ML17262A133

Responds to Violations & Several Unresolved Items Noted in SSFI Rept 50-244/89-81.Update of Appropriate Unresolved Items Encl.Specific Actions Re All NRC Unresolved Items Being Tracked to Completion

ML17262A133
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	09/11/1990
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	MARTIN T T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 9009200182
Download: ML17262A133 (2)

See also: IR 05000244/1989081

Text

k'LROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONROBERTChtECREDYVi<ehetidentCinnet4uclee<Ptoduction/'.tone>t*te~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTERN.Y.14649-0001TELEPHONEAREACODE71B5462700September11,1990Mr.ThomasT.MartinRegionalAdministratorU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406'ubject:120-dayResponsetoInspectionReport50-244/89-81SafetySystemFunctionalInspectionontheRHRSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Reference:(a)NRCInspectionReport50-244/89-81,datedMay9,1990(b)RG&EletterfromR.C.Mecredy-toNRC,T.T.Martin,datedJune8,1990DearMr.Martin:Reference(a)requestedaresponsetotwoNoticesofViolationandseveralunresolveditemswithin30daysandawrittenevaluationofthedeficienciesidentifiedinSection2.1oftheInspectionReportwithin120days.Inour30-dayresponsetotwoNoticesofViolation,Ref.(b),wesummarizedourproposedresolutionorscheduleforresolutionfortheunresolveditems89-81-01through10.TheNRCunresolveditemdescriptionandourproposedresolutionofeachofthesewasdiscussedinenclosuresCandEofRef.(b).AnupdateoftheappropriateunresolveditemsisprovidedasAttachmentAtothisresponse.SpecificactionsregardingallNRCunresolveditemsarebeingtrackedtocompletionbyRG&E.~U~cIQet\Aoo1'Q~C3oPo+TheidentifiedweaknessesinSection2.1oftheInspectionReportcollectivelyraisedanNRCconcernastotheeffectivenessofRG&E'scurrentpracticestoestablishengineeringassurance.Thiswasidentifiedasunresolveditem89-81-11andisthefocusofthisresponse.RG&Erecognizesthatunresolveditem89-81-11,engineeringassurance,ischaracterizedbybroadprogrammaticissues.RG&EhascompletedanevaluationofthedeficienciesandconcernsraisedintheInspectionReportbyperforminganinternalassessmentoftheunderlyingissuesidentifiedinSection2.1andtheexamplesdiscussedinSection2.2.OurassessmenthasbeendocumentedinangQ~o//(]

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internalreportentitled"SystematicAssessmentsofEngineeringAssuranceIssues'andRHRSSFIConcerns"dated9/11/90.RG&Ebelievesthattheunderlyingconcernsnecessitatebothinterim.andlongtermactivitiestoresolve.Ourapproachinperformingthe-internalassessmentandasummaryofthehighpriorityactionsarepresentedinAttachmentB.ThisattachmentisasummaryoftheconsiderableeffortsofanRG&ESSFIAssessmentTeamcomposedofagroupofexperiencedRG&Estaffandmanagementpersonnel.Theprimarytaskof'theRG&ESSFIAssessmentTeamwastoprepareareporttoRG&E'smanagementwhichrecommendedthemosteffectiveinterimactionsneededtobegintheprocessofstrengtheningtheengineeringprocessesand.controls.TheRG&ESSFIAssessmentTeamwascomposedofnineseniorengineersandstaff.Theteammettore-examinetheinspectionreportandcategorizethedeficienciesbytopicalareas.TheteamalsoevaluatedareportpreparedbyanRG&Econsultantwhoindependentlyidentifiedtheprogrammaticconcerns.Theassessmentconsistedofindividualevaluationsbyteammembersaswellasworkingsessionsasagroup.TheRG&EAssessmentTeamgroupedtheNRCidentifieddeficienciesintothefollowingtopicalareas:~Improved~Improved~Improved~Improved~Improved~ImprovedMethodofIdentifyingand.AssessingSafetyConcernsDesignControlandReviewsDesignInterfaceControlDocumentationAssociatedwithDesignBasesDocumentationAssociatedwithModificationsEngineering/PlantCommunicationsTheteamthenestablishedinterimactionsandlongtermcorrectiveactionsforeachtopicalarea.Theteamprioritizedtheinterimactionsandestablishedaproposedschedule.Theinterimactionswererecommendedbaseduponachievingafundamentalimprovementontheengineeringprocess.Interimactionsarethoseactionswhichcanbeimplementedimmediatelyorwithinaperiod.ofuptoayear.Long-termcorrectiveactionswerealsorecommended,.Manyofthelongertermrecommendationsarealreadyembodiedintwomajorprograms:ConfigurationManagement(CM)andtheEngineeringProceduresUpgradeProgram.AreportontheConfigurationManagementprogramdescriptionsandschedulewaspresentedtomembersofRegionIandNRRonMarch6andMarch27,1990,respectively.(IndividualprojectswithintheCMprogrammaybeexaminedwithintheenclosuretoInspectionReport90-03,datedApril18,1990).TheEngineeringProceduresUpgradeprogramhasbeeninitiatedandwillincludeanexternalassessmentofourcurrentproceduresbyanindependentconsultant.Itisexpectedthatthisassessmentwillbecompletebyyear-end.TheresultsofRG&E'sinternalSSFIAssessmentwillbecomeaninputtotheEngineeringProceduresUpgradeandtheConfigurationManagementPrograms.AttachmentBisasummaryreportoftheAssessmentTeamactivitiesandrecommendations.

RG&Ebelievesthatmanyofthedeficienciesnotedundertheengineeringassuranceunresolveditem89-81-11hadbeenrecognizedpriortotheRHRSSFIandhavebeenenvelopedunderthevariousConfigurationManagementProjects,suchastheSetpointVerificationProgramandDesignBasisDocumentationProjects.Wehaverecognizedthatinterimactionsarenecessarytosufficientlystrengthentheengineeringprocesses,proceduresanddocumentationofinformationtobridgethegaptotheselongertermprograms.Wehavebeguntheprocesstoimplementtheseactionsandplantoexaminetheireffectiveness,during1991.WebelievethattheinterimactionsplannedarethemosteffectivemeasuresforRG&EtoprovideadequateresolutionoftheidentifieddeficiencieswhileweareimplementingthelongtermConfigurationManagementPrograms.TheNRCInspectionReportidentifiedtheEngineeringA'ssurancedeficienciesinsections2.2.1.1,2.2.1.2,2.2.3.2,and2.2.3.3.TheRG&Eassessmentconcentratedontherootcausesofthesedeficienciesandnotjusttheexamplesthemselves.Nevertheless,thespecificanalyses,reports,anddrawingsthatrequirerevisionsorcorrectionsasdescribedinthesesectionsarebeingrevisedorupdatedasnecessary,includingforexample,thecalculationsdiscussedinsection2.2.1.2andthedrawingsidentifiedinsection2.2.3.3(B).,OurspecificevaluationsrelativetotheexamplesfoundinthesefoursectionsarecontainedintheAssessmentTeamreport.WebelievethatthesystematicassessmentdiscussedinAttachmentBisathoroughandappropriateresponsetounresolveditem89-81-11.PleasenotifyusifyoubelievewehavenotinterpretedtheNRCreportcorrectly.Verytrulyyours,GAHK118Atta'chmentRobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(original)DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14Dl)ProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,D.C.20555GinnaSeniorResidentInspector

AttachmentAUPDATEOFUNRESOLVEDITEMSFROMRG&E'sENCLOSUREEOF,JUNE8,1990URI89-81-02(Section2.2.1.4)ResolutionofSafetyConcernsJune8,1990:Aninterimprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsisunderdevelopmentandwillbediscussedinour120dayresponse.Update:RG&EhasdevelopedaformalprocessinProcedureQE-1603,DocumentingandReportingofConditionsAdversetoQuality,forhandlingpotentialsafetyconcernsidentifiedbyNuclearEngineeringServicespersonnel.Theseamongtheconditions-whichwouldbereported,are:nonconformances,deviations,deficiencies,failures,malfunctions,defectivematerialandequipment,vendortechnicalreports,designbasisdocumentation,andthematerialconditionoftheplantstructures,systemsorcomponents.TheprocedurerequiresthatpotentialsafetyconcernsbedocumentedandtrackedbyNuclearEngineeringServicespersonnel.Theprocessprovidesfor:ensuringthatapreliminarysafetyevaluationisperformedbyNuclearSafetyandLicensing;transmittinginformationconcerningconditionsthatinvolveasafetyconcerntotheTechnicalManager,GinnaStation;dispositionofsafetyconcernsthroughtheappropriateprocesssuchasanonconformancereport(NCR),and.identifieddeficiencyreport(IDR);reviewingtheconditionandpreliminarysafetyevaluationbyGinnaStationTechnicalSectionagainstthecriteriaforreportingevents(A-25.1);dispositioningtheconditionthroughtheappropriateprocesssuchascorrectiveactionreports(CAR),procedurechangenotice(PCN)andworkrequest/troublerequest(WR/TR);providingtheinitiatorwiththefeedbackonthedisposition.PotentialconditionsadversetoqualitythatarediscoveredbyGinnaStationpersonnelaredispositionedbyoneofthecurrentprocessesundertheMaintenanceWorkRequestandTroubleReport(A-1603),CorrectiveActionReport(A-1601),andReportingofUnusualPlantConditions(A-25).InterimandlongtermcorrectiveactionsrecommendedaspartoftheRG&ESSFIAssessmentaredescribedinAttachmentBunderthegeneraltopicalareaImprovedProcessforReportingandAssessingSafetyConcerns.A-1

URI,89-81-05(Section2.2.2.2)ElectricalLoadGrowthProgramJune8,1990:WearetakingactionstointegratethisprocessintotheappropriateEngineering(QE)procedures.,Weanticipatecompletionoftheseactionsbythedateofour120dayresponse.Update:RG&EissuedachangetoengineeringprocedureQE-301Rev.11withissuanceofPDR0609dated7/9/90.Thischangerequiresthatourdesignprocessensurethattheeffectsofallloadchangesonthestationbatteriesordiesel-generatorsshallbeaddressed,includingtherequirementthatthesebeevaluatedandshowntobewithinthemarginallowedbythecurrentloadinganalysis.DuringtheRG&ESSFIReviewTeamAssessmentitwasnotedthatotherexampleswereidentifiedwhichcouldbeplacedwithintheissueofestablishingamechanismtoevaluatethecumulativeeffectsofmodifications.InterimandlongtermcorrectiveactionsaredescribedwithinAttachmentBunderthegeneraltopicalareaImprovedDocumentationAssociatedwithModifications.URI89-81-07(Section2.2.4.4.a.,b.,andd.)ControlRoomP&ID'sJune8,1990:Aninterimprocessforenhancingtheupdateprocessforcontrolroominformation.iscurrentlyunderreviewandwillbediscussedinthe120dayresponse.Update:Thisconcernwasmanifestedintwoareas,drawingchangerequests(DCRs)andtrainingmaterial.DCRProcess:ThetimelinessofprocessingdrawingchangeshasbeenenhancedthroughimplementationofRevision3ofA-606,DrawingChangeRequestsprocedure.ThisupgradedirectsthetimelyupgradingofdrawingsusedintheControlRoomandTechnicalSupportCenter.Postingofdrawingchangesisrequiredwithin2workingdaysfromtheirreceiptbyCentralRecords.(Generalpracticehasbeensamedayposting).TheapprovalandtrackingoftheDCRprocessiscurrentlyassignedtotheTechnicalSectionatGinnaStation.Plansarebeingmadetotransferdataentry,controlofthedatabaseanddistributiontotheDocumentControldepartment.AnotherenhancementincludesamonthlyDCRstatusreportthatisdistributedtomanagement.TheDCRprocesshasbeengivenincreasedemphasisthroughproceduralcontr'ols.Withitspresentmethod,RG&EbelievesthattimelypostingandeffectivetrackingandtrendingoftheDCRsystemwillbeachieved..A-2

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TraininMaterial:RG&EiscommittedtoensuringthatalltrainingmaterialavailabletoLicensedoperatorsisascorrectandcurrentaspossible.DuringtheinspectionweagreedthattheLessonTextRG&E-25containedaninvalidvalueforthetimeavailabletoisolatea50gpmsealleaktopreventRHRpumpmotorflooding.Otherinformationrelativetoplantmodificationsonvalve:numbers(EWR4761)andpipingmodification(EWR4675)alsohadnotyetbeenincorporatedintotheLessonTextbecausetheTrainingChangeRequesthadnotyetbeenimplemented.AfterthediscrepancyontheisolationtimewasidentifiedtoRG&E,theLessonTextwasimmediatelycorrected.Forclarity,theLessonTextshavebeenrenamedTRAININGSYSTEMSDESCRIPTIONS.However,thesearenotdefinedasControlledConfigurationmaterial.Thesedocumentsarenotmeanttotaketheplaceofapprovedplantprocedures,engineeringdesigndocuments,plantdrawingsorvendortechnicalmanuals.Theyareusedasreferencematerial,arrangedbysystem,thatcontainaconceptualoverviewof.thatsystemdesignedtobeused.asajoband.trainingaid.WeunderstandtheNRC'sconcernoverthefactthatthismaterialisavailableforuseinthecontrolroom,maybefrequentlyused,andisnotdesignatedasbeingpotentiallyoutofdate.Webelievetheprimaryconcernisthetimelinessofupdatingthismaterialtoreflecttheplantconfiguration,notoverthecontroloverthesedocuments.Therefore,strictcontrolhasbeenplacedoverthesedocuments.Thereisamastercopycontrolledb'ytheTrainingDepartmentandallchangesarecontrolledbyprocedureTR5.9(TrainingChangeRequest/Notice).Recordsarekeptofcontrolledcopyholdersofcontrolledcopies.PlacementofthismaterialinthecontrolroomiscontrolledbytheTrainingDepartment.Thisisthenorm,nottheexception,intheutilityindustry.Weunderstandandrecognizetheunderlyingconcernidentifiedoverthetimelinessofprovidingcurrentandcontrolledmaterialtothosewhomayuseit.ProceduresTR5.5.1(TrackingPlantChanges)iscurrentlytheprocessthathasbeendevelopedandimplementedtoidentifyandtrackplantchangesandincludethosechangesintrainingmaterialwhereappropriate.Wehavetakenadditionalstepsinordertoprovidetrainingmaterialthatisascurrentaspossibleandtobetterdefinethepurposeofthismaterial.1.Placeacopyofthe"InformationLetter"inallTrainingSystemDescriptionsthatareaffectedbyaplantmodification.ThisactionhasbeenimplementedandwillbecontrolledbyConfigurationA-3

2.ManagementTrainingGuidelines,CMTG-3.0,PreparationandUseofInformationLetters.Theinformationletterprovidescurrentinformationonamodification.Theletterwillremainpartofthesystemdescriptionuntilthesystemdescriptionhasbeenrevised.toincorporatethenewmodification.IThefirstpageofeachTrainingSystemDescriptionwillbestampedTRAININGINFORMATIONONLY.Thisactionhasbeeninitiated..3.IncludethedateofrevisionforeachpageoftheTrainingSystemDescription.Thisactionhasbeenimplemented.TherewerenoadditionalinterimremedialactionsrecommendedaspartoftheRG&ESSFIReviewTeamAssessmentotherthanthoseabove.LongtermcorrectiveactionsaredescribedinAttachmentBundergeneraltopicalareaPlantDesignInformation/DesignBases.URI89-81-06(Section2.2.2.3)MoldedCaseCircuitBreakerJune8,1990:Theindustryiscurrentlyexaminingtheneedfor,andbenefitsof,moldedcasecircuitbreakerstesting.RG&EwillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeindustryandEPRItodeterminetheappropriatetestmethodsandrequirements.Update:DuringAugustRG&EpersonnelfromEngineeringandPlantMaintenancevisitedtheDiabloCanyonPowerPlanttoinspecttheequipmentandproceduresforperiodictestingofmoldedcasecircuitbreakersusedbyPG&E.ResultsofthefirstcycleoftestingbytheDiabloCanyonstaffwerealsodiscussed.AsimilarprogramforGinnaStationappearstobetechnicallyfeasible,subjecttoadditionalevaluationandprocurementoftestequipment,developmentofprocedures,andperformanceofatrialtestprogram.Itisanticipatedthatatrialprogramcanbeinitiatedwithinthenextyear.Itisestimatedthatthefirstcycleofatestprogramwouldrequirefourormoreyearstocompletefollowingthesuccessfulcompletionofatrialtest.A-4

AttachmentBSYSTEMATICASSESSMENTOFENGINEERINGASSURANCEISSUESANDRHRSSFICONCERNSThisattachmentisasummaryoftheSSFIAssessmentTeamapproachandrecommendedactionsextracted.fromtheRG&Ereportwiththesamename.

SystematicAssessmentofEngineeringAssuranceIssuesandRHRSSFIConcernsTABLEOFCONTENTS1.0INTRODUCTION1.1~purose1.3ScoeofReviewandRecommendations1.4ReviewTeam2.0SYSTEMATICASSESSMENT'I3.0ISSUESANDCONCERNSADDRESSED4.0SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDATIONSAPPENDICES:AppendixA,ProgrammaticConcernsListingPagei

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SystematicAssessmentofEngineeringAssuranceIssuesandRHRSSFIConcerns1.0INTRODUCTION1e2~PuroseThisdocumentprovidestheresultsofasystematicassessmentofissuesandconcernsraisedbytheNRC',sSafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI)conductedduringNovemberandDecember,1989,whichfocusedontheGinnaStationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)System.Thissummaryreportalsopresentsinterimremedialactionsandlong-termcorrectiveactions.Otherstepstowardimprovements,alreadyinprogress,arealsolisted..BackroundAsafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI)wasperformedbyanNRCteamfromNovember6toDecember8,1989,atRG&Efacilities(GinnaStationandthecorporateoffices),andisdocumentedinaletterfromtheNRCdatedMay9,1990.TheobjectiveoftheSSFIwastoassessthecapabilityoftheGinnaResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)systemtoperformitsdesignbasissafetyfunctions.TheNRCinspectionteamevaluatedtheadequacyofoperationalprocedures,testpractices,,andmaintenancepoliciesastheycontributetoRHRsystemreliability.TheNRCteamalsoaddressedthequalityofengineeringsupportactivities.TheNRCteamdidnotidentifyanyconditionsthatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperformingitsintendedfunctionsundernormalanddesignbasisaccidentconditions.However,itwasstatedbytheNRCthatcompleteverificationofsystemreliabilitywasnotpossiblesincethedesignbasiscalculationsfortheRHRsystemwerenotreadilyavailable.TheNRCSSFIteamdidhaveoneimmediateconcernand,asaresult,RG&EwasrequestedtopromptlyresolveadiscrepancyregardingthepotentialfloodingoftheRHRpumproom.OuractionstakentoresolvethisweredocumentedinEnclosureEtoourJune8,1990response(URI89-81-10).InadditionitappearedtotheNRCinspectionteamthattwoactivitieswerenotconductedinfullcompliancewithNRCrequirements,asdescribedintheNoticeofViolation(NOV)enclosedasAppendixAtotheNRCSSFIInspectionReport.B-1

TheRG&EresponsetotheNOVincludedascheduleforresolvingtheunresolveditems(exclusiveof89-81-11discussedabove)identifiedintheNRCSSFIreport.TheRHRSSFIInspectionReportalsocited,anumberofconcernswhichcouldbeassociatedwithbroaderprogrammaticissues.TheNRCinspectionteamconcludedthatweaknessesexistinengineeringsupportandplantmodificationactivities.TheseweaknesseswerelistedinSection2.1,andwerediscussedinSection2.2,oftheNRCSSFIInspectionReport,andhavebeenassignedunresolveditemnumber89-81-11.TheSSFIInspectionReportrequired'G&Eto"providetheirevaluationofthoseweaknesseswithin120days".Theidentifiedweaknesseswereplacedunderthebroadcategoryof"engineeringassurance"bytheNRC.RG&Ecommitted'ntheJune8,199030-dayresponsetoconductareviewofitsengineeringprocessusingasystematicapproach.RG&Eelectedtoperformitsevaluationofthe"engineeringassurance"issuesbyutilizingareviewteamapproach.Theresultsofthereviewteamapproachwasintendedtoprovidethebasistoward.resolutionofNRCSSFIInspectionunresolveditem89-81-11.1.3Scoe.oftheReviewand'RecommendationsThescopeoftheSSFIreviewwasestablishedbyRG&EManagementpriortotheinitiationofthereviewteameffort.RG&EManagementprovidedgeneralguidanceforconductofthereview'teameffortaswellasspecificguidanceonthescopeofpotentialrecommendations.Toensurethatathoroughevaluationwasconducted,thereviewteamexaminedthematerialfoundinthefollowingdocuments:a~NRCSSFIReportno.50-244/89-81,dated,May9,1990b.RG&E's30-dayresponselettertotheNRCdatedJune8,1990c~CommitmentandActionTrackingSystem(CATS)commitmentsestablishedbytheNRCinspectionreportandRG&E'sJune8,1990letter.d.e.INPOGoodPractices,"GuidancefortheConductofDesignEngineering"(INPO88-016)December,1988GroveEngineeringReviewReportdatedJuly10,1990ApplicablesectionsoftheRG&EConfigurationManagement(CM)Plan.B-2

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g,NRCSafetySystemFunctionalInspectionGuidelines,AppendixC(issued11/12/86).h.EPRI,NuclearSafetyAnalysisCenterDocument,NSAC/121,"GuidelinesforPerformingSafetySystemFunctionalInspections(November1988).NQA-1"QualityAssuranceProgramRequirementsforNuclearPowerPlants"(1979)j.ANSIN45.2.11,"QualityAssuranceRequirementsfortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlants"(1974)k.NRC'egulatoryGuide1.64,"QualityAssuranceRequirementsfortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlants"l.QE-seriesEngineeringProceduresm.A-seriesGinnaStationAdministrativeProceduresWiththisreferencematerialasbackgroundinformationthereviewteammembersproceededtoevaluatetheNRCconcernsandmakerecommendationsforcorrectiveactiontoRG&EManagementthroughtheDepartmentManager,NuclearEngineeringServices.Thefollowingis'summaryoftheguidanceprovidedbyRG&EManagement:a.Issuesaddressedweretofocuson,butnot,limitedto,thosecontainedintheNRCSSFIReport(IR89-81).b.c~ConcernscitedbytheNRCweretobeacceptedasvalid.NoeffortwastobeexpendedonquestioningeitherthecitedconcernsortheexamplesusedintheNRCSSFIReport.Recommendationsweretotaketheformofinterimactionsandlong-termcorrectiveactions.d.Recommendationsforinterimactionsweretobelimitedtothefollowingitems:i.Changesto~existinEngineeringandGinnaStationProcedures.ii.CreationofalimitednumberofnewEngineeringQEorAdministrativeProceduresand/orGinnaAdministrativeProcedures.iii.Issuanceofpolicystatements(atdiscipline,departmentorcorporatelevel.)B-3

e.iv.Developmentofdiscipline-specificimplementingdocuments(suchasdesignguides,standards,etc.).v.Reassignmentofdutiestopersonnelwithinspecificdisciplines.Recommendationswere'obeachievableutilizingstafflevelsthatarecurrentlyauthorized.1.4ReviewTeamRG&EManagementselectedareviewteamtoactontheirbehalfconsistingofagroupofnineexperiencedpersonnelrepresentingthefollowingareas:MechanicalEngineering,ElectricalEngineering,StructuralandConstructionEngineering,NuclearSafetyandLicensing,ConfigurationManagement,DocumentControl/RecordsMan'agement,GinnaTechnicalSection,andNuclearEngineeringServicesDepartmentstaff.2.0SYSTEMATICASSESSMENTThemulti-disciplineRG&ESSPIReviewTeamperformedanassessmentoftheissuesandconcernsgeneratedbytheNRCRHRSSFI.Theteambeganbyestablishingthefollowingdefinitionof"EngineeringAssurance":EnineerinAssurance:Theplannedandsystematicactionsnecessarytoprovideadequateconfidencethatengineeringactivitiesareperformedinaconsistentmannerwithadherencetoplantlicensingbasis,applicableprocedures,regulationsandacceptedindustrystandards.Thereviewteammembersformed."focusgroups"whichwereassignedindividualdetailitemsfromtheprogrammaticconcernslistingestablishedintheinitialbreakdownofissues(appendixA).IndividualassessmentsweremadeandtheissuesgroupedanddocumentedaspartofRG&Es"SystematicAssessmentofEngineeringAssuranceandRHRSSPIConcernReport."Thereviewwasbasedonthereviewteam'sownassessmentaswellasondetailedinformationobtainedthroughdiscussionswithothercognizantengineeringand,plantpersonnel.3.0ISSUESANDCONCERNSADDRESSEDThereviewteamregroupedallissuesandprogrammaticconcernsintosixtopicalareas,aslistedbelow:s-4

3.1ToicalArea1:"ImprovedProcessforReportingandAssessingSafetyConcerns"a:"ProcessforHandlingSafetyConcernsOutsidetheEWRProcess"3.2ToicalArea2:."ImprovedDesignControlandReviews"a~b.cd.e.f."EngineeringManagement""EngineeringAssurance""TimelinessofDCRProcessing""DesignReviews""PAIDUpgradeProgram""DesignControl"3.3ToicalArea3:"ImprovedDesignInterfaceControl"a."ProceduralInconsistency"3.4ToicalArea4:"ImprovedDesignDocumentation/DesignBases"a~b.cd.e.f.g,"InterdisciplinaryReviewofNon-Mods""Calculations""DeletionofInformationfromPGIDs""ValveIdentificationDifferences""DesignBasisInformation"ControlledInstrumentListTrainingMaterial3.5ToicalArea5:Modifications"1"ImprovedDocumentationAssociatedwitha."InvalidInformationinUFSAR"b."AssessmentofCumulativeEffectsofModifications"c."IssuanceofDesignOutputs"d."ControlofEWRs"3.6ToicalArea6:"ImprovedEngineering/PlantCommunications"a."Engineering/PlantInterface"b."AcceptanceCriteria"c."AdequacyofSRVTestAcceptanceCriteria"4.0SummarofRecommendationsThefollowingisageneralsummaryofthemostsignificantinterimactionsandlongtermcorrectiveactions.4.1RG&E'smanagementhasensuredclosecontrolandqualityengineeringservicesthroughtheirinteractionandreviewofdesign,butwrittenproceduresdonotmakethatcontrolsufficiently-explicit.B-5

Asinterimactions,asingleprocedurewillbedevelopedthatoutlinestheentirescopeofthedesignprocess.Disciplinedesignguidesforgenerationofdesigncriteria,designanalysesanddesignverificationdocumentswillbeinitiated.Also,theintegrated.assessmentprocesswillbeseparately"proceduralized.Applicableprocedureswillberevisedtoestablishtherequirementsforreview,'a'pproval,andissuanceofvendordocuments.In,thelongerterm,weplantocompletetheupgradeofengineeringproceduresandprocessestoreflectindustrystandardsofgoodpractice,efficiencyandrapidresponse.4.24.34.4Engineeringprocedurescontainastrongbiastomodificationdesign.Thishasprovedtobewellsuitedtowardmajorstandalonedesignprojectsbutisnotaseffectivelyusedtoaggressivelysupportalloftheengineeringactivitiesassociatedwithawell-maintained.operatingplant.Close-outEWRdocumentationcanbeprotracted,becausethescopeofamodificationmaybein'creasedovertime,causingdesigndocumentstoremainopen.Asinterimactions,weplantolimitthepracticeofincreasingthescopeofadesignmodificationduringtheintervalbetweenturnoverofthemodificationintheplantandrecordsclose-out.WewillbegintotransmitEWRDesignPackagestoDocumentControlconcurrentwiththeissuanceoftheconstructionpackage.Inthisway,thelistofapplicabledesigndocumentswillalsobeestablishedforthemodificationtobeinstalled..TheUFSARchangeprocesswillbeproceduralizedandintegratedwiththeaboveturnoverprocess.Interimactivitiesareneededtobegintocapture,retain,provideaccessto,andorganizedesignbasisinformationaspartofthenormalongoingengineeringactivities.RG&EhasincorporatedadesignbasisdocumentationprojectundertheConfigurationManagementProgram.Thisprogramwillbeimplementedoverthenextseveralyearsfocusingonthesafetysystems.Effortswillbemadetoidentifythetypesofmateri'alanddocumentsthatcontaindesignbasisinformationandtobegintoindexandorganizeitinDocumentControl.Inthelongerterm,theDesignBasisDocumentationprojectwilldevelopDesignBasisDocumentsforthemajorplantsystemsandequipment.BecauseofthemajormodificationbiasusedinthedevelopmentofQEproceduresandthemajorupgradeprogramsthathavetakenplaceovertheyears,theengineeringdepartmentisnotformattedonasystembasis.B-6

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TheConfigurationManagementProgramisbeingdevelopedonasystemsbasis.TheQ-Listhasdefinedsystemboundariesthatwillbeusefulasweindexdesign.documentsinDocumentControlanddevelopDesignBasisDocuments.4.5Manyoftheunderlying'concernsandlongtermcorrectiveactionsarecurrentlypartoftheexistingorplannedprogramswithinConfiguration'anagementandEngineeringProceduresUpgradePrograms.TheDesignBasisDocumentation,SetpointVerification,Q-List,DocumentControlEnhancement,and.EngineeringControlledConfigurationDrawingUpgradeProgramsareindividualpartsofthisprogram.ThespecificactionsrecommendedbytheSSFIAssessmentteamwillbereviewedbytheRG&EpersonnelresponsiblefortheCMprojectstogetherwithmanagementtomakeanyneededrevisionstothescopeoftheseprojects.4.6EngineeringactivitiesareperformedbyNuclear,EngineeringServices(NES)andstationtechnicalstaff.Thedesignprocessmustensureconsistencybetweentheseactivities.Asinterimactions,weplantoincreasethecontrolsoversetpointchangesandreportingofsafetyconcerns.Aprocesswillbedevelopedtoensurethatproposedsetpointchangesaregiventheappropriatereviewpriortotheirissuance.ThePCAQprocess(PotentialConditionAdversetoQuality)hasbeenimplementedinQE-1603forNuclearEngineeringServicespersonneltoprovideidentificationanddispositionofpotentialsafetyconcernsandprovideavehicletoimprovetheinterfacewithtechnicalpersonnelattheplant.Wealsoplantodevelopastreamlinedapprovalprocessfortechnicalsupportprojectsnotinvolvingmodifications.InthelongtermwewillexamineestablishingasingleprocessforallNuclearDivisionpersonneltoreportspecificconcernswhichmayhavesafetysignificance.ProcesseswillbedevelopedtoensurecommonalityofproceduresbetweenNESandtheTechnicalSectionatGinna.B-7

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SYSTEMATICASSESSMENTOFENGINEERINGASSURANCEISSUESANDRHRSSFICONCERNSAPPENDIXA

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ProrammaticConcernsAreasInvolvinSiificantIdentifiedWeaknessesResonseScoeListinENGINEERINGMANAGEMENTWeaknessinmanagerialandadministrativecontrolsManagementreliesonengineer'sexperienceinsteadofformalcontrolsEngineeringmanagementhasnotprovidedclearguidanceandproceduralcontrolsoverdesignchangeprocessLackofEngineeringAssurancePracticesOrganizationalInterfacesw~Controlofdocumentation,engineeringdesigninterfaces,andengineeringcommunicationswithexternalorganizationsispoor.Lackofcriteriafor.determiningwhenengineeringconcurrenceisneededDCR'snotprocessedinatimelymannerDesignoutputnotproperlydistributedUFSARcontainsinvalidinformationNoprocessforhandlingsafetyconcernsidentifiedoutsidetheengineeringprocessP&IDchangedidnotresultinanUFSARchangeasappropriateEngineeringDisciplineInterfacesEachdisciplinehasitsowninterpretationofengineeringprocedurerequirements.EngineeringManagementhasadifferentperceptionthantheengineeringstaffP&IDchangesoccurredwithoutaninterdisciplinaryreviewCONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENTPlantBaselineConfigurationLackofcompleteandconsistentnomenclaturebetweenP&IDsandprocedures,UFSARandQAManualDeletionofinformationfromP&IDsDesignBasesr~DesignBasisCalculationnotavailableordonotexist~Lackofdocumenteddesignbasisisagenericweakness~UFSARcontainsinvalidinformationwithoutasupportingdesignbasis~Nocalculationlistorformalizedoveralllisting

~Operatingprocedures,emergencyprocedures,andoperatortraining.,materialdonotreflectthelimitingdesignbasisofthesystemDesignModificationsRG&Edoesnothaveamechanismforaccountingforsynergisticeffectsofmodifications(electricalcalcs,pipestresscalcs)NumerousweaknessesexistinengineeringsupportandplantmodificationactivitiesDocumentControl,~UFSARcontainsinvalidinformationLackofcomprehensivecontrolledinstrumentlistWeaknessinmanagementcontrolsystemtoassurecompleteandconsistentdesignoutputisissuedanddistributedPSIDsissuedhaveremovedandrevisedinformation.TeamconcernedhowRG6EmaintainstraceabilityofthisinformationInformationalinconsistenciesexistbetweendocumentsDCRprocessingisnottimelyEWRsremaininpersonalcontrolofresponsibleengineerEWRslackindexCompletedEWRsarenotprocessedintothedocumentcontrolsysteminatimelymannerUncontrolledtrainingmaterialENGINEERINGPROCEDURESDesignReviewsReviewprocesslacksdepthReviewandverificationdoesnotstrictlyfollowANSIN45.F11InadequateReviewIndependentVerificationnotdoneinaccordancewithengineeringproceduresCalculations-GenericweaknessinreviewandapprovalofcalculationsCalculationalcontrolprogram(ANSIN45.2.11)isweakNolistofcalculations,nowaytotrackpastcalculationsSetpoints~Instrumentloopsetpointsmaynotaccountforloopinaccuracies

~AcceptancecriterianotestablishedintestprocedureforsetpointofundervoltagealarmrelaysOtherLackofformalcontrolofengineeringanddesigndocumentsRG&EdesigncontrolmeasuresdonotcomparefavorablywithacceptedindustrypracticesUFSARcontainsinvalidinformationLackofinterfacecontrolwithinternalandexternalorganizationsSRVtestingprocedurescontaingeneralandminimalinformationSAFETYCONCERNSInabilitytoproperlyidentifysafetyconcerns(batteryloadprofiledeficienciesnotdiscovered)Inabilitytoassesssafetyconcerns(poorrootcauseanalysis)Nomechanismtodispositionsafetyconcernsidentifiedoutsideofthenormalengineeringprocess(PIC-629EWRdidnotreflectanyactiontakenonidentifiedconcernTESTINGDCundervoltagetestinadequateSRVtestinginadequateMCCBsnottestedperiodicallySPECIFICDESIGNCONCERNSSWSingleFailureInadequateRHRNPSHJumpercableexceededminimumallowedbendradiusBatteryrackdonothaveagroundingcableRHRpumpsealfailure(Eg)RHRpumpsealfailurecausinglossofbothRHRpumps(singlefailure)