiontotheEnvironmental Qualification Documentation Packageandupdatingthe10CFR'0.49listtoaddresstheSafetyInjection Tanksamplelinecontainment isolation valves,FCV&3-1EandFCV-03-1F.
PCM027-187MISCELLANEOUSSNUBBERMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisEPprovidesengineeringanddesignformi'scellaneousmodificationstosnubbersasaresultoftheinserviceinspectionfindings.Themodificationgenerallyincludesareplacement'oftheexistingsnubberand/oritscomponentswithanupgradedsnubberoritscomponentsofadifferentorsamemanufacturer.ThisEPhasbeenclassifiedasSafetyRelatedbecausethemodificationaffectssafetyrelatedpipingsystem.Themodificationshavebeenreviewedunderthecriteriaof10CFR50.59andnounreviewedsafetyquestionshavebeendemonstratedtoexist.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthisEPwillnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationassnubbershavenotbeenremovedoraddedtotheTable3.7-2bofthePlantTechnicalSpecification3-7.10.Supplement1,providesengineeringanddesignsformodificationtoadditionalsnubbersasaresultoftheInserviceInspectionfindings.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthissupplementwillrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecificationTable3..7-2aand2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetablestoincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraintMkNoRC-247-H3intheTable3.7-2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendmenttothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Supplement2providesengineeringanddesignsformodificationtoadditionalsnubbersasaresultoftheInserviceInspectionfindings.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthissupplementwillrequireachangetoplantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10toincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforofthrestraintMkNoRC-247-H3inTable3.7-2b.'Howeverperthefttotesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendmenttothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Supplement3providesengineeringanddesignformodificationtotworestraintswhichwerefoundtohavebeendamagedduringtheinserviceinspection.
Thesesolenoidvalveswereinstalled aspartofPCM314-77whichmovedtheSafetyInjection Tanksamplepointfrominsidetooutsidethecontainment.
Thesafetyevaluation'hasshownthatthismodificationdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion;however,asindicatedimplementationofsupplement1and2ofthisPCMwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthissupplementwillnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecification.Supplement4providesengineeringanddesignformodificationstoadditionalsnubbersasaresultofInserviceInspectionsfindings.Theoriginalpipestressanalysis&pipesupportdesignhasnotbeenmodifiedforthisPC/M.TheimplementationofthissupplementdoesnotchangethepreviousconclusionthatTechnicalSpecificationSection3.7.10andtables3.7-2aor3.7-2brequiremodification.ThismodificationrequiresachangetoPlantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10,whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Thesafetyeva'luationhasshown,thatthemodificationsincludedinRevision4ofthisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Basedonthese'points,itisconcludedthatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthisPC/MwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnicalSpecification.'SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)ifthe~robabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybe.increased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.ThisEPisformodificationofexistingrestraintstoeitherreplacesnubbersof'onemanufacturerwiththatofthesameorlargersizeandloadratingfromadifferentmanufacturerortoreplaceexisting'restraintcomponentswithadifferentdesign.ThisisrequiredtoresolverestraintanomaliesfoundduringtheInserviceInspectionoftherestraints.Thismodificationaffectssafetyrelatedpipingsystems.Accordingly,thismodificationisclassifiedassafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingarethebasisforthisjustification:
Thesecontainment isolation valvescontainlimitswitches(inthesolenoidassembly) asrequiredbyRegulatory Guide1.97,Rev3forVariableBCategoryl.Theisolation valvesarelocatedinapotentially harshenvironment, thustheyrequireEnvironmental Qualification asrequiredby10CFR50.49.Nophysicalchanges'areneededtoaddressSupplement 1ofthisPCMsincethequalified limitswitcheswereinstalled aspartofPCM314-77.Revision1doesnotaltertheNuclearSafetyRelatedstatusof.thisEPsinceitonlyaffectsaNuclearSafetyRelatedEnvironmental Qualification Documentation Package.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthattheimplementation ofthePCMsupplement doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforitsimplementation isnotrequired'his EPrevisiondoesnotadversely affectplantsafetyandoperation orimpactPlantTechnical Specifications.
PCM027-187(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincetherestraintsystemsforthepipingwillremainfunctionallyidenticaltoexistingconfiguration.Inaddition,sincetherestraintconfigurationisnotchangedallpreviousanalysisconclusionsarestillvalid.(ii)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyin,thesafety.analysisreportisnotcreatedbecause,nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofeitherthesnubbersortherestraintsand,thesystemremainsfunctionallyidenticaltotherequirementsspecifiedintheexistingstressanlaysisofrecord.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythismodificationbecausethereplacementcomponentsutilizedperformthesamerestrainingfunctionasthosetheyreplace.TheimplementationofthisPCMwillrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationassnubbershavebeenremovedfromTable3.7-2bandaddedtoTable3.7-2aofthe'PlantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10.:ThesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraintMarkNoRC-247-H3isrequiredtobeaddedtoTable3.7-2b.Asperthefootnoteofthesetables,snubbersmaybeaddedtoorremovedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendmenttothesetablesprovidedarevisiontoTables3.7-2aand3.7-2bareincludedwiththe"nextLicenseAmendmentrequest.
PCM141-186SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
PGM028-187REPLACEMENTOFRWTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46Th1sEngineeringPackage(EP)providesthedesignforthereplacementoftheRefuelingWaterTank(RWT)nozzlefor-lineI-3"-CS-46.-Theexistingnozzlehasextensivepittingandcorrosion,therefore1twasconsideredadvisibletoreplaceit.ThisEPisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitrepairsasafetyrelatedpieceofequipment.Thesafetyevaluat1onhasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstituteanyunreviewedsafetyquetsions,"nordoesitrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementtionofthisPCM.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactonnuclearplantsafetyandoperation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or{ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginof'safetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspec1ficationisreduced.Thismodificationreplacesa3inchnozzleintheRWTwithanidenticalnozzleexceptfortheweldingdetailwhichisequivalentbutnotidentical.ThisweldingdetailminimizesradiationexposurebyreducingweldingrequirementsinsidetheRWT.ThemodificationincludedinthisEngineeringPackageisconsideredtobesafetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(1)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunct1onofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethereplacementofthenozzlevillnot.impactthequantityofwatersuppliestothechargingpumps'ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesign-oftheRUTandthenewnozzleisequivalentindesign.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecification.ImplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),themittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction'f equipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeinczeased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.4Theproposedmodification affectsthePressurizer LevelInstrumentation andcontrolloopsinthatitprovidesfortheestablishment'f tworedundant NuclearSafetyRelatedpressurizer levelindication channelsintheControlRoomsoastomeettherequirements ofRegGuide1;97.Inaccordance withRegGuide1.75,physicalseparation isprovidedbetweenthenonsafety(control) andthesafetyrelatedsegmentsoftheloop.Supplement 1ofthisPCMisthevehicleforissuanceofarevisiontotheEgDocumentation PackageforValcorSolenoidvalvestoincludeSafetyInjection TankSampleLineContainment Isolation Valvesinaccordance with10CFR50.49.Supplement 1servestoaddtheenvironment qualification oftheisolation valvesintothedocumentsystemandhasnoimpactonplanthardwareorprocedures asdescribed intheUFSAR.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofaDBEpreviously addressed intheUFSARisnotaffectedbythismodification.
PCN032-187PRESSURIZERSURGELINESAMPLEVALVE(V1210)REPLACENHNTABSTRACTExistingpressurizersurgelinesamplevalveV1210isleaking,hasadamagedvalvestemandcannotberepaired.TnevalvewillbereplacedwithanewvalveoriginallyprocuredforUnit2forsimilarservice.TheReactorCoolantSystemandSamplingSysteminwhich~isvalveislocatedinsafetyrelated.Accordingly,thisEngineeringPackageisclassi.fiedasnuclearsafetyrelated.Thesafetyevaluationhasshownthat'thisEPdoesnotaconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.ThisEPneitherreducesthemarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification,norhasanyimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpzeviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.Thissafetyrelatedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:i)'heprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccident~rmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportismotincreased.Thereplacementvalvehasthesamequalificationforthelocationandserviceonthevalvewhichitreplaces.Totalfailureofthereplacementvalvewillresultinthesameconsequencesorthetotalfailureoftheexistingvalve.Totalfailuzeofthisvalvewillcauseasmalllossofcoolantwhichislimitedbyaorificetobelessthanthecapacityofasinglechargingpump.ThisconditioniswithintheexistingFSARAnalyses-ii)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thismodificationdoesnotchangethesystemfunctionordesign.Thismodificationisthereplacementofavalvewithasimilarbutnotidenticalvalve.Thefailuremodeofthisvalvewillbeidenticalwiththeexistingvalveand,asstatedabove,iswithintheFSARanlaysesiii)ThemarginofsafetyisdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythismodificationsincethevalveinvolveddoesnotformthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.
ThisEPwillinfactdecreasetheprobability ofpressurizex levelinstrumentation failuresinceitprovidesforincreased reliability intheeventasinglefailurebyfurnishing tworedundant, qualified channels.
PCM032-187eTheimplementationofthisPQfdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovides.thebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforimplementationofthisP(Hisnotrequired.  
Thepossibility ofnewDBEsnotconsidered intheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophy hasbeenpreviously discussed intheUFSAR.Thismodification isanenhancement toapre-existing systemandisbeingperformed toprovideincreased xeliability intheeventofasinglefailure.Pressurizer LevelInstrumentation isidentified asPostAccidentMonitoring Instrumentation andisrequiredtobeNuclearSafetyRelatedperRegulatory Guide1.97,Rev3asitpertainstoCategory',
-87CONDENSEROUTLETTUBESHEET.ANDWATERBOXCOATINGS8ACTThisengineeringpackageaddress"theadditionofanepoxycoatingtothetothecondenseroutlettubesheetsandwaterboxes.Thismodificationwillenhancethecorrosionresistanceofthetubesheetsandwaterboxesandallowreductionofthecathodicprotectionsystempotentialsandcurrentdensities.Thecondensersandtheplantcirculatingwatersystemareclassifiedasnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedandtherefore,themodificationaddressedinthisengineeringdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Furthermore,theadditionofaprotectivecoatingtothecondenseroutlettubesheetsandwaterboxesdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.AFVALATINAsnotedinFSAR.Sections9.2.3and10A.5,thecondensersandcirculatingwatersystemperformnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunction.Afailuremodeevaluationoftheproposedcondenseroutlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshasdeterminedthereisnopotentialforinteractionwithequipmentorfunctionsimportanttonuclearsafety.Accordingly,themodificationaddressedbythisengineeringpackageis"classifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelated.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysis,ithasbeendemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Sincethereisnopotentialforinteractionbetweenthemodificationaddressedbythisengineeringpackageandequipmentoffunctionsimportanttosafety,previoussafetyanalysisrepor;evaluationsrelatedtosafetyremainunaffected.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctiondifferentthanthosepreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.nNonewaccidentsormalfunctionsassociatedwiththefailureofthecondenseroutlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshavebeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.Sincethereisnopotentialforinteractionbetweenthemodificationaddressedbythisengineeringpackageandequipmentorfunctionsimportanttosafety,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinanyTechnicalSpecificationremainsunaffected.conclusion,themodificationproposedinthisengineeringpackageisacceptablefromstandpointofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoes=otrequireachangetoanyTechnicalSpecifications.Accordingly,NRCapprovalpriortoimplementationisnotrequired.
TypeDvariables.
PCM035-187REPLACEMENTOFRAYCHEMSPLICESANDCONAXCONDUITSEALSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationstotheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociatedwiththesafetyrelatedinstrumentslistedintheEnvironmentalQualificationListfor10CFR50.49andlocatedintheReactorContainmentBuilding.ThisEngineeringPackagewillprovidetheengineeringand'esign'details'equiredtoimplementthereplacementofthebox'esthatareusedforsplicingtheConaxconduitsealpigtailcabletotheplantcableandreplacementofRaychemsplicesattheboxesandtheElectricalPenetrationAssemblies.Thema]orityofinstrumentslistedinAttachment7.4andtheirassociatedsplicesandconduitsealsareclassifiedasClass1E,areseismicallyqualifiedandperformasafetyrelatedfunction.AlltheinstrumentslistedinAttachment7.4arerequiredforplantsafeshutdown.Therefore,this'EPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthemodificationsdescribedwerereviewedinaccordancewith10CFR50.59anddeterminedtohavenoadverseimpactonplantoperationsorsafetyrelatedequipment.TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecification.FThischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.Supplement1incorporatesadditionalsafetyrelatedinstruments,theirassociatedEquipmentQualificationDocumentationPackageandtheremovaloftheholdpointsforEquipmentQualificationDocumentat'ionPackagesfortheRaychemsplicesandtheConaxconduitseals.Theadditionalequipment,EQDocumentationPackageandremovalofholdpoints,doesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation,exceptfortheremovaloftheholdpoints.Supplement2revisesattachment7.4andincorporatesdetaildrawingsfortheRaychemsplices.ThisadditionalinformationcompletesthemodificationscoveredinthisEPanddoesnotaffecttheconclusionsoftheoriginalsafetyevaluation.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.
Asthismodification involvescablesessentia1 toreactorsafeshutdown(Essential Equipment List8770-B-049, Rev0)andPostAccidentMonitoring Instrumentation (PAMI),allapplicable 10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements havebeenidentified andaresatisfied bythispackage(Section2.1.4).Therefore theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandUFSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.
ThisEngineeringPackageprovidesthespliceinspectioncriteriaandtheengineeringanddesigndetailstoimplement,asrequired,thereplacementofspliceboxesandsplices.TheimplementationofthisEngineeringPackageincreasestheavailabilityoftheequipmentduringsafeshutdownconditionsbyimprovingthereliabilityofthesplicesattheequipmentandpenetration.Thismod'ificationshallbeimplementedprior.toenteringNode4.Theequipment,listedinAttachment7.4.1and7.4.3,whoseassociatedboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesneedreplacement,performsafetyrelatedfunctionswithinthevariousplantsystemsandaredesignedforoperationunderconditionsthatcouldbe'mposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThepowerandcontrolterminationsfortheequipmentlistedinAttachment7.4.2,thoughnon-safetyinnature,couldhaveanadverseaffectonthesafetyrelatedterminationsduetothehighenergylevelsassociatedwiththesenon-safetycircuits.Therefore,thesenon-safetycircuits(withtheexceptionoflowenergyannunciatorcircuitsandcircuitsid'entifiedviaFPLletterJPE-PSL-87-0787dated3/20/87),whichcouldbeenergizedfollowingaLOCAevent,havebeenprovidedwithsplicesorconnectors(asperChapter3,Section3.11.5.4ofthe'SAR),whicheffectivelyeliminatedthepotentialforadverseinteractionbetweensafetyandnon-safetyrelatedterminationsbyeliminatingthehighenergycircuitsfromtheharshLOCAenvironment.ThisEPhasbeenclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.Basedonthepreceeding,thefollowingconclusionscanbemade:I(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased,sincethemodificationstotheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociatedwiththeequipmentlistedinAttachment7.4enhancestheoperabilityoftheequipmentinaharshenvironmentpostDBA.(ii)Asaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibilityforaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificationaltersassociatedcomponentsofaccidentmitigatingequipmenttoenhancetheiroperation.Existingaccuracieswithrespecttocontrolormonitoringfunctionsoftheinstrumentationloops,undermodification,willnotbeaffectedbythischange.Thereisnointroductionofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.(iii)ThismodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.ThesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolledbythevariousapplicableTechnicalSpecificationsismaintainedbythischange.Theproposeddesignensuresthattheequipmentwillfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnicalSpecificationsispreserved.
Sincethispackagemeetstherequirements ofRegGuide1.97asitprovidesfortwoindependent, redundant NuclearSafetyRelatedchannelsofpressurizer levelinstrumentation, thisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.Astheevaluation ofsystemfailuremode(Section2.1.17)indicates, thispackageupgradesexistingredundant, independent pressurizer levelinstrumentation loopsfromIA/IB(important tosafety)toSA/SB(NuclearSafetyRelated)andprovidesadequateelectrical andphysicalseparation.
PCM035-187TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
Hence,thisisanenhancement tothepressuzizer levelinstrumentation andincreases thedegreeofprotection tonuclearsafetyrelatedsystemsandequipment.
PCM044-187MSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)istoreplacethelockingwasherandnutoneachMainSteamChelkValve(MSCV)diskstudwithanewlockingplateandnut.Theexistinglockingwasherdesignhasbeenadequateinservicebutisshowingsomewearindicatingthatreplacementwould'berequiredpriortotheendofthevalvedesignlife.Thenewlockingdevicewillprovideanenhancedmethodoflockingthenutandwillprecludethepossibilityofthenutrotatingand.allowingthedisktobecomeloose.ThevalvesconsideredinthisEPareintheMainSteamSystem.ThissystemisdesignatedasnuclearsafetyrelatedandseismicallyqualifiedontheASMESectionXICodeBoundarydrawings,andthereforethismodificationisclassifiedas'afetyrelated.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.TheimplementationofthisEPwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)&fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificatgnisreduced.83>j~~ThemodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackageareforthereplacementofthelockingdeviceontheMSCVdisk/taillinkconn'ection.Thetwo(2)valvesaffectedareintheMainSteamSystem.Basedontheabovedescription,themodificatinincluded.inthisEngineeringPackage(EP)isconsideredtobesafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,andthefollowingarebasesforthisjustification:i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincethemodificationwilleliminatethepossibilityofthevalves'iskbecomingloosefromthemount.Accordingly,themodificationensuresreliableoperationofthevalvesandconsequentlyof'thesysteminwhichtheyareinstalled.
Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheUFSAR,remainsunchanged.
PCM044"187ii)Asaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethar.a..yevaluatedbecausethemodificationissimplytorepoftnevavewithacomponentwithahigherlevelofinthevalve.Nochangesaremadetotheopera'nasysteminwhichtnemodificationismade.il'yforanpreviouslyace2componetconservatismdes'gnoftneiii)Thismodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdef'nedinthebasisfo=anyTechnicalSpeci~icationbecauseitneitne"changesthedesignparameterorthelockingdev''ceno.doesitchangethesystemdesignfloworfunctionalrequiremets.TheimplementationofthisP'QIdoesnotrequi,reachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthMchangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPQfisnotrequired.
Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyz'ed intheUFSARisnotcreated.
PC/MNo.046-187REACTORCONTAINMENTBUILDINGTELESCOPINGJIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTSABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageisbeingissuedinresponsetothecommitmentmadeinthedispositiontoplantNCR1-099.ThispackageaddressesthemodificationoftheseismicrestraintsontheReactorContainmentBuilding(RCB)TelescopingJibCraneanddoesnotconstituteanewdesign.Thespecifiedsliphookswouldnotengagetheexistingrestraintpadeyes.Theseismicrestraintsaredesignedtoholdthecraneinplaceduringadesignbasisearthquake.Thisengineeringpackagewilldocumentthedesignchangeandwillprovideguidelinesforestablishingamaintenanceproceduretoassurereinstallationoftheseismicrestraintsattheendofeachoutage.ThemodificationoftheseismicrestraintswascompletedunderthedispositiontoNCR1-099.Thejibcraneseismicrestraintsdonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedsincethereisapotentialthatduringaseismiceventthetelescopingjibcranecouldinteractwithsafety-relateditemsthatareinthevicinity.QualityRelatedrequirementsareappliedtothismodification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecifications.Thismodificationdoesnotaffectplantoperationsorsafety.ThisPC/MdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthereforedoesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.SAFETYEVALUATIONSafetAnalsisInresponsetoNCR1&99,thisengineeringpackageaddressesthemodificationoftheRCBTelescopingJibCraneseismicrestraints.Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theseismicrestraintsdonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedsystemorfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedasQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheseismicrestraintsduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.earthquake)couldpotentiallyaffectsafetymelatedsystemsorequipmentsincethejibcraneislocatedintheRCB.Consequently,therevisedrestraintshavebeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditionsspecifiedintheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirementshavebeenimplemented,thusassuringtheintegrityoftheinstallation.0095L'/0018L PCM087-187CODEBOUNDARYDRAWINGREVISIONCodeboundarydrawing8770-G-090isrevised/expandedto30sheetstoincludeallnuclearsafetyrelatedsystems.Thenewdrawingswillfacilitatetestingandexaminationunderthe"inserviceinspection-tenyearplan."Nounreviewedsafetyquestionsexistasdefinedby10CFR50.59,andnoTechnicalSpecificationsareimpactedbythismodification..Therefore,priorcommissionapprovalisnotrequired.NUCLEARSAFETYEVALUATIONCHECKLISTThewrittenevaluationoftheproposeddesignchangetodemonstratethatthechangedoesnotaltertheplantsdesignbasisandisboundedbythedesignanalysesisattachedtotheDesignEquivalentEngineeringPackage.Theanswersbelowaresupportedbythisevaluation.TYPEOFCHANGEYesNoxYesNoXYesNoYes.NoxAchange.totheplantasdescribedintheFSAR?AchangetoproceduresasdescribedintheFSAR?AtestorexperimentnotdescribedintheFSAR?~Achangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications?EFFECTOFCHANGEYesNoYesNoYesNoXYesNoXYesNoXYesNoX'esNoXWilltheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?WilltheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?MaythepossibilityofanaccidentwhichisdifferentthananyalreadyevaluatedintheFSARbecreated?WilltheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?WilltheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?MaythepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetydifferentthananyalreadyevaluatedintheFSARbecreated?Willthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasestoanytechnicalspecificationbereduced'?
PCM143-186PASSDISSOLVED HYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSAbstractThisEngineering Package(EP)coverstheinstallation oftie-instotheexistingUnitNo1PostAccidentSamplingSystem(PASS)foradissolved hydr~oenanalyzer.
PCM097-187TECHNICALSUPPORTCENTERBLOCKWALLNO207AMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageaddressestheinstallationofastatusboardintheTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC),locatedatElev.62.00intheReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB).Theboardwillbeattachedtoamasonryblockwallandwillbeusedduringemergencydrillsandplantoperation,Theboardandwalldonotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedsincethereisapotentialforthewalltointeractwithsafetyrelateditems.Qual-tyRelatedrequirementsareappliedtothismodification.The..mpiementationofthisPC'Mdoesmod,reauireachanget.oolan~2hnca'peci:catons.Tnismodifcationdoesnot"fctplantoperationsorsafey.ThsPC.'2does..otconstituteanunre:iewedsafetyquestionandthereforedoesnotrequirepriorNRCapprovalsSAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto.involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentor-malfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslycalculatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thestatusboardandmasonryblockwall207Adonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedsystemorfunction.However,thisPC/Misclassifiedasqualityrelatedsincefailureofthewallduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake)couldpotentiallyaffectsafety-relatedsystemsorequipment.Consequently,thewallhasbeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditionsspecifiedintheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrquirementshavebeenimplemented,thusassuringtheintegrityoftheinstallation.Themodif'cationsincludedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunrev=ewedsafetyouestionsbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccideptormalfunctionofequipmentimportantto'afetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentreouiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.
lAreviewofthechangetobeimplemented bythisEPwasperformed againsttherequirements oi10CFR50.59.
PCM097-187(ii)Thereisnopossibilitvforanaccidntormal'func.ionofadifferenttypethar.arypreviouslyevaluatedsincethestatusboardandmasonryblockwallperformnosafety.unctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperationaldesign.Failureofthewallcouldnotoccursincethemodificationhasbeenanalyzdforthedsignbasisconditions.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachange~toplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
Asaresulttheinstallation ofadisssolved hydrogenanalyzerinthePASSisclassified asnon-safety related,doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion, doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification andwillnotaffectplantsafety(asaddressed inSection3,"SafetyEvaluation"
PGM108-187TURBINEGANTRYCRANEMAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADEABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageisbeingissuedinresponsetoREASLN-S7-(Later).Thispackagewillprovidetheengineeringdocumentationrequiredformodificationstotheturbinegantrycranemainsheave-nest.Themodificationsarerequiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.TheturbinegantrycraneisclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelated.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedtoprovideQ.C.inspectionofcriticalloadbearingweldsandassurerealignmentofthesheavenestshaft.Asafetyevaluationandfailuremodeevaluationhasdeterminedthatthemodificationsaddressedinthispackagedonotconstitute'anunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefiredin10CFR50,59.Furhermore,theimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangeoplanttechnicalspec"ficatonsanddoesnotaffectplantoperationsorsafety.Basedontheabove,implementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.SAFETYEVALUATIONThispackageaddressestheturbinegantrycranemainsheavenestsupportplatemodificationsandsheavenestshaftreplacementrequiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theturbinegantrycranedoesnotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedsystemorfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedasQualityRelatedtoensureQ.C.inspectionoftheinstallation.Themodificationsincludedjnthi"PC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsecuencesofanaccidntormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentrequiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdownconditipn.(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanaryprviouslsevaluatedsincetheturbinegan.rycranedoesnotperformanysafetyfun"-onandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperationaldesign.
).However,thismodification isqualityrelated,becauseitisrequiredbyNUREG0737formonitoring ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)chemistry andactivityresulting fromadesignbasisaccident.
PCM108-187(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotch=".gthemarginofsa.etyasdefinedinthebasis'oranytec'."",iclspecificatior.becausetheturbinegantrycraneisnotaddressedbyanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachangtoplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perl0CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthschangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Furthermore,theimplementationofthisPC/t1doesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecifications.Basedontheabove,priorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
Thischangewillnotaffectplantoperations.
STLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYANALYSISREVIEWINTROOUCTIONTheSt.LucreUnit1Cycle8SafetyAnalysiswasperformdsupportoperationwith133assembliesofBatchHandalongwith84freshBatchKnaturaluraniumaxialblanketassemblies.ThirtysixoftheBatchKassembliescontainnobtrrnableabsorberrods,24assembliescontaineight4w/oGd203rods,andtheremainingBatchKassembliescontain484C-A1203rodsinadditiontoeightgadoliniabearin'grods.Thebottom.3.04inchesofthefuelrodiscomposedofalonglircaloyendcap'inordertoreducethepossibilityofdebrisrelatedfue'1rodfailures.ATechnicalSpecificationamendmentforthelongendcapchangewasissuedandis.foundinReference5.Inadditiontothischange,thereloadfuelischaracterizedbyanimprovedspacerspringdesignand,inthetopandbottomspacers,by'theadditionofbackupdimplesinthespacerperipheralrodcells.TheCycle8energyrequirementis10390EFPH,basedonane'nd-of-cycle7.burnupof9300EFPH.SAFETYEVALUATION'TheCycle':8SARcoversthefuelmanagement,fueldesignandev'atuationofthephysics.characteristies,shutdownmargib'alculations,powerdistributionsandpeakingfactorsthroughoutthecycle.CorePhysicshasperformed1)adetailedreviewofthevendor'smethodsandneutroniccalculations2)anindependentverificationofthevendorresultsbycomparingtheSARreportedphysicsparameterstothosecalcula'tedwiththecoremodelsgeneratedbytheCorePhysicsGroupdocumentedinReference6and,3)acomparisonofcalculatedvaluestotheplantTechnicalSpecificationsinregardstolimitingpowe~peakingfactors,moderatortemperaturecoefficients,shutdownmarginandlinearheatrates.Basedontheresultsoftheaforementionedevaluation,itcanbeconcludedthat:Ia)Thevendor'sphysicsdatawascalculatedwithapprovedmethodsanddocumented'satisfactorily.b)FPL'sindependentcorephysicsmodelsareinreasonableagreementwiththevendor'sresults,andc)Thecycle8reloaddesignmeetstheTechnicalSpecificationLimitswithregardstoFr,Fxy,HTC,minimumre'quiredshutdownmarginandmaximumlinearheatrate.
PriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEP.SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)if'theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisrepormaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanvTechnical Specification isreduced.Thismodification involvesthenecessary tie-instotheexist'ngsystemincluding tubingandvalves.ThisE""ionlyfo=prov'sions toinstallthedissolved hydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisclassified asnon-safety related.ThisEPisclassified qualityrelatedbecauseitisrequiredbvNUP.EG0737formonitoring ReactorCoolantSystemchemistry andactivityresulting fromadesignbasisaccident.
Sh2oBasedonprojectedburnups,5assemblies(4BatchH-IandIBatchH-4)willexceedthecurrentlyanalyzedmechanica1andradiologicaldesignlimitsof44,500NMO/NTUpriortotheend-of-cycle8.Themostlimitingofthesea'ssemblieswi11reachaburnupof44,500MMD/HTUat9450EFPHcycleexposure.Ananalysistoextendthemechanicalandradiologicalburnuplimitbeyondthecurrent,valuewillbeperformedpriortothattime.Asaresult,operationofcycle8withtheseassembliesinthecoredoesnotconstituteasafetyconcernupto9450EFPHandprovidedtheaforementionedanalysisiscompletedpriortothatcycleexposure'ndsho'ws.acceptableresults,wperationbeyond9450EFPHwillnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Asnotedintheintroduction,thereloadfueldesignincorporatesminormodificationstothefueldesignusedinCycle7.Theendcapinthereloadfuelislengthenedfrom0.4inchesto3.04incheswhiletheactivefuellengthisreducedbythesameamount,thereforemaintainingtheoveralllengthof.therod.ThischangehasbeenpreviouslyevaluatedandwasapprovedbytheNRC(Reference5).Thereloadfuelalsoincorporatesanimprovedspacerspringdesignandspacerbackupdimpleshavebeenaddedtothetopandbottomspacerperipheralcells.Theeffectofthesechangeshasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtohavenoadverseimpactrelativetothefueldesignbasis.TheCycle8safetyevaluationdemonstratedthatthesechangesareboundedbypre.vi.ousanalyses.TheSt.LucieUnitICycle8SafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)(ReferenceI),presentstheevaluationofthereloadcharacteristicswithrespecttothesafetyanalysispresentedforCycle6(Reference2)whichservesasthereferencecyc1e.Thebasi'softhesafetyanalysisforCycle8isthesameasthatusedforCycle6withtheexceptionoftheLocalPowerDensity(LPO)versusAxialShapeIndex(ASI)LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO).ThepeakpowerdensityduringCycle8couldincreaseoverthatassumedinthereferenceanalysessothatitisnecessarytolimitthemaximumpowerlevelwhenrelyingontheex-coredetectorsfordeterminationofthepeaklinearheatrate.AproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangewillreducethefractionofmaximumallowablepowerfrom0.88to0.85whenthein-c'oredetectorsareinoperable.TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangehasbeensubmittedtotheNRCperL-86-510datedDecember18,1986.NRCapprovalisexpectedbyFebruary28,1987.UntilapprovalofthisTechnicalSpecificationchange,thisSafetyEvaluationisonlyapplicableforreactoroperationupto40KratedpowerwhenthisTechnicalSpecificationisapplicable.Uponapprova1ofthisTechnica1Specif'icationchange,poweroperationabove40Kratedpowerupto100KratedpowerfortheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle8re1oadcoreisacceptableandwillnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.  
Basedontheabove,thisengineering designpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincethisEPisonlyforprovisions toinstallthedissolved hydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisnon-safety relatedanditsnormalperformance requirements havenotbeenaffectedbythesetie-ins.Thereisnopotential forthismodification tointeractwith'afety relatedsystemfunctions.
'SoThe.St.LucieUnit1Cycle8SARpresentstheevaluationandreviewoftheChapter15eventsforthereloadcore.FPLhasreviewedtheSARandhasdeterminedthatCycle8isboundedbytheresultsoftheanalysispresented'orCycle6withtheexceptionoftheReactorCoolantPumpRotorSeizureandtheCEAEjectionAccidentswhichwerere-evaluatedandre-analyzedrespectivelyandarepresentedintheSAR.TheReactorCoolantPump(RCP)RotorSeizurewasevaluatedto.assesstheeffectsofminorfueldesignchangesandincreased.axialpowerpeakingonthepercentoffueltoexperienceDAB.PressurecharacteristicsarenotaffectedbythesechangesandtheresultsareboundedbytheCycle6analysis.TheresultsoftheevaluationshowthatthepercentoffuelpredictedtoexperienceDNBiswellbelowthe10%,limitingcriteria.Off-sitedoseratesareasmallfractionof10CFR100doseguidelinesandareboundedbytheresultsofanalysispresentedinReference4.TheCEAEjectioneventwasreanalyzedusingthegenericallyapprovedmethodology(Reference3)andresultsshowsignificantmargintothelimitingcriteria.SincealltheeventshavebeenreviewedandprovedacceptableitcanbestatedthatforCycle8:tTheprobabi'1ityofoccurrenceor.the'consequencesofanac'cidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe,safetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfigurationoftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadverselyaffectthemechanicalintegritynorsignificantlychangethecoolantflowcharacteristicsthroughthecore.Themodeofoperationoftheplantremainsunchanged.Therefore,theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunction.ofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotimpacted.ThesafetyanalysisperformedfortheCycle8reloadcoredemonstratesthattheconsequencesof.an'accidentormalfunctionhavenotbeenincreasedbeyondthoseevaluatedinthepreviousanalyses.Apossibi1ityforanaccidentormalfunctionofa.differenttypethananypreviouslyanalyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.
I~
Sh4of4TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfigurationoftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadverselyaffectthemechanicalintegritynorsignificantly.changethecoolantflowcharacteristicsthroughthecore.Themodeof'perationoftheplantremainsunchanged.Therefor'e,anewaccidentorequipmentmalfunctionhasnotbeencreated.iii.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeveryTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced.There-evaluationoftheRCPRotors.eizureandthere-analysisoftheCEAEjectionaccidentshaveshownthattheresultsarewell'ithinthedesignbasis.Allothereventshavebeendeterminedto'beboundedbypreviousanalyses.Therefore,thereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnicalSpecificatiorlbasisforoperationofCycle8upto40K,ratedpower.WiththeproposedchangeintheLPOLCOimplemented,.thereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnicalSpecificationbasisforoperationofCycle8uptolOOXratedpower.ConclusionIAsperFederalRegulation10CFR50.59(b),theaboveSafetyEvaluationprovidesthebasistoconcludethattheCycle8reloadconfigurationdoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduceanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Therefore,implementationofthischangeispermissiblewithoutpriorNRCapproval..}}
PCM143-186(ii)The-possibility foranaccidgntormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisEP,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.
Implementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
r PCM146-186MISCELLANEOUS ICWSYSTEMMODIPICATIONS ABSTRACTThisengineering packageenablesminormodifications tobemadetotheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)systemresulting fromdisassembly, inspection, repairandreassemblv duringthe1987refueling outage.Thosemodifications thatmeetthecriteriaestablished bythisdesignpackageshallbeinitiated viatheChangeRequest/Notice formanddispositioned byengineering.
Thosemodifications whichdonotmeetthecriteriaestablished bythisdesignpackageshallbeimplemented underseparatedesignpackages.
Thosemodifications totheessential portionoftheICWSystemareclassified asnuclearsafetyrelated,therefore thePC/Misclassified assafetyrelated.Modifications tothenon-essential portionoftheICKSystemareclassified asnon-nuclear safetyrelatedunlessthefailuremodeanalysisdetermines anintelactionwithequipment important tosafety.Ifso,qualityrequirements willbeappliedandthemodification classified asQualityRelated.SincethePC/Mwillrestorethesystemtoitsoriginaldesignconfiguration, itdoesnotresultinanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SAFETYEVALUATION Themodifications totheessential portionoftheICWsystemdescribed intheprojectscopeareclassified asnuclearsafety-related becausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponent inconjunction withtheworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedperFSARTable9.2.2wouldresultintheinability oftheICWsystemtoachieveitsdesignbasissafetyfunction.
HistoricaGy, thetypesofmodifications totheICWSystemresulting fromthedisassembly andreassembly ofthepipingsystemforinspection andrepairhavebeen:1.Modifications topipeventanddrainlines(e.g.,replacement ofcorrodedmaterial).
2.Modifications tosupport/restraints (e.g.,documentation ofweldsymbolsrequiredtoreassemble S/R's,excessive gapatS/Rbaseplates,replacement ofcorrodedmaterial).
3.WeldrepairtoICWpipe(e.g.,documentation ofpipewelds).4.Pipeflangeboltingmaterialchangesorbolttorquevalvedocumentation.
Asdescribed inthedesignbases,thesenuclearsafety-related modifications shallbemadeinaccordance withthedesigncoderequirements forSafetyClass3pipeandpipecomponents andforSeismicClassIsupport/restraints.
PCM146-186Inaccordance withtherequirements specified inthedesignbases.eachmodification tnthenon-nuclear safety-related portionoftheICIUsystemsnal'ave>fa!luremod=evaluation performed todetermine ifthereareanyinterac'.ions withsafty-related equipment orfunctions.
Sine=thenon-nuclear safe~relatedportionoitheICYsystemisnotreliedupo:;.'oranyaccidentprevention ormitigation, failureswhicharedetermined tcnotimpactthefunctionofthenuclearsafety-related portionoftheI:"4systemareacceptable vithregardtonuclearsafety.NoQualityRelatedrequirements willbeappliedto.thedesignofthesemodifications.However,ifamodification tothenon-nuclear safetyrelated portionoftheICLUsystemisdetermined bythefailuremodeevaluation tointeractwithNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment, QualityRelated!equi!'ements willoeappliedtothedesignofthesemodifications.
Basedontheabove,itcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59 doesnotexist.i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased becausenoDBA'sdealwithspecificICWcomponent failures.
Themodifications restoretheICWsystemando!iginaldesigncondition andensureitssafetyfunctionwillbeperformed.
ii)'Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased becausethemodifications proposedbythisdesignpackagearetopassivecomponents onlyandtheywillbedesigned/implemented inaccordancewithsafetyclass/FSAR requirements.
TheFSARdoesnotevaluatepassivecomponent failures.
iii)Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethemodifications permitted bythisdesignpackagedonotaltertheICWsystemfunctionormodeofoperation.
TheFSARevaluation oftheICWsystemenvelopes thefailureofthedescribedmodifiedcomponents.iv)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforatechnical specification isnotreduced.Themodifications permitted bythisdesignpackagehavebeenreviewedandfoundacceptable.
Nochangestothedesignbasis,function, ormodeofoperation oftheICWsystemisproposed10CFR50.59 allows'hanges toafacilityasdescribed intheFSARifan.unreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangeto.theTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.
Asshovninthepreceeding
: sections, thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59 thatpertainstoanunreviewed safetyquestioncanbepos!tively answeredsincethePC/i'eturns theICWsystemtoitsdesigncondition andnoTechnical Specification changeisrequired.
Inconclusion, thechangesproposedinthisdesignpackaage" areacceptable fromthestardpoint ofnuclearsafety,donotinvolveanunreviewe" safe'.yquestion.
donotrequireachangetotheTechnical Spec!fica'.!onsanddonotrequirepriorNRCapprovalpriortoin;plmen:a'.ion.
PCM148-186ICWISOLATION VALVEREPLACEMENT ABSTRACTThisengineering packageisissuedtoprovidedirection forthereplacement ofanyofthe30-inchand36-inchnormallyopenisolation valvesintheIntakeCoolingNate."(ICN)system,asrequired.
Theisolation valvereplacement isclassified asnuclearsafetyrelated,anddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
"Normally closed"isolation valvesmustbereplacdwithrubberlinedvalvesandarenotwithinthescopeofthisdesignoackage.Specification MN2.57whichisinaccordance withtheorocurement specirication usedtoprocuretheoriginalvalves.Thenewvalveshavecaststainless steelbodies{ASI<IZoA-351GradeCF3M)whichprecludedete.ioration seenintheevistin~carbonsteI/rubberlinedvalves.Theprocurement specification specified therequi<rement thatthevalvesandextension mustbecomcatible withtheexstingoperatars.Pressmeboundarycomponents!nstaQed aspartoitheintakeCooli'ngWatersyste<v:vere desi=..ed
'fortheoilowin~:
sfPesicHDassure2~i90Design<Tmcerat",."-<n5Chemistry:
Seawaterwith"..0mavimumdisso.'ved chlorinePerFPLP.OC83918~<814PandPowerPlantEngineering Specification MN2.57evisicn0,thevalves,vereboughttot<".erequirements ofAS'.<IESecL<onIIIforClass3components.
Approoriate seismicrequirem<ents
.veralsospecified.
Thenewvalveswe.edesignediorthefollowing externalenvironmen talconditions:
Temperature, FPressure,psig30-120Atmosoheric 100%Humidity, SaltLadenAtmosphere AQualityControlholdooint hasbeenassignedintheConstruction Scopesectionfortheverification thattheextension bcnnetsupporting detailsareapprovedbyengineering priortosystemturnoverinordertocomelywiththerequirements ofparagraph 1.3.5.
PCM148-186SAFETYEVALUATIONThereplacement ofisolation valvesasdescribed intheProjectScopeisaNuclearSafetyRelatedmodification becauseitchangesvalveswhichformapartofthepressureretaining boundaryofaSafetyClass3/Quality GroupCsystem.Basedupontherequirements of10CFR50.59,anunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistbecause:1.TheICNsystemisnotconsidered indetermining theprobability ofdesignbasisaccidents (i.e.,LOCA,AISLB,LOOP,etc.).2.Theconsequence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tonuclearsafetyisnotmademoreseriousduetothedesignredundancy oftheICNsystem.Theseparation criteriaismaintained bythevalvesdesignedinaccordance withASVlESectionIIIrequirements.
3.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethefailureofanyofthesevalvesisapassivefailurewhichisenveloped bytheevaluations oftheFSAR.4.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnical Specification remainsunchanged becausetheredundancy oftheICWsystemismaintained.
Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation contained intheDesignAnalysis, themodification canbeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapprovalbecauseanUnreviewed SafetyQuest!ondoesnotexistandachangetotheTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.
PCM151-186480VACLOADCENTER1B~2TRANSFORMER COOLINGABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodification tothe480Vac,1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanent sourceof240Vac,ClasslEpower-forthestationservicetransformer's coolingfans.Thismodification consistsofinstalling anew,controlpowertransformer, completewithprimaryandsecondary overcurrent protection, intheexistingtransition compartment of1B-2LoadCenterandtheinterconnection ofthispowersourceto-theexistingautomatic/manual controlschemeassociated withthecoolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassfied asClasslE,seismicCategoryIequipment andperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.
Therefore, thisPlantChange/Modification (PC/M)isclassified asnuclearsafetyrelated.Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Themodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously in=-thesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisEngineering Packagecoversmodification tothe480Vacua1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanent sourceof240Vac,Class1Epowerforthestationservicetransformer's coolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassified asClass1E,seismicCategoryIequipment andperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.
Therefore, thisPC/Mhasbeenclassified nuclearsafetyrelated'nd nuclearsafetyrelateddesignrequirements wereappliedtothisEP.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased since:Allmodifications arebeingperformed onthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter.Theonlymodification istorestoretheinstallation similartoitsoriginalcondition.
Newcomponents installed bythismodification includecurrentlimitingprimaryfusesandasecondary circuitbreaker,whichprovideovercurrent protection ofthenewcontrolpowertransformer anditssecondary circuit.Shoul'dfailureofthenewcomponetsoccur,theywillberemovedfromtheirpowersourcebytheseprotect've deviceswithoutaffecting therestofthe."B"electrical syste=.A:sc,newcompone"ts areev'onme"tally andseismically qua''ie'ctherequiredenviroxae tandw'-'1remainfunctional duringprev'usly evaluated accidents.
'Theefore,the''probability ofoccu=enceortheconsequences ofpreviously evaluated accidents arenotincrease".
PCM151-186Newcomponents arebeingprovidedbyBrownBoveri,formallvITE,theoriginalmanufacture-oftne1B-2LoadCenter.Inaddition, themannerinwhichthecomponents aremountedispeBrownBoveri/industry standardinstallation details.TheBrownBoveriAddendumtothe1B-2LoadCenterCertificate ofConformance (Reference Attachment 4)hasbeenreviewedandithasbeenverifiedthattheadditionofthenewcomponents doesnotaffecttheexistingequipment's environmental orseismicqualification.
Thus,thismodification doesnotcompromise theoperation/reliability oftheexistinginstallation andtheequipment willfunctionduringaccidents aspreviously evaluated.
Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:Allmodifications arebeingperformed onaauxiliary supporting featureofthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter,1B-2,withnomodifications requiredtotheindependent, redundant "A"loadgroupLoadCenter,lA-2..Primaryandsecondary overcurrent protection havebeenprovidedforthenewcontrolpowertransformer.
Allnewcomponents andtheinterconnecting wiringareenvironmentally andseismically qualified totherequiredenvironment andwillbeabletoprovidepowertothe1B-2LoadCenterstationservice'transformer coolingfanspostDesignBasisAccident.
BasedonthisandParagraph 3.3.3.,noaccidents/malfunctions different
.thanthoseevaluated previously arecreatedbythismodification.'he marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsincethemodification ensuresthattheequipment willfunctionaspreviously evaluated duringoperation/accidents.
Also,as1B-2LoadCentermustbedeenergized priortoperforming anywork,implementation ofthisPC/Mwillbecoordinated withPlantOperations sothecriteriaestablished bytheplantTechnical Specifications, eg,Specification 3/4.8,arenotviolated(Reference Section9.0).Therefore, theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplant'sTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
'thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionand.priorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM153-186ROSEMOUNT ANDVALCOREQENHANCEMENTS ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)providesforthemodification ofseven(7)ValcorEngineering Corporation solenoidvalvesandtherelocation ofone(1)Rosemount
'leveltransmitter.
Thesemodifications eliminate theneedtoPatomeEPqualification (EQ)analysisonthisequipment whilebolstering theapplicable qual1f1cat1on documentation packages.
Th1sisaccomplished byraisingthetransmitter ontheInstrument Rack50.1abovefloodlevelandaddingNAMCOControlsconduitsealassemblies totheelectrical powerleadsofseven(7)Valcorsolenoidvalvestoprotectagainstingressofcontainment chemicalsprayintothevalvecontrols.
Thismodification providesforincreased protection toNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment andimprovesthemarginofsafetyofthepressurizer levelinstrumentation andthehydrogensamplingsystem.Theconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areunchanged.
ThisPCMisclassified NuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvesequipment thatservestomitigatetheconsequences ofaDes1gnBasesEvent(DBE).Evaluation Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireanychangetotheStLucie-UnitlTechnical Specifications.
Themodifications, asprovidedbythispackage,donotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforthe1mplementation ofthispackageisnotrequired.
Plantsafetyandoperation arenotaffected.
SafetWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(1)iftheprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction oftheequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased, or(11)ifapossibilility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously 1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebseesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theproposedmodification affectsthelocationofRosemount leveltransmitter LT-lllOXandtheelectrical condu1tconnection toseven(7)Valcorisolation solenoidvalvesinthehydrogensamplingsystem.Theprobability ofoccurence ofanaccidentpreviously addressed intheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedF1nalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)isnotincreased bythismodification.
ThisEPinfactdecreases thepossibility ofRosemount leveltransmitters'ailure byreducingtheprobability offailureduetoflooding.
Probability offailureoftheValcorsolenoidvalvesisreducedbyeliminating'he likelihood oftheintrusion ofchemicalsprayintheelectrical conduit.Thepossibility ofnewDBEsnotconsidered intheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophies ofpressurizer levelandhydrogenanalyzerhavebeenpreviously addressed intheUFSAR.Thismodification isanenhancement toexistinghydrogenanalyzerisolation valvesaswellaspressurizer leveltransmitter LT-lllOX.
PCM153-186DuetothefactthatthisEPinvolvescablesidentified asessential tosafereactorshutdown(pressurizer leveltransmitter LT-1110X),
Appendix"R"requirements havebeenconsidered andaddressed inthispackage(Section2.1.6).Assuch,thedesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandUPSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.
ThisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvespressurizer levelinstrumentation (usedforsafereactorshutdown) andhydrogensampling/analyzer (usedforthemitigation of'adesignbasesevent).Astheevaluation offailuremode(Section2.2.8)indicates, thedegreeofprotection toNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment (marginofsafety)isincreased andtheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUPSARareunchanged.
Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyzedintheUPSARisnotcreated.Theimplementation ofNuclearSafetyRelatedPC/M153-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, nordoesitcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Theforegoing consitutes, per10CPR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM001-187IEBULLETIN85-03MOVSWITCHSETTINGSABSTRACTNRCIEBulletin85-03requiresthatoperating nuclearplantsdevelopandimplement aprogramtoensure'.thatswitchsettingsonselectedsafety-related motor-operated valves(MOV's)arecorrectly
: selected, setandmaintained toaccommodate themaximumdifferential pressures expectedonthesevalvesduringallpostulated eventswithinthedesignbasis.Itema)ofthebulletinrequiresthatthedesignbasisforthosehlOV'slocatedinAFC'ndHPSIsystemsbereviewedtodetermine themaximumdifferential pressureexpectedduringbothopeningandclosingstrokesforallpostulated events.Thiseffortwasperformed forSt.LucieUnitsIand2byCombustion Engineering aspartoftheCEOwner'sGroup(CEOG)Tasks528and531.TheresultsoftheItema)weresubsequently transmitted totheNRCviaFPLletterL-86-200, datedMay15,1986.Itemb)ofBulletin85-03requiresthatthelicenseeestablish thecorrectMCVswitchsettingsbasedonthepreviously determined maximumdifferential pressure.
Allswitches,including torcueswitches,torquebypassswitches,positionlimit,positionindication, overloads, etc.,shallbe'onsidered.
Thisdesignpackageprovidestheoverallswitchsettingguidelines foreachV>OY,inadditiontothespecificdesigninformation necessary.
tosetboththeopenandclosetorquesvitchesandmet:herequirements ofBulietin85-03.Oncethecorrectswitchsettingshavebeenincorporated intotherespective AIC'V,Itemc)ofIEBu!letin85-03requiresthateachK!OYbestroketestedagainstthemaximumdifferential pressureestablished inItema)toverify'.'perability, Becauseallofthe%1OY'sassociated withBulletin85-"3aresafety-related thisengineringpackagehasbeenclassifie asnuclearsafty-re!ated.
Areviewofthsw'tchsettingcangestobimpierne..ted bythisPC/illwasper'ormec againsttherequirements ofIGCFR5~.59,.anditwasconciuded thatthesemodiiic-tions donotconstitute anunreviewed safetycuestionanddonotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Thissupplement revisesthetorqueswitchsettingsforvalveV-3650toaccountforactualfieldtesting.Thiscondition hadbeenpreviously justified viaSafetyEvaluation 3PE-Al-87-038, Pev.i.TheEngineering Packagesafetyclassification andsafetyevaluation areunaffected.
SAFETYEVALUATION lUithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalReulations, Part50.59,themodification described inthisengineering packagedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased.
Thisengineering packageonlyprovidesthenecessary designinformation requiredtosetMOVswitchsettingsutilizing AIOVATSsignatureanalysistechniques.
Therecommended switchsettingsareconsidered enhancements totheexistingsettingstofurtherensurevalveoperability.
Also;FSAR'design baseswere PCM001-187reviewedtodeterminethemaximumloadingconditions oneachMOVtoensuretheswitchsettingswereproperlyselected.
Furthermore, Itemc)ofBulletin85<3requiresthateachMOVbestroketestedundermaximumdifferential pressureconditions toensurevalveoperability.
ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcrested.Nohardwaremodifications areperformed-as partofthisPC/M.TheproposedMOVswitchsettingsalteraccidentmitigating equipment tofurtherenhanceoperability.
However,malfunctions oftheseNOV'sdonotinthemselves initiateanaccident.
Therefore, nonewaccidents havebeencreated.Additionally, thespecified modifications donotintroduce anynewfailuremodesfortheequipment.
Therefore, nodifferentmalfunctions oftheequipment thanthosepreviously analyzedareintroduced.
iii)Themarginofsafetyas=defined inthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Thismodification doesnotimpact.theTechnical Specification requirements fortheassociated equipment.
Valvestroketimesarenotimpacted.
Therefore, themarginofsafetycontrolled bytheTechnical Specifications ispreserved.
~~Inconclusion, thechangeproposedinthisengineering packageis.acceptable fromthestandpoint ofnuclearsafetydoesnotinvolveanunreviewec safetyquestionandprior':RCapprovalforimplementation isnotrequired.
PCM005-187.NRCIEBULLETIN85-03-MOVPOSITIONINDICATION ABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodifications tothesafetyrelatedMotorOperatedValves(MOV's)in.theAux1liary Feedwater (AFW)andtheHighPressureSafetyInfection (HPSI)systems.ThisEngineering Packagewillprovidetheengineering anddesigndeta1lsrequiredto1mplement theclosetoopentorquebypassswitchandclosedpositionindication wiringmodifications.
TheMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystemsarerequiredforplantsafeshutdownandclassified asClass1E,areseismically qual1fied andperformasafetyrelatedfunction.
Therefore, thisPC/Misconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionsincethemodifications described abovewillnothaveanadverseimpactonplantoperations orsafetyrelatedequipment.
SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrev1ewed safetyquestion:
(1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ1pment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction of"a-different typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalys1sreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.Th1sEng1neering Packageprovidestheengineering anddesigndetailsrequiredtoinstalladditional rotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestoMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystems.PC/M001-187increases theclosedtoopentorquebypassswitchsettingswhich1mpacttheclosedpositionind1cat1ng light.Increasing thenumberofrotorsfromtwotofourvillallovthelimitswitchfortheclosedpositionindicating 11ghttobelocatedonarotorotherthanthatusedforthetorquebypassswitch.Motormperated valvesthathavefourrotorswillonlyrequireinternalwiringchanges.Theadditionofthenewrotorsdoesnotaffecttheexistingequipment qualifications.
Theimplementation ofthisEngineering Packageincreases theavailability oftheMOV'sduringsafeshutdownconditions andimprovestheMOVpositionindication providedtothecontrolroomoperators.
TheMOV'sthatarebeingmodifiedperformsafetyrelatedfunctions vithintheAFWandHPSIsystemsandaredesignedforoperation underconditions thatcouldbeimposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThisEPhasbeenclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.
PCM005-187Basedonthepreceeding, thefollowing conclusions canbemade:(1)Therobabilit ofoccurrence ortheconseuencesofanaPqccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety'reviously
,evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased, sincethemodifications totheMOV'senhan'ees theoperability oftheequipment.
Theadditionofrotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestothevalveswillpreventthepossibility ofinaccurate remoteclosedpositionindication resulting fromtheincreased bypass11mitswitchsettings.
(11)Asaresultofthismodification, thereisnopossibility foraccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated.
Thismodificat1on altersaccidentmitigat1ng equipment toenhancetheiroperation.
Therewasnointroduction ofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.
(111)Th1smodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.
Thesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolled bythevariousapplicable Technical Specifications ismaintained bythischange.TheproposeddesignensuresthattheMOV'swillfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.
ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnical Specificat1ons ispreserved.
ETheimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM009-187OVERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEMMODIFICATIONS ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)detailsthemodifications requiredontheOverpressure Mitigation System(OMS)toprovidechangestothePowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)setpoints.
Thenewsetpoints arederivedfromC~ustionEngineering's reportonPressure/Temperature (F7T)limitsandLowTemperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)for10Effective FullPowerYears(EFPY).There-analysis oftheOMSsetpoints ensuresthattheReactorCoolantSystemsPressurewillbemaintained belowtheapplicable P/Tlimitsduringtheoperating periodendingat10EFPY.ThenewP/Tlimitsareidentified toprovideadequateprotection againstrapidpropogation ofaflawinther'eactorvesselwithconsideration giventotheoptimization ofheatupandcooldownrates.TheOMSsetpointmodifications areclassified QualityRelatedbecauseany'a1luretotheOMSsetpointb1stablealarmsundernormaloperating conditions oranticipated transients canresultinexceeding asafetylimitspecified insection3/4.4.13and3/4.4.14oftheTechnical Specifications.
Furthermore, theOMSsetpointmodifications affecttheRTGBoardslocated1nthecontrolroom.ThisEPchangewillnotimpa1rtheeffic1ent operation
.oftheOMS,nordoesitcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore, priorCommission approvalforitsimplementation isnotrequired.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreview'ed safetyquestion:
(1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyprev1ously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafet~hnalyiksReportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.TheOMSprotectstheRCSfrombeingpressur1zed beyondthecurvesdefinedbytheminimumpressur1zation temperature curvesoftheTechnical Specifications, whiletheRCSisatlowtemperatures.
TheOMSachievesitspurposeofprotecting theRCSfromoverpressur1zation atIow,non-ductile temperatures bycontinuously comparing actualpressurizer pressuretotwo(2)pressuresetpo1nts andcorresponding temperature setpoints andbyactuating thePORVswhenactualpressureapproaches thesesetpoints.
Thepressureandtemperature comparisons andPORVactuation arebothaccomplished intwoindependent redundant OMStrainsponeforeachPORV.
PCM009-187TheP/TsetpointchangesoutlinedperthisEPpackageareclassified QualityRelatedbecauseanyfailuretotheOMSsetpointalarmsundernormaloperating conditions oranticipated transients canresultinexceeding asafetylimitspecified inSection3/4.4.13and-3/4.4.14 ofthe.Technical Specifications.
Inaddition, thesechangesalsoaffecttheRTGBoardslocatedinthe-ControlRoom.Thefollowing providestheJustification thatanunreyiewed safetyquestiondoesnotexist.i.Theprobability ofoccurrence ozheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important zosafetypreviouslv evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased becausetheOMSmodification servesonlytochangethesetpoinzs forthePORVswheneveranoverpressurizazion eventoccursinlowtemperature modeswhentheRCSmaybewatermolid.
Thenewsezpoinzs foroverpressure protection inlowtemperature modesmaintainzhedesignphilosophy oftheOMSsyszem.iiThepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisisnotcreatedbecausethenewsetpoints allowbettercontroloverOMSeventsandpreventviolation ofthe10CFRAppendixGpressure/temperature limitsduringtheoperating periodendingat10EFPY.TheCEreportprovidesassurance thatthesystemisabletoperformitsfunctionassuminganysingleactivecomponent failureinadditionzothefailurethatinitiated the.pressuretransient.
iiiThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsince.thisOMSmodification revisesthesetpoints forthePORVstoactuatewheneveranoverpressurization eventoccursinlowtemperature modesofoperation whenzheRCSmaybewater-solid.
Theproposedsystempreventsviolation oftheAppendixGpressure/temperature limitsduringanoperating periodendingaz10EFPY.Theimplementation ofzheproposedLTOPsystemdoesnotresultinthereduction inamarginofsafety;instead,izprovidesadditional setpoints andtherebyincreases themarginofsafezy.ThisEPchangewillnotimpairtheefficientoperation oftheOMS.Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequiredachangetotheTechnical Specifications.
AlthoughnewP/Tlimitsforreactoroperation arebeingdeveloped, thoseTechnical Specification changesapplytooperation beyond7.4EFPY,andarenotdirectlyrelatedzothesetpointchangesaccomplished bythisEP.Theforegoing conszituzes, per10CFR50.59(b),
zhewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovideszhebasesthatthischangedoesnozinvolveanunreviewed safezyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofzhisEPis.notrequiredonthatbasis..
PCM010-187PROTECTIVE COATINGSREPAIRAND/ORREPLACEMENT INREACTORCONTAINMENT BUILDINGJIBR1MCZThisengineering packagecoversthemaintenance ofServiceLevell~rotective coatingsonconcreteandsteelsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainment Building.
ThisproJectisclassified asqualityrelatedanddoes-notconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
F1NThefunctionofthecoatingsusedinsidetheRCBistoprovideprotection againstcorrosion andcontamination.
Theonlysafetyrelatedaspect.isforthecoatingstoremainintactthroughout adesignbasisaccidenttoinsurethatnoengineered safetyfeaturesareinterfered with;ThecoatingstobeusedareDBAtestedandtheircomposition, functional andtestingrequirements areaddressed intheUnit1FSAR.Forthesereasonstheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tothesafetyoftheplanthasnotbeenincreased.
lnaddition, therewillcontinuetobenopossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction different thanthosepreviously evaluated intheUnitIFSAR.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheplanttechnical specifications hasnotbeenreduced.Itistherefore concluded thattherepairand/orreplacement ofprotective coatingsonsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainment Buildingasoutlinedinthispackagedoesnotposeanunreviewed safetyquestionpursuantto10CFR50.59.
PCM011-187CONDENSER HOTWELLNITROGENINJECTION CONNECTIONS ThisEngineering Package1stoprovideconnections tothecondensers toinfectnitrogenintotheco~denser hotwells.
Testhaveshownthatinfecting lcfmofnitrogenintoacondenser shellreducesthed1ssolved oxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensate byapproximately 2ppb.Itistheorized thatbecauseWolowair1n-leakage intothecondensers (condensers aredesignedbaseduponthefacttherewillbeairin-leakage),
theflowofthenon-condensibles intheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished; Therefore, oxygenisentrained asthe'condensate dripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.
Theinjection ofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondenser toestablish theflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibles withoutintroducing oxygenintothesystem.Areviewofthechangestobe1mplemented bythisEng1neering Packagewasperformed againsttherequirements oflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,thesecondenser modifications areclassified asnonmafety related,donotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandwillnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation (asaddressed inSection3"SafetyEvaluation").
SafetEvaluation MithrespecttoT1tle10oftheCodeofPederalRegualtion, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquest1on; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specificat1on isr8fuced.ThisEngineering Packageistoprovideconnections tothecondensers toin)ectnitrogenintothecondenser hotwells.
Testshaveshownthatinfecting 1cfmofnitrogenintoacondenser shellreducesthedissolved oxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensate byapproximately 2.ppb.Itistheorized thatbecauseoflowairin-leakage intothecondensers (condensers aredesignedbasedupon-thefacttherew111beairin-leakage),
theflowofthenon-condensibles intheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished.
Therefore, oxygenisentrained asthecondensate dripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.
Theinfection ofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondenser toestablish theflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibles withoutintroducing oxygenintothesystem.
PCM011-1.87Basedontheabovedescription, themodification includedinthisEngineering Package(EP)18considered tobenon-'safety related.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveonunreviewed safetyquestion,'nd thefollowing arebasesfor.thisJustification:
1)'heprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences.
ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.
Thecondensers arenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibility foranacc1dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprov1desthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofth1sPCMisnotrequired.
PCM012-187ONEANDTWOFEEDWATER HEATERANDEXTRACTION PIPESHIELDING ThisEngineering Packageprovidesgenericdetailsfortherepa1rorreplacement ofdamagedshielding
'fortheExtraction Stre'ssPipeandExpansion JointsandtheFeedwater HeatersinsidetheCondenser..
TheEngineering Packageisclassified asnon-safety relatedsinceitisamodification toanon-safety relatedsystem.Thesafetyevaluation hasshovnthatthisEPdoesnotconstitute anyunreviewed safetyquestion.
Thissystemisnon-safety relatedandvillhavenoeffecton"equipment vitaltoplantsafety.SafetEvaluation Withrespect.to Title10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofan~cident ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanzkysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Speciification isreduced.ThisPCM1nvolvestherepairandreplacement oftheshielding fortheextraction p1pingandfeedwater heaterslocatedinthecondenser.
Ithasbeenclassified asnon-safety relatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ1pment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportsnot1ncreased.
TheStLuci~UnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4readsasfollows:Exceptforaportionofthefeedwater systempiping,thefeatures, components andsystemdescribed inthissectionservenosafetyfunctions1ncetheyarenotrequiredforsafeshutdownortomitigatetheeffectsofaLOCAandtheirfailurewillnotresultinthereleaseofsignificant uncontrolled radioactivity.
TheStLucieUnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4.1describes thecondenser wheretheextraction pipingandlowpressureFeedwater heaters1and2arelocated;Thissystemisnon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.(11)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thecomponents involvedinthismodification donotperformanysafetyrelatedfunction.
Nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthecondenser ortheextraction piping.(111)Themargin.ofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotdirectlyincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.
PCM012-187Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnica'pecification.
Theforegoing constitutes, per'10CFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCM017-187eABSTRACTCCWHEATEXCHANGERS
-SHELLSIDEDRAINADDITIONTHISENGINEERING PACKAGEPRQViDESDETAILSFORTHEADDITIONOFTWOFLANGFDSIXINCHSHELLSIDEDRAINCONNECTIONS TOTHFCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.
THEDRAINSAREDESIREDTOIMPROVEFLUSHENGEFFECTIVENESS ANDTOREDUCECRITICALF'ATHDRAINTINEBETWEENFLUSHESFOLLOWING RETUBINGUNDERPC/M~40-183DURINGTHE1987UNIT1REFUELENS OUTAGE.THISMODIFICATION IBCLASSIFIED ASNUCLEAP,SAFFTYRELATEDSiNCEiTAFFECTSTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYOFTHE=CONPONENT COOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.
THECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANSERS FGRNAPOF;TIONOFTHECQI'1POh!ENT COOLINGWATERANDINTAKECOGLINGWATFRSYSTEllSWHICHARECLASSIFIED ASQUALITYGROUPC,SEISNICBYSTEt'1S.
THISPC/r'iHABBEENRFVEEWEDTGTHECRETER1ASETFOf'THErVIi>CFR50.59ANDHABBEENDF'TERMINED NGTTQINVOLVEANUtVREVIE!VED SAFETYQUESTION, NGRDGEBI7REQUIRFCl!ANSESTQTHFTCHtiiCALBF'ECIFICATIOt!B.'F;IGRCOMMIBSION"F'F'FOVALIBNGTREQUIREDORIMPLEMENTATION GFTHISMODIFICATION.
SAFETYEVALiJAT1Ghl THISi~1ODEF"ATIONCONSISTSONLYOFTHEADDITIONQFTWOSIXINCHF!ANGEDPEF'BT!iBDRAiNSTOTHEUhlDEFBIDEOFEACHCOt'IPONFh!7 COOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGER SHcLLTOREDUCEDRAINAGETIt!cEANDTGENPROVEFLUSHINGEFFECTIVENFBS.TH"NE4!DRAI!V1'!IL'ERFORt iNG"ACTIVc"SAFETYRELAT-DFUNCTIrtV.ON'TH=.='A:8IV=FJN~CTEONOFRETAININSTHEF'RESBJf>E BGUluDARY i!VTEPF'Y QrTHECG!'1PONENT COQ'k!SiVATERS.STEM.TH:St'1QD'~AiIGl<INUCLEARSAF7YRE'T"''B~hiCE7AFr7>7HE,PRE:-8'JF:EPGUNDAr,'Y OFTHECCWHEATEXHANGERSWHi:HAR=QUA'YSRQUc',BEESNICCO!'!PGNENTS
'.REFFRENCE UNi71F.ARTABLE.:.:--2).BASEDQtTHEpOLLOWINGARGL'ENENTS, iiISDEMONSTRATED THATNQUNREVIEW" DBAFETYQUFSTIONS EXISTANDTHATTHEMGDi;ICATIONNAYBEINcLEMhlTEDWITHOUTPR>QRCONN>cSION APcROVALTHPROBABELITYOFOCCUR=filCE OF;THECONBEQUcNCc SOFANACCIDENTGFNALFUNCTEONOFEQ>JIPMENT IMPORTANT TGSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSIBRErORTHASNOTBEENINCREASED.
THISMODIrECATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHEPROBABILITY OFOCCURcNCE OFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLY FVALUATED SINCETHECCWHEATEXCHANSERS ARENOTCONSIDERED INDETERNININS THEPROBABILETIc.SOFACCIDENTS.
THECONSEQUENCES OFPOSTULATED ACCiDENTS HAVENOTBEENMADc.MORESEVERESINCETHISMODIFICATION DOESNQTAFFECTTHEFUNCTiONAL PERFORMANCE OFTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERS ANDDOESNQTAFFECTANYOTHEREQUIPMENT WHICHWOULDMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCES OFPOSTULATED ACCIDENTS.
-THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANPREVIOUSL'Y EVALUATED INTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSiSREPORTHASNOTBEENCREATED.THENEWFLANGEDDRAINCONNECTIONS ARETYPICALINTERMSOFDcSIGNCODES70THEOTHERFLANGEDPIPINGINTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEMTHEREFORE NONEWACCIDENTS QRMALFUNCTIONS AREINTRODUCED.
-THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDiNTHEBASISFOR.ANYTECHNICAL SPECIFiCATIQN HASNOTBEENREDUCED.THEMQDIFICATiON DESCRIBED HEREININNOWAYAFFECTSANYTECHNICALSP"CIFICATIQN.10CFR50.5c'LLOlJSMODIDESCRIBED iNTHEFSARWIUNREN'IEWED 3'AFETYQUESTIFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATARGUcMENTS DEMONTRATENQTRc(UIREDi THEREFORc.
WITHOUTPRIQcCQMMISSIONFICATIONS TONUCLEARFACILITIES ASTHOUTPRIORCQtlMISSI Oh)APPc,'OVAL IFANIQhlISDEMONSTRATED NOTTOEXISTAiv'DiQNSAREUt'jAF."ECTED.THEPRECEDt'lGTHATNOUNREViWEDSAFETYC!UESTiON=
TQTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS THISMQDFI'TIONMAYBEIt'iPLEMENTED APPROVAL.
PCM027-187MISCELLANEOUS SNUBBERMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisEPprovidesengineering anddesignformi'scellaneous modifications tosnubbersasaresultoftheinservice inspection findings.
Themodification generally includesareplacement
'oftheexistingsnubberand/oritscomponents withanupgradedsnubberoritscomponents ofadifferent orsamemanufacturer.
ThisEPhasbeenclassified asSafetyRelatedbecausethemodification affectssafetyrelatedpipingsystem.Themodifications havebeenreviewedunderthecriteriaof10CFR50.59andnounreviewed safetyquestions havebeendemonstrated toexist.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.
Theimplementation ofthisEPwillnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification assnubbershavenotbeenremovedoraddedtotheTable3.7-2bofthePlantTechnical Specification 3-7.10.Supplement 1,providesengineering anddesignsformodification toadditional snubbersasaresultoftheInservice Inspection findings.
Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.
Theimplementation ofthissupplement willrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification Table3..7-2aand2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetablestoincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraint MkNoRC-247-H3 intheTable3.7-2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendment tothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendment request.Supplement 2providesengineering anddesignsformodification toadditional snubbersasaresultoftheInservice Inspection findings.
Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.
Theimplementation ofthissupplement willrequireachangetoplantTechnical Specification 3.7.10toincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforofthrestraint MkNoRC-247-H3 inTable3.7-2b.'Howeverperthefttotesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendment tothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendment request.Supplement 3providesengineering anddesignformodification totworestraints whichwerefoundtohavebeendamagedduringtheinservice inspection.
Thesafetyevaluation
'hasshownthatthismodification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion; however,asindicated implementation ofsupplement 1and2ofthisPCMwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnical Specification 3.7.10whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendment request.Therefore, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.
Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.
Theimplementation ofthissupplement willnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification.
Supplement 4providesengineering anddesignformodifications toadditional snubbersasaresultofInservice Inspections findings.
Theoriginalpipestressanalysis&pipesupportdesignhasnotbeenmodifiedforthisPC/M.Theimplementation ofthissupplement doesnotchangethepreviousconclusion thatTechnical Specification Section3.7.10andtables3.7-2aor3.7-2brequiremodification.
Thismodification requiresachangetoPlantTechnical Specification 3.7.10,whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendment request.Thesafetyeva'luation hasshown,thatthemodifications includedinRevision4ofthisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Basedonthese'points, itisconcluded thatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.
Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/MwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnical Specification.
'SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)ifthe~robability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybe.increased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.ThisEPisformodification ofexistingrestraints toeitherreplacesnubbersof'onemanufacturer withthatofthesameorlargersizeandloadratingfromadifferent manufacturer ortoreplaceexisting'restraint components withadifferent design.Thisisrequiredtoresolverestraint anomalies foundduringtheInservice Inspection oftherestraints.
Thismodification affectssafetyrelatedpipingsystems.Accordingly, thismodification isclassified assafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing arethebasisforthisjustification:
PCM027-187(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincetherestraint systemsforthepipingwillremainfunctionally identical toexistingconfiguration.
Inaddition, sincetherestraint configuration isnotchangedallpreviousanalysisconclusions arestillvalid.(ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously in,thesafety.analysisreportisnotcreatedbecause,nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofeitherthesnubbersortherestraints and,thesystemremainsfunctionally identical totherequirements specified intheexistingstressanlaysisofrecord.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythismodification becausethereplacement components utilizedperformthesamerestraining functionasthosetheyreplace.Theimplementation ofthisPCMwillrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification assnubbershavebeenremovedfromTable3.7-2bandaddedtoTable3.7-2aofthe'Plant Technical Specification 3.7.10.:Thesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraint MarkNoRC-247-H3 isrequiredtobeaddedtoTable3.7-2b.Asperthefootnoteofthesetables,snubbersmaybeaddedtoorremovedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendment tothesetablesprovidedarevisiontoTables3.7-2aand3.7-2bareincludedwiththe"nextLicenseAmendment request.
PGM028-187REPLACEMENT OFRWTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46 Th1sEngineering Package(EP)providesthedesignforthereplacement oftheRefueling WaterTank(RWT)nozzlefor-lineI-3"-CS-46.-
Theexistingnozzlehasextensive pittingandcorrosion, therefore 1twasconsidered advisible toreplaceit.ThisEPisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitrepairsasafetyrelatedpieceofequipment.
Thesafetyevaluat1on hasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstitute anyunreviewed safetyquetsions,"nor doesitrequireaTechnical Specification change.Therefore, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementtion ofthisPCM.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactonnuclearplantsafetyandoperation.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or{ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginof'safety asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical spec1fication isreduced.Thismodification replacesa3inchnozzleintheRWTwithanidentical nozzleexceptfortheweldingdetailwhichisequivalent butnotidentical.
Thisweldingdetailminimizes radiation exposurebyreducingweldingrequirements insidetheRWT.Themodification includedinthisEngineering Packageisconsidered tobesafetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunct1on ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethereplacement ofthenozzlevillnot.impactthequantityofwatersuppliestothechargingpumps'ii)
Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational design-of theRUTandthenewnozzleisequivalent indesign.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification.
Implementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitute s,per10CFR50.59(b),
themittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.
PCN032-187PRESSURIZER SURGELINESAMPLEVALVE(V1210)REPLACENHNT ABSTRACTExistingpressurizer surgelinesamplevalveV1210isleaking,hasadamagedvalvestemandcannotberepaired.
Tnevalvewillbereplacedwithanewvalveoriginally procuredforUnit2forsimilarservice.TheReactorCoolantSystemandSamplingSysteminwhich~isvalveislocatedinsafetyrelated.Accordingly, thisEngineering Packageisclassi.fied asnuclearsafetyrelated.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthat'thisEPdoesnotaconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.
ThisEPneitherreducesthemarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification, norhasanyimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.
SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated pzeviously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.Thissafetyrelatedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:i)'heprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccident~rmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportismotincreased.
Thereplacement valvehasthesamequalification forthelocationandserviceonthevalvewhichitreplaces.
Totalfailureofthereplacement valvewillresultinthesameconsequences orthetotalfailureoftheexistingvalve.Totalfailuzeofthisvalvewillcauseasmalllossofcoolantwhichislimitedbyaorificetobelessthanthecapacityofasinglechargingpump.Thiscondition iswithintheexistingFSARAnalyses-ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thismodification doesnotchangethesystemfunctionordesign.Thismodification isthereplacement ofavalvewithasimilarbutnotidentical valve.Thefailuremodeofthisvalvewillbeidentical withtheexistingvalveand,asstatedabove,iswithintheFSARanlaysesiii)ThemarginofsafetyisdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythismodification sincethevalveinvolveddoesnotformthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.
PCM032-187eTheimplementation ofthisPQfdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovides.
thebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforimplementation ofthisP(Hisnotrequired.  
-87CONDENSER OUTLETTUBESHEET.ANDWATERBOXCOATINGS8ACTThisengineering packageaddress"the additionofanepoxycoatingtothetothecondenser outlettubesheetsandwaterboxes.
Thismodification willenhancethecorrosion resistance ofthetubesheetsandwaterboxes andallowreduction ofthecathodicprotection systempotentials andcurrentdensities.
Thecondensers andtheplantcirculating watersystemareclassified asnon-nuclear safetyrelatedandtherefore, themodification addressed inthisengineering doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Furthermore, theadditionofaprotective coatingtothecondenser outlettubesheetsandwaterboxes doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
AFVALATINAsnotedinFSAR.Sections 9.2.3and10A.5,thecondensers andcirculating watersystemperformnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunction.
Afailuremodeevaluation oftheproposedcondenser outlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshasdetermined thereisnopotential forinteraction withequipment orfunctions important tonuclearsafety.Accordingly, themodification addressed bythisengineering packageis"classified asnonnuclearsafetyrelated.Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysis, ithasbeendemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.
Sincethereisnopotential forinteraction betweenthemodification addressed bythisengineering packageandequipment offunctions important tosafety,previoussafetyanalysisrepor;evaluations relatedtosafetyremainunaffected.
Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction different thanthosepreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.nNonewaccidents ormalfunctions associated withthefailureofthecondenser outlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshavebeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Sincethereisnopotential forinteraction betweenthemodification addressed bythisengineering packageandequipment orfunctions important tosafety,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinanyTechnical Specification remainsunaffected.
conclusion, themodification proposedinthisengineering packageisacceptable fromstandpoint ofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoes=otrequireachangetoanyTechnical Specifications.
Accordingly, NRCapprovalpriortoimplementation isnotrequired.
PCM035-187REPLACEMENT OFRAYCHEMSPLICESANDCONAXCONDUITSEALSABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodifications totheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociated withthesafetyrelatedinstruments listedintheEnvironmental Qualification Listfor10CFR50.49 andlocatedintheReactorContainment Building.
ThisEngineering Packagewillprovidetheengineering and'esign'details'equired toimplement thereplacement ofthebox'esthatareusedforsplicingtheConaxconduitsealpigtailcabletotheplantcableandreplacement ofRaychemsplicesattheboxesandtheElectrical Penetration Assemblies.
Thema]orityofinstruments listedinAttachment 7.4andtheirassociated splicesandconduitsealsareclassified asClass1E,areseismically qualified andperformasafetyrelatedfunction.
Alltheinstruments listedinAttachment 7.4arerequiredforplantsafeshutdown.
Therefore, this'EPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandthemodifications described werereviewedinaccordance with10CFR50.59 anddetermined tohavenoadverseimpactonplantoperations orsafetyrelatedequipment.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification.
FThischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
Supplement 1incorporates additional safetyrelatedinstruments, theirassociated Equipment Qualification Documentation Packageandtheremovaloftheholdpoints forEquipment Qualification Documentat'ion PackagesfortheRaychemsplicesandtheConaxconduitseals.Theadditional equipment, EQDocumentation Packageandremovalofholdpoints, doesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation, exceptfortheremovaloftheholdpoints.
Supplement 2revisesattachment 7.4andincorporates detaildrawingsfortheRaychemsplices.Thisadditional information completes themodifications coveredinthisEPanddoesnotaffecttheconclusions oftheoriginalsafetyevaluation.
SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.
ThisEngineering Packageprovidesthespliceinspection criteriaandtheengineering anddesigndetailstoimplement, asrequired, thereplacement ofspliceboxesandsplices.Theimplementation ofthisEngineering Packageincreases theavailability oftheequipment duringsafeshutdownconditions byimproving thereliability ofthesplicesattheequipment andpenetration.
Thismod'ification shallbeimplemented prior.toenteringNode4.Theequipment, listedinAttachment 7.4.1and7.4.3,whoseassociated boxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesneedreplacement, performsafetyrelatedfunctions withinthevariousplantsystemsandaredesignedforoperation underconditions thatcouldbe'mposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thepowerandcontrolterminations fortheequipment listedinAttachment 7.4.2,thoughnon-safety innature,couldhaveanadverseaffectonthesafetyrelatedterminations duetothehighenergylevelsassociated withthesenon-safety circuits.
Therefore, thesenon-safety circuits(withtheexception oflowenergyannunciator circuitsandcircuitsid'entified viaFPLletterJPE-PSL-87-0787 dated3/20/87),
whichcouldbeenergized following aLOCAevent,havebeenprovidedwithsplicesorconnectors (asperChapter3,Section3.11.5.4ofthe'SAR),
whicheffectively eliminated thepotential foradverseinteraction betweensafetyandnon-safety relatedterminations byeliminating thehighenergycircuitsfromtheharshLOCAenvironment.
ThisEPhasbeenclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.Basedonthepreceeding, thefollowing conclusions canbemade:I(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased, sincethemodifications totheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociated withtheequipment listedinAttachment 7.4enhancestheoperability oftheequipment inaharshenvironment postDBA.(ii)Asaresultofthismodification, thereisnopossibility foraccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated.
Thismodification altersassociated components ofaccidentmitigating equipment toenhancetheiroperation.
Existingaccuracies withrespecttocontrolormonitoring functions oftheinstrumentation loops,undermodification, willnotbeaffectedbythischange.Thereisnointroduction ofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.
(iii)Thismodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.
Thesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolled bythevariousapplicable Technical Specifications ismaintained bythischange.Theproposeddesignensuresthattheequipment willfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.
ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnical Specifications ispreserved.
PCM035-187Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PCM044-187MSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)istoreplacethelockingwasherandnutoneachMainSteamChelkValve(MSCV)diskstudwithanewlockingplateandnut.Theexistinglockingwasherdesignhasbeenadequateinservicebutisshowingsomewearindicating thatreplacement would'berequiredpriortotheendofthevalvedesignlife.Thenewlockingdevicewillprovideanenhancedmethodoflockingthenutandwillprecludethepossibility ofthenutrotatingand.allowing thedisktobecomeloose.Thevalvesconsidered inthisEPareintheMainSteamSystem.Thissystemisdesignated asnuclearsafetyrelatedandseismically qualified ontheASMESectionXICodeBoundarydrawings, andtherefore thismodification isclassified as'afetyrelated.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.
Theimplementation ofthisEPwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.
SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)&fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specificatgn isreduced.83>j~~Themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packageareforthereplacement ofthelockingdeviceontheMSCVdisk/tail linkconn'ection.
Thetwo(2)valvesaffectedareintheMainSteamSystem.Basedontheabovedescription, themodificatin included.
inthisEngineering Package(EP)isconsidered tobesafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, andthefollowing arebasesforthisjustification:
i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincethemodification willeliminate thepossibility ofthevalves'isk becomingloosefromthemount.Accordingly, themodification ensuresreliableoperation ofthevalvesandconsequently of'thesysteminwhichtheyareinstalled.
PCM044"187ii)Asaresultofthismodification, thereisnopossibaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethar.a..yevaluated becausethemodification issimplytorepoftnevavewithacomponent withahigherlevelofinthevalve.Nochangesaremadetotheopera'nasysteminwhichtnemodification ismade.il'yforanpreviously ace2componetconservatism des'gnoftneiii)Thismodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdef'nedinthebasisfo=anyTechnical Speci~ication becauseitneitne"changesthedesignparameter orthelockingdev''ceno.doesitchangethesystemdesignfloworfunctional requiremets.
Theimplementation ofthisP'QIdoesnotrequi,reachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthMchangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPQfisnotrequired.
PC/MNo.046-187REACTORCONTAINMENT BUILDINGTELESCOPING JIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTS ABSTRACTThisengineering packageisbeingissuedinresponsetothecommitment madeinthedisposition toplantNCR1-099.Thispackageaddresses themodification oftheseismicrestraints ontheReactorContainment Building(RCB)Telescoping JibCraneanddoesnotconstitute anewdesign.Thespecified sliphookswouldnotengagetheexistingrestraint padeyes.Theseismicrestraints aredesignedtoholdthecraneinplaceduringadesignbasisearthquake.
Thisengineering packagewilldocumentthedesignchangeandwillprovideguidelines forestablishing amaintenance procedure toassurereinstallation oftheseismicrestraints attheendofeachoutage.Themodification oftheseismicrestraints wascompleted underthedisposition toNCR1-099.Thejibcraneseismicrestraints donotperformoraffectanysafety-related function.
However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedsincethereisapotential thatduringaseismiceventthetelescoping jibcranecouldinteractwithsafety-related itemsthatareinthevicinity.
QualityRelatedrequirements areappliedtothismodification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specifications.
Thismodification doesnotaffectplantoperations orsafety.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandtherefore doesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.
SAFETYEVALUATION SafetAnalsisInresponsetoNCR1&99,thisengineering packageaddresses themodification oftheRCBTelescoping JibCraneseismicrestraints.
Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theseismicrestraints donotperformoraffectanysafety-related systemorfunction.
However,thisPC/Misclassified asQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheseismicrestraints duringadesignbasisevent(e.g.earthquake) couldpotentially affectsafetymelated systemsorequipment sincethejibcraneislocatedintheRCB.Consequently, therevisedrestraints havebeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditions specified intheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirements havebeenimplemented, thusassuringtheintegrity oftheinstallation.
0095L'/0018L PCM087-187CODEBOUNDARYDRAWINGREVISIONCodeboundarydrawing8770-G-090 isrevised/expanded to30sheetstoincludeallnuclearsafetyrelatedsystems.Thenewdrawingswillfacilitate testingandexamination underthe"inservice inspection-tenyearplan."Nounreviewed safetyquestions existasdefinedby10CFR50.59,andnoTechnical Specifications areimpactedbythismodification..
Therefore, priorcommission approvalisnotrequired.
NUCLEARSAFETYEVALUATION CHECKLIST Thewrittenevaluation oftheproposeddesignchangetodemonstrate thatthechangedoesnotaltertheplantsdesignbasisandisboundedbythedesignanalysesisattachedtotheDesignEquivalent Engineering Package.Theanswersbelowaresupported bythisevaluation.
TYPEOFCHANGEYesNoxYesNoXYesNoYes.NoxAchange.to theplantasdescribed intheFSAR?Achangetoprocedures asdescribed intheFSAR?Atestorexperiment notdescribed intheFSAR?~Achangetotheplanttechnical specifications?
EFFECTOFCHANGEYesNoYesNoYesNoXYesNoXYesNoXYesNoX'esNoXWilltheprobability ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?
Willtheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?
Maythepossibility ofanaccidentwhichisdifferent thananyalreadyevaluated intheFSARbecreated?Willtheprobability ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?
Willtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?
Maythepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetydifferent thananyalreadyevaluated intheFSARbecreated?Willthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasestoanytechnical specification bereduced'?
PCM097-187TECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERBLOCKWALLNO207AMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisengineering packageaddresses theinstallation ofastatusboardintheTechnical SupportCenter(TSC),locatedatElev.62.00intheReactorAuxiliary Building(RAB).Theboardwillbeattachedtoamasonryblockwallandwillbeusedduringemergency drillsandplantoperation, Theboardandwalldonotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedfunction.
However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedsincethereisapotential forthewalltointeractwithsafetyrelateditems.Qual-tyRelatedrequirements areappliedtothismodification.
The..mpiementation ofthisPC'Mdoesmod,reauireachanget.oolan~2hnca'peci:catons.Tnismodifcationdoesnot"fctplantoperations orsafey.ThsPC.'2does..otconstitute anunre:iewed safetyquestionandtherefore doesnotrequirepriorNRCapprovals SAFETYEVALUATION Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto.involveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentor-malfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously calculated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thestatusboardandmasonryblockwall207Adonotperformoraffectanysafety-related systemorfunction.
However,thisPC/Misclassified asqualityrelatedsincefailureofthewallduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake) couldpotentially affectsafety-related systemsorequipment.
Consequently, thewallhasbeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditions specified intheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrquirements havebeenimplemented, thusassuringtheintegrity oftheinstallation.
Themodif'cations includedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunrev=ewed safetyouestions because:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccideptormalfunction ofequipment important to'afetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment reouiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.
PCM097-187(ii)Thereisnopossibilitv foranaccidntormal'func.ion ofadifferent typethar.arypreviously evaluated sincethestatusboardandmasonryblockwallperformnosafety.unctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperational design.Failureofthewallcouldnotoccursincethemodification hasbeenanalyzdforthedsignbasisconditions.
(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachange~toplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
PGM108-187TURBINEGANTRYCRANEMAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADEABSTRACTThisengineering packageisbeingissuedinresponsetoREASLN-S7-(Later).
Thispackagewillprovidetheengineering documentation requiredformodifications totheturbinegantrycranemainsheave-nest.Themodifications arerequiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.Theturbinegantrycraneisclassified asNon-Nuclear SafetyRelated.However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedtoprovideQ.C.inspection ofcriticalloadbearingweldsandassurerealignment ofthesheavenestshaft.Asafetyevaluation andfailuremodeevaluation hasdetermined thatthemodifications addressed inthispackagedonotconstitute
'anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefiredin10CFR50,59.Furhermore,theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangeoplanttechnical spec"ficat onsanddoesnotaffectplantoperations orsafety.Basedontheabove,implementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.
SAFETYEVALUATION Thispackageaddresses theturbinegantrycranemainsheavenestsupportplatemodifications andsheavenestshaftreplacement requiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:
(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theturbinegantrycranedoesnotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedsystemorfunction.
However,thisPC/Misclassified asQualityRelatedtoensureQ.C.inspection oftheinstallation.
Themodifications includedjnthi"PC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions because:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsecuences ofanaccidntormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment requiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdownconditipn.
(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanaryprviouslsevaluated sincetheturbinegan.rycranedoesnotperformanysafetyfun"-onandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperational design.
PCM108-187(iii)Thismodification doesnotch=".gthemarginofsa.etyasdefinedinthebasis'oranytec'."",ic lspecificatior.
becausetheturbinegantrycraneisnotaddressed byanytechnical specification.
Theimplementation ofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachangtoplanttechnical specifications.
Theforegoing constitutes, perl0CFR50.59(b),
thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthschangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Furthermore, theimplementation ofthisPC/t1doesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specifications.
Basedontheabove,priorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.
STLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYANALYSISREVIEWINTROOUCTION TheSt.LucreUnit1Cycle8SafetyAnalysiswasperformdsupportoperation with133assemblies ofBatchHandalongwith84freshBatchKnaturaluraniumaxialblanketassemblies.
ThirtysixoftheBatchKassemblies containnobtrrnable absorberrods,24assemblies containeight4w/oGd203rods,andtheremaining BatchKassemblies contain484C-A1203 rodsinadditiontoeightgadoliniabearin'grods.Thebottom.3.04inchesofthefuelrodiscomposedofalonglircaloyendcap'inordertoreducethepossibility ofdebrisrelatedfue'1rodfailures.
ATechnical Specification amendment forthelongendcapchangewasissuedandis.foundinReference 5.Inadditiontothischange,thereloadfuelischaracter izedbyanimprovedspacerspringdesignand,inthetopandbottomspacers,by'theadditionofbackupdimplesinthespacerperipheral rodcells.TheCycle8energyrequirement is10390EFPH,basedonane'nd-of-cycle7.burnupof9300EFPH.SAFETYEVALUATION
'TheCycle':8SARcoversthefuelmanagement, fueldesignandev'atuationofthephysics.character isties,shutdownmargib'alculations, powerdistributions andpeakingfactorsthroughout thecycle.CorePhysicshasperformed 1)adetailedreviewofthevendor'smethodsandneutronic calculations 2)anindependent verification ofthevendorresultsbycomparing theSARreportedphysicsparameterstothosecalcula'tedwiththecoremodelsgenerated bytheCorePhysicsGroupdocumented inReference 6and,3)acomparison ofcalculated valuestotheplantTechnical Specifications inregardstolimitingpowe~peakingfactors,moderator temperature coefficients, shutdownmarginandlinearheatrates.Basedontheresultsoftheaforementioned evaluation, itcanbeconcluded that:Ia)Thevendor'sphysicsdatawascalculated withapprovedmethodsanddocumented
'satisfactorily.
b)FPL'sindependent corephysicsmodelsareinreasonable agreement withthevendor'sresults,andc)Thecycle8reloaddesignmeetstheTechnical Specification LimitswithregardstoFr,Fxy,HTC,minimumre'quiredshutdownmarginandmaximumlinearheatrate.
Sh2oBasedonprojected burnups,5assemblies (4BatchH-IandIBatchH-4)willexceedthecurrently analyzedmechanica 1andradiological designlimitsof44,500NMO/NTUpriortotheend-of-cycle8.Themostlimitingofthesea'ssemblieswi11reachaburnupof44,500MMD/HTUat9450EFPHcycleexposure.
Ananalysistoextendthemechanical andradiological burnuplimitbeyondthecurrent,valuewillbeperformed priortothattime.Asaresult,operation ofcycle8withtheseassemblies inthecoredoesnotconstitute asafetyconcernupto9450EFPHandprovidedtheaforementioned analysisiscompleted priortothatcycleexposure'nd sho'ws.acceptable results,wperation beyond9450EFPHwillnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Asnotedintheintroduction, thereloadfueldesignincorporates minormodifications tothefueldesignusedinCycle7.Theendcapinthereloadfuelislengthened from0.4inchesto3.04incheswhiletheactivefuellengthisreducedbythesameamount,therefore maintaining theoveralllengthof.therod.Thischangehasbeenpreviously evaluated andwasapprovedbytheNRC(Reference 5).Thereloadfuelalsoincorporates animprovedspacerspringdesignandspacerbackupdimpleshavebeenaddedtothetopandbottomspacerperipheral cells.Theeffectofthesechangeshasbeenevaluated anddetermined tohavenoadverseimpactrelativetothefueldesignbasis.TheCycle8safetyevaluation demonstrated thatthesechangesareboundedbypre.vi.ous analyses.
TheSt.LucieUnitICycle8SafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)(Reference I),presentstheevaluation ofthereloadcharacteristics withrespecttothesafetyanalysispresented forCycle6(Reference 2)whichservesasthereference cyc1e.Thebasi'softhesafetyanalysisforCycle8isthesameasthatusedforCycle6withtheexception oftheLocalPowerDensity(LPO)versusAxialShapeIndex(ASI)LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO).ThepeakpowerdensityduringCycle8couldincreaseoverthatassumedinthereference analysessothatitisnecessary tolimitthemaximumpowerlevelwhenrelyingontheex-coredetectorsfordetermination ofthepeaklinearheatrate.AproposedTechnical Specification changewillreducethefractionofmaximumallowable powerfrom0.88to0.85whenthein-c'oredetectors areinoperable.
TheproposedTechnical Specification changehasbeensubmitted totheNRCperL-86-510datedDecember18,1986.NRCapprovalisexpectedbyFebruary28,1987.UntilapprovalofthisTechnical Specificationchange,thisSafetyEvaluation isonlyapplicable forreactoroperation upto40KratedpowerwhenthisTechnical Specification isapplicable.
Uponapprova1ofthisTechnica1Specif'icationchange,poweroperation above40Kratedpowerupto100KratedpowerfortheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle8re1oadcoreisacceptable andwillnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.  
'SoThe.St.LucieUnit1Cycle8SARpresentstheevaluation andreviewoftheChapter15eventsforthereloadcore.FPLhasreviewedtheSARandhasdetermined thatCycle8isboundedbytheresultsoftheanalysispresented'or Cycle6withtheexception oftheReactorCoolantPumpRotorSeizureandtheCEAEjectionAccidents whichwerere-evaluated andre-analyzed respectively andarepresented intheSAR.TheReactorCoolantPump(RCP)RotorSeizurewasevaluated to.assesstheeffectsofminorfueldesignchangesandincreased.
axialpowerpeakingonthepercentoffueltoexperience DAB.Pressurecharacteristics arenotaffectedbythesechangesandtheresultsareboundedbytheCycle6analysis.
Theresultsoftheevaluation showthatthepercentoffuelpredicted toexperience DNBiswellbelowthe10%,limitingcriteria.
Off-sitedoseratesareasmallfractionof10CFR100doseguidelines andareboundedbytheresultsofanalysispresented inReference 4.TheCEAEjectioneventwasreanalyzed usingthegenerically approvedmethodology (Reference 3)andresultsshowsignificantmargintothelimitingcriteria.
Sincealltheeventshavebeenreviewedandprovedacceptable itcanbestatedthatforCycle8:tTheprobabi'1ity ofoccurrence or.the'consequences ofanac'cident ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe,safetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.
TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfiguration oftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadversely affectthemechanical integrity norsignificantly changethecoolantflowcharacteristics throughthecore.Themodeofoperation oftheplantremainsunchanged.
Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction
.ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.
ThesafetyanalysisperformedfortheCycle8reloadcoredemonstrates thattheconsequences of.an'accident ormalfunction havenotbeenincreased beyondthoseevaluated inthepreviousanalyses.Apossibi1ityforanaccidentormalfunctionofa.different typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.
Sh4of4TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfiguration oftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadversely affectthemechanical integritynorsignificantly.
changethecoolantflowcharacteristics throughthecore.Themodeof'peration oftheplantremainsunchanged.
Therefor'e, anewaccidentorequipment malfunction hasnotbeencreated.iii.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeveryTechnical Specification isnotreduced.There-evaluation oftheRCPRotors.eizureandthere-analysisoftheCEAEjectionaccidents haveshownthattheresultsarewell'ithin thedesignbasis.Allothereventshavebeendetermined to'beboundedbypreviousanalyses.
Therefore, thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specificatiorl basisforoperation ofCycle8upto40K,ratedpower.WiththeproposedchangeintheLPOLCOimplemented,.
thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basisforoperation ofCycle8uptolOOXratedpower.Conclusion IAsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethattheCycle8reloadconfiguration doesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.
Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval..}}

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ssososooss ssoss9DRADQCK05000335PPDRQFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEPLANT-UNITNO.1SPENTFUELSTORAGE,FACILITYMODIFICATION SAFETY.ANALYSISREPORTDOCKETNO.50-335

>I',l'4H TABLEOFCONTENTSSECTIONPAGE

1.0INTRODUCTION

1.1LicenseAmendment Requested 1.2CurrentStatus1.3"Interfaces withOtherOrganizations 1.4SummaryofReport1.5Conclusions 1.6References 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1ExistingRacks2.2NewHighDensityRacks3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULIC CONSIDERATIONS 3.1NeutronMultiplication Factor1-21-22-12-12-13-13-13.1.13.1.23.1.33.1.43.1.5NormalStoragePostulated Accidents Calculation MethodsRackModification Acceptance CriteriaforCriticality 3-13-23"23-93-103.2DecayHeatCalculations fortheSpentFuelPool(Bulk)3.2.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesign3.2.2DecayHeatAnalyses3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeup3.3Thermal-Hydraulic AnalysesfortheSpentFuelPool(Localized) 3.3.1Basis3.3.2ModelDescription 3.3.3CladdingTemperature 3-103-103-113"143-153-153-153-16 TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)SECTIONPAGE3.4Potential FuelandRackHandlingAccidents 3.4.1RackModuleMishandling 342Temporary Construction CraneDrop3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDrop)3.5Technical Specification Changes3.6References 3-163-173-173-173-173-184.0MECHANICAL,

MATERIAL, ANDSTRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 4.1Description ofStructure 4.1.1Description ofFuelHandlingBuilding4.1.2Description ofSpentFuelRacks4.2Applicable Codes,Standards, andSpecifications 4.2.1NRCDocuments 4.2.2IndustryCodesandStandards 4.3SeismicandImpactLoads4.4LoadsandLoadCombinations 4-14-14-14-54-74-84-94.4.1SpentFuelPool4.4.2SpentFuelRacks4.5DesignandAnalysisProcedures 4-94-114-124.5.14.5.2DesignandAnalysisProcedures forSpentFuelPoolDesignandAnalysisProcedures forSpentFuelStorageRacks4-124-134.6Structural Acceptance Criteria4-204.6.14.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.54.6.64.6.74.6.8Structural Acceptance CriteriaforSpentFuelPoolStructure Structural Acceptance CriteriaforSpentFuelStorageRacksFuelHandlingCraneUpliftAnalysisImpactAnalysisWeldStressesSummaryofMechanical'nalysis Definition ofTermsUsedInSection4LateralRackMovement4-204-234-274-274-274-284-294-30 4

TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)PAGE4.7Materials, QualityControl,andSpecialCon-struction Techniques 4.7.1Construction Materials 4.7.2NeutronAbsorbing Material4.7.3QualityAssurance 4.7.4Construction Techniques 4.8TestingandIn-Service Surveillance 4.8.1ProgramIntent4.8.2Description ofSpecimens 4.8.3SpecimenEvaluation 4.9References 4-304-304-304-304-304-324-324-324-324-335.0COST/BENEFIT ANDENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 5.1Cost/Benefit andThermalAssessment 5-15-15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.5NeedforIncreased StorageCapacityEstimated CostsConsideration ofAlternatives Resources Committed ThermalImpactontheEnvironment 5-15-15-25-25-25.2Radiological Evaluation 5-35.2.15.2.25.2.35.2.45.2.5SolidRadwasteGaseousReleasesPersonnel ExposureRadiation Protection DuringRe"RackActivities RackDisposal5-35-35-35-45-55.3AccidentEvaluation 5-65.3.15.3.25.3.35.3.45.3.5SpentFuelHandlingAccidents FuelDecayLoadsOverSpentFuelTemperature andWaterDensityEffectsConclusions 5-65-85-95-95-95.4References 5-10 Vted TABLE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLESTITLEDesignDataTableofModuleDataModuleDimensions andWeightSummaryofCriticalSafetyAnalysesMinimumBurnupValuesReactivity EffectsofAbnormalandAccidentConditions PAGE2-32-53-203-213-22FuelBurnupValuesforRequiredReactivities (k~)3-23withFuelofVariousInitialEnrichments Comparison ofCold,CleanReactivities Calculated at36.5Mwd/kgUBurnupand4.5XEnrichment 3-2403-63-83-93-103-113-123-133-14Estimated Uncertainties inReactivity DueToFuelDepletion EffectsLongTermChangesinReactivity inStorageRackDesignBasis(Limiting)

FuelAssemblySpecifications (CE14x14)Thermal/Hydraulic CasesTreatedPeakingFactorDataEssential HeatTransferDatafortheFuelPoolHeatExchanger PowerGeneration RatioPreviously Discharged BatchesBulkPoolTemperature vs.TimeDuringNormalDischarge PoolBulkTemperature vs.TimeSubsequent toCompletion ofDischarge 3-253-263-273-283-293-303-313-323-33 TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TABLETITLEPAGE3-153-163-173-183-194-14-24-34-4LossofCoolingafterCompletion ofNormalRefueling Discharge BulkPoolTemperature vs.TimeDuringFullCoreDischarge PoolBulkTemperature vs.TimeSubsequent toCompletion ofFullCoreDischarge LossofCoolingAfterCompletion ofFullCoreDischarge LocalandCladdingTemperature DataBoraflexExperience forHighDensityRacksMaximumStressSummaryStress/Strain SummaryforLinersandAnchorsSoilBearingStressesStability SafetyFactorsDegreesofFreedomNumbering SystemforGapElementsandFrictionElements3-343-353-363-373-384-354-364-374-384-394-404-84-94-10RackMaterialDataAdjustable HeightSupportMaterialDataBoundingValuesforStressFactors4-414-424-435-1NuclearFuelDischarge Information StLucieUnit15-115-25-35-4AnnualFuelSavingsAttributed toStLucieUnitNo.1GaseousReleasesFromFuelHandlingBuildingGammaIsotopicAnalysisSpentFuelPoolWater5-125-135-14 5-55-65-75-8TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TITLEAnticipated DosesDuringReracking EffectofTemperature andVoidonCalculated Reactivity ofStorageRackSpentFuelPoolPurification SystemRadionuclide AnalysisReportResinActivitySpentFuelPoolAirborneActivityRadionuclide AnalysisReportPAGE5-155-165-175-18 FIGURE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEPoolLayoutTypicalRackElevation

-Region1TypicalRackElevation

-Region2Acceptable BurnupDomaininRegion2oftheStLuciePlantSpentFuelStorageRacksRegion1StorageCellGeometryRegion2StorageCellGeometryComparison ofDepletion Calculations forFuelof4.5XInitialEnrichment 3-53-64-24-44-54-64-74-84-12BulkPoolTemperature ModelforCodeBULKTEMIdealization ofRackAssemblyThermalChimneyFlowModelChannelElement-Regions1and2Composite BoxAssembly-Region1GapElement-Region1TypicalCellElevation

-Region1TypicalCellElevation

-Region2Adjustable Support3x3TypicalArray-Region13x3TypicalArray-Region2FuelHandlingBuildingSpectraEnvelopeCurvesMatPlanandSectionModelOverallViewNorthSouthSSEvii TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEEastWestSSEVerticalSSESchematic ModelforDYNARACKRacktoRackImpactSpringsImpactSpringsArrangement atNodei,SpringMassSimulation forTwo-Dimensional MotionTestCoupon LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGESPAGETitlePageiiiiiiivvviviiviii1-11-22-12-22-32H2-5Figure2-1Figure2-2Figure2-33-13-23-33H3-53W3-73W333-103-113-123-133-143-153-163-173-183-193-203-213-223-233-243-253-263-273-283-29REVISION00000000000000000000000000000PAGE3-303-313-323-333-343-353-363-373-38Figure3-1Figure3-2Figure3-3Figure3HFigure3-5Figure3W4-14-24-34-44-54W4-74W4H4-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-194-204-214-224-234-244-254-264-274-284-294-304-314-324-33REVISION LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGESPAGE4-344-354-364-374-384-394%04-414%24%34444454-46Figure4-1Figure4-2Figure4-3Figure4-4Figure4-5REVISION0FigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigure5-15-25-35H5-55<5-75%5%5-105-115-125-135-145-155-165-175-185-194W4-74W494-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-190000100000000'000000 A'Ll4fAVg(.qf'4 l.0INTRODUCTION 1.1LICENSEAMENDMENT REQUESTED FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)hascontracted forthedesignandmanufacture ofnewspentfuelstoragerackstobeplacedintothespentfuelpoolofStLucieUnitNo.1.Thepurposeofthenewracksistoincreasetheamountofspentfuelthatcanbestoredintheexistingspentfuelpool.Theracksaredesignedsothattheycanstorespentfuelassemblies inahighdensityarray.Therefore, FPLherebyrequeststhataLicenseAmendment beissuedtotheStLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperating LicenseDPR-67(1) toincludeinstallation anduseofnewstorageracksthatmeetthecriteriacontained herein.ThisSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)hasbeenpreparedtosupportthisrequestforlicenseamendment.

1.2CURRENTSTATUSTheexistingracksinthespentfuelpoolatStLucieUnitNo.1have728totalstoragecells.Withthepresently available storagecells,StLucieUnitNo.1lostthefull-core reservestoragecapability aftertheseventhrefueling, whichwascompleted inthespringof1987.Tocorrectthissituation andprovidesufficient capacityatStLucieUnitNo.1tostoredischarged fuelassemblies, FPLplanstoreplacetheexistingstoragerackswithnewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.Thedesignofthenewrackswillallowformoredensestorageofspentfuel,thusenablingtheexistingpooltostoremorefuelinthespentfuelpool.Thenewhighdensityrackshaveausablestoragecapacityof1706cells,extending thefull-core-reserve storagecapability untiltheyear2009.Ifafullcoreoffloadisrequiredintheinterim,priortotheinstallation ofthenewracks,FPLintendstotransferenoughoftheoldestspentfuelfromSt.LucieUnit1toSt.LucieUnit2toallowfullcoreoffload.Aproposedlicenseamendment toallowspentfueltransferwassubmitted inJuly1986(2)andisbeingreviewedbytheNRC.1.3INTERFACES WITHOTHERORGANIZATIONS FPLhasoverallresponsibility forthismodification.

Holtec,International hasdesignedthenewspentfuelstorageracks.JosephOat(JO)isresponsible forthefabrication ofthenewspentfuelstorageracksandtheevaluation ofthoseracksunderaccidentconditions.

EbascoServices, Inc.isresponsible forthebuildingstructural

analysis, theevaluation ofthespentfuelcoolingsystemandtherelatedaccidentevaluations.

Theinstaller, whowillbechosenlater,isresponsible fortheinstallation ofthenewspentfuelpoolracks.1.4SUMMARYOFREPORTThisSafetyAnalysisReportfollowstheguidanceoftheNRCpositionpaperentitled, "OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"

datedApril14,1978,asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979().Sections3.0through5.0ofthisreportareconsistent withthesection/subsection formatandcontentoftheNRCpositionpaper,SectionsIIIthroughV.0076L/0011L 0~P~"~

Thenuclearandthermal-hydraulic aspectsofthereport(Section3.0)addresstheneutronmultiplication factor,considering normalstorageandhandlingofspentfuelaswellaspostulated accidents withrespecttocriticality andtheabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemtomaintainsufficient cooling.Movementofspentfuelstoredinthespentfuelpoolduringremovalofthepresentracksandinstallation ofthenewracksisalsoaddressed.

Section4.0,whichdescribes themechanical, materialandstructural aspectsofthenewracks,containsinformation concerning thecapability ofthefuelassemblies, storageracks,andspentfuelpoolsystemtowithstand theeffectsofnaturalphenomena andotherserviceloadingconditions.

Theenvironmental aspectsofthereport(Section5.0)concernthethermalandradiological releasefromthefacilityundernormalandaccidentconditions.

Thissectionalsoaddresses theoccupational radiation exposures, generation ofradioactive waste,needforexpansion, commitment ofmaterialandnonmaterial resources, andacost-benefit assessment.

1.5CONCLUSION

S Onthebasisoftheevaluations andinformation presented inthisreport,plusoperating experience withhighdensityfuelstorageatStLucieUnit2andTurkeyPointUnit3,FPLconcludes thattheproposedmodification ofStLucieUnitNo.1spentfuelstoragefacilities providessafespentfuelstorage,andthatthemodification iscong~tent withthefacilitydesignandoperating criteriaasprovidedintheFSARandoperating license.

1.6REFERENCES

StLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperating LicensesDPR67,DocketNo.50-335.2~FPLletterL-86-250datedJuly2,1986.3~NuclearRegulatory Commission, LettertoAllPowerReactorLicensees, fromB.K.Grimes,April14,1978,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"

asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.StLuciePlantUnitNo.1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.1-20076L/0011L 4Jg~l!,I 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1EXISTINGRACKSThespentfuelpoolatSt.LucieUnit1presently containsspentfuelassemblystoragerackswhicharedesignedtoprovidestoragelocations forupto728fuelassemblies.

Theracksaredesignedtomaintainthestoredfuelinasafe,eoolable, andsubcritical configuration duringnormalandabnormalconditions.

Thepresentstorageracksarearectangular arraycomposedof14modules.Eachstoragerackmoduleisselfsupporting andrestsonstainless steelpads.Thepresentracksarefreestandinginthattheyareneitherboltednorweldedtothefloor,noraretheyattachedtothepoolwalls.Theinterface withthepoolboundaries isdesignedtotransfernormalandshearloadsviatheracksupportsintothepoolbottomslab.Eachfuelassemblystoragemoduleiscomposedofrectangular storagecavitiesfabricated fromone-quarter inchthickstainless steelplate,witheachcavitycapableofaccepting onefuelassembly.

Thefuelassemblystoragecavitieshavelead-insurfacesatthetoptoprovideguidanceforinsertion offuelassemblies.

Thecavitiesareopenatthetopandbottomtoprovideaflowpathforconvective coolingofspentfuelassemblies throughnaturalcirculation.

Thefuelassemblystoragecavitiesareconnected byachevrongridstructure toformmoduleswhichlimitstructural deformations andmaintainanominalcenter-to-center spacingof12.53inchesbetweenadjacentstoragecavitiesduringdesignconditions including seismic.Forfurtherinformation ontheexistingspentfuelstorageracksseeSection9.1.2intheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.2.2NEWHIGHDENSITYRACKSThenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracksconsistofindividual cellswith8.65inchby8.65inch(nominal) squarecross-section, eachofwhichaccommodates asingleCombustion Engineering orExxonPWRfuelassemblyorequivalent, fromeitherSt.LucieUnit1orUnit2.Atotalof1706cellsarearrangedin17distinctmodulesofvaryingsizesintworegions.Region1isdesignedforstorageofnewfuelassemblies withenrichments upto4.5weightpercentU-235.Region1isalsodesignedtostorefuelassemblies withenrichments upto4.5weightpercentU-235thathavenotachievedadequateburnupforRegion2.TheRegion2cellsarecapableofaccommodating fuelassemblies withvariousinitialenrichments whichhaveaccumulated minimumburnupswithinanacceptable boundasdiscussed inthisreport.Forexample,corresponding to4.5and4.0percentinitialenrichments, theminimumrequiredburn-upsforsafestorageinRegion2are36.5and30.9MWD/KgU,respectively.

Figure2-1showsthearrangement oftherackmodulesinthespentfuelpool.Thehighdensityracksareengineered toachievethedualobjective ofmaximumprotection againststructural loadings(arisingfromgroundmotion,thermalstresses, etc.)'andthemaximization ofavailable storagelocations.

Ingeneral,agreaterwidth-to-height aspectratioprovidesgreatermarginagainstrigidbodytipping.Hence,themodulesaremadeaslargeaspossiblewithintheconstraints oftransportation andsitehandlingcapabilities.

2-10076L/0011L tty,gW"f AsshowninFigure2-1,there-are17discretemodulesarrangedinthefuelpool.Eachrackmoduleisequipped(seeFigures2-2and2-3)withgirdlebars,3/4-inchthickby3-1/2incheshigh.Thenominalgapbetweenadjacentmodulewallsis1-1/2inches.Themodulesmakesurfacecontactbetweentheircontiguous wallsatthegirdlebarlocations andthusmaintainaspecified gapbetweenthecellwalls.Table2-1givestherelevantdesigndataoneachregion.Themodulesinthetworegionsareofeightdifferent types.Tables2-2and2-3summarize thephysicaldataforeachmoduletype.ThepoisoninRegions1and2isBoraflex.

Theuseofthisabsorbermaterialistoprecludeinadvertent criticality.

0076L/0011L 2-2Revision1 TABLE2-1DESIGNDATARegionMin.B-10FluxTrapCellPitchLoadingGap(nominalinch)(arealdensity)(nominalinch)10.128.86.020gm/cm.007gm/cm21.120.02-30076L/0011L TABLE2-2TABLEOFMODULEDATAMODULEI.D.NO.OFMODULESNO.OFCELLSINNWDIRECTION NO.OFCELLSINEWDIRECTION TOTALNO.OFCELLSPERMODULERegion1AlandA281Region1BlandB21090Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2131311710488Region2Fl1296-Region2GlandG2Region2*Hl121310896*Cellsmissinginthismoduleduetosparger.RefertoFigure2-1.0076L/0011L Revision1 TABLE2-3MODULEDIMENSIONS ANDWEIGHTMODULEI.D.NOMINALCROSS%ECTION+

DIMENSIONS N-SEWESTIMATED DRYWEIGHT(lbs)PERMODULERegion1AlandA290-1/4"90-1/4"26,700Region1BlandB290-1/4"100-7/16" 29,800Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2Region2FlRegion2GlandG2Region2Hl115-11/16" 80-1/6"97-7/8"71-3/16"106-3/4"71-3/16"106-3/4"80-1/16"115-11/16" 71-3/16"115-11/16" 71-3/16"24,10021,500187200190800.22,300190800*Excluding girdlebars0076L/0011L Revision1 U~,V')~U,UU N~-413/1B"REF78'8.7/8"~~87.7/8"~i444"(37-0")111/8"REF.CrrCC7crrCLUJC'C7LrrCC7rcrr8CASKAREAEl11x8E211x8Hl13x8-4x20113x8COrAl9x9REGION1A29x9REGION1CtCSCJ7Crr7cbCC7G112x9C113x9C213x9ll0CIll0C0C/7r~C0OQmmcrrez--IG)C~xz~O0zMC/7OXcrrErrcr7O4COcbCC7CC7r819x10REGION1G212x9C313x9C413x9Fl12x8D213x8D313x8B29x10REGION11~1/2"1~1/2"~106.3/4"~

~115.11/16" 115.11/16" 90-1/4"51/255/8"REFCOTrC)COCC7r

+.os"10.12"PITCHGIROLEBARIttIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIoIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATION REGION1FIGURE2-2 P'hh~~PPP>>fPPPPP-P'PPPPPIIh)~~I'P 04II8.86"PITCHGIRDLEBAR4IIIIIttIIILJIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATION REGION2FIGURE2-3 3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULIC CONSIDERATIONS 3.1NEUTRONMULTIPLICATION FACTORThefollowing subsections describetheconditions inthespentfuelpoolwhichareassumedincalculating theeffective neutronmultiplication factor(keff),theanalysismethodology, andtheanalysisresults.Thecriticality analysesofeachofthetwoseparateregionsofthespentfuelstoragepoolaresummarized inTable3-1fortheanticipated normalstorageconditions.

Thecalculated maximumreactivity inRegion2includesaburnup-dependent allowance foruncertainty indepletion calculations and,furthermore, providesanadditional marginof0.00655kbelowthelimitingeffective multiplication factor(k~~)of0.95.Ascoolingtimeincreases inlong-term storage,decayofPu-ZOIresultsinasignificant decreaseinreactivity, whichwillprovideanincreasing subcriticality marginandtendstofurthercompensate foranyuncertainty indepletion calculations.

Spacingbetweentwodifferent rackmodulesissufficient toprecludeadversenuclearinteraction, sincetheminimumspacingbetweenracksisgreaterthanthedesignwatergapspacing.Region2canaccommodate fuelofvariousinitialenrichments anddischarge fuelburnups,providedthecombination fallswithintheacceptable domainillustrated inFigure3-1.Forconvenience ofreference, theminimumburnupvaluesinFigure3-1havebeenfittedbylineartangentsatvariousvaluesandtheresultsaretabulated inTable3-2.Linearinterpolation betweenthetabulated valueswillalwaysyieldvaluesonorconservatively abovethecurveoflimitingburnups.Thesedatawillbeimplemented inappropriate administrative procedures toassureverifiedburnupasspecified indraftRegulatory Guide1.13,Revision2.Administrative procedures willalsobeemployedtoconfirmandassurethepresenceofsolublepoisoninthepoolwateratalltimes,providing afurthermarginofsafetyandassuringsubcriticality intheeventoffuelmisplacement duringfuelhandlingoperations, asdiscussed inSection3.1.2.3.1.1.1NewFuelStorageinRegion2Criticality analysesconfirmthatacheckerboard pattern(fuelassemblies aligneddiagonally) providesanacceptable k~forthestorageoffreshfuelassemblies of4.5Xenrichment inRegion2.Thesecalculations indicateanominalk~of0.819+0.025(95X/95X) whenfullyfloodedwithcleanunborated water.Thisvalueissubstantially lessthanthelimitingkeffof0.95,evenwiththeadditionofareasonable allowance foruncertainties.

\WithBoraflexabsorberbetweenassemblies, conditions donotexistfortheappearance ofapeakinreactivity atlowmoderator densities, andthefullyfloodedcondition corresponds tothehighestreactivity (optimummoderation).

Thus,thecheckerboard patternofnew4.5XenrichedfuelinRegion2represents asafeconfiguration inconformance withbothStandardReviewPlan(SRP)9.1.1and9.1.2.3-10076L/0011L L)~(~I$4'4%I'I~tJr~4(1v"k' 3.1.2Postulated Accidents Althoughcreditforthesolublepoisonnormallypresentinthespentfuelpoolwaterispermitted underabnormaloraccidentconditions",

mostabnormaloraccidentconditions willnotresultinexceeding thelimitingreactivity (keffof0.95)evenintheabsenceofsolublepoison.Theeffectsonreactivity ofcredibleabnormalandaccidentconditions aresummarized inTable3-3.Oftheseabnormal/

accidentconditions, onlyonehasthepotential foramorethannegligible positivereactivity effect.Theinadvertent misplacement ofafreshfuelassembly(eitherintoaRegion2storagecelloroutsideandadjacenttoarackmodule)hasthepotential forexceeIing thelimitingreactivity shouldtherebeaconcurrent andindependent accidentcondition resulting inthelossofallsolublepoison.Administrative procedures assurethepresenceofsolublepoisonatalltimesandwillprecludethepossibility ofthesimultaneous occurrence ofthesetwoindependent accidentconditions.

Thelargestreactivity increaseoccursforaccidentally placinganewfuelassemblyintoaRegion2storagecellwithallothercellsfullyloadedwithfuelofthehighestpermissible reactivity.

Underthiscondition, thepresenceofapproximately 500ppmsolubleboronassuresthattheinfinitemultiplication factorwouldnotexceedthedesignbasisreactivity forRegion2.Withthenormalconcentration ofsolublepoisonpresent(1720ppmboron),k~islessthan0.80andthestoragerackswouldnotbecriticalevenifRegion2weretobefullyloadedwithfreshfuelof4.5Xenrichment.

Thisconcentration ofsolubleboronalsoprecludes thepossibility ofexceeding thecriticality limitintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.

SeeSection5.3fordiscussions onAccidentEvaluations.

3.1.3Calculation Methods3t103+]Criticality AnalysisforRegion13.1.3.1.1 NominalDesignCaseUndernormalconditions, withnominaldimensions, thekmvaluescalculated bythreedifferent methodsofanalysisareasfollows:AnalticalMethodBias-corrected k~CASMO-2E0.9313+0.0018AMPX-KENO (27-gpSCALE)0.9210+0.0084Diffusion/blackness 0.9313theoryMaximumk~(95X/95X) 0.93310.92940.9313TheAMPX-KENO calculations includeaone-sided tolerance factor(13)corresponding to95Xprobability ata95Xconfidence'limit..

Forthenominaldesigncase,theCASMO-2Ecalculation yieldsthehighestreactivity and,therefore, theindependent verification calculations substantiate CASMO-2Eastheprimarycalculational method.*Doublecontingency principle ofANSIN16.1-1975, asspecified intheApril4,1978NRCletter(Section1.2)andimpliedintheproposedrevision(draft)toReg.Guide1.13(Section1.4,AppendixA)~3-20076L/0011L 3.1.3.1.2 BoronLoadingVariation TheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedinRegion1storagecellsarenominally 0.075inchthick,withaB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm.Independent 2manufacturin~

tolerance limitsare+0.007inchinthickness and+0.009g/cminB-10content.Thisassurestha)atanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration (0.1158gramB-10/cm)andminimumBoraflexthickness (0.068inch)maycoincide, theboron-lO,areal densitywillnotbelessthan0.020g/cm.Differential CASMO-2Ecalculations indicatethatthesetolerance limitsresultinreactivity uncertainty of+0.0021Akforboroncontentand+0.00445kforBoraflexthickness variations.

3.1.3.1.3 StorageCellLatticePitchVariation Thedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassemblies inRegion1is10.12inches.Adecreaseinstoragecelllatticespacingmayormaynotincreasereactivity depending uponotherdimensional changesthatmaybeassociated withthedecreaseinlatticespacing.Increasing thewaterthickness betweenthefuelandtheinnerstainless steelboxresultsinasmallincreaseinreactivity.

Thereactivity effectoftheflux-trap waterthickness, however,ismoresignificant, anddecreasing theflux-trap waterthickness increases reactivity.

Bothoftheseeffectshavebeenevaluated forindependent designtolerances.

Theinnerstainless steelboxdimension, 8.650+0.032inches,definestheinnerwaterthickness betweenthefuelandtheinsidebox.Forthetolerance limit,theuncertainty inreactivity is+0.00115kasdetermined bydifferential CASMO-2Ecalculations, withk~increasing astheinnerstainless steelboxdimension (andderivative latticespacing)increases.

Thedesignflux-trap water.thickness is1.120+0.040inches,whichresultsinanuncertainty of+0.0043Qkduetothetolerance influx-trap waterthickness, assumingthewaterthickness issimultaneously reducedonallfoursides.Sincethemanufacturing tolerances oneachofthefoursidesarestatistically independent, thenactualreactivity uncertainties wouldbelessthan+0.0043,althoughthemoreconservative valuehasbeenusedinthecriticality evaluation.

3.1.3.1.4 BoraflexWidthTolerance Variation Thereference storagecelldesignforRegion1(Figure3-2)usesaBoraflexbladewidthof7.50+0.0625inches.Apositiveincrement inreactivity occursforadecreaseinBoraflexabsorberwidth.Forareduction inwidthofthemaximumtolerance, 0.0625inch,thecalculated positivereactivity increment is+0.00175k.3.1.3.1.5 Stainless SteelThickness Tolerances Thenominalstainless steelthickness inRegion1is0.080+0.005inchfortheinnerstainless steelboxand0.020+0.003inchfortheBoraflexcoverplate.

Themaximumpositivereactivity effectoftheexpectedstainless steelthickness tolerance variations, statistically

combined, wascalculated (CASMO-2E) tobe+0.00105k.3-30076L/0011L k't'A'yc,ICl'pp<,"-.qduTIgyIN4stIl~Jk~1%.

3.1.3.1.6FuelEnrichment andDensityVariation Thedesignmaximumenrichment is4.50+0.05wtXU-235.Calculations ofthesensitivity tosmallenrichment variations byCASMO-2Eyieldedacoefficient of0.00545kper0.1wtXU-235atthedesignenrichment.

Foratolerance onU-235enrichment of+0.05inwtX,theuncertainty onkcois+0.00275k.Calculations werealsomadewiththeU02fueldensityincreased tothemaximumexpectedvalueof10.811g/cm3(smeareddensity).

Forthereference designcalculations, theuncertainty inreactivity is+0.00055koverthemaximumexpectedrangeofU02densities.

3.1.3.1.7 FuelPinPitchNormally, thefuelpinsinthelatticearearrangedona0.577inchlatticespacing.Forthemaximumexpectedtolerance of+0.0023inch,thecalculated uncertainty is+0.00245k.3.1.3.1.8 Eccentric Positioning ofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackTheFuelAssemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculations werealsomadewiththefuelassemblies assumedtobethecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assembly clusteratclosestapproach).

Thesecalculations indicated thatthereactivity increases veryslightly, asdetermined bydifferential PD$07calculations withdiffusion coefficients" generated byNULIFandablackness theoryroutine.Thisuncertainty isincludedintheevaluation ofthehighestpossiblereactivity oftheRegion1storagecells.3.1.3.1.9 SummaryofRegion1Cri.ticality ResultsTable3-1demonstrates thattheCASMO-2Ecalculated resultsforRegion1storingfreshfuelat4.50w/oU-235enrichment pluscalculational biasanduncertainties exhibitamaximumk~of0.9409whichallowsamarginof0.0091Qkbelowthelimitingeffective multiplication factorof0.95.3.1.3.2Criticality AnalysisforRegion23.1.3.2.1 NominalDesignCaseTheprincipal methodofanalysisinRegion2wastheCASMO-2Ecode,usingtherestartoptioninCASMOtotransferfuelofaspecified burnupintothestoragerackconfiguration atareference temperature of4oC(maximummoderator density).

Calculations weremadeforfuelofseveraldifferent initialenrichments and,ateachenrichment, alimitingkmvaluewasestablished whichincludedanadditional factorforuncertainty intheburnupanalysisandfortheaxialburnupdistribution.

TherestartCASMO-2Ecalculations (cold,clean,rackgeometry) weretheninterpolated todefinetheburnupvalueyieldingthelimitingka>valueforeachenrichment, asindicated inTable3-4.Theseconverged burnupvaluesdefinetheboundaryoftheacceptable domainshowninFigure3-1.*Thiscalculational approachwasnecessary sincethereactivity effectsaretoosmalltobecalculated byKENO,andCASMO-2Egeometryisnotreadilyamenabletoeccentric positioning ofafuelassembly.

3-40076L/0011L I'if'Itcl4fQ10f Ataburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,thesensitivity toburnupiscalculated tobe-0.00746kperMwd/kgU.Duringlong-term storage,thekcvaluesoftheRegion2fuelrackwilldecreasecontinuously fromdecayofPu-241,asindicated inSection3.1.3.3.4.

Twoindependent calculational methodswereusedtoprovideadditional confidence inthereference Region2criticality analyses.

Fuelof1.69Kinitialenrichment (approximately equivalent tothereference rackdesignforburnedfuel)wasanalyzedbyAMPX-KENO (27-group SCALEcross-section library)andbytheCASMO-2EmodelusedfortheRegion2rackanalysis.

Forthiscase,theCASMO-2Ek~(0.9304)waswithinthestatistical uncertainty ofthebias-corrected value(0.9347+0.0064)(95K/95X) obtainedintheAMPX-KENO calculations.

Thisagreement confirmsthevalidityoftheprimaryCASMO-2Ecalculations.

Thesecondindependent methodofanalysisusedwastheNULIFcodeforburnupanalysis, andforgenerating diffusion theoryconstants (cold,clean)forthecomposition at36.5Mwd/kgUwithfuelof4.5Xinitialenrichment.

Theseconstants, togetherwithblackness theoryconstants fortheBoraflexabsorber, werethenusedinatwo-dimensional PD$07calculation forthestoragerackconfiguration.

Theresultofthiscalculation (keof0.8959)wassomewhatlowerthanthecorresponding CASMO-2Ecalculation forthesameconditions (kaof0.9114)andthusalsotendstoconfirmthevalidityoftheprimarycalculational method.3.1.3.2.2 BoronLoadingVariation TheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedintheRegion2storagecellsarenominally 0.031inchthickwithaB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm2.Independent manufacturing limitsare+0.007inchinthickness and+0.009g/cm3inB-10content.Thisassuresthatatanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration (0.1158gB-10/cm)andtheminimumBoraflexthickness (0.024inch)maycoincide, theboron-10arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.007g/cm.2Differential CASMO-2Ecalculations indicatethatthesetolerance limitsresultinanincremental reactivity uncertainty of+0.0036Qkforboroncontentand+0.0111QkforBoraflexthickness.

3.1.3.2.3 BoraflexWidthTolerance Thereference storagecelldesignforRegion2(Figure3-3)usesaBoraflexabsorberwidthof7.25+0.0625inches.Forareduction inwidthofthemaximumtolerance, thecalculated positivereactivity increment is0.0011Qk.3.1.3.2.4 StorageCellLatticePitchVariations Thedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassemblies inRegion2is8.86+0.04inches,corresponding toanuncertainty inreactivity of0.00165k.3.1.3.2.5 Stainless SteelThickness Tolerance Thenominalthickness ofthestainless steelboxwallis0.080inchwithatolerance limitof+0.005inch,resulting inanuncertainty inreactivity of+0.00025k.3-50076L/0011L

".4l~lipv>$'lyt 3.1.3.2.6 FuelEnrichment, DensityandPinPitchVariation Uncertainties inreactivity duetotolerances onfuelenrichment, UO2density,andpinpitchinRegion2areassumedtobethesameasthosedetermined forRegionl.3.1.3.2.7 Eccentric Positioning ofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackThefuelassemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculations werealsomadewiththefuelassemblies assumedtobeinthecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assembly clusteratclosestapproach).

Thesecalculations indicated thatthereactivity decreases veryslightly, asdetermined byPDQ07calculations withdiffusion coefficients generated byNULIFandablackness theoryroutine.Thehighestreactivity therefore corresponds tothereference designwiththefuelassemblies positioned inthecenterofthestoragecells.3.1.3.3Analytical Methodology 3.1.3.3.1 Reference Analytical MethodsandBiasTheCASMO-2Ecomputercode',atwo-dimensional multigroup transport theorycodeforfuelassemblies, hasbeenbenchmarked andisusedbothasaprimarymethodofanalysis, andasameansofevaluating smallreactivity increments associated withmanufacturing tolerance.

CASMO-2Ebenchmarking resultedinacalculational biasof0.0013+0.0018(95X/95X).

Infuelrackanalyses, forindependent verification, criticality analysesofthehighdensityspentfue)stgagerackswerealsoperformed withtheAHPE-[computerpackage'usingthe27-groupSCALEcross-section libran)withtheNITAWLsubroutine forU23Sresonance shielding effects(Nordheim integraltreatment).

Benchmark calculations resultedinabiasof0.0106+0.0048(95X/95X)

~Inthegeometric modelusedinKENO,eachfuelrodanditscladdingweredescribed explicitly.

InRegion1calculations, areflecting boundarycondition (zeroneutroncurrent)wasusedintheaxialdirection andatthecenterline ofthewatergapbetweenstoragecells.Theseboundaryconditions havetheeffectofcreatinganinfinitearrayofstoragecellsinalldirections.

InRegion2,thezerocurrentboundarycondition wasappliedatthecenteroftheBoraflexabsorbersheetsbetweenstoragecells.TheAMPX-KENO MonteCarlocalculations inherently includeastatistical uncertainty duetotherandomnatureofneutrontracking.

Tominimizethestatistical uncertainty oftheKENO-calculated reactivity, atotalof50,000neutronhistories isnormallyaccumulated foreachcalculation, in100generations of500neutronseach.*SCALEisanacronymforStandardized ComputerAnalysisforLicensing Evaluation, astandardcross-section setdeveloped byORNLfortheUSNRC.3-60076L/0011L Kr(

CASMO"2Eisalsousedforburnupcalculations, withindependent verification byEPRI-CELL andNULIFcalculations.

Intrackinglong-term (30-year) reactivity effectsofspentfuelstoredinRegion2ofthefuelstoragerack,EPRI-CELL calculations indicateacontinuous reduction inreactivity withtime(afterXedecay)dueprimarily toPu-241decayandAm-241growth.Athirdindependent methodofcriticality

analysis, utilizing diffusion/blackness theory,wasalsousedforadditional confidence inresultsoftheprimarycalculational methods,althoughnorelianceforcriticality safetyisplacedonthereactivity valuefromthediffusion/blackness theorytechnique.

Thistechnique, however,isusedforauxiliary calculations ofthesmallincremental reactivity effectofeccentric fuelpositioning thatwouldotherwise belostinnormalKENOstatistical variations, orwouldbeinconsistent withCASMO-2Egeometrylimitations.

Crosssectionsforthediffusion/blackness theorycalculations werederivedfromtheNULIFcomputercode),supplemented byablackness theoryroutinethateffectively imposesatransport theoryboundarycondition atthesurfaceoftheBoraflexneutronabsorber.

Twodifferent spatialdiffusion theorycodes,PDQ07(intwodimensions andSNEID*inonedimension, wereusedtocalculate reactivities.

3.1.3.3.2 FuelBurnupCalculations Fuelburnupcalculations i'nthehotoperating condition wereperformed primarily withtheCASMO"2Ecode.However,toenhancethecredibility oftheburnupcalculations, theCASMO-2Eresultswereindependently checkedbycalculations withtheNULIFcode(7)andwithEPRI-CELL(9).

Figure3-4comparesresultsoftheseindependent methodsofburnupanalysisunderhotreactoroperating conditions.

TheresultsagreewiththeCASMOcalculation within0.00546kinthehotoperating condition.

Anarchivecalculation withtheCHEETAH-P codeisalsopresented inFigure3-4foradditional confidence.

Similarcomparisons wereobtainedinburnupcalculations forotherinitialenrichments, asindicated inFigure3-4.Inadditiontodepletion calculations underhotoperating conditions, reactivity comparisons underconditions morerepresentative offueltobestoredintheracks(cold,xenon-free) arealsosignificant instoragerackcriticality analyses.

Table3-5comparesthecold,xenon"free reactivities calculated byCASM0-2E, EPRI-CELL, anddiffusion/blackness theory.Intherackundercoldconditions, theCASMO-2Ecalculations gaveaslightlyhigherreactivity valuefortheRegion2fuelstoragecell,andthegoodagreement generally observedlendscredibility tothecalculations.

  • SNEIDisaone-dimensional diffusion theoryroutinedeveloped byBlack&Veatchandverifiedbycomparison withPDQ07one-dimensional calculations.

3-70076L/0011L iIPIgI~Cl4s41kIQI~'I'IIII'JII/11~'FIII~,I~$1YIt4I Nodefinitive methodexistsfordetermining theuncertainty inburnup-dependent reactivity calculations.

Allofthecodesdiscussed abovehavebeenusedtoaccurately followreactivity lossratesino~e~atina reactors.

CASMO-2Ehasbeenextensively benchmarked(1>>

yagainst1230cold,clean,criticalexperiments (including plutonium-bearing fuel),MonteCarlocalculations, reactoroperations, andhyavy-element concentration inirradiated fuel.Inparticular, theanalyses<10>

ofllcriticalexperiments withplutonium-bearing fuelgaveanaveragekeffof1.002+0.011(95X/95X),

showingadequatetreatment oftheplutonium nuclides.

Inaddition, Johansson(11) hasobtainedverygoodagreement incalculations ofclose-packed, high-plutonium-content, experimental configurations.

Sincecritical-experiment datawithspentfuelisnotavailable, itisnecessary toassignanuncertainty inreactivity basedonotherconsiderations, supported bythecloseagreement betweendifferent calculational methodsandthegeneralindustryexperience inpredicting reactivity lossratesinoperating plants.Overaconsiderable portionoftheburnup,thereactivity lossrateinPMRsisapproximately 0.01AkforeachMwd/kgUburnup,becomingsomewhatsmalleratthehigherburnups.Byconservatively assuminganuncertainty inreactivity of0.0005timestheburnupinMwd/kgU,aburnup-dependent uncertainty isdefinedthatincreases withincreasing fuelburnup,aswouldbereasonably expected.

Thisassumption providesanestimateoftheburnupuncertainty thatismoreconservative andboundsestimates frequently employedinotherfuelracklicensing applications (i.e.,5Xofthetotalreactivity decrement).

Atthedesignbasisburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,theestimateofburnupuncertainty is0.0183Ak;Table3-6summarizes resultsoftheburnupanalysesandestimated uncertainties atotherburnups.Theseuncertainties areappreciably larger,ingeneral,thanwouldbe'suggested bytheindustryexperience inpredicting reactivity lossratesandboronlet-downcurvesovermanycyclesinoperating plants.Theincreasing levelofconservatism atthehigherfuelburnupsprovidesanadequatemarginintheuncertainty estimatetoaccommodate thepossibleexistence ofasmallpositivereactivity increment fromtheaxialdistribution inburnup(seeSection3.1.3.3.3).

Inaddition, althoughtheburnupuncertainty maybeeitherpositiveornegative, itistreatedasanadditivetermratherthanbeingcombinedstatistically withotheruncertainties.

Thus,theallowance foruncertainty inburnupcalculations isconsidered tobeaconservative

estimate, particularly inviewofthesubstantial reactivity decreasewithagedfuel,asdiscussed inSection3.1.3.3.4.
  • Onlythatportionoftheuncertainty duetoburnup.'ther uncertainties areaccounted forelsewhere.

3-80076L/0011L S$kQt'+1qZil, 3.1.3.3.3 EffectofAxialBurnupDistribution Initially, fuelloadedintothereactorwillburnwithaslightlyskewedcosinepowerdistribution.

Asburnupprogresses, theburnupdistribution willtendtoflatten,becomingmorehighlyburnedinthecentralregionsthanintheupperandlowerends.ThiseffectmaybeclearlyseeninthecurvescompiledinReference 12.Athighburnup,themorereactivefuelneartheendsofthefuelassembly(lessthanaverageburned)occursinregionsoflowerreactivity worthduetoneutronleakage.Consequently, itisexpectedthatdistributed-burnup fuelassemblies wouldexhibitaslightlylowerreactivity thanthatcalculated fortheaverageburnup.Asburnupprogresses, thedistribution, tosomeextent,tendstobeself-regulating ascontrolled bytheaxialpowerdistribution, precluding theexistence oflargeregionsofsignificantly reducedburnup.Anumberofone-dimensional diffusion theoryanalyseshavebeenmadebaseduponcalculated andmeasuredaxialburnupdistributions.

Theseanalysesconfirmtheminor,andgenerally

negative, reactivity effectoftheaxiallydistributed burnup.Thetrendsobserved, however,suggestthepossibility ofasmallpositivereactivity effectatthehighburnupvalues(estimated tobeasmuchas0.0066kat36.5Mwd/kgU);

buttheuncertainty inkcduetoburnup,assignedatthehigherburnups(Section3.1.3.3.2),

isadequately conservative toencompass thepotential forasmallpositivereactivity effectofaxialburnupdistributions.

Furthermore, reactivity significantly decreases withtimeinstorage(Section3.1.3.3.4),

and,inaddition, "thereisafurthermargininreactivity

()0.0066k)sincethemaximumcalculated value(0.9435)isbelowthelimitingkegpvalue(0.95).Thesefactorswouldaccommodate anyreasonable reactivity eZKectsthatmightbelargerthanexpected.

3.1.3.3.4 Long-term DecaySincethefuelracksinRegion2areintendedtocontainspentfuelforlongperiodsoftime,calculations weremadeusingEPRI-CELL (whichincorporates theCINDERcode)tofollowthelong-term changesinreactivity ofspentfuelovera30-yearperiod.CINDERtracksthedecayandburnupdependence ofsome179fissionproducts.

Earlyinthedecayperiod,xenongrowsfromiodinedecay(reducing reactivity) andsubsequently decays,withthereactivity reachingamaximumat100-200hours.ThedecayofPu-241(13"yearhalf-life) andgrowthofAm-241substantially reducereactivity duringlongtermstorage,asindicated inTable3-7.Thereference designcriticality calculations donottakecreditforthislong-term reduction inreactivity, otherthantoindicateanincreasing subcriticality margininRegion2ofthespentfuelstoragepool.3.1.4RackModification Thedesignbasisfuelassembly, illustrated inFigure3-2,isa14x14arrayoffuelrodswith20rodsreplacedby5controlrodguidetubes.Table3-8summarizes thedesignspecifications andtheexpectedrangeofsignificant variations.

Independent calculations, withotherpotential fuelassemblyspecifications, confirmed thatthe14x14CEdesignexhibited thehighestreactivity andwastherefore usedasthedesignbasis.3-90076L/0011L t$th4iI'I4jll~~g~li 3.1.4.1Region1StorageCellsThenominalspentfuelstoragecellusedforthecriticality analysesofRegion1storagecellsisshowninFigure3-2.TherackiscomposedofBoraflexabsorbermaterialsandwiched betweenan8.65-inchI.D.,0.080-inchthickinnerstainless steelbox,anda0.020-inch outerstainless steelcoverplate.

Thefuelassemblies arecentrally locatedineachstoragecellonanominallatticespacingof10.120+0.05inches.Stainless steelgapchannelsconnectonestoragecellboxtoanotherinarigidstructure anddefineanouterwaterspacebetweenboxes.Thisouterwaterspaceconstitutes aflux-trap betweenthetwoBoraflexabsorbersheetsthatareessentially opaque(black)tothermalneutrons.

TheBoraflexabsorberhasathickness of0.075+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm2.3.1.4.2Region2StorageCellsRegion2storagecellsweredesignedforfuelof4.5wtXU-235initialenrichment burnedto36.5Mwd/kgU.Inthisregion,thestoragecellsarecomposedofasingleBoraflexabsorbersandwiched betweenthe0.080-inch stainless steelwallsofadjacentstoragecells.Thesecells,showninFigure3-3,arelocatedonalatticespacingof8.86+0.040inches.TheBoraflexabsorberhasathickness of0.031+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm.3.1.5Acceptance CriteriaforCriticalit Criticality isprecluded byspacingofthefuelassemblies, whichensuresthatasubcritical arrayofkefflessthanorequalto0.95ismaintained, assumingunborated poolwater.Thepool,however,willalwayscontainboricacidattherefueling concentration of1720ppmwheneverthereisirradiated fuelinthepool.Theneutronmultiplication factorinspentfuelpoolsshallbelessthanorequalto0.95,including alluncertainties, underallconditions.

Calculated maximumreactivity uncertainties forfuelstoredintheracksarepresented inTable3-1.Methodsofinitialandlong-term verification ofpoisonmaterialstability andmechanical integrity arediscussed inSection4.8.3.2DECAYHEATCALCULATIONS FORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(BULK)3.2.1SentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesignFornormalrefueling discharge conditions, onefuelpoolpumpandthefuelpoolheatexchanger areinservice.Duringabnormalrefueling conditions, suchasfullcoredischarge, twofuelpoolpumpsandtheheatexchanger areinservice.Thesystemismanuallycontrolled andtheoperation monitored locally,exceptasfollows.Apressureswitchonthefuelpoolpumpdischarge headerannunciates lowheaderpressureinthecontrolroom.Thefuelpoolhightemperature alarmandlowlevelalarmsareannunciated inthecontrolroom.Intheeventthefuelpoolpumpbreakersareopened,analarmisannunciated inthecontrolroom.Thecomponent coolingwaterflowtothefuelpoolheatexchanger isinitially ad)ustedtotherequiredflow.Furtheradjustments ofthecomponent coolingwaterarenotrequired.

Thecomponent coolingwaterdischarge linehasaflowindicator.

Highandlowcomponent coolingwaterflowalarmsareannunciated inthecontrolroom.3-100076L/0011L t'~yCP7'tr, Theclarityandpurityofthewaterinthefuelpoolismaintained bythepurification portionofthefuelpoolsystem.Thepurification loopconsistsofthefuelpoolpurification pump,ionexchanger, filter,strainers andsurfaceskimmers.

Mostofthepurification flowisdrawnthroughthesurfaceskimmerstoremovesurfacedebris.Abasketstrainerisprovidedinthepurification linetothepumpsuctiontoremoveanyrelatively largeparticulate matter.Thefuelpoolwateriscirculated bythepumpthroughafilter,whichremovesparticulates largerthan5micronsize,andthroughanionexchanger toremoveionicmaterial.

Connections areprovidedforpurification oftherefueling watertankandrefueling watercavity.Fuelpoolwaterchemistry isgiveninFSARTable9.1-2.Thefuelpoolpipingisarrangedsothatthepoolcannotbeinadvertently drainedtouncoverthefuelintheeventofasupplyordischarge piperupture.Allfuelpoolpipingisarrangedtopreventgravitydrainingthefuelpool.Topreventsiphoning ofthefuelpool,thefuelpooldischarge andpurification suctionlineshave1/2"and1/4"holesrespectively 1footbelowthenormalwaterlevel.Theonlymeansofdrainingthepoolbelowthesesiphonbreakerholesisthroughanopenlineinthecoolingloopwhileoperating thepoolcoolingpumps.Insuchaneventthefuelpoolwaterlevelcanbereducedbyonly6feetsincethepumpsuctionconnection entersnearthetopofthepool.Theremaining waterintheSpentFuelPoolwillprovideadequateshielding andheatremovalcapabilities atthispoint.Thetemperature andlevelalarmswouldwarntheoperatorofsuchanevent.3.2.2DecaHeatAnalyses3.2.2.1BasisTheSt.LuciePlantUnit1reactorisratedat2700megawatts thermal(MWt).Thecorecontains217fuelassemblies.

Thus,theaverageoperating powerperfuelassembly, Po,is12.44MW.Thefueldischarge canbemadeinoneofthefollowing twomodes:Normalrefueling discharge Fullcoredischarge Tables3-9through3-11givetheparameters forbulkandlocalpooltemperature analyses.

3.2.2.2ModelDescription NUREG-0800 BranchTechnical PositionASB9-2,"Residual DecayEnergyForLightWaterReactorsForLongTermCooling"~

~~isutilizedtocomputetheheatdissipation requirements inthepool.03-110076L/0011L

'7<'nIglp'il0g~

Withthelongtermuncertainty factor,K,asspecified inSRP9.1.3(15)theoperating power,Po,istakenequaltotheratedpower,eventhoughthereactormaybeoperating atlessthanitsratedpowerduringmuchoftheexposureperiodforthebatchoffuelassemblies.

Thecomputations andresultsreportedherearebasedonthedischarge takingplacewhentheinventory offuelinthepoolwillbeatitsmaximumresulting inanupperboundonthedecayheatrate.Havingdetermined theheatdissipation rate,thenexttaskistoevaluatethetime-dependent temperature ofthepoolwater.Table3-9identifies theloadingcasesexamined.

Thisisaconservative representation ofactualandfutureexpecteddischarges suchasthosepresented inTable5-1.BULKTEMtreatsthegeneralized poolcoolingproblemshowninFigure3"5.Anumberofsimplifying assumptions aremadewhichrendertheanalysisconservative, including:

Theheatexchanger isassumedtohavemaximumfouling.Thus,thetemperature effectiveness, P,fortheheatexchanger utilizedintheanalysisisthelowestpostulated valuecalculated fromheatexchanger technical datasheets.Nocreditistakenfortheimprovement inthefilmcoefficients oftheheatexchanger astheoperating temperature risesduetomonotonic reduction inthewaterkinematic viscosity withtemperature rise.Thus,thefilmcoefficient usedinthecomputations arelowerbounds.Nocreditistakenforheatlossbyevaporation ofthepoolwater.Nocreditistakenforheatlosstopoolwallsandpoolfloorslab.Thebasicenergyconservation relationship forthepoolheatexchanger systemyields:Ql-Q2dtdTwhere'.ctThermalcapacityofstoredwaterinthepoolTemperature ofpoolwaterattime,7Heatgeneration rateduetostoredfuelassemblies inthepoolQ2Heatremovedinthefuelpoolheatexchanger Thisequationissolvedasaninitialvalueproblembynotingthatthecoolerheatremovalratemustequaltheheatgeneration ratefrompreviously discharged assemblies.

Hence,0076L/0011L 4~'d where:PCONS:Wcool':Heatgeneration ratefrompreviously storedassemblies CoolantthermalflowrateTemperature effectiveness ofthefuelpoolcoolerTinCoincident poolwatertemperature (initialvaluebeforebeginning ofdischarge)

Coolantinlettemperature TheaboveequationyieldsTinPCONSWcoolP+tcoolThevalueofTincomputedfromtheaboveformulaistheinitialvalueofthepoolwatertemperature (atthestartoffueldischarge).

BULKTEMautomates thesolutionoftheaboveequationusingthetheorypresented inReference 16.Tabulated resultsarepresented inthenextsub-section.

3BulkPoolTemperature ResultseTable3-12givesthetotaldimensionless powergeneration ratioofallfuelassemblybatchespreviously storedinthepoolconsisting ofatotalof18batches.ThefirstcolumninTable3-12givesthebatchnumber,andthelastcolumngivesthedimensionless power,definedastheheatgeneration rateofthebatchdividedbythenominaloperating powerofonefuelassembly.

ItisnotedfromTable3-12thatthecumulative poweris0.14timestheoperating powerofonefuelassembly.

Tables3-13/3-14 and3-16/3-17 givethebulktemperature vs.timedata.The'ollowing keyoutputdataisgleanedfromthesetables:Maximumpoolbulktemperature:

Normaldischarge:

133.3FFullcoredischarge:

150.8oFTable3-14Table3-17Tables3-15and3-18givetime-to-boil data.Time-to-boil (ifcoolantflowislostuponcompletion ofdischarge andwhenthebulkpooltemperature ismaximum):

Normaldischarge condition:

13.43hoursTable3-15Fullcoredischarge condition:

5.04hoursTable3-183-130076L/0011L

'I"VI'l.gjll1kg'I 3.2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemSummaryThespentfueldecayheatcalculations wereperformed inaccordance withthemethodprovidedinNRCBranchTechnical PositionASB9-2ResidualDecayEnergyforLight-Water ReactorsforLong-Term Cooling(15~.

Theexistingspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisconsidered tobeadequate.

Thespentfuelpoolisdesignedtowithstand stressesassociated withasteady-state watertemperature of217oF.AsshowninTable3-17thepoolpeaktransient watertemperature afterfullcoredischarge islessthan151oF.Intheeventofacompletelossofcoolingcapability, thereissufficient timetoprovideanalternate meansforcooling.Thetotalincreaseinheatloadre)ectedtotheenvironment throughthecoolingsystemsduetotheincreased spentfuelstorageoverthecurrentheatloadrejectedis1.7x10Btu/hour.

Thisrepresents anincreaseofapproximately 0.03percentofthetotalheatrejectedtotheenvironment.

Theincreaseinheatrejectedwillhavenegligible impactontheenvironment.

Theincreaseinheatloaddoesnotalterinanywaytheexistingfacilitydesignbases.Thus,theheatloadincreaseisacceptable.

Thisdecayheatanalysisisalsoboundingforthetemporary fuelstorageconfiguration (seeSection4.7.4)thatwillbeutilizedduringrackinstallation.

3.2.2.4.1 SafetyEvaluation Thecalculations fortheamountofthermalenergythatmayhavetoberemovedbythespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemaremadeinaccordance withBranchTechnical PositionASB9-2(Reference 15).Theresulting bulkspentfuelpooltemperatures areacceptable.

3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeuThereareseveralsourcesoffreshwateronthesitethatareavailable tothefuelhandlingbuilding; namely,refueling waterstoragetank,citywaterstoragetankviathefiremain,citywaterstoragetanksviatheportablefirepump,andprimarywatertank.Theconcurrent lossofthesesourcesandthefuelpoolcoolingsystemisremote.Duetothefuelpool'sboil-offperiod,thereissufficient timetoobtainmakeup.ItshouldbenotedthataseismicCategoryIbackupsaltwatersupplyisavailable fromtheintakecoolingwaterintertie.

Astandpipe onthefuelhandlingbuildingisprovidedfromgradetotheoperating deckelevation andhoseconnections areprovidedatbothendsofthestandpipe.

Thus,viafirehose,thefuelpoolmakeupcanbereadilysuppliedbytheintakecoolingwaterpumps.Theheadprovidedbythesepumpsissufficient toprovidetherequiredfuelpoolmakeup.Thestructural andleaktight integrity ofthefuelpoolwillnotbecompromised bycontinuous fuelpooltemperatures ofupto217F.Theresultsofthebulkdecayheatanalysesindicatethatthesetemperatures arenotexceeded.

Theintakecoolingwatersystemconnection viathehoseconnections canprovide150gpmofmakeup.SeeFSARSubsection 9.1.3.4.3-140076L/0011L

\NI' 3.3THERMAL-HYDRAULIC ANALYSESFORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(LOCALIZED)

Thepurposeofthethermal-hydraulic analysesistodetermine themaximumfuelcladtemperatures whichmayoccurasaresultofusingthenewhighdensityspentfuelracksintheStLucieUnit1spentfuelpool.3.3.1BasesInordertodetermine anupperboundonthemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature, aseriesofconservative assumptions aremade.Themostimportant assumptions arelistedbelow:Asstatedabove,thefuelpoolwillcontainspentfuelwithvaryingtime-after-shutdown (7's).Sincetheheatemissionfallsoffrapidlywithincreasing Ts,itisobviously conservative toassumethatallfuelassemblies arefreshandtheyallhavehadthemaximumpostulated yearsofoperating timeinthereactor.Theheatemissionrateofeachfuelassemblyisassumedtobeequalandmaximum.AsshowninFigure2-1,themodulesoccupyanirregular floorspaceinthepool.Forthehydrothermal

analysis, acirclecircumscribing theactualrackfloorspaceisdrawn(Figure3-6).ItisfurtherassumedthatthecylinderwiththiscircleasitsbaseXspackedwithfuelassemblies atthenominallayoutpitch.Theactualdowncomer spacearoundtherackmodulegroupvaries,asshowninFigure2-1.Thenominaldowncomer gapavailable inthepoolisassumedtobethetotalgapavailable aroundtheidealized cylindrical rack;thus,themaximumresistance todownwardflowisincorporated intotheanalysis(Figure3-7).Nodowncomer flowisassumedtoexistbetweentherackmodules.3.3.2ModelDescritionUsingthebasesdescribed above,aconservative idealized modelfortherackassemblage isobtained.

'hewaterflowisaxisymmetric abouttheverticalaxisofthecircularrackassemblage and,thus,theflowistwo-dimensional (axisymmetric three-dimensional).

Figure3-7showsatypical"flowchimney"rendering ofthethermalhydraulics model.Thegoverning equationtocharacterize theflowfieldinthepoolisanintegralequationthatcanbesolvedforthelowerplenumvelocityfield(intheradialdirection

)andaxialvelocity(in-cellvelocityfield),byusingthemethodofcollocation.

Itshouldbeaddedthatthehydrodynamic losscoefficients whichenterintothefovyulytion oftheintegralequationarealsotakenfromwellmecognized sources<17>

andwhereverdiscrepancies inreportedvaluesexist,theconservative valuesareconsistently used.Reference 18givesthedetailsofmathematical analysisusedinthissolutionprocess..

3-150076L/0011L

~ll$lg' Aftertheaxialvelocityfieldisevaluated, thefuelassemblycladdingtemperature canbecalculated.

Theknowledge oftheoverallflowfieldenablespinpointing ofthestoragelocationwiththeminimumaxialflow(i.e.,maximumwateroutlettemperatures).

Thisiscalledthemost"choked"location.

Inordertofindanupperboundonthetemperature inatypicalcell,itisassumedthatitislocatedatthemostchokedlocation.

Knowingtheglobalplenumvelocityfield,therevisedaxialflowthroughthischokedcellcanbecalculated bysolvingtheBernoulli equationfortheflowcircuitthroughthiscell.Thus,anabsoluteupperboundonthewaterexittemperature andmaximumfuelcladdingtemperature isobtained.

Inviewoftheaforementioned assumptions, thetemperatures calculated inthismanneroverestimate thetemperature risethatwillactuallyoccurinthepool.THERPOOL, basedonthetheoryofReference 18,automates thiscalculation.

Finally,themaximumspecificpowerofafuelarrayqAcanbegivenby:where:qFxyqaveragefuelassemblyspecificpowerFxyradialpeakingfactorThedataonradialandaxialpeakingfactorsmaybefoundinTable3-10.Themaximumtemperature riseofpoolwaterinthemostdisadvantageously placedfuelassemblyiscomputedforallloadingcases.Table3-19,thirdcolumn,givestheoutputsfromTHERPOOLintabularform.3.3.3.CladdingTemperature

~~~Havingdetermined themaximumlocalwatertemperature inthepool,itisnowpossibletodetermine themaximumfuelcladdingtemperature.

AfuelrodcanproduceFoottimestheaverageheatemissionrateoverasmalllength,whereTtistfietotalpeakingfactor.Theaxialheatdissipation inarodisknowntoreachamaximuminthecentralregion,andtaperoffatitstwoextremities.

Foraddedconservatism, itisassumedthatthepeakheatemissionoccursatthetopwherethelocalwatertemperature alsoreachesitsmaximum.Futhermore, nocreditistakenforaxialconduction ofheatalongtherod.Thehighlyconservative modelthusconstructed leadstosimplealgebraic equations whichdirectlygivethemaximumlocalcladdingtemperature, tc.Table3-19,fourthcolumn,summarizes thekeyoutputdata.Itisfoundthatthemaximumvalueofthelocalwatertemperature iswellbelowthenucleateboilingcondition value.Theincremental claddingtemperature istoosmalltoproducesignificant thermalstresses.

3.4POTENTIAL FUELANDRACKHANDLINGACCIDENTS Themethodformovingtheracksintoandoutofthespentfuelpoolisbrieflydiscussed inSection4.7.4.2.Themethodsutilizedensurethatpostulated accidents donotresultinalossofcoolingtoeitherthespentfuelpoolorthereactor,orresultinakeffinthespentfuelpoolexceeding 0.95.3-160076L/0011L

~~

3.4.1RackModuleMishandlin Thepotential formishandling ofrackmodulesduringthererackoperation hasbeenevaluated.

Atnotimewillthecaskhandlingcraneorthetemporary construction cranecarryarackmoduledirectlyoverarackcontaining spentfuel.Theprocedures andadministrative controlsgoverning thererackoperation willensurethesafehandlingofrackmodules.Boththetemporary construction craneandthecaskhandlingcranemeetthedesignandoperational requirements ofSectionP.l.lofNUREG-0612, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"<19'n theunlikelyeventthatarackshouldstrikethesideofanotherrackmodulecontaining fuelassemblies, theconsequences ofthispostulated accidentwouldbeboundedbythecaskdropevaluations described inSection5.3.1.2.3.4.2Temporary Construction CraneDroDuringthererackoperation, atemporary construction cranewillbeinstalled intheFuelHandlingBuilding.

Thisinstallation willbeperformed usingliftrigswhichmeetthedesignandoperational requirements ofNUREG-0612, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."Theconsequences ofapostulated accidentduringthisinstallation areboundedbythecaskdropevaluations described inSection5.3.1.2.3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDro)Duringthere-racking operation, itwillbenecessary toraiseandmaneuvertheoldracksoutofthespentfuelpoolinordertoinstallthenewspentfuelracks(SeeSection4.7.4).Thehandlingoftheseheavyloadswillbeaccomplished bytheuseofatemporary construction craneandthecaskhandlingcrane.Bothofthesecranesmeetthedesignandoperational requirements ofSection5.1.1ofNUREG-0612, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."Theconsequences ofdroppingarackintheSpentFuelPoolweredetermined byreviewing theanalysisinFSARSubsection 9.1.4fordroppingofthespentfuelcask.Theresultsofthiscaskdropanalysisdemonstrated thatthepoolfloorwouldremainelasticduringimpactandthatcrackswouldnotdevelop.Thiscaskweighssubstantially morethanasinglerackassemblyandhasasmallercrosssectional areaforloaddistribution.

Therefore, therackdropscenarioisboundedbythepreviousanalysisforacaskdropscenario, andlossofspentfuelcoolingfromlossofpoolwaterinventory willnotoccurasaresultofarackdrop.3.5TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESThisproposedamendment permitsreplacement ofthespentfuelpoolrackstoensurethatsufficient capacityexistsforstorageofspentfuelatSt.LucieUnit1.Thenewracksincreasetheavailable storageto1706spentfuelassemblies andisexpectedtoprovideadequatestoragespaceuntiltheyear2009.3-170076L/0011L I'NI'i,Kl's>""II.VII't~lf1'IB1 TheproposedTechnical Specification changesaredescribed below:1.Specification 3/4.9.14Basesisrevisedtoreflecttheassumptions usedincalculations ofdosesbasedontheDecayTimes.2.Specification 5.6.1.a.lisrevisedtocorrespond tothe.StandardTechnical Specifications forCombustion Engineering Pressurized WaterReactors(NUREG-0212 Rev2).3.Specification 5.6.l.a.2isrevisedtoshowthenominalcenter-to-center distanceforthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.4.Specification 5.6.1.a.3 iseditedtodiscusstheboronconcentration only.5.Specification 5.6.1.a.4 iscreatedtoindicatethepresenceofBoraflexinthecells.6.Specification 5.6.1.bandaccompanying Figure5.6-1arecreatedtodefinethefuelenrichment/burnup limitsforstorageineachregionofthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.7.Specification 5.6.1ciseditorially changedfrom"b"to"c".8.Specification 5.6.3ischangedtoshowthecapacityofthehigh-capacityspentfuelstorageracks.

3.6REFERENCES

FORSECTION3~~~1.A.Ahlin,M.Edenius,H.Haggblom, "CASMO-AFuelAssemblyBurnupProgram,"

AE-RF-76-4158, Studsvikreport(proprietary).

2.A.AhlinandM.Edenius,"CASMO-AFastTransport TheoryDepletion CodeforLWRAnalysis,"

ANSTransactions, Vol.26,p.604,1977.3.M.Edeniusetal.,"CASMOBenchmark Report,"Studsvik/RF-78-6293, Aktiebolaget Atomenergi, March1978.4.Green,Lucious,Petrie,Ford,White,Wright,"PSR-63/AMPX-1 (codepackage),

AMPXModularCodeSystemforGenerating CoupledMultigroup Neutron-GammaLibraries fromENDF/B,"ORNL-TM-3706, OakRidgeNationalLaboratory, March1976.5.L.M.PetrieandN.F.Cross,"KENO-IV, AnImprovedMonteCarloCriticality Program,"

ORNL-4938, OakRidgeNationalLaboratory, November1975.6.R.,M.Westfalletal.,"SCALE:AModularCodeSystemforPerforming Standardized ComputerAnalysesforLicensing Evaluation,"

NUREG/CR-0200, 1979.3-180076L/0011L jI-lllp't~',hVgyII1't W.A.Wittkopf, "NULIF-NeutronSpectrumGenerator, Fe~roupConstantGenerator andFuelDepletion Code,"BAW-426,TheBabcock6WilcoxCompany,August1976.W.R.Cadwell,PD$07Reference Manual,WAPD-TM-678, BettisAtomicPowerLaboratory, January1967.W.J.Eich,"Advanced RecycleMethodology Program,CEM-3,"ElectricPowerResearchInstitute, 1976.E.E.Pilat,"MethodsfortheAnalysisofBoilingWaterReactors(LatticePhysics),"

YAEC-1232, YankeeAtomicElectricCo.,December1980.E.Johansson, "ReactorPhysicsCalculations onClose-Packed Pressurized WaterReactorLattices,"

NuclearTechnology, Vol.68,pp.263-268,February1985.H.Richings, SomeNotesonPWR(W)PowerDistribution Probabilities forLOCAProbabilistic

Analyses, NRCMemorandum toP.S.Check,datedJuly5J1977.M.G.Natrella, Experimental Statistics, NationalBureauofStandards, Handbook91,August1963.J.M.Canoetal.,"Supercriticality ThroughOptimumModeration inNuclearFuelStorage,"

NuclearTechnology, Vol.48,pp.251-260,May1980.NUREG-0800, U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, StandardReviewPlan,BranchTechnical PositionASB9-2,Rev.2,July1981.Singh,K.P.,JournalofHeatTransfer, Transactions oftheASME,August1981,Vol.1-3,"SomeFundamental Relationships forTubularHeatExchanger ThermalPerformance."

GeneralElectricCorporation, R&DDataBooks,"HeatTransferandFluidFlow,"1974andupdates.Singh,K.P.etal.,"MethodforComputing theMaximumWaterTemperature inaFuelPoolContaining SpentNuclearFuel,"HeatTransferEngineering, Vol.7,No.1-2,pp.72-82(1986).NuclearRegulatory Commission, "ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NUREG-0612, July1980.3-190076L/0011L

'~TI*("~t~Uf'f~~'I~If~'I4 TABLE3-1SUMMARYOFCRITICALITY SAFETYANALYSESRegion1Region2Minimumacceptable burnup84.5Xinitialenrichment Temperature assumedforanalysisReference k~(nominal)

Calculational biasUncertainties BiasB-10concentration Boraflexthickness BoraflexwidthInnerboxdimension Watergapthickness SSthickness Fuelenrichment FueldensityFuelelementpitchStatistical combination Eccentric assemblypositionAllowance forburnupuncertainty TotalMaximumreactivity (with1720ppmsolubleboron)4'c0.93130.0013+0.0018+0.0021+0.0044+0.0017+0.0011+0.0043+0.0010+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0080+0.0003N/A0.9329+0.00800.9409(0.767)36.5Mwd/kgU4'c0.91140.0013+0.0018+0.0036+0.0111+0.0011+0.0016H'/A+0.0002+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0125negative+0.01830.9310+0.01250.9435(0.760)(1)Squarerootofsumofsquares.N/A-NotApplicable 3-200076L/0011L

TABLE3-2MINIMUMBURNUPVALUESInitialEnrichment, XMinimumBurnup,Mwd/kgU1.631.752.002.252.502.753.003.253.503.754.004.254.5002.306.009.7012.9016.1019.1522.2025.1528.1030.9033.7036.503-210076L/0011L TABLE3-3REACTIVITY EFFECTSOFABNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONS Accident/Abnormal Conditions Reactivity EffectTemperature increaseVoid(boiling)

AssemblydroppedontopofrackLateralrackmodulemovementMisplacement ofafuelassemblyNegativeinbothregionsNegativeinbothregionsNegligible Negligible Positive0,3-220076L/0011L TABLE3-4FUELBURNUPVALUESFORREQUIREDREACTIVITIES (k~)WITHFUELOFVARIOUSINITIALENRICHMENTS (Reference kc0.9297)InitialEnrichment Uncertainty inBurnup,5kDesignLimitkcCalculated BurnuplimitMwd/kgU1.62.02.53.03.54.04.500.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.50(1)SeeSubsection 3.1.3.3.2 3-230076L/0011L TABLE3-5COMPARISON OFCOLD,CLEANREACTIVITIES CALCULATED AT36.5Mwd/kgUBURNUPAND4.5XENRICHMENT k~Xe-free,4CCalculational MethodInfiniteArray9fFuelAssemblies~

inReactorSpacingAssemblies inRegion2CellCASMO-2EDIFFUSION/BLACKNESS THEORYEPRI-CELL l.12121.13061.12810.91140.8972(1)Cold,cleancondition incontrasttohotoperating conditions ofFigure3-4.(2)EPRI-CELL k~atmaximumvalueduringlong-term (30-year) storage.3-240076L/0011L TABLE3-6ESTIMATED UNCERTAINTIES INREACTIVITY DUETOFUELDEPLETION EFFECTSInitialEnrichment DesignBurnupMwd/kgU0.0005TimesBurnup,5kDesignkcgReactivity Loss,6k<1.62.02.53.03.54.04.505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.5000.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911500.05790.12840.18280.22620.26200.2924(1)Totalreactivity

decrease, calculated forthecold,Xe-freecondition inthefuelstoragerack,fromthebeginning-of-life tothedesignburnup.3-250076L/0011L

~h~l TABLE3-7LONG-TERM CHANGESINREACTIVITY INSTORAGERACKStorageTime,years5kfromShutdown(Xenon-free) at4.5XEand36.5Mwd/kgU0.51.010.020.030.0-0.0047-0.0088-0.0470-0.0673-0.07883-260076L/0011L 0TABLE3-8DESIGNBASIS(LIMITING)

FUELASSEMBLYSPECIFICATIONS (CE14x14)FuelRodDataCladdingoutsidediameter, in.Claddingthickness, in.CladdingmaterialPelletdiameter, in.U02stackdensity,g/cmEnrichment, AXU-2350.4400.028Zircaloy-4 0.37710.281+0.0314.5+0.05FuelAssemblyDataMaximumnumberoffuelrodsFuelrodpitch,in.ControlrodguidetubeNumberOutsidediameter, in.Insidediameter, in.MaterialU-235Loadinggrams/axial cmofassembly176(14x14array)0.577+0.002351.1151.035Zircaloy-4 51.7+0.703-270076L/0011L TABLE3-9THERMAL/HYDRAULIC CASESTREATED*1.NormalBatchDischarge:

Irradiation time:54months(1.42x10sees)8Additionofthemostrecentbatch:150hoursaftershutdownBatchsize:80assemblies 2.PullCoreDischarge Irradiation time:73assemblies 90days72assemblies 21months72assemblies 39monthsFueltransferbegins7daysaftershutdown.

  • Thepoolhastotalstoragecapacityof1706storagecells.Itisconservatively assumedthat18batchesof80assemblies havebeenpreviously discharged at18monthintervals.

Eachassemblyinthesepreviousdischarges hashad54monthsofexposureatfullpower(12.44MWt).3-280076L/0011L TABLE3-10PEAKINGFACTORDATAFuelMaximumRadialPeakingFactorMaximumAxialPeakingFactorSt.LucieUnit1CE14x14andExxon14x141.671.32StLucieUnit2,CE16x16l.751.353-290076L/0011L V,rrJL~

TABLE3-11ESSENTIAL HEATTRANSFERDATAFORTHEFUELPOOLHEATEXCHANGER Numberofheatexchangers:

Coolantflowrate:Temperature effectiveness:

one3560gpm0.36{twopumps)*0.263{onepump)Heattransfersurfacearea:Overallheattransfercoefficient

{fouled){twopumps):43SOsq.ft.260Btu/sq.ft.-hr-oF

  • Temperature efficiency oftheheatexchanger iscalculated inthefollowing manner,usingtheinformation providedintheFSAR:PaCoolingwateroutlet-inletPoolwaterinlet-coolingwaterinlet118-100150-100.363-300076L/0011L t~'e TABLE3-12POWERGENERATION RATIOPREVIOUSLY DISCHARGED BATCHESBatchBatchNo.SizeTimeAfterShutReactorExposureNonDimensional DowninDaysTimeinDaysPowerGen.Ratio12345678910ll121317188080808080808080808080808080808080809719.99179.98639.98099.97559.97019.96479.95939.95399.94859.94319.93779.93239.92699.92159.91619.91079.9540.01643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.5.00487.00505.00523.00542.00562.00582.00603.00624.00647.00670.00694.00720.00746.00776~00815.00888.01097..01893CUMULATIVE DIMENSIONLESS POWER1.3374E-013-310076L/0011L TABLE3-13BULKPOOLTEMPERATURE VS.TIMEDURINGNORMALREFUELING DISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)150.00*151.00106.0108.8.5689E+07.1643E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischarge isassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously, simulated byonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-320076L/0011L

TABLE3-14POOLBULKTEMPERATURE VS.TIMESUBSEQUENT TOCOMPLETION OFNORMALREFUELING DISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)151.00161.00171.00181.00191.00201.00211.00221.00231.00241.00251.00261.00271.00281.00291.00301.00311.00321.00331.00341.00351.00361.00371.00381.00391.00108.8130.0133.2133.3133.0132.6132.2131.8131.5131.1130.8130.6130.3130.1129.8129.6129.4129.2129.0128.8128.6128.4128.3128.1127.9.1642E+08.1613E+08.1588E+08.1565E+08.1544E+08.1525E+08.1507E+08.1490E+08.1475E+08.1461E+08.1447E+08.1435E+08.1423E+08.1411E+08.1401E+08.1390E+08.1380E+08.1371E+08.1362E+08.1353E+08.1344E+08.1336E+081328E+08.1320E+08.1313E+083-330076L/0011L TABLE3-15LOSSOFCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETION OFNORMALREFUELING DISCHARGE CaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation (ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)

Whenheatgeneration ismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperature eiamaximum16.7913.4316933.016294.02.672.573-340076L/0011L k

TABLE3-16BUIXPOOLTEMPERATURE VSTIMEDURINGFULLCOREDISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)168.00*169.00113.6117.8.8690E+07.3371E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischarge isassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously, simulated byonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-350076L/0011L TABLE3-17POOLBULKTEMPERATURE VSTIMESUBSEQUENT TOCOMPLETION OFFULLCOREDISCHARGE Time(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGeneration Rate(Btu/hr)169.00179.00189.00199.00209.00219.00229.00239.00249.00259.00269.00279.00289.00299.00309.00319.00329.00339.00349.00359.00369.00379.00389.00399.00409.00117.8148.8150.8150.2149.4148.7148.1147.4146.9146.3145.8145.3144.8144.4144.0143.6143.2142.8142.5142.1141.8141.5141.1140.8140.5.3370E+08.3307E+08.3249E+08.3197E+08.3149E+08.3104E+08.3062E+08.3024E+08.2987E+08.2953E+08.2921E+08.2991E+08.2862E+08.2834E+08.2807E+08.2782E+08.2758E+08.2734E+08.2712E+08.2690E+08.2668E+08.2648E+08.2628E+08.2608e+08.2589E+083-360076L/0011L 11ti1II TABLE3-18LOSSOPCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETION OFPULLCOREDISCHARGE CaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation (ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)

Whenheatgeneration ismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperature ismaximum7.475.0434742.233660.05.475.33-370076L/0011L III TABLE3-19LOCALANDCLADDINGTEMPERATURE DATACaseInstantMaximumLocalMaximumWaterCladdingTemp.oFTemp.oFNormaldischarge Whenthepoolheatgeneration rateisatitspeakvalue155.9198.8Normaldischarge Fullcoredischarge Fullcoredischarge Whenthepoolbulktemperature isatitspeakvalueWhentheheatgeneration rateinthepoolisatthepeakvalueWhenthepoolbulktemperature isatitspeakvalue179.2162.8188.0219.4209.4222.803-380076L/0011L II 4030Uh4025DZ20,xu015ACCEPTABLE BURNUPDOMAINUNACCEPTABLE BURNUPDOMAIN1002.02.53.0,3.54.0INITIALENRICHMENT, WT%U-2354.5FLORIDAPOWER5LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1ACCEPTABI EBURNUPDOMAININREGION2OFTHEST.LUCIEPLANTSPENTFUELSTORAGERACKSFIGURE3-1 OO~OO0OO~~~~0~~~~~~~~~0~0~0~0~~~~~~~0~OO~0~0~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~OO~~00~~~~~~0~~~~0~~~OO~~0OOOOOl~~OO~eo~ee0~~~~e~~~~~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'

o~~~~~~~~~0~~~o~~~~~~~~~~o~~0~o~~oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~ocoo~e~oo~~o~~o%o~o0~~~~~~~~~o~o~oo~o~~0+0~~~~~~ohio~~~~o~~~~~~~~~~o~0~o~oo~o~~o~~o~~~0~~~~0~o~~o~oo~~e~o~~~o~oo0~~~~~oooo

1.40OrnOQCg->Ocnirzo~mcoz0lTiXOg~C~mmmezlmHO+llQ4zI0g7COr~CO0g~mmrQozIHGJC+~zOQz1.30C9R~1.200IOxLUIz;'I.10LLzhC1.000.900102.5%%dE152025FUELBURNUP,IVIWD/KGU 3.5%ECASNIO-2ENULIFEPRI-CELLCHEETAH-P, (COINCIDES WITH4.5%ECASNIO)304.5'YoE40 POOLATBULKTEMPERAlURE, t'COOLANTAT8)COOLANTAT02COOLANTAT0;COOLANTAT~NHXKg)O~orm~Itl~OCn+ZOrnftlo+mac'n~mCCmNPmIO>ommR4>rz~C)zC~K+0zCOOLER¹1COOLER¹2COOLER¹iCOOLERSNHX ASSUMEDADDEDFUELASSEMBLIES ACTUALOUTLINEOFPOOLACTUALOUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLIES RACKASSEMBLY++if+++++IDEALIZED OUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLY0mlVTl0AC0llmPcmr0th0C0OQmmQo~I~C)C+0+0IDEALIZED OUTLINEOFPOOLBOUNDARY

IZFUELBUNDLEXmTlA9xzm4lV0OII0ch0I0C0OQmmI~rR4C)gZ4o40z0XmaOI0ZnOC 4.0MECHANICAL,

MATERIAL, ANDSTRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 4.1DESCRIPTION OPSTRUCTURE 4.1.1DescritionoftheFuelHandlingBuildingTheFuelHandlingBuilding(FHB)consistsofcast-in-place reinforced concreteinteriorandexteriorwalls.Itiscompletely isolatedfromallotherstructures.

Thefloorsandroofareofbeamandgirderconstruction supported bycolumns.Acompletedescription ofthePHBisprovidedinSection3.8.1.1.2 oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.TheFHBgeneralarrangement isshownonFSARFigures1.2-18and1.2-19.ThePHBhasbeendesignedasaseismicClassIstructure inaccordance withthecriteriaoutlinedinSections3.8.1.1.2 and3.8.1.4through3.8.1.7oftheupdatedPSAR.Thebuildingexteriorwalls,floorsandinteriorpartitions aredesignedtoprovideplantpersonnel withthenecessary biological radiation shielding andprotecttheequipment insidefromtheeffectsofadverseenvironmental conditions including tornadoandhurricane winds,temperature, externalmissilesandflooding.

Thespentfuelpoolisacast-in-place steellinedreinforced concretetankstructure thatprovidesspaceforstorageofspentfuelassemblies, controlelementassemblies, newfuelduringinitialcoreloadingandaspentfuelshippingcask.ThefuelpoolportionofthePHBincluding thewallsandroofdirectlyabovethepoolisdesignedtowithstand, withoutpenetration, theimpactofhighvelocityexternalmissilesthatmightoccurduringthepassageofatornado.Thedesignmissilesarefurtherdiscussed inSection3.5oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.Thespentfuelhandlingsystemincludesinterlocks, travellimitsandotherprotective devicestominimizetheprobability ofeithermishandling orofequipment malfunction thatcouldresultininadvertent damagetoafuelassemblyandpotential fissionproductrelease.Theinterlocks preventmovementintothewallswhilelimitswitchespreventthespentfuelhandlingmachinefromraisingthefuelaboveaheightwhere,lessthanninefeetseparates thesurfaceofthewaterfromthetopoftheactivefuellength.Aleakdetection systemisprovidedinthespentfuelpooltomonitor100percentofthepoollinerplateweldseams.Thissystemconsistsofanetworkofstainless steelanglesattachedtotheoutsideofthepoollinerwallsandtheunderside ofthepoollinerfloorbymeansofweldsandsealedwithepoxymaterial.

Intheeventthatoneoftheweldseamsdevelopsaleak,theliquidentersthemonitorchannelsystemandflowstooneof19collection pointsatthebaseofthepool,fromwhichtheleakcanbetracedbacktoaspecificpoolarea.4.1.2Description ofSpentFuelRacksThefunctionofthespentfuelstorageracksistoprovideforstorageofspentfuelassemblies inafloodedpool,whilemaintaining aeoolablegeometry, preventing criticality, andprotecting thefuelassemblies fromexcessive mechanical orthermalloadings.

4-10077L/0011L 0eeo0~~1fl0l0~~

Alistofdesigncriteriaisgivenbelow:Theracksaredesignedinaccordance withtheNRC,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"

datedApril14,1978(asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979)andSRPSection3.8.4[1].2.Theracksaredesignedtomeetthenuclearrequirements ofANSIN210-1976.

Theeffective multiplication factor,kff,inthespentfuelpoolislessthanorequalto0.95,incfutiing alluncertainties andunderallcredibleconditions.

3~Theracksaredesignedtoallowcoolantflowsuchthatboilinginthewaterchannelsbetweenthefuelassemblies intherackdoesnotoccur.Maximumfuelcladdingtemperatures arecalculated forvariouspoolcoolingconditions asdescribed inSection3.3.4~TheracksaredesignedtoseismicCategoryIrequirements, andareclassified asANSSafetyClass3andASMECodeClass3Component SupportStructures.

Thestructural evaluation andseismicanalysesareperformed usingthespecified loadsandloadcombinations inSection4.4.Theracksaredesignedtowithstand loadswithoutviolating thecriticality acceptance criteriawhichmayresultfromfuelhandlingaccidents andfromthemaximumupliftforceofthespentfuelhandlingmachine.6.7~8.Eachstoragepositionintheracksisdesignedtosupportandguidethefuelassemblyinamannerthatwillminimizethepossibility ofapplication ofexcessive lateral,axialandbendingloadstofuelassemblies duringfuelassemblyhandlingandstorage.Theracksaredesignedtoprecludetheinsertion ofafuelassemblyinotherthandesignlocations withintherackarray.Thematerials usedinconstruction oftheracksarecompatible withthestoragepoolenvironment andwillnotcontaminate thefuelassemblies.

4.1.2.1DesignofSpentFuelRacks4.1.2.1.1 Region1Therackmoduleisfabricated fromASMESA-240-304L austenitic stainless steelsheetandplatematerial, andSA-351-CF3 castingmaterialandSA-564-630 precipitation hardenedstainless steel(to1100oF)forsupportsonly.TheweldfillermaterialutilizedinbodyweldsisASMESFA-5.9,Classification ER308L.Boraflexservesastheneutronabsorbermaterial.

Additional information onBorafiexmaybefoundinSection3.1.3.TheBoraflexeexperience listisgiveninTable4-1.4-20077L/0011L 0ll~~ElC~01 Atypicalmodulecontainsstoragecellswhichhavean8.65-inch nominalsquarecross-sectional opening.Thisdimension ensuresthatfuelassemblies withmaximumexpectedaxialbowcanbeinsertedandremovedfromthestoragecellswithoutanydamagetothefuelassemblies ortherackmodules.Pigure4-7showsahorizontal cross-section ofa3x3array.Thecellsprovideasmoothandcontinuous surfaceforlateralcontactwiththefuelassembly.

Theanatomyoftherackmodulesisbestexplained bydescribing thecomponents ofthedesign,namely:InternalSquareTubeNeutronAbsorbermaterial(Boraflex)

Poisonsheathing GapelementBaseplate SupportassemblyTopLead-In4.1.2.1.1.1 InternalSquareTubeThiselementprovidesthelateralbearingsurfacetothefuelassembly.

Itisfabricated byjoiningtwoformedchannels(Pigure4-1)usingacontrolled seamweldingoperation.

Thiselementisan8.65-inch square(nominal) cross-section by169incheslong.4.1.2.1.1.2 NeutronAbsorberMaterial(Boraflex)

Boraflexisplacedonallfoursidesofasquaretubeoveralengthof143"(minimum),

whichprovidestherequisite B-10screenforallstoredassemblies including afour-inch shrinkage allowance.

4.1.2.1.1.3 AbsorberSheathing Theabsorbersheathing (coverplate),showninFigure4-2,servestopositionandretaintheabsorbermaterialinitsdesignated space.Thisisaccomplished byspotweldingthecoversheettothesquaretubealongtheformer'sedgesatnumerous(atleast20)locations.

Thismannerofattachment ensuresthattheabsorbermaterialwillnotsagorlaterally displaceduringfabrication processes andunderanysubsequent loadingcondition.

4.1.2.1.1.4 GapElementGapelements, illustrated inPigure4-3,positiontwoinnerboxesatapredetermined distancetomaintaintheminimumfluxtrapgaprequiredbetweentwoboxes.Thegapelementisweldedtotheinnerboxbyfilletwelds.Anarrayofcomposite boxassemblies weldedasindicated inFigure4-7formsthehoneycomb gridworkofcellswhichharnesses thestructural strengthofallsheetandplatetypemembersinanefficient manner.Thearrayofcomposite boxeshasoverallbending,torsional, andaxialrigidities whichareanorderofmagnitude greaterthanconfigurations utilizing gridbartypeofconstruction.

4-30077L/0011L

~~ea0l0 e4.1.2.1.1.5 Baseplate Thebaseplate isa3/4&nchthickplatetypememberwhichhas6-inchdiameterholesconcentrically locatedwithrespecttotheinternalsquaretube,exceptatsupportleglocations, wheretheholesizeis5inchesindiameter.

Theseholesprovidetheprimarypathforcoolantflow.Secondary flowpathsareavailable betweenadjacentcellsviathelateralflowholes(1inchindiameter) neartherootofthehoneycomb (Figure4-4)whichprecludeflowblockages.

Thehoneycomb isweldedtothebaseplate with3/32-inch filletwelds.4.1.2.1.1.

6SupportAssemblyEachmodulehasatleastfoursupportlegs.Allsupportsareadjustable inlengthtoenablelevelingoftherack.Thevariableheightsupportassemblyconsistsofaflat-footed spindlewhichridesintoaninternally-threaded cylindrical member.Thecylindrical memberisattachedtotheunderside ofthebaseplate throughfilletandpartialpenetration welds.Thebaseoftheflat-footed spindlesitsonthepoolfloor.Levelingoftherackmodulesisaccomplished byturningthesquaresprocketinthespindleusingalongarm(approximately 46feetlong)squareheadwrench.Figure4-6showsaverticalcrossMection oftheadjustable supportassembly.

Thesupportselevatethemodulebaseplate approximately 5-5/8inchesabovethepoolfloor,thuscreatingthewaterplenumforcoolantflow.Thelateralholesinthecylindrical memberprovidethecoolantentrypathleadingintothebottomofthestoragelocations.

4.1.2.1.1.7 TopLead-InLead-insareprovidedoneachcelltofacilitate fuelassemblyinsertion.

Contiguous wallsofadjacentcellsarestructurally connected atthelead-inswithasuitableventopening.Theselead-injointsaidinreducingthelateraldeflection oftheinnersquaretubeduetotheimpactoffuelassemblies duringthegroundmotion(postulated seismicmotionspecified intheFSAR).Thistypeofconstruction leadstonaturalventinglocations fortheintermell spacewheretheneutronabsorbermaterialislocated.4.1.2.1.2Region2DesignTherackmodulesinRegion2arefabricated fromthesamematerialasthatusedforRegion1modules,i.e.,ASMESA-240-304L austenitic stainless steel.As,showninFigure4-5atypicalRegion2modulestoragecellalsohasan8.65-inch nominalsquarecrossmectional opening.Figure4Wshowsahorizontal cross-section ofa3x3array.Therackconstruction variesfromthatforRegion1inasmuchasthestainless steelcoverplates,gapelementsandtoplead-insareeliminated.

Hence,thebasiccomponents ofthisdesignareasfollows:InnertubeNeutronabsorbermaterialSidestripsBaseplate Supportassembly0077L/0011L Revision1 mI'~e Inthisconstruction, twochannelelementsformthecellofan8.65-inch nominalsquarecross-sectional opening.ThepoisonmaterialisplacedbetweentwoboxesasshowninFigure4-8.Stainless steelsidestripsareinsertedonbothsidesofthepoisonmaterialtofirmlylocateitinthelateraldirection.

Thebottomstrippositions thepoisonmaterialintheverticaldirection toenvelopetheentireactivefuellengthofafuelassembly(Figure4-5).TwoadjacentboxesandthesidestripbetweenboxesareweldedtogetherasshowninFigure4-8,toformthehoneycomb rackmodule.Thebaseplate andsupportassemblies areincorporated inexactlythesamemannerasdescribed forRegion1inthepreceding section.4.1.2.2FuelHandlingThedesignofthespentfuelrackswillnotaffectthec'onclusions ofthefuelhandlingaccidents presented intheFSAR(Section15.4.3)andsummarized bytheNRCintheSafetyEvaluation Report.Thatis,theradiological dosesforthepostulated fuelcaskandfuelassemblydropaccidents arewellwithinthe10CFR100criteria.

4.2APPLICABLE CODES,STANDARDS, ANDSPECIFICATIONS Thedesignandfabrication ofthespentfuelracksandtheanalysisofthespentfuelpoolhavebeenperformed inaccordance withtheapplicable portionsofthefollowing NRCRegulatory Guides,StandardReviewPlanSections, andpublished standards:

~~~4.2.1NRCDocuments a.April14,1978NRCOTPositionforReviewandAcceptance ofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications, asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.b.StLuciePlantUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.C~NRCRegulatory Guides1.13,Rev2SpentFuelStorageFacilityDesignBasisDec.1981(Draft)1.25March1972Assumptions UsedforEvaluating thePotential Radiological Consequences ofaFuelHandlingAccidentintheFuelHandlingandStorageFacilityforBoilingandPressurized WaterReactors0077L/0011L (l

1.26,Rev3Feb.1976QualityGroupClassifications andStandards forHater,SteamandRadioactive WasteContaining Components ofNuclearPowerPlants1.29,Rev3Sept.19781.31,Rev31.71,Rev01.85,Rev22SeismicDesignClassification ProposedControlofFerriteComponent inStainless SteelHeldMaterialWelderQualification forAreasofLimitedAccessibility MaterialCodeCaseAcceptability ASMESectionIIIDivisionI1.92,Rev11.124,Rev1Jan.19783.41,Rev1Combining ModalResponses andSpatialComponents inSeismicResponseAnalysisServiceLimitsandLoadCombinations forClass1Linear-Type Component SupportsValidation ofCalculational MethodsforNuclearCriticality Safety.NRCStandardReviewPlan-NUREG-0800 Rev1,July1981Section3.7,SeismicDesignRev1,July1981Section3.8.4,OtherSeismicCategoryIStructures, AppendixDRev3,July1981Section9.1.2,SpentFuelStorageRev1,July1981Section9.1.3,SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemRev2,July1981NRCBranchTechnical PositionASB9-2,ResidualDecayEnergyforLightWaterReactorsforLongTermCoolingGeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlants,CodeofFederalRegulations, Title10,Part50,AppendixA(GDCNos.1,2,61,62and63)NUREG-0612 ControlofHeavyloadsatNuclearPowerPlants.4-60077L/0011L no0 4.2.2IndustrCodesandStandards ANSIN14.6-1978 AmericanNationalStandardforSpecialLiftingDevicesforShippingContainers Weighing10,000PoundsorMoreforNuclearMaterials ANSIN16.1-75NuclearCriticality SafetyinOperations withFissionable Materials OutsideReactorsANSIN16.9-75ANSIN18.2-1973 Validation ofCalculation MethodsforNuclearCriticality SafetyNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationary Pressurized WaterReactorPlantsANSIN45.2.2Packaging,

Shipping, Receiving, StorageandHandlingofItemsforNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN45.2.1ANSIN45.2.11CleaningofFluidSystemsandAssociated Components duringConstruction PhaseofNuclearPowerPlants1974QualityAssurance Requirements fortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlantsANSIANS-57.2-1983 DesignRequirements forLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilities atNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN210-76DesignObjectives forLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilities atNuclearPowerStationsASMESectionIII(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984AddendaNuclearPowerPlantComponentsp Subsection NFACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2(1977Edition)CodeforConcreteReactorVesselsandContainments ACI318-63AISC1980BuildingCodeRequirements forReinforced ConcreteSpecification fortheDesign,Fabrication andErectionofStructural SteelforBuildings, EighthEditionAWSDl.lASNT-TC-lA June1980Structural WeldingCodeAmericanSocietyforNondestructive Testing(Recommended PracticeforPersonnel Qualification) 4-70077L/0011L r

ASMEIIPartA6C(1983Editionuptoandincluding Summer1984Addenda)MaterialSpecifications PartAFerrous,PartCWeldingRods,Electrodes andFillerMetalsASMEIX(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984Addenda)Welding&BrazingQualifications ASMEBoilerandPressureVessel,'ectionV,(1983Editionuptoandincluding Summer1984Addenda)Non-destructive Examination 4.3SEISMICANDIMPACTLOADSTheobjective oftheseismicanalysisofthespentfuelracksistodetermine thestructural responses resulting fromthesimultaneous application ofthreeorthogonal seismicexcitations.

Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetimehistorymethod.Seismicfloorresponsespectraforthespentfuelpoolfloorhavebeendeveloped usingthemethodsdescribed inSubsections 3.7.1and3.7.2oftheStLucieUnitNo1UpdatedFSAR.Theparameters oftheoriginallumpedmassmodeloftheFuelHandlingBuildingwereadjustedtoreflecttheincreased masscorresponding tothenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.Theresulting floorresponsespectraareshowninFigure4-9.Thesespectrawerethenusedtogeneratestatistically independent timehistoryexcitations, oneforeachofthethreeorthogonal directions.

Sincethespentfuelrackshavenoconnection withthepoolwallsorwitheachother,thepoolfloortimehistories areusedasinputtothedynamicanalysisoftheracks,asdescribed inSubsection 4.5.2.2.1.

Fluidcouplingisalsoconsidered asdescribed therein.Deflection ormovements ofracksunderearthquake loadingislimitedbydesignsuchthatthenuclearparameters outlinedinSection3.1arenotexceeded.

Impactloadshavebeenconsidered asdiscussed inSubsection 4.6.4.Theinteraction betweenthefuelassemblies andtherackhasbeenconsidered, particularly gapeffects.Theresulting impactloadsareofsmallmagnitudes sothereisnostructural damagetothefuelassemblies.

Thespentfuelpoolstructure hasbeenreanalyzed fortheincreased dead,thermalandseismicloadingresulting fromthestorageofadditional fuelassemblies inthepool,asdescribed inSubsection 4.5.1.4-80077L/0011L e~1f4 4.4LOADSANDLOADCOMBINATIONS 4.4.1SentFuelPool4.4.1.1Loads*Thefollowing designloadswereconsidered inthespentfuelpoolanalysis:

a)Structural DeadLoad(D)Deadloadconsistsofthedeadweightofthespentfuelracks,thepoolwaterandtheconcretestructure, superstructure, wallsandmiscellaneous buildingitemswithintheFuelHandlingBuilding.

b)LiveLoad(L)Liveloadsarerandomtemporary loadconditions formaintenance whichincludethespentfuelcaskdeadweight.c)SeismicLoads(SSEandOBE)SeismicloadsincludetheloadsinducedbySafeShutdownEarthquake (SSE)andOperating BasisEarthquake (OBE).Thehydrodynamic loadduringtheearthquake eventswasalsoconsidered.

d)NormalOperating ThermalLoads(T)Theloadinducedbynormalthermalgradients existingbetweenthebuildinginteriorandtheambientexternalenvironment wasconsidered.

Theconditions are:SummerInterior" watertemperature 150PExteriorairtemperature Soiltemperature Winter93'P70'PInteriorwatertemperature 150FExteriorairtemperature Soiltemperature 32'p70oPPorallcases,the"asconstructed" concretetemperature wasassumedtobe70P.Alineargradientthroughthewallandmatwasassumed.4-90077L/0011L SII e)Accident(LossofFuelPoolCooling)ThermalLoad(TA)Thethermalaccidenttemperature forthespentfuelpoolwateris217oFthroughout thepool.Atthistemperature, theexteriorairtemperature at40Fwasassumedforthecriticalthermalgradientthroughthewall.70Fsoiltemperature wasused.Thethermalgradientwasassumedtobelinear.f)FuelCaskDropLoad(M)A25toncaskdropfromthemaximumheightof58feetabovethepoolfloor(Elevation 79.50')wasconsidered.

(ThecaskbottommustattainElevation 77.00'orentryintothebuilding.)

4.4.1.2LoadCombinations Inthespentfuelpoolanalysis, thefollowing loadcombinations, fromtheStLucreNo.1UpdatedFSAR,Section3.8.1.5,wereconsidered:

a)NormalOperation 1.5(D+T)+1.8Lb)OBECondition 1.25(D+T+OBE+0.2L)c)SSECondition 105(D+T+0.2L)+1.0SSEd)AccidentandCaskDrop105(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+T+0.2L)+1.0MFortheevaluation ofthelinerandlineranchors,theaboveloadcombinations areapplicable exceptthatloadfactorsforallcasesmaybetakenequalto1.0(inaccordance withTableCC-3230-1 ofACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2)inconjunction withthestructural acceptance criteriaofthisSARsubsection 4.6.1.1.b.

Linearanalyseswithoutiterations wereperformed initially todetermine thecriticalloadcombinations.

Asaresult,thefollowing loadingcaseswereselectedforthenon-linear concretecrackinganalysis:

i)ii)iii)iv)v)vi)vii)1.5D+1.8L1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+Tsummer+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0M105(D+0.2L)+1.0M4-100077L/0011L nJ05c0~,fI' 4.4.2SpentFuelRacks14.4.2.1LoadsThefollowing loadsDeadLoad(D)wereconsidered intherackdesign:Deadweight-induced stresses(including fuelassemblyweight).(D')=LiveLoad(L)Deadweightofemptyrack.0forthestructure, sincetherearenomovingobjectsintherackloadpath.FuelDropAccidentLoad(Fd)=Forcecausedbytheaccidental dropoftheheaviestloadfromthemaximumpossibleheight.(SeeSection4.6.6.)CraneUpliftLoadUpwardforceontherackscausedbypostulated stuckfuelassembly(4000lbs).SeismicLoads(E)Operating BasisEarthquake.

(E')=SafeShutdownEarthquake.

Thermal(To)Loads(Ta)Differential temperature inducedloads(normalcondition).

Differential temperature inducedloads(abnormal designcondition).

Forupsetandemergency conditions, Tisthedifferential temperature forthefullycoreoffloadcondition, Forfaultedconditions, Taisthedifferential temperature forthelossofcoolingcondition.

Theconditions TaandTocauselocalthermalstressestobeproduced.

Theworstsituation willbeobtainedwhenanisolatedstoragelocationhasafuelassemblywhichisgenerating heatatthemaximumpostulated rate.Thesurrounding storagelocations areassumedtocontainnofuel.Theheatedwatermakesunobstructed contactwiththeinsideofthestoragewalls,therebyproducing themaximumpossibletemperature difference betweentheadjacentcells.Thesecondary stressesthusproducedarelimitedtothebodyoftherack;thatis,thesupportlegsdonotexperience thesecondary (thermal) stresses.

4.4.2.2LoadCombinations Eachcomponent operating condition hasbeenevaluated fortheapplicable loadingcombinations listedbelow:4-110077L/0011L C

0a)NormalCondition b)UpsetCondition c)Emergency Condition d)FaultedCondition D+LD+L+TD+L+To+ED'TD+L+Ta+ED+L+Ta+PfD+Ta+FDD+T+Pf+ED+T+FD+ED+L+T+E'+L+FDD+L+Pf4.5DESIGNANDANALYSISPROCEDURES 4.5.1DesignandAnalysisProcedures fortheSpentFuelPool4.5.1.1SpentFuelPoolStructure FiniteElementAnalysisInthisanalysis, theEBS/NASTRAN program,developed byEbascoandlinkedtothecommercially available NASTRANprogram,wasused.Variouslayersofconcreteandreinforcing barswereusedtodetermine theeffectsofconcretecracking.

Thenonlinear analysisschemebasedonthecombination ofstiffness iteration andloaditeration methods,whichwereavailable inEBS/NASTRAN program,wasusedtoautomatically determine thestressesintheconcreteandreinforcing barsaftertheconcretecracks.Thefiniteelementmodelusedinthisanalysiscanbesummarized asfollows:a)Sincetheeffectoftheadditional fuelrackloadonthepoolfloorislimitedtothematinthepoolarea,theupperportionofthepoolwallsisnotrequiredforthere-evaluation.

Therefore, thefiniteelementmodelincludedthelowerportionofwalls,thepoolfloor(mat)andtheunderlying soil.Thestructural components includedinthemodelareshownonFigure4-10.Thecut-offboundaryofthewallsisatEL.45.25ft.b)Thefollowing boundaryconditions wereusedatthemodelcut-offboundaries:

i)Southendofthemat-Rotational springsrepresenting thebendingresistance ofthecut-offmatwereprovided.

4-120077L/0011L IfIII ii)Topofthewalls-Therotationabouttheaxisparalleltotheedgeofthewallwasrestrained toconsidertheeffectofthecut-offwall.Thisassumedboundarycondition haslittleeffectontheresponseofthepoolmat,sincetheboundaryisfarabovethemat.Thiswasdemonstrated inthelinearanalysisresults.iii)Southendofeastandwestwalls-Sincetherigidityofthecut-offwallsisverysmall,afreeboundarycondition wasassumed.Acomputerplotofthefiniteelementmodelispresented inFigure4-11whichshowstheoverallviewofthemodelindicating thecomposite ofthefourexteriorandoneinteriorwalls.4.5.1.2LinerandAnchorage AnalysisThelineranditsanchorswereevaluated forthetemperature load,thestraininducedloadduetothedeformation ofthefloor,andthehorizontal seismicload.TheprogramPOSBUKFdeveloped byEbascowasusedforthelinerbucklinganalysisduetothetemperature andstraininducedloads.Thisprogramiscapableofdetermining thepost-buckling stress/strain ifthelinerplatebuckles.Theeffectofthehydrostatic pressurewasconsidered inthisanalysis.

Incalculating thein-planeshearduetothehorizontal seismicloadstransmitted fromthefuelracktotheliner,themaximumassumedfrictioncoefficient of0.8wasused.Thelineranchorswereevaluated fortheunbalanced linerin-planeforceduetothetemperature andstraininducedloads,aswellasthehorizontal seismicin-planeshearforce.4.5.1.3Foundation Stability andSoilBearingAdetailedsoilbearingevaluation wasperformed fortheincreased fuelrackloading.Thesoilstresseswereobtainedateachmatcornerandcomparedtotheallowable value.Stability calculations wereperformed foroverturning andsliding.4.5.2DesignandAnalysisProcedures forSpentFuelStorageRacksThepurposeofthissubsection istodemonstrate thestructural adequacyofthespentfuelrackdesignundernormalandaccidentloadingconditions.

Themethodofanalysispresented hereinusesatime-history integration methodsimilartothatpreviously usedintheLicensing ReportsonHighDensityFuelRacksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2(DocketNos50-254and50-265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),GrandGulfUnit1(DocketNo50-416),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),DiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323)andByronUnits1and2(DocketNos50-454and50-455).Theresultsshowthatthehighdensityspentfuelracksarestructurally adequatetoresistthepostulated stresscombinations associated withlevelA,B,CandDconditions asdefinedinReferences 1and2.4-130077L/0011L

~Il~Ie 4.5.2.1AnalysisOutlineThespentfuelstorageracksareseismicCategoryIequipment.

Thus,theyarerequiredtoremainfunctional duringandafteraSafeShutdownEarthquake(

).Asnotedpreviously, theseracksareneitheranchoredtothepoolfloornoraretheyattachedtothesidewalls.Theindividual rackmodulesarenotinterconnected.

Furthermore, aparticular rackmaybecompletely loadedwithfuelassemblies (whichcorresponds togreatestrackinertia),

oritmaybecompletely empty.Thecoefficient offriction, p,betweenthysupportsandpoolfloorisdetermined asfollows.According toRabinowicz<"~

theresultsof199testsperformed onaustenitic stainless steelplatessubmerged inwatershowameanvalueofp,tobe0.503withastandarddeviation of0.125.Theupperandlowerbounds(basedontwicethestandarddeviation) arethus0.753and0.253,respectively.

Twoseparateanalysesareperformed fortherackassemblies withvaluesofthecoefficient offrictionequalto0.2(lowerlimit)and0.8(upperlimit),respectively.

Analysesperformed forthegeometrically limitingrackmodulesfocusonlimitingvaluesofthecoefficient offriction, andthenumberoffuelassemblies stored.Typicalcasesstudiedare:Fullyloadedrack(allstoragelocations occupied),

p~0.8,0.2(p~coefficient offricti.on)

NearlyemptyrackP0.8,02RackhalffullP=0.2,0.8Poolfloorslabacceleration datadeveloped fortheSafeShutdownEarthquake (SSE)areshowninFigures4-12through4-14.Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetime-history method.Thepoolslabacceleration dataweredeveloped fromthebuildingresponsespectra.Theobjective oftheseismicanalysisistodetermine thestructural response(stresses, deformation, rigidbodymotion,etc)duetosimulataneous application ofthethreeindependent, orthogonal excitations.

Theseismicanalysisisperformed inthreesteps,namely:1.Development ofanonlinear dynamicmodelconsisting ofinertialmasselementsandgapandfrictionelements.

2.Generation oftheequations ofmotionandinertialcouplingandsolutionoftheequations usingthe"component elementtimeintegration scheme">todetermine nodalforcesanddisplacements.

3.Computation ofthedetailedstressfieldintherack(atthecriticallocation) andinthesupportlegsusingthenodalforcescalculated inthepreviousstep.ThesestressesarecheckedagainstthedesignlimitsgiveninSection4.6.2.2.Abriefdescription ofthedynamicmodelfollows.4-140077L/0011L e~eeP~e0e 4.5.2.2FuelRack-FuelAssemblyModelSincetheracksarenotanchoredtothepoolslaborattachedtothepoolwallsortoeachother,theycanexecuteawidevarietyofrigidbodymotions.Forexample,therackmayslideonthepoolfloor(so-called "slidingcondition");

oneormorelegsmaymomentarily losecontactwiththeliner("tipping condition");

ortherackmayexperience acombination ofslidingandtippingconditions.

Thestructural modelshouldpermitsimulation ofthesekinematic eventswithinherentbuilt-inconservatisms.

Sincetheseracksareequippedwithgirdlebarstodissipate energyduetointer-rack impact(ifitoccurs),itisalsonecessary tomodeltheinter-rack impactphenomena inaconservative manner.Similarly, liftoffofthesupportlegsandsubsequent impactsmustbemodelledusingappropriate impactelements, andCoulombfrictionbetweentherackandthepoollinermustbesimulated byappropriate piecewise linearsprings.Thesespecialattributes oftherackdynamicsrequireastrongemphasisonthemodelingofthelinearandnonlinear springs,dampers,andstopelements.

Themodeloutlineintheremainder ofthissection,andthemodeldescription inthefollowing sectiondescribethedetailedmodelingtechnique tosimulatetheseeffects,withemphasisplacedonthenonlinearity oftherackseismicresponse.

4.5.2.2.1 OutlineofModelaOThefuelrackstructure isafoldedmetalplateassemblage weldedtoabaseplate andsupported onfourlegs.Therackstructure itselfisaveryrigidstructure.

Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticell rackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructure iscapturedalmostcompletely bythebehaviorofasixdegrees-of-freedom structure; therefore, themovementoftherackcross-section atanyheightis,described intermsofthesixdegrees-of-freedom oftherackbase.b.Theseismicmotionofafuelrackischaracterized byrandomrattlingoffuelassemblies intheirindividual storagelocations.

Assumingthatallassemblies vibrateinphaseobviously exaggerates thecomputeddynamicloadingontherackstructure.

Thisassumption, however,greatlyreducestherequireddegrees-of-freedom neededtomodelthefuelassemblies whicharerepresented byfivelumpedmasseslocatedatdifferent levelsoftherack.Thecentroidofeachfuelassemblymasscanbelocated,relativetotherackstructure centroidatthatlevel,soastosimulateapartially loadedrack.c.Thelocalflexibility oftherack-support interface ismodeledconservatively intheanalysis.

d.Therackbasesupportmayslideorliftoffthepoolfloor.e.Thepoolfloorandwallshaveaspecified time-history ofseismicaccelerations alongthethreeorthogonal directions.

Fluidcouplingbetweenrackandassemblies, andbetweenrackandadjacentracks,issimulated byintroducing appropriate inertialcouplingintothesystemkineticenergy,Inclusion oftheseeffectsusesthemethodsofReferences 4and6forrack/assembly couplingandforrack/rack coupling(seeSection4.5.2.2.3 ofthisreport).4-150077L/0011L aoe g.Potential impactsbetweenrackandassemblies areaccounted forbyappropriate "compression only"gapelementsbetweenmassesinvolved.

h.Fluiddampingbetweenrackandassemblies, andbetweenrackandadjacentrack,isconservatively neglected.

Thesupportsaremodeledas"compression only"elementsfortheverticaldirection andas"rigidlinks"fordynamicanalysis.

Thebottomofasupportlegisattachedtoafrictional elementasdescribed inSection4.5.2.2.2.Thecrossmection inertialproperties ofthesupportlegsarecomputedandusedinthefinalcomputations todetermine supportlegstresses.

Theeffectofsloshinghasbeenshowntobenegligible atthebottomofapoolandhenceisneglected.

k.Intermack impact,ifitoccurs,issimulated byaseriesofgapelementsatthetopandbottomofoftherackinthetwohorizontal directions.

Themostconservative caseofadjacentrackmovementisassumed;eachadjacentrackisassumedtomovecompletely outofphasewiththerackbeinganalyzed.

1.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelassemblies inthestoragelocations isconservatively neglected intheresultsreportedherein.m.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelrackinthewaterisalsoconservatively neglected intheresultsreportedherein.n.Therattlingofthefuelassemblies insidethestoragelocations causesthe"gap"betweenthefuelassemblies andthecellwalltochangefromamaximumoftwicethenominalgaptoatheoretical zerogap.However,thefluidcouplingcoefficients(8) utilizedarebasedonlinearvibration theory(9).

Studiesintheliterature showthatinclusion ofthenonlinear effect(viz.,vibration amplitude ofthesameorderofmagnitude asthegap)drastically lowerstheequipment response(>0).

Figure4-15showsaschematic ofthemodel.Sixdegreesmf-freedom areusedtotrackthemotionoftherackstructure.

Figures4-16and4-17,respectively, showtheintermack impactspringsandfuelassembly/storage cellimpactsprings.Themodelforsimulating fuelassemblymotionincorporates fivelumpedmasses.Thelowermassisassumedtobeattachedtothebaseplate andtomovewiththebaseplate.

Thefourrattlingmassesarelocatedatquarterheight,halfheight,threequarterheightandtopoftherack.Twodegrees-of-freedom areusedtotrackthemotionofeachrattlingmass.Thesolutionprocedure described inthefollowing isimplemented incomputercodeDYNARACK, whichisavalidated computercodeunderHoltec'sQAprogram.0077L/0011L 4-16Revision1 4vL1L' 4.5.2.2.2 ModelDescription

~~~~eabsolutedegrees-of-freedom associated witheachofthemasslocations areshowninFigure4-15.Asshown,thediscretemassfractions arelocatedatheightsz=0,0.25H,0.5H,0.75HandHrespectively.

Table4Wgivesthedegreesmf-freedom andtheassociated generalized coordinates.

Ui(t)isthepoolfloorslabdisplacement seismictime-history.

1hus,astabulated inTable4WandshowninFigure4-15,therearesixteendegreesmf-freedom inthesystem.NotshowninFigure4-15arethegapelementsusedtomodelthesupportlegsandtheimpactswithadjacentracks.4.5.2.2.3 FluidCouplingAneffectofsomesignificance requiring carefulmodelingistheso-called "fluidcouplingeffect".Ifonebodyofmass(m)vibratesadjacenttoanotherbody(massm),andbothbodiesaresubmerged inafrictionless fluidmedium,thenNewton'sequations ofmotionforthetwobodieshavetheform:~~~~(ml+Mll)Xl-M12X2=appliedforcesonmassml~~~~M21Xl+(m2+M22)X2appliedforcesonmassm2~~~~Xl,X2denoteabsoluteaccelerations ofmassmlandm2,respectively.

Mll,M12,M21andM22arefluidcouplingcoefficients whichdependontheshapeoXthetwobodies,theirrelativedisposition, etc.Fritz(9)ivesdata<<rMijforvariousbodyshapesandarrangements.

Itistobeotedthattheaboveequationindicates thattheeffectofthefluidistoaddacertainamountofmasstothebody(Mlltobody1),andanexternalforcewhichisproportional totheacceleration oftheadjacentbody(massm2),Ttlustheacceleration oftheonebodyaffectstheforcefieldonanother.Thisforceisastrongfunctionoftheinterbody gap,reachinglargevaluesforverysmallgaps.Thisinertialcouplingiscalledfluidcoupling.

Ithasanimportant effectinrackdynamics.

Thelateralmotionofafuelassemblyinsidethestoragelocationwillencounter thiseffect.Sowillthemotionofarackadjacenttoanotherrack.'theseeffectsareincludedintheequations ofmotion.1hefluidcouplingisbetweenfuelarraynodeiandcellwallinFigure4-17.Furthermore, therackequations containcouplingtermswhichmodeltheeffectoffluidinthegapsbetweenadjacentracks.Thecouplingtermsmodelingtheeffectsoffluidflowingbetweenadjacentracksarecomputedassumingthatalladjacentracksarevibrating 180degreesoutofphasefromtherackbeinganalyzed.

Therefore, onlyonerackisconsidered surrounded byahydrodynamic masscomputedasiftherewereaplaneofsymmetrylocatedinthemiddleofthegapregion.Finally,fluidvirtualmassisincludedintheverticaldirection vibration equations oftherack;virtualinertiaisalsoaddedtothegoverning equationcoresponding totherotational degreemf-freedom, q(t).0077L/00llL 4-17Revision1 444C4~/

4.5.2.2.4 DampingInreality,dampingoftherackmotionarisesfrommaterialhysteresis (material damping),

relativeintercomponent motioninstructures (structural damping),

andfluiddrageffects(fluiddamping).

Intheanalysis, amaximumof2Xstructural dampingisimposedonelementsoftherackstructure duringSSEseismicsimulations.

Thisisinaccordance withtheStLucieUnit1FSAR(13).

Materialandfluiddampingareconservatively neglected.

Thedynamicmodelhastheprovision toincorporate fluiddampingeffects;however,nofluiddampinghasbeenusedforthisanalysis.

4.5.2.2.5ImpactReferring toFigure4-18,anyfuelassemblynodemayimpactthecorresponding structural massnode.Tosimulatethi.simpact,fourcompressionmnly gapelementsaroundeachrattlingfuelassemblynodeareprovided(seeFigure4-17).Asnotedpreviously, fluiddampersmayalsobeprovidedinparallelwiththesprings.Thecompressive loadsdeveloped inthesespringsprovidethenecessary datatoevaluatetheintegrity ofthecellwallstructure andstoredarrayduringtheseismicevent.Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheimpactspringsusedtosimulateanypotential forintermack impacts.Section4.5.2.4.2 givesmoredetailsontheseadditional impactsprings.4.5.2.3AssemblyoftheDynamicModelThecartesian coordinate systemassociated withtherackhasthefollowing nomenclature:

ox~Horizontal coordinate alongtheshortdirection ofrackrectangular platformoyHorizontal coordinate alongthelongdirection oftherackrectangular platformozVertically upwardAsdescribed inthepreceding section,therack,alongwiththebase,supports, andstoredfuelassemblies, ismodeledforthegeneralthree-dimensional (3-D)motionsimulation byafourteendegreemf-freedommodel.Tosimulatetheimpactandslidingphenomena

expected, 60nonlinear gapelementsand16nonlinear frictionelementsareused.Gapandfrictionelements, withtheirconnectivity andpurpose,arepresented inTable4-7.Ifthesimulation modelisrestricted totwodimensions (onehorizontal motionplusverticalmotion,forexample)forthepurposesofmodelclarification only,thenadescriptive modelofthesimulated structure whichincludesgapandfrictionelementsisshowninFigure4-18.(Notethatonlythetoprattlingmassisshownforclarity.)

Theimpactsbetweenfuelassemblies andrackshowupinthegapelement,havinglocalstiffness KI,inFigure4-18.InTable4-7,gapelements5through8areforthevibrating massatthetopoftherack.Thesupportleg~pringratesQaremodeledbyelements1through4inTable4-7.Notethat0077L/0011L 4-18Revision1 (I4I thelocalcompliance oftheconcretefloorisincludedinKd.Tosimulateslidingpotential, frictionelements1through8inTable4-7areemployed.

Frictionelements2and8,and4and6(Table4-7)arerepresented asKfinFigure4-18.Thefrictionofthesupport/liner interface ismodeledbyapiecewise linearspringwithasuitablylargestiffness Kfuptothelimitinglateralload,N,whereNisthecurrentcompression loadattheinterface betweensupportandliner.Ateverytimestepduringthetransient

analysis, thecurrentvalueofN(eitherzeroforliftoffcondition, oracompressive finitevalue)iscomputed.

Finally,thesupportrotational fr<<t<<nspringsKRreflectanyrotational restraint thatmaybeofferedbythefoundation.

Thisspringrateiscalculated usingamodifiedBoussinesq equation(4) andisincludedtosimulatetheresistive momentofthesupporttocounteract rotationoftherackleginaverticalplane.Thisrotationspringisalsononlinear, withazerospringconstantvalueassignedafteracertainlimitingcondition ofslabmomentloadingisreached.Thenonlinearity ofthesesprings(friction elements9,11,13and15inTable4-7)reflectstheedginglimitation imposedonthebaseoftheracksupportlegs.Inthisanalysis, thiseffectisneglected; anysupportlegbending,inducedbyliner/baseplate frictionforces,isresistedbythelegactingasabeamcantilevered fromtherackbaseplate.

Forthe3Wsimulation, allsupportelements(listedinTable4-7)areincludedinthemodel.Couplingbetweenthetwohorizontal seismicmotionsisprovidedbothbytheoffsetofthefuelassemblygroupcentroidwhichcausestherotationoftheentirerackandbythepossibility ofliftoffofoneormoresupportlegs.Thepotential existsfortheracktobesupported ononeormoresupportlegsortoliftoffcompletely duringanyinstantofacomplex3Wseismicevent.Allofthesepotential eventsmaybesimulated duringa3-Dmotionandhavebeenobservedintheresults.4.5.2.4TimeIntegration oftheEquations ofMotion4.5.2.4.1Time-History AnalysisUsing16DOFRackModelHavingassembled thestructural model,thedynamicequations ofmotioncorresponding toeachdegree-of-freedom canbewrittenbyusingNewton'ssecondlawofmotion;orbyusingLagrange's equation.

Thesystemofequations canberepresented inmatrixnotationas:~~[M](q)=(Q)+(G)wherethevector(Q)isafunctionofnodaldisplacements andvelocities, and(G)dependsonthecouplinginertiaandthegroundacceleration.

Premultiplying theaboveequations by[M]1renderstheresulting equationuncoupled inmass.~~Wehave:(q)~[M]1(Q)+[M]1(G)Asnotedearlier,inthenumerical simulations runtoverifystructural integrity duringaseismicevent,allelementsofthefuelassemblies areassumedtomoveinphase.Thiswillprovidemaximumimpactforcelevel,andinduceadditional conservatism inthetime-history analysis.

0077L/0011L 4-19Revision1 El4

'Ihisequationsetismassuncoupled, displacement coupled,andisideallyuitedfornumerical solutionusingacentraldifference scheme.Thecomputerrogram"DYNARACK'"

isutilizedforthispurpose.Stressesinvariousportionsofthestructure arecomputedfromknownelementforcesateachinstantoftime.Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticell rackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructure iscapturedalmostcompletely bythebehaviorofasixdegreemf-freedom structure; therefore, inthisanalysismodel,themovementoftherackcrossmection atanyheightisdescribed intermsoftherackbasedegreesmf-freedom (ql(t),"q6(t)).Theremaining degrees-of-freedom areassociated withhorizontal movements ofthefuelassemblymasses.Inthisdynamicmodel,fiverattlingmassesareusedtorepresent fuelassemblymovement.

Therefore, thefinaldynamicmodelconsistsofsixdegreesmf-freedom fortherackplustenadditional massdegrees-of-freedom forthefiverattlingmasses.Theremaining portionofthefuelassemblyisassumedtomovewiththerackbase.Thus,thetotalityoffuelmassisincludedinthesimulation.

4.5.2.4.2Evaluation ofPotential forInter-Rack ImpactSincetheracksarecloselyspaced,thesimulation includesimpactspringstomodelthepotential forintermack impact,especially forlowvaluesofthefrictioncoefficient betweenthesupportandthepoolliner.Toaccountforthispotential, fiveintermack gapelementswerelocatedateachsideoftherackatthetopandatthebaseplate.

Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheseapelements.

Loadsintheseelements, computedduringthedynamicanalysis, reusedtoassessrackintegrity ifinter-rack impactoccurs.4.6STRUCTURAL EVALUATION CRITERIA4.6.1Structural AccetanceCriteriaforSentFuelPoolStructure 4.6.1.1CriteriaThestresses/strains resulting fromtheloadingcombinations described inSection4.4.1satisfythefollowing acceptance criteria:

a)SpentFuelPoolConcreteStructure Thedesignstresslimitsdescribed inSection3.8.1.6ofStLucieUnitNo.1UpdatedFSARwereusedfortheevaluation ofthespentfuelpoolreinforced concretestructural components.

Thecapacityofallsectionswascomputedinaccordance withACI318+3PartIV-B,UltimateStrengthDesign.*Thenumerical procedure underlying DYNARACKhasbeenpreviously utilizedinicensingof'similar racksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2DocketNos50-254and265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),andDiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323).0077L/0011L 4-20Revision1 thpIt~~1Ii(~~

Re:St.LuciePlantDocketNo.50-33510CFR50.59 REPORTSt.LuciePlantUnit1ReportofChangesMadeUndertheProvisions of10CFR50.59forthePeriodEndingJanuary22,~1988GRMATWS.RAI DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDFORFSARAMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITlE118-181848-182892-182188-182846-183878-183336-183348-183383-183412-183174-184187-184-1842-184815-185822-185824-185839-185847-185ceo-185873-185131-185142-185155-1858-18-18-28-18-18-18-18-18-28-18AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACENENT AUXILIARY BUILDINGJIBHOISTDIESELGENERATOR UPGRADEREMOVALOFSTEAN6ENERATOR DELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERS REACTORUPPERCAVITYHANDRAIL~NITR06ENSUPPLYSYSTEMINSTRUNENT AIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONCCMHEATEXCHANGER RETUBINGSECURITYCONSOLES-LEDHICROMAVE DETECTORREPLACEMENT HAINSTEANSAFETYVALVELIFTLEVERRENOVALED6CFDRELAYREPLACEMENT EX-CORENEUTRONFLUXMONITORING SYSTEMUPGRADETRAVELING MATERSCREENUPGRADEDIESEL6ENERATOR AIRSTARTSYSTEHPIPINGMODIFICATION INSTRUMENT AIRUPGRADETIEINSEPASINSTALLATION DIESELGENERATOR SUBSYSTEM FLOMDIAGRAMS6ESANRELAYPCCARDREPLACENEN1 NSRRETUBINGNSRPERFORATED PLATENODIFICATION REPLACEMENT OFRISDEVICESAPPENDIXRCONTROLROONINDEPENDENCE FORALlERNATE SHUTDOMNREACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFITNGRIGPIPEASSENBLYTURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEHNODIFICATION DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDFORFSAR-AMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITLE174-185179-185282-185884-186887-186823-186832-186837-186843-186871-186874-186882-186186-186888-186898-186893-186895-186898-186186-186116-186117-186118-186119-1868-188-18-18-1RCPOILLIFTSYSTENPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENT DIESEL6ENERATOR COOLIN6SYSTENVALVEREPLACENENT CGMSTRAINERBACKFl.USHDRAINLUBEOILCENTRIFUGE ANNUNCIATION NRVACTUATION SOLENOIOS NAINFEEDMATER PUNPLUBEOILPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENT EXCITERCOOLERVENTSANODRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEPCBTRANSFORNER REPLACENENT NON-SAFETY RELATEDNISGELLANEOUS PIPINGSYSTENSNOOIFIGATIONS FHBHVACPENETRATION BARRIERSHEATERDRAINPUNPDENINERALIZEO MATERSUPPLY.HAINSTEANPIPIN6NODIFICATION LOMPOWERFEED'MATER CONTROLSYSTEMNISAPPLICATION OFLINITORQUE OPERATORISOLATEDPHASEBUSDUCTJUNPERNOOIFICATION CLOSEINTERCEPT VALVECIRCUITNODIFICATION RTGBANNUNCIATOR 6ROUNDDETECTION REPLACENENT OFINSTRUNENT SCALESHYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONS:

REPLACEOFVLVSI-V-25-11 13.15HIREXCITATION SYSTENTURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIREXTRACTION STEANPIPIN6ANOFITTIN6NATERIALUP6RADEREACTORCAVITYSEALRING18CFR58.49 ENVIRONNENTAL QUALlFICAT'ION LISTREVISIONPRESSURIZER NISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCA6E DOCUMENTS REVIEVEDFORFSARAMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITLE126-186132-186136-186139-186148-186141-186143-186146-186148-186151-186153-18688.1-187-187-187818-187811-187.812-187817-187827-187828-187832-187..-834-187 835-187844-187846-1878-18-18-18-18-1AFASDVNHODIFICATION EXCESSIVE AC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPREPLACEMENT OFSGLEVELTRANSMITTERS MASONRYMALLHODIFICATIONS ANNUNCIATOR-NUISANCEALARNSPRESSURIZER LEVELINSTRUMENTATION HODIFICATION PASSDISSOLVED HYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSl1ISCELLANEOUS ICMSYSTEHMODIFICATIONS ICMISOlATION VALVEREPLACEMENT 488VOLTACLOADCENTER18-2TRANSFORMER COOLINGROSEHOUNT ANDVALCOREQENHANCEHENT IEBULLETIN85-83HOVSMITCHSETTINGSNRCIEBULLETING 85-83HOVPOSITIONINDICATION OVERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEMHODIFICATION PROTECTIVE COATINGSREPAIR/REPL INREACTORCONTAINHENT BLDGCONDENSER HOTMELDNITROGENINJECTION CONNECTIONS FEEDMATER HEATERANDEXTRACTION PIPESHIELDING CCMHEATEXCHANGER SHElLSIDEDRAINADDITIONNISCELLANEOUS SNUBBERMODIFICATION REPLACEMENT OFRMTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46 PRESSURIZER SURGELINESAHPLEVALVEV1218REPLACEMENT CONDENSER OUTLETTUBESHEETANDMATERBOXCOATINGSREPLACEMENT OFRAYCHEHSPLICESNSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATION CONTAINMENT BLDGTELESCOPING JIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTS DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDEORESARAMENDMENT 7BERREVISIONTITLE887-187897-187188-187888-984227-984178-98519S-S85815-986112-986138-9868-18'8CODEBOUNDRYORAMIN6REVISIONTSCBLOCKMALL287AMODIFICATIONS TURBINE6ANTRYCRANEHAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADENON-HANUAL PARKINGLOTTURBINEGANTRYCRANESEPARATION REQUIREMENTS TIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTION FIREHAINANOPLANTFIREl.OOPMATERTREATMENT PLANTCAUSTICDILUTIONMATERBOOSTERPUNPTELEPHONE SYSTEMUPGRADETURBINEBUILONGGANTRYCRANEGIRDERINSPECTION ANOTBISOLNEUTRALIZATION BASINCLOSUREtlONITORMELLSN/ASTLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYEVALUATION REVIEW PCM118-181AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACEMENT SYSTEMDESCRIPTION FUNCTIONThepurposeofthismodification istoreplacethelubricated plugvalvesontheinstrument airdryerwithnon-lubricated type'stopreventgreaseintrusion intotheinstrument airsystem.DESIGNDESCRIPTION Thegreasesealedplugvalvesoriginally installed ontheinstrument airdryerallowgreasetocontaminate thesystemandplugupthecoolercausingtheblowertotriponhighcurrent.Replacement ofthesevalveswithgreaseless typevalveswilleliminate theproblem.OPERATIONTheoperation oftheairdryerwillremainthesame-.Thevalvesarehandoperatedandutilizedwhenthedessicant bedsarebeingswitchedforregeneration.

SAFETYANALYSISTheinstrument airdryerisNon-Safety RelatedQualityGroupD.Itisnon-seismic a'ndhasnowind,flood,ormissilecriteria.

Failureoftheinstrument airdryerwillnotaffecta'ysafetyrelatedsystemssincetheinstrument airsystemcanoperatewithouttheinstrument airdryerandtheinstrument airsystemisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.

Theinstrument airdryerislocatedintheturbinebuildingsointheeventofacatastrophic failure,nosafetyrelatedequipment willbeaffected.

PCM040-182REACTORAUXILIARY BUILDINGJIBHOISTDESCRIPTION Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mpackagewillprovidea5toncapacityjibhoistin-theReactorAuxiliary Building(RAB).'Thehoistwillbelocatedeastofthehotmachineshopasdetailedonthelocationplan,JPE-C-40-82.-001, included.withthispackage.Thehoistwillbeusedtotransferequipment intheRABbetweenEl-0.5'ndEl19.5'.Theboomshallbeprovidedwithaholddownchaintolimitmovementwhennotinoperation.

Thisdesignpackageprimarily outlinesCivil'srequirements

.Electrical srequirements areincludedinAppendixCDSAFETYEVALUATION Thejibhoistwillbeusedtotransferequipment andmaterials intheRABbetweenEl0.5'ndEl19.5'.Thehoistperformsnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunctiontherefore thisPC/Misnon-nuclearsafetyrelated.~~~~~~~~Thedesignofthejibcraneattachments

'totheconcretewalloftheRABwillbeverifiedbasedonseismicloadsaswellasdeadandliveloads.Thiswillprecludedetachment duringaseismicevent.Therequirements ofNUREG0612willnotbeapplicable astherewillbenointeractions withsafetyrelatedequipment.

Allstructural steelandboltingmaterialwillberequired'tohaveCertificates ofCompliance withtheapplicable materialspecification.

Thiswillassurematerialintegrity.

Inaccordance withQISection3.2,nounreviewed safetyquestions havebeenintroduced.

PCM092-182DIESELGENERATOR UPGRADEABSTRACTPC/M92-'182wasgenerated toperformseveralmodifications recommended bythedieselgenerator vendortoupgradeourdieselswiththelatestdesignimprovements foroptimalreliability.

Themodifications included:

1)2)3)4)5)Vibration damperreplacement Idlergearstubshaft replacement Exhaustscreenmspection portadditionAirdryeradditionLubeoilmodification Items1tlwcagh4wereinstalled in1993perthePC/Mpackage.Item//wasneverinstalled duetodifficulty inprocuring partsandescalating cost.ex-ieaAsummaryofPC/M8&~isprovidedbelow.Supplement 0-Installed thevibration damper,idlergearstubshaft, andexhaustscreeninspection port.Engineering wasbyFPL.Supplement 1-Installed theElectrical, CIvilandINCportionoftheairdryeradditionandthelubeoilmodification.

Engineering wasbyEbasco.Supplement 2-Installed themechanical portionoftheairdryeraddition.

Engineering'as byFPL.Supplement 3-Transmitted thevendorwiringdiagramsforthe'irdryers.Engineering wasbyEbasco.Supplement 4-Installed themechanical portionoft5elubeoilmodification.

EngineetingwasbyFPL.Supplement 5-Revisedsupplement 4basedonadditional vendorsubmittals.

Engineering wasbyFPL.Supplements 0,2and3werefullyinstalled.

OnlyaportionofSupplement 1wasinstalled andnoneofsupplements 4and5waseverinstalled.

Supplements 0,1,2,and3wereappropriately as-built.

4Thescope,engineering andmaterials ofsupplement/

wereallincludedintheoriginallubeoilmodification.

Supplement 6breaksoutalloftheportionsrequiredtoimplement theturbocharger soakbacklowpressurealarmanddeletestheremainder ofthedrawingsnotyetas-built.

Whensupplement 6isinstalled, andas-built, thePC/Mcanbeclosedout.Thissupplement doesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyanalysis, doesnotrequireanytechnical specification changesanddoesnotcauseanychanges.totheoperation ofthedieselgenerator.

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PCM092-182.SAFETYANALYSISTheadditionofaturbocharger soakbacklowpressurealarmdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionsincethealarm=doesnotaffecttheoperation oroperability ofthedieselgenerators, itmerelyalertsoperators toalowpressurecondition intheturbocharger soakbacksystemwhiletheengineisinthestandbymode.Asaresult,itcanbeconcluded thattheprobability ofocccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethedieselgenerators arenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofaccidents andsincethealarmwasdesignedtotheappropriate codesanditdoesnotaffecttheoperation ofthedieselgenerators.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreducedsincethemodification doesnotaffecttheperformance oroperability oftheengine.~~

PCM100-182REMOVALOFSTEAMGENERATOR DELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERS SYSTENOESCRIPTIONThesystemwhichisbeingaffectedbythisaadificationistheSteamGenerator ReactorCoolantDifferentia1FlowInstr'umentat ionandControlSystem.ThissystemmonitorstheReactorCoolantflowacrosseachofthetwoSteamGenerators withthepurposeofprotectingthecoreagainstdepartur'e.

fromnucleateboil.ingONBintheeventofacoolantflowdecrease.

Flowmeasurement signalsareprovidedbysunningthe-outputofdifferential pressuretransmitters acrosseachsteamgenerator.

Thismeasurement ofdifferential pressureismodifiedbytwosignalcharacterizers ineachofthefourchannelstoprovide'square rootofdifferential pressuresignalswhichcorrespond toactualflow.Thelowflowreactortripisactuateddirectlybythesummedflowsignal.Itrequiresatwo-out-of-four coincidence logicfromthefourindependent channels(whentheflowfa11sbelowapreselectedvalue)toinitiateaReactortrip.InadditIon,fourseparateindicators (oneperchannel)receivesignalsfromeachinstrumentat ionloop.Bymeansofaselectorhandswitch theoperatorcanreadeitherthesumned,.averageflowsigna'Iofthetwosteamgenerators, asmeasuredfromthatchannel,ortheflowsignalofeithersteamgenerator byItself.Thepurposeofthismodification.

istoremovefromtheinstrumentation andcontrolloopstheeightsignalcharacterizers (twoperchannel).

Becausetechnical specificationsIimitplantoperations tofourReactorCoolantPumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizer function.

Thecharacterizer modifiesthedeltapinputsignalstoallowforoperation underconditions oflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumps.Thecharacter izerswi1Iremainphysicallyintheloops,butwiII'ebypassedelectrically sothattheywillservenofunction.

Theindicators wilIberecalibrated andtheirscaleswiIIbechangedtoreadthedeltapsignalsdirectlyratherthanthemodifiedflowsignals.Thewiringintheloopswillbealteredandseveralresistors willneedtobereplaced-withnewvaluestomaintaintherequiredvoltageranges.FuelResources hascompleted an'ngineering evaluation thatwillgeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpoints fortheSystem.

PCM100-182SAFETYANALYSISThismodification isNuclearSafetyrelatedbecausetheSteamGenerator ReactorCoolantOeItaFlowInstrumentat ionandControlsystemisNuclearSystemrelated,andtheequipment beingmodifiedispart.ofthissystem.ThisPC/Hproposestoremovethesignalcharacter izersfromthefourredundant loopsandmodifytheinstrument andcontrolcircuitssothattheloopcurrentandvoltagesignalsbecomeproportional tothedifferences inreactorprimarycoolantpressures, ratherthandirectlytotheflowacrossthesteamgenerators.

Inaccordance withtheFuelResources recommendations (Appendix C),"bothsteamgenerator deltapsignaisaresumnedandareactortripisinitiat'edwhenthesumneddeltapfa1isbelowaprese1ectedtripvalue."Accordingly, thetransmitters intheloopswillberecalibratedandtheindicators rescaledfortheprocessrangeof0to50psid.Thecharacterizers servedafunctionundercondition oflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpoperation.

However,becauseSt.LuciedlTechnical Specifications limitplantoperation whiieatpowertofourreactorcoolantpumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizer functions.

Combustion Engineering, theoriginalArchitect EngineerfortheReactorProtection System;hasrecommended removalofthecharacterizers becausetheremovalwi11reducethecalibration timeofthe'eltapsignalprocessing circuitry.

Thechangeisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

FuelResources hascompleted anengineering evaluation thatwillbeusedtogeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpoints fortheReactorCoolantdeltapressureinputsfortheReactorProtection Systembasedonremovalofthecharacterizers.

Newvaluesofresistors willberequiredtomaintainthevoltagerangesrequiredbythecircuitry intheabsenceofthesignalcharacterizers.

Thenewresistors arebeingpurchased ascommercial gradeitemstoexactingstandards ofprecision andperformance.

Additionally, failureofthenewresistors wouid.havethesameconsequences ontheStreamGenerator delta~p.inputtotheReactorProtection Systemasfailureoftheexistingresistors.

Hence,nopossibi1Ityfor~naccidentormalfunction ofatypedifferent fromanyevaluated previously intheFSARhasbeencreatedbythismodification.Forthesamereasons,themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforthetechnical specifications hasnotbeendecreased.

Inconclusion, thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

PCM046-183REACTORBUILDINGUPPERCAVITYHANDRAILINTRODUCTION Thereactorbuildingrefueling cavityisastainless steellinedpoolwithasplitlevelbottomatElevations 36.0'nd21.5'Duringplantshutdown',

theuppercavityisoccupiedforvariousoperations including reactorheadremoval,headstuddetensioning, etc..Atthepresenttimethereisnopro-vision.alongtheedgeoftheuppercavitytopreventpersonnel fromfallingintothelowercavity.ThisPC/Mprovidesahandrailinthisarea.ISAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle,10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThehandrailprovidedbythisPC/Mhasbeendesignedtowithstand thoseloadingcombinations asspecified inFSARChapter3.Althoughthehand-railservesnosafetyrelatedfunction, seismicloadshavebeenconsidered inthedesign.Inordertoprecludepotential missilegeneration duringaLOCA,thehandrailhasbeendesignedtowithstand jetimpingement loads.Therearenounreviewed safetyquestions associated withthisPC/MandpriorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation.,

PCM078-183NITROGENSUPPLYSYSTEMSYSTEMDESCRIPTION Functions andDesinRuirements VFunctionTheNitrogenSystemsupplieslowandhighpressurenitrogentovarioussystemsandvesselswhichrequirecovergasforSt.Lucie-Unitsfland02.a)Lowpressurenitrogen(200psigandbelow)issuppliedtothefollowing foreachunit:SpentResinTankVolumeControlTankRefueling FailedFuelDetectorReactorDtainTankQuenchTankPressureReduction andSampleCabinetWasteConcentrator BoricAcidConcentrators Flash.TankHoldUpTanksb)Highpressurenitrogen(over200PSIG)is.suppliedsolelyascovergasforthesafetyinjection tanks.DesignRequirements The'system shallbecapableofsupplying bothunitswithhighandlowpressurenitrogenfor30dayswithoutrefilling.

Thehighpressurestoragevolumeshallbeofsufficient capactytorechargeallfoursafetyinjection tanksoneitherunit.Thenitrogencompressors shallbeofadequatesizetorechargethehighpressurestoragevolumewithin24hourseachor12hourscombined.

SAFETYA'NALYSISThenitrogensupplysystemprovidesahighpressuresourceandnormaloperating sourceofnitrogengasforplantuse.Thenitrogen.

systemservesnosafetyfunction.

Thenitrogen'upply systemislocatedoutdoorsadjacenttothegashouse.Failureofanyportionofthenitrogensupplysystemwillnotinhibittheabilitytomitigatetheconsequences ofapostulated

accident, achievesafeshutdown, oradequately coolspentfueLThischangeistherefore notconsidered safetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Allpioinghasbeendesignedinaccordance withANSIB-31.1.Theconcretefoundations havebeendesignedinaccordance withallapplicable codes.Thepowersourcesforthenitrogencompressors arefromnonwafety relatedMCC's1A-3and1B-3.Allconduitsutilizedarebelowthe..allowable filLInaddition, qualified cablewillbeusedforthisinstallation.

PCM336-183INSTRUMENT AIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONTCTSYST-"MOESCRIPTIOH

~OerationThismodification addsonecheckvalvetothecross-tie linetoprevntaccidental bleed-down oftheIAsystem.ThisvalveperFormsitsfunctionautomatically andrequiresnooperatoraction.Thmodification alsoadds,adifferential pressureindicator tothecoalescing filter.Thedifferential pressureshouldbemonitored

.onaperiodic-basistodetermine whenfiltrelementreplacement isnecessry.(Thisshouldbedoneat10PSIO)Operating procedtressnouldbemodiriedtoindicatethislimitation.

FunctionThismodification willprovideadownortheIAsystembywayofUnit=-"I/Unit g2IAcrossconnetcross-tie isinuse.passivemeansofpreventirag bleed-lekagetotheSAsystemwhiteiheisinusortheUnitglSAtoIADesicnOesc.iotiond>rrerential SAFiTYcVALUATIGH ThismodiFication providsthedeailsForinstallation ofonecheckvalveintheUnit='1SA-toIAcross-conne tlineandadditionoFapressureindicator onthecoalscirgrilter.1.0,Thismodification isnon-seismic, non-safety rlatdanddoe"notinvolveanunreviewed saftyquestionbecause:1.1TheIA/SAcross-tie performsnosafety.unctionardisclassiried asnon-safety related.1.2Thesemodi,icationsdorointeractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemorcomponents.

1.3Hosafetyreletdequipment orccmponents areccmprcmis dbyanyeassumedrailureo-anyexistingornewecuipmntorcomponer.ts.

1.4HoTechnical Specificati nsaralteredoradversely affected.

2.0Carehasbentaknintndesigntoeliminatorcontrolaspectswhichcouicbha3rdoustoeqipm~ntand/orperson.ea.

PCM340-183CCWHEATEXCHANGER RETUBINGSYSTEMDESCRIPTION FunctionThecomponent coolingwater(CCW)heatexchangers areonesidemixed,onesideunmixedsinglepasshorizontal mountunitswithintakecoolingwater(ICW)onthetubesideandCCWontheshellside.ThebasicfunctionoftheCCWheatexchangers istorejectheatfromvariouscomponents associated withthereactorsupportandsafetyequipment (suchastheshutdownheatexchangers, containment fancoolersandRCPsealcoolers)totheICWsystem.DesiDescritionDuetothedeteriorated condition oftheexistingCCWheatexchanger Aluminum-Brass tubing,theseunitsaretoberetubedduringthenextrefueling outage.Thisdesignpackageincludesthespecification requiredfortheprocurementofthetubesandguidelines fortheretubingeffort.~Oeration Thecomponent coolingsystem(CCS)isarrangedastworedundant.

essential supplyheadersystems(designated A2B)eachwithapump'ndheatexchanger andthecapability tosupplytheminimumsafetyfeaturesrequirements duringplantshutdownorLOCAconditions.

SAFETYANALYSISla.Withrespecttotheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theprobability ofoccurrence'of anaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.b.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theconsequences ofFSARaccidentevaluations havenotbeenalteredsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.

PCM340-183c.Withrespecttotheprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theprobability ofanyequipment malfunction hasnotincreased forthereasonsoutlinedinla.d.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofmalfunciton ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Theconsequences-*of anyequipment

'malfunction hasnotbeenincreased forthesamereasonoutlinedinlb.2a.Withrespecttothepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR:Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSARsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchangeoranewdesign.b.Withrespecttothepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR:Thereisnopossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethan,analyzedintheFSARforthesamereasonasgivenin2a.3.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification:

Nomarginofsafetyhasbeendecreased oralteredforthereasongivenin2a.

PCM383-183SECURITYCONSOLE-LEDGRAPHICDISPLAYINTRODUCTION TheNRChasdetermined thatannunciation oftheSecuritySystempowersuppliesisrequiredforcompliance with10CFRPart73(i.e.requirements forsecuritysystemsfornuclearpowerplants).Tomeettheintentofthisrequirement, statuslightsshall,beinstalled onthesecuritysystemalarmconsolestoindicatethe"athand"condition ofthepowerinputtothesecuritySUPSandtherefore, totheentiresecuritysystem.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasi.sforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thesecuritvsystemisanon-safety relatedplantsystem.TheCentralandSecondary AlarmStationsarecomponents ofthissystem.Themodifications presented inthisPC/Maffectbothsafetyandnon-safety relatedplantequipment.

Themodifications totheCAS'ndSAScontrolpanels,i.e.installation andwiringoftheannunciator circuitry, andtheinputstothese.annunciators arenon-safety related.ThealarmstationsarelocatedintheTurbineandSecurityBuilding, whicharenon-safety, non-seismic structures.

Thema)orityofrequiredcabletotheseareaswillberoutedinnon-safety relatedcabletrayintheTGBandthroughthededicated securityductbankstotheSecurityBuilding.

Thebalanceofcablewillberoutedthroughappropriately dedicated raceway.Dieselgenerator breakerpositionismonitored toprovideinputtothe"Normal"and"Diesel"annunciator circuits.

Thisportionofthed'ieselgenerator

'ontrolcircuitry issafetyrelated.Therefore, thissignalwillbeisolatedfromthenon-safety securityannunciation circuitry byinstalling safetyrelatedisolation relaysin4160Vswitchgears 1A3and1B3.Theserelayswerepurchased underRPA432953tobequalified totheapplicable industrystandards.

Thebalanceofthecontrolrelaysthatarerequiredinthismodification havebeenpurchased andwillbeinstal'ed asnon-safety relatedequipment.

J%Controlpowertoallrelaysisfromtheassociated plantpowertrain(safetytoisolation relays,non-safety tothenon-safety controlrelays).Allcableswillberoutedthroughtheappropriate racewayandtheracewaywillbeseismically supported asrequired(i.e.insidetheRAB).Thismodification hasnoimpactontheplantTechnical Specification".

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safety,question, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPC/M.

PCM412-183MICROWAVE DETECTORREPLACEMENT INTRODUCTION TheexistingMicrowave 700seriesIntrusion Detection Systemwhichisinstalled attheUnit1and2perimeter fence,willbereplacedwith.Stellar's Model682E-Field.Thereplacement oftheMicrowave 700seriesatUnits1and2willbecoveredbyPC/Ms412-183and54-283,respectively.

PC/M412-183addresses Zones25,30,31,and32.~asenoteFPLStart-Uphaspreviously installed theStellarE-FieldsystematZones31and32inatest-bedapplication.

PC/M412-183willdocumentthesezonesasapermanent installation.

Thereisnoconstruction impactforthesezones.Aspreviously agreed,thechangeoutfromMicrowave toE-FieldintheareaoftheDischarge Canalhasfirstpriority.

Thiswilleliminate theneedfortheexistingsecuritystation,whichismanned24hoursaday.Therefore, Supplement 0ofPC/M412-183addresses theUnit1perimeter zonesattheDischarge Canal(Zones30,31,and32).Zone25willbemodifiedviaSupplement 1toPC/M412-183.SAFETY'ANAL'YSIS WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, P~50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyques-tion:(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thesecuritysystemisnon-safety related.Furthermore, themodifications totheperimeter intrusion detection systempresented bythisPC/Mwillimprovetheoverallsecuritysystemoperation.

The,changeoutfrommicrowave toE-Fieldisrequiredinordertoeliminate theneedforasecuritystationattheDischarge Canalwhichismanned24-hoursaday.Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; therefore,'rior Commission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPC/M.

PCM008-984NON-MANUAL PARKINGLOTThisengineering packagecoverstherestoration andrepavingoftheNon-Manual ParkingLotwhichisontheeastsideoftheSt.LuciePlant.Alsoincludedinthe.packageistheremovaloftheconstruction firewatertankintheparkinglot,aswellastheadditionofanimprovedarealightingdesign.Theparkinglotislocatedoutsideoftheplantsecurityfenceperimeter.

Themodifications includedinthisdesignpackagewillnotaffectanyplantsafety-related systemandaretherefore classified asnon-nuclear-safety-related.

Inaddition, theremovalof'theconstruction firewatertankwQlnotaffecttheplantfireprotection system,sincethisworkcannotbestarteduntilPCM178-985isimplemented.

PCM178-985tiesthefirewaterpipingdownstream fromthetankintotheplantsystem.Therestoration andrepavingoftheNon-Manual ParkingLotandthetankremovaldonotposeanyunreviewed safetyquestions.

TheNon-Manual ParkingLotislocatedoutsideofthesecurityperimeter fenceandwQ1notbeinthevicinityofanyplantsafety-related structure orsystem.Itdoesnotinanywayperformoraffectaplantsafety-related function.

TheNon-Manual ParkingLotarealightingdoesnotperformoraffectanyplantsafety-related.

systemsorfunction.

ItisbeingsuppliedfromLP.260whichisanon-safety reIatedlightingpanelandisnotloadedontheemergency dieselgenerator.

Theremovaloftheconstr'uction firewatertank.andpipingdoesnotaffectanyplantsafety-related systemorfunctions.

Thecitywatertotheplantisnotasafety-related system.Thefirewatersupplyfromthetankisnotpartoftheplantfirewatersystemanddoesnotaffectthatsystem.Themodifications totheNon-Manual ParkingLotdonotchangeanyassumptions madeorconclusions drawnintheSt.LuciePSAR.Therepavingofthelotdoesnotadversely affectanysitetopographic features.

Portheabovereasonsthemodifications oftheNon-Manual ParkingLotwillnotincreasetheprobability of'ccurrence northeconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tothesafetyoftheplant.Additionally, therewQ1continuetobenopossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction different thanthosealreadyevaluated inthePSAR.PinaQy,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthePlantTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.Itistherefore concluded thatthismodification doesnotposeanunreviewed safetyquestions pursuantto10CPR50.59anddoesnotaffectanytechnical specifications.

'INOTE-THISPACKAGECONTAINSSAFEGUARD DRAWINGS.

PCM174-184MAENSTEAMSAPETYVALVELIPTLEVERREMOVALSYSTEMDESCRIPTION

1.0 DesignDescription

OnFebruary9,1984,aPSL-2planttripcausedactuation oftheMainSteamSafetyValves(MSSV's).

Following thetransient, oneoftheMSSV'sfailedtoreseatbecausetheabsenceofthespindle~ut caterpinallowedthespindlenuttorotatedownontotheforkedliftleverandprevented fulltravelofthespindlerod.Topreventthistypeofeventfromoccurring again,thisdesignpackageallowsther'emovaloftheliftlevercomponents (spindlenut,cotterpinandforklever).AnewvalvecapisrequiredtomaintainASMECoderequirements concerning capsealing.2.0FunctionTheliftleverassemblyprovidesthecapability tomanuallyexercisethesafetyvalvetofacilitate blowingoutlines.Whiletheoriginalcomponent designspecification requiredaliftinglever,theCoderequirement forliftleversonClass2valveshasbeeneliminated.

Thepurchaser ofthesafetyvalves,C-Eagreesthattheseliftleverscanberemoved.Theoriginalvalve"designutilizedtheliftingleverassemblytosealthevalvecapandpreventunauthorized

'adjustments ofthevalve'ssetpressure.

CapsealingisrequiredbytheCode.Inordertomaintainthisrequirement, newvalvecapswithanintegralsealingdevicearerequired.

3.0 Operation

Removaloftheliftleversoperation oftheMSSV's.'IheMSSV'ssecondary sideoverpressure events.manuallyexercisethevalve,thecapliftleversreinstalled.

willnotimpacttheintendedwillstillbecapableofrelieving However,iftheneedarisestowillhavetoberemovedandtheSAFETYANALYSIS&%-WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence orthecoymequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification aDowsfor.theremovaloftheMSSVliftleversandreplacestluteexistingvalvecapswithonesthatwillenableproperCoderequiredsealingofthevalveadjusting bolts.Thismodification willnotin.anywayimpactorjeopardize theintendedoperation oftheMSSV'sortheirabilitytoprovideoverpressure protection forthesecondary sideofthesteamgenerator.

PCM174-184Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR(excessive heatremovalfromthesteamgenerator causedbyastuckopensafetyvalve)willbesignificantly reducedbyremovingtheliftlever.components.

Alsotheprobability ofamalfunction ofequipment importanttosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisalsoreducedbythismodification.

Noothertypeofaccidentormalfunction notpreviously evaluated intheFSARiscreated.Inaddition, itdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specifications.

AchangetoplantTech.Specs.isnotrequired.

'Iheforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischange'doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM187-184SUMMARYSTATEMENT

~Summar.EDGCPDRELAXREPLACEMENT ThisPC/Mprovidesthe.designforreplacement oftheexistingemergency dieselgenerator CFDcurrentdifferential relays.~fThisPC/Mimprovesthefragility leveloftheD/Gdifferential circuitbyreducingtheprobability ofrelaytripduetomechanical vibration.

Thismodification isaccomplished solelybyreplacing theexistingdifferential relaysandcases,whileimplementing nointernalorexternalwiringchangesinthedieselgenerator controlpanel.Thisthenprecludes anynewtypeofinteraction wkhothersafetyrelatedequipment.

Therefore, thisPC/Misnuclearsafetyrelatedbutdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SAFETYANALYSSThisPC/Mimprovesthevibrational fragility ofthedieselgenerator differential relaycircuit.Thisisaccomplished byreplacing theexistingCFDdifferential relayswithIJDdifferential relays.Thismakesthecircuitlesssusceptible tospurioustripscausedbycontrolpanelvibration.

Thismodification doesnotadversely affectthenormaloperation ofthedieselgenerator differential circuitoroperation ofthedieselgenerator.

Thereplacement differential relayshavebeenseismically testedbythevendorasstatedintheGeneralElectricMIL.NO.82-12.Theseismicresponsespectrum(TRS)for=theinstrument envelopes theSt.LucieUnit102EnvelopeResponseSpectrumfortheDieselGenerator Building(RRS)formasspoint53(elev.23.0')whichcorresponds totheinstrument location.

Adampingfactorof5%wasusedintheTRSinaccordance withIEEEStd-344-1975.

Consequently, a4%dampingfactorwasconservatively usedintheRRSforcomparison ofacceleration values.Theacceleration valuesrequiredbytheRRSareaminimumof2.8timeslessatallfrequencies thanthoseoftheTRSinthenonmperate mode,and4.9timeslessfortheoperatemode.Thiswillsufficiently accountforanyacceleration amplification throughtherelaycabinet.Inaddition, thesize,weight,.mounting locationandmountingdetailsofthereplacement relayswillbethesameasthatoftheoriginalrelays.Therefore, theoriginalrelaysupportandcabinetdesigncriteriawillnotbeadversely affected.

Thismodification doesnotaffectanycabletrayanalysis, Appendix"R"analysisoranyothersafety,relatedequipment asitonlyinvolvesreplacement ofrelaysonthedieselgenerator controlpaneLWithrespecttotheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheFSAR:ThePC/Msimplyinvolvesreplacing theCFDdifferential relaysandcases,Whichmeansonlyaslight'change ofinternalrelaycontactswithoutchangingtherelays'unction orexternalwiring.ThisPC/Mdoesnotaffecttheoperation oftheemergency dieselgenerator as.discussed'n FSAR8.0.,nordoesitadversely affecttheoperation oftheD/Goranyothersafetyrelatedequipment ThedesignbasisintheFSAR(Chapters 8and15).whichaddresses theoperation oftheD/G,isaneventinvolving thelossmfmffsite power.Theevaluation ofthisdesignbasisisnotaffectedbythisPC/M.

PCM187-184Withrespecttothepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSAR:ThisPC/Mjustinvolvesreplacing theexistingdieselgenerator differential relayswithanothermodeltoimprovethevibrational fragility ofthedifferential circuitandtherefore, doesnotcreatethepossibility oftheabove.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforaTechnical Specification:

AsthisPC/M'does notnotadversely affectoperation oftheemergency, diesel'generator, itdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheDieselGenerator Technical Specification 4.8.Additionally thisPC/MdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification asitonlyinvolveschangesinthedieselgenerator controlpanel.Therefore itcanbeconcluded thatthisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

PCM227-984TURBINEGANTRYCRANEPROXIMITY RESTRICTIONS INTRODUCTION ThisPCMprovidesrestrictions ontheproximity oftheUnits1and2tur-binegantrycranestoeachotherinordertopreventpotential overstress-ingoftheturbinebuildingstructure.

SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyques-tion;(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanacci-dentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated

.pre-viouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreat@8;or(iii)ifthemar-ginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theturbinebuildingisanon-Category Istructure andcontainsnosafetyrelatedequipment.

ThisPCMimposesarestriction oftheproximity oftheturbinebuildinggantrycranetoeachother.Thisrestriction assuresthattheassumptions usedinthebuildingdesignremainvalid.Ther'efore theimplementation ofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheprobability ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Implementation ofthis-PCMdoesnotinvolveachangetotheStLucieUnit2Technical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevalua-tionwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveany'nre-viewedsafetyquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequir-edfortheimplement'ation ofthisPCM.

PCM228-184EXCORENEUTRON-FLUXMONITORING SYSTEMINTRODUCTION PC/M228-184providesthemethodtoinstalltheEx-CoreNeutronFluxMonitoring Systemthatmonitorswideandsourcerangesneutronfluxwithindependent displaysintheControlRooma'ndHotShutdownPanel(HSP).=ThissystemmeetstheFPSLcommitment totheNRCbyproviding widerangeneutronfluxmonitoring inthehotshutdownpanelwhichisindependent oftheControlRoomandrequiredby18CFR50AppendixR.Italsosatisfies theguidelines ofRegulatory Guide1.97Rev.3byproviding aneutronmonitoring systemtomeetthedefinition andrequirements forcategary1variables asindicated intheRegulatory Guide.Inadditionthissystempermitsthecontinuity ofrefueling activities intheeventofafailureoftheexistingstart-upexcoredetectors duringrefueling.

Technical Specifications 3/4.9.3Refueling Operations, requiresthesuspension ofoperations involving corealterations orpositivereactivity changesifatleasttwostart~pdetectors arenotoperational.

Asaresultofamalfunction ofoneofthetwofissionchambersintheNeutronDetectorAssemblyChannelSB,duringthesystemcommissioning, itisneces'sary toreplacethemalfunctioning detector.

Thereplacement detectorissimilartotheonereplacedexceptthatitisenvironmentally qualified for10yearlifeplusDesignBasisAccident.

'TYANALYSISpithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,proposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences

'ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foraniccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.TheExcoreNeutronMonitoring SystemisaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemdesignedtomeettherequirements of)OCFR50AppendixRbyproviding independent sourcerangeandwiderangeneutronfluxmonitoring intheControlRoomandHSP.Italsosatisfies theguidelines ofRegulatory Guide1.97Rev3forcategory1variables.

Thesecomponents areseismically andenvironmentally qualified totherequirements ofIEEE323-1974and344-1975.

Theinsideandoutsidecontainment cableisqualified toIEEE'-383-1974.

Thereplacement detectoranditsintegralcableassembly, ofthefaileddetector, isalsoqualified toIEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1975 andIEEE383-1974, howeveritsqualified lifeis10yearsnormaloperation plusDesignBasisAccident, therefore thisreplacement detectorisconsidered onlyatemporary replacement.

PCM228-184TheExcoreNeutronMonitoring Systemisapost-accident monitoring systemthatprovidesaneutronsourcerangemonitoring signalwhichisredundant totheexistingnon-postaccidentqualified excoreneutrondetectorsystem.Theinstallation oftheExcoreNeutronMonitoring Systemdoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence of;anaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated sincethesystemperformsonlymonitoring functions, itisseismically andenvironmentally qualified; anditisnotinterlocked withanysafeguards system.Itdoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously sinceitisanindependent/redundant systemdesignedtomeettherequirements ofRegulatory Guidel.75.Theinstrumentation addedtotheexistingboards(RTGB-104, PACBandESP)hasbeenevaluated byEbascoanddoesnothaveanysignificant impactonthepreviousseismicqualification oftheboards.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthetechnical specifications isnotreduced.Infacttheadditional sourcerangeinstrumentation addedintheControlRoomwillpermitcontinuity inrefueling operations intheeventoffailureoftheexistingexcoredetectors bysatisfying therequirements ofTechnical Specification 3.49.2.Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafety'valuation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPC/M-PCM252-184INTRODUCTION TRAVELING WATERSCREENUPGRADERecentexperiences ofexcessive jellyfish runshavecauseddamagecotheintaketraveling waterscreens.,

ThisPCMreplacestheexistingtraveling waterscreenframesandbasketswithnew,highstrength, braced,sectionsthatwillincreasethestrengthofthescreenstoadifferential pressureheadcapacityof15feet.Inaddition, thereplacement basketswillbefurnished withintermediate andlowerliftinglipshavingserratededgestoimpaledebriswhichmayslipoucofthebasketsontheirupwardtravel.Asaresultofthesechanges,thescreenswillhaveanimprovedM>anceofsurviving afutureinfluxofjellyfish.

Theheadsections, footshaft assemblies andcarryingchainshavealsobeenreplacedwithupgradedcomponents tofurtherextendtheusefullifeofthescreens.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbeaeemedtoinvolveanunrevieweu safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobabilicy ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important cosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction o:adifferenctypethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysiReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety-asdefinedi:.thebasisforanytechrical specification isreduced.'ThisPCi".providesthedetailsformodificationslimprovemencs tocheexistingintaketraveling waterscreens.Thescreensarefabricate-'nd designedbyEnvirexIncorporated inaccordance witnEbas-cSpecification FLO8770.760, whichrequiresthatthescreenbenon-seismic andnon-safety related.ThisPCMincreases thescreng.nofthescreenstoadifferential pressureheadcapacityof15feet.Thestrengthening ofthescreensdoesnotaltertheconditions towhichtheymaybesubjected butwillreducethedamagetothescreensintheeventofanexcessive differential pressurecondition.

Thenewloadsimposedontheexistingembeddedguideslotsasaresultofthescreenredesignhavebeenreviewedandareacceptable.

Eachtraveling screenispresently furnished withapneumatic differential waterlevelcontroller forautomatic operation.

Initially, thescreenwashpumpandrotationofthescreer.willautomatically startwhenaspecified differential pressureheadlossisreached.Whenthedifferential pressureincreases beyond'his point,thecontrolroomisalertedviaanannunciator whichreceivesitsinputfromdifferential pressureindicator transmitters.

Tnemodifications issuedviathisPCMdonotalterinanywaytneoperation oftheexistingcontrolsystem.Modification issuecviachisPCMsubmergence 1eve1sfromtheIntakeCirculatingWater(CW)puŽp.Incomipromise theoperation orsaeyofwi11notimpacttheminimu-..

CoolingWater(ICW)pumportneaddir,ion, thisPCMwillno:these-pumps.

PCM252-184Therefore, theimplementation probability orconsequences ofdoesitcreateanynewtvpesofdoesnotinvolveacnangeSpecifications.

ofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheanyaccidentpreviously evaluated noraccidents.

lmplementatior.

ofthisPD:totneStLucieUnit1Technics1Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvclveanunreviewed safetvquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimpi.ementation of'hisPCH.

PCM015-185DIESELGENERATOR AIRSTARTSYSTEMPIPINGMODIPICATION PC/MSCONCESystemDescription Ea'chdieselgenerator (D/G)setatSt.LucieUnit//1hasanindependent airstartingsystem.Eachsystemhasfourskidmountedairreceivers whichprovidesufficient airchargefortenstartsperdieselgenerator set.Theairreceivers arepressurized byanelectrically drivencompressor viaanairdryer.Adieseldrivenaircompressor isusedasabackuptotheelectricdriven"compressor.

Thechargingairflowstothenumber3and0airreceivers inparallelandthentothenumber1and2"airreceivers throughtheoutletairheader.DesignDescription Theairreceiverchargingconfiguration willbemodifiedbyinstalling abranchofftheairdryeroutletpipingtothenumber1and2airreceivers (1Al,1A2,IB1and1B2).Thenewlinewillenablethecompressors tochargethenumber1and2airreceivers inparallelwiththenumber3and0airreceivers.

Theexistingdieseldrivenaircompressor discharge checkvalves(V-17355A) willberelocated tobeinthenewchargingline.Newcheckvalveswillbeinstalled atthedischarge ofalltheaircompressors.

Aflexibleconnector willbeinstalled inthecharginglinetoalltheairreceivers inordertolimittheboundaryoftheseismicstressanalysis.

Drawings3PE-15-185.001,.002,.003and.000showthebeforeandafterD/Gairstartschematics.

SAFETYANALYSISTheproposedchangeisolatesthetwoairreceiversets(andassociated airstartmotorsets)perD/Genginebymodifying theinletairheadersandclosingtheoutletairheadercross-connect valve.Themodificationprovidesfurtherseparation andredundancy thanrequiredbytheSt.LucieUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).Eachemergency dieselenginestartingsystemmustbeindependent andphysically separated fromothersystemsservingtheredundant dieselgenerator, suchthatasinglefailureinanyoneofthesystemswillaffectonlytheassociated dieselgenerator.

Thismodification willmakeeachD/Gengineairstartmotorsetsindependent andphysically separated.

Therefore, afailureassociated withoneofthetwoairreceiversetsperD/GenginewillnotdisabletheairstartsystemforthethatD/Gengine.Thisredundancy isaboveandbeyondwhatisrequiredbytheFSAR,Reg.GuidesorGeneralDesignCriteriaforSt.LucieUnit5/1.Themodification doesnotinvolveanUnreviewed SafetyQuestionbecause:1)Theprobabilityofoccurrence ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisdecreased b'ecausetheairstartmotorsetsandassociated airreceivers andpipingareindependent andseparated.

~t PCM015-185Theconsequence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisdecreased becauseasingleequipment malfunction willnotdisablebothairstartmotorsetsonaD/Gengine.3)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethatanypreciously evaluated intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausetheairstartsystemoperatesfunctionally thesameasbeforewithoutintedependence betweenairmotorsets.0)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnical Specification isincreased, notreduced,becausegreater'reliability tostartbothD/G'sisprovided.

ThisPC/Misclassified asaNuclearSafetyRelatedchangebecausetheairreceiverinletheadersuptothecheckvalvearerequiredtowithstand alldesignbasisevents,toprecludeanairreceiversetfromlosingsufficient airpressurefortencoldstartsofaDieselGenerator.

ThepipingupstreamoftheairreceiverinletheadercheckvalveisnotNuclearSafetyRelatedbecausetheabilitytochargetheairreceivers duringorafteradesignbasiseventisnotrequiredpertheFSAR.Thespecificpipeswhichareattachedtothenewsupportsarenon-safety related.Assuch,thesesupportsareclassified non-safety related,QA/QCrequired.

Thepipesupportshavebeen-seismically designedsothattheywillnotinteractwithnearbysafetyrelatedequipment orpipingintheeventofanearthquake.

PCM022-185INSTRUMENT AIRUPGRADETIE-INSSYSTEMDESCRIPTION t.0~Oeratinn TheInstrument Air(IA)tie-insprovidedbythismodification willhaveisolation valveswhichshouldremainclosedatalltimesuntilthebalanceoftheinstrument airmodification isimplemented.

Thesevalvesshouldbeincludedinthevalvealignment tableinOperating Procedure 1-1010020.

2.0 FunctionThismodification

functions toprovidealloutagerelatedtie-instotheIASystemsothatinstallation ofnewcompressors anddryerscanbecompleted duringplantoperations.

Notethatelectrical tie-inscanbeinstalled duringanyplantoperating mode.3.0DesinDescritionThismodification providestie-insforcoolingwatertothenewcompressors.

ThecoolingwaterwillbefromthelocalTurbineCoolingWater(TCW)Systemsupplyandreturnheaders.Themodification alsoprovidestie-instotheIASystemjustupstreamoftheexistingairreceiver.

Eachtie-inwillconsistofanisolation valve,piping,pipecapandthenecessary materials to.tieintotheexistingpiping.SAFETYEVALUATION le0Thismodification isnon-seismic, non-safety relatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:1.2TheTCWandIASystemsperformnosafetyfunctionandareclassified asnon-safety, non-seismic QualityGroupD.Thesemodifications donotinteractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.

le3Nosafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents arecompromised

.byanyassumedfailureofanyexistingornewequipment orcomponents.

IANoTechnical Specifications arealteredora'dversely affected.

2.0Carehasbeentakeninthedesignto'eliminate orcontrolaspectswhichcouldbehazardous toequipment and/orpersonnel.

PCM024-,185ELECTRICPENETRATION ASSEMBLIES'NSTALLATION ABSTRACTThisengineering packagecoversreplacement ofcertainEgectricPenetration Assemblies (EPAs)attheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1.Thesemodifications consistof:l.RemovaloffiveexistingEPAsmanufactured byGulfGeneralAtomicCompany,EPADesignation NosC8,Dl,D2,D3andD9.TheseEPAsareusedforlowvoltagepowerandcontrolcircuits.

2.Installation ofsixnewEPAsmanufactured byConaxBuffaloCorporation.

TnesenewEPAswillbeinstalled inthecontainment nozzlesitemizedaboveandsparecontainment nozzleC9.3.Recircuiting ofallcircuitspresently connected toNo4,No8andNo12AWGmodulesassociated withalltheGulfGeneralAtomicCompanyEPAsinstalled atUnitNo1.InadditiontothefiveremovedEPAs,tnismodification affectsnineotherexisting'ulf GeneralAtomicEPAs,totalling approximately 400-circuits.

The'ffectedcircuitshavebeenprovidedinAttachments 4and5.TheEPAsareclassified asSafetyClass2(gualityGroupB),Class1E,seismicCategoryIcomponents andperformasafetyrelatedfunction.

Therefore,.

thisPC/Misconsidered nuclearsafetyrelated.Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

The,modifications donotinvolve-anunreviewed safetyquestionandprior'ommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction

.ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences

.ofanaccidentormalfunction isnotincreased since:EPAsarebeingsuppliedbyConaxBuffaloCorporation, whohassuppliedpreviously fiveEPAsinstalled intheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1,aswellasalltheEPAsforUnitNo2.TheseEPAshavebeenenvironmentally andseismically qualified in,accordance withIEEE317-1976forapplication inbothStLuciePlants.Tnedesign,fabrication, test,inspection, installation, and~~qualification oftheEPAsareinaccordance withIEEE317-1976andtheASIDEBGPVCode,SectionIII,Subsection NEfarClassMCComponents.

Asdiscussed intheDesignAnalysis, allratingsassociated withthenewequipment meetorexceedtherequirements fortheapplication.

PCM024-185Newwirewayismanufactured byHoffman,vendoroftheexistingEPAwirewaysystem.Wirewayins"allation hasbeenanalyzedassuitablefortheapplication asdiscussed intheDesignAnalysis.

Allnewcablesarequalified totheflametestrequirements ofIEEE3S3-1974'and,exceptforafewCEDMcircuitjumpers,aresuitableforClass1Euse,asistheRaychemsplicematerial.

Asdiscussed intheDesignAnalysis, theCEDMjumpercableissuitableforuseundertheStLuciePlantnormalconditions andisde-energized immediately uponreactortrip.Specialconsideration oftheCEDMcircuitconductors isconsistent withthepresentStLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR(Reference Section3.11.5.4).

The.possibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously analyzedisnotcreatedsince:ThenewEPAsarequalified totherequiredenvironment andwillbeabletoperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionpostDBA.Theonlymodification toplantcomponents isrecircuiting tothenewEPAs.Thecomponents beingthusmodifiedhavebeenreviewedtoassurethattheirremovalfromserviceforrecircuiting

-~esnotviolatetechnical specifications norimpactrequiredplantsystems.Containment vesselstructural integrity isunaffected bythismodification, asdiscussed intheDesignAna1ysis.

Aftertheinstallation oftheEPAs,theoverallcontainment boundary.

integrity willbeverifiedviaa10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeAleakratetest.'Inaddition, alocalTypeBleaktestwillbeperformed oneachEPAtoverifytheintegrity oftheelectricfeedthrough seals.Configuration oftheinterface betweentheexistingplantcableandthenewequipment isconsistent withthedesignbasesestablished inthe.StLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR.Tnisinsuresthattheconsequences ofallanalyzedaccidents remainunchanged.

Also,nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areintroduced bythismodification.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsinceSpecialInstructions havebeenprovidedinSection9.0sotheimplementation ofthismodification doesnotviolatetheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1Technical Specifications.

Therefore, theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'plant'sTechnical Specifications.

Aholdpoint hasbeenestablished forthereworkofEPAC3conduitsandthetermination locations intheRCBverticaltermination boxes.Thisholdpoint willberemoveduponaccesstotheRCBandfield'erification oftheexistinginstallation.

Pendingthereleaseoftnehold,arevisedsafetyevaluation willbeprovided.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewritte"safetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesno"involveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM039-185DIESELGENERATOR SUBSYSTEM FLOWDIAGRAMSModification Description Allvalvesandinstruments mustbetaggedinthefieldasperthenewflowdiagrams.

L2.)Affectedoperating procedures mustbereviewedtodetermine ifrevisionisrequiredtoreQectth~ewtagnumbersorQowdiagramnumbers.IIIla.Withrespecttotheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated inthePSAR:ThisPC/MreleasesthenewDieselGenerator Subsystem FlowDiagramstothesiteThefoll'owing activities mustbecompleted beforethenewfiowdiagramscanbeissuedaspermanent plantdrawings:

Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered inevaluating FSARaccidents.

lb.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered inevaluating FSARaccidents.

1c.Withrespecttotheprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important-tosafetypreviously evaluated inFSAR:Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.

1d.Withrespecttotheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tonuclearsafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR:Plowdiagramsarenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofsafetyrelatedequipment malfunctions.

2a.Withrespecttothepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR'-Flowdiagramsarenotconsidered inevaluating FSARaccidents.

2b.Withrespecttothepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananalyzedintheFSAR-'low diagramsarenotconsidered indetermining theprobabilities ofsafetyrelatedequipment malfunctions.

3..Withrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytchnicalspecification:

Flowdiagramsdonotimpacttechnical specification safetymargins.Basedonthe'above,thenewQowdiagramsandthetagging/retagging ofdieselgenerator valvesandinstruments aredetermineQ nottoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therearenosystemmodifications involved.

PCM047-185G.E.SAMRELAYSP.C.CARDREPLACEMENT IntroductionTheGeneralElectrictype.Sam11ButilizedatSt.LuciePlantare~operatedtimingrelaysthatemploysolidwtate components toprovideanextremely stabletimedehyfunction.

Thisrelayfindsapplication, wherevershort9.C.operatedtimingfunctions arerequired.

Specifically thisrelayisusedforcircuitbreakerfaQureback~protection schemeswhereaccurateandrepeatable timesettingsare.essentiaL Ithasbeendetermined thatitispossibleforthistyperelaytooperateinlessthanthesettimedelayiftheinitiating contactexperiences averyspecificmodeofcontactbounce.Theforeshortened operating timehasbeenobservedbyotherusersandhasbeendemonstrated inthefactoryundercarefully controlled testconditions.

Althoughtheactualoccurrence ofthisparticular modeofinitiating contactbounceappearstoberatherunlikely, aminordesignchangeinternaltotherelayhasbeenrecommended bythemanufacturer.

ItistheintentofthisPC/Mtoincorporate thedesigncha~ewhichreplacestheexistingprintedcircuitboardintherelaytoeliminate thepossibility ofsuchforeshortened timingbytheSAMrelay..Thismodification hasbeenreviewedwithrespecttoTitle'10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,whichstatesthataproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed

'safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evahiated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis.foranytechnical specification isreduced.Themodification beingperformed underthisPC/Mwillenhancetheoperation oftheG.FSam1IBrelayassuringthatiftheunlikelyeventofaninitiating contactbounceoccurred, therelaywilltimeoutappropriately.

TheG.ESam11Brelayaffectedareutilizedforcircuitbreakerfaourebackupprotection schemesandarenotinanysafetyrelatedcircuitorperformed asafetyrelatedfunction.

Environmental qualification isjustified bythefactthattheserelaysandthustheirinternalPCcards'arelocatedinamildenvironment.

Thereisnoseismicconcernsaffectedbythismodification, therelays.havenoseismicrequirements associated withthem.Therefoie, theprobability ofapreviously reviewedaccidentisnotincreased, thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typehasnotbeencreatedandthemarginofsafetyhasnotbeenreduced.Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'pla'nt'echnical specification.

'Iheforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevahation whichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore, priorCommission approvalforimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotnecessary.

PCM064-185MSRRETUBINGThisEngineering Packagecoversthemodifications totheMoistureSeparator'eheaters (MSRs)andtotheScavenging SteamVentCondenser (SSVC)System.Th'ema)orfeatureofthispackageisBieinstallation ofnewtubebundlesintheMSRswhichwillprovideimprovedthermalperformance oftheplantsecondary side.Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed againsttherequirements oflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,theseMSRandSSVCmodifications areclass1fied asnon-safety related,donotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquest1on, andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressed inSection3,"SafetyEvaluation"

).However,theMSROperating Procedure mustberevisedpriortoplant.startup.SAFETYEVALUATION MithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposed.

changeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important'to safetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction efadifferent typethananyevaluated prev1ously 1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)1fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunrevi,ewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ1pment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalys1sreportisnotincreased.

TheMSRs,theportionofMainSteamassociated withtheMSRsandtheHeaterDrainSystempipingarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.0Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction of-adifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated..

The.components involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.

PCM064-185iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,'ince thecomponent involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

Theimpl'ementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolve'nunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM073-185ABSTRACTMSRPERFORATED PLATEMODIFICATION ThisEngineering Packagecoversthemodifications totheMoistureSeparator Reheaters (MSRs).Thispackageisfortheinstallation ofperforated'lates 1ntheMSRswhichwillprovidebettersteamflowdistribution.

Thiswillimprovethermalperformance oftheplantsecondary sideandreduceerosion/corrosion ofthemoistureseparator vanesandsupports.

Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed aga1nsttherequirements oflOCFR50.59; Asaresult,thisMSRmodification isclassified asnon-safety related,doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion, doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification, andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressed inSection3,"SafetyEvaluation"

).However,theMSROperating Procedure mustberevisedpriortoplantstartupasindicated inPCM064-185.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)1$apossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanany'valuated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanytechnical specification 1sreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated 1nthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincetheMSRsarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshas'eenmadetothe~operational designofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodificat1on arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidethebasesthat.thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM131-185REPLACEMENT OFRISDEVICESINTRODUCTION ThisPC/Misfortheinstallation offourteen(14)newtransmitters byRochester Instrument SystemsmodelSC-1302-323 toreplaceexistingunits.Theexistingtransmitters arereachingtheirqualified lifeexpectancy.

Therefore, anewre-placement unitisrequiredtosatisfythe'ifeexpectancy requirement.

SAFETYANALYSIS'VithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbe,deemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe'afety analysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibil'itv foranacci-dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalvsisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthom>>>>~nf~~<atv~~definedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Th'mod'ication doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollow-ingprov'desthebasesforthisconclusion.

~~~Thesenewtransmitters byRISarequalified environmentally toIEEE-323-1974 a'ndseismically toIEEE-344-1975.

ThisPC/Mreplacesex'tingRIStrans=itte sw'hnewunitsthussatisfy'g thelifeexpectancy requirement.

These'-'qualification ofthesedeviceshavebeenpreviously reviewedforthepart'u'ar mountinglocationandfoundacceptable.

Theseismicintegrity oftheRTGB,PostAccidentPanel'AandRadiation Monitor'ng Cabinet"E"arenotaffec:edsincethedeviceisareplacement foranexisting, identica'evice atthesamelocation.'herefor-

-"'smod'fication willnotofanyaccident, whetherprevious'y evalua:ed of'dfere".evaluated andwillnotreducethesafetyoftheplan:.t4aqsiei4ni~r~~CThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoenotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specificat'ons.

Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvdlveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM142-185APPENDIXRCONTROLROOMINDEPENDENCE FORALTERNATE SHUTDOWNINTRODUCTION Sincetheseparation definedinAppendix"R"SectionIII.G.2cannotbeprovidedforessential components andcircuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom,alternative shutdowncapability isprovided.

ThisensuresthatintheunlikelyeventafiremakestheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroomuninhabitable orrendersequipment ineitherroominoperable;-

theplantcanbesafelysakentocoldshutdownfromremotelocations andHotShutdownControlPanel(HSCP)ThisPC/Minstallsredundant fuses,.isolation switchesandfuseblockstovariouscontrolcircuitsasidentified bythe"Essential Equipment ListforAlternate Shutdown" transmitted byEbascoletterP-M-SL-85-0325 datedFebruary28,1985.Themodifications tothecontrolcircuitswillassuresafeshutdownfromtheHotShutdownPanelandotherlocalcontrolstationsshouldafiredisabletheessential circuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreading room.Theaddedcomponents arelocatedoutsidetheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclusion.

Thematerial, devicesassociated withthismodification, willbeClass1Ewhereconnected to.safetygradeequipment.

SafetygradedevicesshallconformtoIEEE-323-1974 andIEEE-344-1975

'hismodification providesthemeansforanalternate plantshutdownbytheinstallation ofadditional switchesandredundant fusestoisolatetheControlRoomintheunlikelyeventofafire.Thenewcableroutingisbeingdoneinaccordance w'ithStLucieUnitNo1ampacityandtrayfillcriteria.

Thesafetyrelatedswitchgears, MCC,and'iesel Generator panelhavebeenreviewedtoaccountfortheeffectoftheweightsoftheaddeddevices.Basedontheinsignificant addedweight,weconcludethereisnoimpact.to theexistingequipment seismicqualifications.

Therefore, thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability oftheoccurrence ofanaccident, whetherpreviously evaluated orofadifferent typethenpreviously evaluated andwill~otreduce,thesafetyoftheplant.

PCM142-185ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical-specifications, nordoesitrequirearevisionof,atechnical specification.

Thismodification willbeperformed inaccordance withtherequirements ofTechnical Specification TS-3.4.3andTS-3.4.4.

Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorcommission

'approval fortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM155-185REACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGPIPEASSEMBLYTHECLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGASSEMBLYCONSISTSOFTHREEMAJORASSEM-BLIESNAMELYr'(1)THELIFTINGFRAMEASSEMBLY>>

(Z)THElINKASSEMBLYWHICHINCLUDESTHEBOXGIRDERASSEMBLYANDTHEPIPEASSEMBLYr AND(3)THEPLATFORMASSEMBLY>>

THEPIPEASSEMBLY.

IS"ATTACHEDTOTHETRAMRAILANDTHETRAMRAILISATTACHEDTOTHEHOISTWHICHISATTACHEDTOTHEPIPE'SSEMBLY+

THEASSEMBLYROTATESVIATHETRAMRAILANDALLOWSTHETENSIONING DEVICESTOBEINPOSITION>

THEINTENTOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOUTILIZETHEPIPERINGOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYASANAXRDISTRIBUTION HEADERFORTHEPNEUMATIC TUGGERSFOMHESTUDTENSIONING DEVICES'HIS ENTAILSTHEINSTAILATIONOFAZ'IAMETER AXRSUPPLYNOZZLEANDTHREE1'IAMETER OUTLETNOZZLESFORTHEPNEUMATIC TUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES>>THISWILLELIMINATE THEUSEOFXNDIVXDUAl SUPPLYLINESTOTHETUGGERSANDWILLREDUCEPERSONNEL RADI-ATIONEXPOSUREANDHIlLALSOPROVIDEEASEINRIGGINGANDREMOVALOFTHETUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES.OVERALL>>THISMODIFICATION WILLEASEUPTHEENTIRESTUDTENSIONING OPERATIONS SAFETYANALYSISWITHRFSPECTTOTITLEleOFTHFCODEOFFEDERALRfGULATION>>

PART5859>>APROPOSEDCHANGESHALLBEDEEMEDTOINVOlVEANUNREVIEHED SAFETYQUESTION>>

(1)IFTHEPROBABILITY OFOGCURENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT XMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVI-OUSLYEVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBEINCREASED>>

OR(II)IFAPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBECREATED>>OR(III)IFTHEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATXON ISREDUCEDTHEPROBABILITY ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OF.EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANAL-YSISREPORTISNOTINCREASED BECAUSETHEPIPERINGASSEMBLYTHATISBEINGMODIFIEDDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTIONANDDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFE%SHUTDOWNCAPABILXTY OFTHEUNIT>>THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTCREATEANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PCVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTBECAUSETHEADDEDNOZZLESAREWELDEDANDMADEASPARTOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYWHICHDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFt)RANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ISNOTREDUCEDSINCETHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTREQUIREANYREVISIONTOANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS iTHEFOREGOING CONSTITUTES>>

PER16CFR56o55'B)r THEWRXTTENSAFETYEVALUATION HHICHPROVIDESTHEBASISTHATTHISCHANGEDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION>>

THEREFORE>>

PRIORCOMMISSION APPROVALISNOTREQUIREDFORTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISPC/Mo PCM169-185'ZURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEM.ABSTRACT REASLN-85-72 requested engineering tobeprovidedtoupgradetheUnitIturbinegantrycranebrakesystemtomeetthe"operating capabilities oftheexistingUnit2turbinegantrycranebrakesystem.Baseduponthedesignandhardware" providedbythecranevendor(Indusco),

apneumatic hydraulic systemfunctionally equivalent tothatutilizedontheUnit2turbinegantrycranewasimplemented.

Tosupportthismodification, a10CFR50.59reviewwascompleted andtherespective safetyanalysiswhichisnowpartofthisdocumentwastransmitted byRef.3.Thisdesignpackagefunctions toendorsethebrakemodification implemented bythevendor.Themodification isconsidered Non-NuclearSafetyRelatedanddoesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.

RevisionIprovides'changes tothedrawinglisttoreference attachedinstruction manualsnotaddressed byRevision0.Thisrevisiondoesnotchangetheoriginalscopeofwork.The10CFR50.59reviewandsafetyevaluation asprovidedbyRevision0,therefore, remainsvalidandisacceptable.

Inaddition, nochangesto.theTechnical Specifications wererequiredbyRevision0orarerequiredbyRevisionlofthisdesignpackage.SAFETYEVALUATION TheUnit1turbinebuildinggantrycraneislocatedontheturbinebuildingandassuchisnotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.

Therefore, thismodification affectsonlyNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedQualityGroupDequipment.

Thecranedesignrequirements ofNUREG0612"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"arenotapplicable totheSt.Lucie1TurbineGantryCrane(FPLLetterL-81-276fromR.E.UhrigtoD.EisenhutdatedJuly2,1978).Basedonafailuremodeanalysis, failureoftheturbinegantrycranebrakingsystemasprovidedbythismodification willnotinhibittheoperation ofanyexistingsafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.

Thenewbrakingsystemprovidesahydraulic brakeforeachcranemotorthusproviding controloflateralmovementofthecranealongitsrails.Failuretoprovidethisbreakingactionwillresultinaninability toadequately controllateralmovementofthecrane.Additionally, allnewelectrical components addedbythismodification arepoweredfromthecraneelectrical systemwhich.ispoweredfromanonvitalsource.Therefore anyfailuremodeanalyzedforthenewbrakingsystemwillnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.

Basedonthisinformation itcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59 doesnotexistsincetheconsequences ofallanalyzedaccidents remainsunchanged.

Additionally, withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areintroduced asaresultofusingthenewbrakesystem.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreducednorhavechanges'o theTechnical Specifications beenrequired.

Inconclusion, thismodification isacceptable

-fromthestandpointof'uclearsafetysinceitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequirechangestotheTechnical Specifications.

Therefore implementation ofthismodification withoutpriorNRCapprovalisacceptable.

PCM174-185RCPOILLIFTSYSTEMPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENT INTRODUCTION ThisPC/Misfortheinstallation oftwenty(20)pressuresw'tchesbyBarksdale ModelB1T-A48SS toreplacetheexistingBarksdale Model9048-4.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshal'edeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyouestion; (i)iftheprobab1'yofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanacc'dentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluateo intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossb-liryforanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafety,AnalysisReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specif'ation isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesfor'hisconclusion.

Thenewswitcheswillbemountedinthesameplaceandmannerastheexist-ingswitches, whicharemountedseismically.

Bothswitcheshavethesameweight2.5lbs.Theydonotperformanysafetyfunctionandarenon-safety related.ThisPC/Mdoes'otreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnical specifications.

jTheimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical speci'fica'tions.

Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthipPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM178-985TIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTION PIREMAINANDPLANTPIRELOOPAbstractThisPlantChange/Modification isfortheconnection oftheBackfitConstruction FireHaintotheStLucieUnits1and2FireWaterLoop-Thl.sconnection consistsoftwoseparatetie-insbetweenthefiremainandthefireloop.Thl.sPCMI.snotclassified asSafetyRelatedsincethefiremainandthefireloopdonotperformanysafetyfunction.

Sincethefireloopprovidesprotection forsafetyrelatedequipment, thisPCMisclassified asQualityRelated.Thl.sPCHprovidesadditional fireprotection totheplantsincethesetie-l.nscreateanadditional firewatersupplytootherportionsofthePlant.SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethefiremain/fire looptie-inisqualityrelatedandthismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment performing asafetyfunction.

Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincethefiremain/fire looptie-inhasno'afetyfunction.

andnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.iiiThismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specification.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCHisnotrequired.

PCM179-185DIESELGENERATOR COOLINGSYSTEMVALVEREPLACEMENT ABSTRACTThisengineering packagecoversthereplacement ofseveralvalvesintheDieselGenerator CoolingSystemandDemineralized NakeUpWaterSystem.Thereplacement oftheDieselGenerator CoolingSystemValvesisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedanddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Thereplacement ofthevalvesintheDemineralized MakeUpWaterSystemisclassified asnonnuclearsafetyrelated.SAFETYEVALUATION Thereplacement ofvalvesintheDieselGenerator CoolingWater'System andtheDemineralized Make'pWaterSystemdoesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59.Thereplacement ofvalvesintheDemineralized MakeUpWaterSystemhasnoeffectonnuclearsafetysincetheD.LWaterSystemisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentprevention ormitigation andfailureofthesystemwouldnotresultinareleaseofradioactive materiaLThereplacement of.valvesintheDieselGenerator CoolingSystemdoesnotincreasetheprobability'previously analyzedaccidents sincetheD/Gsarenotutilizedindetermining theprobabilities ofaccidents.

Sincethevalvereplacement doesnotchangetheoperation oroperability ofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipment important tosafety,theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, theprobability ofandconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviouslyanalyzedhavenotchanged.Likewise, thepossibility ofanewaccidentoranewmalfunction hasnotbeencreatedsincetheoperation oroperability ofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipment important tosafetyhasnotchanged.Inaddition, themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenchangedsincethismodification doesnotchangetheperformance, loadcapabilities, oroperating characteristics ofthedieselgenerators.

PCM199-985WATERTREATMENT I'LANTREGENERATXON WASTENEUTRALIZATION TANKMODIPICATION ABSTRACTThesubjectREArequested aneutralization tankbeaddedtotheWaterTreatment Plant(WTP)tomeetcurrentDepartment ofEnvironmental Regulation (DER)regula'tions governing discharge ofhazardous wastes.Theneutralization tankmodification (PC/M116-985)providesthenecessary detailsforinstallation ofthistankandtheassociated piping,equipment andcomponents necessary toallowforregeneration wastestobeautomatically directedtothetankduring'the appropriate timesintheregeneration process.Duringthecausticinjection stepsofregeneration, causticsolutions mustbedirectedtothetank.Theexistingsystem,however,isunabletoprovidethenecessary flowsandpressures requiredtoaccommodate theseregeneration stepsduetotheadditional headlossinthenewpipingruns.Thus,toaccommodate thenewarrangement, aboosterpumpmustbeaddedtothecausticdilutionwaterdemineralized watersupply.Inaddition, thecausticdilutionwaterflowcontrolvalveandflowindicator/transmitter mustbereplacedtoaccommodate theflowrequirements.

Thissystemisnotrequiredforplantsafeshutdown; therefore thismodification isnon-nuclear safetyrelatedanditsimplementation doesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SAFEFYEVALUATION Thesubjectmodification providesforadditionofaboosterpumpandflowcontrolvalveinthecausticdilutionwatersupplytotheWTP.Inaddition, themodification providesforreplacement ofcertaincausticdilutionwaterflowtransmitter components toaccommodate therequiredflowrates.AsdefinedinSection9oftheUnit1PSAR,theWTPanditsassociated systemsareclassified asnon-nuclear safetyielatedandarenotrequiredtoperformasafetyfunction.

Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis, asaddressed intheDesignAnalysis, themodification hasnoaffectonnuclearsafety.Therefore, themodification isadequately classified asNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedQualityGroupD.Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysh,itcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59isnotcreated.Sincethemodification affectsonlytheWTPwhichisclassified asNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedandcannotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents asaddressed inthefailuremodeanalysis, theconsequences ofallanalyzedaccidents remainsunchanged.

Also,withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidents ormalfunctions areintroduced asaresultofthis.designchange.Additionally, themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.Therefore, anunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexist.Sincethismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, norrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications, thismodification isacceptable withrespecttonuclearsafetythuspriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthemodification.

PCH202-185CCWSTRAINERBACKFLUSH DRAINAbstractThisengineering designpackage(EDP)modifiestheCCWStrainerBackflush Drainpiping.Existingcastiron-andfiberglass drainpiping,whichisrouteatotheCCWsump,willbereplacedwithstainless steelpipingwhichtiesintotheICWdischarge line.Thiswilleliminate thefloodingproblemintheCCWpitarea,whichiscausingcorrosion of=structural steelandpipingsupportsmountedonornearthefloor.~~ThisEDPisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthatthisEDP-doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59',aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously

'valuated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodification includedinthisengineering designpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincetheconnection ofaCCWstrainerbackflush drainlinetotheICWdischarge linewillhavenoeffectonthesafetyperformance oftheICWorCCWsystemsoranyoftheircomponents.

(ii)Thereisnopossiblity foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evalutedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designoftheCCWstrainerbackflush system.(iii)This modification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefined.inthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Implementation ofthisengineering designpackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommxsszon approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCSisnotrequired~

PCM004-186LUBEOILCENTRIFUGE ANNUNCIATION INTRODUCTION Modification isrequiredtotheexistingTurbineLubeOilCentrifuge circuit.Atpresent,onlylocalannunciation isprovidedforTurbineLubeOilabnormalconditions.

Amodification tothepresentdesignisrequiredtotie-inthislocalsignaltotheannunciator attheRTGB.Thiswillprovideinformation toalerttheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressureorlowoiltemperature.

SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation, Part50.59,a'proposed changeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunc~nofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifa'ossibility foranaccidentormalfunctionofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnot.involveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclusion.

Theadditional signalprovidedattheRTGBenhancesthepresentsystembyproviding turbinelubeoilcentrifuge annunciation underabnormalconditions.

Thisinformation alertstheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressure.

orlovoiltemperature.

Inaddition, therearenosafetyconcernsassociated viththecircuitry changesandnevcablerouting,forthefollowing reasons:1~The~urbine lubeoilcircuitry isnon-safety related.2.Thelocationofthecableroutingspecified inthebackfitsketchesvillnotdamageanysafetyrelatedequipment.

Therefore, thismodification villnotincreasetheprobability oftheoccurrence ofanyaccident, vhetherpreviously evaluated ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated andvillnotreducethesafetyoftheplant.~ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotreq'reachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, andpriorCommission approval'fortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM007-186NONRETURNVALVESACTUATION SOLENOIDS ABS1'RACfZnisengineering packagecoversthemodifications toimprovetheperformance oftheTurbineExtraction SteamReverseCurrentValves(NR4)onoverspeed turbinetrip.Tnemodifications anddetailsconsistoftheadditionofapressureswitchintheturbineOverspeed Protection Control(OPC)headerinterlocked withsix(6)NRV'sactuation solenoids andthereplacement ofthepneumatic HRVtestvalveswitnelectric'est pushouttons.

Presently theindividual solenoids areactuatedbyhighlevelswitcnesinstalled inthecorresponding feedwater neaters.BasedonthedesignoftheMainTurbineanditsSubsystems andtheextraction steamlinesNRV's,thisEngineering Packagehasbeenclassifiednon-safetyrelated.Primarily, theNRl'swillimprovetheclosingtimeonturbineoverspeed trip.Thisisthemainobjective oftnisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10of.theCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanuneviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysis'eport maybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.'he SteamTurbineandReverseCurrentValvesarenonsafety related.Theinstrumentation additions andchangestobeperformed havenoimpactonanysafetyrelatedplantsystemsand/oroperations.

Themodifications improvetheequipment operation withoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.The,additionofthepressureswitch,thelocalelectrictestpushoutton andthedeletionofthepneumatic testvalvewillimprovetheturbineprotection incaseofoverspeed trip.Themodification tothispackagewi'llnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.

Tnissystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigation scenarioandtherefore thesystemsfailurewillhavenoimpactonplantsafeshutdown.

Tnismodificaton isnotdescribed inthetechnical Specifications andtherefore, theimplementation oithisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoin~

constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation wnicnprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approval; for'the.implementation ofthisPCHisnotrequired.

Theturoinemi.ssilecriterion specified inSe"tion3.5oftheOnit1FSARisno-applicable tothecomponents addedbythisPCM.

PCM015-986TELEPHONE SYSTEMUPGRADEABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversthemodifications anddetailsrequiredtosupporttheinstallation (byAT&T)ofanewA'T&TSystem85PBXTelephone System.Thecentralequipment forSystem85wil'1belocaedintheTelecommunication Equipment RoomsintheUnit1ServiceBuildingandUnit2D-13Building.

Themodifications anddetailsconsistofenlargement ofthetelecommunication roomstoaccommodate thenewequipment; installation ofredundant airconditioner unitsforeachroomtosatisfyequipment environmental

-requirements; powersupplieswithemergency back"up;racewaybetweenthetwotelecommunication roomstoinstalltheAT&Tsuppliedfiberoptics cable,andracewaybetweentheD-13Building, G-3BuildingandStart-upTrailerstoaccommodate theAT&Tsuppliedmultipair telephone cables.Basedontheimportance ofthetelephone systemasoneoftheplantcommunication means,th'isEngineering Packagehasbeenclassified QualityRelatedtoenhancethesystemdesignandinstallation confidence.

Thenew"System85"willreplacetheexistingDimension 600Electronic StoredProgramPBXlocatedintheUnit1ServiceBuildingTelecommunications RoomandthePrivateAutomatic Telephone Exchange(PAX)locatedinUnit1ReactorAuxiliary Building(Elev43'-0).Thisreplacement willrequire.modification ofSection9.5.2"Communication Systems"oftheUnit1andUnit2FUSAR,Figures9.5-1and9.5-4,Table9.5-6oftheUnit2FUSARandSection3.8oftheUnit1andUnit2NuclearFireProtection Program.ToenergizetheSystem85telephone equipment andairconditioners locatedintheUnitgServiceBuildinguponlossofnormaloff-sitepowerwillrequiremanualswitching atPowerPanelPP-135locatedintheSecurityandRecordsBuilding.

Resetting willalsoberequireduponreturning ofnormaloff-.site power.TheSysem85telephone equipment modulesandairconditioners located'n theUnit2D-13Buildingwillbeautomatically suppliedbytheNon-Class lEdieselsupplying theD-13Buildinguponloss-ofnormalpower.

PCM023-186MAINFEEDWATER PUMPOILPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENT TheexistingMainFeedwater PumplubeoilpressureswitchesareUnitedElectricSeries300.Themodel300hasbeendiscontinued bythemanufacturer andsparepartsareveryscarceandareessentially not'vailable.

Thisengineering packagecoversthereplacement, of(2)twopressureswitchesperpump(foratotalof(4)four)withnewupgradedseries400bythesamemanufacturer FBothoftheabovemodelshavecomparable overalldimensions, weightandmountingfacilities, therefore, noothermodification isneeded.Thefunctionofeachpressureswitchwillremainunchanged.

Allswitcheswillhavead5ustable differentials.

BasedonthedesignoftheMainFeedwater Pumpsanditssubsystems, thisEngineering Packagehasbeenclassified asslatyRelated.SeeSection2.1.1foradditional information.

ThisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Thereplacement ofthesepressureswitcheshasnaimpactonplantoperation anddoesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.

SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe.safetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased, sincetheFeedwater Pumpanditssubsystems arenon-safety related.Therefore thismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment performing anysafetyfunction.

TheFeedwater PumpLubeOilSystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigation

scenario, therefore thereisnopossibility forcreatinganaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreport.Itsfailurewillhavenoimpactontheplantsafeshutdown.

PCM023-186Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification sincethereplacement oftheMainFeedwater Pumplubeoilpressureswitchesimprovestheiroperational qualitywithoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.TheTechnical Specifications donotaddresstheMFWpump/system surveillance.

Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM032-186EXCITERCOOLERVENTS&.DRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEThisEngineering DesignPackagecoversthereplac'ement oftheExciterCoolerVentsandDrainsTubing.Theoriginaldesignprovidedfor1/2"coppertubingwhichissusceptible todamageduetoabrasionandvibration.

Thisdesignp~akac}eprovidesfortheinstallation of1/2"Stainless SteelTubingandoneadditional tubers,support tofirmlylocatethetubingawayfrompipecouplings.

AlloftheeighttubingrunsinvolvedarelocatedinsidetheExciterHousing,eachrunapproximately 12feetinlength.TheExciter,itscoolers,andthetubinginvolvedinthismodification areallnonnuclear safetyrelated,nonmeismic, andtheimplementation ofthisdesignpackagedoesnotcreateanyfailuremodeswhichcouldadversely affectanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.

Theclassification ofthisdesignpackageistherefore nonnuclear safetyrelated.TheDesignPackagewasreviewedusingthe10CFR50.59criteriaanditwasfoundthatthechangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionnorisaTechSpecchangerequired.

Therefore priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplement thisPC/M.Thesubjectmodification involvesthereplacement of1/2"coppertubingwith1/2"stainless steeltubingcontaining TurbineCoolingWaterfromtheExciterCoolers.BoththeMainGenerator ExciterandtheTurbineCoolingWaterSystemareno~afety.related,no~eismic systemswhichperformnoSafetyRelatedfunctions.

Afailuremodesaneffectsevaluation wasperformed todetermine ifanysafetyrelatedcomponents Frouldbeaffectedbythecomponents modifiedb~thischange.Afailureofhardwarefailureofthetubingwouldresultinpossiblemechanical damagetotheExciterfromhardwareimpactorwaterdamageduetoleakage.Afunctional failurewouldresultineithertheinability toventordrainthecoolers,oracontained lossofTurbineCoolingWaterfromtheCoolers.Noneoftheabovefailureswouldinanywayadversely affectanysafetyrelatedequipment.

BasedupontheSafetyclassification oftheaffectedsystems,andtheresultsofthefailuremodeevaluation, theimplementation ofthismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59because:1)Theconsequences ofanalyzedaccidents arenotaffectedbecausenoequipment requiredtomitigateanalyzedaccidents areinvolvedinthismodification.

2)Theprobability ofananalyzedaccidentorthepossibility ofanunanalyzed accidentisnotincreased becausefailureoftheinvolvedcomponents doesnotaffectanyDBArequiredcomponents.

3)TheTechSpecmarginofsafetyisnotdecreased becausenoTechSpecLimitsorequipment areaffected.

Sincethismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications, itmaybeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapproval.

PCM037-186PCBTRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT DuetopendingEnvironmental Protection AgencyrulesoncontrolofPolychlorinated Bephenyls (PCB)thesematerials willberemovedfromalloilfilledtransformers.

TheMainNeutralGrounding Transformer atStLucieUnitNo1has-beenidentified ascontaining PCB.ThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)coversthemodifications anddetailsnecessary toreplacetheexistingPCBfI.liedMa1nGenerator NeutralGrounding Transformer withasiliconfilledtransformer.

Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59asindicated inSection3.0ofthisEDP.ThisPCMdoesnot1nvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, willnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation, nordoesitrequireachangetotheTechnical Specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.Th1sEDPisnonmafety relatedinthattheGenerator NeutralGrounding

'ransformer providesnosafetymelated functionandasthetiansformer islocatedintheTurbineBuilding, itdoesnothaveany1mpactorinteractions withanysafetyrelatedequipment.

SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPedezalRegulat1ons, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveaaunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment

-Important tosafetyprev1ously evaluated 1ntheanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysismportmaybecrPeted;or(111)1'fthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification consistsofreplacement oftheexistingPCBfilledMaiaGenerator NeutralGrounding Transformer w1thasiliconfilledtraasformer.

Znallotheraspectsthereplacement transformer isidentical insizeandelectrical characteristics astheexistingtransformer-TheMainGenerator NeutralGrounding Transformer ispartofthehighresistance grounding systemconnected by2500ampselfmooled bustotheMainGenerator Neutrals.

-TheNeutralGroundiag Transformer, locatedintheTurbineBu1lding, doesnotInteractwithanysafetyrelatedequipmeat orprov1deanysafetyrelatedfunction.

Asanonmafety relatedsystem,theNeutralGrounding Transformer doesnotI.ncrease theprobability ofoccurrence ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.Noaccidentevaluated 1ntheFUSARtakescredI.tfortheNeutralGrounding Transformer andthismodificat1on doesnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated.

PCM037-186Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotmodifytheoperation ofanyplantsystemorfunction.

Therefore, itsmarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequi'reachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10'CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestion, andpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM043-186MISCELLANEOUS PIPING'SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS ThisEngineering Packageisissuedforthepurposeofdocumentation (i.e..as-building) ofminormodifications madetovariouspipingsystem/supports asaresultofdisassembly, inspection, repair,andreassembly duringthe1985fallrefueling outage.Themodifications wereinitiated viatheFieldChangeRequestPHotice formwhichwereWeviewedandapprovedbyEngineering.

Themodifications areclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedanddonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

NOTE:ThisPCMisfordocumentation

{as&uilding) purposesonly.Themodifications totheessential portionsoftheCCW,Sl,AFWandILRTsystems,asdescribed intheProjectScope,areclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedbecausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponent, inconjunction withaworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedbycorresponding sectionsoftheFSAR,wouldresultintheinability oftheparticular systemtoachieveitsdesignedsafetyfunction.

Asdescribed intheDesignAnalysis, thesafetyrelatedmodifications wereperformed inaccordance withtherequirements ofASMESectionillforClass2and3components andaredeemednottoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionforthefollowing reasons:i)Theprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR~y*environment sincetherepairsincludedhereindidnotalterthefunctionofanyaffectedsystem,createnewsystemsorreducethedesignmarginofaffectedsystems.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsinceallrepairsandreplacements wereperformed instrictaccordance withalloriginaldesignbasesandapplicable coderequirements.

Sinceallpossibleaccidents andmalfunctions resulting fromthesesystemshave,previously beenanalyzed, therepairand/orreplacement ofdegradedportionsofthesesystemsis~~~~rn~

anydifferent typesoffailures.

iii)Themarginofsafetyforanytechnical specifications dduetorepairand/orreplacement ofpartsandcomponents, sincetheaffecteditemswererestoredtotheiroriginaldesignsafetymargin,asaminimum,ineverycase.iv)Allrepairs,replacements, andmodifications havebeendetermined tobethantheexistingcomponents intermsofdesign,procurement, andinstallation.

Thusthereliability oftheaffectedsystemshasnotdecreased.

.'IBasedontheaboveevaluations, andpursuantto10CFR50.59,theforgoingconstitutes thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasisthatthesechangesvconsequently priorapprovalfrom-NRCfortheimplementation ofthesemodifications isnotrequired.

PCM071-186FHBHVACPENETRATION BARRIERSABSTRACTIthasbeendetermined thatsteelbarriersarerequiredfortnetwo(2)HVACpenetrations locatedatelevation 48ftoftheFuelHandlingBuilding(westexteriorwall).The.barriersarerequiredinordertopreventunauthorized accessintotheFHB.BothHVACpenetrations areprotected byacontinuous L-shapedconcretetornadomissilebarrier,.

cantilevered two(2)feetfromtheFHBexteriorwallandextending downtoapproximately one(1)footbelowthebottomofthepenetration.

Foreaseofconstruction, theaccessbarrierswillbelocatedatthebottomofthetwo(2)'footopening"whichexistsbetweenthemissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall.TheexistingHVACsystemhasnotbeenaffectedbythismodification.

BasedonthereviewoftheexistingHVACsystem,a40'eduction ofthemissilebarrieropeningisacceptable.

Asaresultoftheadditionoftheaccessbarriers, themissilebarrieropeningshavebeenreducedbyonly17K.Failureoftheaccessbarrierswillnotadversely affectthefunctionofanysafety-related systemsorcomponents.

However,since,tnebarriersarebeinginstalled inatornadomissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall,thisPCMhasbeenclassified asQualityRelated.Tnismodification doesnotaffectthestructural capability ofthemissilebarrierortheFHBwall,nordoesitposeanysafetyhazards.ThisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Tneadditionoftneaccessbarriershasnoimpactonplantoperation anddoesnot'ffect anysafety'elatedequipment

~SAFETYEVAlUATION Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability of.occurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe.marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforany'technical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionaecause:Theprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased since:a-Thefailureoftheaccessbarriersforthetwo(2)HVACpenetrations locatedatelevation 48ftoftneFuelHandlingBuildingwillnotadversely affectthestructural

.capacity.

ofthe.-.missilebarriernortheFHBwall,forwhichcertainqualitycontrolinspections (e.g.holesizeandverification thatnorebariscut)willbeperformed.

PCN071-186b-Noeffectonequipment orcomponents performing asafetyfunctionarelocatedbeneaththisaccessbarrier.c-TneHVACventilation systemoperation hasnotbeenaffectedbythereduction inthemissilebarrieropening.Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincethismodification willhavenoimpa"tontheplansafeshutdown.

LTnismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification bytheadditionoftheseaccessbarriers.

Tnereisnochangeontneexistingtechnical spe"ification duetotheimplementation ofthisPCH.Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation wnicnprovidesthebasistnatthiscnangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPCN.

PCM074-186HEATERDRAINPUMPDEMINERALIZED MATERSUPPLYABSTRACTThisdesignpackagepaovidestherequiredengineering for,addingpermanent pipingfromthedemineralized watersystemtotheUnit1heaterdrainpumps'echanical seals.Thepipingwillmakeavailable tothesealsthenecessary backupflushingwatermeetingtheappropriate chemistry requirements.

Thebackupwatersourceisrequiredduringinitialplantstartupwheneverthepumpssitidle.Basedonthefailuremodesanalysis.and 10CFR50.59review,thismodification doesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipment andisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentprevention ormitigation.

Thusitdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandiscorrectly classified asNon-Nuclear SafetyRelated.Implementation ofthismodification, therefore, doesnotrequirepriorNRCapproyal.

Sulement1ThispackagerevisionprovidesvalvedrawingsforvalvesaddedbythisPC/MandmocQfiestheexpiration datetoreflectthecorrectformat.Thescopeofworkspecified bythisEngineering Packagehasnotbeenaffectedbythisrevision'.

Thesafetyclassification andthesafetyevaluation asstatediscorrectandisnotimpacted.

SAFETYEVALUATION TheUnit1HeaterDrainPumpsarelocatedinaNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedsystemandassucharenotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.

Therefore, modifications tothesepumpsaffectonlyNon-.NuclearSafetyRelated,QualityGroupDequipment.

Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis, failureofthedemineralized watersupplypipingcouldresultonlyinfailureoftheheaterdrainpumps.Sincethepipingandcomponents arelocatedremotefromanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents, failureofthisequipment willnotinhibitoperation ofanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.

Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59 doesnotexist.oTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Sincethisdesignchangedoesnotalteroraffectequipment usedtomitigateaccidents, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanalyzedaccidents remainsunchanged.

oThepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Thereisnonewfailuremodeintroduced bythischangethathasnotbeenevaluated previously intheFSAR.oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreduced.ThischangehasnoaffectonanyexistingTechnical Specifications.

PCM082-186MAINSTEAMPIPINGMODIFICATION ABSTRACTDuringtheas-building ofPCM580-79,theas-builtinformation andfieldwalkdowas indicated thatsomeoQtherestra1nts onMSdrainlinesdidnotconformtothedes1gnanalys1s.

Thestressanalysisperformed incorporating theas-builtinformation indicated stressesinthepipingfortwostresscalculations exceededtheallowable stresslimitsfortheOperat1onal BasesEarthquake (OBE)condition whilethestresslimitsfortheDesignBasesEarthquake

.(DBE)coadition weremet.Inordertocorrect,theoverstress condition iathepip1ng,tworestraints areaddedandtwoexistingrestraints aremodifiedthroughthisengineering designpackage(EDP).Thisissuewas,presented toPlantPersonnel viaFFLPowerPlaatEngineeriag MemoEPO86-1237.Thismemoaddresses the"functionality" aspectsoftheMainSteamdra1npipingiaitspresentconfiguration.

Thepipingsystemconsidered inthisEDPisNuclearSafetyClass2,QualityGroupBandSe1smicCategoryIpipingandhencethesupport/restraints forthispipiagareclassified asNuclearSafetyClass2andSeismicCategoryI'.Thesafetyevaluation hasshowathatthisEDPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.

SafetAnalsesWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto1nvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment importaat tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafeeyanalys1sreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranacc1dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously 1nthesafetyanalysisreport-may becreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesaotinvolveanunrev1ewed safetyquestionand.thefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclus1on:

Thismodificat1on providestwonewrestraints andadditional restraint functiontothetwoexistingrestraints ontheMSdrainlines.Thesemod1fications whenimplemented willreducethestresslevelsinthepip1ngtotheacceptable stresslimitsestab11shed intheUSASB31.7Code,1969Edition.Theintegralattachments (lugs)weldedtothepipingcreateadditional stressesinthepiping.However,thetotalpipingstressesincluding thoseduetotheweldedattachment havebeenshowatobewithinallowable stresslimits.Hence,theintegrity ofthepressureboundaryofthe.pipinghasnotbeencompromised andnonewfailuremechanism hasbeenintroduced.

Therefore.,

the.implementation ofthisPCMdoesnot1acreasetheprobability ofoccurrence orthe,consequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysesReport; PCM082-186(ii)Sincethepipestressesremainwithinthecodeallowable limits,thismodification doesnotcreatethepossiblity foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated

~previously intheSafetyAnalysesReport.(111)Themainsteamsystemasawholehasbeenconsidered inestablishing thebasesforseveraltechnical specifications.

SincetheMSdrainlinepressureboundary1ntegrity hasnotbeenaffected, theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specif1cation.

Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specification.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluat1on whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorcommission approvalfortheimplementation ofth1sPCM1snotrequired.

PCM083-186LOWPOWERPEEDWATER CONTROLSYSTEMTheStLucieUnitNo1Peedwater ControlSystemconsistsoftwo(2)feedvater regulators whichoperateInparallel.

Themainfeedvater regulator IBautomatically controlled byathree-element feedwater controlsystemandisresponsive intherangeof15-100Xpoveroperation.

By~assfeedvater regulators aremanuallyoperatedduringplantstartmpintherangeof0-15Xpoveropera~on.

Thezmodynamic characteristics ofthesteamgenerators atlovpowerloadsaresuchthatincreased feedwater flowwilltendtoshrinkorlowerthesteamgenerator level.Atthetimethermalequilibrium hasbeenze-established thelevelwilltendtoincreaseduetoswellingcharacteristics.

Reactortripstherefore couldresultfromeitherahighorlowsteamgenerator level.ThenewLowPowerPeedvater ControlSystem(onefortheLCV-9005andoneforLCV-9006),

vhichismicroprocessor based,isdesignedtoprovidestableandautomatic controloftheby~assfeedvater regulators atlovpowerloadsIntherangeof2-15X.Thesystemwill.receiveandprocesssystemvariables suchassteamgenerator level,feedvater flow/temperature andneutronfluxinordertoprovideforasmoothandsteadyoutputforautomatic controloftheby-passregulators andtosignifIcaatly reducethefrequency ofreactortripsdurIngunitstart~p.ThisnewsystemIsconsidered tobeanextension ofthepresentPeedwater Regulating System,doesnotaffectothersafetyrelatedequipment andassuchprovidesnosafetyrelatedfunctions.

Arevievofthechangestobeimplemented bythIsPCMwasperfozmed againsttherequirements of10CPR50.59.

Asindicated inSection3.0ofthisPCH,thisPCMdoesnotInvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesItrequirearevisiontothetechnical specification; therefore,

'priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisPCM.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrenewed safetyquestion; (I)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentozmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethenanyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeczeated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification Isreduced.1)Theprobability ofoccurence orthecoasequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment importaat tosafetypreviously evaluated iatheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreased sincethisnevLowPowerPeedvater ControlSystem(LPPCS)Isaaextension ofthePeedvater Regulating Systemandasdescribed inPUSARSubsection 7.7.1thIssystemsfunctionienotessential, forthesafetyoftheplant.Theinstallation oftheLPPCS'will providecontrolimprovements tomaintainsteamgenerator vaterlevelatsetpointvalueduringunitstartswithsignificant..

reduction Inthenumberofreactortripeduetosteamgenerator levelexcursions.

PCM083-18611)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously in.thesafetyanalys1sreportisnotcreatedsince:Thisinstallation isinaccordance withtheCodeofFederalRegulation'10 CFR50.48andnoimpactisincurredbythisinstallation.

Thenewequipment mountings andaddedcomponents havebeenseismically analyized foradditional loadingandithasbeenconcluded thattheseadditions villnotaltertheoriginalstressconditions orthefundamental frequency oftheRTGBBoards.Consequently, theseismicqualification oftheRTGBoardsvillnotbeadversely affected.

Modification totheRTGBoardshavebeendesignedinaccordance withNUREG0700.Thisinstallation

'isinaccordance withtheCodeofFederalRegulation 10CFR50.49andhasbeendetermined tohavenoimpactontheEnvrionmental Qualification criteriabecausetheequipment islocatedintheControlRoomwhichisamildenvironment.

eTheLPFCS,whichisanextension oftheFeedwater Regulation Systemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnorformitigating theconsequences ofanaccident.

111)Themarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnical Specifications isnotaffectedbythisPC/Msincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

The1mplementation ofth1sPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischange.doesnotinvolve..

anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM086-186MISAPPLICATION OFLIMITORQUE OPERATORS ABSTRACTThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)replacesthemotorsfortheMainFeedwater PlowControlStati~by-passvalves(MV-09-3andMV-09-4)motoroperators.

Thereplacement oftheexistingmotorswithmotorshavinglowerRPMisrequiredtoreducethevalvestemspeed,tobewithinthelimitsrecommended bythevalveoperatormanufacturer (Limitorque) forthetypeofoperator(SMB)involved.

ThisEDPisclassified non-safety relatedsincetheMainFeedwater FlowControlStations, wheretheaffectedvalvesareinstalled, doesnotperformanysafetyfunctionandareinthenon-safety classportionoftheMainFeedwater System.Thesafetyanalysishascorrectly concluded thatnounreviewed safetyconcernexistandnochangestotheTechnical Specifications arerequiredasaresultofthismodification.

Therefore, previousNRCapprovalfortheimplementation ofthismodification isnot'equired.

ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyand/oroperation.

Revision1wasfo"theremovalofParagraph 9.1whichrequiredaLimitorque representative toprovidetechnical assistance for'theimplementation ofthisEP.Revision2addedtheRevision1description totheabstractandtheEngineering approvalsignature topageIII-i.Revisions 1and2donothaveanimpactonthesafetyclassification and/o"theresultsofthesafetyevaluation ofthisEP.SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchange'shallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanany.aevaluated previously inthesafetyanaIysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

Theportionsofthefeedwater systemwherethismodification willbeimplemented arenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.

PCM086-186ii)Thepossiblity foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Speification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponent involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPCNdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotnecessary.

PCM088-186ISOPHASEBUSDUCTJUMPERMODIFICATION TheStLucieUnit1Isolate~ase BussuppliedbyWestinghouse makesuseofcablejumperstoprovideelectrical continuity ateachhousingjointsothatthelongitudinal currentsflowingintheenclosures willflowinaclosedloop.Thesecablesarecontinuously exposedtoweatherresulting inheating,overloading andfurtherinsulation degradation.

Thishasresultedinreducedloadingontheunitwhilerepairs/cleaning takeplace.ThisEPprovidesforthereplacement oftheexistingcablejumperswithlaminated shunts,weldingadaptorbrackets(forcovers)ontothebusenclosure andinstalling coversovertheshuntstoshieldthemfromtheweather.Thisengineering packageisconsidered non-safety relatedinthattheequipment beingmodifieddoesnotinterface withanysafetyrelatedcomponent orfunction.

Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythiswasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59.

Asindicated inSection3.0ofthisEngineering package,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnical specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.-ISAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveandunreviewed safetyquestion:

(1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheanalysisreportmaybeincr'eased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.ITheIsolatedPhaseBusisdescribed inFSARSection8.2.Thiscomponent i.spartoftheoffsitepowersystemandisnotrequiredtomitigateanyaccident.

ThelossofACpowerhasbeenaddressed inFSARSection15.2.9.'he resultsreachedinthatsection,namelythattheplantcanbesafelyshutdownandmaintained inasafeshutdowncondition, isnotaffected.

Infact,withtheadditionofthismodification thereliabilit;y oftheoffsitepowersystemwillbeincreased.

TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Thereplacement ofthecablejumpershasnoimpactonanyplantsystemsandoperations.

TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotnecessary tomitigateormonitoranyresultofanaccident.

Failureofthiscomponent hasnoimpact.,on

.previously generated safetyanalysisrepoits.Themarginofs'afetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotimpacted.

PCM088-186Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, Noaccidentpreviously evaluated takescreditfo"theisolate"PhaseBus.,Taismodification, toimproveoperabilitv andreliability o.tneIsolatedPhaseBus,doesnotaffectanyequipment important tosafety.Assuch,thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability ooccu"enceortheconsequences ofanaccidento"malunctionofequipment important tosafety.TheIsolatedPhaseBus,aspartoftheoffsitepowersystem,isno-requiredtomitigateanyaccidentanddoesnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethenpreviously evaluated.

Thismodification doesnotimpactanytechnical specification andassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreduced.Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59, thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions, andpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM090-186CLOSEINTERCEPT VALVE-CONTROLCIRCUITMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)providesfortheremovaloftheCloseIntercept Valve(CIV)anticipatory controlcircuitfromtheWestinghouse DigitalElectro-hydrauli,c (DEH}turbinecontrolsystem.TheoriginalintentoftheCIVanticipatory circuitwastoprovideatemporary closureoftheInterceptor Valvesintheeventofaloadmismatchbetweenturbinesteamflowandgenerated electrical output.Thisparticular circuitdoesnottakeintoaccountthedynamicresponseoftheturbinesteamcycles,'or doestheDEHmodelP-2000containthenecessary

'rogramming softwaretoperformtherequiredcalculations toautomatically ad)usttheturbinegovernorvalvestothenewthermodynamic values.Thesefeatures, therefore, will,inmostcases,maintaintheInterceptor Valvesclosedwitharesultant tripofboththeturbineandthereactor.TheCIVcontrolcircu1t1sadownstream extensi.on oftheDEHoverspeed c'ontrolchannel.Systemfailurewouldnotimpactplantsafety,sincethissystemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnordoesitperformanysafetyrelatedfunctions.

HowevertheDEHControlSystemisrequiredtobeoperablebytheTechnical Specifications.

Sincethismodif1cation impactsthesubjectcontrolcircuit,thisengineering designpackageshallbeclassified asanalityRelated.Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPC/Mwasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59.

Asindicated inSection3.0ofthisPC/M,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoes.itrequirearevisi'on tothetechnical specification; therefore, priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTi.tie10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence oftheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment 1mportant tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibilSty foranaccidentormalfunct1on ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreatd;or(ii.i)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced;Theprobability ofoccurrence astheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalys1sReportisnotincreased bythisPC/M.Thismodification totheCIVcontrolcircuitdoesnotchangeoraltertheturbine-generator monitoring andcontrolsystem.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofatypedifferent thanpreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:

PCM090-186TheCIVcontrolcircuitisanindependent functiongenerated bytheDEHcontrolsystemsoftware.

Theremovalofthe,CIVanticipatory functiondoesnotaltertheoperation oftheDEHcontrolsystem.Thismodification, whichwillremovethepartialloadmismatchcircuit,willreducethenumberofspuriousreactortripswhichwilloccurshouldtheInterceptor Valvesfailtore-open.Theturbineoverspeed protection channelstoboththeReheaterStopvalvesandtheIntercept valvesandthemechanical overspeed protection channelsarenotalteredbyimplementation ofthiscircuitmodification.

Therefore, themarginofsafetyforturbineruptureduetotheprobability ofturbineoverspeed isnotreduced.The'mplementation ofthis.PC/M doesnotrequireachangetotheStLucieUnit1Technical Specifications.

"Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebases.thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired."

PCM093-186RTGBANNUNCIATOR GROUNDDETECTION ABSTRACTPrimarypowerfortheRTGBAnnuniciator actuation circuitsisprovidedbytheplant125VDCungrounded powersupply.Althoughtheplant125VDCungrounded powersupplyisfurnished withagroundfaultdetection system,thesegroundfaultdetectormodulesareineffective indetecting agroundfaultontheannunciator 125VDCactuation system.TheRTGBannunciators containaDCisolation circuitwhichessentially separates theplant125VDCsyst:emfromtheannunciator 125VDCactuation circuit.Asingle'ground faultoneitherthepositiveornegativeterminalofanungrounded systemwillremainundetected andthesystemwilloperatenormally.

Intheeventofasecondgroundontheoppositepolarityline,ashortcircuitwillbecreatedcausinglineinterruption bywayofthefuseswithresultant lossofthesystem.Corrective actionfollowing acatastropic failureisextremely difficult sinceafaultwillnowexistonbothlines.Itisextremely important therefore thatgroundfaultbedetectedandclearedassoonaspractical.

EachRTGBAnnunciator (totalof6)willbefurnished withanindividual grounddetector.

Thesegrounddetectors willmonitortheannunciator 125VDCactuation sy'temforexcesscurrentleakagelevelstoground.Groundfaultindication willbeprovidedviaindicating lampslocatedonthefrontofeachoftheground-detector modules.Inordertoincreaseefficiency introubleshootingandlocatinggroundfaults,atotalofsixgrounddetectormoduleswillbeinstalled intheRTGboard101.Eachgroundfaultdetectorshalldetectthosegroundlevelleakagecurrentswhichmayexceedpresetvalues.Thismodi=ication willim"roveboththeoperability andtheavailabil'ty oftheRTGBannunciator system.Theannuncietors servenoszetyre'ate"function.

Howevesincethispackageinvolvesmodification tothemair.co"t"o'oard, itmayrequireworkinandaroundsafetyrelatedsub-panels, compartments, etc.Therefore, thispackageisconsidered tobeQualityRelated.Areviewofthechangestobeimplemented bythisPCMwasperformed againsttherequirements of10CFR50.59.

Asindicatec inSection3.0ofthisPCM,this"PCMdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnical specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisP&i.

PCM093-186SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence oftheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfucntion ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe'margin ofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ITheprobability ofoccurrence astheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreased bythisPCM.Theimplementation ofgroundfaultdetectors doesnotchangeoraltertheoperation oftheRTGBannunicator system.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofatypedifferent thanpreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince.Thenew'quipment mountinghasbeenseismically analyzedforadditional loadinginaccordance withSt.LucieDesignCriteriaManual,SectionIandfoundnottohaveanyimpactontheseismicqualification oftheboards.Thegrouncfaultdetectors willbelocatedintheControlRoom,whichisconsidered tobeamileenvironment.

Tneadd.zionofgroundrau'deecto"stotheannunciator 125VDCsvstemwillenhancebot.".theoperab'lity actheavai'lability oftheRTGBannunicator system.Tneuseoffusesonthe125VDCcircuitprovidesforisolating non-class lEcircuitsfromClasslEandassociated circuits.

IThegrounddetectormodulesandtheirmountingdeviceswereanalyzedanditwasdetermined thattheywillretaintheirstructural integrity duringandfollowing anSS"".Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequire'achangetotnePlantTechnical Specifications.

"Theforgoingconstitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired."

hy PCM095-186REPLACEMENT OFINSTRUMENT SCALESABSTRACTThisEngineering DesignPackagecoversthereplacement ofthescalesforthefollowing instruments; indicator TIA-1116, "QuenchTankTemperature, indicators PI-09-2A, 2Bandrecorders FR-09-2A, 2B"Aux.F.W.Pumps2A42Bdischarge/

Theindicators arelocatedontheRTGBoardwhiletherecorders arelocatedonthePostAccidentPanel-(PAP).

Thepresentscalerangesontheseindicators andrecotders donotagreewiththeinstrument ranges.listedintheOctober1985RG1.97Rev.3,"Parameter SummarySheet"TypeDvariables.

Nonconformance Reports5287and0288(Attachments 7.1and7.2)identifythediscrepancies betweentheexistingandtherequiredscaleranges.Asa.resultofthescalereplacement theassociated transmitters FT-09-2AandFT-09-2BwiQrequirerecalibration inordertoaccommodate theextendedranges.ThisPCMisclassified asnuclear.safetyrelatedsincesomeoftheindicators andrecorders aremonitoring asafetyrelatedsystem.However,themodification initiated bythisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

SAPETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing providesthebasesforthisconclusion:

(i)Thismodification providesnewscalesforexistinginstruments inordertoincreasetheviewingrangeoftheparameters, whileallthecomponents andcircuitry remainunchanged.

Therefore, theimplementation ofthisPCMhasnoeffectonsafetyanddoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysesReport.(ii)Sincethecomponents andcircuitry remain'nchanged, thismodification doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccident'ormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysesReport.(iii)Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification, forthereasonsstatedabove.Theimplementa!on o:hisPCY.doesno";requireachangetoplanttechncial specifica:!

on.Theforgoingcons:itutes, per10CFR50.59 (b),tnewrittensafetyevaluation whichp!ovidesthebasesthe-.th!schangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyques-.ion andpriorNRCapp!ovalfortheimplementation oithisPMinotrequired.

PCM098-186HYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONS ThisEngineering DesignPackage(EDP)allowsforthereplacement oftheinboardvalve(valveclosesttotheReactorContainment Vessel)onContainment Penetrations P-56,P-57andP-58,Theexistingvalveshaveflangedendsandthenewvalvesarebuttwelded.Thismodification isbeingimplemented toimprovetheContainment Vesselintegrity withrespecttopostaccidentleakageratesbyreplacing flangedconnections withweldedconnections.

ThisEDPisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem,Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthatthisEDPdoesnotconstitute anyunreviewed safetyquestions, nordoesitrequireaTechnical Specification change,Therefoze, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEDP.SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunzeviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentozmalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.Thereplacement valvesforthismodification areclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated,ASMESectionIII,Class2,QualityGroupB,becausetheyareReactorContainment Buildingisolation valves.Themodifications includedinthisengineering designpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated ispotincreased sincereplacement ofthehydzogenpurgepenetrations isolation valvesdoes'otaffecttheirdualperfonnance requirements.

Theperformance requirement forcontainment isolation remainsintactandisperiodically verifiedbytestinginaccordance withlOCFR50,AppendixJ.Theperformance requirement forhydrogenpurgehasbeenverifiedasremaining acceptable.

Thereisnopossib'it dfferenttvpethananmod'atiodoesnoOperating P"o"edure o"modification isaoeyforanaccidentormalfunction oaypreviously evaluated.

Taisc'nangaa"yex't'ngDesignCr'ez'a,Teen"ica'pe"'fice"'on.

Thisfo"one=e=acme"..:o=exstingequipment.

PCM098-186(iii)Thismodification doesnotaffectthebas's=oranyTechnical Speci'ation,andtherefore doesnot"educethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisfo=an~~echricalSpecifications.

Implementation ofthisEnginee'ngDesignPackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTec'nnica'pecification.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFP50.59 (b),'thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorachangetotheTechnical Specifica ion;thuspriorCommission approvaifortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM106-186HIREXCITATION SYSTEMABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodifications totheTurbine-Generator brushless excitation system.Thebrushless excitation systemwillbeupgradedtoaHighInitialResponse(HIR)Brushless Excitation Systemwhichwillallowthegenerato~o respondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.A1argerpermanent magnetgenerator, anewstatorcoilinbrushless exciter,anewvoltageregulator andanewvoltageregulator enclosure willberequiredtomodifythissystem.TheTurbineWenerator doesnotperformasafetyrelatedfunction.

Themodifications totheTurbineGenerator areclassified asnonsafetyrelated.However,sincetherewillbemodifications totheRTGBoards,thispackageisclassified asQualityRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionsincethemodifications described abovewillhavenoimpactonplantoperations orsafetyrelatedequipment.

Sulement1Thissupplement revisedtheAbstractandProjectScopepages.Theoriginalsafetyevaiuation isnotaffectedbyth'supplement.

Suelement2Th'ssupp'ement incorporates thevendorietterdocumenting theexcitercomponen.

seria'umber

>dawngsfc"irstaiiation ofvoltageregulator enciosure; fabrietiodrawngsfc"theHVAduct;testingandprotection requ'ements fortheconcreteinsulation beneaththevoitagereguiato" andreguiato" enciosure; revisiontodrawinglist.Theoriginalsaetyevaluation isno-affectecbythissuppiement.

SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysTsreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.TheTurbineGenerator HighInitialResponse(HIR)brushless excitation systemisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Alargerpermanent magnetgenerator (PMG),statorcoilinbrushless exciterandvoltageregulator willreplacetheexistingequipment andhaveno.impactonanyplantsystemoroperation.

The.HWexcitation systemallowsthegenerator torespondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.

PCM106-186Subsection 3.5.3.2oftheFSARaddresses ExternalMissileswithsubpart(b)addressing TurbineMissiles, specifically, missilesgenerated bythehighpressureturbinerotorandthelowpressureturbinediscs.Therearenochangestothehighpressureturbinerotor'nor thelowpressureturbinediscs.Themodifications requiredto'pgrade thesystemincludeanewPMGrotor,PMGstatorandexciterstatorwhicharelocatedattheexciterend.Theconsequences ofturbinefailureandthepotential fordamagetocriticalplantstructures, systems,andcomponents fromtheresulting missileshasnotbeenincreased bythismod'fication.

Themodificatons totheTubineGenerator, thevoltageregulator, thevoltag'eregulator enclosu"e ancthoHVACsvstemIntheTurb'neBuildingarenotsafetyrelatedandccnotaf=ectanyplantsystems.Thecablesforthelighting, receptacles andpowe"feecsinthevoltagereguatorenclosure areroutedincabletrayandconduitintheTubineBuilding.

Tneydonotrequireseism'csupportancdonotaffectsafetyrelatedeouipment.

Themodifications totheRTGBoardswillinvolvethereplacement o:selectorswitcheswithanupdatedversion,thatisthesamesizeandhasanegligible weightdifreentialastheexistingswitches, therelabling ofannunciator windowsandtheactuation o.anexistingsparerelay,thatwillhavethesamecharacteristics astheex'tingequipment.

Thesemodifications donoteffectthesafetyrelatedfunctions oftheaffectedRTGBoards.Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes~

per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommi.ssion approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM112-986TURBINEBUILDINGCRANEGURDERCONNECTIONANGLE MODIFICATIONS

Recently, crackingandexcessive pryingdeformation werenotedatsomeofthecranegirderconnections inthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1and2turbinebuildings.

kn,evaluation ofthecondition concluded thatthefailureswereattributabl'e totheinability oftheconnections atcolumnline20toslideasoriginally designed.

=ThisPC/Mw111providemodifications tothecranegirderconnections atcolumnline20torestoreindependent thermalmovementbetweentheunits.Modifications willalsobeimplemented attheothercranegirderconnections inthelaydownareatoprovidereinforcement forthoseconnections whichmayhavebeensub)ected tooverstress asaresultofthethermalrestraint ofthecranegirders.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Theturbinebuildings areclassified asnonnuclear safetyrelatedstructures andtherefore themodification doesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.

.Theconnection modifications havenoimpactonplantoperation exceptforrestrict1ons onthemovementoftheturbinegantrycraneswhilethemodifications areinprogress.

The'urbine buildings havebeendesignedforseismicloadingtopreclude-interaction withad)scentSeismicCategoryIstructures duringaseismicevent.Consequently, thisPC/Hisclassified asQualityRelated.

PCMI'12-986SAFETYEVALUATION SafetAnalsisWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshillbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisPC/Mprovidesmodifications tothecranegirderconnections inthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1andUnit2turbinebuildings torestoreindependent thermalmovementbetweentheunits.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Thefollowing arethebasesforthisconclusion:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willbeperformed inaccordance withQualityRelatedrequirements, hencetheseismiccapability oftheturbinebuildings isnotcompromised andtherecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentSeismicCategoryIstructures, systems,orequipment.

(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previouslv sincetheturbinebuildings arenon-safety relatedstructures contain'ng nosafety-related equipment, hencethismodification canhavenoimpactonanysafety-related system.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed

'safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM116-1860TURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIRThisEngineering DesignPackagecoversvariousrepairsnecessary tobeperformed intheHPturbineexhaustpipes.Theserepairsarenecessitated bydamageduetowetsteamerosionofturningvanebracingbars,backingringsofcircumferential welds,andpipewali.Thecarbonsteelbracingbarswillbereplacedwithstainless steelbarswhicharemoreresistant toerosionlcorrosion damage.Thebackingringswillberemovedandanypipewalldamagewillberepairedt'orestorethe'cross underpipetoacceptable thickness.

Thismodification isclassified asnonnuclear safetyrelatedanddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Operation oftheHPturbineexhaustlineshasnotbeenaffected.

Basedonfailuremodeevaluation and10CFR50.59 reviews,ithasbeendetermined thatnounreviewed safetyquestionexistsasaresultofthischange.Therefore, priorNRCapprovaifortheimplementation ofthismodification isnotrequired.

Thissupplement incorporated Y/estinghouse ElectricCorp.commentsregarding theuseofadifferen.

typeofstainless steelmate.ialfortheturningvanebracingbars.Thi<<<pp1e" mentdoesnota=rectthesafetyeva1uatior..

<VAThep.opose'ociica.ions.otheturbinecrossunderpipewil!resto.ethecomponen:s tcoricinaldesicr:cn;iguration ancprovideincreasec marginagainstpre..atureerosionwearduetotheserviceconditions.

Basedonthemostrecentinspection thecarbonstee!bracingbarsor:theturningvanesmustbereplacedduetoextremeerosion.Theremai..ing numberofbackingringsmustalsoberemovedtopreventturbulence insteamflowandsubsequent pipewallerosior,.

Anyexistingpipewallerosionwillberepairedtorestorewailthickness tothenominalvalue.TheSt.LucieUnit1HPturbinecrossunderpipeisdesignated asnonnuclear safetyrelated,QualityGroupD.Accordingly, themodifications tothecrossunderpipehavebeendesignated asnon-nuclear safetyrelated,QualityGroupD-Afailuremodeanalysishasdemonstrated thatthemodifications tothecrossunderpipeoranyofitscomponents willhavenoeffecton,orinhibittheoperation of,anysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.

Thecrossunderpipeislocatedremotelyfromanysafetyrelatedequipment andcannot.fallon,hit,orotherwise affectanysuchequipment.

PCM117-186EXTRACTION STEANPIPINGANDPITTING-NATERIALUPGRADEABSTRACTAruptureofane:<tracionsearnlineonunit1duringcycle7resultedinaforcedoutageandalossofappro:cimately

~'Pfullpowerhours.Ane::amination ofthefailedpipeandafolio~-upengineering evaluation concluded thatErosion/Corrosion was'hefailuremechanism.

Erosion/Corrosion isanindustrywideproblemthatisuniqueto<<etsteampipingsystems.Erosion/Corrosion isanaceleratedformofcorrosion inducedbyflewduetothebreakdown ofaprotective ocidefilmfromthematerial'ssurface.ThisPC/Mprovidesdetailsandinstrucionsforplantpersonnel toreplaceerodedcarbonsteelpipingandfittingsintheE::traction Steamsystemsonan"as-needed" basis.Thefittingstobereplacedwill.be'dentfiedfollowing reviewofultrasonic inspectondataduringthe1<C7refuelingcutage.Thenewma'ralsspecifiedASTMP.-.a<NP'22(fIttings)andASTMA-~'(P22(piping)a.e,chromium-molybdenum alloysandwillprcvidesuperiorresstancetccorrosion/erosion effects.Addi"iona'y.thenewma~eri=-;

=canbewe'dedintathee::istinc A-10~andA-1V~pip'ncanc-.t"ines.Theetentcfthereplacement recreceachs'tua-ior wi'bebaseconinscec-'n datareviewbyPower~lan=Enoiner.nc.T'~ee.'tentofthereplacemen

-requ'.eandGea'scft.aeseeepacemeltsw'eaodedtcthepackagevatet'ploess~ThisPC/M'sSa-.etyRe'tedc~asscncnsesmic)sl.'s<<ems~as."Ncn-Nuc1 ea.Safe-yRc1a-ed"snceQua'-yC.ourDpipinginNon-Nuclea.

Basedonthe-.ai'remocesana'si5nd10CFR50'Prev'"ew"5smodification doesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipment anc'snctrel'd~uponfo.anyaccidentprevention ormitiga'on.Thusitdoesnctco,.s-'."ute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Sincetherearenounrev'ewed safetyquestions, andsincenochance>>iotechnica'pecifications areinvo)ved, thisPC/Mmaybe'mplemented withcutproirNRCapproval.

SAFETYEUALL'P7IONTheUnit1E::rect'onSteamSystemisaNon-Nuclear SafetyRelatedsystenandassuch'notrequiredtofunc"'r.duringanye>:isting analy"edacc'dentscenario.

Therefore, modaticnstothese,pipesaffectonlyNon-Nuclear SafetyRela"ed,QualityC.oupDequipment.

Themcdfica-'or, isamaterialupgradeonly.Thenewmateralhasbeer.shcwn,intheDesignAnalysis, cmeetalldesigr,requ,'rements c<tneprevousmaterial.

PCM117-186Postul'ated failuresoftheextraction steamlinewouldhavenoimpactonsafeshutdownof-theplant,orsafetyrelatedsystems.Theextraction steamlinesarenotusedtopreventpostulated acidents,mitigatetheconsequences ofsuchacc.dents,maintainsafeshutdownconditions, or'adequately storespentfuel.Thefollowing, statements demonstrate thatanunreviewed safetyques"ion,asdefinedby10CFR50.59,does.notexist:Theprobablity ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.

importantosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport,hasnotbeenincreased.

Failureofanextraction steamlineisnotconside.edasanaccidentinitiat'g eventorconsidered indetermining

  • theprobability ofanaccident.

Also,sincethisdesign.changedoesnotalteroraffectequipment usedtomitigateaccidents, theprobability ofmalfunc'.'onofequipmentimportant tosafetyrema'sunchanged Thepcsibilityofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferen" typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetvan-lysisreporthasnotbeencreated;Thereisncnewfa'hathasno-beenAdd'ona'yonofailurmodeintrodcedbythischangeeva'ua"ed prev'ouslyintheFSA.-",.'.uremodesana'=edytheFS.-".Rare~MIweI~Themare'cfsafetyasce!inedinthebasis(ehncapeelf:cations hasnotbeenreouced.fcranyThischangehasnoeffec"'nanyexisiinoSpec.-.icataonsanadoeno=requireanychangTechn'a'oeci ficaticns.Tehni.ca1esto.theSincencunreviewed safteycuestions havebeendeternined toexis,andsincenorevisions totheTechnical Specfiatcnsa.erequired, NRCapprovalisnotrequiredpriortomp'mentaion.

PCM118-186REACTORCAVITYSEALRINGABSTRACTThisEngineering PackagemodifiestheSt.LucieUnit1ReactorCavitySealRing.Themodifications consistofenlarging thepenetrations inthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallation andaddingpenetrations andpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.'his waterprovidesadditional shielding whiletheringisinplace.Thewatershallberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusion oftheoutage.Also,thecavitysea)ringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetoastainless steelbraidhose.ThecavitysealringbasedontheFSARisnon-nuclear safetyrelated.Somequalityrequirements areassignedtoassurethattheReactorCavitySealRingwillperformitsintendedfunction.

Basedonafailuremodeevaluation anda10CFR50.59review,thismodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, norrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

Therefore, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisengineering package.SAFETYEVALUATION ThisEngineering PackagemodifiedtheSt.LucieUnit1ReactoiCavitySealRing.Themodifications consistofenlarging thepenetrations inthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallation andaddingpenetrations andpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.Thiswaterpiovidesadditional shielding whiletheringisinplace.ThewatershaQberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusion oftheoutage.Also,thecavitysealringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetostainless steelbiaidhose.Basedontheaboveandinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.oTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Sincethereactorcavitysealringisnotconsidered bytheFSARindetermining theprobability ofaccidents, possibletypesofaccidents, orintheevaluation ofconsequences ofaccidents, itcanbeconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ofaccidents previously addressed intheFSARremainsunchanged.

PCM118-186oThepossibQty ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Sincethesealingportionofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,thepossibility ofanacidentofadifferent typehasnotbeencreated,oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeen."educed.

Again,sincethesealingpor'r,ofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.10CFR50.59allowschangestoafacilityasdescribed intheFSARifanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnical Specification isnotrequired.

Asshowninthepreceding section=-,

thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59thatpertainstoanunreviewed safetyquestioncanbepositively answered.

Also,nochangetotheTechnical Specifications isrequiredbasedontheaboveevaluation.

Inconclusion, thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptable fromthestandpoint ofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, anddoesnotrequireanychangetoTechnical Specifications.

Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthemodification.

PCM119-18610CFR50.49ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION LISTREVISIONABSTRACTThisEngineering Packageprovidesthevehicleforupdatingseveralareasofequipment qualification.

Thispackageincludescorrections tothe10CFR50.49 list,changesinmaintenance requirements, andvariousdocumentation packagecorrections.

ThisEngineering Package(EP)isconsidered NuclearSafetyRelatedbecauseitaffectsequipment'falling underthescopeof10CFR50.49.

Thispackagedoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionsinceitdealsstrictlywithenhancing thepresentdocumentation usedtoqualifyequipment atStLucieUnitNo1andnophysicalplantmodifications arerequiredbytheEP.Thesafetyevaluation ofthispackageindicates thatachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.

Removalofequipment fromthe10CFR50.49 listdoesnotaffectplantsafetyandoperation.

Sulement1ThisEPrevisionaddsterminalblockstothe10CFR50.49 listandtheirassociated Equipment Qualification Documentation Package8770-A-451-17.0 "AmeraceTerminalBlocks".Theequipment andEQDocumentation Packagedoesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisEngineering PackageprovidesforseveralchangestothepresentStLucieUnitNo.1's10CFR50.49 list.Thisdocumentation willaffectthefutureprocurement ofvarioussafetyrelatedcomponents andassistinvalidating thecomponents'bility tofunctionbefore,duringandafteradesignbasisaccident.

Therefore, thisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.0Thedocumentation changesaddressed inthispackagerangefromcorrections oftypographical errorsonthe10CFR50.49 listtoadditions anddeletions ofequipment asaresultofEQdocumentation packagesreviews.Noneofthechangesrequirephysicalmodification toanyplantsystem.Theydo,however,affectthefuturemaintenance ofvariousequipment.

Thepossibility ofnewDesignBasisEvents(DBEs)notconsidered intheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethischangedoesnot-alter anyequipment usedtomitigateaccidents.

Thismodification isanenhancement oftheenvironmental qualification documentation ofvariousequipment andinnowayaffectstheplantdesign.

PCM119-186DuetothefactthatthisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessential tosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociated withachieving andmaintaining shutdowns, thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements.

Therefore theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandUFSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.

Sincethismodification involvesnophysicalmodifications tosafetyrelatedequipment andchangesinthemaintenance schedules willnotresultinfailureofequipment, thedegreeofprotection providedtoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment isunchanged.

Removalofequipment fromthe10CFR50.49 listdoesnotaffectthe.plant'ssafety."Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment isunchanged.

Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously, evaluated intheUFSARremainsunchanged.

Theconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARareunchanged.

Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyzedintheUFSARisnotcreated.Basedontheabove,themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseofthefollowing reasons:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence andtheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysis'eport willnotbe'ncreased bythismodification becauseit'oesnotaffecttheavailability, redundancy,

capacity, orfunctionofanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

(ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification..

Function, mountingandtheabilitytowithstand harshenvironmental conditions havenotbeenalteredandthismodification doesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

(iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsincethismodification doesnotchangetherequirements oftheTechnical Specifications.

Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM122-186PRESSURIZER MISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCAGEThisdesignpackageconsistsofthefabrication andinstallation ofapersonnel safetycageforthepressurizer missileshieldaccessladderandmodification oftheladder.Thesafetycagewillbeattached.totheladder.Themodification oftheladderisrequiredtoprovidesafeaccesstothetopofthepressurizer wallaswellastothemissileshield.Thepersonnel safetycagedoesn'tperformoraffectasafetymelated function.

However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedsincethereisapotential that,duringaseismicevent,thepersonnel safetycagecoulddamagesafety-related itemsthatareinthevicinity.

QualityRelatedrequirements areappliedtothisdesignThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

SAFETYEVALUATION Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipmen&

important.

tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thepressurizer missileshieldaccessladderandsafetycagedonotperformoraffectanysafety-related systemorfunction.,

However,thisPC/Misclassified asQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheaccessladderorsafetycageduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake) couldpotentially affectasafetymelated systemorequipment, sincetheladderandcagearelocatedinthecontainment buildingwhichcontainssafetymelated systems.Consequently, theladderandsafetycagehavebeendesignedforthedesignbasisconditions specified intheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirements havebeenimplemented, thusassuringtheintegrity oftheinstallation duringanydesignbasisevent.Themodifications includedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions because:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ'pme-important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased s'ncethismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment requiredtosnu-downtheplantancmonitortheplantinasafesnutdow"condit'on.

PCM122-186(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranacc'dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evauatecsincetheladderandcageperformnosafetyfunctionancnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperational design.Failueoftheladderandcagecouldnotoccursincethemodification hasbeen,designedforthedesignbasisconditions.

(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachange.toplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approval.fortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM126-1860ABSTRACTAUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEMDVMCIRCUITMODIFICATION Thisengineering packagecoversmodifications totheSt.LucieUnit2Auxiliary Feedwater.Actuation System(AFAS)thatwillallowtheuseofanexternalmetertomonitorthevariousinputsignals,pretripsetpoint, andtripsetpointvoltages.

ThecurrentAFASsystemhasabuiltinDigitalVoltmeter (DVM)thatmonitorsvariousinputvoltages.

HoweverthisDVMhasbecomeobsolete.

Themodification described inthisengineering packagewillallowtheuseofaportableexternalmetertobeusedinplaceofthebuiltinDigitalVoltmeter.

ThisPC/Misclassified asNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitmodifiesthesafetyrelatedAFAS.Themodifications havebeenreviewedinaccordance with10CFR50.59 andhavebeenfoundtoneitherinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionnorrequireatechnical specification change.Therefore priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplement thisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATION TheAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation System(AFAS)cabinetcontains'llfoursafetychannelsofequipment thatautomatically initiateauxiliary feedwater flowtoeitherorbothNSSSSteamGenerators.

TheAuxiliary Feedwater SystemisactuatedbytheAFASwhenlossofnormalsteamgenerator flowwouldcauseareactortripbytheRPSduetolowsteamgenerator waterlevel.TheDVMcircuitmodification.

involvestheadditionoffuses,fuseholders, resistors, andanameplate tothetestcircuitinordertoprovideanexternaltestjackformonitoring

.testfunctions usinga.portableDVMinsteadofthebuiltinDVMthatcurrently exists.Thetestcircuitisdisconnected fromtheoperating

'circuitinnormaloperating conditions.

Therefore anyfaultoccuringinthetestcircuitwhentheAFASisinnormaloperation willhavenoaffectonthecapability of'theAFAStoperformitssafeguard function.

Thefunctional capability oftheAFASwillremainthesameaf+erthemodification therefore nochange,inthesafetymarginwilloccur.Thismodification willresultinnonewmalfuncti,ons.

oraccidents tothesafetysystemsinceallthemodifications aretothetestcircuitwhichwasp'reviously analyzedtobedisconnctedfromthesafetyfunctionoperating circuitdurinonormalopera;ion.

PCM126'-186TheAFAS.es:circuitinconside.ednotobesafe.yrelatecsinceitdoesnotperformanysafetyfun".ior,.Howeverit15designedasanassociated ClassI"-circui.inordernottcdegadcthequalfice'onofthesafetyfunctioncircuitoftheAFAS.10CFR50.59 allowschangestoafacilityifanunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.

Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysis, itcanbesta.edthatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10.CFR50.59 doesnotexistsince:(1)Thechangedescribed hereindoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport,(2)Thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreport,(3)Thechangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Inconclusion, thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptable fromthestandpoint ofnuclearsafetyasitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotchangetheTechnical Specifications.

Therefore priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplement thisprocedure.

IIPCM130-986NEUTRALIZATION BASINCLOSUREMONITORING WELLSABSTRACTThisengineering packagecovers.theinstallation oftwotemporary groundwatermonitoring wellsinthevicinityoftheSt.LucieWaterTreatment Plant.Thesewellswillbeusedtodemonstrate totheStateDepartment ofEnvironmental Regulation (DER)thattheoperation ofouracid/caustic neutralization basinhasnotresultedinanygroundwatercontamination.

Thetemporary monitorwellsperformnosafetyrelatedfunctionandarelocatedawayfrom,andhavenoeffecton,anysafetyrelatedsystem.ThisPC/Misnon-safety related,buthasbeenclassified as'QualityRelated'o ensurethewellsarelocatedasspecified bytheencloseddesigndrawings.

Theadditionofthesewellsdoesnotposeanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SAFETYEVALUATION TheNeutralization Basingroundwatermonitoring wellsdonotperformanyplantsafety-relatedfunction.

Theywillnotbelocatedinthevicinityofanysafety-relatedequipment andtherefor'e welldrillingoperations cannotadversely impact,safety-relatedfunctions.

Acompletewellfailureorcollapsewillnotimpairthestructural integrity ofplantfillmaterial; accordingly, safety-relatedstructures orequipment supported bytheplantfillwillnotbeaffected.

Basedontheaboveevaluation andtheinformation suppliedinthedesignanalyisit'canbed'emonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobability ofoccurence

'ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfuntion ofadifferent typethananyevaluate'd previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.

PCM132-186EXCESSIVE AC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPABSTRACTAstudywasperformed byEbascooatheStLuciePlantUnit1toaddresstheconcern(perINPOSER80-83)thatexcessive AC/DCcontrolcircuitvoltagedropsatthecontrolpower'erminals ofthebreaker/combination stareersmayleadtothefailureoftheequipment ccntactor mechanism" tooperate.Thestudyidentified deficiencies infour(4)controlcircuitloopswherethecalculated controlcircuitloopresistances exceedthemaximumallowable loopresistances.

However,thestudyfoundthatduetoconservatism iathedesignofthecontrolcircuitcompoaents, therewillbesufficient voltageatthemotorstartercoiltermiaals toallowproperoperation ofthevalvesduringundervoltageanddegradedgridvoltageconditions.

Nevertheless, FPLhasdecidedtoimplement therecommendatioas ofthestudytoassurethereliability ofthesecontrolcircuitloops.Thiseagineering package(EP)providesfortheimplementation oftherecommendations oftheEbascostudy.Theseconsistofreplacement ofcontroltransformers fortwoofthefouraffectedcoatrolcircuitloopsandparalleling conductors forselectedportionsofallfourcontrolcircuitloops.Thesemodifications willensurethatthecalculated loopresistances willbelessthanthemaximumallowable loopresistances.

Thise"-gineering packageisconsidered safetyrelatedinthatthecontrolcircuitloopsbeingmodifiedareforequipment requiredformitigat'oa ofaaacideat;MainFeedwater PumpDischageIsolatior ValvesMV<91}MV<9-2aa"Ma'r.Feedwater Isolation Valves,MV-09-7,MV&9-8~reviewofthechangestobeimplemeated byth's2'asperformed againsttherequirempts of10CFR50.59

~Asindicated inSectio"3.0ofthisEag'neer'ng Package,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewec safetyquestion.

hasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation, aordoesitrequirearevisior.

totnetechnical specification; therefore priorCommission approvalisnotrequ'recfo=implementation oit'nisPC/M.Supplement 1AddendumTaissupplement incorporated seismicandenvironmental qualification forreplacement transformer andfuseblock.Theholdpoint established.

forthisinstallation hasbeenremovedandtheoriginalsafetyevaluation hasnotbeenaffectedbythissupplement.

PCM132-1863.0SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.AsaresultoftheAC/DCControlCircuitVoltageDropStudy(FLO62-8.5000 Rl),itwasdetermined thatthecalculated actualcontrolloopcableresistance foreachisolation valveexceedsthemaximumallowable controlloopcableresistance.

Althoughthiscondition exists,theconservatism ofthecontrolcircuitcomponents allows'hevalvestooperateduringundervoltage anddegradedgzidvoltageconditions.

Thismodification consistsofimplementing therecommendation ofthestudywhichinclude;(1)replacing the150VAcontroltransformers witha500VAtransformer forMV-09-16MV-09-2controlcircuitloop,(2)paralleling conductors forselectedportionsofthecontrolcircuitloopsforMV<9-1,MV-09-2,MV-09-7,andMV-09-8.Althoughthecalculated valuesindicated insufficient voltagemayexistatthemotorstartercoils,.fieldtestswereperformed todetermine ifanactualdeficient condition existed.Theresultsofthesetests,documented inAttachment 8.3ofthevoltagedropstudy,concluded thatduetoconservatism inthedesignofthecontrolcircuitcomponents, therewillbesufficient voltageatthemotorstartercoilterminals toallowproperoperation ofthevalvesduringundervoltage anddegradedgridvoltageconditions.

Theoperation ofthesevalvesasdescribed inUFSAP.Amendment 4Section7.3.1.1.12 and15.4.6.1isnotaffectedbythismodification.

Infact,withtheimplementation ofthismodification, thereliability oftheoperation ofthesevalveswillbeincreased.

Assuch,thismodification willnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyanddoesnotcreateapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated.

Thismodification doesnotimpactanytechnical specification andassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesfozanytechnical specification isnotreduced.Theforegoing constitutes, per10CPR50.59 thewrittensafety,evaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions, andpriorCommision approvalofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM136-186REPLACEMENT OFSTEAMGENERATOR LEVELTRANSMITTERS ThisEngineering Packagecoversthereplacement ofthesteamgenerator leveltransmitters.

Thetransmitters provideinputsignalstotheReactorProtection System,Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System,SteamGenerator LevelIndicating Controller andHighSteamGenerator TurbineProtection Circuitry.

Theexistingtransmitters arepartoftheReactorProtection Systemandclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodification isaone-for-one replacement oftheexistingtransmitters withRosemount Model1154DP4RAN0026 transmitter, thesameclassification applies.Theexisting~iringisnotaffectedbythischange.Plantsafetyandoperation arenotaffected.

Thesafetyevaluation ofthispackageindicates thatthetransmitters'eplacement doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, anddoesnotrequireachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseofthefollowing reasons:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence andtheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreased bythismodification becauseitdoesnotaffecttheavailability, redundance,

capacity, orfunctionofanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification.

Function, mountingandtheabilitytowithstand harshenvironmental conditions havenotbeenalteredandthismodification doesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

PCM136-186(iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsinceth'modification installs"transmitters withimprovedaccuracyandacceptable responsetimewhichareseismically andenvironmentally qualified towithstand thenormalandaccidentcond'ions whichareanticipated.

Thepossibilitv ofnewDesignBas'sEvents(DBEs)notconsidered intheFUSAP.isnotcreateds'ncethedesignphilosophy otheRPShasbeenpreviously discussed intheFUSA"-.andisnotchangedbythereplacement oftheeight(8)leveltransmitters (LT-9013A,B,C,D andLT-9023A,B,C,D).

Thismodification isanenhancement ofanexistingsystemasitfurnishes replacement transmitters whichcoverboththenormalandhightransient levelresponses ofthesteamgenerators withimprovedaccuracyandreliability.

Duetothefactthat.thisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessential tosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociated withachieving andmaintaining shutdowns, thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements.

Therefore theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandFUSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.

According totheFUSARSections7.1.1and7.2.1,theRPSisidentified hsaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemsinceitmonitorsthesteamsupplysystemandeffectsreliableandrapidreactorshutdownifanyoneofacombination ofparameters deviatesfromapreselected opezating range.Hence,thisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodification providesforaone-for-one replacement ofexistingleveltransmitters withmorereliableandaccurateequipment andinvolvesnoothermodifications tosafetyrelatedequipment, thedegreeofprotection providedtonuclearsafetyrelatedequipment isunchanged.

Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARremainsunchanged.

Theconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFUSARareunchanged.

Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyzedintheFUSARisnotcreated.Theimplementation ofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM136-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, nordoesitcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewritten.safetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM139-186MASONRYWALLMODIFICATIONS Certainmasonrywallsrequireaclassification upgradeasaresultoftheinstallation ofsafetyrelatedequipment intheirvicinity.

23suchwallshavebeenidentified.

ThisPCM,issuedinresponse toJCOJPE-LR-87-001, Revis1on0,willprovidemodifications to10oftheseupgradedwallstoenablethemtosatisfythestructural acceptance criteriaforsafetyrelatedwalls-ThisPCMdoes"motconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Themodification willensurethattheaffectedwallswillhaveno1nteraction withsafetyrelatedequipment andtherefore hasnoeffectonplantsafety.Themodification hasnoimpactonplantoperation.

Theaffectedmasonrywallsandthestructural modifications theretobeingimplemented bythisPCMhavebeenseismically designed.

Consequently, thisPCMisclassified asQualityRelated.SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability of.occurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunct1on ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisPC/Mprovidesmodifications to10masonrywallstoimprovethelateralloadcarryingcapabilities of.thesewalls.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Thefollowing arethebasesforthisconclusion:

(1)Theprobab1lity ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willbeperformed inaccordance withQualityRelatedrequirements, hencetheseismiccapability ofthe.affected masonrywallsisnotcompromised.

Therefore, therecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentsafetyrelatedstructures, systems,orequipment.

PCM139-186(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent

'ypethananyevaluated previously sincethe.modification willensurethattheaffectedwallswil'avenointeraction withsafetyrelatedequipment andhencewillhavenoefrectonplantsafety.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyadefine"inthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Theimplementatio-ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetcplanttechnical specificat'ns.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CPR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Hisnotrequired.

PCM140-186ANNUNCIATOR NUISANCEALARMSABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)coversthemodifications offiveannunciator circuitsintheMainControlRoom.Existinglogic,circuitconfiguration andcomponents willbechangedintheReactorTurbineGenerator..Boards (RTGBs)soastoeliminate existingnuisanceconditions causedbyerroneous alarmindication ofthesefiveannunciator circuits.

Byimplementing thisEP,thesecircuitswillbeconsistent withthe"DarkAnnunciator" conceptwhichallowsforlightedannunciators duringoff-normal conditions only.ThisEPisclassified asNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvestheinterposing ofacontrolrelayinasafetyrelatedcircuit(hydrogen analyzer) andtheextension ofsafetyrelatedpowersupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H).Thesafetyevaluation hasdetermined thatthisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangeintheplanttechnical specifications.

ThisPCMmaybeimplemented withoutpriorCommission approval.

ThisEngineering PackageRevisioncoversmodification ofthesixannunciator circuitsassociated withannunciated windowsP-30,P-35,P-36,P-42,9-40andX-5intheControlRoom.Thesemodifications, whichincluderelocation oflocalresetswitches, installation ofreflashers andlogicmodifications, willeliminate the;nuisance alarmstatusofthesixannunciators.

Byimplementing thisPCMSupplement, thesesixannunciators willbebroughtintocompliance withthe"DarkAnnunciator" conceptofNUREG0700"Guidelines forControlRoomDesignReview"..

TheoriginalSafetyEvaluation hasbeenrevised.TheSafetyEvaluation stillconcludes, however,thatthisEPdoesnot,involve andunreviewed safetyquestion, orachangetothetechnical specifications.

Therefore, priorcommissi'on approvalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthePCM.TheintentoftheoriginalSafetyEvaluation isnotaffectedbythissupplement.

SAFETYEVALUATION PithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59;aproposedchangedshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.

PCM140-186Themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packagedonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincetheannunciators servenofunctioninthecontrolofplantoperat'ions orsafeshutdown.

Electrical separation isprovidedbetweenredundant safetyrelatedwiringandcomponents andannunciator logicwhichisseparated toprotectcontrolfunctions frombeingaffectedbyannunciation circuitfailure.(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofanycontrolcircuitsorassociated systems.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafety.asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

SincethisEPaffectsequipment thatisidentified asNuclearSafetyRelated(Hydrogen Analyzer) andrequirestheextention ofNuclearSafetyRelatedpowe'rsupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H),itisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.DuetothefactthattheFPdoesnot'nvolve anycablesessential tosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociated withachieving andmaintaining safeshutdownconditions, thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements.

Therefore, theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandStLucie-Unit1FSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.

Implementation ofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM140-186andSupplement 1tothesamePCMdonotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical

'pecifications andmaybeimplemented withoutpriorcommission approval.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMandSupplement 1tothesameisnotrequired.

PCM14D-186PRESSURIZER LEVELINSTRUMFNTATION MODIFICATION REA-SLN-86-076 ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)modifiesthePressurizer LevelInstrumentation toprovidetworedundant qualified channelsofControlRoomindication (Sigmameters).Electrical isolators willbeinstalled soastoseparatethenon-safety (control) loopfromtheupgradedNuclearSafetyRelatedPressurizer LevelInstrumentation loops.Existingpressurizer pressureandpressurizer levelrecorders willbereplacedwithnarrowcaseequivalent equipment inordertoallowspacefortheinstallation,,

ofnewSigmaindicators, inthefrontpanelofRTGB-103.

Cable,conduit,penetrations andcomponents whichwillbepartoftheNuclearSafetyRelatedloopwillbere-tagged toindicatethisupgrade.Thetwoupgradedchannelsofpressurizer levelinstrumentation willmeettherequirements ofRegulatory Guide1.97,Rev3forVariableDCategory10ThisEPisclassified asNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitprovidesanupgradeofanexistingsystemtoNuclearSafetyRelatedstatus.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthattheimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforitsimplementation isnotrequired.

ThisEPdoesnotadversely affectplantsafetyandoperation orimpactPlantTechnical Specifications.

Supplement 1tothisPCMisthevehiclefortheissuanceofarevisiontotheEnvironmental Qualification Documentation Packageandupdatingthe10CFR'0.49listtoaddresstheSafetyInjection Tanksamplelinecontainment isolation valves,FCV&3-1EandFCV-03-1F.

Thesesolenoidvalveswereinstalled aspartofPCM314-77whichmovedtheSafetyInjection Tanksamplepointfrominsidetooutsidethecontainment.

Thesecontainment isolation valvescontainlimitswitches(inthesolenoidassembly) asrequiredbyRegulatory Guide1.97,Rev3forVariableBCategoryl.Theisolation valvesarelocatedinapotentially harshenvironment, thustheyrequireEnvironmental Qualification asrequiredby10CFR50.49.Nophysicalchanges'areneededtoaddressSupplement 1ofthisPCMsincethequalified limitswitcheswereinstalled aspartofPCM314-77.Revision1doesnotaltertheNuclearSafetyRelatedstatusof.thisEPsinceitonlyaffectsaNuclearSafetyRelatedEnvironmental Qualification Documentation Package.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthattheimplementation ofthePCMsupplement doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforitsimplementation isnotrequired'his EPrevisiondoesnotadversely affectplantsafetyandoperation orimpactPlantTechnical Specifications.

PCM141-186SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction'f equipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeinczeased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.4Theproposedmodification affectsthePressurizer LevelInstrumentation andcontrolloopsinthatitprovidesfortheestablishment'f tworedundant NuclearSafetyRelatedpressurizer levelindication channelsintheControlRoomsoastomeettherequirements ofRegGuide1;97.Inaccordance withRegGuide1.75,physicalseparation isprovidedbetweenthenonsafety(control) andthesafetyrelatedsegmentsoftheloop.Supplement 1ofthisPCMisthevehicleforissuanceofarevisiontotheEgDocumentation PackageforValcorSolenoidvalvestoincludeSafetyInjection TankSampleLineContainment Isolation Valvesinaccordance with10CFR50.49.Supplement 1servestoaddtheenvironment qualification oftheisolation valvesintothedocumentsystemandhasnoimpactonplanthardwareorprocedures asdescribed intheUFSAR.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofaDBEpreviously addressed intheUFSARisnotaffectedbythismodification.

ThisEPwillinfactdecreasetheprobability ofpressurizex levelinstrumentation failuresinceitprovidesforincreased reliability intheeventasinglefailurebyfurnishing tworedundant, qualified channels.

Thepossibility ofnewDBEsnotconsidered intheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophy hasbeenpreviously discussed intheUFSAR.Thismodification isanenhancement toapre-existing systemandisbeingperformed toprovideincreased xeliability intheeventofasinglefailure.Pressurizer LevelInstrumentation isidentified asPostAccidentMonitoring Instrumentation andisrequiredtobeNuclearSafetyRelatedperRegulatory Guide1.97,Rev3asitpertainstoCategory',

TypeDvariables.

Asthismodification involvescablesessentia1 toreactorsafeshutdown(Essential Equipment List8770-B-049, Rev0)andPostAccidentMonitoring Instrumentation (PAMI),allapplicable 10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotection requirements havebeenidentified andaresatisfied bythispackage(Section2.1.4).Therefore theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandUFSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.

Sincethispackagemeetstherequirements ofRegGuide1.97asitprovidesfortwoindependent, redundant NuclearSafetyRelatedchannelsofpressurizer levelinstrumentation, thisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.Astheevaluation ofsystemfailuremode(Section2.1.17)indicates, thispackageupgradesexistingredundant, independent pressurizer levelinstrumentation loopsfromIA/IB(important tosafety)toSA/SB(NuclearSafetyRelated)andprovidesadequateelectrical andphysicalseparation.

Hence,thisisanenhancement tothepressuzizer levelinstrumentation andincreases thedegreeofprotection tonuclearsafetyrelatedsystemsandequipment.

Theprobability ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheUFSAR,remainsunchanged.

Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyz'ed intheUFSARisnotcreated.

PCM143-186PASSDISSOLVED HYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSAbstractThisEngineering Package(EP)coverstheinstallation oftie-instotheexistingUnitNo1PostAccidentSamplingSystem(PASS)foradissolved hydr~oenanalyzer.

lAreviewofthechangetobeimplemented bythisEPwasperformed againsttherequirements oi10CFR50.59.

Asaresulttheinstallation ofadisssolved hydrogenanalyzerinthePASSisclassified asnon-safety related,doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion, doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification andwillnotaffectplantsafety(asaddressed inSection3,"SafetyEvaluation"

).However,thismodification isqualityrelated,becauseitisrequiredbyNUREG0737formonitoring ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)chemistry andactivityresulting fromadesignbasisaccident.

Thischangewillnotaffectplantoperations.

PriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation ofthisEP.SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)if'theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisrepormaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanvTechnical Specification isreduced.Thismodification involvesthenecessary tie-instotheexist'ngsystemincluding tubingandvalves.ThisE""ionlyfo=prov'sions toinstallthedissolved hydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisclassified asnon-safety related.ThisEPisclassified qualityrelatedbecauseitisrequiredbvNUP.EG0737formonitoring ReactorCoolantSystemchemistry andactivityresulting fromadesignbasisaccident.

Basedontheabove,thisengineering designpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincethisEPisonlyforprovisions toinstallthedissolved hydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisnon-safety relatedanditsnormalperformance requirements havenotbeenaffectedbythesetie-ins.Thereisnopotential forthismodification tointeractwith'afety relatedsystemfunctions.

I~

PCM143-186(ii)The-possibility foranaccidgntormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisEP,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

Implementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, perlOCFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

r PCM146-186MISCELLANEOUS ICWSYSTEMMODIPICATIONS ABSTRACTThisengineering packageenablesminormodifications tobemadetotheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)systemresulting fromdisassembly, inspection, repairandreassemblv duringthe1987refueling outage.Thosemodifications thatmeetthecriteriaestablished bythisdesignpackageshallbeinitiated viatheChangeRequest/Notice formanddispositioned byengineering.

Thosemodifications whichdonotmeetthecriteriaestablished bythisdesignpackageshallbeimplemented underseparatedesignpackages.

Thosemodifications totheessential portionoftheICWSystemareclassified asnuclearsafetyrelated,therefore thePC/Misclassified assafetyrelated.Modifications tothenon-essential portionoftheICKSystemareclassified asnon-nuclear safetyrelatedunlessthefailuremodeanalysisdetermines anintelactionwithequipment important tosafety.Ifso,qualityrequirements willbeappliedandthemodification classified asQualityRelated.SincethePC/Mwillrestorethesystemtoitsoriginaldesignconfiguration, itdoesnotresultinanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SAFETYEVALUATION Themodifications totheessential portionoftheICWsystemdescribed intheprojectscopeareclassified asnuclearsafety-related becausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponent inconjunction withtheworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedperFSARTable9.2.2wouldresultintheinability oftheICWsystemtoachieveitsdesignbasissafetyfunction.

HistoricaGy, thetypesofmodifications totheICWSystemresulting fromthedisassembly andreassembly ofthepipingsystemforinspection andrepairhavebeen:1.Modifications topipeventanddrainlines(e.g.,replacement ofcorrodedmaterial).

2.Modifications tosupport/restraints (e.g.,documentation ofweldsymbolsrequiredtoreassemble S/R's,excessive gapatS/Rbaseplates,replacement ofcorrodedmaterial).

3.WeldrepairtoICWpipe(e.g.,documentation ofpipewelds).4.Pipeflangeboltingmaterialchangesorbolttorquevalvedocumentation.

Asdescribed inthedesignbases,thesenuclearsafety-related modifications shallbemadeinaccordance withthedesigncoderequirements forSafetyClass3pipeandpipecomponents andforSeismicClassIsupport/restraints.

PCM146-186Inaccordance withtherequirements specified inthedesignbases.eachmodification tnthenon-nuclear safety-related portionoftheICIUsystemsnal'ave>fa!luremod=evaluation performed todetermine ifthereareanyinterac'.ions withsafty-related equipment orfunctions.

Sine=thenon-nuclear safe~relatedportionoitheICYsystemisnotreliedupo:;.'oranyaccidentprevention ormitigation, failureswhicharedetermined tcnotimpactthefunctionofthenuclearsafety-related portionoftheI:"4systemareacceptable vithregardtonuclearsafety.NoQualityRelatedrequirements willbeappliedto.thedesignofthesemodifications.However,ifamodification tothenon-nuclear safetyrelated portionoftheICLUsystemisdetermined bythefailuremodeevaluation tointeractwithNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment, QualityRelated!equi!'ements willoeappliedtothedesignofthesemodifications.

Basedontheabove,itcanbedemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59 doesnotexist.i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased becausenoDBA'sdealwithspecificICWcomponent failures.

Themodifications restoretheICWsystemando!iginaldesigncondition andensureitssafetyfunctionwillbeperformed.

ii)'Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased becausethemodifications proposedbythisdesignpackagearetopassivecomponents onlyandtheywillbedesigned/implemented inaccordancewithsafetyclass/FSAR requirements.

TheFSARdoesnotevaluatepassivecomponent failures.

iii)Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethemodifications permitted bythisdesignpackagedonotaltertheICWsystemfunctionormodeofoperation.

TheFSARevaluation oftheICWsystemenvelopes thefailureofthedescribedmodifiedcomponents.iv)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforatechnical specification isnotreduced.Themodifications permitted bythisdesignpackagehavebeenreviewedandfoundacceptable.

Nochangestothedesignbasis,function, ormodeofoperation oftheICWsystemisproposed10CFR50.59 allows'hanges toafacilityasdescribed intheFSARifan.unreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangeto.theTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.

Asshovninthepreceeding

sections, thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59 thatpertainstoanunreviewed safetyquestioncanbepos!tively answeredsincethePC/i'eturns theICWsystemtoitsdesigncondition andnoTechnical Specification changeisrequired.

Inconclusion, thechangesproposedinthisdesignpackaage" areacceptable fromthestardpoint ofnuclearsafety,donotinvolveanunreviewe" safe'.yquestion.

donotrequireachangetotheTechnical Spec!fica'.!onsanddonotrequirepriorNRCapprovalpriortoin;plmen:a'.ion.

PCM148-186ICWISOLATION VALVEREPLACEMENT ABSTRACTThisengineering packageisissuedtoprovidedirection forthereplacement ofanyofthe30-inchand36-inchnormallyopenisolation valvesintheIntakeCoolingNate."(ICN)system,asrequired.

Theisolation valvereplacement isclassified asnuclearsafetyrelated,anddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

"Normally closed"isolation valvesmustbereplacdwithrubberlinedvalvesandarenotwithinthescopeofthisdesignoackage.Specification MN2.57whichisinaccordance withtheorocurement specirication usedtoprocuretheoriginalvalves.Thenewvalveshavecaststainless steelbodies{ASI<IZoA-351GradeCF3M)whichprecludedete.ioration seenintheevistin~carbonsteI/rubberlinedvalves.Theprocurement specification specified therequi<rement thatthevalvesandextension mustbecomcatible withtheexstingoperatars.Pressmeboundarycomponents!nstaQed aspartoitheintakeCooli'ngWatersyste<v:vere desi=..ed

'fortheoilowin~:

sfPesicHDassure2~i90Design<Tmcerat",."-<n5Chemistry:

Seawaterwith"..0mavimumdisso.'ved chlorinePerFPLP.OC83918~<814PandPowerPlantEngineering Specification MN2.57evisicn0,thevalves,vereboughttot<".erequirements ofAS'.<IESecL<onIIIforClass3components.

Approoriate seismicrequirem<ents

.veralsospecified.

Thenewvalveswe.edesignediorthefollowing externalenvironmen talconditions:

Temperature, FPressure,psig30-120Atmosoheric 100%Humidity, SaltLadenAtmosphere AQualityControlholdooint hasbeenassignedintheConstruction Scopesectionfortheverification thattheextension bcnnetsupporting detailsareapprovedbyengineering priortosystemturnoverinordertocomelywiththerequirements ofparagraph 1.3.5.

PCM148-186SAFETYEVALUATIONThereplacement ofisolation valvesasdescribed intheProjectScopeisaNuclearSafetyRelatedmodification becauseitchangesvalveswhichformapartofthepressureretaining boundaryofaSafetyClass3/Quality GroupCsystem.Basedupontherequirements of10CFR50.59,anunreviewed safetyquestiondoesnotexistbecause:1.TheICNsystemisnotconsidered indetermining theprobability ofdesignbasisaccidents (i.e.,LOCA,AISLB,LOOP,etc.).2.Theconsequence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tonuclearsafetyisnotmademoreseriousduetothedesignredundancy oftheICNsystem.Theseparation criteriaismaintained bythevalvesdesignedinaccordance withASVlESectionIIIrequirements.

3.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethefailureofanyofthesevalvesisapassivefailurewhichisenveloped bytheevaluations oftheFSAR.4.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnical Specification remainsunchanged becausetheredundancy oftheICWsystemismaintained.

Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation contained intheDesignAnalysis, themodification canbeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapprovalbecauseanUnreviewed SafetyQuest!ondoesnotexistandachangetotheTechnical Specifications isnotrequired.

PCM151-186480VACLOADCENTER1B~2TRANSFORMER COOLINGABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodification tothe480Vac,1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanent sourceof240Vac,ClasslEpower-forthestationservicetransformer's coolingfans.Thismodification consistsofinstalling anew,controlpowertransformer, completewithprimaryandsecondary overcurrent protection, intheexistingtransition compartment of1B-2LoadCenterandtheinterconnection ofthispowersourceto-theexistingautomatic/manual controlschemeassociated withthecoolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassfied asClasslE,seismicCategoryIequipment andperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.

Therefore, thisPlantChange/Modification (PC/M)isclassified asnuclearsafetyrelated.Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Themodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously in=-thesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.ThisEngineering Packagecoversmodification tothe480Vacua1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanent sourceof240Vac,Class1Epowerforthestationservicetransformer's coolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassified asClass1E,seismicCategoryIequipment andperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.

Therefore, thisPC/Mhasbeenclassified nuclearsafetyrelated'nd nuclearsafetyrelateddesignrequirements wereappliedtothisEP.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased since:Allmodifications arebeingperformed onthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter.Theonlymodification istorestoretheinstallation similartoitsoriginalcondition.

Newcomponents installed bythismodification includecurrentlimitingprimaryfusesandasecondary circuitbreaker,whichprovideovercurrent protection ofthenewcontrolpowertransformer anditssecondary circuit.Shoul'dfailureofthenewcomponetsoccur,theywillberemovedfromtheirpowersourcebytheseprotect've deviceswithoutaffecting therestofthe."B"electrical syste=.A:sc,newcompone"ts areev'onme"tally andseismically quaie'ctherequiredenviroxae tandw'-'1remainfunctional duringprev'usly evaluated accidents.

'Theefore,theprobability ofoccu=enceortheconsequences ofpreviously evaluated accidents arenotincrease".

PCM151-186Newcomponents arebeingprovidedbyBrownBoveri,formallvITE,theoriginalmanufacture-oftne1B-2LoadCenter.Inaddition, themannerinwhichthecomponents aremountedispeBrownBoveri/industry standardinstallation details.TheBrownBoveriAddendumtothe1B-2LoadCenterCertificate ofConformance (Reference Attachment 4)hasbeenreviewedandithasbeenverifiedthattheadditionofthenewcomponents doesnotaffecttheexistingequipment's environmental orseismicqualification.

Thus,thismodification doesnotcompromise theoperation/reliability oftheexistinginstallation andtheequipment willfunctionduringaccidents aspreviously evaluated.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:Allmodifications arebeingperformed onaauxiliary supporting featureofthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter,1B-2,withnomodifications requiredtotheindependent, redundant "A"loadgroupLoadCenter,lA-2..Primaryandsecondary overcurrent protection havebeenprovidedforthenewcontrolpowertransformer.

Allnewcomponents andtheinterconnecting wiringareenvironmentally andseismically qualified totherequiredenvironment andwillbeabletoprovidepowertothe1B-2LoadCenterstationservice'transformer coolingfanspostDesignBasisAccident.

BasedonthisandParagraph 3.3.3.,noaccidents/malfunctions different

.thanthoseevaluated previously arecreatedbythismodification.'he marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsincethemodification ensuresthattheequipment willfunctionaspreviously evaluated duringoperation/accidents.

Also,as1B-2LoadCentermustbedeenergized priortoperforming anywork,implementation ofthisPC/Mwillbecoordinated withPlantOperations sothecriteriaestablished bytheplantTechnical Specifications, eg,Specification 3/4.8,arenotviolated(Reference Section9.0).Therefore, theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplant'sTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

'thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionand.priorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM153-186ROSEMOUNT ANDVALCOREQENHANCEMENTS ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)providesforthemodification ofseven(7)ValcorEngineering Corporation solenoidvalvesandtherelocation ofone(1)Rosemount

'leveltransmitter.

Thesemodifications eliminate theneedtoPatomeEPqualification (EQ)analysisonthisequipment whilebolstering theapplicable qual1f1cat1on documentation packages.

Th1sisaccomplished byraisingthetransmitter ontheInstrument Rack50.1abovefloodlevelandaddingNAMCOControlsconduitsealassemblies totheelectrical powerleadsofseven(7)Valcorsolenoidvalvestoprotectagainstingressofcontainment chemicalsprayintothevalvecontrols.

Thismodification providesforincreased protection toNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment andimprovesthemarginofsafetyofthepressurizer levelinstrumentation andthehydrogensamplingsystem.Theconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areunchanged.

ThisPCMisclassified NuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvesequipment thatservestomitigatetheconsequences ofaDes1gnBasesEvent(DBE).Evaluation Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireanychangetotheStLucie-UnitlTechnical Specifications.

Themodifications, asprovidedbythispackage,donotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforthe1mplementation ofthispackageisnotrequired.

Plantsafetyandoperation arenotaffected.

SafetWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(1)iftheprobability ofoccurence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction oftheequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased, or(11)ifapossibilility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously 1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebseesforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theproposedmodification affectsthelocationofRosemount leveltransmitter LT-lllOXandtheelectrical condu1tconnection toseven(7)Valcorisolation solenoidvalvesinthehydrogensamplingsystem.Theprobability ofoccurence ofanaccidentpreviously addressed intheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedF1nalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)isnotincreased bythismodification.

ThisEPinfactdecreases thepossibility ofRosemount leveltransmitters'ailure byreducingtheprobability offailureduetoflooding.

Probability offailureoftheValcorsolenoidvalvesisreducedbyeliminating'he likelihood oftheintrusion ofchemicalsprayintheelectrical conduit.Thepossibility ofnewDBEsnotconsidered intheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophies ofpressurizer levelandhydrogenanalyzerhavebeenpreviously addressed intheUFSAR.Thismodification isanenhancement toexistinghydrogenanalyzerisolation valvesaswellaspressurizer leveltransmitter LT-lllOX.

PCM153-186DuetothefactthatthisEPinvolvescablesidentified asessential tosafereactorshutdown(pressurizer leveltransmitter LT-1110X),

Appendix"R"requirements havebeenconsidered andaddressed inthispackage(Section2.1.6).Assuch,thedesignofthispackageisincompliance withtheapplicable codesandUPSARrequirements forfireprotection equipment.

ThisEPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvespressurizer levelinstrumentation (usedforsafereactorshutdown) andhydrogensampling/analyzer (usedforthemitigation of'adesignbasesevent).Astheevaluation offailuremode(Section2.2.8)indicates, thedegreeofprotection toNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment (marginofsafety)isincreased andtheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUPSARareunchanged.

Thepossibility ofmalfunctions ofadifferent typethanthoseanalyzedintheUPSARisnotcreated.Theimplementation ofNuclearSafetyRelatedPC/M153-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, nordoesitcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Theforegoing consitutes, per10CPR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM001-187IEBULLETIN85-03MOVSWITCHSETTINGSABSTRACTNRCIEBulletin85-03requiresthatoperating nuclearplantsdevelopandimplement aprogramtoensure'.thatswitchsettingsonselectedsafety-related motor-operated valves(MOV's)arecorrectly

selected, setandmaintained toaccommodate themaximumdifferential pressures expectedonthesevalvesduringallpostulated eventswithinthedesignbasis.Itema)ofthebulletinrequiresthatthedesignbasisforthosehlOV'slocatedinAFC'ndHPSIsystemsbereviewedtodetermine themaximumdifferential pressureexpectedduringbothopeningandclosingstrokesforallpostulated events.Thiseffortwasperformed forSt.LucieUnitsIand2byCombustion Engineering aspartoftheCEOwner'sGroup(CEOG)Tasks528and531.TheresultsoftheItema)weresubsequently transmitted totheNRCviaFPLletterL-86-200, datedMay15,1986.Itemb)ofBulletin85-03requiresthatthelicenseeestablish thecorrectMCVswitchsettingsbasedonthepreviously determined maximumdifferential pressure.

Allswitches,including torcueswitches,torquebypassswitches,positionlimit,positionindication, overloads, etc.,shallbe'onsidered.

Thisdesignpackageprovidestheoverallswitchsettingguidelines foreachV>OY,inadditiontothespecificdesigninformation necessary.

tosetboththeopenandclosetorquesvitchesandmet:herequirements ofBulietin85-03.Oncethecorrectswitchsettingshavebeenincorporated intotherespective AIC'V,Itemc)ofIEBu!letin85-03requiresthateachK!OYbestroketestedagainstthemaximumdifferential pressureestablished inItema)toverify'.'perability, Becauseallofthe%1OY'sassociated withBulletin85-"3aresafety-related thisengineringpackagehasbeenclassifie asnuclearsafty-re!ated.

Areviewofthsw'tchsettingcangestobimpierne..ted bythisPC/illwasper'ormec againsttherequirements ofIGCFR5~.59,.anditwasconciuded thatthesemodiiic-tions donotconstitute anunreviewed safetycuestionanddonotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Thissupplement revisesthetorqueswitchsettingsforvalveV-3650toaccountforactualfieldtesting.Thiscondition hadbeenpreviously justified viaSafetyEvaluation 3PE-Al-87-038, Pev.i.TheEngineering Packagesafetyclassification andsafetyevaluation areunaffected.

SAFETYEVALUATION lUithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalReulations, Part50.59,themodification described inthisengineering packagedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased.

Thisengineering packageonlyprovidesthenecessary designinformation requiredtosetMOVswitchsettingsutilizing AIOVATSsignatureanalysistechniques.

Therecommended switchsettingsareconsidered enhancements totheexistingsettingstofurtherensurevalveoperability.

Also;FSAR'design baseswere PCM001-187reviewedtodeterminethemaximumloadingconditions oneachMOVtoensuretheswitchsettingswereproperlyselected.

Furthermore, Itemc)ofBulletin85<3requiresthateachMOVbestroketestedundermaximumdifferential pressureconditions toensurevalveoperability.

ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcrested.Nohardwaremodifications areperformed-as partofthisPC/M.TheproposedMOVswitchsettingsalteraccidentmitigating equipment tofurtherenhanceoperability.

However,malfunctions oftheseNOV'sdonotinthemselves initiateanaccident.

Therefore, nonewaccidents havebeencreated.Additionally, thespecified modifications donotintroduce anynewfailuremodesfortheequipment.

Therefore, nodifferentmalfunctions oftheequipment thanthosepreviously analyzedareintroduced.

iii)Themarginofsafetyas=defined inthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Thismodification doesnotimpact.theTechnical Specification requirements fortheassociated equipment.

Valvestroketimesarenotimpacted.

Therefore, themarginofsafetycontrolled bytheTechnical Specifications ispreserved.

~~Inconclusion, thechangeproposedinthisengineering packageis.acceptable fromthestandpoint ofnuclearsafetydoesnotinvolveanunreviewec safetyquestionandprior':RCapprovalforimplementation isnotrequired.

PCM005-187.NRCIEBULLETIN85-03-MOVPOSITIONINDICATION ABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodifications tothesafetyrelatedMotorOperatedValves(MOV's)in.theAux1liary Feedwater (AFW)andtheHighPressureSafetyInfection (HPSI)systems.ThisEngineering Packagewillprovidetheengineering anddesigndeta1lsrequiredto1mplement theclosetoopentorquebypassswitchandclosedpositionindication wiringmodifications.

TheMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystemsarerequiredforplantsafeshutdownandclassified asClass1E,areseismically qual1fied andperformasafetyrelatedfunction.

Therefore, thisPC/Misconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionsincethemodifications described abovewillnothaveanadverseimpactonplantoperations orsafetyrelatedequipment.

SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrev1ewed safetyquestion:

(1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ1pment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction of"a-different typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalys1sreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.Th1sEng1neering Packageprovidestheengineering anddesigndetailsrequiredtoinstalladditional rotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestoMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystems.PC/M001-187increases theclosedtoopentorquebypassswitchsettingswhich1mpacttheclosedpositionind1cat1ng light.Increasing thenumberofrotorsfromtwotofourvillallovthelimitswitchfortheclosedpositionindicating 11ghttobelocatedonarotorotherthanthatusedforthetorquebypassswitch.Motormperated valvesthathavefourrotorswillonlyrequireinternalwiringchanges.Theadditionofthenewrotorsdoesnotaffecttheexistingequipment qualifications.

Theimplementation ofthisEngineering Packageincreases theavailability oftheMOV'sduringsafeshutdownconditions andimprovestheMOVpositionindication providedtothecontrolroomoperators.

TheMOV'sthatarebeingmodifiedperformsafetyrelatedfunctions vithintheAFWandHPSIsystemsandaredesignedforoperation underconditions thatcouldbeimposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThisEPhasbeenclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.

PCM005-187Basedonthepreceeding, thefollowing conclusions canbemade:(1)Therobabilit ofoccurrence ortheconseuencesofanaPqccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety'reviously

,evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased, sincethemodifications totheMOV'senhan'ees theoperability oftheequipment.

Theadditionofrotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestothevalveswillpreventthepossibility ofinaccurate remoteclosedpositionindication resulting fromtheincreased bypass11mitswitchsettings.

(11)Asaresultofthismodification, thereisnopossibility foraccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated.

Thismodificat1on altersaccidentmitigat1ng equipment toenhancetheiroperation.

Therewasnointroduction ofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.

(111)Th1smodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

Thesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolled bythevariousapplicable Technical Specifications ismaintained bythischange.TheproposeddesignensuresthattheMOV'swillfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.

ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnical Specificat1ons ispreserved.

ETheimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM009-187OVERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEMMODIFICATIONS ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)detailsthemodifications requiredontheOverpressure Mitigation System(OMS)toprovidechangestothePowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)setpoints.

Thenewsetpoints arederivedfromC~ustionEngineering's reportonPressure/Temperature (F7T)limitsandLowTemperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)for10Effective FullPowerYears(EFPY).There-analysis oftheOMSsetpoints ensuresthattheReactorCoolantSystemsPressurewillbemaintained belowtheapplicable P/Tlimitsduringtheoperating periodendingat10EFPY.ThenewP/Tlimitsareidentified toprovideadequateprotection againstrapidpropogation ofaflawinther'eactorvesselwithconsideration giventotheoptimization ofheatupandcooldownrates.TheOMSsetpointmodifications areclassified QualityRelatedbecauseany'a1luretotheOMSsetpointb1stablealarmsundernormaloperating conditions oranticipated transients canresultinexceeding asafetylimitspecified insection3/4.4.13and3/4.4.14oftheTechnical Specifications.

Furthermore, theOMSsetpointmodifications affecttheRTGBoardslocated1nthecontrolroom.ThisEPchangewillnotimpa1rtheeffic1ent operation

.oftheOMS,nordoesitcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion, therefore, priorCommission approvalforitsimplementation isnotrequired.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreview'ed safetyquestion:

(1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyprev1ously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased, or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafet~hnalyiksReportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification isreduced.TheOMSprotectstheRCSfrombeingpressur1zed beyondthecurvesdefinedbytheminimumpressur1zation temperature curvesoftheTechnical Specifications, whiletheRCSisatlowtemperatures.

TheOMSachievesitspurposeofprotecting theRCSfromoverpressur1zation atIow,non-ductile temperatures bycontinuously comparing actualpressurizer pressuretotwo(2)pressuresetpo1nts andcorresponding temperature setpoints andbyactuating thePORVswhenactualpressureapproaches thesesetpoints.

Thepressureandtemperature comparisons andPORVactuation arebothaccomplished intwoindependent redundant OMStrainsponeforeachPORV.

PCM009-187TheP/TsetpointchangesoutlinedperthisEPpackageareclassified QualityRelatedbecauseanyfailuretotheOMSsetpointalarmsundernormaloperating conditions oranticipated transients canresultinexceeding asafetylimitspecified inSection3/4.4.13and-3/4.4.14 ofthe.Technical Specifications.

Inaddition, thesechangesalsoaffecttheRTGBoardslocatedinthe-ControlRoom.Thefollowing providestheJustification thatanunreyiewed safetyquestiondoesnotexist.i.Theprobability ofoccurrence ozheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important zosafetypreviouslv evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased becausetheOMSmodification servesonlytochangethesetpoinzs forthePORVswheneveranoverpressurizazion eventoccursinlowtemperature modeswhentheRCSmaybewatermolid.

Thenewsezpoinzs foroverpressure protection inlowtemperature modesmaintainzhedesignphilosophy oftheOMSsyszem.iiThepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisisnotcreatedbecausethenewsetpoints allowbettercontroloverOMSeventsandpreventviolation ofthe10CFRAppendixGpressure/temperature limitsduringtheoperating periodendingat10EFPY.TheCEreportprovidesassurance thatthesystemisabletoperformitsfunctionassuminganysingleactivecomponent failureinadditionzothefailurethatinitiated the.pressuretransient.

iiiThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedsince.thisOMSmodification revisesthesetpoints forthePORVstoactuatewheneveranoverpressurization eventoccursinlowtemperature modesofoperation whenzheRCSmaybewater-solid.

Theproposedsystempreventsviolation oftheAppendixGpressure/temperature limitsduringanoperating periodendingaz10EFPY.Theimplementation ofzheproposedLTOPsystemdoesnotresultinthereduction inamarginofsafety;instead,izprovidesadditional setpoints andtherebyincreases themarginofsafezy.ThisEPchangewillnotimpairtheefficientoperation oftheOMS.Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequiredachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

AlthoughnewP/Tlimitsforreactoroperation arebeingdeveloped, thoseTechnical Specification changesapplytooperation beyond7.4EFPY,andarenotdirectlyrelatedzothesetpointchangesaccomplished bythisEP.Theforegoing conszituzes, per10CFR50.59(b),

zhewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovideszhebasesthatthischangedoesnozinvolveanunreviewed safezyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofzhisEPis.notrequiredonthatbasis..

PCM010-187PROTECTIVE COATINGSREPAIRAND/ORREPLACEMENT INREACTORCONTAINMENT BUILDINGJIBR1MCZThisengineering packagecoversthemaintenance ofServiceLevell~rotective coatingsonconcreteandsteelsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainment Building.

ThisproJectisclassified asqualityrelatedanddoes-notconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

F1NThefunctionofthecoatingsusedinsidetheRCBistoprovideprotection againstcorrosion andcontamination.

Theonlysafetyrelatedaspect.isforthecoatingstoremainintactthroughout adesignbasisaccidenttoinsurethatnoengineered safetyfeaturesareinterfered with;ThecoatingstobeusedareDBAtestedandtheircomposition, functional andtestingrequirements areaddressed intheUnit1FSAR.Forthesereasonstheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tothesafetyoftheplanthasnotbeenincreased.

lnaddition, therewillcontinuetobenopossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction different thanthosepreviously evaluated intheUnitIFSAR.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheplanttechnical specifications hasnotbeenreduced.Itistherefore concluded thattherepairand/orreplacement ofprotective coatingsonsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainment Buildingasoutlinedinthispackagedoesnotposeanunreviewed safetyquestionpursuantto10CFR50.59.

PCM011-187CONDENSER HOTWELLNITROGENINJECTION CONNECTIONS ThisEngineering Package1stoprovideconnections tothecondensers toinfectnitrogenintotheco~denser hotwells.

Testhaveshownthatinfecting lcfmofnitrogenintoacondenser shellreducesthed1ssolved oxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensate byapproximately 2ppb.Itistheorized thatbecauseWolowair1n-leakage intothecondensers (condensers aredesignedbaseduponthefacttherewillbeairin-leakage),

theflowofthenon-condensibles intheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished; Therefore, oxygenisentrained asthe'condensate dripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.

Theinjection ofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondenser toestablish theflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibles withoutintroducing oxygenintothesystem.Areviewofthechangestobe1mplemented bythisEng1neering Packagewasperformed againsttherequirements oflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,thesecondenser modifications areclassified asnonmafety related,donotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandwillnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation (asaddressed inSection3"SafetyEvaluation").

SafetEvaluation MithrespecttoT1tle10oftheCodeofPederalRegualtion, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquest1on; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specificat1on isr8fuced.ThisEngineering Packageistoprovideconnections tothecondensers toin)ectnitrogenintothecondenser hotwells.

Testshaveshownthatinfecting 1cfmofnitrogenintoacondenser shellreducesthedissolved oxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensate byapproximately 2.ppb.Itistheorized thatbecauseoflowairin-leakage intothecondensers (condensers aredesignedbasedupon-thefacttherew111beairin-leakage),

theflowofthenon-condensibles intheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished.

Therefore, oxygenisentrained asthecondensate dripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.

Theinfection ofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondenser toestablish theflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibles withoutintroducing oxygenintothesystem.

PCM011-1.87Basedontheabovedescription, themodification includedinthisEngineering Package(EP)18considered tobenon-'safety related.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveonunreviewed safetyquestion,'nd thefollowing arebasesfor.thisJustification:

1)'heprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences.

ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

Thecondensers arenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidents ormalfunction ofequipment andassucharenon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibility foranacc1dentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponents involvedinthismodification havenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprov1desthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofth1sPCMisnotrequired.

PCM012-187ONEANDTWOFEEDWATER HEATERANDEXTRACTION PIPESHIELDING ThisEngineering Packageprovidesgenericdetailsfortherepa1rorreplacement ofdamagedshielding

'fortheExtraction Stre'ssPipeandExpansion JointsandtheFeedwater HeatersinsidetheCondenser..

TheEngineering Packageisclassified asnon-safety relatedsinceitisamodification toanon-safety relatedsystem.Thesafetyevaluation hasshovnthatthisEPdoesnotconstitute anyunreviewed safetyquestion.

Thissystemisnon-safety relatedandvillhavenoeffecton"equipment vitaltoplantsafety.SafetEvaluation Withrespect.to Title10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofan~cident ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanzkysisreportmaybeincreased; or(11)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Speciification isreduced.ThisPCM1nvolvestherepairandreplacement oftheshielding fortheextraction p1pingandfeedwater heaterslocatedinthecondenser.

Ithasbeenclassified asnon-safety relatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequ1pment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportsnot1ncreased.

TheStLuci~UnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4readsasfollows:Exceptforaportionofthefeedwater systempiping,thefeatures, components andsystemdescribed inthissectionservenosafetyfunctions1ncetheyarenotrequiredforsafeshutdownortomitigatetheeffectsofaLOCAandtheirfailurewillnotresultinthereleaseofsignificant uncontrolled radioactivity.

TheStLucieUnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4.1describes thecondenser wheretheextraction pipingandlowpressureFeedwater heaters1and2arelocated;Thissystemisnon-safety relatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipment vitaltoplantsafety.(11)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thecomponents involvedinthismodification donotperformanysafetyrelatedfunction.

Nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofthecondenser ortheextraction piping.(111)Themargin.ofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponents involvedinthismodification arenotdirectlyincludedinthebasesofanyTechnical Specification.

PCM012-187Theimplementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnica'pecification.

Theforegoing constitutes, per'10CFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM017-187eABSTRACTCCWHEATEXCHANGERS

-SHELLSIDEDRAINADDITIONTHISENGINEERING PACKAGEPRQViDESDETAILSFORTHEADDITIONOFTWOFLANGFDSIXINCHSHELLSIDEDRAINCONNECTIONS TOTHFCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.

THEDRAINSAREDESIREDTOIMPROVEFLUSHENGEFFECTIVENESS ANDTOREDUCECRITICALF'ATHDRAINTINEBETWEENFLUSHESFOLLOWING RETUBINGUNDERPC/M~40-183DURINGTHE1987UNIT1REFUELENS OUTAGE.THISMODIFICATION IBCLASSIFIED ASNUCLEAP,SAFFTYRELATEDSiNCEiTAFFECTSTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYOFTHE=CONPONENT COOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.

THECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANSERS FGRNAPOF;TIONOFTHECQI'1POh!ENT COOLINGWATERANDINTAKECOGLINGWATFRSYSTEllSWHICHARECLASSIFIED ASQUALITYGROUPC,SEISNICBYSTEt'1S.

THISPC/r'iHABBEENRFVEEWEDTGTHECRETER1ASETFOf'THErVIi>CFR50.59ANDHABBEENDF'TERMINED NGTTQINVOLVEANUtVREVIE!VED SAFETYQUESTION, NGRDGEBI7REQUIRFCl!ANSESTQTHFTCHtiiCALBF'ECIFICATIOt!B.'F;IGRCOMMIBSION"F'F'FOVALIBNGTREQUIREDORIMPLEMENTATION GFTHISMODIFICATION.

SAFETYEVALiJAT1Ghl THISi~1ODEF"ATIONCONSISTSONLYOFTHEADDITIONQFTWOSIXINCHF!ANGEDPEF'BT!iBDRAiNSTOTHEUhlDEFBIDEOFEACHCOt'IPONFh!7 COOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGER SHcLLTOREDUCEDRAINAGETIt!cEANDTGENPROVEFLUSHINGEFFECTIVENFBS.TH"NE4!DRAI!V1'!IL'ERFORt iNG"ACTIVc"SAFETYRELAT-DFUNCTIrtV.ON'TH=.='A:8IV=FJN~CTEONOFRETAININSTHEF'RESBJf>E BGUluDARY i!VTEPF'Y QrTHECG!'1PONENT COQ'k!SiVATERS.STEM.TH:St'1QD'~AiIGl<INUCLEARSAF7YRE'T"B~hiCE7AFr7>7HE,PRE:-8'JF:EPGUNDAr,'Y OFTHECCWHEATEXHANGERSWHi:HAR=QUA'YSRQUc',BEESNICCO!'!PGNENTS

'.REFFRENCE UNi71F.ARTABLE.:.:--2).BASEDQtTHEpOLLOWINGARGL'ENENTS, iiISDEMONSTRATED THATNQUNREVIEW" DBAFETYQUFSTIONS EXISTANDTHATTHEMGDi;ICATIONNAYBEINcLEMhlTEDWITHOUTPR>QRCONN>cSION APcROVALTHPROBABELITYOFOCCUR=filCE OF;THECONBEQUcNCc SOFANACCIDENTGFNALFUNCTEONOFEQ>JIPMENT IMPORTANT TGSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSIBRErORTHASNOTBEENINCREASED.

THISMODIrECATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHEPROBABILITY OFOCCURcNCE OFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLY FVALUATED SINCETHECCWHEATEXCHANSERS ARENOTCONSIDERED INDETERNININS THEPROBABILETIc.SOFACCIDENTS.

THECONSEQUENCES OFPOSTULATED ACCiDENTS HAVENOTBEENMADc.MORESEVERESINCETHISMODIFICATION DOESNQTAFFECTTHEFUNCTiONAL PERFORMANCE OFTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERS ANDDOESNQTAFFECTANYOTHEREQUIPMENT WHICHWOULDMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCES OFPOSTULATED ACCIDENTS.

-THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANPREVIOUSL'Y EVALUATED INTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSiSREPORTHASNOTBEENCREATED.THENEWFLANGEDDRAINCONNECTIONS ARETYPICALINTERMSOFDcSIGNCODES70THEOTHERFLANGEDPIPINGINTHECOMPONENT COOLINGWATERSYSTEMTHEREFORE NONEWACCIDENTS QRMALFUNCTIONS AREINTRODUCED.

-THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDiNTHEBASISFOR.ANYTECHNICAL SPECIFiCATIQN HASNOTBEENREDUCED.THEMQDIFICATiON DESCRIBED HEREININNOWAYAFFECTSANYTECHNICALSP"CIFICATIQN.10CFR50.5c'LLOlJSMODIDESCRIBED iNTHEFSARWIUNREN'IEWED 3'AFETYQUESTIFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATARGUcMENTS DEMONTRATENQTRc(UIREDi THEREFORc.

WITHOUTPRIQcCQMMISSIONFICATIONS TONUCLEARFACILITIES ASTHOUTPRIORCQtlMISSI Oh)APPc,'OVAL IFANIQhlISDEMONSTRATED NOTTOEXISTAiv'DiQNSAREUt'jAF."ECTED.THEPRECEDt'lGTHATNOUNREViWEDSAFETYC!UESTiON=

TQTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS THISMQDFI'TIONMAYBEIt'iPLEMENTED APPROVAL.

PCM027-187MISCELLANEOUS SNUBBERMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisEPprovidesengineering anddesignformi'scellaneous modifications tosnubbersasaresultoftheinservice inspection findings.

Themodification generally includesareplacement

'oftheexistingsnubberand/oritscomponents withanupgradedsnubberoritscomponents ofadifferent orsamemanufacturer.

ThisEPhasbeenclassified asSafetyRelatedbecausethemodification affectssafetyrelatedpipingsystem.Themodifications havebeenreviewedunderthecriteriaof10CFR50.59andnounreviewed safetyquestions havebeendemonstrated toexist.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.

Theimplementation ofthisEPwillnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification assnubbershavenotbeenremovedoraddedtotheTable3.7-2bofthePlantTechnical Specification 3-7.10.Supplement 1,providesengineering anddesignsformodification toadditional snubbersasaresultoftheInservice Inspection findings.

Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.

Theimplementation ofthissupplement willrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification Table3..7-2aand2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetablestoincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraint MkNoRC-247-H3 intheTable3.7-2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendment tothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendment request.Supplement 2providesengineering anddesignsformodification toadditional snubbersasaresultoftheInservice Inspection findings.

Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.

Theimplementation ofthissupplement willrequireachangetoplantTechnical Specification 3.7.10toincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforofthrestraint MkNoRC-247-H3 inTable3.7-2b.'Howeverperthefttotesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendment tothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendment request.Supplement 3providesengineering anddesignformodification totworestraints whichwerefoundtohavebeendamagedduringtheinservice inspection.

Thesafetyevaluation

'hasshownthatthismodification doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion; however,asindicated implementation ofsupplement 1and2ofthisPCMwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnical Specification 3.7.10whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendment request.Therefore, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.

Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.

Theimplementation ofthissupplement willnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification.

Supplement 4providesengineering anddesignformodifications toadditional snubbersasaresultofInservice Inspections findings.

Theoriginalpipestressanalysis&pipesupportdesignhasnotbeenmodifiedforthisPC/M.Theimplementation ofthissupplement doesnotchangethepreviousconclusion thatTechnical Specification Section3.7.10andtables3.7-2aor3.7-2brequiremodification.

Thismodification requiresachangetoPlantTechnical Specification 3.7.10,whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendment request.Thesafetyeva'luation hasshown,thatthemodifications includedinRevision4ofthisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Basedonthese'points, itisconcluded thatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.

Thissupplement hasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/MwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnical Specification.

'SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)ifthe~robability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybe.increased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.ThisEPisformodification ofexistingrestraints toeitherreplacesnubbersof'onemanufacturer withthatofthesameorlargersizeandloadratingfromadifferent manufacturer ortoreplaceexisting'restraint components withadifferent design.Thisisrequiredtoresolverestraint anomalies foundduringtheInservice Inspection oftherestraints.

Thismodification affectssafetyrelatedpipingsystems.Accordingly, thismodification isclassified assafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandthefollowing arethebasisforthisjustification:

PCM027-187(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincetherestraint systemsforthepipingwillremainfunctionally identical toexistingconfiguration.

Inaddition, sincetherestraint configuration isnotchangedallpreviousanalysisconclusions arestillvalid.(ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously in,thesafety.analysisreportisnotcreatedbecause,nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational designofeitherthesnubbersortherestraints and,thesystemremainsfunctionally identical totherequirements specified intheexistingstressanlaysisofrecord.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythismodification becausethereplacement components utilizedperformthesamerestraining functionasthosetheyreplace.Theimplementation ofthisPCMwillrequireachangetothePlantTechnical Specification assnubbershavebeenremovedfromTable3.7-2bandaddedtoTable3.7-2aofthe'Plant Technical Specification 3.7.10.:Thesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraint MarkNoRC-247-H3 isrequiredtobeaddedtoTable3.7-2b.Asperthefootnoteofthesetables,snubbersmaybeaddedtoorremovedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendment tothesetablesprovidedarevisiontoTables3.7-2aand3.7-2bareincludedwiththe"nextLicenseAmendment request.

PGM028-187REPLACEMENT OFRWTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46 Th1sEngineering Package(EP)providesthedesignforthereplacement oftheRefueling WaterTank(RWT)nozzlefor-lineI-3"-CS-46.-

Theexistingnozzlehasextensive pittingandcorrosion, therefore 1twasconsidered advisible toreplaceit.ThisEPisclassified asnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitrepairsasafetyrelatedpieceofequipment.

Thesafetyevaluat1on hasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstitute anyunreviewed safetyquetsions,"nor doesitrequireaTechnical Specification change.Therefore, priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementtion ofthisPCM.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactonnuclearplantsafetyandoperation.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (1)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or{ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginof'safety asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical spec1fication isreduced.Thismodification replacesa3inchnozzleintheRWTwithanidentical nozzleexceptfortheweldingdetailwhichisequivalent butnotidentical.

Thisweldingdetailminimizes radiation exposurebyreducingweldingrequirements insidetheRWT.Themodification includedinthisEngineering Packageisconsidered tobesafetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:(1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunct1on ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethereplacement ofthenozzlevillnot.impactthequantityofwatersuppliestothechargingpumps'ii)

Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated sincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperational design-of theRUTandthenewnozzleisequivalent indesign.(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specification.

Implementation ofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitute s,per10CFR50.59(b),

themittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCN032-187PRESSURIZER SURGELINESAMPLEVALVE(V1210)REPLACENHNT ABSTRACTExistingpressurizer surgelinesamplevalveV1210isleaking,hasadamagedvalvestemandcannotberepaired.

Tnevalvewillbereplacedwithanewvalveoriginally procuredforUnit2forsimilarservice.TheReactorCoolantSystemandSamplingSysteminwhich~isvalveislocatedinsafetyrelated.Accordingly, thisEngineering Packageisclassi.fied asnuclearsafetyrelated.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthat'thisEPdoesnotaconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.

ThisEPneitherreducesthemarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification, norhasanyimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.

SAFETYEVALUATION WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated pzeviously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.Thissafetyrelatedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbecause:i)'heprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccident~rmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportismotincreased.

Thereplacement valvehasthesamequalification forthelocationandserviceonthevalvewhichitreplaces.

Totalfailureofthereplacement valvewillresultinthesameconsequences orthetotalfailureoftheexistingvalve.Totalfailuzeofthisvalvewillcauseasmalllossofcoolantwhichislimitedbyaorificetobelessthanthecapacityofasinglechargingpump.Thiscondition iswithintheexistingFSARAnalyses-ii)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thismodification doesnotchangethesystemfunctionordesign.Thismodification isthereplacement ofavalvewithasimilarbutnotidentical valve.Thefailuremodeofthisvalvewillbeidentical withtheexistingvalveand,asstatedabove,iswithintheFSARanlaysesiii)ThemarginofsafetyisdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythismodification sincethevalveinvolveddoesnotformthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

PCM032-187eTheimplementation ofthisPQfdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovides.

thebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalforimplementation ofthisP(Hisnotrequired.

-87CONDENSER OUTLETTUBESHEET.ANDWATERBOXCOATINGS8ACTThisengineering packageaddress"the additionofanepoxycoatingtothetothecondenser outlettubesheetsandwaterboxes.

Thismodification willenhancethecorrosion resistance ofthetubesheetsandwaterboxes andallowreduction ofthecathodicprotection systempotentials andcurrentdensities.

Thecondensers andtheplantcirculating watersystemareclassified asnon-nuclear safetyrelatedandtherefore, themodification addressed inthisengineering doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Furthermore, theadditionofaprotective coatingtothecondenser outlettubesheetsandwaterboxes doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

AFVALATINAsnotedinFSAR.Sections 9.2.3and10A.5,thecondensers andcirculating watersystemperformnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunction.

Afailuremodeevaluation oftheproposedcondenser outlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshasdetermined thereisnopotential forinteraction withequipment orfunctions important tonuclearsafety.Accordingly, themodification addressed bythisengineering packageis"classified asnonnuclearsafetyrelated.Basedontheaboveevaluation andinformation suppliedinthedesignanalysis, ithasbeendemonstrated thatanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.

Sincethereisnopotential forinteraction betweenthemodification addressed bythisengineering packageandequipment offunctions important tosafety,previoussafetyanalysisrepor;evaluations relatedtosafetyremainunaffected.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction different thanthosepreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.nNonewaccidents ormalfunctions associated withthefailureofthecondenser outlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshavebeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification hasnotbeenreduced.Sincethereisnopotential forinteraction betweenthemodification addressed bythisengineering packageandequipment orfunctions important tosafety,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinanyTechnical Specification remainsunaffected.

conclusion, themodification proposedinthisengineering packageisacceptable fromstandpoint ofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoes=otrequireachangetoanyTechnical Specifications.

Accordingly, NRCapprovalpriortoimplementation isnotrequired.

PCM035-187REPLACEMENT OFRAYCHEMSPLICESANDCONAXCONDUITSEALSABSTRACTThisEngineering Packagecoversmodifications totheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociated withthesafetyrelatedinstruments listedintheEnvironmental Qualification Listfor10CFR50.49 andlocatedintheReactorContainment Building.

ThisEngineering Packagewillprovidetheengineering and'esign'details'equired toimplement thereplacement ofthebox'esthatareusedforsplicingtheConaxconduitsealpigtailcabletotheplantcableandreplacement ofRaychemsplicesattheboxesandtheElectrical Penetration Assemblies.

Thema]orityofinstruments listedinAttachment 7.4andtheirassociated splicesandconduitsealsareclassified asClass1E,areseismically qualified andperformasafetyrelatedfunction.

Alltheinstruments listedinAttachment 7.4arerequiredforplantsafeshutdown.

Therefore, this'EPisconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandthemodifications described werereviewedinaccordance with10CFR50.59 anddetermined tohavenoadverseimpactonplantoperations orsafetyrelatedequipment.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification.

FThischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

Supplement 1incorporates additional safetyrelatedinstruments, theirassociated Equipment Qualification Documentation Packageandtheremovaloftheholdpoints forEquipment Qualification Documentat'ion PackagesfortheRaychemsplicesandtheConaxconduitseals.Theadditional equipment, EQDocumentation Packageandremovalofholdpoints, doesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation, exceptfortheremovaloftheholdpoints.

Supplement 2revisesattachment 7.4andincorporates detaildrawingsfortheRaychemsplices.Thisadditional information completes themodifications coveredinthisEPanddoesnotaffecttheconclusions oftheoriginalsafetyevaluation.

SafetyEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isreduced.

ThisEngineering Packageprovidesthespliceinspection criteriaandtheengineering anddesigndetailstoimplement, asrequired, thereplacement ofspliceboxesandsplices.Theimplementation ofthisEngineering Packageincreases theavailability oftheequipment duringsafeshutdownconditions byimproving thereliability ofthesplicesattheequipment andpenetration.

Thismod'ification shallbeimplemented prior.toenteringNode4.Theequipment, listedinAttachment 7.4.1and7.4.3,whoseassociated boxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesneedreplacement, performsafetyrelatedfunctions withinthevariousplantsystemsandaredesignedforoperation underconditions thatcouldbe'mposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thepowerandcontrolterminations fortheequipment listedinAttachment 7.4.2,thoughnon-safety innature,couldhaveanadverseaffectonthesafetyrelatedterminations duetothehighenergylevelsassociated withthesenon-safety circuits.

Therefore, thesenon-safety circuits(withtheexception oflowenergyannunciator circuitsandcircuitsid'entified viaFPLletterJPE-PSL-87-0787 dated3/20/87),

whichcouldbeenergized following aLOCAevent,havebeenprovidedwithsplicesorconnectors (asperChapter3,Section3.11.5.4ofthe'SAR),

whicheffectively eliminated thepotential foradverseinteraction betweensafetyandnon-safety relatedterminations byeliminating thehighenergycircuitsfromtheharshLOCAenvironment.

ThisEPhasbeenclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.Basedonthepreceeding, thefollowing conclusions canbemade:I(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased, sincethemodifications totheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociated withtheequipment listedinAttachment 7.4enhancestheoperability oftheequipment inaharshenvironment postDBA.(ii)Asaresultofthismodification, thereisnopossibility foraccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated.

Thismodification altersassociated components ofaccidentmitigating equipment toenhancetheiroperation.

Existingaccuracies withrespecttocontrolormonitoring functions oftheinstrumentation loops,undermodification, willnotbeaffectedbythischange.Thereisnointroduction ofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.

(iii)Thismodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

Thesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolled bythevariousapplicable Technical Specifications ismaintained bythischange.Theproposeddesignensuresthattheequipment willfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.

ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnical Specifications ispreserved.

PCM035-187Theimplementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnical Specification.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59 (b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM044-187MSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisEngineering Package(EP)istoreplacethelockingwasherandnutoneachMainSteamChelkValve(MSCV)diskstudwithanewlockingplateandnut.Theexistinglockingwasherdesignhasbeenadequateinservicebutisshowingsomewearindicating thatreplacement would'berequiredpriortotheendofthevalvedesignlife.Thenewlockingdevicewillprovideanenhancedmethodoflockingthenutandwillprecludethepossibility ofthenutrotatingand.allowing thedisktobecomeloose.Thevalvesconsidered inthisEPareintheMainSteamSystem.Thissystemisdesignated asnuclearsafetyrelatedandseismically qualified ontheASMESectionXICodeBoundarydrawings, andtherefore thismodification isclassified as'afetyrelated.Thesafetyevaluation hasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.

Theimplementation ofthisEPwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

SafetEvaluation WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion; (i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)&fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specificatgn isreduced.83>j~~Themodifications includedinthisEngineering Packageareforthereplacement ofthelockingdeviceontheMSCVdisk/tail linkconn'ection.

Thetwo(2)valvesaffectedareintheMainSteamSystem.Basedontheabovedescription, themodificatin included.

inthisEngineering Package(EP)isconsidered tobesafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion, andthefollowing arebasesforthisjustification:

i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased sincethemodification willeliminate thepossibility ofthevalves'isk becomingloosefromthemount.Accordingly, themodification ensuresreliableoperation ofthevalvesandconsequently of'thesysteminwhichtheyareinstalled.

PCM044"187ii)Asaresultofthismodification, thereisnopossibaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethar.a..yevaluated becausethemodification issimplytorepoftnevavewithacomponent withahigherlevelofinthevalve.Nochangesaremadetotheopera'nasysteminwhichtnemodification ismade.il'yforanpreviously ace2componetconservatism des'gnoftneiii)Thismodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdef'nedinthebasisfo=anyTechnical Speci~ication becauseitneitne"changesthedesignparameter orthelockingdevceno.doesitchangethesystemdesignfloworfunctional requiremets.

Theimplementation ofthisP'QIdoesnotrequi,reachangetotheplantTechnical Specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthMchangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPQfisnotrequired.

PC/MNo.046-187REACTORCONTAINMENT BUILDINGTELESCOPING JIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTS ABSTRACTThisengineering packageisbeingissuedinresponsetothecommitment madeinthedisposition toplantNCR1-099.Thispackageaddresses themodification oftheseismicrestraints ontheReactorContainment Building(RCB)Telescoping JibCraneanddoesnotconstitute anewdesign.Thespecified sliphookswouldnotengagetheexistingrestraint padeyes.Theseismicrestraints aredesignedtoholdthecraneinplaceduringadesignbasisearthquake.

Thisengineering packagewilldocumentthedesignchangeandwillprovideguidelines forestablishing amaintenance procedure toassurereinstallation oftheseismicrestraints attheendofeachoutage.Themodification oftheseismicrestraints wascompleted underthedisposition toNCR1-099.Thejibcraneseismicrestraints donotperformoraffectanysafety-related function.

However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedsincethereisapotential thatduringaseismiceventthetelescoping jibcranecouldinteractwithsafety-related itemsthatareinthevicinity.

QualityRelatedrequirements areappliedtothismodification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specifications.

Thismodification doesnotaffectplantoperations orsafety.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandtherefore doesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.

SAFETYEVALUATION SafetAnalsisInresponsetoNCR1&99,thisengineering packageaddresses themodification oftheRCBTelescoping JibCraneseismicrestraints.

Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifapossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theseismicrestraints donotperformoraffectanysafety-related systemorfunction.

However,thisPC/Misclassified asQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheseismicrestraints duringadesignbasisevent(e.g.earthquake) couldpotentially affectsafetymelated systemsorequipment sincethejibcraneislocatedintheRCB.Consequently, therevisedrestraints havebeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditions specified intheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirements havebeenimplemented, thusassuringtheintegrity oftheinstallation.

0095L'/0018L PCM087-187CODEBOUNDARYDRAWINGREVISIONCodeboundarydrawing8770-G-090 isrevised/expanded to30sheetstoincludeallnuclearsafetyrelatedsystems.Thenewdrawingswillfacilitate testingandexamination underthe"inservice inspection-tenyearplan."Nounreviewed safetyquestions existasdefinedby10CFR50.59,andnoTechnical Specifications areimpactedbythismodification..

Therefore, priorcommission approvalisnotrequired.

NUCLEARSAFETYEVALUATION CHECKLIST Thewrittenevaluation oftheproposeddesignchangetodemonstrate thatthechangedoesnotaltertheplantsdesignbasisandisboundedbythedesignanalysesisattachedtotheDesignEquivalent Engineering Package.Theanswersbelowaresupported bythisevaluation.

TYPEOFCHANGEYesNoxYesNoXYesNoYes.NoxAchange.to theplantasdescribed intheFSAR?Achangetoprocedures asdescribed intheFSAR?Atestorexperiment notdescribed intheFSAR?~Achangetotheplanttechnical specifications?

EFFECTOFCHANGEYesNoYesNoYesNoXYesNoXYesNoXYesNoX'esNoXWilltheprobability ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?

Willtheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?

Maythepossibility ofanaccidentwhichisdifferent thananyalreadyevaluated intheFSARbecreated?Willtheprobability ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?

Willtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARbeincreased?

Maythepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetydifferent thananyalreadyevaluated intheFSARbecreated?Willthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasestoanytechnical specification bereduced'?

PCM097-187TECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERBLOCKWALLNO207AMODIFICATION ABSTRACTThisengineering packageaddresses theinstallation ofastatusboardintheTechnical SupportCenter(TSC),locatedatElev.62.00intheReactorAuxiliary Building(RAB).Theboardwillbeattachedtoamasonryblockwallandwillbeusedduringemergency drillsandplantoperation, Theboardandwalldonotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedfunction.

However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedsincethereisapotential forthewalltointeractwithsafetyrelateditems.Qual-tyRelatedrequirements areappliedtothismodification.

The..mpiementation ofthisPC'Mdoesmod,reauireachanget.oolan~2hnca'peci:catons.Tnismodifcationdoesnot"fctplantoperations orsafey.ThsPC.'2does..otconstitute anunre:iewed safetyquestionandtherefore doesnotrequirepriorNRCapprovals SAFETYEVALUATION Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto.involveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentor-malfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously calculated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Thestatusboardandmasonryblockwall207Adonotperformoraffectanysafety-related systemorfunction.

However,thisPC/Misclassified asqualityrelatedsincefailureofthewallduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake) couldpotentially affectsafety-related systemsorequipment.

Consequently, thewallhasbeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditions specified intheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrquirements havebeenimplemented, thusassuringtheintegrity oftheinstallation.

Themodif'cations includedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunrev=ewed safetyouestions because:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccideptormalfunction ofequipment important to'afetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment reouiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

PCM097-187(ii)Thereisnopossibilitv foranaccidntormal'func.ion ofadifferent typethar.arypreviously evaluated sincethestatusboardandmasonryblockwallperformnosafety.unctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperational design.Failureofthewallcouldnotoccursincethemodification hasbeenanalyzdforthedsignbasisconditions.

(iii)Thismodification doesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachange~toplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, per10CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandpriorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PGM108-187TURBINEGANTRYCRANEMAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADEABSTRACTThisengineering packageisbeingissuedinresponsetoREASLN-S7-(Later).

Thispackagewillprovidetheengineering documentation requiredformodifications totheturbinegantrycranemainsheave-nest.Themodifications arerequiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.Theturbinegantrycraneisclassified asNon-Nuclear SafetyRelated.However,thisPC/Misclassified QualityRelatedtoprovideQ.C.inspection ofcriticalloadbearingweldsandassurerealignment ofthesheavenestshaft.Asafetyevaluation andfailuremodeevaluation hasdetermined thatthemodifications addressed inthispackagedonotconstitute

'anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefiredin10CFR50,59.Furhermore,theimplementation ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangeoplanttechnical spec"ficat onsanddoesnotaffectplantoperations orsafety.Basedontheabove,implementation ofthisPC/MdoesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.

SAFETYEVALUATION Thispackageaddresses theturbinegantrycranemainsheavenestsupportplatemodifications andsheavenestshaftreplacement requiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations, Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

(i)iftheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased; or(ii)ifthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isreduced.Theturbinegantrycranedoesnotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedsystemorfunction.

However,thisPC/Misclassified asQualityRelatedtoensureQ.C.inspection oftheinstallation.

Themodifications includedjnthi"PC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewed safetyquestions because:(i)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsecuences ofanaccidntormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated isnotincreased sincethismodification willhavenoeffectonequipment requiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdownconditipn.

(ii)Thereisnopossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanaryprviouslsevaluated sincetheturbinegan.rycranedoesnotperformanysafetyfun"-onandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperational design.

PCM108-187(iii)Thismodification doesnotch=".gthemarginofsa.etyasdefinedinthebasis'oranytec'."",ic lspecificatior.

becausetheturbinegantrycraneisnotaddressed byanytechnical specification.

Theimplementation ofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachangtoplanttechnical specifications.

Theforegoing constitutes, perl0CFR50.59(b),

thewrittensafetyevaluation whichprovidesthebasesthatthschangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Furthermore, theimplementation ofthisPC/t1doesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnical specifications.

Basedontheabove,priorCommission approvalfortheimplementation ofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

STLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYANALYSISREVIEWINTROOUCTION TheSt.LucreUnit1Cycle8SafetyAnalysiswasperformdsupportoperation with133assemblies ofBatchHandalongwith84freshBatchKnaturaluraniumaxialblanketassemblies.

ThirtysixoftheBatchKassemblies containnobtrrnable absorberrods,24assemblies containeight4w/oGd203rods,andtheremaining BatchKassemblies contain484C-A1203 rodsinadditiontoeightgadoliniabearin'grods.Thebottom.3.04inchesofthefuelrodiscomposedofalonglircaloyendcap'inordertoreducethepossibility ofdebrisrelatedfue'1rodfailures.

ATechnical Specification amendment forthelongendcapchangewasissuedandis.foundinReference 5.Inadditiontothischange,thereloadfuelischaracter izedbyanimprovedspacerspringdesignand,inthetopandbottomspacers,by'theadditionofbackupdimplesinthespacerperipheral rodcells.TheCycle8energyrequirement is10390EFPH,basedonane'nd-of-cycle7.burnupof9300EFPH.SAFETYEVALUATION

'TheCycle':8SARcoversthefuelmanagement, fueldesignandev'atuationofthephysics.character isties,shutdownmargib'alculations, powerdistributions andpeakingfactorsthroughout thecycle.CorePhysicshasperformed 1)adetailedreviewofthevendor'smethodsandneutronic calculations 2)anindependent verification ofthevendorresultsbycomparing theSARreportedphysicsparameterstothosecalcula'tedwiththecoremodelsgenerated bytheCorePhysicsGroupdocumented inReference 6and,3)acomparison ofcalculated valuestotheplantTechnical Specifications inregardstolimitingpowe~peakingfactors,moderator temperature coefficients, shutdownmarginandlinearheatrates.Basedontheresultsoftheaforementioned evaluation, itcanbeconcluded that:Ia)Thevendor'sphysicsdatawascalculated withapprovedmethodsanddocumented

'satisfactorily.

b)FPL'sindependent corephysicsmodelsareinreasonable agreement withthevendor'sresults,andc)Thecycle8reloaddesignmeetstheTechnical Specification LimitswithregardstoFr,Fxy,HTC,minimumre'quiredshutdownmarginandmaximumlinearheatrate.

Sh2oBasedonprojected burnups,5assemblies (4BatchH-IandIBatchH-4)willexceedthecurrently analyzedmechanica 1andradiological designlimitsof44,500NMO/NTUpriortotheend-of-cycle8.Themostlimitingofthesea'ssemblieswi11reachaburnupof44,500MMD/HTUat9450EFPHcycleexposure.

Ananalysistoextendthemechanical andradiological burnuplimitbeyondthecurrent,valuewillbeperformed priortothattime.Asaresult,operation ofcycle8withtheseassemblies inthecoredoesnotconstitute asafetyconcernupto9450EFPHandprovidedtheaforementioned analysisiscompleted priortothatcycleexposure'nd sho'ws.acceptable results,wperation beyond9450EFPHwillnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Asnotedintheintroduction, thereloadfueldesignincorporates minormodifications tothefueldesignusedinCycle7.Theendcapinthereloadfuelislengthened from0.4inchesto3.04incheswhiletheactivefuellengthisreducedbythesameamount,therefore maintaining theoveralllengthof.therod.Thischangehasbeenpreviously evaluated andwasapprovedbytheNRC(Reference 5).Thereloadfuelalsoincorporates animprovedspacerspringdesignandspacerbackupdimpleshavebeenaddedtothetopandbottomspacerperipheral cells.Theeffectofthesechangeshasbeenevaluated anddetermined tohavenoadverseimpactrelativetothefueldesignbasis.TheCycle8safetyevaluation demonstrated thatthesechangesareboundedbypre.vi.ous analyses.

TheSt.LucieUnitICycle8SafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)(Reference I),presentstheevaluation ofthereloadcharacteristics withrespecttothesafetyanalysispresented forCycle6(Reference 2)whichservesasthereference cyc1e.Thebasi'softhesafetyanalysisforCycle8isthesameasthatusedforCycle6withtheexception oftheLocalPowerDensity(LPO)versusAxialShapeIndex(ASI)LimitingCondition forOperation (LCO).ThepeakpowerdensityduringCycle8couldincreaseoverthatassumedinthereference analysessothatitisnecessary tolimitthemaximumpowerlevelwhenrelyingontheex-coredetectorsfordetermination ofthepeaklinearheatrate.AproposedTechnical Specification changewillreducethefractionofmaximumallowable powerfrom0.88to0.85whenthein-c'oredetectors areinoperable.

TheproposedTechnical Specification changehasbeensubmitted totheNRCperL-86-510datedDecember18,1986.NRCapprovalisexpectedbyFebruary28,1987.UntilapprovalofthisTechnical Specificationchange,thisSafetyEvaluation isonlyapplicable forreactoroperation upto40KratedpowerwhenthisTechnical Specification isapplicable.

Uponapprova1ofthisTechnica1Specif'icationchange,poweroperation above40Kratedpowerupto100KratedpowerfortheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle8re1oadcoreisacceptable andwillnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

'SoThe.St.LucieUnit1Cycle8SARpresentstheevaluation andreviewoftheChapter15eventsforthereloadcore.FPLhasreviewedtheSARandhasdetermined thatCycle8isboundedbytheresultsoftheanalysispresented'or Cycle6withtheexception oftheReactorCoolantPumpRotorSeizureandtheCEAEjectionAccidents whichwerere-evaluated andre-analyzed respectively andarepresented intheSAR.TheReactorCoolantPump(RCP)RotorSeizurewasevaluated to.assesstheeffectsofminorfueldesignchangesandincreased.

axialpowerpeakingonthepercentoffueltoexperience DAB.Pressurecharacteristics arenotaffectedbythesechangesandtheresultsareboundedbytheCycle6analysis.

Theresultsoftheevaluation showthatthepercentoffuelpredicted toexperience DNBiswellbelowthe10%,limitingcriteria.

Off-sitedoseratesareasmallfractionof10CFR100doseguidelines andareboundedbytheresultsofanalysispresented inReference 4.TheCEAEjectioneventwasreanalyzed usingthegenerically approvedmethodology (Reference 3)andresultsshowsignificantmargintothelimitingcriteria.

Sincealltheeventshavebeenreviewedandprovedacceptable itcanbestatedthatforCycle8:tTheprobabi'1ity ofoccurrence or.the'consequences ofanac'cident ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe,safetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfiguration oftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadversely affectthemechanical integrity norsignificantly changethecoolantflowcharacteristics throughthecore.Themodeofoperation oftheplantremainsunchanged.

Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction

.ofequipment important tosafetyisnotimpacted.

ThesafetyanalysisperformedfortheCycle8reloadcoredemonstrates thattheconsequences of.an'accident ormalfunction havenotbeenincreased beyondthoseevaluated inthepreviousanalyses.Apossibi1ityforanaccidentormalfunctionofa.different typethananypreviously analyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.

Sh4of4TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfiguration oftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadversely affectthemechanical integritynorsignificantly.

changethecoolantflowcharacteristics throughthecore.Themodeof'peration oftheplantremainsunchanged.

Therefor'e, anewaccidentorequipment malfunction hasnotbeencreated.iii.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeveryTechnical Specification isnotreduced.There-evaluation oftheRCPRotors.eizureandthere-analysisoftheCEAEjectionaccidents haveshownthattheresultsarewell'ithin thedesignbasis.Allothereventshavebeendetermined to'beboundedbypreviousanalyses.

Therefore, thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specificatiorl basisforoperation ofCycle8upto40K,ratedpower.WiththeproposedchangeintheLPOLCOimplemented,.

thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnical Specification basisforoperation ofCycle8uptolOOXratedpower.Conclusion IAsperFederalRegulation 10CFR50.59(b),theaboveSafetyEvaluation providesthebasistoconcludethattheCycle8reloadconfiguration doesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduce anunreviewed safetyquestion.

Therefore, implementation ofthischangeispermissible withoutpriorNRCapproval..