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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:xREGULATOY | ||
AE;f,Nfe~~~ | INFORMATION | ||
DISTRIBUTZOYSTEM | |||
(RIDE)x~xACCESSION | |||
NBR:9006200487 | |||
DOC.DATE: | |||
90/06/08NOTARIZED: | |||
NO;CFACIL:50-244 | |||
RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester | |||
GAUTH.NAME~~~~AUTHORAFFILIATION | |||
CREDY,R,C. | |||
Rochester | |||
Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME | |||
RECIPIENT | |||
AFFILIATION | |||
MARTINET.T. | |||
Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:RespondstoNRC900509ltrreviolations | |||
notedinInspRept50-244/89-81. | |||
DISTRIBUTION | |||
CODE:IEOZDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR | |||
1ENCL3SIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp | |||
Rept/Notice | |||
ofViolation | |||
ResponseNOTES:License | |||
Expdateinaccordance | |||
with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). | |||
DOCKET0500024405000244cRECIPIENT | |||
IDCODE/NAME | |||
PD1-3PDRGN1ERNAL:LPDRNSICINTERNAL: | |||
AEODAEOD/TPAD | |||
NRRMORISSEAU,D | |||
NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 | |||
NRR/DREP/PEPB9D | |||
NRR/DST/DIR | |||
8E2NUDOCS-ABSTRACT | |||
OGC/HDS2FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT | |||
IDCODE/NAME | |||
JOHNSONFA | |||
AEOD/DEIIB | |||
DEDRONRRSHANKMAN,S | |||
NRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DRIS/DIR | |||
NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 | |||
OE~IREG~02NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111<11~~+NG:P3fo)579+/NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS: | |||
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS''CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE | |||
YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION | |||
LISTSFORDOCUMENTS | |||
YOUDON'TNEED!ADD,TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: | |||
LTTR22ENCL22 | |||
AE;f,Nfe~~~5OAA55455ROCHESTER | |||
GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION | |||
~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, | |||
N.Y.14849-PPPI | |||
June8,1990TEEER<04C | |||
AREACODE75555462700Mr.ThomasT.MartinRegionalAdministrator | |||
RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory | |||
Commission | |||
475Allendale | |||
RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406Subject:ResponsetoInspection | |||
Report50-244/89-81 | |||
SafetySystemFunctional | |||
Inspect'ion | |||
--RHRSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantNRCDocket50-244DearMr.Martin:Thisletterprovidestheinitial30-dayresponsetotheSafetySystemFunctional | |||
Inspection | |||
(SSFI)oftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SystemattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,conducted, | |||
betweenNovember6andDecember8,1989.TheNRCletterofMay09,1990fromMarvinW.Hodges(NRC)toRobertC.Mecredy(RG&E)transmitted | |||
thereportforthatinspection. | |||
ThisletterprovidestheRG&Eresponses, | |||
pursuantto10CFR2.201,tothetwoviolations | |||
issuedinconjunction | |||
withtheSSFIreport.Inaddition, | |||
weareproviding | |||
scheduleinformation | |||
concerning | |||
theunresolved | |||
issues,including | |||
thepostulated | |||
floodingoftheRHRroom,identified | |||
intheinspection | |||
report.Additional | |||
information | |||
willbeprovidedinthe120-dayresponsetotheSSFIreport.Thenuclearindustryisgoingthroughmajorupgradeeffortsinvolving | |||
configuration | |||
management | |||
anddesignbasisdocuments. | |||
RG&Eisnotaloneinrecognizing | |||
thebenefitsoftheseimprovements | |||
andhasbeenproceeding | |||
withtheseefforts.OnMarch6,1990RG&Emadeaformalpresentation | |||
toNRCRegionIstaffandonMarch27,1990madeapresentation | |||
toNRRregarding | |||
ourconfiguration | |||
management | |||
program.Wehavecompleted | |||
threepilotsystemdesignbasisdocuments | |||
andarereviewing | |||
themtodetermine | |||
theoptimalspecification | |||
fortheoveralldesignbasisdocumentprogramfortheremaining | |||
plantsystems.Inaddition, | |||
RG&Ehasdeveloped | |||
aseparateprogramtoprovidefurtherassurance | |||
thatalldesignbasisinformation | |||
and,commitments | |||
whichmayhavebeenrelieduponbytheNRCarecaptured. | |||
Theobjective | |||
oftheNRCSSFIoftheRHRsystemswastoassessthecapability | |||
ofthatsystemtoperformitsdesignbasisfunctions. | |||
Aspartofthatinspection, | |||
theSSFIteamassessedtheoveralldesigncontrolprogramandotherworkprocesses | |||
usedbyRG&E.Thereviewoftheseprogrammatic | |||
aspectswasfarbroaderthantheRHRsystem.Specialemphasiswasplacedupontheengineering | |||
processes | |||
andtheirinterfaces | |||
withotheractivities. | |||
900b200487 | |||
900b08PDRADOCK050002448PNUggIJt~fP( | |||
2TheprimaryresultoftheSSFIwasthatnosituations | |||
wereidentified | |||
thatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperforming | |||
itsintendedfunctions | |||
undernormalanddesignbasisaccidentconditions. | |||
AswouldbeexpectedfromanSSFIofanynuclearpowerplant,andinparticular | |||
oneoftheearlySEPplants,theSSFIidentified. | |||
areaswhereimprove-mentiswarranted. | |||
TwoSeverityLevelIVviolations | |||
werecited.,andtenspecificunresolved | |||
itemsweredocumented. | |||
TheNRCletterofMay09,1990requiresthattheviolations | |||
beaddressed, | |||
pursuantto10CFR2.201,within30days.TheletteralsorequeststhatRG&Eprovideitsevaluation | |||
ofthespecificunresolved | |||
itemsandplannedactions,within120days.Inaddition, | |||
theNRCletterrequeststhatRG&Ealsoprovidescheduleinformation | |||
regarding | |||
theactionstoaddresstheunresolved | |||
items,within30days.Theschedules | |||
requested | |||
areexclusive | |||
ofunresolved | |||
item89-81-11, | |||
Engineering | |||
Assurance, | |||
forwhicharesponsewasrequested | |||
in120days.kResponses | |||
totwoviolations | |||
identified | |||
ar'eprovidedasEnclosures | |||
A&Btothisletter.Thefirstviolation | |||
involved. | |||
notmaintaining | |||
anup-to-dateloadprofileforthebatteries. | |||
Theactualcapability | |||
ofthebatteries | |||
wasnotanissue,onlytheadequacyofthetesting.RG&Ehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcompliance | |||
onthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived. | |||
>>Thesecondviolation | |||
citedhadtwoparts.Thefirstpartinvolveshavingnotalreadydeveloped | |||
aperiodictestingprogramforthemoldedcasecircuitbreakers. | |||
Thesecondpartinvolvesnothavinganexplicitacceptance | |||
criterion | |||
inthetestprocedure | |||
forthesetpoints | |||
ofthedcundervoltage | |||
alarmrelays.Althoughagenerally | |||
acceptedperiodictestmethodformoldedcasecircuitbreakersisnotavailable | |||
intheindustrytoday,wechoosenottotakeissuewiththisviolation. | |||
Theindustryiscurrently | |||
examining | |||
theneedforand/orrequirements | |||
formoldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&Ewillimplement, | |||
when.available, | |||
thosetestingmethodsandrequirements | |||
endorsedbytheindustry. | |||
Withregardtotheacceptance | |||
criterion | |||
fortheundervoltage | |||
relaysetpoints, | |||
wehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcompliance | |||
onthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived. | |||
Inaddition, | |||
onourowninitiative, | |||
wehaveexpandedthisconcerntoincludetheacundervoltage | |||
relaysforthesafetybuses.Inadditiontotheseviolations, | |||
NRCalsoidentified | |||
tenunresolved | |||
items.Theidentification | |||
oftheseitemsiscontained | |||
inEnclosure | |||
C.Severaloftheseunresolved | |||
itemshavealreadybeencompleted | |||
andseveralmoreareinprocess.DuringtheRG&EreviewoftheSSFIreport,management | |||
recognized | |||
thatmanyoftheunresolved | |||
itemswereexamplesofbroader,underlying, | |||
programmatic | |||
concerns. | |||
Manyoftheseconcernsfocusedonengineering | |||
functions | |||
and,controls'. | |||
BecauseRG&Eunderstands | |||
theimportance | |||
ofresolving | |||
theprogrammatic | |||
andmanagement | |||
issuesaswellasthespecificitemscitedbytheNRC,wearedeveloping | |||
asystematic | |||
approachtoaddressbothtypesofconcerns. | |||
Thisapproachisatwo-part,paralleleffort.Thefirstpartfocusesonthemanagement | |||
processes | |||
inadisciplined | |||
manner,whilethesecond.partfocusesontheresolution | |||
ofthespecificunresolved | |||
items. | |||
P | P | ||
Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,wehavere- | Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns, | ||
wehavere-reviewed | |||
theSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorized | |||
themintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolved | |||
item89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanism | |||
toassurethatdesigncalculations | |||
aremain-tainedup-to-date. | |||
Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.Enclosure | |||
Disapreliminary | |||
categorization | |||
oftheunresolved | |||
itemsintothegeneraltopicalareas.Inaddition, | |||
RG&Eisinitiating | |||
amoredetailedreviewoftheworkprocesses | |||
andtheircontrolsforeachofthegeneralareaswhichcontainsignificant | |||
identified, | |||
weaknesses. | |||
Thisreviewwillencompass | |||
identifying | |||
thecauseoftheviolations, | |||
aswellastheunresolved | |||
issues,identified | |||
bytheSSFIreport.Enclosure | |||
Econtainstheschedular | |||
information | |||
asrequested | |||
bythestaff.Wehaveseparated | |||
thisscheduleinformation | |||
intotwocatego-ries:resolution | |||
completed | |||
andscheduled | |||
forresolution. | |||
RG&Ehasresolveditems89-81-04, | |||
06,07A,and10asidentified | |||
inEnclosure | |||
C.Inparticular, | |||
RG&Ehaspromptlyresolvedtheissueregarding | |||
floodingoftheRHRpumproom.TheUFSARhasbeenupdated,andtheEOPsandtrainingdocuments | |||
havebeenrevised.Adetailedaccountofthoseactionstakentoresolvetheitemsidentified | |||
abovearecon-tainedinEnclosure | |||
E.RG&Ebelievesthattheapproachoutlinedinthisletterassuresproperandcompleteresolution | |||
ofthespecificissuesidentified | |||
aswellasthemoreprogrammatic | |||
issuesdiscussed. | |||
Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MeceyDivisionManagerNuclearProduction | |||
GAHN108Enclosures | |||
xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory | |||
Commission | |||
(original) | |||
DocumentControlDeskWashington, | |||
D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate | |||
I-3Washington, | |||
D.C.20555GinnaNRCSeniorResidentInspector | |||
0 | 0 | ||
ENCLOSURE | |||
AResponsetoNoticeofViolation | |||
50-244/89-81 | |||
Violation | |||
1 | |||
.InsectionReort44/88- | .InsectionReort44/88-81VIOLATION | ||
1:STATEMENT | |||
OFVIOLATION- | |||
10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion | |||
III,requiresinpartthatmeasuresbeestablished | |||
toensurethatapplicable | |||
regulatory | |||
requirements | |||
anddesignbasesaretranslated | |||
intospecifications | |||
andprocedures. | |||
Thesemeasuresshallprovideforverifying | |||
theadequacyofdesignbyperformance | |||
ofdesignreviews.GinnaStationQualityAssurance | |||
Manual,SectionNo.11,"TestCon-trol,"requiresthatengineering | |||
establish | |||
designtestrequirements | |||
andthattestingbeperformed | |||
inaccordance | |||
withapprovedprocedures | |||
whichincorporate | |||
therequirements | |||
andacceptance | |||
criteriacontained | |||
inapplicable | |||
Technical | |||
Specifications | |||
andregulatory | |||
requirements. | |||
Contrarytotheabove,onNovember15,1989,thedesignreviewsforEngineering | |||
WorkRequest(EWR)3891wereinadequate | |||
inthattheEWRdidnotestablish | |||
thebatteryload,requirements | |||
therebyresulting | |||
inabatteryload.profileusedduringtheservicetest.notreflecting | |||
thedesignbasisloadrequirements. | |||
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation | |||
(Supplement | |||
1).ACCEPTANCE | |||
OFVIOLATION: | |||
RG&EagreesthatitdidnotupdatethebatteryloadprofileaspartofEWR3891.DISCUSSION: | |||
ThepurposeofEWR3891wastoreplacethebatteries | |||
becausetheywerenearingtheendoftheirservicelifeand,whilereplacing | |||
them,toincreasethecapacitymargin.EWR3891didnotincludeanupdat-ingofthebatterytestprofilebecauseithadbeendetermined | |||
thatnolargeloadshadbeenadded.tothebatterysincetheoriginalloadprofilehadbeendeveloped. | |||
ThebatteryloadprofilewasbasedupontheoriginalWestinghouse | |||
designdata.Thatinformation | |||
wasconsistent | |||
withindustrypracticeatthetimeitwasdeveloped. | |||
Analytical | |||
techniques | |||
werenotassophisticated | |||
asthoseinusetoday.Ratherthanexplicitly | |||
quanti-fyingsuchfactorsasmomentary | |||
loadsand.theloadstartingcurrents, | |||
itwasgeneralpracticetoprovideadditional | |||
batterysizingbaseduponexperience | |||
andengineering | |||
judgement. | |||
Today'sstandards | |||
(suchasIEEEstandard485)suggestamorerefined,moreprecisely | |||
quanti-fiedanalysis. | |||
Theactualbatterycapacitywassufficient | |||
toprovideitssafetyfunctions. | |||
Thebatteryhasbeenshowntohaveadequatecapacityasconfirmed | |||
byaphysicaltest.Althoughthereisnorequirement | |||
fortheGinnaNuclearPowerPlanttoincorporate | |||
allnewly-developed | |||
industrystandards, | |||
webelieveitprudenttousethecurrentindustrystandards | |||
fordeveloping | |||
revisedbatteryloadprofiles, | |||
andhavedoneso.A-1 | |||
CORRECTIVE | |||
STEPSTApreliminary | |||
analysis, | |||
performed | |||
duringtheinspection, | |||
demonstrated | |||
thatthebatterysizeisadequate. | |||
Therevisedbatterysizecalculation | |||
had,beenfinalized | |||
subsequent | |||
totheNRCinspection | |||
andpriortothereceiptoftheinspection | |||
report,whichconfirmsthatthebatterysizeisnotaconcern.Animprovedbatteryloadprofilehasbeendeveloped | |||
whichincorpo-ratescalculational | |||
improvements | |||
contained | |||
incurrentindustrystandardIEEE485-1983. | |||
Theupgradedbatteryloadprofile(DesignAnalysisEWR3341"SizingofVitalBatteries", | |||
datedMarch12,1990)hasbeentransmitted | |||
byEngineering | |||
totheplantstaff,andthebatterytestingprocedures'PT-10.2 | |||
andPT-10.3,BatteryServiceTests)havebeenrevised.Thebatteries | |||
weretestedduringtherecentoutageusingtherevisedprocedures. | |||
Theresultsdemonstrated | |||
theadequacyofthebatterycapacity. | |||
CORRECTIVE | |||
STEPSTOBETAKENTOPREVEBVPREClJRRENCE: | |||
Theapplicability | |||
ofthisviolation | |||
hasbeenbroadened | |||
byRG&Etoassurethatnotonlytheimportant | |||
dcelectrical | |||
loadsareanalyzedandtested,butalsothattheimportant | |||
acelectrical | |||
loadswhichmayimpacttheoperation | |||
oftheplantemergency | |||
dieselgenerators | |||
areidentified | |||
andtracked.Wehaveimplemented | |||
anelectrical | |||
load'rowth | |||
programasdescribed | |||
underunresolved | |||
item89-81-05. | |||
DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE | |||
WILLBEACHIEVED: | |||
Engineering | |||
established | |||
updatedbatteryloadrequirements. | |||
Thebatterytestprocedures | |||
havebeenrevisedandthebatteries | |||
havebeentestedusingthenewprocedure. | |||
Theseactionswerecompleted | |||
priortothereceiptoftheNRCinspection | |||
report.RG&Eisinfullcompli-ance.A-2 | |||
ENCLOSURE | |||
BResponsetoNoticeofViolation | |||
50-244/89-81 | |||
Violation | |||
2 | |||
IP | IP | ||
~RG&E/ | ~RG&E/Ginna | ||
WhilethefunctioniO~ | InsectiReort50-244/89-81 | ||
VION2:STATEMENT | |||
OFVIOLATION: | |||
R.E.GinnaTechnical | |||
Specifications | |||
Section6.8.1requiresthatwrittenprocedures | |||
beestablished | |||
and.implemented. | |||
foractivities | |||
suchassurveillance | |||
andtestingactivities | |||
ofsafety-related | |||
equipment. | |||
GinnaStationQualityAssurance | |||
Manual,SectionII,"TestControl," | |||
establishes | |||
therequirements | |||
forestablishing | |||
andimplementing | |||
testprogramstodemonstrate | |||
thatsafety-related | |||
systemsandcomponents | |||
willperformsatisfactorily. | |||
Furthermore, | |||
thissectionrequiresthattestingshallbeperformed | |||
inaccordance | |||
withwrittenprocedures | |||
whichincorporate | |||
acceptance | |||
criteria. | |||
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember9,1989,Class1E480Vacmoldedcasecircuitbreakershavenotbeensubjected | |||
toscheduled | |||
periodictesting.Furthermore, | |||
thereisnoestablished | |||
acceptance | |||
criteriafortestingthedcundervoltage | |||
relayal'armsinProcedure | |||
PT-11,"60-CellBatteryBanks'A''B'hisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation | |||
(Supplement | |||
1).ACCEPTANCE | |||
OFVIOLATION: | |||
RG&Eagreesthattheperiodictestingprogramofsafety-related | |||
equipment | |||
attheGinna.Nuclear | |||
PowerPlantdoesnotcurrently | |||
includemoldedcasecircuitbreakers. | |||
RG&EalsoagreesthattheGinnaperiodictestprocedure | |||
PT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'A''B'"didnotspecifyanacceptance | |||
criterion | |||
forthesetpointofthedcundervoltage | |||
relayalarms.Thisviolation | |||
hastwopartswhichareaddressed | |||
separately | |||
below:Part1:MoldedCaseCircuitBreakerTestingDISCUSSION: | |||
Moldedcasecircuitbreakersaredesignedfornuclearandnon-nuclear | |||
applications. | |||
Thistypecircuitbreakerissealed.anddoesnotincludedesignfeaturestotestallthecapabilities | |||
ofthebreakerbeyondfunctional | |||
tests.RG&Erealizestheimportance | |||
ofassuringproperoperation | |||
ofthesebreakers. | |||
RG&Ehasnotbeenlaxinitsattention | |||
totheimportance | |||
oftestingmoldedcasecircuitbreakers. | |||
Thisproblemwasself-identified | |||
byRG&Eandwasincorporated | |||
intotheRCMprogram.Onourowninitiative, | |||
wedeveloped | |||
andimplemented | |||
receipt-inspection | |||
testingforallnewmoldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinna.Wehavealsoperformed | |||
testingonmolded,casecircuitbreakersinanefforttodetermine | |||
theircharacteristics. | |||
Threeyearsago,RG&Eperformed | |||
specialtestingofallofitsexist-ingmagneticonly,moldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinnaStationonaspecialone-timebasis.Successful | |||
operation | |||
hasindicated | |||
noknowndegradation. | |||
B-1 | |||
WhilethefunctioniO~ | |||
ofmoldedcasecircuithkersisimportant | |||
tosafetyandwhilethereisanNRCrequirement | |||
foratestprogramtoassurethatsafety-related | |||
structures, | |||
systemsand.components | |||
willperformsatisfactorily, | |||
thereisnospecificrequirement | |||
totestperiodically | |||
everypieceofequipment. | |||
Asstated.inAppendixB,Criterion | |||
XI,"Thetestprogramshallinclude,asappropriate, | |||
operational | |||
tests...ofstructures, | |||
systemsandcomponents." | |||
Theterm"asappropriate" | |||
isapplicable | |||
andincludestheavailability | |||
ofappropriate | |||
testmethods.Moldedcasecircuitbreakersarenotdesignedforinsitutestingandwouldrequiredetermination | |||
andretermination | |||
toperformthetesting.Thevendorsofthisequipment | |||
havealsonotmaderecommendations | |||
forperiodictesting.Becauseofgenericapplicability, | |||
periodictestingformoldedcasecircuitbreakershasbeenanindustry-wide | |||
issueandnogenerally | |||
acceptedtestmethodhasbeendeveloped | |||
atthistime.Thenuclearindustryhasresponded | |||
totheNRCthroughNUMARCconcern-ingmoldedcasecircuitbreakertestingandRG&Eispursuingthisinconjunction | |||
withthiseffort.CORRECTIVE | |||
STEPSTAKEN:RG&Eiscontinuing | |||
toworktowarddeveloping | |||
appropriate | |||
testmethodsformoldedcasecircuitbreakers, | |||
aspartoftheReliability | |||
CenteredMaintenance | |||
(RCM)program.TheGinnaNuclearPowerPlantisoneofthetwo"pilotplants"inthenationfortheEPRIsponsored | |||
RCMprogram.CORRECTIVE | |||
STEPSTOBETAKENTOPR1DGQFZRECURRENCE- | |||
Theindustryiscurrently | |||
examining | |||
theneedfor,andbenefitsof,moldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&EwillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeindustryandEPRItodetermine | |||
appropriate | |||
testmethodsand.requirements. | |||
DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE | |||
WILLBEACHIEVED: | |||
AlthoughRG&Edoesnotconsiderthisacompliance | |||
matter,RG&Ewillimplement, | |||
whenavailable, | |||
thosetestingmethodsandrequirements | |||
endorsedbytheindustry. | |||
Part2:Undervoltage | |||
RelayAlarmAcceptance | |||
CriteriaCORRECTIVE | |||
STEPSTAKEN:Theperiodictestprocedure | |||
PT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'A''B'"hasbeenrevisedtoexplicitly | |||
definetheacceptance | |||
band/criterion | |||
forthedcundervoltage | |||
alarmrelays.Thedcrelayshavesubsequently | |||
beencalibrated | |||
andtested.Therelayshavebeenverifiedtoperformwithinthespecified | |||
acceptance | |||
criterion. | |||
B-2 | |||
~10 | ~10 | ||
. | .CORRECTIVE | ||
STEPSTAKENTOPREVIXTREE:Theapplicability | |||
ofthisviolation | |||
hasbeenbroadened | |||
byRG&Etoassurethatnot.onlythetestprocedures | |||
fordcundervoltage | |||
alarmrelayshaveexplicitacceptance | |||
criteria, | |||
butalsothatthetestprocedures | |||
fortheacundervoltage | |||
relaysforthesafeguards | |||
buseshaveexplicitacceptance | |||
criteria. | |||
Thetestprocedure, | |||
PT-11forthedcundervoltage | |||
alarmrelayshasbeenrevisedandPT-9.1forthe480Vacsafeguards | |||
busesisbeingrevisedtoprovideexplicitacceptance | |||
criterion. | |||
DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE | |||
WILLBEACHIEVED: | |||
Thetestprocedure | |||
forthedcundervoltage | |||
alarmrelayshasbeenrevisedtoprovideanexplicitacceptance | |||
band/criterion. | |||
Thisactionwascompleted | |||
priortothereceiptoftheNRCinspection | |||
report.RG&Eisinfullcompliance. | |||
B-3 | |||
0t' | 0t' | ||
ENCLOSURE | |||
CIdentification | |||
ofSpecificUnresolved | |||
ItemsNote:Thestatements | |||
ofissueshavebeendirectlyextracted | |||
fromtheSSFIreport.Inafewinstances | |||
theissueshavebeencondensed | |||
andparaphrased. | |||
r00e | r00e | ||
.89-81- | .89-81-01ServicerSingleFailureSusceptlityPotential | ||
.89-81- | lossofcoolingwater[flow]tobothemergency | ||
dieselgenerators | |||
duringorfollowing | |||
aseismicevent.Thecoolingwaterforthewaterjacketheatexchanger | |||
andlubeoilheatexchanger | |||
discharges | |||
throughacommonnon-safety | |||
non-seismic | |||
10-inchdischarge | |||
pipe.Thecoolingwaterdischarge | |||
pipewouldhavetofail[orhasbeenpostulated | |||
bytheNRCSSFIteamtofail]soastoprevent[block/pinch | |||
off]theflowoftheservicewater.89-81-02Resolution | |||
ofSafetyConcernsThelicenseewasunabletoprovidetheteamwithadocumented | |||
orverifiable | |||
processavailable | |||
atRG&Ethataddresses | |||
howsafetyconcernsraisedoutsidethenormalengineering | |||
processarebroughttotheattention | |||
oftheNuclearSafetyandLicensing | |||
staffandresolved. | |||
89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHAconsultant | |||
independently | |||
evaluated | |||
theavailable | |||
NPSHduringpost-accidentrecirculation | |||
modefromthecontainment | |||
sumpand,aprelimi-naryresultindicates | |||
thattheremaybesomemodesofoperation | |||
oftheRHRpumpsunderwhichadequateNPSHisnotavailable. | |||
Licenseeisevaluating | |||
thevalidityofthesemodesandtheprobability | |||
ofoccurrence. | |||
Licenseeisalsoevaluating | |||
thepossibility | |||
thattheconsultant's | |||
analytical | |||
modelwastooconservative. | |||
89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingFailuretotestthebatteries | |||
withaloadprofilewhichtrulyrepre-sentedtheloaddemandonthebatteryisconsidered | |||
aviolation | |||
of10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion | |||
III.89-81-05Electrical | |||
LoadGrowthControlProgramRG&Edoesnothaveamechanism | |||
toassurethatplantcalculations | |||
affectedbymodifications | |||
areupdatedtoensurethattheyaremain-tainedup-to-date | |||
andaccurate. | |||
Thedesignprocessprovidesguidancetoengineers | |||
toreviewthesystemcapacityandotherattributes, | |||
buttheguidanceaddresses | |||
onlyspecificmodifications | |||
astheyareperformed. | |||
Thereisnoformalloadtrackingsystemtoensurethatsystemcapacityisreviewedfortheintegrated | |||
effectofseveralmodifications | |||
insteadofjustone.Thelicenseestatedthatanon-lineprogramtocaptureelectrical | |||
loadgrowthandupdateaffectedcalculations | |||
wouldbedeveloped. | |||
89-81-06MoldedCaseCircuitBreakersand,Undervoltage | |||
RelayAlarmsFailuretoperiodically | |||
testthemoldedcasecircuitbreakersandnotestablishing | |||
anacceptance | |||
criteriafortheundervoltage | |||
relayalarmsareaviolation | |||
offacilityTechnical | |||
Specifications | |||
6.8.1,whichrequirestestingofsafety-related. | |||
components | |||
inaccordance | |||
withestablished | |||
procedures. | |||
.89-81-07A | |||
Calibrate | |||
ofControlRoomInstrumeThecontrolroomdcvoltmeters | |||
arenotcalibrated | |||
onaperiodicbasistoensurereliablesystemvoltageindication | |||
tooperators. | |||
89-81-07B | |||
ControlRoomP&IDsPipingandInstrument | |||
Diagram(P&ID)updatesandDesignChangeRequests(DCRs)postedinthecontrolroomwerereviewedbytheteam.ItwasnotedthattheRHRsystemP&ID(33013-1247) | |||
didnotreflectthecurrentvalvepositionconfiguration | |||
fortheRHRsystem.Also,theexistingDCRsoutstanding | |||
againstthisdrawingcouldnotbeused.toderivethecorrectvalvepositions | |||
inthatDCRs1247-4,and1247-5hadnotbeenapprovedbyRG&EEngineering | |||
anddidnotreflectthecurrentpositionofvalve822B.Processing | |||
ofDCRsdoesnotalwaysoccurinatimelymannersuchthatthecontrolroomP&IDscanbeimmediately | |||
updated.Plantoperations | |||
organization | |||
makespermanent | |||
changestosystemvalvepositions, | |||
thereisnotanimmediate | |||
markuporannotation | |||
madeontheeffecteddraw-ings.Theteamnotedthatpermanent | |||
changestovalvepositions | |||
insystemoperating | |||
procedures | |||
areoccurring | |||
withoutthepriorconcurrence | |||
ofRG&Eengineering. | |||
UFSAR,sections5.4.5.3.5 | |||
and5.4.5.2,referstotworemotelyoperat-edvalveswhichcanbeutilizedtoisolateanRHRloopfromoutsidethepumproom.ThesystemwalkdownandtheupgradedP&IDsindicatethatthereisnolongeranymethodavailable | |||
toisolateanRHRloopremotely(i.e.,viareachrods).Althoughthisinformation | |||
hasbeenremovedfromtheRHRP&ID,thereisnoidentified | |||
punchlist | |||
itemtodeletethisinformation | |||
fromtheUFSAR.Theteamnotedthatuncontrolled | |||
trainingmaterial(LessonTexts)havenotbeenupdatedtoreflectsystemchangesaccomplished | |||
duringthelastoutage.Thereisnostationrequirement | |||
tomaintainthistrainingmaterialcurrent.Theinspection | |||
teamconsiders | |||
thatmakingthistypeofinformation | |||
available | |||
tocontrolroomoperators | |||
insuchanuncontrolled | |||
mannerrepresents | |||
anotableprogramweakness. | |||
Thelackoftimelyoperating | |||
information | |||
updatesforcontrolroomuseisconsidered | |||
anunresolved. | |||
item.89-81-08Equipment | |||
Environmental | |||
Qualification | |||
Evaluation | |||
TheNRCquestioned. | |||
thebasisfortheassumption | |||
thatRHRpumpsealfailurewilloccurafter24hours.TheNRCrequestsRG&Etosub-stantiate | |||
themethodofdetecting | |||
anyleakintheRHRpumproomifthepumpsealweretofailbeforethestated24hourperiod.C-2 | |||
Thesafetyreliefvalvetestprocedures | |||
O89-81-11Engineer' | containgeneralandminimalinstructions | ||
ENCLOSURE. | forperforming | ||
DESIGNCONTROLGeneralControlofDesignInputsControlofDesignProcessSSFIURI89-81-05:SSFIURI89-81-08: | thereliefsetpointtest.Standardtestpractices | ||
arenotalwaysperformed. | |||
ordocumented. | |||
Aswritten,thetestprocedure | |||
requiresonlyonesuccessful | |||
setpointtest.Datafromreliefvalvetestinghasbeenrecordedinaccurately | |||
and.inconsistent- | |||
lyinsomecases.TheNRCconcluded | |||
thatRG&Eshouldformalize | |||
testprocedures | |||
instructions | |||
anddatarecording | |||
requirements. | |||
Duringtheon-goingprocedure | |||
upgradeeffort,RG&Eshouldassurethatvalvetestprocedures | |||
incorporate | |||
allnew(1986)ASMECodeSectionXI,IWV-3512, | |||
andANSI/ASME | |||
OM-1-1981 | |||
requirements | |||
forsafetyreliefvalves.Inparticular, | |||
morethanonesuccessful | |||
"poptest"atthedesignated | |||
liftpressureshouldbeperformed | |||
andtheresultscomp-letelyandaccurately | |||
documented. | |||
Valvesetpointandleaktestingshouldalsobeperformed | |||
withtheallowable | |||
specification | |||
listedintheprocedure. | |||
Valvetestresultsanddatashouldaccurately | |||
reflect'heresultsofalltestactivities. | |||
RG&Eshouldalsoconsiderthebenefitsofaddingotherperiodicvalvetestssuchastheas-foundreliefliftsetpoint, | |||
valveaccumulation, | |||
and.valvecapacity. | |||
89-81-10Translation | |||
ofFSARRequirements | |||
intoOperating | |||
Procedures | |||
TheGinnaUFSARcontains"operational" | |||
information | |||
anddatawhichtheinspectors | |||
determined | |||
tobeinvalidand,withoutasupporting | |||
designbasis.,Specifically, | |||
Section5.4.5.3.5 | |||
statesthatintheeventofa50gpmRHRpumpsealleakandlossofbothpumproomsumppumps,operators | |||
have4hourstoisolatetheleakbeforetheRHRpumpmotorsbecomeflooded.Theteamdetermined | |||
thata50gpmleakintothepumproom,withtwofailedsumpmotors;cannotbesustained | |||
intheRHRpumproomforfourhoursbeforefloodingthepumpmotors.Itwassuggested | |||
.thatthefourhourallowance | |||
wasoriginally | |||
intendedjusttoindicatearoughsystemmarginforcopingwithgrossleakageinthepumppit.Theteamwasunabletofindanyconsideration | |||
ofthisinanyoftheavailable | |||
designdocuments | |||
associated, | |||
withtheRHRsystem.Italsocouldnotbefoundinanyofthesystemoperating | |||
oremergency | |||
procedures. | |||
Thealarmresponseprocedure | |||
forthehighsumplevelalarmrequirescontrolroomoperators | |||
todispatchanauxiliary | |||
operatortoinvestigate | |||
possiblepumproomflooding, | |||
howeverthereisnoreference | |||
tomaximumtimelimittoisolatealeakingRHRtrainifnecessary. | |||
Theteamreviewedtheinstrumentation | |||
devicesavailable | |||
tocontrol,roomoperators | |||
whichwouldindicateRHRleakageinthepumproom.Theonlyknownindication | |||
wouldbefromahighlevelsumpalarm.However,thesumpalarminstrument | |||
isnotqualified | |||
forserviceinaharshenvironment. | |||
Operating | |||
procedures, | |||
emergency | |||
procedures, | |||
andoperator. | |||
trainingmaterialdonotreflectthelimitingdesignbasisofthesystem.Theapparently | |||
unsupported | |||
4hourfloodinglimitisconsidered | |||
anun-resolveditempendingverification | |||
ofthevaluebythelicenseeorcorrection | |||
oftheUFSAR.C-3 | |||
O89-81-11Engineer'ssurance | |||
Thedesigncontrolmeasuresasimplemented/practiced | |||
bythelicensee's | |||
engineering | |||
department | |||
wereweak,anddidnotfavorably | |||
comparetogoodengineering | |||
assurance | |||
practices | |||
generally | |||
acceptedintheindustry. | |||
Therewaslackofconsistency | |||
intheimplementation | |||
ofapprovedengineering | |||
procedures | |||
amongthevariousdepartments | |||
andengineering | |||
management | |||
didnotappeartobecognizant | |||
ofthisincon-sistency. | |||
Therewasalackofformaldesigninterface | |||
control,lackofcontroloverexternalcommunication | |||
withdesignconsultants, | |||
andalackofcontroloverdesigndocuments/modification | |||
packagesduringthedevelopment | |||
andimplementation | |||
phase.C-4 | |||
ENCLOSURE | |||
.DPreliminary | |||
Categorization | |||
ofIssuesNote:Thecategories | |||
contained | |||
inEnclosure | |||
Dwereselectedtopicsin10CFR50AppendixBandothersources.Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns, | |||
wehavereviewedtheSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorized | |||
themintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolved | |||
item89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanism | |||
toassurethatdesigncalculations | |||
aremaintained | |||
up-to-date. | |||
Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.Enclosure | |||
Disapreliminary | |||
categorization | |||
oftheunre-solveditemsintothegeneraltopicalareas..Itiscurrently | |||
plannedtocategorize | |||
alltheconcernsidentified | |||
intheinspection | |||
report. | |||
DESIGNCONTROLGeneralControlofDesignInputsControlofDesignProcessSSFIURI89-81-05: | |||
SSFIURI89-81-08: | |||
Electrical | |||
LoadGrowthCon-trolProgramEquipment | |||
Environmental | |||
Qual-ification | |||
Evaluation | |||
ControlofDesignOutputsSSFIURI89-81-07B: | |||
ControlRoomP&IDsControlofDesignInterfaces | |||
and.Coordination | |||
ControlofDesignChangesDesignReviews/Engineering | |||
Assurance | |||
SSFIURI89-81-05: | |||
Electrical | |||
LoadGrowthControlProgramSSFIURI89-81-11: | |||
Engineering | |||
Assurance | |||
SpecificDesignConcernsSSFIURI89-81-01: | |||
ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibility | |||
SSFIURI89-81-03: | |||
RHRPumpNPSHPROCEDURES | |||
SSFIURI89-81-09: | |||
SafetyReliefValveTestingDOCUMENTCONTROLSSFIURI89-81-07B: | |||
ControlRoomP&IDs | |||
0 | 0 | ||
ORGANIZATIONAL.ACESSSFIURI89-81-02: | ORGANIZATIONAL | ||
.ACESSSFIURI89-81-02: | |||
Resolution | |||
ofSafetyConcernsSSFIURI89-81-07B: | |||
ControlRoomP&IDsSSFIURI89-81"10: | |||
Translation | |||
ofFSARRequire-mentsintoOperating | |||
Proce-duresHANDLINGOFSAFETYCONCERNSSSFIURI89-81-02: | |||
Resolution | |||
ofSafetyConcernsSURVEILLANCE | |||
TESTINGMAINTENANCE | |||
SSFIURI89-81-07A: | |||
Calibration | |||
ofControlRoomInstruments | |||
SSFIURI89-81-09: | |||
SafetyReliefValveTestingD-2 | |||
ENCLOSURE | |||
EResolution | |||
ofSpecificIssuesNote:Wehaveseparated. | |||
thescheduleinformation | |||
contained | |||
inthisenclo-sureintotwocategories: | |||
resolution | |||
completed, | |||
andscheduleforresolution. | |||
ListedfirstarethoseitemsforwhichRG&Ehascomplet-edresolution. | |||
ThosemeasurestakenbyRG&Eareidentified. | |||
Someoftheunresolved | |||
itemslistedcannotbeadequately | |||
resolved, | |||
withoutaddressing | |||
thebroadermoreprogrammatic | |||
issuessuchasdesigncontrolandengineering | |||
assurance | |||
andrequiremoretimetoresolvethanthespecificitems.Theschedules | |||
providedforsomeitemsmaychangeasRG&Efurtheridentifies | |||
theunderlying | |||
concerns. | |||
Anupdatedschedulewillbeprovidedinthe120dayresponse. | |||
0 | 0 | ||
~ | ~Resolution | ||
Comlete~89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.seeEnclosure | |||
Aforactionstakenforresolution. | |||
Please89-81-06Undervoltage | |||
RelayAlarmsandMoldedCaseCircuitBreakersPleaseseeEnclosure | |||
Bforactionstakenforresolution. | |||
89-81-07A | |||
Calibration | |||
ofContxolRoomInstruments | |||
ThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Calibration | |||
ofallcontrolroomdcbusvoltmeters | |||
duringtherecentrefueling | |||
outage(thevoltmeters | |||
werefoundtobewithinthespecified | |||
acceptance | |||
criteria). | |||
2)Alldcbusvoltmeters | |||
arenowcalibrated | |||
perCalibration | |||
Proce-,dureCP-514onanannualbasis.3)Allemergency | |||
dieselgenerator | |||
andvarioussecondary | |||
systempowermetercalibrations | |||
havebeenaddedtotheCP-500seriesprocedures, | |||
andthemeterswerecalibrated | |||
duringthe1990refueling | |||
outage.89-81-10Translation | |||
oftheFSARRequirements | |||
intoOperational | |||
Procedures | |||
Thisitemwasresolvedpromptly. | |||
Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Performance | |||
ofareanalysis, | |||
duringtheSSFIinspection, | |||
whichdetermined | |||
thatoperators | |||
havetwohourstorespond.(DesignAnalysis, | |||
10CFR50.59 | |||
SafetyEvaluation, | |||
NSL-0000-015, | |||
Rev.0,datedDecember8,1989,ResidualHeatRemovalLeakageProvi-sions.)T2)UpdateofUFSARsections5.4.5.3.5, | |||
5.4.5.2and6.3.3.8,submit-tedaspartoftheUFSARupdateonDecember16,1989.3)RevisionofTrainingSystemDescription | |||
RGE-25duringtheinspection. | |||
4)RevisionofEOPspriortoreceiptoftheinspection | |||
report.(Procedure | |||
E-1,LossofReactororSecondary | |||
Coolant,Step18wasaddedandES-1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation, | |||
anotebeforeStep9wasadded.) | |||
. | .Schedule | ||
forResolu.n89-81-01ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibility | |||
Asnotedintheinspection | |||
report,thefailureofthe10inchdis-chargelineinamannerwhichwouldstopservicewaterflowtothedieselgenerators | |||
isalowprobability | |||
event.Thiseventisalsobeyondthedesignandlicensing | |||
basisoftheplant.Nevertheless, | |||
RG&Eplanstofurtherevaluatethepotential | |||
riskofthisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffort.OurIPEiscurrently | |||
scheduled | |||
tobesubmitted | |||
inthethirdquarterof1991.89-81-02Resolution | |||
ofSafetyConcernsAninterimprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsisunder-development | |||
andwillbediscussed | |||
inour120dayresponse. | |||
89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHDocumentation | |||
oftheanalysisfindingsisscheduled | |||
tobecompleted | |||
byDecember31,1990.Inaddition, | |||
RG&EplanstoconsiderthismatterinthePRA/IPE.89-81-05Electrical | |||
LoadGrowthProgramRG&Ehasimplemented | |||
aninterimprocessforallmodifications | |||
toperformthefollowing | |||
actions:Currentsystemloadingsforthedcbatteries | |||
havebeenestab-lishedinDesignAnalysis, | |||
EWR3341,SizingofVitalBatteries, | |||
andforthedieselgenerator | |||
loadsinDesignAnalysis, | |||
EWR4136,DieselGenerator | |||
Loading.2)AnElectrical | |||
Engineering | |||
DesignGuide,Electrical | |||
Interface | |||
Checklist | |||
EDG-15D,Rev.0,isbeingimplemented | |||
onallmodifica- | |||
tionswhichrequiresidentification | |||
ofloadchangestothedcbatteries | |||
andthedieselgenerator | |||
acloads.3)Aprocesscontrolled | |||
byElectrical | |||
DesignGuide,DesignVerifi-cationModelEDG-15B,Rev.0,hasbeenestablished | |||
withintheElectrical | |||
Engineering | |||
DesignVerification | |||
Groupwhichupdatestheloadingdatafortheimpactedpowersupplyanddetermines | |||
theremaining | |||
capacitymarginforacanddcloads.Wearetakingactionstointegrate | |||
thisprocessintotheappropriate | |||
Engineering | |||
(QE)procedures. | |||
Weanticipate | |||
completion | |||
oftheseactionsbythedateofour120dayresponse.- | |||
89-81-07B | |||
ControlRoomP&IDsRG&Ehasconsidered | |||
theexamplesidentified | |||
bythestaffwhichresultedinthestaff'sconclusion | |||
thatinformation | |||
updatesforcontrolroomusearenotimplemented | |||
inatimelymanner.RG&Ehasresolvedseveraloftheexamplesidentified. | |||
Theseinclude:E-2 | |||
C4'C0 | C4'C0 | ||
.1)RG& | .1)RG&Ehasimpleilhted | ||
improvedcontrolsinDrawingChangeRequest(DCR)process.RG&EhasassignedZ"StationEngineerwithresponsibi | |||
lityfortrackingandprocessing | |||
allDCRs.~~2)TheUFSARhasbeenreviewedtoassurethattheappropriate | |||
information | |||
withregardtotheisolation | |||
oftheRHRpumpsealiscorrect.3)RGGEhasrevisedthelessontexttoreflecttherevisedRHR'pumpsealleakagetimelimitation | |||
oftwohours.Aninterimprocessforenhancing | |||
theupdateprocessforcontrolroominformation | |||
iscurrently | |||
underreviewandwillbediscussed, | |||
inthe120dayresponse. | |||
89-81-08Equipment | |||
Environmental | |||
Qualification | |||
Evaluation | |||
Thepassivefailure'ofaRHRpumpsealisassumedtooccurat24hours,consistent | |||
withSRP15.6.5.Theconsequences | |||
ofthisassumedpassivefailure,concurrent | |||
withtheassumeddesignbasisLOCA,wasevaluated, | |||
bytheNRCduringthereviewofSEPTopicXV-19andfoundtobeacceptable. | |||
Nevertheless, | |||
RGGEplanstofurtherevaluatethisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffortwithitsattendant | |||
requirement | |||
toperformaninternalfloodinganalysis. | |||
OurIPEiscurrently | |||
sched-uledtobesubmitted | |||
inthethirdquarterof1991.Theresultsofthisevaluation | |||
willdetermine | |||
iftheupgradeofthesumplevelswitchestoasafety-related | |||
statusisrecommended. | |||
89-81-09SafetyReliefValveTestingand,Documentation | |||
RGGEhascommit/ed | |||
toincorporate | |||
ASMECodeSectionZI-IWV-3512 | |||
(1986)andimplement | |||
ANSI/ASME | |||
OM-1-1987 | |||
aspartoftheISTProgramUpgrade.Procedure | |||
changestoincorporate | |||
theserequirements | |||
werecompleted. | |||
priortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.RGfiEwillhavecompleted. | |||
alltestingsunderthesenewrequirements | |||
byDecember31,1994.E-3 | |||
e | e | ||
}} | }} |
Revision as of 14:44, 29 June 2018
ML17250B199 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Ginna |
Issue date: | 06/08/1990 |
From: | MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
To: | MARTIN T T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
References | |
NUDOCS 9006200487 | |
Download: ML17250B199 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1989081
Text
xREGULATOY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTZOYSTEM
(RIDE)x~xACCESSION
NBR:9006200487
DOC.DATE:
90/06/08NOTARIZED:
NO;CFACIL:50-244
RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester
GAUTH.NAME~~~~AUTHORAFFILIATION
CREDY,R,C.
Rochester
Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT
AFFILIATION
MARTINET.T.
Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:RespondstoNRC900509ltrreviolations
notedinInspRept50-244/89-81.
DISTRIBUTION
CODE:IEOZDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
1ENCL3SIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp
Rept/Notice
ofViolation
ResponseNOTES:License
Expdateinaccordance
with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
DOCKET0500024405000244cRECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
PD1-3PDRGN1ERNAL:LPDRNSICINTERNAL:
AEODAEOD/TPAD
NRRMORISSEAU,D
NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10
NRR/DREP/PEPB9D
NRR/DST/DIR
8E2NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
OGC/HDS2FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
JOHNSONFA
AEOD/DEIIB
DEDRONRRSHANKMAN,S
NRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DRIS/DIR
NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
OE~IREG~02NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111<11~~+NG:P3fo)579+/NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASCONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE
YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION
LISTSFORDOCUMENTS
YOUDON'TNEED!ADD,TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR22ENCL22
AE;f,Nfe~~~5OAA55455ROCHESTER
GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION
~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,
N.Y.14849-PPPI
June8,1990TEEER<04C
AREACODE75555462700Mr.ThomasT.MartinRegionalAdministrator
RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
475Allendale
RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406Subject:ResponsetoInspection
Report50-244/89-81
SafetySystemFunctional
Inspect'ion
--RHRSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantNRCDocket50-244DearMr.Martin:Thisletterprovidestheinitial30-dayresponsetotheSafetySystemFunctional
Inspection
(SSFI)oftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SystemattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,conducted,
betweenNovember6andDecember8,1989.TheNRCletterofMay09,1990fromMarvinW.Hodges(NRC)toRobertC.Mecredy(RG&E)transmitted
thereportforthatinspection.
ThisletterprovidestheRG&Eresponses,
pursuantto10CFR2.201,tothetwoviolations
issuedinconjunction
withtheSSFIreport.Inaddition,
weareproviding
scheduleinformation
concerning
theunresolved
issues,including
thepostulated
floodingoftheRHRroom,identified
intheinspection
report.Additional
information
willbeprovidedinthe120-dayresponsetotheSSFIreport.Thenuclearindustryisgoingthroughmajorupgradeeffortsinvolving
configuration
management
anddesignbasisdocuments.
RG&Eisnotaloneinrecognizing
thebenefitsoftheseimprovements
andhasbeenproceeding
withtheseefforts.OnMarch6,1990RG&Emadeaformalpresentation
toNRCRegionIstaffandonMarch27,1990madeapresentation
toNRRregarding
ourconfiguration
management
program.Wehavecompleted
threepilotsystemdesignbasisdocuments
andarereviewing
themtodetermine
theoptimalspecification
fortheoveralldesignbasisdocumentprogramfortheremaining
plantsystems.Inaddition,
RG&Ehasdeveloped
aseparateprogramtoprovidefurtherassurance
thatalldesignbasisinformation
and,commitments
whichmayhavebeenrelieduponbytheNRCarecaptured.
Theobjective
oftheNRCSSFIoftheRHRsystemswastoassessthecapability
ofthatsystemtoperformitsdesignbasisfunctions.
Aspartofthatinspection,
theSSFIteamassessedtheoveralldesigncontrolprogramandotherworkprocesses
usedbyRG&E.Thereviewoftheseprogrammatic
aspectswasfarbroaderthantheRHRsystem.Specialemphasiswasplacedupontheengineering
processes
andtheirinterfaces
withotheractivities.
900b200487
900b08PDRADOCK050002448PNUggIJt~fP(
2TheprimaryresultoftheSSFIwasthatnosituations
wereidentified
thatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperforming
itsintendedfunctions
undernormalanddesignbasisaccidentconditions.
AswouldbeexpectedfromanSSFIofanynuclearpowerplant,andinparticular
oneoftheearlySEPplants,theSSFIidentified.
areaswhereimprove-mentiswarranted.
TwoSeverityLevelIVviolations
werecited.,andtenspecificunresolved
itemsweredocumented.
TheNRCletterofMay09,1990requiresthattheviolations
beaddressed,
pursuantto10CFR2.201,within30days.TheletteralsorequeststhatRG&Eprovideitsevaluation
ofthespecificunresolved
itemsandplannedactions,within120days.Inaddition,
theNRCletterrequeststhatRG&Ealsoprovidescheduleinformation
regarding
theactionstoaddresstheunresolved
items,within30days.Theschedules
requested
areexclusive
ofunresolved
item89-81-11,
Engineering
Assurance,
forwhicharesponsewasrequested
in120days.kResponses
totwoviolations
identified
ar'eprovidedasEnclosures
A&Btothisletter.Thefirstviolation
involved.
notmaintaining
anup-to-dateloadprofileforthebatteries.
Theactualcapability
ofthebatteries
wasnotanissue,onlytheadequacyofthetesting.RG&Ehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcompliance
onthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived.
>>Thesecondviolation
citedhadtwoparts.Thefirstpartinvolveshavingnotalreadydeveloped
aperiodictestingprogramforthemoldedcasecircuitbreakers.
Thesecondpartinvolvesnothavinganexplicitacceptance
criterion
inthetestprocedure
forthesetpoints
ofthedcundervoltage
alarmrelays.Althoughagenerally
acceptedperiodictestmethodformoldedcasecircuitbreakersisnotavailable
intheindustrytoday,wechoosenottotakeissuewiththisviolation.
Theindustryiscurrently
examining
theneedforand/orrequirements
formoldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&Ewillimplement,
when.available,
thosetestingmethodsandrequirements
endorsedbytheindustry.
Withregardtotheacceptance
criterion
fortheundervoltage
relaysetpoints,
wehadalreadyreachedastateoffullcompliance
onthismatterwhentheSSFIreportwasreceived.
Inaddition,
onourowninitiative,
wehaveexpandedthisconcerntoincludetheacundervoltage
relaysforthesafetybuses.Inadditiontotheseviolations,
NRCalsoidentified
tenunresolved
items.Theidentification
oftheseitemsiscontained
inEnclosure
C.Severaloftheseunresolved
itemshavealreadybeencompleted
andseveralmoreareinprocess.DuringtheRG&EreviewoftheSSFIreport,management
recognized
thatmanyoftheunresolved
itemswereexamplesofbroader,underlying,
programmatic
concerns.
Manyoftheseconcernsfocusedonengineering
functions
and,controls'.
BecauseRG&Eunderstands
theimportance
ofresolving
theprogrammatic
andmanagement
issuesaswellasthespecificitemscitedbytheNRC,wearedeveloping
asystematic
approachtoaddressbothtypesofconcerns.
Thisapproachisatwo-part,paralleleffort.Thefirstpartfocusesonthemanagement
processes
inadisciplined
manner,whilethesecond.partfocusesontheresolution
ofthespecificunresolved
items.
P
Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,
wehavere-reviewed
theSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorized
themintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolved
item89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanism
toassurethatdesigncalculations
aremain-tainedup-to-date.
Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.Enclosure
Disapreliminary
categorization
oftheunresolved
itemsintothegeneraltopicalareas.Inaddition,
RG&Eisinitiating
amoredetailedreviewoftheworkprocesses
andtheircontrolsforeachofthegeneralareaswhichcontainsignificant
identified,
weaknesses.
Thisreviewwillencompass
identifying
thecauseoftheviolations,
aswellastheunresolved
issues,identified
bytheSSFIreport.Enclosure
Econtainstheschedular
information
asrequested
bythestaff.Wehaveseparated
thisscheduleinformation
intotwocatego-ries:resolution
completed
andscheduled
forresolution.
RG&Ehasresolveditems89-81-04,
06,07A,and10asidentified
inEnclosure
C.Inparticular,
RG&Ehaspromptlyresolvedtheissueregarding
floodingoftheRHRpumproom.TheUFSARhasbeenupdated,andtheEOPsandtrainingdocuments
havebeenrevised.Adetailedaccountofthoseactionstakentoresolvetheitemsidentified
abovearecon-tainedinEnclosure
E.RG&Ebelievesthattheapproachoutlinedinthisletterassuresproperandcompleteresolution
ofthespecificissuesidentified
aswellasthemoreprogrammatic
issuesdiscussed.
Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MeceyDivisionManagerNuclearProduction
GAHN108Enclosures
xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
(original)
DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate
I-3Washington,
D.C.20555GinnaNRCSeniorResidentInspector
0
ENCLOSURE
AResponsetoNoticeofViolation
50-244/89-81
Violation
1
.InsectionReort44/88-81VIOLATION
1:STATEMENT
OFVIOLATION-
10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
III,requiresinpartthatmeasuresbeestablished
toensurethatapplicable
regulatory
requirements
anddesignbasesaretranslated
intospecifications
andprocedures.
Thesemeasuresshallprovideforverifying
theadequacyofdesignbyperformance
ofdesignreviews.GinnaStationQualityAssurance
Manual,SectionNo.11,"TestCon-trol,"requiresthatengineering
establish
designtestrequirements
andthattestingbeperformed
inaccordance
withapprovedprocedures
whichincorporate
therequirements
andacceptance
criteriacontained
inapplicable
Technical
Specifications
andregulatory
requirements.
Contrarytotheabove,onNovember15,1989,thedesignreviewsforEngineering
WorkRequest(EWR)3891wereinadequate
inthattheEWRdidnotestablish
thebatteryload,requirements
therebyresulting
inabatteryload.profileusedduringtheservicetest.notreflecting
thedesignbasisloadrequirements.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation
(Supplement
1).ACCEPTANCE
OFVIOLATION:
RG&EagreesthatitdidnotupdatethebatteryloadprofileaspartofEWR3891.DISCUSSION:
ThepurposeofEWR3891wastoreplacethebatteries
becausetheywerenearingtheendoftheirservicelifeand,whilereplacing
them,toincreasethecapacitymargin.EWR3891didnotincludeanupdat-ingofthebatterytestprofilebecauseithadbeendetermined
thatnolargeloadshadbeenadded.tothebatterysincetheoriginalloadprofilehadbeendeveloped.
ThebatteryloadprofilewasbasedupontheoriginalWestinghouse
designdata.Thatinformation
wasconsistent
withindustrypracticeatthetimeitwasdeveloped.
Analytical
techniques
werenotassophisticated
asthoseinusetoday.Ratherthanexplicitly
quanti-fyingsuchfactorsasmomentary
loadsand.theloadstartingcurrents,
itwasgeneralpracticetoprovideadditional
batterysizingbaseduponexperience
andengineering
judgement.
Today'sstandards
(suchasIEEEstandard485)suggestamorerefined,moreprecisely
quanti-fiedanalysis.
Theactualbatterycapacitywassufficient
toprovideitssafetyfunctions.
Thebatteryhasbeenshowntohaveadequatecapacityasconfirmed
byaphysicaltest.Althoughthereisnorequirement
fortheGinnaNuclearPowerPlanttoincorporate
allnewly-developed
industrystandards,
webelieveitprudenttousethecurrentindustrystandards
fordeveloping
revisedbatteryloadprofiles,
andhavedoneso.A-1
CORRECTIVE
STEPSTApreliminary
analysis,
performed
duringtheinspection,
demonstrated
thatthebatterysizeisadequate.
Therevisedbatterysizecalculation
had,beenfinalized
subsequent
totheNRCinspection
andpriortothereceiptoftheinspection
report,whichconfirmsthatthebatterysizeisnotaconcern.Animprovedbatteryloadprofilehasbeendeveloped
whichincorpo-ratescalculational
improvements
contained
incurrentindustrystandardIEEE485-1983.
Theupgradedbatteryloadprofile(DesignAnalysisEWR3341"SizingofVitalBatteries",
datedMarch12,1990)hasbeentransmitted
byEngineering
totheplantstaff,andthebatterytestingprocedures'PT-10.2
andPT-10.3,BatteryServiceTests)havebeenrevised.Thebatteries
weretestedduringtherecentoutageusingtherevisedprocedures.
Theresultsdemonstrated
theadequacyofthebatterycapacity.
CORRECTIVE
STEPSTOBETAKENTOPREVEBVPREClJRRENCE:
Theapplicability
ofthisviolation
hasbeenbroadened
byRG&Etoassurethatnotonlytheimportant
dcelectrical
loadsareanalyzedandtested,butalsothattheimportant
acelectrical
loadswhichmayimpacttheoperation
oftheplantemergency
dieselgenerators
areidentified
andtracked.Wehaveimplemented
anelectrical
load'rowth
programasdescribed
underunresolved
item89-81-05.
DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE
WILLBEACHIEVED:
Engineering
established
updatedbatteryloadrequirements.
Thebatterytestprocedures
havebeenrevisedandthebatteries
havebeentestedusingthenewprocedure.
Theseactionswerecompleted
priortothereceiptoftheNRCinspection
report.RG&Eisinfullcompli-ance.A-2
ENCLOSURE
BResponsetoNoticeofViolation
50-244/89-81
Violation
2
IP
~RG&E/Ginna
InsectiReort50-244/89-81
VION2:STATEMENT
OFVIOLATION:
R.E.GinnaTechnical
Specifications
Section6.8.1requiresthatwrittenprocedures
beestablished
and.implemented.
foractivities
suchassurveillance
andtestingactivities
ofsafety-related
equipment.
GinnaStationQualityAssurance
Manual,SectionII,"TestControl,"
establishes
therequirements
forestablishing
andimplementing
testprogramstodemonstrate
thatsafety-related
systemsandcomponents
willperformsatisfactorily.
Furthermore,
thissectionrequiresthattestingshallbeperformed
inaccordance
withwrittenprocedures
whichincorporate
acceptance
criteria.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember9,1989,Class1E480Vacmoldedcasecircuitbreakershavenotbeensubjected
toscheduled
periodictesting.Furthermore,
thereisnoestablished
acceptance
criteriafortestingthedcundervoltage
relayal'armsinProcedure
PT-11,"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'hisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation
(Supplement
1).ACCEPTANCE
OFVIOLATION:
RG&Eagreesthattheperiodictestingprogramofsafety-related
equipment
attheGinna.Nuclear
PowerPlantdoesnotcurrently
includemoldedcasecircuitbreakers.
RG&EalsoagreesthattheGinnaperiodictestprocedure
PT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'"didnotspecifyanacceptance
criterion
forthesetpointofthedcundervoltage
relayalarms.Thisviolation
hastwopartswhichareaddressed
separately
below:Part1:MoldedCaseCircuitBreakerTestingDISCUSSION:
Moldedcasecircuitbreakersaredesignedfornuclearandnon-nuclear
applications.
Thistypecircuitbreakerissealed.anddoesnotincludedesignfeaturestotestallthecapabilities
ofthebreakerbeyondfunctional
tests.RG&Erealizestheimportance
ofassuringproperoperation
ofthesebreakers.
RG&Ehasnotbeenlaxinitsattention
totheimportance
oftestingmoldedcasecircuitbreakers.
Thisproblemwasself-identified
byRG&Eandwasincorporated
intotheRCMprogram.Onourowninitiative,
wedeveloped
andimplemented
receipt-inspection
testingforallnewmoldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinna.Wehavealsoperformed
testingonmolded,casecircuitbreakersinanefforttodetermine
theircharacteristics.
Threeyearsago,RG&Eperformed
specialtestingofallofitsexist-ingmagneticonly,moldedcasecircuitbreakersatGinnaStationonaspecialone-timebasis.Successful
operation
hasindicated
noknowndegradation.
B-1
WhilethefunctioniO~
ofmoldedcasecircuithkersisimportant
tosafetyandwhilethereisanNRCrequirement
foratestprogramtoassurethatsafety-related
structures,
systemsand.components
willperformsatisfactorily,
thereisnospecificrequirement
totestperiodically
everypieceofequipment.
Asstated.inAppendixB,Criterion
XI,"Thetestprogramshallinclude,asappropriate,
operational
tests...ofstructures,
systemsandcomponents."
Theterm"asappropriate"
isapplicable
andincludestheavailability
ofappropriate
testmethods.Moldedcasecircuitbreakersarenotdesignedforinsitutestingandwouldrequiredetermination
andretermination
toperformthetesting.Thevendorsofthisequipment
havealsonotmaderecommendations
forperiodictesting.Becauseofgenericapplicability,
periodictestingformoldedcasecircuitbreakershasbeenanindustry-wide
issueandnogenerally
acceptedtestmethodhasbeendeveloped
atthistime.Thenuclearindustryhasresponded
totheNRCthroughNUMARCconcern-ingmoldedcasecircuitbreakertestingandRG&Eispursuingthisinconjunction
withthiseffort.CORRECTIVE
STEPSTAKEN:RG&Eiscontinuing
toworktowarddeveloping
appropriate
testmethodsformoldedcasecircuitbreakers,
aspartoftheReliability
CenteredMaintenance
(RCM)program.TheGinnaNuclearPowerPlantisoneofthetwo"pilotplants"inthenationfortheEPRIsponsored
RCMprogram.CORRECTIVE
STEPSTOBETAKENTOPR1DGQFZRECURRENCE-
Theindustryiscurrently
examining
theneedfor,andbenefitsof,moldedcasecircuitbreakertesting.RG&EwillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeindustryandEPRItodetermine
appropriate
testmethodsand.requirements.
DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE
WILLBEACHIEVED:
AlthoughRG&Edoesnotconsiderthisacompliance
matter,RG&Ewillimplement,
whenavailable,
thosetestingmethodsandrequirements
endorsedbytheindustry.
Part2:Undervoltage
RelayAlarmAcceptance
CriteriaCORRECTIVE
STEPSTAKEN:Theperiodictestprocedure
PT-11"60-CellBatteryBanks'AB'"hasbeenrevisedtoexplicitly
definetheacceptance
band/criterion
forthedcundervoltage
alarmrelays.Thedcrelayshavesubsequently
beencalibrated
andtested.Therelayshavebeenverifiedtoperformwithinthespecified
acceptance
criterion.
B-2
~10
.CORRECTIVE
STEPSTAKENTOPREVIXTREE:Theapplicability
ofthisviolation
hasbeenbroadened
byRG&Etoassurethatnot.onlythetestprocedures
fordcundervoltage
alarmrelayshaveexplicitacceptance
criteria,
butalsothatthetestprocedures
fortheacundervoltage
relaysforthesafeguards
buseshaveexplicitacceptance
criteria.
Thetestprocedure,
PT-11forthedcundervoltage
alarmrelayshasbeenrevisedandPT-9.1forthe480Vacsafeguards
busesisbeingrevisedtoprovideexplicitacceptance
criterion.
DATEWHENFULLCOMPLIANCE
WILLBEACHIEVED:
Thetestprocedure
forthedcundervoltage
alarmrelayshasbeenrevisedtoprovideanexplicitacceptance
band/criterion.
Thisactionwascompleted
priortothereceiptoftheNRCinspection
report.RG&Eisinfullcompliance.
B-3
0t'
ENCLOSURE
CIdentification
ofSpecificUnresolved
ItemsNote:Thestatements
ofissueshavebeendirectlyextracted
fromtheSSFIreport.Inafewinstances
theissueshavebeencondensed
andparaphrased.
r00e
.89-81-01ServicerSingleFailureSusceptlityPotential
lossofcoolingwater[flow]tobothemergency
dieselgenerators
duringorfollowing
aseismicevent.Thecoolingwaterforthewaterjacketheatexchanger
andlubeoilheatexchanger
discharges
throughacommonnon-safety
non-seismic
10-inchdischarge
pipe.Thecoolingwaterdischarge
pipewouldhavetofail[orhasbeenpostulated
bytheNRCSSFIteamtofail]soastoprevent[block/pinch
off]theflowoftheservicewater.89-81-02Resolution
ofSafetyConcernsThelicenseewasunabletoprovidetheteamwithadocumented
orverifiable
processavailable
atRG&Ethataddresses
howsafetyconcernsraisedoutsidethenormalengineering
processarebroughttotheattention
oftheNuclearSafetyandLicensing
staffandresolved.
89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHAconsultant
independently
evaluated
theavailable
NPSHduringpost-accidentrecirculation
modefromthecontainment
sumpand,aprelimi-naryresultindicates
thattheremaybesomemodesofoperation
oftheRHRpumpsunderwhichadequateNPSHisnotavailable.
Licenseeisevaluating
thevalidityofthesemodesandtheprobability
ofoccurrence.
Licenseeisalsoevaluating
thepossibility
thattheconsultant's
analytical
modelwastooconservative.
89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingFailuretotestthebatteries
withaloadprofilewhichtrulyrepre-sentedtheloaddemandonthebatteryisconsidered
aviolation
of10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
III.89-81-05Electrical
LoadGrowthControlProgramRG&Edoesnothaveamechanism
toassurethatplantcalculations
affectedbymodifications
areupdatedtoensurethattheyaremain-tainedup-to-date
andaccurate.
Thedesignprocessprovidesguidancetoengineers
toreviewthesystemcapacityandotherattributes,
buttheguidanceaddresses
onlyspecificmodifications
astheyareperformed.
Thereisnoformalloadtrackingsystemtoensurethatsystemcapacityisreviewedfortheintegrated
effectofseveralmodifications
insteadofjustone.Thelicenseestatedthatanon-lineprogramtocaptureelectrical
loadgrowthandupdateaffectedcalculations
wouldbedeveloped.
89-81-06MoldedCaseCircuitBreakersand,Undervoltage
RelayAlarmsFailuretoperiodically
testthemoldedcasecircuitbreakersandnotestablishing
anacceptance
criteriafortheundervoltage
relayalarmsareaviolation
offacilityTechnical
Specifications
6.8.1,whichrequirestestingofsafety-related.
components
inaccordance
withestablished
procedures.
.89-81-07A
Calibrate
ofControlRoomInstrumeThecontrolroomdcvoltmeters
arenotcalibrated
onaperiodicbasistoensurereliablesystemvoltageindication
tooperators.
89-81-07B
ControlRoomP&IDsPipingandInstrument
Diagram(P&ID)updatesandDesignChangeRequests(DCRs)postedinthecontrolroomwerereviewedbytheteam.ItwasnotedthattheRHRsystemP&ID(33013-1247)
didnotreflectthecurrentvalvepositionconfiguration
fortheRHRsystem.Also,theexistingDCRsoutstanding
againstthisdrawingcouldnotbeused.toderivethecorrectvalvepositions
inthatDCRs1247-4,and1247-5hadnotbeenapprovedbyRG&EEngineering
anddidnotreflectthecurrentpositionofvalve822B.Processing
ofDCRsdoesnotalwaysoccurinatimelymannersuchthatthecontrolroomP&IDscanbeimmediately
updated.Plantoperations
organization
makespermanent
changestosystemvalvepositions,
thereisnotanimmediate
markuporannotation
madeontheeffecteddraw-ings.Theteamnotedthatpermanent
changestovalvepositions
insystemoperating
procedures
areoccurring
withoutthepriorconcurrence
ofRG&Eengineering.
UFSAR,sections5.4.5.3.5
and5.4.5.2,referstotworemotelyoperat-edvalveswhichcanbeutilizedtoisolateanRHRloopfromoutsidethepumproom.ThesystemwalkdownandtheupgradedP&IDsindicatethatthereisnolongeranymethodavailable
toisolateanRHRloopremotely(i.e.,viareachrods).Althoughthisinformation
hasbeenremovedfromtheRHRP&ID,thereisnoidentified
punchlist
itemtodeletethisinformation
fromtheUFSAR.Theteamnotedthatuncontrolled
trainingmaterial(LessonTexts)havenotbeenupdatedtoreflectsystemchangesaccomplished
duringthelastoutage.Thereisnostationrequirement
tomaintainthistrainingmaterialcurrent.Theinspection
teamconsiders
thatmakingthistypeofinformation
available
tocontrolroomoperators
insuchanuncontrolled
mannerrepresents
anotableprogramweakness.
Thelackoftimelyoperating
information
updatesforcontrolroomuseisconsidered
anunresolved.
item.89-81-08Equipment
Environmental
Qualification
Evaluation
TheNRCquestioned.
thebasisfortheassumption
thatRHRpumpsealfailurewilloccurafter24hours.TheNRCrequestsRG&Etosub-stantiate
themethodofdetecting
anyleakintheRHRpumproomifthepumpsealweretofailbeforethestated24hourperiod.C-2
Thesafetyreliefvalvetestprocedures
containgeneralandminimalinstructions
forperforming
thereliefsetpointtest.Standardtestpractices
arenotalwaysperformed.
ordocumented.
Aswritten,thetestprocedure
requiresonlyonesuccessful
setpointtest.Datafromreliefvalvetestinghasbeenrecordedinaccurately
and.inconsistent-
lyinsomecases.TheNRCconcluded
thatRG&Eshouldformalize
testprocedures
instructions
anddatarecording
requirements.
Duringtheon-goingprocedure
upgradeeffort,RG&Eshouldassurethatvalvetestprocedures
incorporate
allnew(1986)ASMECodeSectionXI,IWV-3512,
andANSI/ASME
OM-1-1981
requirements
forsafetyreliefvalves.Inparticular,
morethanonesuccessful
"poptest"atthedesignated
liftpressureshouldbeperformed
andtheresultscomp-letelyandaccurately
documented.
Valvesetpointandleaktestingshouldalsobeperformed
withtheallowable
specification
listedintheprocedure.
Valvetestresultsanddatashouldaccurately
reflect'heresultsofalltestactivities.
RG&Eshouldalsoconsiderthebenefitsofaddingotherperiodicvalvetestssuchastheas-foundreliefliftsetpoint,
valveaccumulation,
and.valvecapacity.
89-81-10Translation
ofFSARRequirements
intoOperating
Procedures
TheGinnaUFSARcontains"operational"
information
anddatawhichtheinspectors
determined
tobeinvalidand,withoutasupporting
designbasis.,Specifically,
Section5.4.5.3.5
statesthatintheeventofa50gpmRHRpumpsealleakandlossofbothpumproomsumppumps,operators
have4hourstoisolatetheleakbeforetheRHRpumpmotorsbecomeflooded.Theteamdetermined
thata50gpmleakintothepumproom,withtwofailedsumpmotors;cannotbesustained
intheRHRpumproomforfourhoursbeforefloodingthepumpmotors.Itwassuggested
.thatthefourhourallowance
wasoriginally
intendedjusttoindicatearoughsystemmarginforcopingwithgrossleakageinthepumppit.Theteamwasunabletofindanyconsideration
ofthisinanyoftheavailable
designdocuments
associated,
withtheRHRsystem.Italsocouldnotbefoundinanyofthesystemoperating
oremergency
procedures.
Thealarmresponseprocedure
forthehighsumplevelalarmrequirescontrolroomoperators
todispatchanauxiliary
operatortoinvestigate
possiblepumproomflooding,
howeverthereisnoreference
tomaximumtimelimittoisolatealeakingRHRtrainifnecessary.
Theteamreviewedtheinstrumentation
devicesavailable
tocontrol,roomoperators
whichwouldindicateRHRleakageinthepumproom.Theonlyknownindication
wouldbefromahighlevelsumpalarm.However,thesumpalarminstrument
isnotqualified
forserviceinaharshenvironment.
Operating
procedures,
emergency
procedures,
andoperator.
trainingmaterialdonotreflectthelimitingdesignbasisofthesystem.Theapparently
unsupported
4hourfloodinglimitisconsidered
anun-resolveditempendingverification
ofthevaluebythelicenseeorcorrection
oftheUFSAR.C-3
O89-81-11Engineer'ssurance
Thedesigncontrolmeasuresasimplemented/practiced
bythelicensee's
engineering
department
wereweak,anddidnotfavorably
comparetogoodengineering
assurance
practices
generally
acceptedintheindustry.
Therewaslackofconsistency
intheimplementation
ofapprovedengineering
procedures
amongthevariousdepartments
andengineering
management
didnotappeartobecognizant
ofthisincon-sistency.
Therewasalackofformaldesigninterface
control,lackofcontroloverexternalcommunication
withdesignconsultants,
andalackofcontroloverdesigndocuments/modification
packagesduringthedevelopment
andimplementation
phase.C-4
ENCLOSURE
.DPreliminary
Categorization
ofIssuesNote:Thecategories
contained
inEnclosure
Dwereselectedtopicsin10CFR50AppendixBandothersources.Tobeginthereviewofthebroaderconcerns,
wehavereviewedtheSSFIreportandthecitedissues,andhavecategorized
themintogeneraltopicalareas.Forexample,unresolved
item89-81-05involvesnothavingamechanism
toassurethatdesigncalculations
aremaintained
up-to-date.
Weseethisspecificitemasbeingpartofamoregeneralareacalleddesigncontrol.Enclosure
Disapreliminary
categorization
oftheunre-solveditemsintothegeneraltopicalareas..Itiscurrently
plannedtocategorize
alltheconcernsidentified
intheinspection
report.
DESIGNCONTROLGeneralControlofDesignInputsControlofDesignProcessSSFIURI89-81-05:
SSFIURI89-81-08:
Electrical
LoadGrowthCon-trolProgramEquipment
Environmental
Qual-ification
Evaluation
ControlofDesignOutputsSSFIURI89-81-07B:
ControlRoomP&IDsControlofDesignInterfaces
and.Coordination
ControlofDesignChangesDesignReviews/Engineering
Assurance
SSFIURI89-81-05:
Electrical
LoadGrowthControlProgramSSFIURI89-81-11:
Engineering
Assurance
SpecificDesignConcernsSSFIURI89-81-01:
ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibility
SSFIURI89-81-03:
RHRPumpNPSHPROCEDURES
SSFIURI89-81-09:
SafetyReliefValveTestingDOCUMENTCONTROLSSFIURI89-81-07B:
ControlRoomP&IDs
0
ORGANIZATIONAL
.ACESSSFIURI89-81-02:
Resolution
ofSafetyConcernsSSFIURI89-81-07B:
ControlRoomP&IDsSSFIURI89-81"10:
Translation
ofFSARRequire-mentsintoOperating
Proce-duresHANDLINGOFSAFETYCONCERNSSSFIURI89-81-02:
Resolution
ofSafetyConcernsSURVEILLANCE
TESTINGMAINTENANCE
SSFIURI89-81-07A:
Calibration
ofControlRoomInstruments
SSFIURI89-81-09:
SafetyReliefValveTestingD-2
ENCLOSURE
EResolution
ofSpecificIssuesNote:Wehaveseparated.
thescheduleinformation
contained
inthisenclo-sureintotwocategories:
resolution
completed,
andscheduleforresolution.
ListedfirstarethoseitemsforwhichRG&Ehascomplet-edresolution.
ThosemeasurestakenbyRG&Eareidentified.
Someoftheunresolved
itemslistedcannotbeadequately
resolved,
withoutaddressing
thebroadermoreprogrammatic
issuessuchasdesigncontrolandengineering
assurance
andrequiremoretimetoresolvethanthespecificitems.Theschedules
providedforsomeitemsmaychangeasRG&Efurtheridentifies
theunderlying
concerns.
Anupdatedschedulewillbeprovidedinthe120dayresponse.
0
~Resolution
Comlete~89-81-04Class1EBatteryTestingThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.seeEnclosure
Aforactionstakenforresolution.
Please89-81-06Undervoltage
RelayAlarmsandMoldedCaseCircuitBreakersPleaseseeEnclosure
Bforactionstakenforresolution.
89-81-07A
Calibration
ofContxolRoomInstruments
ThisitemwasresolvedpriortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Calibration
ofallcontrolroomdcbusvoltmeters
duringtherecentrefueling
outage(thevoltmeters
werefoundtobewithinthespecified
acceptance
criteria).
2)Alldcbusvoltmeters
arenowcalibrated
perCalibration
Proce-,dureCP-514onanannualbasis.3)Allemergency
dieselgenerator
andvarioussecondary
systempowermetercalibrations
havebeenaddedtotheCP-500seriesprocedures,
andthemeterswerecalibrated
duringthe1990refueling
outage.89-81-10Translation
oftheFSARRequirements
intoOperational
Procedures
Thisitemwasresolvedpromptly.
Theactionstakentoresolvethisissueinclude:1)Performance
ofareanalysis,
duringtheSSFIinspection,
whichdetermined
thatoperators
havetwohourstorespond.(DesignAnalysis,
SafetyEvaluation,
NSL-0000-015,
Rev.0,datedDecember8,1989,ResidualHeatRemovalLeakageProvi-sions.)T2)UpdateofUFSARsections5.4.5.3.5,
5.4.5.2and6.3.3.8,submit-tedaspartoftheUFSARupdateonDecember16,1989.3)RevisionofTrainingSystemDescription
RGE-25duringtheinspection.
4)RevisionofEOPspriortoreceiptoftheinspection
report.(Procedure
E-1,LossofReactororSecondary
Coolant,Step18wasaddedandES-1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation,
anotebeforeStep9wasadded.)
.Schedule
forResolu.n89-81-01ServiceWaterSingleFailureSusceptibility
Asnotedintheinspection
report,thefailureofthe10inchdis-chargelineinamannerwhichwouldstopservicewaterflowtothedieselgenerators
isalowprobability
event.Thiseventisalsobeyondthedesignandlicensing
basisoftheplant.Nevertheless,
RG&Eplanstofurtherevaluatethepotential
riskofthisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffort.OurIPEiscurrently
scheduled
tobesubmitted
inthethirdquarterof1991.89-81-02Resolution
ofSafetyConcernsAninterimprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsisunder-development
andwillbediscussed
inour120dayresponse.
89-81-03RHRPumpNPSHDocumentation
oftheanalysisfindingsisscheduled
tobecompleted
byDecember31,1990.Inaddition,
RG&EplanstoconsiderthismatterinthePRA/IPE.89-81-05Electrical
LoadGrowthProgramRG&Ehasimplemented
aninterimprocessforallmodifications
toperformthefollowing
actions:Currentsystemloadingsforthedcbatteries
havebeenestab-lishedinDesignAnalysis,
EWR3341,SizingofVitalBatteries,
andforthedieselgenerator
loadsinDesignAnalysis,
EWR4136,DieselGenerator
Loading.2)AnElectrical
Engineering
DesignGuide,Electrical
Interface
Checklist
EDG-15D,Rev.0,isbeingimplemented
onallmodifica-
tionswhichrequiresidentification
ofloadchangestothedcbatteries
andthedieselgenerator
acloads.3)Aprocesscontrolled
byElectrical
DesignGuide,DesignVerifi-cationModelEDG-15B,Rev.0,hasbeenestablished
withintheElectrical
Engineering
DesignVerification
Groupwhichupdatestheloadingdatafortheimpactedpowersupplyanddetermines
theremaining
capacitymarginforacanddcloads.Wearetakingactionstointegrate
thisprocessintotheappropriate
Engineering
(QE)procedures.
Weanticipate
completion
oftheseactionsbythedateofour120dayresponse.-
89-81-07B
ControlRoomP&IDsRG&Ehasconsidered
theexamplesidentified
bythestaffwhichresultedinthestaff'sconclusion
thatinformation
updatesforcontrolroomusearenotimplemented
inatimelymanner.RG&Ehasresolvedseveraloftheexamplesidentified.
Theseinclude:E-2
C4'C0
.1)RG&Ehasimpleilhted
improvedcontrolsinDrawingChangeRequest(DCR)process.RG&EhasassignedZ"StationEngineerwithresponsibi
lityfortrackingandprocessing
allDCRs.~~2)TheUFSARhasbeenreviewedtoassurethattheappropriate
information
withregardtotheisolation
oftheRHRpumpsealiscorrect.3)RGGEhasrevisedthelessontexttoreflecttherevisedRHR'pumpsealleakagetimelimitation
oftwohours.Aninterimprocessforenhancing
theupdateprocessforcontrolroominformation
iscurrently
underreviewandwillbediscussed,
inthe120dayresponse.
89-81-08Equipment
Environmental
Qualification
Evaluation
Thepassivefailure'ofaRHRpumpsealisassumedtooccurat24hours,consistent
withSRP15.6.5.Theconsequences
ofthisassumedpassivefailure,concurrent
withtheassumeddesignbasisLOCA,wasevaluated,
bytheNRCduringthereviewofSEPTopicXV-19andfoundtobeacceptable.
Nevertheless,
RGGEplanstofurtherevaluatethisscenarioduringthePRA/IPEeffortwithitsattendant
requirement
toperformaninternalfloodinganalysis.
OurIPEiscurrently
sched-uledtobesubmitted
inthethirdquarterof1991.Theresultsofthisevaluation
willdetermine
iftheupgradeofthesumplevelswitchestoasafety-related
statusisrecommended.
89-81-09SafetyReliefValveTestingand,Documentation
RGGEhascommit/ed
toincorporate
ASMECodeSectionZI-IWV-3512
(1986)andimplement
ANSI/ASME
OM-1-1987
aspartoftheISTProgramUpgrade.Procedure
changestoincorporate
theserequirements
werecompleted.
priortoreceiptoftheSSFIreport.RGfiEwillhavecompleted.
alltestingsunderthesenewrequirements
byDecember31,1994.E-3
e