Revision as of 03:21, 2 May 2018

Text

Rev 1 to Spent Fuel Storage Facility Mod Sar.
	ML17221A605
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	01/29/1988
From:	; FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17221A604	List: ML17221A603; ML17221A605;
References
	NUDOCS 8802030025
	Download: ML17221A605 (294)
	v • d • e

ssososoossssoss9DRADQCK05000335PPDRQFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYSTLUCIEPLANT-UNITNO.1SPENTFUELSTORAGE,FACILITYMODIFICATIONSAFETY.ANALYSISREPORTDOCKETNO.50-335

>I',l'4H TABLEOFCONTENTSSECTIONPAGE

1.0INTRODUCTION

1.1LicenseAmendmentRequested1.2CurrentStatus1.3"InterfaceswithOtherOrganizations1.4SummaryofReport1.5Conclusions1.6References2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1ExistingRacks2.2NewHighDensityRacks3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULICCONSIDERATIONS3.1NeutronMultiplicationFactor1-21-22-12-12-13-13-13.1.13.1.23.1.33.1.43.1.5NormalStoragePostulatedAccidentsCalculationMethodsRackModificationAcceptanceCriteriaforCriticality3-13-23"23-93-103.2DecayHeatCalculationsfortheSpentFuelPool(Bulk)3.2.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesign3.2.2DecayHeatAnalyses3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeup3.3Thermal-HydraulicAnalysesfortheSpentFuelPool(Localized)3.3.1Basis3.3.2ModelDescription3.3.3CladdingTemperature3-103-103-113"143-153-153-153-16 TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)SECTIONPAGE3.4PotentialFuelandRackHandlingAccidents3.4.1RackModuleMishandling342TemporaryConstructionCraneDrop3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDrop)3.5TechnicalSpecificationChanges3.6References3-163-173-173-173-173-184.0MECHANICAL,MATERIAL,ANDSTRUCTURALCONSIDERATIONS4.1DescriptionofStructure4.1.1DescriptionofFuelHandlingBuilding4.1.2DescriptionofSpentFuelRacks4.2ApplicableCodes,Standards,andSpecifications4.2.1NRCDocuments4.2.2IndustryCodesandStandards4.3SeismicandImpactLoads4.4LoadsandLoadCombinations4-14-14-14-54-74-84-94.4.1SpentFuelPool4.4.2SpentFuelRacks4.5DesignandAnalysisProcedures4-94-114-124.5.14.5.2DesignandAnalysisProceduresforSpentFuelPoolDesignandAnalysisProceduresforSpentFuelStorageRacks4-124-134.6StructuralAcceptanceCriteria4-204.6.14.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.54.6.64.6.74.6.8StructuralAcceptanceCriteriaforSpentFuelPoolStructureStructuralAcceptanceCriteriaforSpentFuelStorageRacksFuelHandlingCraneUpliftAnalysisImpactAnalysisWeldStressesSummaryofMechanical'nalysisDefinitionofTermsUsedInSection4LateralRackMovement4-204-234-274-274-274-284-294-30 4

TABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd)PAGE4.7Materials,QualityControl,andSpecialCon-structionTechniques4.7.1ConstructionMaterials4.7.2NeutronAbsorbingMaterial4.7.3QualityAssurance4.7.4ConstructionTechniques4.8TestingandIn-ServiceSurveillance4.8.1ProgramIntent4.8.2DescriptionofSpecimens4.8.3SpecimenEvaluation4.9References4-304-304-304-304-304-324-324-324-324-335.0COST/BENEFITANDENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT5.1Cost/BenefitandThermalAssessment5-15-15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.5NeedforIncreasedStorageCapacityEstimatedCostsConsiderationofAlternativesResourcesCommittedThermalImpactontheEnvironment5-15-15-25-25-25.2RadiologicalEvaluation5-35.2.15.2.25.2.35.2.45.2.5SolidRadwasteGaseousReleasesPersonnelExposureRadiationProtectionDuringRe"RackActivitiesRackDisposal5-35-35-35-45-55.3AccidentEvaluation5-65.3.15.3.25.3.35.3.45.3.5SpentFuelHandlingAccidentsFuelDecayLoadsOverSpentFuelTemperatureandWaterDensityEffectsConclusions5-65-85-95-95-95.4References5-10 Vted TABLE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLESTITLEDesignDataTableofModuleDataModuleDimensionsandWeightSummaryofCriticalSafetyAnalysesMinimumBurnupValuesReactivityEffectsofAbnormalandAccidentConditionsPAGE2-32-53-203-213-22FuelBurnupValuesforRequiredReactivities(k~)3-23withFuelofVariousInitialEnrichmentsComparisonofCold,CleanReactivitiesCalculatedat36.5Mwd/kgUBurnupand4.5XEnrichment3-2403-63-83-93-103-113-123-133-14EstimatedUncertaintiesinReactivityDueToFuelDepletionEffectsLongTermChangesinReactivityinStorageRackDesignBasis(Limiting)FuelAssemblySpecifications(CE14x14)Thermal/HydraulicCasesTreatedPeakingFactorDataEssentialHeatTransferDatafortheFuelPoolHeatExchangerPowerGenerationRatioPreviouslyDischargedBatchesBulkPoolTemperaturevs.TimeDuringNormalDischargePoolBulkTemperaturevs.TimeSubsequenttoCompletionofDischarge3-253-263-273-283-293-303-313-323-33 TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TABLETITLEPAGE3-153-163-173-183-194-14-24-34-4LossofCoolingafterCompletionofNormalRefuelingDischargeBulkPoolTemperaturevs.TimeDuringFullCoreDischargePoolBulkTemperaturevs.TimeSubsequenttoCompletionofFullCoreDischargeLossofCoolingAfterCompletionofFullCoreDischargeLocalandCladdingTemperatureDataBoraflexExperienceforHighDensityRacksMaximumStressSummaryStress/StrainSummaryforLinersandAnchorsSoilBearingStressesStabilitySafetyFactorsDegreesofFreedomNumberingSystemforGapElementsandFrictionElements3-343-353-363-373-384-354-364-374-384-394-404-84-94-10RackMaterialDataAdjustableHeightSupportMaterialDataBoundingValuesforStressFactors4-414-424-435-1NuclearFuelDischargeInformationStLucieUnit15-115-25-35-4AnnualFuelSavingsAttributedtoStLucieUnitNo.1GaseousReleasesFromFuelHandlingBuildingGammaIsotopicAnalysisSpentFuelPoolWater5-125-135-14 5-55-65-75-8TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd)TITLEAnticipatedDosesDuringRerackingEffectofTemperatureandVoidonCalculatedReactivityofStorageRackSpentFuelPoolPurificationSystemRadionuclideAnalysisReportResinActivitySpentFuelPoolAirborneActivityRadionuclideAnalysisReportPAGE5-155-165-175-18 FIGURE2-12-22-33-13-23-3TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEPoolLayoutTypicalRackElevation-Region1TypicalRackElevation-Region2AcceptableBurnupDomaininRegion2oftheStLuciePlantSpentFuelStorageRacksRegion1StorageCellGeometryRegion2StorageCellGeometryComparisonofDepletionCalculationsforFuelof4.5XInitialEnrichment3-53-64-24-44-54-64-74-84-12BulkPoolTemperatureModelforCodeBULKTEMIdealizationofRackAssemblyThermalChimneyFlowModelChannelElement-Regions1and2CompositeBoxAssembly-Region1GapElement-Region1TypicalCellElevation-Region1TypicalCellElevation-Region2AdjustableSupport3x3TypicalArray-Region13x3TypicalArray-Region2FuelHandlingBuildingSpectraEnvelopeCurvesMatPlanandSectionModelOverallViewNorthSouthSSEvii TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFFIGURESTITLEEastWestSSEVerticalSSESchematicModelforDYNARACKRacktoRackImpactSpringsImpactSpringsArrangementatNodei,SpringMassSimulationforTwo-DimensionalMotionTestCoupon LISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGESPAGETitlePageiiiiiiivvviviiviii1-11-22-12-22-32H2-5Figure2-1Figure2-2Figure2-33-13-23-33H3-53W3-73W333-103-113-123-133-143-153-163-173-183-193-203-213-223-233-243-253-263-273-283-29REVISION00000000000000000000000000000PAGE3-303-313-323-333-343-353-363-373-38Figure3-1Figure3-2Figure3-3Figure3HFigure3-5Figure3W4-14-24-34-44-54W4-74W4H4-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-194-204-214-224-234-244-254-264-274-284-294-304-314-324-33REVISION LISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGESPAGE4-344-354-364-374-384-394%04-414%24%34444454-46Figure4-1Figure4-2Figure4-3Figure4-4Figure4-5REVISION0FigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigureFigure5-15-25-35H5-55<5-75%5%5-105-115-125-135-145-155-165-175-185-194W4-74W494-104-114-124-134-144-154-164-174-184-190000100000000'000000 A'Ll4fAVg(.qf'4 l.0INTRODUCTION1.1LICENSEAMENDMENTREQUESTEDFloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)hascontractedforthedesignandmanufactureofnewspentfuelstoragerackstobeplacedintothespentfuelpoolofStLucieUnitNo.1.Thepurposeofthenewracksistoincreasetheamountofspentfuelthatcanbestoredintheexistingspentfuelpool.Theracksaredesignedsothattheycanstorespentfuelassembliesinahighdensityarray.Therefore,FPLherebyrequeststhataLicenseAmendmentbeissuedtotheStLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperatingLicenseDPR-67(1)toincludeinstallationanduseofnewstorageracksthatmeetthecriteriacontainedherein.ThisSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)hasbeenpreparedtosupportthisrequestforlicenseamendment.1.2CURRENTSTATUSTheexistingracksinthespentfuelpoolatStLucieUnitNo.1have728totalstoragecells.Withthepresentlyavailablestoragecells,StLucieUnitNo.1lostthefull-corereservestoragecapabilityaftertheseventhrefueling,whichwascompletedinthespringof1987.TocorrectthissituationandprovidesufficientcapacityatStLucieUnitNo.1tostoredischargedfuelassemblies,FPLplanstoreplacetheexistingstoragerackswithnewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.Thedesignofthenewrackswillallowformoredensestorageofspentfuel,thusenablingtheexistingpooltostoremorefuelinthespentfuelpool.Thenewhighdensityrackshaveausablestoragecapacityof1706cells,extendingthefull-core-reservestoragecapabilityuntiltheyear2009.Ifafullcoreoffloadisrequiredintheinterim,priortotheinstallationofthenewracks,FPLintendstotransferenoughoftheoldestspentfuelfromSt.LucieUnit1toSt.LucieUnit2toallowfullcoreoffload.AproposedlicenseamendmenttoallowspentfueltransferwassubmittedinJuly1986(2)andisbeingreviewedbytheNRC.1.3INTERFACESWITHOTHERORGANIZATIONSFPLhasoverallresponsibilityforthismodification.Holtec,Internationalhasdesignedthenewspentfuelstorageracks.JosephOat(JO)isresponsibleforthefabricationofthenewspentfuelstorageracksandtheevaluationofthoseracksunderaccidentconditions.EbascoServices,Inc.isresponsibleforthebuildingstructuralanalysis,theevaluationofthespentfuelcoolingsystemandtherelatedaccidentevaluations.Theinstaller,whowillbechosenlater,isresponsiblefortheinstallationofthenewspentfuelpoolracks.1.4SUMMARYOFREPORTThisSafetyAnalysisReportfollowstheguidanceoftheNRCpositionpaperentitled,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978,asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979().Sections3.0through5.0ofthisreportareconsistentwiththesection/subsectionformatandcontentoftheNRCpositionpaper,SectionsIIIthroughV.0076L/0011L 0~P~"~

Thenuclearandthermal-hydraulicaspectsofthereport(Section3.0)addresstheneutronmultiplicationfactor,consideringnormalstorageandhandlingofspentfuelaswellaspostulatedaccidentswithrespecttocriticalityandtheabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemtomaintainsufficientcooling.Movementofspentfuelstoredinthespentfuelpoolduringremovalofthepresentracksandinstallationofthenewracksisalsoaddressed.Section4.0,whichdescribesthemechanical,materialandstructuralaspectsofthenewracks,containsinformationconcerningthecapabilityofthefuelassemblies,storageracks,andspentfuelpoolsystemtowithstandtheeffectsofnaturalphenomenaandotherserviceloadingconditions.Theenvironmentalaspectsofthereport(Section5.0)concernthethermalandradiologicalreleasefromthefacilityundernormalandaccidentconditions.Thissectionalsoaddressestheoccupationalradiationexposures,generationofradioactivewaste,needforexpansion,commitmentofmaterialandnonmaterialresources,andacost-benefitassessment.

1.5CONCLUSION

SOnthebasisoftheevaluationsandinformationpresentedinthisreport,plusoperatingexperiencewithhighdensityfuelstorageatStLucieUnit2andTurkeyPointUnit3,FPLconcludesthattheproposedmodificationofStLucieUnitNo.1spentfuelstoragefacilitiesprovidessafespentfuelstorage,andthatthemodificationiscong~tentwiththefacilitydesignandoperatingcriteriaasprovidedintheFSARandoperatinglicense.

1.6REFERENCES

StLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperatingLicensesDPR67,DocketNo.50-335.2~FPLletterL-86-250datedJuly2,1986.3~NuclearRegulatoryCommission,LettertoAllPowerReactorLicensees,fromB.K.Grimes,April14,1978,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.StLuciePlantUnitNo.1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.1-20076L/0011L 4Jg~l!,I 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1EXISTINGRACKSThespentfuelpoolatSt.LucieUnit1presentlycontainsspentfuelassemblystoragerackswhicharedesignedtoprovidestoragelocationsforupto728fuelassemblies.Theracksaredesignedtomaintainthestoredfuelinasafe,eoolable,andsubcriticalconfigurationduringnormalandabnormalconditions.Thepresentstorageracksarearectangulararraycomposedof14modules.Eachstoragerackmoduleisselfsupportingandrestsonstainlesssteelpads.Thepresentracksarefreestandinginthattheyareneitherboltednorweldedtothefloor,noraretheyattachedtothepoolwalls.Theinterfacewiththepoolboundariesisdesignedtotransfernormalandshearloadsviatheracksupportsintothepoolbottomslab.Eachfuelassemblystoragemoduleiscomposedofrectangularstoragecavitiesfabricatedfromone-quarterinchthickstainlesssteelplate,witheachcavitycapableofacceptingonefuelassembly.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitieshavelead-insurfacesatthetoptoprovideguidanceforinsertionoffuelassemblies.Thecavitiesareopenatthetopandbottomtoprovideaflowpathforconvectivecoolingofspentfuelassembliesthroughnaturalcirculation.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitiesareconnectedbyachevrongridstructuretoformmoduleswhichlimitstructuraldeformationsandmaintainanominalcenter-to-centerspacingof12.53inchesbetweenadjacentstoragecavitiesduringdesignconditionsincludingseismic.ForfurtherinformationontheexistingspentfuelstorageracksseeSection9.1.2intheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.2.2NEWHIGHDENSITYRACKSThenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracksconsistofindividualcellswith8.65inchby8.65inch(nominal)squarecross-section,eachofwhichaccommodatesasingleCombustionEngineeringorExxonPWRfuelassemblyorequivalent,fromeitherSt.LucieUnit1orUnit2.Atotalof1706cellsarearrangedin17distinctmodulesofvaryingsizesintworegions.Region1isdesignedforstorageofnewfuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235.Region1isalsodesignedtostorefuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235thathavenotachievedadequateburnupforRegion2.TheRegion2cellsarecapableofaccommodatingfuelassemblieswithvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithinanacceptableboundasdiscussedinthisreport.Forexample,correspondingto4.5and4.0percentinitialenrichments,theminimumrequiredburn-upsforsafestorageinRegion2are36.5and30.9MWD/KgU,respectively.Figure2-1showsthearrangementoftherackmodulesinthespentfuelpool.Thehighdensityracksareengineeredtoachievethedualobjectiveofmaximumprotectionagainststructuralloadings(arisingfromgroundmotion,thermalstresses,etc.)'andthemaximizationofavailablestoragelocations.Ingeneral,agreaterwidth-to-heightaspectratioprovidesgreatermarginagainstrigidbodytipping.Hence,themodulesaremadeaslargeaspossiblewithintheconstraintsoftransportationandsitehandlingcapabilities.2-10076L/0011L tty,gW"f AsshowninFigure2-1,there-are17discretemodulesarrangedinthefuelpool.Eachrackmoduleisequipped(seeFigures2-2and2-3)withgirdlebars,3/4-inchthickby3-1/2incheshigh.Thenominalgapbetweenadjacentmodulewallsis1-1/2inches.Themodulesmakesurfacecontactbetweentheircontiguouswallsatthegirdlebarlocationsandthusmaintainaspecifiedgapbetweenthecellwalls.Table2-1givestherelevantdesigndataoneachregion.Themodulesinthetworegionsareofeightdifferenttypes.Tables2-2and2-3summarizethephysicaldataforeachmoduletype.ThepoisoninRegions1and2isBoraflex.Theuseofthisabsorbermaterialistoprecludeinadvertentcriticality.0076L/0011L2-2Revision1 TABLE2-1DESIGNDATARegionMin.B-10FluxTrapCellPitchLoadingGap(nominalinch)(arealdensity)(nominalinch)10.128.86.020gm/cm.007gm/cm21.120.02-30076L/0011L TABLE2-2TABLEOFMODULEDATAMODULEI.D.NO.OFMODULESNO.OFCELLSINNWDIRECTIONNO.OFCELLSINEWDIRECTIONTOTALNO.OFCELLSPERMODULERegion1AlandA281Region1BlandB21090Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2131311710488Region2Fl1296-Region2GlandG2Region2*Hl121310896*Cellsmissinginthismoduleduetosparger.RefertoFigure2-1.0076L/0011LRevision1 TABLE2-3MODULEDIMENSIONSANDWEIGHTMODULEI.D.NOMINALCROSS%ECTION+DIMENSIONSN-SEWESTIMATEDDRYWEIGHT(lbs)PERMODULERegion1AlandA290-1/4"90-1/4"26,700Region1BlandB290-1/4"100-7/16"29,800Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2Region2FlRegion2GlandG2Region2Hl115-11/16"80-1/6"97-7/8"71-3/16"106-3/4"71-3/16"106-3/4"80-1/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"24,10021,500187200190800.22,300190800*Excludinggirdlebars0076L/0011LRevision1 U~,V')~U,UU N~-413/1B"REF78'8.7/8"~~87.7/8"~i444"(37-0")111/8"REF.CrrCC7crrCLUJC'C7LrrCC7rcrr8CASKAREAEl11x8E211x8Hl13x8-4x20113x8COrAl9x9REGION1A29x9REGION1CtCSCJ7Crr7cbCC7G112x9C113x9C213x9ll0CIll0C0C/7r~C0OQmmcrrez--IG)C~xz~O0zMC/7OXcrrErrcr7O4COcbCC7CC7r819x10REGION1G212x9C313x9C413x9Fl12x8D213x8D313x8B29x10REGION11~1/2"1~1/2"~106.3/4"~~115.11/16"115.11/16"90-1/4"51/255/8"REFCOTrC)COCC7r

+.os"10.12"PITCHGIROLEBARIttIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIoIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATIONREGION1FIGURE2-2 P'hh~~PPP>>fPPPPP-P'PPPPPIIh)~~I'P 04II8.86"PITCHGIRDLEBAR4IIIIIttIIILJIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATIONREGION2FIGURE2-3 3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULICCONSIDERATIONS3.1NEUTRONMULTIPLICATIONFACTORThefollowingsubsectionsdescribetheconditionsinthespentfuelpoolwhichareassumedincalculatingtheeffectiveneutronmultiplicationfactor(keff),theanalysismethodology,andtheanalysisresults.ThecriticalityanalysesofeachofthetwoseparateregionsofthespentfuelstoragepoolaresummarizedinTable3-1fortheanticipatednormalstorageconditions.ThecalculatedmaximumreactivityinRegion2includesaburnup-dependentallowanceforuncertaintyindepletioncalculationsand,furthermore,providesanadditionalmarginof0.00655kbelowthelimitingeffectivemultiplicationfactor(k~~)of0.95.Ascoolingtimeincreasesinlong-termstorage,decayofPu-ZOIresultsinasignificantdecreaseinreactivity,whichwillprovideanincreasingsubcriticalitymarginandtendstofurthercompensateforanyuncertaintyindepletioncalculations.Spacingbetweentwodifferentrackmodulesissufficienttoprecludeadversenuclearinteraction,sincetheminimumspacingbetweenracksisgreaterthanthedesignwatergapspacing.Region2canaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentsanddischargefuelburnups,providedthecombinationfallswithintheacceptabledomainillustratedinFigure3-1.Forconvenienceofreference,theminimumburnupvaluesinFigure3-1havebeenfittedbylineartangentsatvariousvaluesandtheresultsaretabulatedinTable3-2.Linearinterpolationbetweenthetabulatedvalueswillalwaysyieldvaluesonorconservativelyabovethecurveoflimitingburnups.ThesedatawillbeimplementedinappropriateadministrativeprocedurestoassureverifiedburnupasspecifiedindraftRegulatoryGuide1.13,Revision2.Administrativeprocedureswillalsobeemployedtoconfirmandassurethepresenceofsolublepoisoninthepoolwateratalltimes,providingafurthermarginofsafetyandassuringsubcriticalityintheeventoffuelmisplacementduringfuelhandlingoperations,asdiscussedinSection3.1.2.3.1.1.1NewFuelStorageinRegion2Criticalityanalysesconfirmthatacheckerboardpattern(fuelassembliesaligneddiagonally)providesanacceptablek~forthestorageoffreshfuelassembliesof4.5XenrichmentinRegion2.Thesecalculationsindicateanominalk~of0.819+0.025(95X/95X)whenfullyfloodedwithcleanunboratedwater.Thisvalueissubstantiallylessthanthelimitingkeffof0.95,evenwiththeadditionofareasonableallowanceforuncertainties.\WithBoraflexabsorberbetweenassemblies,conditionsdonotexistfortheappearanceofapeakinreactivityatlowmoderatordensities,andthefullyfloodedconditioncorrespondstothehighestreactivity(optimummoderation).Thus,thecheckerboardpatternofnew4.5XenrichedfuelinRegion2representsasafeconfigurationinconformancewithbothStandardReviewPlan(SRP)9.1.1and9.1.2.3-10076L/0011L L)~(~I$4'4%I'I~tJr~4(1v"k' 3.1.2PostulatedAccidentsAlthoughcreditforthesolublepoisonnormallypresentinthespentfuelpoolwaterispermittedunderabnormaloraccidentconditions",mostabnormaloraccidentconditionswillnotresultinexceedingthelimitingreactivity(keffof0.95)evenintheabsenceofsolublepoison.TheeffectsonreactivityofcredibleabnormalandaccidentconditionsaresummarizedinTable3-3.Oftheseabnormal/accidentconditions,onlyonehasthepotentialforamorethannegligiblepositivereactivityeffect.Theinadvertentmisplacementofafreshfuelassembly(eitherintoaRegion2storagecelloroutsideandadjacenttoarackmodule)hasthepotentialforexceeIingthelimitingreactivityshouldtherebeaconcurrentandindependentaccidentconditionresultinginthelossofallsolublepoison.Administrativeproceduresassurethepresenceofsolublepoisonatalltimesandwillprecludethepossibilityofthesimultaneousoccurrenceofthesetwoindependentaccidentconditions.ThelargestreactivityincreaseoccursforaccidentallyplacinganewfuelassemblyintoaRegion2storagecellwithallothercellsfullyloadedwithfuelofthehighestpermissiblereactivity.Underthiscondition,thepresenceofapproximately500ppmsolubleboronassuresthattheinfinitemultiplicationfactorwouldnotexceedthedesignbasisreactivityforRegion2.Withthenormalconcentrationofsolublepoisonpresent(1720ppmboron),k~islessthan0.80andthestoragerackswouldnotbecriticalevenifRegion2weretobefullyloadedwithfreshfuelof4.5Xenrichment.Thisconcentrationofsolubleboronalsoprecludesthepossibilityofexceedingthecriticalitylimitintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.SeeSection5.3fordiscussionsonAccidentEvaluations.3.1.3CalculationMethods3t103+]CriticalityAnalysisforRegion13.1.3.1.1NominalDesignCaseUndernormalconditions,withnominaldimensions,thekmvaluescalculatedbythreedifferentmethodsofanalysisareasfollows:AnalticalMethodBias-correctedk~CASMO-2E0.9313+0.0018AMPX-KENO(27-gpSCALE)0.9210+0.0084Diffusion/blackness0.9313theoryMaximumk~(95X/95X)0.93310.92940.9313TheAMPX-KENOcalculationsincludeaone-sidedtolerancefactor(13)correspondingto95Xprobabilityata95Xconfidence'limit..Forthenominaldesigncase,theCASMO-2Ecalculationyieldsthehighestreactivityand,therefore,theindependentverificationcalculationssubstantiateCASMO-2Eastheprimarycalculationalmethod.*DoublecontingencyprincipleofANSIN16.1-1975,asspecifiedintheApril4,1978NRCletter(Section1.2)andimpliedintheproposedrevision(draft)toReg.Guide1.13(Section1.4,AppendixA)~3-20076L/0011L 3.1.3.1.2BoronLoadingVariationTheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedinRegion1storagecellsarenominally0.075inchthick,withaB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm.Independent2manufacturin~tolerancelimitsare+0.007inchinthicknessand+0.009g/cminB-10content.Thisassurestha)atanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration(0.1158gramB-10/cm)andminimumBoraflexthickness(0.068inch)maycoincide,theboron-lO,arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.020g/cm.DifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculationsindicatethatthesetolerancelimitsresultinreactivityuncertaintyof+0.0021Akforboroncontentand+0.00445kforBoraflexthicknessvariations.3.1.3.1.3StorageCellLatticePitchVariationThedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassembliesinRegion1is10.12inches.Adecreaseinstoragecelllatticespacingmayormaynotincreasereactivitydependinguponotherdimensionalchangesthatmaybeassociatedwiththedecreaseinlatticespacing.Increasingthewaterthicknessbetweenthefuelandtheinnerstainlesssteelboxresultsinasmallincreaseinreactivity.Thereactivityeffectoftheflux-trapwaterthickness,however,ismoresignificant,anddecreasingtheflux-trapwaterthicknessincreasesreactivity.Bothoftheseeffectshavebeenevaluatedforindependentdesigntolerances.Theinnerstainlesssteelboxdimension,8.650+0.032inches,definestheinnerwaterthicknessbetweenthefuelandtheinsidebox.Forthetolerancelimit,theuncertaintyinreactivityis+0.00115kasdeterminedbydifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculations,withk~increasingastheinnerstainlesssteelboxdimension(andderivativelatticespacing)increases.Thedesignflux-trapwater.thicknessis1.120+0.040inches,whichresultsinanuncertaintyof+0.0043Qkduetothetoleranceinflux-trapwaterthickness,assumingthewaterthicknessissimultaneouslyreducedonallfoursides.Sincethemanufacturingtolerancesoneachofthefoursidesarestatisticallyindependent,thenactualreactivityuncertaintieswouldbelessthan+0.0043,althoughthemoreconservativevaluehasbeenusedinthecriticalityevaluation.3.1.3.1.4BoraflexWidthToleranceVariationThereferencestoragecelldesignforRegion1(Figure3-2)usesaBoraflexbladewidthof7.50+0.0625inches.ApositiveincrementinreactivityoccursforadecreaseinBoraflexabsorberwidth.Forareductioninwidthofthemaximumtolerance,0.0625inch,thecalculatedpositivereactivityincrementis+0.00175k.3.1.3.1.5StainlessSteelThicknessTolerancesThenominalstainlesssteelthicknessinRegion1is0.080+0.005inchfortheinnerstainlesssteelboxand0.020+0.003inchfortheBoraflexcoverplate.Themaximumpositivereactivityeffectoftheexpectedstainlesssteelthicknesstolerancevariations,statisticallycombined,wascalculated(CASMO-2E)tobe+0.00105k.3-30076L/0011L k't'A'yc,ICl'pp<,"-.qduTIgyIN4stIl~Jk~1%.

3.1.3.1.6FuelEnrichmentandDensityVariationThedesignmaximumenrichmentis4.50+0.05wtXU-235.CalculationsofthesensitivitytosmallenrichmentvariationsbyCASMO-2Eyieldedacoefficientof0.00545kper0.1wtXU-235atthedesignenrichment.ForatoleranceonU-235enrichmentof+0.05inwtX,theuncertaintyonkcois+0.00275k.CalculationswerealsomadewiththeU02fueldensityincreasedtothemaximumexpectedvalueof10.811g/cm3(smeareddensity).Forthereferencedesigncalculations,theuncertaintyinreactivityis+0.00055koverthemaximumexpectedrangeofU02densities.3.1.3.1.7FuelPinPitchNormally,thefuelpinsinthelatticearearrangedona0.577inchlatticespacing.Forthemaximumexpectedtoleranceof+0.0023inch,thecalculateduncertaintyis+0.00245k.3.1.3.1.8EccentricPositioningofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackTheFuelAssemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculationswerealsomadewiththefuelassembliesassumedtobethecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assemblyclusteratclosestapproach).Thesecalculationsindicatedthatthereactivityincreasesveryslightly,asdeterminedbydifferentialPD$07calculationswithdiffusioncoefficients"generatedbyNULIFandablacknesstheoryroutine.ThisuncertaintyisincludedintheevaluationofthehighestpossiblereactivityoftheRegion1storagecells.3.1.3.1.9SummaryofRegion1Cri.ticalityResultsTable3-1demonstratesthattheCASMO-2EcalculatedresultsforRegion1storingfreshfuelat4.50w/oU-235enrichmentpluscalculationalbiasanduncertaintiesexhibitamaximumk~of0.9409whichallowsamarginof0.0091Qkbelowthelimitingeffectivemultiplicationfactorof0.95.3.1.3.2CriticalityAnalysisforRegion23.1.3.2.1NominalDesignCaseTheprincipalmethodofanalysisinRegion2wastheCASMO-2Ecode,usingtherestartoptioninCASMOtotransferfuelofaspecifiedburnupintothestoragerackconfigurationatareferencetemperatureof4oC(maximummoderatordensity).Calculationsweremadeforfuelofseveraldifferentinitialenrichmentsand,ateachenrichment,alimitingkmvaluewasestablishedwhichincludedanadditionalfactorforuncertaintyintheburnupanalysisandfortheaxialburnupdistribution.TherestartCASMO-2Ecalculations(cold,clean,rackgeometry)weretheninterpolatedtodefinetheburnupvalueyieldingthelimitingka>valueforeachenrichment,asindicatedinTable3-4.TheseconvergedburnupvaluesdefinetheboundaryoftheacceptabledomainshowninFigure3-1.*ThiscalculationalapproachwasnecessarysincethereactivityeffectsaretoosmalltobecalculatedbyKENO,andCASMO-2Egeometryisnotreadilyamenabletoeccentricpositioningofafuelassembly.3-40076L/0011L I'if'Itcl4fQ10f Ataburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,thesensitivitytoburnupiscalculatedtobe-0.00746kperMwd/kgU.Duringlong-termstorage,thekcvaluesoftheRegion2fuelrackwilldecreasecontinuouslyfromdecayofPu-241,asindicatedinSection3.1.3.3.4.TwoindependentcalculationalmethodswereusedtoprovideadditionalconfidenceinthereferenceRegion2criticalityanalyses.Fuelof1.69Kinitialenrichment(approximatelyequivalenttothereferencerackdesignforburnedfuel)wasanalyzedbyAMPX-KENO(27-groupSCALEcross-sectionlibrary)andbytheCASMO-2EmodelusedfortheRegion2rackanalysis.Forthiscase,theCASMO-2Ek~(0.9304)waswithinthestatisticaluncertaintyofthebias-correctedvalue(0.9347+0.0064)(95K/95X)obtainedintheAMPX-KENOcalculations.ThisagreementconfirmsthevalidityoftheprimaryCASMO-2Ecalculations.ThesecondindependentmethodofanalysisusedwastheNULIFcodeforburnupanalysis,andforgeneratingdiffusiontheoryconstants(cold,clean)forthecompositionat36.5Mwd/kgUwithfuelof4.5Xinitialenrichment.Theseconstants,togetherwithblacknesstheoryconstantsfortheBoraflexabsorber,werethenusedinatwo-dimensionalPD$07calculationforthestoragerackconfiguration.Theresultofthiscalculation(keof0.8959)wassomewhatlowerthanthecorrespondingCASMO-2Ecalculationforthesameconditions(kaof0.9114)andthusalsotendstoconfirmthevalidityoftheprimarycalculationalmethod.3.1.3.2.2BoronLoadingVariationTheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedintheRegion2storagecellsarenominally0.031inchthickwithaB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm2.Independentmanufacturinglimitsare+0.007inchinthicknessand+0.009g/cm3inB-10content.Thisassuresthatatanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration(0.1158gB-10/cm)andtheminimumBoraflexthickness(0.024inch)maycoincide,theboron-10arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.007g/cm.2DifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculationsindicatethatthesetolerancelimitsresultinanincrementalreactivityuncertaintyof+0.0036Qkforboroncontentand+0.0111QkforBoraflexthickness.3.1.3.2.3BoraflexWidthToleranceThereferencestoragecelldesignforRegion2(Figure3-3)usesaBoraflexabsorberwidthof7.25+0.0625inches.Forareductioninwidthofthemaximumtolerance,thecalculatedpositivereactivityincrementis0.0011Qk.3.1.3.2.4StorageCellLatticePitchVariationsThedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassembliesinRegion2is8.86+0.04inches,correspondingtoanuncertaintyinreactivityof0.00165k.3.1.3.2.5StainlessSteelThicknessToleranceThenominalthicknessofthestainlesssteelboxwallis0.080inchwithatolerancelimitof+0.005inch,resultinginanuncertaintyinreactivityof+0.00025k.3-50076L/0011L

".4l~lipv>$'lyt 3.1.3.2.6FuelEnrichment,DensityandPinPitchVariationUncertaintiesinreactivityduetotolerancesonfuelenrichment,UO2density,andpinpitchinRegion2areassumedtobethesameasthosedeterminedforRegionl.3.1.3.2.7EccentricPositioningofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackThefuelassemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculationswerealsomadewiththefuelassembliesassumedtobeinthecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assemblyclusteratclosestapproach).Thesecalculationsindicatedthatthereactivitydecreasesveryslightly,asdeterminedbyPDQ07calculationswithdiffusioncoefficientsgeneratedbyNULIFandablacknesstheoryroutine.Thehighestreactivitythereforecorrespondstothereferencedesignwiththefuelassembliespositionedinthecenterofthestoragecells.3.1.3.3AnalyticalMethodology3.1.3.3.1ReferenceAnalyticalMethodsandBiasTheCASMO-2Ecomputercode',atwo-dimensionalmultigrouptransporttheorycodeforfuelassemblies,hasbeenbenchmarkedandisusedbothasaprimarymethodofanalysis,andasameansofevaluatingsmallreactivityincrementsassociatedwithmanufacturingtolerance.CASMO-2Ebenchmarkingresultedinacalculationalbiasof0.0013+0.0018(95X/95X).Infuelrackanalyses,forindependentverification,criticalityanalysesofthehighdensityspentfue)stgagerackswerealsoperformedwiththeAHPE-[computerpackage'usingthe27-groupSCALEcross-sectionlibran)withtheNITAWLsubroutineforU23Sresonanceshieldingeffects(Nordheimintegraltreatment).Benchmarkcalculationsresultedinabiasof0.0106+0.0048(95X/95X)~InthegeometricmodelusedinKENO,eachfuelrodanditscladdingweredescribedexplicitly.InRegion1calculations,areflectingboundarycondition(zeroneutroncurrent)wasusedintheaxialdirectionandatthecenterlineofthewatergapbetweenstoragecells.Theseboundaryconditionshavetheeffectofcreatinganinfinitearrayofstoragecellsinalldirections.InRegion2,thezerocurrentboundaryconditionwasappliedatthecenteroftheBoraflexabsorbersheetsbetweenstoragecells.TheAMPX-KENOMonteCarlocalculationsinherentlyincludeastatisticaluncertaintyduetotherandomnatureofneutrontracking.TominimizethestatisticaluncertaintyoftheKENO-calculatedreactivity,atotalof50,000neutronhistoriesisnormallyaccumulatedforeachcalculation,in100generationsof500neutronseach.*SCALEisanacronymforStandardizedComputerAnalysisforLicensingEvaluation,astandardcross-sectionsetdevelopedbyORNLfortheUSNRC.3-60076L/0011L Kr(

CASMO"2Eisalsousedforburnupcalculations,withindependentverificationbyEPRI-CELLandNULIFcalculations.Intrackinglong-term(30-year)reactivityeffectsofspentfuelstoredinRegion2ofthefuelstoragerack,EPRI-CELLcalculationsindicateacontinuousreductioninreactivitywithtime(afterXedecay)dueprimarilytoPu-241decayandAm-241growth.Athirdindependentmethodofcriticalityanalysis,utilizingdiffusion/blacknesstheory,wasalsousedforadditionalconfidenceinresultsoftheprimarycalculationalmethods,althoughnorelianceforcriticalitysafetyisplacedonthereactivityvaluefromthediffusion/blacknesstheorytechnique.Thistechnique,however,isusedforauxiliarycalculationsofthesmallincrementalreactivityeffectofeccentricfuelpositioningthatwouldotherwisebelostinnormalKENOstatisticalvariations,orwouldbeinconsistentwithCASMO-2Egeometrylimitations.Crosssectionsforthediffusion/blacknesstheorycalculationswerederivedfromtheNULIFcomputercode),supplementedbyablacknesstheoryroutinethateffectivelyimposesatransporttheoryboundaryconditionatthesurfaceoftheBoraflexneutronabsorber.Twodifferentspatialdiffusiontheorycodes,PDQ07(intwodimensionsandSNEID*inonedimension,wereusedtocalculatereactivities.3.1.3.3.2FuelBurnupCalculationsFuelburnupcalculationsi'nthehotoperatingconditionwereperformedprimarilywiththeCASMO"2Ecode.However,toenhancethecredibilityoftheburnupcalculations,theCASMO-2EresultswereindependentlycheckedbycalculationswiththeNULIFcode(7)andwithEPRI-CELL(9).Figure3-4comparesresultsoftheseindependentmethodsofburnupanalysisunderhotreactoroperatingconditions.TheresultsagreewiththeCASMOcalculationwithin0.00546kinthehotoperatingcondition.AnarchivecalculationwiththeCHEETAH-PcodeisalsopresentedinFigure3-4foradditionalconfidence.Similarcomparisonswereobtainedinburnupcalculationsforotherinitialenrichments,asindicatedinFigure3-4.Inadditiontodepletioncalculationsunderhotoperatingconditions,reactivitycomparisonsunderconditionsmorerepresentativeoffueltobestoredintheracks(cold,xenon-free)arealsosignificantinstoragerackcriticalityanalyses.Table3-5comparesthecold,xenon"freereactivitiescalculatedbyCASM0-2E,EPRI-CELL,anddiffusion/blacknesstheory.Intherackundercoldconditions,theCASMO-2EcalculationsgaveaslightlyhigherreactivityvaluefortheRegion2fuelstoragecell,andthegoodagreementgenerallyobservedlendscredibilitytothecalculations.*SNEIDisaone-dimensionaldiffusiontheoryroutinedevelopedbyBlack&VeatchandverifiedbycomparisonwithPDQ07one-dimensionalcalculations.3-70076L/0011L iIPIgI~Cl4s41kIQI~'I'IIII'JII/11~'FIII~,I~$1YIt4I Nodefinitivemethodexistsfordeterminingtheuncertaintyinburnup-dependentreactivitycalculations.Allofthecodesdiscussedabovehavebeenusedtoaccuratelyfollowreactivitylossratesino~e~atinareactors.CASMO-2Ehasbeenextensivelybenchmarked(1>>yagainst1230cold,clean,criticalexperiments(includingplutonium-bearingfuel),MonteCarlocalculations,reactoroperations,andhyavy-elementconcentrationinirradiatedfuel.Inparticular,theanalyses<10>ofllcriticalexperimentswithplutonium-bearingfuelgaveanaveragekeffof1.002+0.011(95X/95X),showingadequatetreatmentoftheplutoniumnuclides.Inaddition,Johansson(11)hasobtainedverygoodagreementincalculationsofclose-packed,high-plutonium-content,experimentalconfigurations.Sincecritical-experimentdatawithspentfuelisnotavailable,itisnecessarytoassignanuncertaintyinreactivitybasedonotherconsiderations,supportedbythecloseagreementbetweendifferentcalculationalmethodsandthegeneralindustryexperienceinpredictingreactivitylossratesinoperatingplants.Overaconsiderableportionoftheburnup,thereactivitylossrateinPMRsisapproximately0.01AkforeachMwd/kgUburnup,becomingsomewhatsmalleratthehigherburnups.Byconservativelyassuminganuncertaintyinreactivityof0.0005timestheburnupinMwd/kgU,aburnup-dependentuncertaintyisdefinedthatincreaseswithincreasingfuelburnup,aswouldbereasonablyexpected.Thisassumptionprovidesanestimateoftheburnupuncertaintythatismoreconservativeandboundsestimatesfrequentlyemployedinotherfuelracklicensingapplications(i.e.,5Xofthetotalreactivitydecrement).Atthedesignbasisburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,theestimateofburnupuncertaintyis0.0183Ak;Table3-6summarizesresultsoftheburnupanalysesandestimateduncertaintiesatotherburnups.Theseuncertaintiesareappreciablylarger,ingeneral,thanwouldbe'suggestedbytheindustryexperienceinpredictingreactivitylossratesandboronlet-downcurvesovermanycyclesinoperatingplants.Theincreasinglevelofconservatismatthehigherfuelburnupsprovidesanadequatemarginintheuncertaintyestimatetoaccommodatethepossibleexistenceofasmallpositivereactivityincrementfromtheaxialdistributioninburnup(seeSection3.1.3.3.3).Inaddition,althoughtheburnupuncertaintymaybeeitherpositiveornegative,itistreatedasanadditivetermratherthanbeingcombinedstatisticallywithotheruncertainties.Thus,theallowanceforuncertaintyinburnupcalculationsisconsideredtobeaconservativeestimate,particularlyinviewofthesubstantialreactivitydecreasewithagedfuel,asdiscussedinSection3.1.3.3.4.*Onlythatportionoftheuncertaintyduetoburnup.'theruncertaintiesareaccountedforelsewhere.3-80076L/0011L S$kQt'+1qZil, 3.1.3.3.3EffectofAxialBurnupDistributionInitially,fuelloadedintothereactorwillburnwithaslightlyskewedcosinepowerdistribution.Asburnupprogresses,theburnupdistributionwilltendtoflatten,becomingmorehighlyburnedinthecentralregionsthanintheupperandlowerends.ThiseffectmaybeclearlyseeninthecurvescompiledinReference12.Athighburnup,themorereactivefuelneartheendsofthefuelassembly(lessthanaverageburned)occursinregionsoflowerreactivityworthduetoneutronleakage.Consequently,itisexpectedthatdistributed-burnupfuelassemblieswouldexhibitaslightlylowerreactivitythanthatcalculatedfortheaverageburnup.Asburnupprogresses,thedistribution,tosomeextent,tendstobeself-regulatingascontrolledbytheaxialpowerdistribution,precludingtheexistenceoflargeregionsofsignificantlyreducedburnup.Anumberofone-dimensionaldiffusiontheoryanalyseshavebeenmadebaseduponcalculatedandmeasuredaxialburnupdistributions.Theseanalysesconfirmtheminor,andgenerallynegative,reactivityeffectoftheaxiallydistributedburnup.Thetrendsobserved,however,suggestthepossibilityofasmallpositivereactivityeffectatthehighburnupvalues(estimatedtobeasmuchas0.0066kat36.5Mwd/kgU);buttheuncertaintyinkcduetoburnup,assignedatthehigherburnups(Section3.1.3.3.2),isadequatelyconservativetoencompassthepotentialforasmallpositivereactivityeffectofaxialburnupdistributions.Furthermore,reactivitysignificantlydecreaseswithtimeinstorage(Section3.1.3.3.4),and,inaddition,"thereisafurthermargininreactivity()0.0066k)sincethemaximumcalculatedvalue(0.9435)isbelowthelimitingkegpvalue(0.95).ThesefactorswouldaccommodateanyreasonablereactivityeZKectsthatmightbelargerthanexpected.3.1.3.3.4Long-termDecaySincethefuelracksinRegion2areintendedtocontainspentfuelforlongperiodsoftime,calculationsweremadeusingEPRI-CELL(whichincorporatestheCINDERcode)tofollowthelong-termchangesinreactivityofspentfuelovera30-yearperiod.CINDERtracksthedecayandburnupdependenceofsome179fissionproducts.Earlyinthedecayperiod,xenongrowsfromiodinedecay(reducingreactivity)andsubsequentlydecays,withthereactivityreachingamaximumat100-200hours.ThedecayofPu-241(13"yearhalf-life)andgrowthofAm-241substantiallyreducereactivityduringlongtermstorage,asindicatedinTable3-7.Thereferencedesigncriticalitycalculationsdonottakecreditforthislong-termreductioninreactivity,otherthantoindicateanincreasingsubcriticalitymargininRegion2ofthespentfuelstoragepool.3.1.4RackModificationThedesignbasisfuelassembly,illustratedinFigure3-2,isa14x14arrayoffuelrodswith20rodsreplacedby5controlrodguidetubes.Table3-8summarizesthedesignspecificationsandtheexpectedrangeofsignificantvariations.Independentcalculations,withotherpotentialfuelassemblyspecifications,confirmedthatthe14x14CEdesignexhibitedthehighestreactivityandwasthereforeusedasthedesignbasis.3-90076L/0011L t$th4iI'I4jll~~g~li 3.1.4.1Region1StorageCellsThenominalspentfuelstoragecellusedforthecriticalityanalysesofRegion1storagecellsisshowninFigure3-2.TherackiscomposedofBoraflexabsorbermaterialsandwichedbetweenan8.65-inchI.D.,0.080-inchthickinnerstainlesssteelbox,anda0.020-inchouterstainlesssteelcoverplate.Thefuelassembliesarecentrallylocatedineachstoragecellonanominallatticespacingof10.120+0.05inches.Stainlesssteelgapchannelsconnectonestoragecellboxtoanotherinarigidstructureanddefineanouterwaterspacebetweenboxes.Thisouterwaterspaceconstitutesaflux-trapbetweenthetwoBoraflexabsorbersheetsthatareessentiallyopaque(black)tothermalneutrons.TheBoraflexabsorberhasathicknessof0.075+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm2.3.1.4.2Region2StorageCellsRegion2storagecellsweredesignedforfuelof4.5wtXU-235initialenrichmentburnedto36.5Mwd/kgU.Inthisregion,thestoragecellsarecomposedofasingleBoraflexabsorbersandwichedbetweenthe0.080-inchstainlesssteelwallsofadjacentstoragecells.Thesecells,showninFigure3-3,arelocatedonalatticespacingof8.86+0.040inches.TheBoraflexabsorberhasathicknessof0.031+0.007inchandanominalB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm.3.1.5AcceptanceCriteriaforCriticalitCriticalityisprecludedbyspacingofthefuelassemblies,whichensuresthatasubcriticalarrayofkefflessthanorequalto0.95ismaintained,assumingunboratedpoolwater.Thepool,however,willalwayscontainboricacidattherefuelingconcentrationof1720ppmwheneverthereisirradiatedfuelinthepool.Theneutronmultiplicationfactorinspentfuelpoolsshallbelessthanorequalto0.95,includingalluncertainties,underallconditions.CalculatedmaximumreactivityuncertaintiesforfuelstoredintheracksarepresentedinTable3-1.Methodsofinitialandlong-termverificationofpoisonmaterialstabilityandmechanicalintegrityarediscussedinSection4.8.3.2DECAYHEATCALCULATIONSFORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(BULK)3.2.1SentFuelPoolCoolingSystemDesignFornormalrefuelingdischargeconditions,onefuelpoolpumpandthefuelpoolheatexchangerareinservice.Duringabnormalrefuelingconditions,suchasfullcoredischarge,twofuelpoolpumpsandtheheatexchangerareinservice.Thesystemismanuallycontrolledandtheoperationmonitoredlocally,exceptasfollows.Apressureswitchonthefuelpoolpumpdischargeheaderannunciateslowheaderpressureinthecontrolroom.Thefuelpoolhightemperaturealarmandlowlevelalarmsareannunciatedinthecontrolroom.Intheeventthefuelpoolpumpbreakersareopened,analarmisannunciatedinthecontrolroom.Thecomponentcoolingwaterflowtothefuelpoolheatexchangerisinitiallyad)ustedtotherequiredflow.Furtheradjustmentsofthecomponentcoolingwaterarenotrequired.Thecomponentcoolingwaterdischargelinehasaflowindicator.Highandlowcomponentcoolingwaterflowalarmsareannunciatedinthecontrolroom.3-100076L/0011L t'~yCP7'tr, Theclarityandpurityofthewaterinthefuelpoolismaintainedbythepurificationportionofthefuelpoolsystem.Thepurificationloopconsistsofthefuelpoolpurificationpump,ionexchanger,filter,strainersandsurfaceskimmers.Mostofthepurificationflowisdrawnthroughthesurfaceskimmerstoremovesurfacedebris.Abasketstrainerisprovidedinthepurificationlinetothepumpsuctiontoremoveanyrelativelylargeparticulatematter.Thefuelpoolwateriscirculatedbythepumpthroughafilter,whichremovesparticulateslargerthan5micronsize,andthroughanionexchangertoremoveionicmaterial.Connectionsareprovidedforpurificationoftherefuelingwatertankandrefuelingwatercavity.FuelpoolwaterchemistryisgiveninFSARTable9.1-2.Thefuelpoolpipingisarrangedsothatthepoolcannotbeinadvertentlydrainedtouncoverthefuelintheeventofasupplyordischargepiperupture.Allfuelpoolpipingisarrangedtopreventgravitydrainingthefuelpool.Topreventsiphoningofthefuelpool,thefuelpooldischargeandpurificationsuctionlineshave1/2"and1/4"holesrespectively1footbelowthenormalwaterlevel.Theonlymeansofdrainingthepoolbelowthesesiphonbreakerholesisthroughanopenlineinthecoolingloopwhileoperatingthepoolcoolingpumps.Insuchaneventthefuelpoolwaterlevelcanbereducedbyonly6feetsincethepumpsuctionconnectionentersnearthetopofthepool.TheremainingwaterintheSpentFuelPoolwillprovideadequateshieldingandheatremovalcapabilitiesatthispoint.Thetemperatureandlevelalarmswouldwarntheoperatorofsuchanevent.3.2.2DecaHeatAnalyses3.2.2.1BasisTheSt.LuciePlantUnit1reactorisratedat2700megawattsthermal(MWt).Thecorecontains217fuelassemblies.Thus,theaverageoperatingpowerperfuelassembly,Po,is12.44MW.Thefueldischargecanbemadeinoneofthefollowingtwomodes:NormalrefuelingdischargeFullcoredischargeTables3-9through3-11givetheparametersforbulkandlocalpooltemperatureanalyses.3.2.2.2ModelDescriptionNUREG-0800BranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,"ResidualDecayEnergyForLightWaterReactorsForLongTermCooling"~~~isutilizedtocomputetheheatdissipationrequirementsinthepool.03-110076L/0011L

'7<'nIglp'il0g~

Withthelongtermuncertaintyfactor,K,asspecifiedinSRP9.1.3(15)theoperatingpower,Po,istakenequaltotheratedpower,eventhoughthereactormaybeoperatingatlessthanitsratedpowerduringmuchoftheexposureperiodforthebatchoffuelassemblies.Thecomputationsandresultsreportedherearebasedonthedischargetakingplacewhentheinventoryoffuelinthepoolwillbeatitsmaximumresultinginanupperboundonthedecayheatrate.Havingdeterminedtheheatdissipationrate,thenexttaskistoevaluatethetime-dependenttemperatureofthepoolwater.Table3-9identifiestheloadingcasesexamined.ThisisaconservativerepresentationofactualandfutureexpecteddischargessuchasthosepresentedinTable5-1.BULKTEMtreatsthegeneralizedpoolcoolingproblemshowninFigure3"5.Anumberofsimplifyingassumptionsaremadewhichrendertheanalysisconservative,including:Theheatexchangerisassumedtohavemaximumfouling.Thus,thetemperatureeffectiveness,P,fortheheatexchangerutilizedintheanalysisisthelowestpostulatedvaluecalculatedfromheatexchangertechnicaldatasheets.Nocreditistakenfortheimprovementinthefilmcoefficientsoftheheatexchangerastheoperatingtemperaturerisesduetomonotonicreductioninthewaterkinematicviscositywithtemperaturerise.Thus,thefilmcoefficientusedinthecomputationsarelowerbounds.Nocreditistakenforheatlossbyevaporationofthepoolwater.Nocreditistakenforheatlosstopoolwallsandpoolfloorslab.Thebasicenergyconservationrelationshipforthepoolheatexchangersystemyields:Ql-Q2dtdTwhere'.ctThermalcapacityofstoredwaterinthepoolTemperatureofpoolwaterattime,7HeatgenerationrateduetostoredfuelassembliesinthepoolQ2HeatremovedinthefuelpoolheatexchangerThisequationissolvedasaninitialvalueproblembynotingthatthecoolerheatremovalratemustequaltheheatgenerationratefrompreviouslydischargedassemblies.Hence,0076L/0011L 4~'d where:PCONS:Wcool':HeatgenerationratefrompreviouslystoredassembliesCoolantthermalflowrateTemperatureeffectivenessofthefuelpoolcoolerTinCoincidentpoolwatertemperature(initialvaluebeforebeginningofdischarge)CoolantinlettemperatureTheaboveequationyieldsTinPCONSWcoolP+tcoolThevalueofTincomputedfromtheaboveformulaistheinitialvalueofthepoolwatertemperature(atthestartoffueldischarge).BULKTEMautomatesthesolutionoftheaboveequationusingthetheorypresentedinReference16.Tabulatedresultsarepresentedinthenextsub-section.3BulkPoolTemperatureResultseTable3-12givesthetotaldimensionlesspowergenerationratioofallfuelassemblybatchespreviouslystoredinthepoolconsistingofatotalof18batches.ThefirstcolumninTable3-12givesthebatchnumber,andthelastcolumngivesthedimensionlesspower,definedastheheatgenerationrateofthebatchdividedbythenominaloperatingpowerofonefuelassembly.ItisnotedfromTable3-12thatthecumulativepoweris0.14timestheoperatingpowerofonefuelassembly.Tables3-13/3-14and3-16/3-17givethebulktemperaturevs.timedata.The'ollowingkeyoutputdataisgleanedfromthesetables:Maximumpoolbulktemperature:Normaldischarge:133.3FFullcoredischarge:150.8oFTable3-14Table3-17Tables3-15and3-18givetime-to-boildata.Time-to-boil(ifcoolantflowislostuponcompletionofdischargeandwhenthebulkpooltemperatureismaximum):Normaldischargecondition:13.43hoursTable3-15Fullcoredischargecondition:5.04hoursTable3-183-130076L/0011L

'I"VI'l.gjll1kg'I 3.2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemSummaryThespentfueldecayheatcalculationswereperformedinaccordancewiththemethodprovidedinNRCBranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2ResidualDecayEnergyforLight-WaterReactorsforLong-TermCooling(15~.Theexistingspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisconsideredtobeadequate.Thespentfuelpoolisdesignedtowithstandstressesassociatedwithasteady-statewatertemperatureof217oF.AsshowninTable3-17thepoolpeaktransientwatertemperatureafterfullcoredischargeislessthan151oF.Intheeventofacompletelossofcoolingcapability,thereissufficienttimetoprovideanalternatemeansforcooling.Thetotalincreaseinheatloadre)ectedtotheenvironmentthroughthecoolingsystemsduetotheincreasedspentfuelstorageoverthecurrentheatloadrejectedis1.7x10Btu/hour.Thisrepresentsanincreaseofapproximately0.03percentofthetotalheatrejectedtotheenvironment.Theincreaseinheatrejectedwillhavenegligibleimpactontheenvironment.Theincreaseinheatloaddoesnotalterinanywaytheexistingfacilitydesignbases.Thus,theheatloadincreaseisacceptable.Thisdecayheatanalysisisalsoboundingforthetemporaryfuelstorageconfiguration(seeSection4.7.4)thatwillbeutilizedduringrackinstallation.3.2.2.4.1SafetyEvaluationThecalculationsfortheamountofthermalenergythatmayhavetoberemovedbythespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemaremadeinaccordancewithBranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2(Reference15).Theresultingbulkspentfuelpooltemperaturesareacceptable.3.2.3SpentFuelPoolMakeuThereareseveralsourcesoffreshwateronthesitethatareavailabletothefuelhandlingbuilding;namely,refuelingwaterstoragetank,citywaterstoragetankviathefiremain,citywaterstoragetanksviatheportablefirepump,andprimarywatertank.Theconcurrentlossofthesesourcesandthefuelpoolcoolingsystemisremote.Duetothefuelpool'sboil-offperiod,thereissufficienttimetoobtainmakeup.ItshouldbenotedthataseismicCategoryIbackupsaltwatersupplyisavailablefromtheintakecoolingwaterintertie.Astandpipeonthefuelhandlingbuildingisprovidedfromgradetotheoperatingdeckelevationandhoseconnectionsareprovidedatbothendsofthestandpipe.Thus,viafirehose,thefuelpoolmakeupcanbereadilysuppliedbytheintakecoolingwaterpumps.Theheadprovidedbythesepumpsissufficienttoprovidetherequiredfuelpoolmakeup.Thestructuralandleaktightintegrityofthefuelpoolwillnotbecompromisedbycontinuousfuelpooltemperaturesofupto217F.Theresultsofthebulkdecayheatanalysesindicatethatthesetemperaturesarenotexceeded.Theintakecoolingwatersystemconnectionviathehoseconnectionscanprovide150gpmofmakeup.SeeFSARSubsection9.1.3.4.3-140076L/0011L

\NI' 3.3THERMAL-HYDRAULICANALYSESFORTHESPENTFUELPOOL(LOCALIZED)Thepurposeofthethermal-hydraulicanalysesistodeterminethemaximumfuelcladtemperatureswhichmayoccurasaresultofusingthenewhighdensityspentfuelracksintheStLucieUnit1spentfuelpool.3.3.1BasesInordertodetermineanupperboundonthemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature,aseriesofconservativeassumptionsaremade.Themostimportantassumptionsarelistedbelow:Asstatedabove,thefuelpoolwillcontainspentfuelwithvaryingtime-after-shutdown(7's).SincetheheatemissionfallsoffrapidlywithincreasingTs,itisobviouslyconservativetoassumethatallfuelassembliesarefreshandtheyallhavehadthemaximumpostulatedyearsofoperatingtimeinthereactor.Theheatemissionrateofeachfuelassemblyisassumedtobeequalandmaximum.AsshowninFigure2-1,themodulesoccupyanirregularfloorspaceinthepool.Forthehydrothermalanalysis,acirclecircumscribingtheactualrackfloorspaceisdrawn(Figure3-6).ItisfurtherassumedthatthecylinderwiththiscircleasitsbaseXspackedwithfuelassembliesatthenominallayoutpitch.Theactualdowncomerspacearoundtherackmodulegroupvaries,asshowninFigure2-1.Thenominaldowncomergapavailableinthepoolisassumedtobethetotalgapavailablearoundtheidealizedcylindricalrack;thus,themaximumresistancetodownwardflowisincorporatedintotheanalysis(Figure3-7).Nodowncomerflowisassumedtoexistbetweentherackmodules.3.3.2ModelDescritionUsingthebasesdescribedabove,aconservativeidealizedmodelfortherackassemblageisobtained.'hewaterflowisaxisymmetricabouttheverticalaxisofthecircularrackassemblageand,thus,theflowistwo-dimensional(axisymmetricthree-dimensional).Figure3-7showsatypical"flowchimney"renderingofthethermalhydraulicsmodel.Thegoverningequationtocharacterizetheflowfieldinthepoolisanintegralequationthatcanbesolvedforthelowerplenumvelocityfield(intheradialdirection)andaxialvelocity(in-cellvelocityfield),byusingthemethodofcollocation.Itshouldbeaddedthatthehydrodynamiclosscoefficientswhichenterintothefovyulytionoftheintegralequationarealsotakenfromwellmecognizedsources<17>andwhereverdiscrepanciesinreportedvaluesexist,theconservativevaluesareconsistentlyused.Reference18givesthedetailsofmathematicalanalysisusedinthissolutionprocess..3-150076L/0011L

~ll$lg' Aftertheaxialvelocityfieldisevaluated,thefuelassemblycladdingtemperaturecanbecalculated.Theknowledgeoftheoverallflowfieldenablespinpointingofthestoragelocationwiththeminimumaxialflow(i.e.,maximumwateroutlettemperatures).Thisiscalledthemost"choked"location.Inordertofindanupperboundonthetemperatureinatypicalcell,itisassumedthatitislocatedatthemostchokedlocation.Knowingtheglobalplenumvelocityfield,therevisedaxialflowthroughthischokedcellcanbecalculatedbysolvingtheBernoulliequationfortheflowcircuitthroughthiscell.Thus,anabsoluteupperboundonthewaterexittemperatureandmaximumfuelcladdingtemperatureisobtained.Inviewoftheaforementionedassumptions,thetemperaturescalculatedinthismanneroverestimatethetemperaturerisethatwillactuallyoccurinthepool.THERPOOL,basedonthetheoryofReference18,automatesthiscalculation.Finally,themaximumspecificpowerofafuelarrayqAcanbegivenby:where:qFxyqaveragefuelassemblyspecificpowerFxyradialpeakingfactorThedataonradialandaxialpeakingfactorsmaybefoundinTable3-10.Themaximumtemperatureriseofpoolwaterinthemostdisadvantageouslyplacedfuelassemblyiscomputedforallloadingcases.Table3-19,thirdcolumn,givestheoutputsfromTHERPOOLintabularform.3.3.3.CladdingTemperature~~~Havingdeterminedthemaximumlocalwatertemperatureinthepool,itisnowpossibletodeterminethemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature.AfuelrodcanproduceFoottimestheaverageheatemissionrateoverasmalllength,whereTtistfietotalpeakingfactor.Theaxialheatdissipationinarodisknowntoreachamaximuminthecentralregion,andtaperoffatitstwoextremities.Foraddedconservatism,itisassumedthatthepeakheatemissionoccursatthetopwherethelocalwatertemperaturealsoreachesitsmaximum.Futhermore,nocreditistakenforaxialconductionofheatalongtherod.Thehighlyconservativemodelthusconstructedleadstosimplealgebraicequationswhichdirectlygivethemaximumlocalcladdingtemperature,tc.Table3-19,fourthcolumn,summarizesthekeyoutputdata.Itisfoundthatthemaximumvalueofthelocalwatertemperatureiswellbelowthenucleateboilingconditionvalue.Theincrementalcladdingtemperatureistoosmalltoproducesignificantthermalstresses.3.4POTENTIALFUELANDRACKHANDLINGACCIDENTSThemethodformovingtheracksintoandoutofthespentfuelpoolisbrieflydiscussedinSection4.7.4.2.Themethodsutilizedensurethatpostulatedaccidentsdonotresultinalossofcoolingtoeitherthespentfuelpoolorthereactor,orresultinakeffinthespentfuelpoolexceeding0.95.3-160076L/0011L

~~

3.4.1RackModuleMishandlinThepotentialformishandlingofrackmodulesduringthererackoperationhasbeenevaluated.Atnotimewillthecaskhandlingcraneorthetemporaryconstructioncranecarryarackmoduledirectlyoverarackcontainingspentfuel.Theproceduresandadministrativecontrolsgoverningthererackoperationwillensurethesafehandlingofrackmodules.BoththetemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcranemeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSectionP.l.lofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"<19'ntheunlikelyeventthatarackshouldstrikethesideofanotherrackmodulecontainingfuelassemblies,theconsequencesofthispostulatedaccidentwouldbeboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.2TemporaryConstructionCraneDroDuringthererackoperation,atemporaryconstructioncranewillbeinstalledintheFuelHandlingBuilding.ThisinstallationwillbeperformedusingliftrigswhichmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofapostulatedaccidentduringthisinstallationareboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDro)Duringthere-rackingoperation,itwillbenecessarytoraiseandmaneuvertheoldracksoutofthespentfuelpoolinordertoinstallthenewspentfuelracks(SeeSection4.7.4).Thehandlingoftheseheavyloadswillbeaccomplishedbytheuseofatemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcrane.BothofthesecranesmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSection5.1.1ofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofdroppingarackintheSpentFuelPoolweredeterminedbyreviewingtheanalysisinFSARSubsection9.1.4fordroppingofthespentfuelcask.Theresultsofthiscaskdropanalysisdemonstratedthatthepoolfloorwouldremainelasticduringimpactandthatcrackswouldnotdevelop.Thiscaskweighssubstantiallymorethanasinglerackassemblyandhasasmallercrosssectionalareaforloaddistribution.Therefore,therackdropscenarioisboundedbythepreviousanalysisforacaskdropscenario,andlossofspentfuelcoolingfromlossofpoolwaterinventorywillnotoccurasaresultofarackdrop.3.5TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESThisproposedamendmentpermitsreplacementofthespentfuelpoolrackstoensurethatsufficientcapacityexistsforstorageofspentfuelatSt.LucieUnit1.Thenewracksincreasetheavailablestorageto1706spentfuelassembliesandisexpectedtoprovideadequatestoragespaceuntiltheyear2009.3-170076L/0011L I'NI'i,Kl's>""II.VII't~lf1'IB1 TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangesaredescribedbelow:1.Specification3/4.9.14BasesisrevisedtoreflecttheassumptionsusedincalculationsofdosesbasedontheDecayTimes.2.Specification5.6.1.a.lisrevisedtocorrespondtothe.StandardTechnicalSpecificationsforCombustionEngineeringPressurizedWaterReactors(NUREG-0212Rev2).3.Specification5.6.l.a.2isrevisedtoshowthenominalcenter-to-centerdistanceforthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.4.Specification5.6.1.a.3iseditedtodiscusstheboronconcentrationonly.5.Specification5.6.1.a.4iscreatedtoindicatethepresenceofBoraflexinthecells.6.Specification5.6.1.bandaccompanyingFigure5.6-1arecreatedtodefinethefuelenrichment/burnuplimitsforstorageineachregionofthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.7.Specification5.6.1ciseditoriallychangedfrom"b"to"c".8.Specification5.6.3ischangedtoshowthecapacityofthehigh-capacityspentfuelstorageracks.

3.6REFERENCES

FORSECTION3~~~1.A.Ahlin,M.Edenius,H.Haggblom,"CASMO-AFuelAssemblyBurnupProgram,"AE-RF-76-4158,Studsvikreport(proprietary).2.A.AhlinandM.Edenius,"CASMO-AFastTransportTheoryDepletionCodeforLWRAnalysis,"ANSTransactions,Vol.26,p.604,1977.3.M.Edeniusetal.,"CASMOBenchmarkReport,"Studsvik/RF-78-6293,AktiebolagetAtomenergi,March1978.4.Green,Lucious,Petrie,Ford,White,Wright,"PSR-63/AMPX-1(codepackage),AMPXModularCodeSystemforGeneratingCoupledMultigroupNeutron-GammaLibrariesfromENDF/B,"ORNL-TM-3706,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,March1976.5.L.M.PetrieandN.F.Cross,"KENO-IV,AnImprovedMonteCarloCriticalityProgram,"ORNL-4938,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,November1975.6.R.,M.Westfalletal.,"SCALE:AModularCodeSystemforPerformingStandardizedComputerAnalysesforLicensingEvaluation,"NUREG/CR-0200,1979.3-180076L/0011L jI-lllp't~',hVgyII1't W.A.Wittkopf,"NULIF-NeutronSpectrumGenerator,Fe~roupConstantGeneratorandFuelDepletionCode,"BAW-426,TheBabcock6WilcoxCompany,August1976.W.R.Cadwell,PD$07ReferenceManual,WAPD-TM-678,BettisAtomicPowerLaboratory,January1967.W.J.Eich,"AdvancedRecycleMethodologyProgram,CEM-3,"ElectricPowerResearchInstitute,1976.E.E.Pilat,"MethodsfortheAnalysisofBoilingWaterReactors(LatticePhysics),"YAEC-1232,YankeeAtomicElectricCo.,December1980.E.Johansson,"ReactorPhysicsCalculationsonClose-PackedPressurizedWaterReactorLattices,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.68,pp.263-268,February1985.H.Richings,SomeNotesonPWR(W)PowerDistributionProbabilitiesforLOCAProbabilisticAnalyses,NRCMemorandumtoP.S.Check,datedJuly5J1977.M.G.Natrella,ExperimentalStatistics,NationalBureauofStandards,Handbook91,August1963.J.M.Canoetal.,"SupercriticalityThroughOptimumModerationinNuclearFuelStorage,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.48,pp.251-260,May1980.NUREG-0800,U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,StandardReviewPlan,BranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,Rev.2,July1981.Singh,K.P.,JournalofHeatTransfer,TransactionsoftheASME,August1981,Vol.1-3,"SomeFundamentalRelationshipsforTubularHeatExchangerThermalPerformance."GeneralElectricCorporation,R&DDataBooks,"HeatTransferandFluidFlow,"1974andupdates.Singh,K.P.etal.,"MethodforComputingtheMaximumWaterTemperatureinaFuelPoolContainingSpentNuclearFuel,"HeatTransferEngineering,Vol.7,No.1-2,pp.72-82(1986).NuclearRegulatoryCommission,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NUREG-0612,July1980.3-190076L/0011L

'~TI*("~t~Uf'f~~'I~If~'I4 TABLE3-1SUMMARYOFCRITICALITYSAFETYANALYSESRegion1Region2Minimumacceptableburnup84.5XinitialenrichmentTemperatureassumedforanalysisReferencek~(nominal)CalculationalbiasUncertaintiesBiasB-10concentrationBoraflexthicknessBoraflexwidthInnerboxdimensionWatergapthicknessSSthicknessFuelenrichmentFueldensityFuelelementpitchStatisticalcombinationEccentricassemblypositionAllowanceforburnupuncertaintyTotalMaximumreactivity(with1720ppmsolubleboron)4'c0.93130.0013+0.0018+0.0021+0.0044+0.0017+0.0011+0.0043+0.0010+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0080+0.0003N/A0.9329+0.00800.9409(0.767)36.5Mwd/kgU4'c0.91140.0013+0.0018+0.0036+0.0111+0.0011+0.0016H'/A+0.0002+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0125negative+0.01830.9310+0.01250.9435(0.760)(1)Squarerootofsumofsquares.N/A-NotApplicable3-200076L/0011L

TABLE3-2MINIMUMBURNUPVALUESInitialEnrichment,XMinimumBurnup,Mwd/kgU1.631.752.002.252.502.753.003.253.503.754.004.254.5002.306.009.7012.9016.1019.1522.2025.1528.1030.9033.7036.503-210076L/0011L TABLE3-3REACTIVITYEFFECTSOFABNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONSAccident/AbnormalConditionsReactivityEffectTemperatureincreaseVoid(boiling)AssemblydroppedontopofrackLateralrackmodulemovementMisplacementofafuelassemblyNegativeinbothregionsNegativeinbothregionsNegligibleNegligiblePositive0,3-220076L/0011L TABLE3-4FUELBURNUPVALUESFORREQUIREDREACTIVITIES(k~)WITHFUELOFVARIOUSINITIALENRICHMENTS(Referencekc0.9297)InitialEnrichmentUncertaintyinBurnup,5kDesignLimitkcCalculatedBurnuplimitMwd/kgU1.62.02.53.03.54.04.500.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.50(1)SeeSubsection3.1.3.3.23-230076L/0011L TABLE3-5COMPARISONOFCOLD,CLEANREACTIVITIESCALCULATEDAT36.5Mwd/kgUBURNUPAND4.5XENRICHMENTk~Xe-free,4CCalculationalMethodInfiniteArray9fFuelAssemblies~inReactorSpacingAssembliesinRegion2CellCASMO-2EDIFFUSION/BLACKNESSTHEORYEPRI-CELLl.12121.13061.12810.91140.8972(1)Cold,cleanconditionincontrasttohotoperatingconditionsofFigure3-4.(2)EPRI-CELLk~atmaximumvalueduringlong-term(30-year)storage.3-240076L/0011L TABLE3-6ESTIMATEDUNCERTAINTIESINREACTIVITYDUETOFUELDEPLETIONEFFECTSInitialEnrichmentDesignBurnupMwd/kgU0.0005TimesBurnup,5kDesignkcgReactivityLoss,6k<1.62.02.53.03.54.04.505.9912.8819.1325.1530.8636.5000.00300.00640.00960.01260.01540.01830.92970.92670.92330.92010.91710.91430.911500.05790.12840.18280.22620.26200.2924(1)Totalreactivitydecrease,calculatedforthecold,Xe-freeconditioninthefuelstoragerack,fromthebeginning-of-lifetothedesignburnup.3-250076L/0011L

~h~l TABLE3-7LONG-TERMCHANGESINREACTIVITYINSTORAGERACKStorageTime,years5kfromShutdown(Xenon-free)at4.5XEand36.5Mwd/kgU0.51.010.020.030.0-0.0047-0.0088-0.0470-0.0673-0.07883-260076L/0011L 0TABLE3-8DESIGNBASIS(LIMITING)FUELASSEMBLYSPECIFICATIONS(CE14x14)FuelRodDataCladdingoutsidediameter,in.Claddingthickness,in.CladdingmaterialPelletdiameter,in.U02stackdensity,g/cmEnrichment,AXU-2350.4400.028Zircaloy-40.37710.281+0.0314.5+0.05FuelAssemblyDataMaximumnumberoffuelrodsFuelrodpitch,in.ControlrodguidetubeNumberOutsidediameter,in.Insidediameter,in.MaterialU-235Loadinggrams/axialcmofassembly176(14x14array)0.577+0.002351.1151.035Zircaloy-451.7+0.703-270076L/0011L TABLE3-9THERMAL/HYDRAULICCASESTREATED*1.NormalBatchDischarge:Irradiationtime:54months(1.42x10sees)8Additionofthemostrecentbatch:150hoursaftershutdownBatchsize:80assemblies2.PullCoreDischargeIrradiationtime:73assemblies90days72assemblies21months72assemblies39monthsFueltransferbegins7daysaftershutdown.*Thepoolhastotalstoragecapacityof1706storagecells.Itisconservativelyassumedthat18batchesof80assemblieshavebeenpreviouslydischargedat18monthintervals.Eachassemblyinthesepreviousdischargeshashad54monthsofexposureatfullpower(12.44MWt).3-280076L/0011L TABLE3-10PEAKINGFACTORDATAFuelMaximumRadialPeakingFactorMaximumAxialPeakingFactorSt.LucieUnit1CE14x14andExxon14x141.671.32StLucieUnit2,CE16x16l.751.353-290076L/0011L V,rrJL~

TABLE3-11ESSENTIALHEATTRANSFERDATAFORTHEFUELPOOLHEATEXCHANGERNumberofheatexchangers:Coolantflowrate:Temperatureeffectiveness:one3560gpm0.36{twopumps)*0.263{onepump)Heattransfersurfacearea:Overallheattransfercoefficient{fouled){twopumps):43SOsq.ft.260Btu/sq.ft.-hr-oF*Temperatureefficiencyoftheheatexchangeriscalculatedinthefollowingmanner,usingtheinformationprovidedintheFSAR:PaCoolingwateroutlet-inletPoolwaterinlet-coolingwaterinlet118-100150-100.363-300076L/0011L t~'e TABLE3-12POWERGENERATIONRATIOPREVIOUSLYDISCHARGEDBATCHESBatchBatchNo.SizeTimeAfterShutReactorExposureNonDimensionalDowninDaysTimeinDaysPowerGen.Ratio12345678910ll121317188080808080808080808080808080808080809719.99179.98639.98099.97559.97019.96479.95939.95399.94859.94319.93779.93239.92699.92159.91619.91079.9540.01643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.51643.5.00487.00505.00523.00542.00562.00582.00603.00624.00647.00670.00694.00720.00746.00776~00815.00888.01097..01893CUMULATIVEDIMENSIONLESSPOWER1.3374E-013-310076L/0011L TABLE3-13BULKPOOLTEMPERATUREVS.TIMEDURINGNORMALREFUELINGDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)150.00*151.00106.0108.8.5689E+07.1643E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischargeisassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously,simulatedbyonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-320076L/0011L

TABLE3-14POOLBULKTEMPERATUREVS.TIMESUBSEQUENTTOCOMPLETIONOFNORMALREFUELINGDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)151.00161.00171.00181.00191.00201.00211.00221.00231.00241.00251.00261.00271.00281.00291.00301.00311.00321.00331.00341.00351.00361.00371.00381.00391.00108.8130.0133.2133.3133.0132.6132.2131.8131.5131.1130.8130.6130.3130.1129.8129.6129.4129.2129.0128.8128.6128.4128.3128.1127.9.1642E+08.1613E+08.1588E+08.1565E+08.1544E+08.1525E+08.1507E+08.1490E+08.1475E+08.1461E+08.1447E+08.1435E+08.1423E+08.1411E+08.1401E+08.1390E+08.1380E+08.1371E+08.1362E+08.1353E+08.1344E+08.1336E+081328E+08.1320E+08.1313E+083-330076L/0011L TABLE3-15LOSSOFCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETIONOFNORMALREFUELINGDISCHARGECaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation(ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)WhenheatgenerationismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperatureeiamaximum16.7913.4316933.016294.02.672.573-340076L/0011L k

TABLE3-16BUIXPOOLTEMPERATUREVSTIMEDURINGFULLCOREDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)168.00*169.00113.6117.8.8690E+07.3371E+08*Thistablecontainsonlytwolinesofoutputdata.Thisisduetothefactthatthedischargeisassumedtotakeplaceinstantaneously,simulatedbyonehourinthiscomputerrun.3-350076L/0011L TABLE3-17POOLBULKTEMPERATUREVSTIMESUBSEQUENTTOCOMPLETIONOFFULLCOREDISCHARGETime(Hrs.)BulkPoolTemp.(oF)HeatGenerationRate(Btu/hr)169.00179.00189.00199.00209.00219.00229.00239.00249.00259.00269.00279.00289.00299.00309.00319.00329.00339.00349.00359.00369.00379.00389.00399.00409.00117.8148.8150.8150.2149.4148.7148.1147.4146.9146.3145.8145.3144.8144.4144.0143.6143.2142.8142.5142.1141.8141.5141.1140.8140.5.3370E+08.3307E+08.3249E+08.3197E+08.3149E+08.3104E+08.3062E+08.3024E+08.2987E+08.2953E+08.2921E+08.2991E+08.2862E+08.2834E+08.2807E+08.2782E+08.2758E+08.2734E+08.2712E+08.2690E+08.2668E+08.2648E+08.2628E+08.2608e+08.2589E+083-360076L/0011L 11ti1II TABLE3-18LOSSOPCOOLINGAFTERCOMPLETIONOFPULLCOREDISCHARGECaseTimetoBoil(hrs)RateofEvaporation(ibm/hr)RateofLevelChange(inch/hr)WhenheatgenerationismaximumWhenthebulkpooltemperatureismaximum7.475.0434742.233660.05.475.33-370076L/0011L III TABLE3-19LOCALANDCLADDINGTEMPERATUREDATACaseInstantMaximumLocalMaximumWaterCladdingTemp.oFTemp.oFNormaldischargeWhenthepoolheatgenerationrateisatitspeakvalue155.9198.8NormaldischargeFullcoredischargeFullcoredischargeWhenthepoolbulktemperatureisatitspeakvalueWhentheheatgenerationrateinthepoolisatthepeakvalueWhenthepoolbulktemperatureisatitspeakvalue179.2162.8188.0219.4209.4222.803-380076L/0011L II 4030Uh4025DZ20,xu015ACCEPTABLEBURNUPDOMAINUNACCEPTABLEBURNUPDOMAIN1002.02.53.0,3.54.0INITIALENRICHMENT,WT%U-2354.5FLORIDAPOWER5LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1ACCEPTABIEBURNUPDOMAININREGION2OFTHEST.LUCIEPLANTSPENTFUELSTORAGERACKSFIGURE3-1 OO~OO0OO~~~~0~~~~~~~~~0~0~0~0~~~~~~~0~OO~0~0~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~OO~~00~~~~~~0~~~~0~~~OO~~0OOOOOl~~OO~eo~ee0~~~~e~~~~~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'

o~~~~~~~~~0~~~o~~~~~~~~~~o~~0~o~~oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~ocoo~e~oo~~o~~o%o~o0~~~~~~~~~o~o~oo~o~~0+0~~~~~~ohio~~~~o~~~~~~~~~~o~0~o~oo~o~~o~~o~~~0~~~~0~o~~o~oo~~e~o~~~o~oo0~~~~~oooo

1.40OrnOQCg->Ocnirzo~mcoz0lTiXOg~C~mmmezlmHO+llQ4zI0g7COr~CO0g~mmrQozIHGJC+~zOQz1.30C9R~1.200IOxLUIz;'I.10LLzhC1.000.900102.5%%dE152025FUELBURNUP,IVIWD/KGU3.5%ECASNIO-2ENULIFEPRI-CELLCHEETAH-P,(COINCIDESWITH4.5%ECASNIO)304.5'YoE40 POOLATBULKTEMPERAlURE,t'COOLANTAT8)COOLANTAT02COOLANTAT0;COOLANTAT~NHXKg)O~orm~Itl~OCn+ZOrnftlo+mac'n~mCCmNPmIO>ommR4>rz~C)zC~K+0zCOOLER¹1COOLER¹2COOLER¹iCOOLERSNHX ASSUMEDADDEDFUELASSEMBLIESACTUALOUTLINEOFPOOLACTUALOUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLIESRACKASSEMBLY++if+++++IDEALIZEDOUTLINEOFRACKASSEMBLY0mlVTl0AC0llmPcmr0th0C0OQmmQo~I~C)C+0+0IDEALIZEDOUTLINEOFPOOLBOUNDARY

IZFUELBUNDLEXmTlA9xzm4lV0OII0ch0I0C0OQmmI~rR4C)gZ4o40z0XmaOI0ZnOC 4.0MECHANICAL,MATERIAL,ANDSTRUCTURALCONSIDERATIONS4.1DESCRIPTIONOPSTRUCTURE4.1.1DescritionoftheFuelHandlingBuildingTheFuelHandlingBuilding(FHB)consistsofcast-in-placereinforcedconcreteinteriorandexteriorwalls.Itiscompletelyisolatedfromallotherstructures.Thefloorsandroofareofbeamandgirderconstructionsupportedbycolumns.AcompletedescriptionofthePHBisprovidedinSection3.8.1.1.2oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.TheFHBgeneralarrangementisshownonFSARFigures1.2-18and1.2-19.ThePHBhasbeendesignedasaseismicClassIstructureinaccordancewiththecriteriaoutlinedinSections3.8.1.1.2and3.8.1.4through3.8.1.7oftheupdatedPSAR.Thebuildingexteriorwalls,floorsandinteriorpartitionsaredesignedtoprovideplantpersonnelwiththenecessarybiologicalradiationshieldingandprotecttheequipmentinsidefromtheeffectsofadverseenvironmentalconditionsincludingtornadoandhurricanewinds,temperature,externalmissilesandflooding.Thespentfuelpoolisacast-in-placesteellinedreinforcedconcretetankstructurethatprovidesspaceforstorageofspentfuelassemblies,controlelementassemblies,newfuelduringinitialcoreloadingandaspentfuelshippingcask.ThefuelpoolportionofthePHBincludingthewallsandroofdirectlyabovethepoolisdesignedtowithstand,withoutpenetration,theimpactofhighvelocityexternalmissilesthatmightoccurduringthepassageofatornado.ThedesignmissilesarefurtherdiscussedinSection3.5oftheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.Thespentfuelhandlingsystemincludesinterlocks,travellimitsandotherprotectivedevicestominimizetheprobabilityofeithermishandlingorofequipmentmalfunctionthatcouldresultininadvertentdamagetoafuelassemblyandpotentialfissionproductrelease.Theinterlockspreventmovementintothewallswhilelimitswitchespreventthespentfuelhandlingmachinefromraisingthefuelaboveaheightwhere,lessthanninefeetseparatesthesurfaceofthewaterfromthetopoftheactivefuellength.Aleakdetectionsystemisprovidedinthespentfuelpooltomonitor100percentofthepoollinerplateweldseams.Thissystemconsistsofanetworkofstainlesssteelanglesattachedtotheoutsideofthepoollinerwallsandtheundersideofthepoollinerfloorbymeansofweldsandsealedwithepoxymaterial.Intheeventthatoneoftheweldseamsdevelopsaleak,theliquidentersthemonitorchannelsystemandflowstooneof19collectionpointsatthebaseofthepool,fromwhichtheleakcanbetracedbacktoaspecificpoolarea.4.1.2DescriptionofSpentFuelRacksThefunctionofthespentfuelstorageracksistoprovideforstorageofspentfuelassembliesinafloodedpool,whilemaintainingaeoolablegeometry,preventingcriticality,andprotectingthefuelassembliesfromexcessivemechanicalorthermalloadings.4-10077L/0011L 0eeo0~~1fl0l0~~

Alistofdesigncriteriaisgivenbelow:TheracksaredesignedinaccordancewiththeNRC,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978(asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979)andSRPSection3.8.4[1].2.TheracksaredesignedtomeetthenuclearrequirementsofANSIN210-1976.Theeffectivemultiplicationfactor,kff,inthespentfuelpoolislessthanorequalto0.95,incfutiingalluncertaintiesandunderallcredibleconditions.3~Theracksaredesignedtoallowcoolantflowsuchthatboilinginthewaterchannelsbetweenthefuelassembliesintherackdoesnotoccur.MaximumfuelcladdingtemperaturesarecalculatedforvariouspoolcoolingconditionsasdescribedinSection3.3.4~TheracksaredesignedtoseismicCategoryIrequirements,andareclassifiedasANSSafetyClass3andASMECodeClass3ComponentSupportStructures.ThestructuralevaluationandseismicanalysesareperformedusingthespecifiedloadsandloadcombinationsinSection4.4.Theracksaredesignedtowithstandloadswithoutviolatingthecriticalityacceptancecriteriawhichmayresultfromfuelhandlingaccidentsandfromthemaximumupliftforceofthespentfuelhandlingmachine.6.7~8.Eachstoragepositionintheracksisdesignedtosupportandguidethefuelassemblyinamannerthatwillminimizethepossibilityofapplicationofexcessivelateral,axialandbendingloadstofuelassembliesduringfuelassemblyhandlingandstorage.Theracksaredesignedtoprecludetheinsertionofafuelassemblyinotherthandesignlocationswithintherackarray.Thematerialsusedinconstructionoftheracksarecompatiblewiththestoragepoolenvironmentandwillnotcontaminatethefuelassemblies.4.1.2.1DesignofSpentFuelRacks4.1.2.1.1Region1TherackmoduleisfabricatedfromASMESA-240-304Lausteniticstainlesssteelsheetandplatematerial,andSA-351-CF3castingmaterialandSA-564-630precipitationhardenedstainlesssteel(to1100oF)forsupportsonly.TheweldfillermaterialutilizedinbodyweldsisASMESFA-5.9,ClassificationER308L.Boraflexservesastheneutronabsorbermaterial.AdditionalinformationonBorafiexmaybefoundinSection3.1.3.TheBoraflexeexperiencelistisgiveninTable4-1.4-20077L/0011L 0ll~~ElC~01 Atypicalmodulecontainsstoragecellswhichhavean8.65-inchnominalsquarecross-sectionalopening.Thisdimensionensuresthatfuelassemblieswithmaximumexpectedaxialbowcanbeinsertedandremovedfromthestoragecellswithoutanydamagetothefuelassembliesortherackmodules.Pigure4-7showsahorizontalcross-sectionofa3x3array.Thecellsprovideasmoothandcontinuoussurfaceforlateralcontactwiththefuelassembly.Theanatomyoftherackmodulesisbestexplainedbydescribingthecomponentsofthedesign,namely:InternalSquareTubeNeutronAbsorbermaterial(Boraflex)PoisonsheathingGapelementBaseplateSupportassemblyTopLead-In4.1.2.1.1.1InternalSquareTubeThiselementprovidesthelateralbearingsurfacetothefuelassembly.Itisfabricatedbyjoiningtwoformedchannels(Pigure4-1)usingacontrolledseamweldingoperation.Thiselementisan8.65-inchsquare(nominal)cross-sectionby169incheslong.4.1.2.1.1.2NeutronAbsorberMaterial(Boraflex)Boraflexisplacedonallfoursidesofasquaretubeoveralengthof143"(minimum),whichprovidestherequisiteB-10screenforallstoredassembliesincludingafour-inchshrinkageallowance.4.1.2.1.1.3AbsorberSheathingTheabsorbersheathing(coverplate),showninFigure4-2,servestopositionandretaintheabsorbermaterialinitsdesignatedspace.Thisisaccomplishedbyspotweldingthecoversheettothesquaretubealongtheformer'sedgesatnumerous(atleast20)locations.Thismannerofattachmentensuresthattheabsorbermaterialwillnotsagorlaterallydisplaceduringfabricationprocessesandunderanysubsequentloadingcondition.4.1.2.1.1.4GapElementGapelements,illustratedinPigure4-3,positiontwoinnerboxesatapredetermineddistancetomaintaintheminimumfluxtrapgaprequiredbetweentwoboxes.Thegapelementisweldedtotheinnerboxbyfilletwelds.AnarrayofcompositeboxassembliesweldedasindicatedinFigure4-7formsthehoneycombgridworkofcellswhichharnessesthestructuralstrengthofallsheetandplatetypemembersinanefficientmanner.Thearrayofcompositeboxeshasoverallbending,torsional,andaxialrigiditieswhichareanorderofmagnitudegreaterthanconfigurationsutilizinggridbartypeofconstruction.4-30077L/0011L

~~ea0l0 e4.1.2.1.1.5BaseplateThebaseplateisa3/4&nchthickplatetypememberwhichhas6-inchdiameterholesconcentricallylocatedwithrespecttotheinternalsquaretube,exceptatsupportleglocations,wheretheholesizeis5inchesindiameter.Theseholesprovidetheprimarypathforcoolantflow.Secondaryflowpathsareavailablebetweenadjacentcellsviathelateralflowholes(1inchindiameter)neartherootofthehoneycomb(Figure4-4)whichprecludeflowblockages.Thehoneycombisweldedtothebaseplatewith3/32-inchfilletwelds.4.1.2.1.1.6SupportAssemblyEachmodulehasatleastfoursupportlegs.Allsupportsareadjustableinlengthtoenablelevelingoftherack.Thevariableheightsupportassemblyconsistsofaflat-footedspindlewhichridesintoaninternally-threadedcylindricalmember.Thecylindricalmemberisattachedtotheundersideofthebaseplatethroughfilletandpartialpenetrationwelds.Thebaseoftheflat-footedspindlesitsonthepoolfloor.Levelingoftherackmodulesisaccomplishedbyturningthesquaresprocketinthespindleusingalongarm(approximately46feetlong)squareheadwrench.Figure4-6showsaverticalcrossMectionoftheadjustablesupportassembly.Thesupportselevatethemodulebaseplateapproximately5-5/8inchesabovethepoolfloor,thuscreatingthewaterplenumforcoolantflow.Thelateralholesinthecylindricalmemberprovidethecoolantentrypathleadingintothebottomofthestoragelocations.4.1.2.1.1.7TopLead-InLead-insareprovidedoneachcelltofacilitatefuelassemblyinsertion.Contiguouswallsofadjacentcellsarestructurallyconnectedatthelead-inswithasuitableventopening.Theselead-injointsaidinreducingthelateraldeflectionoftheinnersquaretubeduetotheimpactoffuelassembliesduringthegroundmotion(postulatedseismicmotionspecifiedintheFSAR).Thistypeofconstructionleadstonaturalventinglocationsfortheintermellspacewheretheneutronabsorbermaterialislocated.4.1.2.1.2Region2DesignTherackmodulesinRegion2arefabricatedfromthesamematerialasthatusedforRegion1modules,i.e.,ASMESA-240-304Lausteniticstainlesssteel.As,showninFigure4-5atypicalRegion2modulestoragecellalsohasan8.65-inchnominalsquarecrossmectionalopening.Figure4Wshowsahorizontalcross-sectionofa3x3array.TherackconstructionvariesfromthatforRegion1inasmuchasthestainlesssteelcoverplates,gapelementsandtoplead-insareeliminated.Hence,thebasiccomponentsofthisdesignareasfollows:InnertubeNeutronabsorbermaterialSidestripsBaseplateSupportassembly0077L/0011LRevision1 mI'~e Inthisconstruction,twochannelelementsformthecellofan8.65-inchnominalsquarecross-sectionalopening.ThepoisonmaterialisplacedbetweentwoboxesasshowninFigure4-8.Stainlesssteelsidestripsareinsertedonbothsidesofthepoisonmaterialtofirmlylocateitinthelateraldirection.Thebottomstrippositionsthepoisonmaterialintheverticaldirectiontoenvelopetheentireactivefuellengthofafuelassembly(Figure4-5).TwoadjacentboxesandthesidestripbetweenboxesareweldedtogetherasshowninFigure4-8,toformthehoneycombrackmodule.ThebaseplateandsupportassembliesareincorporatedinexactlythesamemannerasdescribedforRegion1intheprecedingsection.4.1.2.2FuelHandlingThedesignofthespentfuelrackswillnotaffectthec'onclusionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentspresentedintheFSAR(Section15.4.3)andsummarizedbytheNRCintheSafetyEvaluationReport.Thatis,theradiologicaldosesforthepostulatedfuelcaskandfuelassemblydropaccidentsarewellwithinthe10CFR100criteria.4.2APPLICABLECODES,STANDARDS,ANDSPECIFICATIONSThedesignandfabricationofthespentfuelracksandtheanalysisofthespentfuelpoolhavebeenperformedinaccordancewiththeapplicableportionsofthefollowingNRCRegulatoryGuides,StandardReviewPlanSections,andpublishedstandards:~~~4.2.1NRCDocumentsa.April14,1978NRCOTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.b.StLuciePlantUnit1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.C~NRCRegulatoryGuides1.13,Rev2SpentFuelStorageFacilityDesignBasisDec.1981(Draft)1.25March1972AssumptionsUsedforEvaluatingthePotentialRadiologicalConsequencesofaFuelHandlingAccidentintheFuelHandlingandStorageFacilityforBoilingandPressurizedWaterReactors0077L/0011L (l

1.26,Rev3Feb.1976QualityGroupClassificationsandStandardsforHater,SteamandRadioactiveWasteContainingComponentsofNuclearPowerPlants1.29,Rev3Sept.19781.31,Rev31.71,Rev01.85,Rev22SeismicDesignClassificationProposedControlofFerriteComponentinStainlessSteelHeldMaterialWelderQualificationforAreasofLimitedAccessibilityMaterialCodeCaseAcceptabilityASMESectionIIIDivisionI1.92,Rev11.124,Rev1Jan.19783.41,Rev1CombiningModalResponsesandSpatialComponentsinSeismicResponseAnalysisServiceLimitsandLoadCombinationsforClass1Linear-TypeComponentSupportsValidationofCalculationalMethodsforNuclearCriticalitySafety.NRCStandardReviewPlan-NUREG-0800Rev1,July1981Section3.7,SeismicDesignRev1,July1981Section3.8.4,OtherSeismicCategoryIStructures,AppendixDRev3,July1981Section9.1.2,SpentFuelStorageRev1,July1981Section9.1.3,SpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemRev2,July1981NRCBranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,ResidualDecayEnergyforLightWaterReactorsforLongTermCoolingGeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlants,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title10,Part50,AppendixA(GDCNos.1,2,61,62and63)NUREG-0612ControlofHeavyloadsatNuclearPowerPlants.4-60077L/0011L no0 4.2.2IndustrCodesandStandardsANSIN14.6-1978AmericanNationalStandardforSpecialLiftingDevicesforShippingContainersWeighing10,000PoundsorMoreforNuclearMaterialsANSIN16.1-75NuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactorsANSIN16.9-75ANSIN18.2-1973ValidationofCalculationMethodsforNuclearCriticalitySafetyNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlantsANSIN45.2.2Packaging,Shipping,Receiving,StorageandHandlingofItemsforNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN45.2.1ANSIN45.2.11CleaningofFluidSystemsandAssociatedComponentsduringConstructionPhaseofNuclearPowerPlants1974QualityAssuranceRequirementsfortheDesignofNuclearPowerPlantsANSIANS-57.2-1983DesignRequirementsforLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilitiesatNuclearPowerPlantsANSIN210-76DesignObjectivesforLightWaterReactorSpentFuelStorageFacilitiesatNuclearPowerStationsASMESectionIII(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984AddendaNuclearPowerPlantComponentspSubsectionNFACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2(1977Edition)CodeforConcreteReactorVesselsandContainmentsACI318-63AISC1980BuildingCodeRequirementsforReinforcedConcreteSpecificationfortheDesign,FabricationandErectionofStructuralSteelforBuildings,EighthEditionAWSDl.lASNT-TC-lAJune1980StructuralWeldingCodeAmericanSocietyforNondestructiveTesting(RecommendedPracticeforPersonnelQualification)4-70077L/0011L r

ASMEIIPartA6C(1983EditionuptoandincludingSummer1984Addenda)MaterialSpecificationsPartAFerrous,PartCWeldingRods,ElectrodesandFillerMetalsASMEIX(1983Editionuptoandin-cludingSummer1984Addenda)Welding&BrazingQualificationsASMEBoilerandPressureVessel,'ectionV,(1983EditionuptoandincludingSummer1984Addenda)Non-destructiveExamination4.3SEISMICANDIMPACTLOADSTheobjectiveoftheseismicanalysisofthespentfuelracksistodeterminethestructuralresponsesresultingfromthesimultaneousapplicationofthreeorthogonalseismicexcitations.Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetimehistorymethod.SeismicfloorresponsespectraforthespentfuelpoolfloorhavebeendevelopedusingthemethodsdescribedinSubsections3.7.1and3.7.2oftheStLucieUnitNo1UpdatedFSAR.TheparametersoftheoriginallumpedmassmodeloftheFuelHandlingBuildingwereadjustedtoreflecttheincreasedmasscorrespondingtothenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks.TheresultingfloorresponsespectraareshowninFigure4-9.Thesespectrawerethenusedtogeneratestatisticallyindependenttimehistoryexcitations,oneforeachofthethreeorthogonaldirections.Sincethespentfuelrackshavenoconnectionwiththepoolwallsorwitheachother,thepoolfloortimehistoriesareusedasinputtothedynamicanalysisoftheracks,asdescribedinSubsection4.5.2.2.1.Fluidcouplingisalsoconsideredasdescribedtherein.DeflectionormovementsofracksunderearthquakeloadingislimitedbydesignsuchthatthenuclearparametersoutlinedinSection3.1arenotexceeded.ImpactloadshavebeenconsideredasdiscussedinSubsection4.6.4.Theinteractionbetweenthefuelassembliesandtherackhasbeenconsidered,particularlygapeffects.Theresultingimpactloadsareofsmallmagnitudessothereisnostructuraldamagetothefuelassemblies.Thespentfuelpoolstructurehasbeenreanalyzedfortheincreaseddead,thermalandseismicloadingresultingfromthestorageofadditionalfuelassembliesinthepool,asdescribedinSubsection4.5.1.4-80077L/0011L e~1f4 4.4LOADSANDLOADCOMBINATIONS4.4.1SentFuelPool4.4.1.1Loads*Thefollowingdesignloadswereconsideredinthespentfuelpoolanalysis:a)StructuralDeadLoad(D)Deadloadconsistsofthedeadweightofthespentfuelracks,thepoolwaterandtheconcretestructure,superstructure,wallsandmiscellaneousbuildingitemswithintheFuelHandlingBuilding.b)LiveLoad(L)Liveloadsarerandomtemporaryloadconditionsformaintenancewhichincludethespentfuelcaskdeadweight.c)SeismicLoads(SSEandOBE)SeismicloadsincludetheloadsinducedbySafeShutdownEarthquake(SSE)andOperatingBasisEarthquake(OBE).Thehydrodynamicloadduringtheearthquakeeventswasalsoconsidered.d)NormalOperatingThermalLoads(T)Theloadinducedbynormalthermalgradientsexistingbetweenthebuildinginteriorandtheambientexternalenvironmentwasconsidered.Theconditionsare:SummerInterior"watertemperature150PExteriorairtemperatureSoiltemperatureWinter93'P70'PInteriorwatertemperature150FExteriorairtemperatureSoiltemperature32'p70oPPorallcases,the"asconstructed"concretetemperaturewasassumedtobe70P.Alineargradientthroughthewallandmatwasassumed.4-90077L/0011L SII e)Accident(LossofFuelPoolCooling)ThermalLoad(TA)Thethermalaccidenttemperatureforthespentfuelpoolwateris217oFthroughoutthepool.Atthistemperature,theexteriorairtemperatureat40Fwasassumedforthecriticalthermalgradientthroughthewall.70Fsoiltemperaturewasused.Thethermalgradientwasassumedtobelinear.f)FuelCaskDropLoad(M)A25toncaskdropfromthemaximumheightof58feetabovethepoolfloor(Elevation79.50')wasconsidered.(ThecaskbottommustattainElevation77.00'orentryintothebuilding.)4.4.1.2LoadCombinationsInthespentfuelpoolanalysis,thefollowingloadcombinations,fromtheStLucreNo.1UpdatedFSAR,Section3.8.1.5,wereconsidered:a)NormalOperation1.5(D+T)+1.8Lb)OBECondition1.25(D+T+OBE+0.2L)c)SSECondition105(D+T+0.2L)+1.0SSEd)AccidentandCaskDrop105(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+T+0.2L)+1.0MFortheevaluationofthelinerandlineranchors,theaboveloadcombinationsareapplicableexceptthatloadfactorsforallcasesmaybetakenequalto1.0(inaccordancewithTableCC-3230-1ofACI-ASMESectionIII,Division2)inconjunctionwiththestructuralacceptancecriteriaofthisSARsubsection4.6.1.1.b.Linearanalyseswithoutiterationswereperformedinitiallytodeterminethecriticalloadcombinations.Asaresult,thefollowingloadingcaseswereselectedforthenon-linearconcretecrackinganalysis:i)ii)iii)iv)v)vi)vii)1.5D+1.8L1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+Tsummer+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+0.2L)+1.0SSE1.05(D+TA+0.2L)1.05(D+Twinter+0.2L)+1.0M105(D+0.2L)+1.0M4-100077L/0011L nJ05c0~,fI' 4.4.2SpentFuelRacks14.4.2.1LoadsThefollowingloadsDeadLoad(D)wereconsideredintherackdesign:Deadweight-inducedstresses(includingfuelassemblyweight).(D')=LiveLoad(L)Deadweightofemptyrack.0forthestructure,sincetherearenomovingobjectsintherackloadpath.FuelDropAccidentLoad(Fd)=Forcecausedbytheaccidentaldropoftheheaviestloadfromthemaximumpossibleheight.(SeeSection4.6.6.)CraneUpliftLoadUpwardforceontherackscausedbypostulatedstuckfuelassembly(4000lbs).SeismicLoads(E)OperatingBasisEarthquake.(E')=SafeShutdownEarthquake.Thermal(To)Loads(Ta)Differentialtemperatureinducedloads(normalcondition).Differentialtemperatureinducedloads(abnormaldesigncondition).Forupsetandemergencyconditions,Tisthedifferentialtemperatureforthefullycoreoffloadcondition,Forfaultedconditions,Taisthedifferentialtemperatureforthelossofcoolingcondition.TheconditionsTaandTocauselocalthermalstressestobeproduced.Theworstsituationwillbeobtainedwhenanisolatedstoragelocationhasafuelassemblywhichisgeneratingheatatthemaximumpostulatedrate.Thesurroundingstoragelocationsareassumedtocontainnofuel.Theheatedwatermakesunobstructedcontactwiththeinsideofthestoragewalls,therebyproducingthemaximumpossibletemperaturedifferencebetweentheadjacentcells.Thesecondarystressesthusproducedarelimitedtothebodyoftherack;thatis,thesupportlegsdonotexperiencethesecondary(thermal)stresses.4.4.2.2LoadCombinationsEachcomponentoperatingconditionhasbeenevaluatedfortheapplicableloadingcombinationslistedbelow:4-110077L/0011L C

0a)NormalConditionb)UpsetConditionc)EmergencyConditiond)FaultedConditionD+LD+L+TD+L+To+ED'TD+L+Ta+ED+L+Ta+PfD+Ta+FDD+T+Pf+ED+T+FD+ED+L+T+E'+L+FDD+L+Pf4.5DESIGNANDANALYSISPROCEDURES4.5.1DesignandAnalysisProceduresfortheSpentFuelPool4.5.1.1SpentFuelPoolStructureFiniteElementAnalysisInthisanalysis,theEBS/NASTRANprogram,developedbyEbascoandlinkedtothecommerciallyavailableNASTRANprogram,wasused.Variouslayersofconcreteandreinforcingbarswereusedtodeterminetheeffectsofconcretecracking.Thenonlinearanalysisschemebasedonthecombinationofstiffnessiterationandloaditerationmethods,whichwereavailableinEBS/NASTRANprogram,wasusedtoautomaticallydeterminethestressesintheconcreteandreinforcingbarsaftertheconcretecracks.Thefiniteelementmodelusedinthisanalysiscanbesummarizedasfollows:a)Sincetheeffectoftheadditionalfuelrackloadonthepoolfloorislimitedtothematinthepoolarea,theupperportionofthepoolwallsisnotrequiredforthere-evaluation.Therefore,thefiniteelementmodelincludedthelowerportionofwalls,thepoolfloor(mat)andtheunderlyingsoil.ThestructuralcomponentsincludedinthemodelareshownonFigure4-10.Thecut-offboundaryofthewallsisatEL.45.25ft.b)Thefollowingboundaryconditionswereusedatthemodelcut-offboundaries:i)Southendofthemat-Rotationalspringsrepresentingthebendingresistanceofthecut-offmatwereprovided.4-120077L/0011L IfIII ii)Topofthewalls-Therotationabouttheaxisparalleltotheedgeofthewallwasrestrainedtoconsidertheeffectofthecut-offwall.Thisassumedboundaryconditionhaslittleeffectontheresponseofthepoolmat,sincetheboundaryisfarabovethemat.Thiswasdemonstratedinthelinearanalysisresults.iii)Southendofeastandwestwalls-Sincetherigidityofthecut-offwallsisverysmall,afreeboundaryconditionwasassumed.AcomputerplotofthefiniteelementmodelispresentedinFigure4-11whichshowstheoverallviewofthemodelindicatingthecompositeofthefourexteriorandoneinteriorwalls.4.5.1.2LinerandAnchorageAnalysisThelineranditsanchorswereevaluatedforthetemperatureload,thestraininducedloadduetothedeformationofthefloor,andthehorizontalseismicload.TheprogramPOSBUKFdevelopedbyEbascowasusedforthelinerbucklinganalysisduetothetemperatureandstraininducedloads.Thisprogramiscapableofdeterminingthepost-bucklingstress/strainifthelinerplatebuckles.Theeffectofthehydrostaticpressurewasconsideredinthisanalysis.Incalculatingthein-planeshearduetothehorizontalseismicloadstransmittedfromthefuelracktotheliner,themaximumassumedfrictioncoefficientof0.8wasused.Thelineranchorswereevaluatedfortheunbalancedlinerin-planeforceduetothetemperatureandstraininducedloads,aswellasthehorizontalseismicin-planeshearforce.4.5.1.3FoundationStabilityandSoilBearingAdetailedsoilbearingevaluationwasperformedfortheincreasedfuelrackloading.Thesoilstresseswereobtainedateachmatcornerandcomparedtotheallowablevalue.Stabilitycalculationswereperformedforoverturningandsliding.4.5.2DesignandAnalysisProceduresforSpentFuelStorageRacksThepurposeofthissubsectionistodemonstratethestructuraladequacyofthespentfuelrackdesignundernormalandaccidentloadingconditions.Themethodofanalysispresentedhereinusesatime-historyintegrationmethodsimilartothatpreviouslyusedintheLicensingReportsonHighDensityFuelRacksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2(DocketNos50-254and50-265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),GrandGulfUnit1(DocketNo50-416),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),DiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323)andByronUnits1and2(DocketNos50-454and50-455).TheresultsshowthatthehighdensityspentfuelracksarestructurallyadequatetoresistthepostulatedstresscombinationsassociatedwithlevelA,B,CandDconditionsasdefinedinReferences1and2.4-130077L/0011L

~Il~Ie 4.5.2.1AnalysisOutlineThespentfuelstorageracksareseismicCategoryIequipment.Thus,theyarerequiredtoremainfunctionalduringandafteraSafeShutdownEarthquake().Asnotedpreviously,theseracksareneitheranchoredtothepoolfloornoraretheyattachedtothesidewalls.Theindividualrackmodulesarenotinterconnected.Furthermore,aparticularrackmaybecompletelyloadedwithfuelassemblies(whichcorrespondstogreatestrackinertia),oritmaybecompletelyempty.Thecoefficientoffriction,p,betweenthysupportsandpoolfloorisdeterminedasfollows.AccordingtoRabinowicz<"~theresultsof199testsperformedonausteniticstainlesssteelplatessubmergedinwatershowameanvalueofp,tobe0.503withastandarddeviationof0.125.Theupperandlowerbounds(basedontwicethestandarddeviation)arethus0.753and0.253,respectively.Twoseparateanalysesareperformedfortherackassemblieswithvaluesofthecoefficientoffrictionequalto0.2(lowerlimit)and0.8(upperlimit),respectively.Analysesperformedforthegeometricallylimitingrackmodulesfocusonlimitingvaluesofthecoefficientoffriction,andthenumberoffuelassembliesstored.Typicalcasesstudiedare:Fullyloadedrack(allstoragelocationsoccupied),p~0.8,0.2(p~coefficientoffricti.on)NearlyemptyrackP0.8,02RackhalffullP=0.2,0.8PoolfloorslabaccelerationdatadevelopedfortheSafeShutdownEarthquake(SSE)areshowninFigures4-12through4-14.Themethodofanalysisemployedisthetime-historymethod.Thepoolslabaccelerationdataweredevelopedfromthebuildingresponsespectra.Theobjectiveoftheseismicanalysisistodeterminethestructuralresponse(stresses,deformation,rigidbodymotion,etc)duetosimulataneousapplicationofthethreeindependent,orthogonalexcitations.Theseismicanalysisisperformedinthreesteps,namely:1.Developmentofanonlineardynamicmodelconsistingofinertialmasselementsandgapandfrictionelements.2.Generationoftheequationsofmotionandinertialcouplingandsolutionoftheequationsusingthe"componentelementtimeintegrationscheme">todeterminenodalforcesanddisplacements.3.Computationofthedetailedstressfieldintherack(atthecriticallocation)andinthesupportlegsusingthenodalforcescalculatedinthepreviousstep.ThesestressesarecheckedagainstthedesignlimitsgiveninSection4.6.2.2.Abriefdescriptionofthedynamicmodelfollows.4-140077L/0011L e~eeP~e0e 4.5.2.2FuelRack-FuelAssemblyModelSincetheracksarenotanchoredtothepoolslaborattachedtothepoolwallsortoeachother,theycanexecuteawidevarietyofrigidbodymotions.Forexample,therackmayslideonthepoolfloor(so-called"slidingcondition");oneormorelegsmaymomentarilylosecontactwiththeliner("tippingcondition");ortherackmayexperienceacombinationofslidingandtippingconditions.Thestructuralmodelshouldpermitsimulationofthesekinematiceventswithinherentbuilt-inconservatisms.Sincetheseracksareequippedwithgirdlebarstodissipateenergyduetointer-rackimpact(ifitoccurs),itisalsonecessarytomodeltheinter-rackimpactphenomenainaconservativemanner.Similarly,liftoffofthesupportlegsandsubsequentimpactsmustbemodelledusingappropriateimpactelements,andCoulombfrictionbetweentherackandthepoollinermustbesimulatedbyappropriatepiecewiselinearsprings.Thesespecialattributesoftherackdynamicsrequireastrongemphasisonthemodelingofthelinearandnonlinearsprings,dampers,andstopelements.Themodeloutlineintheremainderofthissection,andthemodeldescriptioninthefollowingsectiondescribethedetailedmodelingtechniquetosimulatetheseeffects,withemphasisplacedonthenonlinearityoftherackseismicresponse.4.5.2.2.1OutlineofModelaOThefuelrackstructureisafoldedmetalplateassemblageweldedtoabaseplateandsupportedonfourlegs.Therackstructureitselfisaveryrigidstructure.Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticellrackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructureiscapturedalmostcompletelybythebehaviorofasixdegrees-of-freedomstructure;therefore,themovementoftherackcross-sectionatanyheightis,describedintermsofthesixdegrees-of-freedomoftherackbase.b.Theseismicmotionofafuelrackischaracterizedbyrandomrattlingoffuelassembliesintheirindividualstoragelocations.Assumingthatallassembliesvibrateinphaseobviouslyexaggeratesthecomputeddynamicloadingontherackstructure.Thisassumption,however,greatlyreducestherequireddegrees-of-freedomneededtomodelthefuelassemblieswhicharerepresentedbyfivelumpedmasseslocatedatdifferentlevelsoftherack.Thecentroidofeachfuelassemblymasscanbelocated,relativetotherackstructurecentroidatthatlevel,soastosimulateapartiallyloadedrack.c.Thelocalflexibilityoftherack-supportinterfaceismodeledconservativelyintheanalysis.d.Therackbasesupportmayslideorliftoffthepoolfloor.e.Thepoolfloorandwallshaveaspecifiedtime-historyofseismicaccelerationsalongthethreeorthogonaldirections.Fluidcouplingbetweenrackandassemblies,andbetweenrackandadjacentracks,issimulatedbyintroducingappropriateinertialcouplingintothesystemkineticenergy,InclusionoftheseeffectsusesthemethodsofReferences4and6forrack/assemblycouplingandforrack/rackcoupling(seeSection4.5.2.2.3ofthisreport).4-150077L/0011L aoe g.Potentialimpactsbetweenrackandassembliesareaccountedforbyappropriate"compressiononly"gapelementsbetweenmassesinvolved.h.Fluiddampingbetweenrackandassemblies,andbetweenrackandadjacentrack,isconservativelyneglected.Thesupportsaremodeledas"compressiononly"elementsfortheverticaldirectionandas"rigidlinks"fordynamicanalysis.ThebottomofasupportlegisattachedtoafrictionalelementasdescribedinSection4.5.2.2.2.Thecrossmectioninertialpropertiesofthesupportlegsarecomputedandusedinthefinalcomputationstodeterminesupportlegstresses.Theeffectofsloshinghasbeenshowntobenegligibleatthebottomofapoolandhenceisneglected.k.Intermackimpact,ifitoccurs,issimulatedbyaseriesofgapelementsatthetopandbottomofoftherackinthetwohorizontaldirections.Themostconservativecaseofadjacentrackmovementisassumed;eachadjacentrackisassumedtomovecompletelyoutofphasewiththerackbeinganalyzed.1.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelassembliesinthestoragelocationsisconservativelyneglectedintheresultsreportedherein.m.Theformdragopposingthemotionofthefuelrackinthewaterisalsoconservativelyneglectedintheresultsreportedherein.n.Therattlingofthefuelassembliesinsidethestoragelocationscausesthe"gap"betweenthefuelassembliesandthecellwalltochangefromamaximumoftwicethenominalgaptoatheoreticalzerogap.However,thefluidcouplingcoefficients(8)utilizedarebasedonlinearvibrationtheory(9).Studiesintheliteratureshowthatinclusionofthenonlineareffect(viz.,vibrationamplitudeofthesameorderofmagnitudeasthegap)drasticallylowerstheequipmentresponse(>0).Figure4-15showsaschematicofthemodel.Sixdegreesmf-freedomareusedtotrackthemotionoftherackstructure.Figures4-16and4-17,respectively,showtheintermackimpactspringsandfuelassembly/storagecellimpactsprings.Themodelforsimulatingfuelassemblymotionincorporatesfivelumpedmasses.Thelowermassisassumedtobeattachedtothebaseplateandtomovewiththebaseplate.Thefourrattlingmassesarelocatedatquarterheight,halfheight,threequarterheightandtopoftherack.Twodegrees-of-freedomareusedtotrackthemotionofeachrattlingmass.ThesolutionproceduredescribedinthefollowingisimplementedincomputercodeDYNARACK,whichisavalidatedcomputercodeunderHoltec'sQAprogram.0077L/0011L4-16Revision1 4vL1L' 4.5.2.2.2ModelDescription~~~~eabsolutedegrees-of-freedomassociatedwitheachofthemasslocationsareshowninFigure4-15.Asshown,thediscretemassfractionsarelocatedatheightsz=0,0.25H,0.5H,0.75HandHrespectively.Table4Wgivesthedegreesmf-freedomandtheassociatedgeneralizedcoordinates.Ui(t)isthepoolfloorslabdisplacementseismictime-history.1hus,astabulatedinTable4WandshowninFigure4-15,therearesixteendegreesmf-freedominthesystem.NotshowninFigure4-15arethegapelementsusedtomodelthesupportlegsandtheimpactswithadjacentracks.4.5.2.2.3FluidCouplingAneffectofsomesignificancerequiringcarefulmodelingistheso-called"fluidcouplingeffect".Ifonebodyofmass(m)vibratesadjacenttoanotherbody(massm),andbothbodiesaresubmergedinafrictionlessfluidmedium,thenNewton'sequationsofmotionforthetwobodieshavetheform:~~~~(ml+Mll)Xl-M12X2=appliedforcesonmassml~~~~M21Xl+(m2+M22)X2appliedforcesonmassm2~~~~Xl,X2denoteabsoluteaccelerationsofmassmlandm2,respectively.Mll,M12,M21andM22arefluidcouplingcoefficientswhichdependontheshapeoXthetwobodies,theirrelativedisposition,etc.Fritz(9)ivesdata<<rMijforvariousbodyshapesandarrangements.Itistobeotedthattheaboveequationindicatesthattheeffectofthefluidistoaddacertainamountofmasstothebody(Mlltobody1),andanexternalforcewhichisproportionaltotheaccelerationoftheadjacentbody(massm2),Ttlustheaccelerationoftheonebodyaffectstheforcefieldonanother.Thisforceisastrongfunctionoftheinterbodygap,reachinglargevaluesforverysmallgaps.Thisinertialcouplingiscalledfluidcoupling.Ithasanimportanteffectinrackdynamics.Thelateralmotionofafuelassemblyinsidethestoragelocationwillencounterthiseffect.Sowillthemotionofarackadjacenttoanotherrack.'theseeffectsareincludedintheequationsofmotion.1hefluidcouplingisbetweenfuelarraynodeiandcellwallinFigure4-17.Furthermore,therackequationscontaincouplingtermswhichmodeltheeffectoffluidinthegapsbetweenadjacentracks.Thecouplingtermsmodelingtheeffectsoffluidflowingbetweenadjacentracksarecomputedassumingthatalladjacentracksarevibrating180degreesoutofphasefromtherackbeinganalyzed.Therefore,onlyonerackisconsideredsurroundedbyahydrodynamicmasscomputedasiftherewereaplaneofsymmetrylocatedinthemiddleofthegapregion.Finally,fluidvirtualmassisincludedintheverticaldirectionvibrationequationsoftherack;virtualinertiaisalsoaddedtothegoverningequationcorespondingtotherotationaldegreemf-freedom,q(t).0077L/00llL4-17Revision1 444C4~/

4.5.2.2.4DampingInreality,dampingoftherackmotionarisesfrommaterialhysteresis(materialdamping),relativeintercomponentmotioninstructures(structuraldamping),andfluiddrageffects(fluiddamping).Intheanalysis,amaximumof2XstructuraldampingisimposedonelementsoftherackstructureduringSSEseismicsimulations.ThisisinaccordancewiththeStLucieUnit1FSAR(13).Materialandfluiddampingareconservativelyneglected.Thedynamicmodelhastheprovisiontoincorporatefluiddampingeffects;however,nofluiddampinghasbeenusedforthisanalysis.4.5.2.2.5ImpactReferringtoFigure4-18,anyfuelassemblynodemayimpactthecorrespondingstructuralmassnode.Tosimulatethi.simpact,fourcompressionmnlygapelementsaroundeachrattlingfuelassemblynodeareprovided(seeFigure4-17).Asnotedpreviously,fluiddampersmayalsobeprovidedinparallelwiththesprings.Thecompressiveloadsdevelopedinthesespringsprovidethenecessarydatatoevaluatetheintegrityofthecellwallstructureandstoredarrayduringtheseismicevent.Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheimpactspringsusedtosimulateanypotentialforintermackimpacts.Section4.5.2.4.2givesmoredetailsontheseadditionalimpactsprings.4.5.2.3AssemblyoftheDynamicModelThecartesiancoordinatesystemassociatedwiththerackhasthefollowingnomenclature:ox~HorizontalcoordinatealongtheshortdirectionofrackrectangularplatformoyHorizontalcoordinatealongthelongdirectionoftherackrectangularplatformozVerticallyupwardAsdescribedintheprecedingsection,therack,alongwiththebase,supports,andstoredfuelassemblies,ismodeledforthegeneralthree-dimensional(3-D)motionsimulationbyafourteendegreemf-freedommodel.Tosimulatetheimpactandslidingphenomenaexpected,60nonlineargapelementsand16nonlinearfrictionelementsareused.Gapandfrictionelements,withtheirconnectivityandpurpose,arepresentedinTable4-7.Ifthesimulationmodelisrestrictedtotwodimensions(onehorizontalmotionplusverticalmotion,forexample)forthepurposesofmodelclarificationonly,thenadescriptivemodelofthesimulatedstructurewhichincludesgapandfrictionelementsisshowninFigure4-18.(Notethatonlythetoprattlingmassisshownforclarity.)Theimpactsbetweenfuelassembliesandrackshowupinthegapelement,havinglocalstiffnessKI,inFigure4-18.InTable4-7,gapelements5through8areforthevibratingmassatthetopoftherack.Thesupportleg~pringratesQaremodeledbyelements1through4inTable4-7.Notethat0077L/0011L4-18Revision1 (I4I thelocalcomplianceoftheconcretefloorisincludedinKd.Tosimulateslidingpotential,frictionelements1through8inTable4-7areemployed.Frictionelements2and8,and4and6(Table4-7)arerepresentedasKfinFigure4-18.Thefrictionofthesupport/linerinterfaceismodeledbyapiecewiselinearspringwithasuitablylargestiffnessKfuptothelimitinglateralload,N,whereNisthecurrentcompressionloadattheinterfacebetweensupportandliner.Ateverytimestepduringthetransientanalysis,thecurrentvalueofN(eitherzeroforliftoffcondition,oracompressivefinitevalue)iscomputed.Finally,thesupportrotationalfr<<t<<nspringsKRreflectanyrotationalrestraintthatmaybeofferedbythefoundation.ThisspringrateiscalculatedusingamodifiedBoussinesqequation(4)andisincludedtosimulatetheresistivemomentofthesupporttocounteractrotationoftherackleginaverticalplane.Thisrotationspringisalsononlinear,withazerospringconstantvalueassignedafteracertainlimitingconditionofslabmomentloadingisreached.Thenonlinearityofthesesprings(frictionelements9,11,13and15inTable4-7)reflectstheedginglimitationimposedonthebaseoftheracksupportlegs.Inthisanalysis,thiseffectisneglected;anysupportlegbending,inducedbyliner/baseplatefrictionforces,isresistedbythelegactingasabeamcantileveredfromtherackbaseplate.Forthe3Wsimulation,allsupportelements(listedinTable4-7)areincludedinthemodel.Couplingbetweenthetwohorizontalseismicmotionsisprovidedbothbytheoffsetofthefuelassemblygroupcentroidwhichcausestherotationoftheentirerackandbythepossibilityofliftoffofoneormoresupportlegs.Thepotentialexistsfortheracktobesupportedononeormoresupportlegsortoliftoffcompletelyduringanyinstantofacomplex3Wseismicevent.Allofthesepotentialeventsmaybesimulatedduringa3-Dmotionandhavebeenobservedintheresults.4.5.2.4TimeIntegrationoftheEquationsofMotion4.5.2.4.1Time-HistoryAnalysisUsing16DOFRackModelHavingassembledthestructuralmodel,thedynamicequationsofmotioncorrespondingtoeachdegree-of-freedomcanbewrittenbyusingNewton'ssecondlawofmotion;orbyusingLagrange'sequation.Thesystemofequationscanberepresentedinmatrixnotationas:~~[M](q)=(Q)+(G)wherethevector(Q)isafunctionofnodaldisplacementsandvelocities,and(G)dependsonthecouplinginertiaandthegroundacceleration.Premultiplyingtheaboveequationsby[M]1renderstheresultingequationuncoupledinmass.~~Wehave:(q)~[M]1(Q)+[M]1(G)Asnotedearlier,inthenumericalsimulationsruntoverifystructuralintegrityduringaseismicevent,allelementsofthefuelassembliesareassumedtomoveinphase.Thiswillprovidemaximumimpactforcelevel,andinduceadditionalconservatisminthetime-historyanalysis.0077L/0011L4-19Revision1 El4

'Ihisequationsetismassuncoupled,displacementcoupled,andisideallyuitedfornumericalsolutionusingacentraldifferencescheme.Thecomputerrogram"DYNARACK'"isutilizedforthispurpose.Stressesinvariousportionsofthestructurearecomputedfromknownelementforcesateachinstantoftime.Dynamicanalysisoftypicalmulticellrackshasshownthatthemotionofthestructureiscapturedalmostcompletelybythebehaviorofasixdegreemf-freedomstructure;therefore,inthisanalysismodel,themovementoftherackcrossmectionatanyheightisdescribedintermsoftherackbasedegreesmf-freedom(ql(t),"q6(t)).Theremainingdegrees-of-freedomareassociatedwithhorizontalmovementsofthefuelassemblymasses.Inthisdynamicmodel,fiverattlingmassesareusedtorepresentfuelassemblymovement.Therefore,thefinaldynamicmodelconsistsofsixdegreesmf-freedomfortherackplustenadditionalmassdegrees-of-freedomforthefiverattlingmasses.Theremainingportionofthefuelassemblyisassumedtomovewiththerackbase.Thus,thetotalityoffuelmassisincludedinthesimulation.4.5.2.4.2EvaluationofPotentialforInter-RackImpactSincetheracksarecloselyspaced,thesimulationincludesimpactspringstomodelthepotentialforintermackimpact,especiallyforlowvaluesofthefrictioncoefficientbetweenthesupportandthepoolliner.Toaccountforthispotential,fiveintermackgapelementswerelocatedateachsideoftherackatthetopandatthebaseplate.Figure4-16showsthelocationoftheseapelements.Loadsintheseelements,computedduringthedynamicanalysis,reusedtoassessrackintegrityifinter-rackimpactoccurs.4.6STRUCTURALEVALUATIONCRITERIA4.6.1StructuralAccetanceCriteriaforSentFuelPoolStructure4.6.1.1CriteriaThestresses/strainsresultingfromtheloadingcombinationsdescribedinSection4.4.1satisfythefollowingacceptancecriteria:a)SpentFuelPoolConcreteStructureThedesignstresslimitsdescribedinSection3.8.1.6ofStLucieUnitNo.1UpdatedFSARwereusedfortheevaluationofthespentfuelpoolreinforcedconcretestructuralcomponents.ThecapacityofallsectionswascomputedinaccordancewithACI318+3PartIV-B,UltimateStrengthDesign.*ThenumericalprocedureunderlyingDYNARACKhasbeenpreviouslyutilizedinicensingof'similarracksforFermi2(DocketNo50-341),QuadCities1and2DocketNos50-254and265),RanchoSeco(DocketNo50-312),OysterCreek(DocketNo50-219),VCSummer(DocketNo50-395),andDiabloCanyon1and2(DocketNos50-275and50-323).0077L/0011L4-20Revision1 thpIt~~1Ii(~~

Re:St.LuciePlantDocketNo.50-33510CFR50.59REPORTSt.LuciePlantUnit1ReportofChangesMadeUndertheProvisionsof10CFR50.59forthePeriodEndingJanuary22,~1988GRMATWS.RAI DOCUMENTSREVIEWEDFORFSARAMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITlE118-181848-182892-182188-182846-183878-183336-183348-183383-183412-183174-184187-184-1842-184815-185822-185824-185839-185847-185ceo-185873-185131-185142-185155-1858-18-18-28-18-18-18-18-18-28-18AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACENENTAUXILIARYBUILDINGJIBHOISTDIESELGENERATORUPGRADEREMOVALOFSTEAN6ENERATORDELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERSREACTORUPPERCAVITYHANDRAIL~NITR06ENSUPPLYSYSTEMINSTRUNENTAIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONCCMHEATEXCHANGERRETUBINGSECURITYCONSOLES-LEDHICROMAVEDETECTORREPLACEMENTHAINSTEANSAFETYVALVELIFTLEVERRENOVALED6CFDRELAYREPLACEMENTEX-CORENEUTRONFLUXMONITORINGSYSTEMUPGRADETRAVELINGMATERSCREENUPGRADEDIESEL6ENERATORAIRSTARTSYSTEHPIPINGMODIFICATIONINSTRUMENTAIRUPGRADETIEINSEPASINSTALLATIONDIESELGENERATORSUBSYSTEMFLOMDIAGRAMS6ESANRELAYPCCARDREPLACENEN1NSRRETUBINGNSRPERFORATEDPLATENODIFICATIONREPLACEMENTOFRISDEVICESAPPENDIXRCONTROLROONINDEPENDENCEFORALlERNATESHUTDOMNREACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFITNGRIGPIPEASSENBLYTURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEHNODIFICATION DOCUMENTSREVIEWEDFORFSAR-AMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITLE174-185179-185282-185884-186887-186823-186832-186837-186843-186871-186874-186882-186186-186888-186898-186893-186895-186898-186186-186116-186117-186118-186119-1868-188-18-18-1RCPOILLIFTSYSTENPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENTDIESEL6ENERATORCOOLIN6SYSTENVALVEREPLACENENTCGMSTRAINERBACKFl.USHDRAINLUBEOILCENTRIFUGEANNUNCIATIONNRVACTUATIONSOLENOIOSNAINFEEDMATERPUNPLUBEOILPRESSURESMITCHREPLACENENTEXCITERCOOLERVENTSANODRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEPCBTRANSFORNERREPLACENENTNON-SAFETYRELATEDNISGELLANEOUSPIPINGSYSTENSNOOIFIGATIONSFHBHVACPENETRATIONBARRIERSHEATERDRAINPUNPDENINERALIZEOMATERSUPPLY.HAINSTEANPIPIN6NODIFICATIONLOMPOWERFEED'MATERCONTROLSYSTEMNISAPPLICATIONOFLINITORQUEOPERATORISOLATEDPHASEBUSDUCTJUNPERNOOIFICATIONCLOSEINTERCEPTVALVECIRCUITNODIFICATIONRTGBANNUNCIATOR6ROUNDDETECTIONREPLACENENTOFINSTRUNENTSCALESHYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONS:REPLACEOFVLVSI-V-25-1113.15HIREXCITATIONSYSTENTURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIREXTRACTIONSTEANPIPIN6ANOFITTIN6NATERIALUP6RADEREACTORCAVITYSEALRING18CFR58.49ENVIRONNENTALQUALlFICAT'IONLISTREVISIONPRESSURIZERNISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCA6E DOCUMENTSREVIEVEDFORFSARAMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITLE126-186132-186136-186139-186148-186141-186143-186146-186148-186151-186153-18688.1-187-187-187818-187811-187.812-187817-187827-187828-187832-187..-834-187835-187844-187846-1878-18-18-18-18-1AFASDVNHODIFICATIONEXCESSIVEAC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPREPLACEMENTOFSGLEVELTRANSMITTERSMASONRYMALLHODIFICATIONSANNUNCIATOR-NUISANCEALARNSPRESSURIZERLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONHODIFICATIONPASSDISSOLVEDHYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSl1ISCELLANEOUSICMSYSTEHMODIFICATIONSICMISOlATIONVALVEREPLACEMENT488VOLTACLOADCENTER18-2TRANSFORMERCOOLINGROSEHOUNTANDVALCOREQENHANCEHENTIEBULLETIN85-83HOVSMITCHSETTINGSNRCIEBULLETING85-83HOVPOSITIONINDICATIONOVERPRESSUREMITIGATIONSYSTEMHODIFICATIONPROTECTIVECOATINGSREPAIR/REPLINREACTORCONTAINHENTBLDGCONDENSERHOTMELDNITROGENINJECTIONCONNECTIONSFEEDMATERHEATERANDEXTRACTIONPIPESHIELDINGCCMHEATEXCHANGERSHElLSIDEDRAINADDITIONNISCELLANEOUSSNUBBERMODIFICATIONREPLACEMENTOFRMTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46PRESSURIZERSURGELINESAHPLEVALVEV1218REPLACEMENTCONDENSEROUTLETTUBESHEETANDMATERBOXCOATINGSREPLACEMENTOFRAYCHEHSPLICESNSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATIONCONTAINMENTBLDGTELESCOPINGJIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTS DOCUMENTSREVIEWEDEORESARAMENDMENT7BERREVISIONTITLE887-187897-187188-187888-984227-984178-98519S-S85815-986112-986138-9868-18'8CODEBOUNDRYORAMIN6REVISIONTSCBLOCKMALL287AMODIFICATIONSTURBINE6ANTRYCRANEHAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADENON-HANUALPARKINGLOTTURBINEGANTRYCRANESEPARATIONREQUIREMENTSTIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTIONFIREHAINANOPLANTFIREl.OOPMATERTREATMENTPLANTCAUSTICDILUTIONMATERBOOSTERPUNPTELEPHONESYSTEMUPGRADETURBINEBUILONGGANTRYCRANEGIRDERINSPECTIONANOTBISOLNEUTRALIZATIONBASINCLOSUREtlONITORMELLSN/ASTLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYEVALUATIONREVIEW PCM118-181AIRDRYERPLUGVALVEREPLACEMENTSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONFUNCTIONThepurposeofthismodificationistoreplacethelubricatedplugvalvesontheinstrumentairdryerwithnon-lubricatedtype'stopreventgreaseintrusionintotheinstrumentairsystem.DESIGNDESCRIPTIONThegreasesealedplugvalvesoriginallyinstalledontheinstrumentairdryerallowgreasetocontaminatethesystemandplugupthecoolercausingtheblowertotriponhighcurrent.Replacementofthesevalveswithgreaselesstypevalveswilleliminatetheproblem.OPERATIONTheoperationoftheairdryerwillremainthesame-.Thevalvesarehandoperatedandutilizedwhenthedessicantbedsarebeingswitchedforregeneration.SAFETYANALYSISTheinstrumentairdryerisNon-SafetyRelatedQualityGroupD.Itisnon-seismica'ndhasnowind,flood,ormissilecriteria.Failureoftheinstrumentairdryerwillnotaffecta'ysafetyrelatedsystemssincetheinstrumentairsystemcanoperatewithouttheinstrumentairdryerandtheinstrumentairsystemisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.Theinstrumentairdryerislocatedintheturbinebuildingsointheeventofacatastrophicfailure,nosafetyrelatedequipmentwillbeaffected.

PCM040-182REACTORAUXILIARYBUILDINGJIBHOISTDESCRIPTIONTheimplementationofthisPC/Mpackagewillprovidea5toncapacityjibhoistin-theReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB).'Thehoistwillbelocatedeastofthehotmachineshopasdetailedonthelocationplan,JPE-C-40-82.-001,included.withthispackage.ThehoistwillbeusedtotransferequipmentintheRABbetweenEl-0.5'ndEl19.5'.Theboomshallbeprovidedwithaholddownchaintolimitmovementwhennotinoperation.ThisdesignpackageprimarilyoutlinesCivil'srequirements.ElectricalsrequirementsareincludedinAppendixCDSAFETYEVALUATIONThejibhoistwillbeusedtotransferequipmentandmaterialsintheRABbetweenEl0.5'ndEl19.5'.ThehoistperformsnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunctionthereforethisPC/Misnon-nuclearsafetyrelated.~~~~~~~~Thedesignofthejibcraneattachments'totheconcretewalloftheRABwillbeverifiedbasedonseismicloadsaswellasdeadandliveloads.Thiswillprecludedetachmentduringaseismicevent.TherequirementsofNUREG0612willnotbeapplicableastherewillbenointeractionswithsafetyrelatedequipment.Allstructuralsteelandboltingmaterialwillberequired'tohaveCertificatesofCompliancewiththeapplicablematerialspecification.Thiswillassurematerialintegrity.InaccordancewithQISection3.2,nounreviewedsafetyquestionshavebeenintroduced.

PCM092-182DIESELGENERATORUPGRADEABSTRACTPC/M92-'182wasgeneratedtoperformseveralmodificationsrecommendedbythedieselgeneratorvendortoupgradeourdieselswiththelatestdesignimprovementsforoptimalreliability.Themodificationsincluded:1)2)3)4)5)VibrationdamperreplacementIdlergearstubshaftreplacementExhaustscreenmspectionportadditionAirdryeradditionLubeoilmodificationItems1tlwcagh4wereinstalledin1993perthePC/Mpackage.Item//wasneverinstalledduetodifficultyinprocuringpartsandescalatingcost.ex-ieaAsummaryofPC/M8&~isprovidedbelow.Supplement0-Installedthevibrationdamper,idlergearstubshaft,andexhaustscreeninspectionport.EngineeringwasbyFPL.Supplement1-InstalledtheElectrical,CIvilandINCportionoftheairdryeradditionandthelubeoilmodification.EngineeringwasbyEbasco.Supplement2-Installedthemechanicalportionoftheairdryeraddition.Engineering'asbyFPL.Supplement3-Transmittedthevendorwiringdiagramsforthe'irdryers.EngineeringwasbyEbasco.Supplement4-Installedthemechanicalportionoft5elubeoilmodification.EngineetingwasbyFPL.Supplement5-Revisedsupplement4basedonadditionalvendorsubmittals.EngineeringwasbyFPL.Supplements0,2and3werefullyinstalled.OnlyaportionofSupplement1wasinstalledandnoneofsupplements4and5waseverinstalled.Supplements0,1,2,and3wereappropriatelyas-built.4Thescope,engineeringandmaterialsofsupplement/wereallincludedintheoriginallubeoilmodification.Supplement6breaksoutalloftheportionsrequiredtoimplementtheturbochargersoakbacklowpressurealarmanddeletestheremainderofthedrawingsnotyetas-built.Whensupplement6isinstalled,andas-built,thePC/Mcanbeclosedout.Thissupplementdoesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyanalysis,doesnotrequireanytechnicalspecificationchangesanddoesnotcauseanychanges.totheoperationofthedieselgenerator.fgcgerci'.C[Itic'~ppgcvialgeoTr.rquii.CPFg,i,wig~egimgivwoisEF'.

PCM092-182.SAFETYANALYSISTheadditionofaturbochargersoakbacklowpressurealarmdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionsincethealarm=doesnotaffecttheoperationoroperabilityofthedieselgenerators,itmerelyalertsoperatorstoalowpressureconditionintheturbochargersoakbacksystemwhiletheengineisinthestandbymode.Asaresult,itcanbeconcludedthattheprobabilityofocccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethedieselgeneratorsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofaccidentsandsincethealarmwasdesignedtotheappropriatecodesanditdoesnotaffecttheoperationofthedieselgenerators.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreducedsincethemodificationdoesnotaffecttheperformanceoroperabilityoftheengine.~~

PCM100-182REMOVALOFSTEAMGENERATORDELTAPSIGNALCHARACTERIZERSSYSTENOESCRIPTIONThesystemwhichisbeingaffectedbythisaadificationistheSteamGeneratorReactorCoolantDifferentia1FlowInstr'umentationandControlSystem.ThissystemmonitorstheReactorCoolantflowacrosseachofthetwoSteamGeneratorswiththepurposeofprotectingthecoreagainstdepartur'e.fromnucleateboil.ingONBintheeventofacoolantflowdecrease.Flowmeasurementsignalsareprovidedbysunningthe-outputofdifferentialpressuretransmittersacrosseachsteamgenerator.Thismeasurementofdifferentialpressureismodifiedbytwosignalcharacterizersineachofthefourchannelstoprovide'squarerootofdifferentialpressuresignalswhichcorrespondtoactualflow.Thelowflowreactortripisactuateddirectlybythesummedflowsignal.Itrequiresatwo-out-of-fourcoincidencelogicfromthefourindependentchannels(whentheflowfa11sbelowapreselectedvalue)toinitiateaReactortrip.InadditIon,fourseparateindicators(oneperchannel)receivesignalsfromeachinstrumentationloop.Bymeansofaselectorhandswitchtheoperatorcanreadeitherthesumned,.averageflowsigna'Iofthetwosteamgenerators,asmeasuredfromthatchannel,ortheflowsignalofeithersteamgeneratorbyItself.Thepurposeofthismodification.istoremovefromtheinstrumentationandcontrolloopstheeightsignalcharacterizers(twoperchannel).BecausetechnicalspecificationsIimitplantoperationstofourReactorCoolantPumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizerfunction.Thecharacterizermodifiesthedeltapinputsignalstoallowforoperationunderconditionsoflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumps.Thecharacterizerswi1Iremainphysicallyintheloops,butwiII'ebypassedelectricallysothattheywillservenofunction.TheindicatorswilIberecalibratedandtheirscaleswiIIbechangedtoreadthedeltapsignalsdirectlyratherthanthemodifiedflowsignals.Thewiringintheloopswillbealteredandseveralresistorswillneedtobereplaced-withnewvaluestomaintaintherequiredvoltageranges.FuelResourceshascompletedan'ngineeringevaluationthatwillgeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpointsfortheSystem.

PCM100-182SAFETYANALYSISThismodificationisNuclearSafetyrelatedbecausetheSteamGeneratorReactorCoolantOeItaFlowInstrumentationandControlsystemisNuclearSystemrelated,andtheequipmentbeingmodifiedispart.ofthissystem.ThisPC/Hproposestoremovethesignalcharacterizersfromthefourredundantloopsandmodifytheinstrumentandcontrolcircuitssothattheloopcurrentandvoltagesignalsbecomeproportionaltothedifferencesinreactorprimarycoolantpressures,ratherthandirectlytotheflowacrossthesteamgenerators.InaccordancewiththeFuelResourcesrecommendations(AppendixC),"bothsteamgeneratordeltapsignaisaresumnedandareactortripisinitiat'edwhenthesumneddeltapfa1isbelowaprese1ectedtripvalue."Accordingly,thetransmittersintheloopswillberecalibratedandtheindicatorsrescaledfortheprocessrangeof0to50psid.Thecharacterizersservedafunctionunderconditionoflessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpoperation.However,becauseSt.LuciedlTechnicalSpecificationslimitplantoperationwhiieatpowertofourreactorcoolantpumps,thereisnolongeraneedforthecharacterizerfunctions.CombustionEngineering,theoriginalArchitectEngineerfortheReactorProtectionSystem;hasrecommendedremovalofthecharacterizersbecausetheremovalwi11reducethecalibrationtimeofthe'eltapsignalprocessingcircuitry.Thechangeisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.FuelResourceshascompletedanengineeringevaluationthatwillbeusedtogeneratethenewvoltagetrippingsetpointsfortheReactorCoolantdeltapressureinputsfortheReactorProtectionSystembasedonremovalofthecharacterizers.Newvaluesofresistorswillberequiredtomaintainthevoltagerangesrequiredbythecircuitryintheabsenceofthesignalcharacterizers.Thenewresistorsarebeingpurchasedascommercialgradeitemstoexactingstandardsofprecisionandperformance.Additionally,failureofthenewresistorswouid.havethesameconsequencesontheStreamGeneratordelta~p.inputtotheReactorProtectionSystemasfailureoftheexistingresistors.Hence,nopossibi1Ityfor~naccidentormalfunctionofatypedifferentfromanyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasbeencreatedbythismodification.Forthesamereasons,themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforthetechnicalspecificationshasnotbeendecreased.Inconclusion,thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

PCM046-183REACTORBUILDINGUPPERCAVITYHANDRAILINTRODUCTIONThereactorbuildingrefuelingcavityisastainlesssteellinedpoolwithasplitlevelbottomatElevations36.0'nd21.5'Duringplantshutdown',theuppercavityisoccupiedforvariousoperationsincludingreactorheadremoval,headstuddetensioning,etc..Atthepresenttimethereisnopro-vision.alongtheedgeoftheuppercavitytopreventpersonnelfromfallingintothelowercavity.ThisPC/Mprovidesahandrailinthisarea.ISAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle,10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThehandrailprovidedbythisPC/MhasbeendesignedtowithstandthoseloadingcombinationsasspecifiedinFSARChapter3.Althoughthehand-railservesnosafetyrelatedfunction,seismicloadshavebeenconsideredinthedesign.InordertoprecludepotentialmissilegenerationduringaLOCA,thehandrailhasbeendesignedtowithstandjetimpingementloads.TherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsassociatedwiththisPC/MandpriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.,

PCM078-183NITROGENSUPPLYSYSTEMSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONFunctionsandDesinRuirementsVFunctionTheNitrogenSystemsupplieslowandhighpressurenitrogentovarioussystemsandvesselswhichrequirecovergasforSt.Lucie-Unitsfland02.a)Lowpressurenitrogen(200psigandbelow)issuppliedtothefollowingforeachunit:SpentResinTankVolumeControlTankRefuelingFailedFuelDetectorReactorDtainTankQuenchTankPressureReductionandSampleCabinetWasteConcentratorBoricAcidConcentratorsFlash.TankHoldUpTanksb)Highpressurenitrogen(over200PSIG)is.suppliedsolelyascovergasforthesafetyinjectiontanks.DesignRequirementsThe'systemshallbecapableofsupplyingbothunitswithhighandlowpressurenitrogenfor30dayswithoutrefilling.Thehighpressurestoragevolumeshallbeofsufficientcapactytorechargeallfoursafetyinjectiontanksoneitherunit.Thenitrogencompressorsshallbeofadequatesizetorechargethehighpressurestoragevolumewithin24hourseachor12hourscombined.SAFETYA'NALYSISThenitrogensupplysystemprovidesahighpressuresourceandnormaloperatingsourceofnitrogengasforplantuse.Thenitrogen.systemservesnosafetyfunction.Thenitrogen'upplysystemislocatedoutdoorsadjacenttothegashouse.Failureofanyportionofthenitrogensupplysystemwillnotinhibittheabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofapostulatedaccident,achievesafeshutdown,oradequatelycoolspentfueLThischangeisthereforenotconsideredsafetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.AllpioinghasbeendesignedinaccordancewithANSIB-31.1.Theconcretefoundationshavebeendesignedinaccordancewithallapplicablecodes.ThepowersourcesforthenitrogencompressorsarefromnonwafetyrelatedMCC's1A-3and1B-3.Allconduitsutilizedarebelowthe..allowablefilLInaddition,qualifiedcablewillbeusedforthisinstallation.

PCM336-183INSTRUMENTAIRSYSTEMCROSSTIECHECKVALVEADDITIONTCTSYST-"MOESCRIPTIOH~OerationThismodificationaddsonecheckvalvetothecross-tielinetoprevntaccidentalbleed-downoftheIAsystem.ThisvalveperFormsitsfunctionautomaticallyandrequiresnooperatoraction.Thmodificationalsoadds,adifferentialpressureindicatortothecoalescingfilter.Thedifferentialpressureshouldbemonitored.onaperiodic-basistodeterminewhenfiltrelementreplacementisnecessry.(Thisshouldbedoneat10PSIO)Operatingprocedtressnouldbemodiriedtoindicatethislimitation.FunctionThismodificationwillprovideadownortheIAsystembywayofUnit=-"I/Unitg2IAcrossconnetcross-tieisinuse.passivemeansofpreventiragbleed-lekagetotheSAsystemwhiteiheisinusortheUnitglSAtoIADesicnOesc.iotiond>rrerentialSAFiTYcVALUATIGHThismodiFicationprovidsthedeailsForinstallationofonecheckvalveintheUnit='1SA-toIAcross-connetlineandadditionoFapressureindicatoronthecoalscirgrilter.1.0,Thismodificationisnon-seismic,non-safetyrlatdanddoe"notinvolveanunreviewedsaftyquestionbecause:1.1TheIA/SAcross-tieperformsnosafety.unctionardisclassiriedasnon-safetyrelated.1.2Thesemodi,icationsdorointeractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemorcomponents.1.3Hosafetyreletdequipmentorccmponentsareccmprcmisdbyanyeassumedrailureo-anyexistingornewecuipmntorcomponer.ts.1.4HoTechnicalSpecificatinsaralteredoradverselyaffected.2.0Carehasbentaknintndesigntoeliminatorcontrolaspectswhichcouicbha3rdoustoeqipm~ntand/orperson.ea.

PCM340-183CCWHEATEXCHANGERRETUBINGSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONFunctionThecomponentcoolingwater(CCW)heatexchangersareonesidemixed,onesideunmixedsinglepasshorizontalmountunitswithintakecoolingwater(ICW)onthetubesideandCCWontheshellside.ThebasicfunctionoftheCCWheatexchangersistorejectheatfromvariouscomponentsassociatedwiththereactorsupportandsafetyequipment(suchastheshutdownheatexchangers,containmentfancoolersandRCPsealcoolers)totheICWsystem.DesiDescritionDuetothedeterioratedconditionoftheexistingCCWheatexchangerAluminum-Brasstubing,theseunitsaretoberetubedduringthenextrefuelingoutage.Thisdesignpackageincludesthespecificationrequiredfortheprocurementofthetubesandguidelinesfortheretubingeffort.~OerationThecomponentcoolingsystem(CCS)isarrangedastworedundant.essentialsupplyheadersystems(designatedA2B)eachwithapump'ndheatexchangerandthecapabilitytosupplytheminimumsafetyfeaturesrequirementsduringplantshutdownorLOCAconditions.SAFETYANALYSISla.WithrespecttotheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Theprobabilityofoccurrence'ofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.b.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:TheconsequencesofFSARaccidentevaluationshavenotbeenalteredsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchange.

PCM340-183c.WithrespecttotheprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Theprobabilityofanyequipmentmalfunctionhasnotincreasedforthereasonsoutlinedinla.d.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofmalfuncitonofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Theconsequences-*ofanyequipment'malfunctionhasnotbeenincreasedforthesamereasonoutlinedinlb.2a.WithrespecttothepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR:ThereisnopossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSARsincethisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveadesignchangeoranewdesign.b.WithrespecttothepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR:Thereisnopossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethan,analyzedintheFSARforthesamereasonasgivenin2a.3.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification:Nomarginofsafetyhasbeendecreasedoralteredforthereasongivenin2a.

PCM383-183SECURITYCONSOLE-LEDGRAPHICDISPLAYINTRODUCTIONTheNRChasdeterminedthatannunciationoftheSecuritySystempowersuppliesisrequiredforcompliancewith10CFRPart73(i.e.requirementsforsecuritysystemsfornuclearpowerplants).Tomeettheintentofthisrequirement,statuslightsshall,beinstalledonthesecuritysystemalarmconsolestoindicatethe"athand"conditionofthepowerinputtothesecuritySUPSandtherefore,totheentiresecuritysystem.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasi.sforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thesecuritvsystemisanon-safetyrelatedplantsystem.TheCentralandSecondaryAlarmStationsarecomponentsofthissystem.ThemodificationspresentedinthisPC/Maffectbothsafetyandnon-safetyrelatedplantequipment.ThemodificationstotheCAS'ndSAScontrolpanels,i.e.installationandwiringoftheannunciatorcircuitry,andtheinputstothese.annunciatorsarenon-safetyrelated.ThealarmstationsarelocatedintheTurbineandSecurityBuilding,whicharenon-safety,non-seismicstructures.Thema)orityofrequiredcabletotheseareaswillberoutedinnon-safetyrelatedcabletrayintheTGBandthroughthededicatedsecurityductbankstotheSecurityBuilding.Thebalanceofcablewillberoutedthroughappropriatelydedicatedraceway.Dieselgeneratorbreakerpositionismonitoredtoprovideinputtothe"Normal"and"Diesel"annunciatorcircuits.Thisportionofthed'ieselgenerator'ontrolcircuitryissafetyrelated.Therefore,thissignalwillbeisolatedfromthenon-safetysecurityannunciationcircuitrybyinstallingsafetyrelatedisolationrelaysin4160Vswitchgears1A3and1B3.TheserelayswerepurchasedunderRPA432953tobequalifiedtotheapplicableindustrystandards.Thebalanceofthecontrolrelaysthatarerequiredinthismodificationhavebeenpurchasedandwillbeinstal'edasnon-safetyrelatedequipment.J%Controlpowertoallrelaysisfromtheassociatedplantpowertrain(safetytoisolationrelays,non-safetytothenon-safetycontrolrelays).Allcableswillberoutedthroughtheappropriateracewayandtheracewaywillbeseismicallysupportedasrequired(i.e.insidetheRAB).ThismodificationhasnoimpactontheplantTechnicalSpecification".Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafety,question,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPC/M.

PCM412-183MICROWAVEDETECTORREPLACEMENTINTRODUCTIONTheexistingMicrowave700seriesIntrusionDetectionSystemwhichisinstalledattheUnit1and2perimeterfence,willbereplacedwith.Stellar'sModel682E-Field.ThereplacementoftheMicrowave700seriesatUnits1and2willbecoveredbyPC/Ms412-183and54-283,respectively.PC/M412-183addressesZones25,30,31,and32.~asenoteFPLStart-UphaspreviouslyinstalledtheStellarE-FieldsystematZones31and32inatest-bedapplication.PC/M412-183willdocumentthesezonesasapermanentinstallation.Thereisnoconstructionimpactforthesezones.Aspreviouslyagreed,thechangeoutfromMicrowavetoE-FieldintheareaoftheDischargeCanalhasfirstpriority.Thiswilleliminatetheneedfortheexistingsecuritystation,whichismanned24hoursaday.Therefore,Supplement0ofPC/M412-183addressestheUnit1perimeterzonesattheDischargeCanal(Zones30,31,and32).Zone25willbemodifiedviaSupplement1toPC/M412-183.SAFETY'ANAL'YSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,P~50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyques-tion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thesecuritysystemisnon-safetyrelated.Furthermore,themodificationstotheperimeterintrusiondetectionsystempresentedbythisPC/Mwillimprovetheoverallsecuritysystemoperation.The,changeoutfrommicrowavetoE-FieldisrequiredinordertoeliminatetheneedforasecuritystationattheDischargeCanalwhichismanned24-hoursaday.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;therefore,'riorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPC/M.

PCM008-984NON-MANUALPARKINGLOTThisengineeringpackagecoverstherestorationandrepavingoftheNon-ManualParkingLotwhichisontheeastsideoftheSt.LuciePlant.Alsoincludedinthe.packageistheremovaloftheconstructionfirewatertankintheparkinglot,aswellastheadditionofanimprovedarealightingdesign.Theparkinglotislocatedoutsideoftheplantsecurityfenceperimeter.Themodificationsincludedinthisdesignpackagewillnotaffectanyplantsafety-relatedsystemandarethereforeclassifiedasnon-nuclear-safety-related.Inaddition,theremovalof'theconstructionfirewatertankwQlnotaffecttheplantfireprotectionsystem,sincethisworkcannotbestarteduntilPCM178-985isimplemented.PCM178-985tiesthefirewaterpipingdownstreamfromthetankintotheplantsystem.TherestorationandrepavingoftheNon-ManualParkingLotandthetankremovaldonotposeanyunreviewedsafetyquestions.TheNon-ManualParkingLotislocatedoutsideofthesecurityperimeterfenceandwQ1notbeinthevicinityofanyplantsafety-relatedstructureorsystem.Itdoesnotinanywayperformoraffectaplantsafety-relatedfunction.TheNon-ManualParkingLotarealightingdoesnotperformoraffectanyplantsafety-related.systemsorfunction.ItisbeingsuppliedfromLP.260whichisanon-safetyreIatedlightingpanelandisnotloadedontheemergencydieselgenerator.Theremovaloftheconstr'uctionfirewatertank.andpipingdoesnotaffectanyplantsafety-relatedsystemorfunctions.Thecitywatertotheplantisnotasafety-relatedsystem.Thefirewatersupplyfromthetankisnotpartoftheplantfirewatersystemanddoesnotaffectthatsystem.ThemodificationstotheNon-ManualParkingLotdonotchangeanyassumptionsmadeorconclusionsdrawnintheSt.LuciePSAR.Therepavingofthelotdoesnotadverselyaffectanysitetopographicfeatures.PortheabovereasonsthemodificationsoftheNon-ManualParkingLotwillnotincreasetheprobabilityof'ccurrencenortheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttothesafetyoftheplant.Additionally,therewQ1continuetobenopossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctiondifferentthanthosealreadyevaluatedinthePSAR.PinaQy,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.Itisthereforeconcludedthatthismodificationdoesnotposeanunreviewedsafetyquestionspursuantto10CPR50.59anddoesnotaffectanytechnicalspecifications.'INOTE-THISPACKAGECONTAINSSAFEGUARDDRAWINGS.

PCM174-184MAENSTEAMSAPETYVALVELIPTLEVERREMOVALSYSTEMDESCRIPTION1.0DesignDescriptionOnFebruary9,1984,aPSL-2planttripcausedactuationoftheMainSteamSafetyValves(MSSV's).Followingthetransient,oneoftheMSSV'sfailedtoreseatbecausetheabsenceofthespindle~utcaterpinallowedthespindlenuttorotatedownontotheforkedliftleverandpreventedfulltravelofthespindlerod.Topreventthistypeofeventfromoccurringagain,thisdesignpackageallowsther'emovaloftheliftlevercomponents(spindlenut,cotterpinandforklever).AnewvalvecapisrequiredtomaintainASMECoderequirementsconcerningcapsealing.2.0FunctionTheliftleverassemblyprovidesthecapabilitytomanuallyexercisethesafetyvalvetofacilitateblowingoutlines.Whiletheoriginalcomponentdesignspecificationrequiredaliftinglever,theCoderequirementforliftleversonClass2valveshasbeeneliminated.Thepurchaserofthesafetyvalves,C-Eagreesthattheseliftleverscanberemoved.Theoriginalvalve"designutilizedtheliftingleverassemblytosealthevalvecapandpreventunauthorized'adjustmentsofthevalve'ssetpressure.CapsealingisrequiredbytheCode.Inordertomaintainthisrequirement,newvalvecapswithanintegralsealingdevicearerequired.3.0OperationRemovaloftheliftleversoperationoftheMSSV's.'IheMSSV'ssecondarysideoverpressureevents.manuallyexercisethevalve,thecapliftleversreinstalled.willnotimpacttheintendedwillstillbecapableofrelievingHowever,iftheneedarisestowillhavetoberemovedandtheSAFETYANALYSIS&%-WithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceorthecoymequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThismodificationaDowsfor.theremovaloftheMSSVliftleversandreplacestluteexistingvalvecapswithonesthatwillenableproperCoderequiredsealingofthevalveadjustingbolts.Thismodificationwillnotin.anywayimpactorjeopardizetheintendedoperationoftheMSSV'sortheirabilitytoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerator.

PCM174-184TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR(excessiveheatremovalfromthesteamgeneratorcausedbyastuckopensafetyvalve)willbesignificantlyreducedbyremovingtheliftlever.components.AlsotheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisalsoreducedbythismodification.NoothertypeofaccidentormalfunctionnotpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARiscreated.Inaddition,itdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecifications.AchangetoplantTech.Specs.isnotrequired.'Iheforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischange'doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM187-184SUMMARYSTATEMENT~Summar.EDGCPDRELAXREPLACEMENTThisPC/Mprovidesthe.designforreplacementoftheexistingemergencydieselgeneratorCFDcurrentdifferentialrelays.~fThisPC/MimprovesthefragilityleveloftheD/Gdifferentialcircuitbyreducingtheprobabilityofrelaytripduetomechanicalvibration.Thismodificationisaccomplishedsolelybyreplacingtheexistingdifferentialrelaysandcases,whileimplementingnointernalorexternalwiringchangesinthedieselgeneratorcontrolpanel.Thisthenprecludesanynewtypeofinteractionwkhothersafetyrelatedequipment.Therefore,thisPC/Misnuclearsafetyrelatedbutdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYANALYSSThisPC/Mimprovesthevibrationalfragilityofthedieselgeneratordifferentialrelaycircuit.ThisisaccomplishedbyreplacingtheexistingCFDdifferentialrelayswithIJDdifferentialrelays.Thismakesthecircuitlesssusceptibletospurioustripscausedbycontrolpanelvibration.Thismodificationdoesnotadverselyaffectthenormaloperationofthedieselgeneratordifferentialcircuitoroperationofthedieselgenerator.ThereplacementdifferentialrelayshavebeenseismicallytestedbythevendorasstatedintheGeneralElectricMIL.NO.82-12.Theseismicresponsespectrum(TRS)for=theinstrumentenvelopestheSt.LucieUnit102EnvelopeResponseSpectrumfortheDieselGeneratorBuilding(RRS)formasspoint53(elev.23.0')whichcorrespondstotheinstrumentlocation.Adampingfactorof5%wasusedintheTRSinaccordancewithIEEEStd-344-1975.Consequently,a4%dampingfactorwasconservativelyusedintheRRSforcomparisonofaccelerationvalues.TheaccelerationvaluesrequiredbytheRRSareaminimumof2.8timeslessatallfrequenciesthanthoseoftheTRSinthenonmperatemode,and4.9timeslessfortheoperatemode.Thiswillsufficientlyaccountforanyaccelerationamplificationthroughtherelaycabinet.Inaddition,thesize,weight,.mountinglocationandmountingdetailsofthereplacementrelayswillbethesameasthatoftheoriginalrelays.Therefore,theoriginalrelaysupportandcabinetdesigncriteriawillnotbeadverselyaffected.Thismodificationdoesnotaffectanycabletrayanalysis,Appendix"R"analysisoranyothersafety,relatedequipmentasitonlyinvolvesreplacementofrelaysonthedieselgeneratorcontrolpaneLWithrespecttotheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:ThePC/MsimplyinvolvesreplacingtheCFDdifferentialrelaysandcases,Whichmeansonlyaslight'changeofinternalrelaycontactswithoutchangingtherelays'unctionorexternalwiring.ThisPC/Mdoesnotaffecttheoperationoftheemergencydieselgeneratoras.discussed'nFSAR8.0.,nordoesitadverselyaffecttheoperationoftheD/GoranyothersafetyrelatedequipmentThedesignbasisintheFSAR(Chapters8and15).whichaddressestheoperationoftheD/G,isaneventinvolvingthelossmfmffsitepower.TheevaluationofthisdesignbasisisnotaffectedbythisPC/M.

PCM187-184WithrespecttothepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSAR:ThisPC/Mjustinvolvesreplacingtheexistingdieselgeneratordifferentialrelayswithanothermodeltoimprovethevibrationalfragilityofthedifferentialcircuitandtherefore,doesnotcreatethepossibilityoftheabove.WithrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforaTechnicalSpecification:AsthisPC/M'doesnotnotadverselyaffectoperationoftheemergency,diesel'generator,itdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheDieselGeneratorTechnicalSpecification4.8.AdditionallythisPC/MdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationasitonlyinvolveschangesinthedieselgeneratorcontrolpanel.ThereforeitcanbeconcludedthatthisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

PCM227-984TURBINEGANTRYCRANEPROXIMITYRESTRICTIONSINTRODUCTIONThisPCMprovidesrestrictionsontheproximityoftheUnits1and2tur-binegantrycranestoeachotherinordertopreventpotentialoverstress-ingoftheturbinebuildingstructure.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyques-tion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanacci-dentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluated.pre-viouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreat@8;or(iii)ifthemar-ginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theturbinebuildingisanon-CategoryIstructureandcontainsnosafetyrelatedequipment.ThisPCMimposesarestrictionoftheproximityoftheturbinebuildinggantrycranetoeachother.Thisrestrictionassuresthattheassumptionsusedinthebuildingdesignremainvalid.Ther'eforetheimplementationofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Implementationofthis-PCMdoesnotinvolveachangetotheStLucieUnit2TechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevalua-tionwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveany'nre-viewedsafetyquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequir-edfortheimplement'ationofthisPCM.

PCM228-184EXCORENEUTRON-FLUXMONITORINGSYSTEMINTRODUCTIONPC/M228-184providesthemethodtoinstalltheEx-CoreNeutronFluxMonitoringSystemthatmonitorswideandsourcerangesneutronfluxwithindependentdisplaysintheControlRooma'ndHotShutdownPanel(HSP).=ThissystemmeetstheFPSLcommitmenttotheNRCbyprovidingwiderangeneutronfluxmonitoringinthehotshutdownpanelwhichisindependentoftheControlRoomandrequiredby18CFR50AppendixR.ItalsosatisfiestheguidelinesofRegulatoryGuide1.97Rev.3byprovidinganeutronmonitoringsystemtomeetthedefinitionandrequirementsforcategary1variablesasindicatedintheRegulatoryGuide.Inadditionthissystempermitsthecontinuityofrefuelingactivitiesintheeventofafailureoftheexistingstart-upexcoredetectorsduringrefueling.TechnicalSpecifications3/4.9.3RefuelingOperations,requiresthesuspensionofoperationsinvolvingcorealterationsorpositivereactivitychangesifatleasttwostart~pdetectorsarenotoperational.AsaresultofamalfunctionofoneofthetwofissionchambersintheNeutronDetectorAssemblyChannelSB,duringthesystemcommissioning,itisneces'sarytoreplacethemalfunctioningdetector.Thereplacementdetectorissimilartotheonereplacedexceptthatitisenvironmentallyqualifiedfor10yearlifeplusDesignBasisAccident.'TYANALYSISpithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,proposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequences'ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforaniccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheExcoreNeutronMonitoringSystemisaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemdesignedtomeettherequirementsof)OCFR50AppendixRbyprovidingindependentsourcerangeandwiderangeneutronfluxmonitoringintheControlRoomandHSP.ItalsosatisfiestheguidelinesofRegulatoryGuide1.97Rev3forcategory1variables.ThesecomponentsareseismicallyandenvironmentallyqualifiedtotherequirementsofIEEE323-1974and344-1975.TheinsideandoutsidecontainmentcableisqualifiedtoIEEE'-383-1974.Thereplacementdetectoranditsintegralcableassembly,ofthefaileddetector,isalsoqualifiedtoIEEE-323-1974,IEEE-344-1975andIEEE383-1974,howeveritsqualifiedlifeis10yearsnormaloperationplusDesignBasisAccident,thereforethisreplacementdetectorisconsideredonlyatemporaryreplacement.

PCM228-184TheExcoreNeutronMonitoringSystemisapost-accidentmonitoringsystemthatprovidesaneutronsourcerangemonitoringsignalwhichisredundanttotheexistingnon-postaccidentqualifiedexcoreneutrondetectorsystem.TheinstallationoftheExcoreNeutronMonitoringSystemdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceof;anaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedsincethesystemperformsonlymonitoringfunctions,itisseismicallyandenvironmentallyqualified;anditisnotinterlockedwithanysafeguardssystem.Itdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslysinceitisanindependent/redundantsystemdesignedtomeettherequirementsofRegulatoryGuidel.75.Theinstrumentationaddedtotheexistingboards(RTGB-104,PACBandESP)hasbeenevaluatedbyEbascoanddoesnothaveanysignificantimpactonthepreviousseismicqualificationoftheboards.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthetechnicalspecificationsisnotreduced.InfacttheadditionalsourcerangeinstrumentationaddedintheControlRoomwillpermitcontinuityinrefuelingoperationsintheeventoffailureoftheexistingexcoredetectorsbysatisfyingtherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.49.2.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafety'valuationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPC/M-PCM252-184INTRODUCTIONTRAVELINGWATERSCREENUPGRADERecentexperiencesofexcessivejellyfishrunshavecauseddamagecotheintaketravelingwaterscreens.,ThisPCMreplacestheexistingtravelingwaterscreenframesandbasketswithnew,highstrength,braced,sectionsthatwillincreasethestrengthofthescreenstoadifferentialpressureheadcapacityof15feet.Inaddition,thereplacementbasketswillbefurnishedwithintermediateandlowerliftinglipshavingserratededgestoimpaledebriswhichmayslipoucofthebasketsontheirupwardtravel.Asaresultofthesechanges,thescreenswillhaveanimprovedM>anceofsurvivingafutureinfluxofjellyfish.Theheadsections,footshaftassembliesandcarryingchainshavealsobeenreplacedwithupgradedcomponentstofurtherextendtheusefullifeofthescreens.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbeaeemedtoinvolveanunrevieweusafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilicyofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportantcosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctiono:adifferenctypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysiReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety-asdefinedi:.thebasisforanytechricalspecificationisreduced.'ThisPCi".providesthedetailsformodificationslimprovemencstocheexistingintaketravelingwaterscreens.Thescreensarefabricate-'nddesignedbyEnvirexIncorporatedinaccordancewitnEbas-cSpecificationFLO8770.760,whichrequiresthatthescreenbenon-seismicandnon-safetyrelated.ThisPCMincreasesthescreng.nofthescreenstoadifferentialpressureheadcapacityof15feet.Thestrengtheningofthescreensdoesnotaltertheconditionstowhichtheymaybesubjectedbutwillreducethedamagetothescreensintheeventofanexcessivedifferentialpressurecondition.Thenewloadsimposedontheexistingembeddedguideslotsasaresultofthescreenredesignhavebeenreviewedandareacceptable.Eachtravelingscreenispresentlyfurnishedwithapneumaticdifferentialwaterlevelcontrollerforautomaticoperation.Initially,thescreenwashpumpandrotationofthescreer.willautomaticallystartwhenaspecifieddifferentialpressureheadlossisreached.Whenthedifferentialpressureincreasesbeyond'hispoint,thecontrolroomisalertedviaanannunciatorwhichreceivesitsinputfromdifferentialpressureindicatortransmitters.TnemodificationsissuedviathisPCMdonotalterinanywaytneoperationoftheexistingcontrolsystem.ModificationissuecviachisPCMsubmergence1eve1sfromtheIntakeCirculatingWater(CW)puŽp.Incomipromisetheoperationorsaeyofwi11notimpacttheminimu-..CoolingWater(ICW)pumportneaddir,ion,thisPCMwillno:these-pumps.

PCM252-184Therefore,theimplementationprobabilityorconsequencesofdoesitcreateanynewtvpesofdoesnotinvolveacnangeSpecifications.ofthisPCMwillnotincreasetheanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatednoraccidents.lmplementatior.ofthisPD:totneStLucieUnit1Technics1Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvclveanunreviewedsafetvquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimpi.ementationof'hisPCH.

PCM015-185DIESELGENERATORAIRSTARTSYSTEMPIPINGMODIPICATIONPC/MSCONCESystemDescriptionEa'chdieselgenerator(D/G)setatSt.LucieUnit//1hasanindependentairstartingsystem.Eachsystemhasfourskidmountedairreceiverswhichprovidesufficientairchargefortenstartsperdieselgeneratorset.Theairreceiversarepressurizedbyanelectricallydrivencompressorviaanairdryer.Adieseldrivenaircompressorisusedasabackuptotheelectricdriven"compressor.Thechargingairflowstothenumber3and0airreceiversinparallelandthentothenumber1and2"airreceiversthroughtheoutletairheader.DesignDescriptionTheairreceiverchargingconfigurationwillbemodifiedbyinstallingabranchofftheairdryeroutletpipingtothenumber1and2airreceivers(1Al,1A2,IB1and1B2).Thenewlinewillenablethecompressorstochargethenumber1and2airreceiversinparallelwiththenumber3and0airreceivers.Theexistingdieseldrivenaircompressordischargecheckvalves(V-17355A)willberelocatedtobeinthenewchargingline.Newcheckvalveswillbeinstalledatthedischargeofalltheaircompressors.Aflexibleconnectorwillbeinstalledinthecharginglinetoalltheairreceiversinordertolimittheboundaryoftheseismicstressanalysis.Drawings3PE-15-185.001,.002,.003and.000showthebeforeandafterD/Gairstartschematics.SAFETYANALYSISTheproposedchangeisolatesthetwoairreceiversets(andassociatedairstartmotorsets)perD/Genginebymodifyingtheinletairheadersandclosingtheoutletairheadercross-connectvalve.ThemodificationprovidesfurtherseparationandredundancythanrequiredbytheSt.LucieUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).Eachemergencydieselenginestartingsystemmustbeindependentandphysicallyseparatedfromothersystemsservingtheredundantdieselgenerator,suchthatasinglefailureinanyoneofthesystemswillaffectonlytheassociateddieselgenerator.ThismodificationwillmakeeachD/Gengineairstartmotorsetsindependentandphysicallyseparated.Therefore,afailureassociatedwithoneofthetwoairreceiversetsperD/GenginewillnotdisabletheairstartsystemforthethatD/Gengine.ThisredundancyisaboveandbeyondwhatisrequiredbytheFSAR,Reg.GuidesorGeneralDesignCriteriaforSt.LucieUnit5/1.ThemodificationdoesnotinvolveanUnreviewedSafetyQuestionbecause:1)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisdecreasedb'ecausetheairstartmotorsetsandassociatedairreceiversandpipingareindependentandseparated.~t PCM015-185TheconsequenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisdecreasedbecauseasingleequipmentmalfunctionwillnotdisablebothairstartmotorsetsonaD/Gengine.3)ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethatanypreciouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotcreatedbecausetheairstartsystemoperatesfunctionallythesameasbeforewithoutintedependencebetweenairmotorsets.0)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnicalSpecificationisincreased,notreduced,becausegreater'reliabilitytostartbothD/G'sisprovided.ThisPC/MisclassifiedasaNuclearSafetyRelatedchangebecausetheairreceiverinletheadersuptothecheckvalvearerequiredtowithstandalldesignbasisevents,toprecludeanairreceiversetfromlosingsufficientairpressurefortencoldstartsofaDieselGenerator.ThepipingupstreamoftheairreceiverinletheadercheckvalveisnotNuclearSafetyRelatedbecausetheabilitytochargetheairreceiversduringorafteradesignbasiseventisnotrequiredpertheFSAR.Thespecificpipeswhichareattachedtothenewsupportsarenon-safetyrelated.Assuch,thesesupportsareclassifiednon-safetyrelated,QA/QCrequired.Thepipesupportshavebeen-seismicallydesignedsothattheywillnotinteractwithnearbysafetyrelatedequipmentorpipingintheeventofanearthquake.

PCM022-185INSTRUMENTAIRUPGRADETIE-INSSYSTEMDESCRIPTIONt.0~OeratinnTheInstrumentAir(IA)tie-insprovidedbythismodificationwillhaveisolationvalveswhichshouldremainclosedatalltimesuntilthebalanceoftheinstrumentairmodificationisimplemented.ThesevalvesshouldbeincludedinthevalvealignmenttableinOperatingProcedure1-1010020.2.0FunctionThismodificationfunctionstoprovidealloutagerelatedtie-instotheIASystemsothatinstallationofnewcompressorsanddryerscanbecompletedduringplantoperations.Notethatelectricaltie-inscanbeinstalledduringanyplantoperatingmode.3.0DesinDescritionThismodificationprovidestie-insforcoolingwatertothenewcompressors.ThecoolingwaterwillbefromthelocalTurbineCoolingWater(TCW)Systemsupplyandreturnheaders.Themodificationalsoprovidestie-instotheIASystemjustupstreamoftheexistingairreceiver.Eachtie-inwillconsistofanisolationvalve,piping,pipecapandthenecessarymaterialsto.tieintotheexistingpiping.SAFETYEVALUATIONle0Thismodificationisnon-seismic,non-safetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:1.2TheTCWandIASystemsperformnosafetyfunctionandareclassifiedasnon-safety,non-seismicQualityGroupD.Thesemodificationsdonotinteractwithanysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.le3Nosafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponentsarecompromised.byanyassumedfailureofanyexistingornewequipmentorcomponents.IANoTechnicalSpecificationsarealteredora'dverselyaffected.2.0Carehasbeentakeninthedesignto'eliminateorcontrolaspectswhichcouldbehazardoustoequipmentand/orpersonnel.

PCM024-,185ELECTRICPENETRATIONASSEMBLIES'NSTALLATIONABSTRACTThisengineeringpackagecoversreplacementofcertainEgectricPenetrationAssemblies(EPAs)attheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1.Thesemodificationsconsistof:l.RemovaloffiveexistingEPAsmanufacturedbyGulfGeneralAtomicCompany,EPADesignationNosC8,Dl,D2,D3andD9.TheseEPAsareusedforlowvoltagepowerandcontrolcircuits.2.InstallationofsixnewEPAsmanufacturedbyConaxBuffaloCorporation.TnesenewEPAswillbeinstalledinthecontainmentnozzlesitemizedaboveandsparecontainmentnozzleC9.3.RecircuitingofallcircuitspresentlyconnectedtoNo4,No8andNo12AWGmodulesassociatedwithalltheGulfGeneralAtomicCompanyEPAsinstalledatUnitNo1.InadditiontothefiveremovedEPAs,tnismodificationaffectsnineotherexisting'ulfGeneralAtomicEPAs,totallingapproximately400-circuits.The'ffectedcircuitshavebeenprovidedinAttachments4and5.TheEPAsareclassifiedasSafetyClass2(gualityGroupB),Class1E,seismicCategoryIcomponentsandperformasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,.thisPC/Misconsiderednuclearsafetyrelated.TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.The,modificationsdonotinvolve-anunreviewedsafetyquestionandprior'ommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction.ofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequences.ofanaccidentormalfunctionisnotincreasedsince:EPAsarebeingsuppliedbyConaxBuffaloCorporation,whohassuppliedpreviouslyfiveEPAsinstalledintheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1,aswellasalltheEPAsforUnitNo2.TheseEPAshavebeenenvironmentallyandseismicallyqualifiedin,accordancewithIEEE317-1976forapplicationinbothStLuciePlants.Tnedesign,fabrication,test,inspection,installation,and~~qualificationoftheEPAsareinaccordancewithIEEE317-1976andtheASIDEBGPVCode,SectionIII,SubsectionNEfarClassMCComponents.AsdiscussedintheDesignAnalysis,allratingsassociatedwiththenewequipmentmeetorexceedtherequirementsfortheapplication.

PCM024-185NewwirewayismanufacturedbyHoffman,vendoroftheexistingEPAwirewaysystem.Wirewayins"allationhasbeenanalyzedassuitablefortheapplicationasdiscussedintheDesignAnalysis.AllnewcablesarequalifiedtotheflametestrequirementsofIEEE3S3-1974'and,exceptforafewCEDMcircuitjumpers,aresuitableforClass1Euse,asistheRaychemsplicematerial.AsdiscussedintheDesignAnalysis,theCEDMjumpercableissuitableforuseundertheStLuciePlantnormalconditionsandisde-energizedimmediatelyuponreactortrip.SpecialconsiderationoftheCEDMcircuitconductorsisconsistentwiththepresentStLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR(ReferenceSection3.11.5.4).The.possibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyanalyzedisnotcreatedsince:ThenewEPAsarequalifiedtotherequiredenvironmentandwillbeabletoperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionpostDBA.TheonlymodificationtoplantcomponentsisrecircuitingtothenewEPAs.Thecomponentsbeingthusmodifiedhavebeenreviewedtoassurethattheirremovalfromserviceforrecircuiting-~esnotviolatetechnicalspecificationsnorimpactrequiredplantsystems.Containmentvesselstructuralintegrityisunaffectedbythismodification,asdiscussedintheDesignAna1ysis.AftertheinstallationoftheEPAs,theoverallcontainmentboundary.integritywillbeverifiedviaa10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeAleakratetest.'Inaddition,alocalTypeBleaktestwillbeperformedoneachEPAtoverifytheintegrityoftheelectricfeedthroughseals.Configurationoftheinterfacebetweentheexistingplantcableandthenewequipmentisconsistentwiththedesignbasesestablishedinthe.StLuciePlant,UnitNo1FSAR.Tnisinsuresthattheconsequencesofallanalyzedaccidentsremainunchanged.Also,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionsareintroducedbythismodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsinceSpecialInstructionshavebeenprovidedinSection9.0sotheimplementationofthismodificationdoesnotviolatetheStLuciePlant,UnitNo1TechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,theimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'plant'sTechnicalSpecifications.AholdpointhasbeenestablishedforthereworkofEPAC3conduitsandtheterminationlocationsintheRCBverticalterminationboxes.ThisholdpointwillberemoveduponaccesstotheRCBandfield'erificationoftheexistinginstallation.Pendingthereleaseoftnehold,arevisedsafetyevaluationwillbeprovided.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewritte"safetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesno"involveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM039-185DIESELGENERATORSUBSYSTEMFLOWDIAGRAMSModificationDescriptionAllvalvesandinstrumentsmustbetaggedinthefieldasperthenewflowdiagrams.L2.)AffectedoperatingproceduresmustbereviewedtodetermineifrevisionisrequiredtoreQectth~ewtagnumbersorQowdiagramnumbers.IIIla.WithrespecttotheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedinthePSAR:ThisPC/MreleasesthenewDieselGeneratorSubsystemFlowDiagramstothesiteThefoll'owingactivitiesmustbecompletedbeforethenewfiowdiagramscanbeissuedaspermanentplantdrawings:FlowdiagramsarenotconsideredinevaluatingFSARaccidents.lb.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:FlowdiagramsarenotconsideredinevaluatingFSARaccidents.1c.Withrespecttotheprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportant-tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinFSAR:Flowdiagramsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.1d.WithrespecttotheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttonuclearsafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR:Plowdiagramsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.2a.WithrespecttothepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR'-FlowdiagramsarenotconsideredinevaluatingFSARaccidents.2b.WithrespecttothepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananalyzedintheFSAR-'lowdiagramsarenotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofsafetyrelatedequipmentmalfunctions.3..Withrespecttothemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytchnicalspecification:Flowdiagramsdonotimpacttechnicalspecificationsafetymargins.Basedonthe'above,thenewQowdiagramsandthetagging/retaggingofdieselgeneratorvalvesandinstrumentsaredetermineQnottoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Therearenosystemmodificationsinvolved.

PCM047-185G.E.SAMRELAYSP.C.CARDREPLACEMENTIntroductionTheGeneralElectrictype.Sam11ButilizedatSt.LuciePlantare~operatedtimingrelaysthatemploysolidwtatecomponentstoprovideanextremelystabletimedehyfunction.Thisrelayfindsapplication,wherevershort9.C.operatedtimingfunctionsarerequired.SpecificallythisrelayisusedforcircuitbreakerfaQureback~protectionschemeswhereaccurateandrepeatabletimesettingsare.essentiaLIthasbeendeterminedthatitispossibleforthistyperelaytooperateinlessthanthesettimedelayiftheinitiatingcontactexperiencesaveryspecificmodeofcontactbounce.Theforeshortenedoperatingtimehasbeenobservedbyotherusersandhasbeendemonstratedinthefactoryundercarefullycontrolledtestconditions.Althoughtheactualoccurrenceofthisparticularmodeofinitiatingcontactbounceappearstoberatherunlikely,aminordesignchangeinternaltotherelayhasbeenrecommendedbythemanufacturer.ItistheintentofthisPC/Mtoincorporatethedesigncha~ewhichreplacestheexistingprintedcircuitboardintherelaytoeliminatethepossibilityofsuchforeshortenedtimingbytheSAMrelay..ThismodificationhasbeenreviewedwithrespecttoTitle'10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,whichstatesthataproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewed'safetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevahiatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis.foranytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationbeingperformedunderthisPC/MwillenhancetheoperationoftheG.FSam1IBrelayassuringthatiftheunlikelyeventofaninitiatingcontactbounceoccurred,therelaywilltimeoutappropriately.TheG.ESam11Brelayaffectedareutilizedforcircuitbreakerfaourebackupprotectionschemesandarenotinanysafetyrelatedcircuitorperformedasafetyrelatedfunction.EnvironmentalqualificationisjustifiedbythefactthattheserelaysandthustheirinternalPCcards'arelocatedinamildenvironment.Thereisnoseismicconcernsaffectedbythismodification,therelays.havenoseismicrequirementsassociatedwiththem.Therefoie,theprobabilityofapreviouslyreviewedaccidentisnotincreased,thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypehasnotbeencreatedandthemarginofsafetyhasnotbeenreduced.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetothe'pla'nt'echnicalspecification.'Iheforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevahationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,therefore,priorCommissionapprovalforimplementationofthisPC/Misnotnecessary.

PCM064-185MSRRETUBINGThisEngineeringPackagecoversthemodificationstotheMoistureSeparator'eheaters(MSRs)andtotheScavengingSteamVentCondenser(SSVC)System.Th'ema)orfeatureofthispackageisBieinstallationofnewtubebundlesintheMSRswhichwillprovideimprovedthermalperformanceoftheplantsecondaryside.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedagainsttherequirementsoflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,theseMSRandSSVCmodificationsareclass1fiedasnon-safetyrelated,donotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquest1on,andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressedinSection3,"SafetyEvaluation").However,theMSROperatingProceduremustberevisedpriortoplant.startup.SAFETYEVALUATIONMithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposed.changeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant'tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionefadifferenttypethananyevaluatedprev1ously1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)1fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunrevi,ewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ1pmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalys1sreportisnotincreased.TheMSRs,theportionofMainSteamassociatedwiththeMSRsandtheHeaterDrainSystempipingarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.0Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionof-adifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated..The.componentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.

PCM064-185iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,'incethecomponentinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.Theimpl'ementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolve'nunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM073-185ABSTRACTMSRPERFORATEDPLATEMODIFICATIONThisEngineeringPackagecoversthemodificationstotheMoistureSeparatorReheaters(MSRs).Thispackageisfortheinstallationofperforated'lates1ntheMSRswhichwillprovidebettersteamflowdistribution.Thiswillimprovethermalperformanceoftheplantsecondarysideandreduceerosion/corrosionofthemoistureseparatorvanesandsupports.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedaga1nsttherequirementsoflOCFR50.59;Asaresult,thisMSRmodificationisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated,doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion,doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecification,andwillnotaffectplantsafety,(asaddressedinSection3,"SafetyEvaluation").However,theMSROperatingProceduremustberevisedpriortoplantstartupasindicatedinPCM064-185.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)1$apossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanany'valuatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or'iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanytechnicalspecification1sreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:1)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluated1nthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincetheMSRsarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshas'eenmadetothe~operationaldesignofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificat1onarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecificationTheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidethebasesthat.thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM131-185REPLACEMENTOFRISDEVICESINTRODUCTIONThisPC/Misfortheinstallationoffourteen(14)newtransmittersbyRochesterInstrumentSystemsmodelSC-1302-323toreplaceexistingunits.Theexistingtransmittersarereachingtheirqualifiedlifeexpectancy.Therefore,anewre-placementunitisrequiredtosatisfythe'ifeexpectancyrequirement.SAFETYANALYSIS'VithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbe,deemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe'afetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibil'itvforanacci-dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalvsisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthom>>>>~nf~~<atv~~definedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Th'mod'icationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollow-ingprov'desthebasesforthisconclusion.~~~ThesenewtransmittersbyRISarequalifiedenvironmentallytoIEEE-323-1974a'ndseismicallytoIEEE-344-1975.ThisPC/Mreplacesex'tingRIStrans=ittesw'hnewunitsthussatisfy'gthelifeexpectancyrequirement.These'-'qualificationofthesedeviceshavebeenpreviouslyreviewedforthepart'u'armountinglocationandfoundacceptable.TheseismicintegrityoftheRTGB,PostAccidentPanel'AandRadiationMonitor'ngCabinet"E"arenotaffec:edsincethedeviceisareplacementforanexisting,identica'eviceatthesamelocation.'herefor--"'smod'ficationwillnotofanyaccident,whetherprevious'yevalua:edof'dfere".evaluatedandwillnotreducethesafetyoftheplan:.t4aqsiei4ni~r~~CThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoenotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecificat'ons.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvdlveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM142-185APPENDIXRCONTROLROOMINDEPENDENCEFORALTERNATESHUTDOWNINTRODUCTIONSincetheseparationdefinedinAppendix"R"SectionIII.G.2cannotbeprovidedforessentialcomponentsandcircuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom,alternativeshutdowncapabilityisprovided.ThisensuresthatintheunlikelyeventafiremakestheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroomuninhabitableorrendersequipmentineitherroominoperable;-theplantcanbesafelysakentocoldshutdownfromremotelocationsandHotShutdownControlPanel(HSCP)ThisPC/Minstallsredundantfuses,.isolationswitchesandfuseblockstovariouscontrolcircuitsasidentifiedbythe"EssentialEquipmentListforAlternateShutdown"transmittedbyEbascoletterP-M-SL-85-0325datedFebruary28,1985.ThemodificationstothecontrolcircuitswillassuresafeshutdownfromtheHotShutdownPanelandotherlocalcontrolstationsshouldafiredisabletheessentialcircuitsintheControlRoomand/orcablespreadingroom.TheaddedcomponentsarelocatedoutsidetheControlRoomand/orcablespreadroom.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclusion.Thematerial,devicesassociatedwiththismodification,willbeClass1Ewhereconnectedto.safetygradeequipment.SafetygradedevicesshallconformtoIEEE-323-1974andIEEE-344-1975'hismodificationprovidesthemeansforanalternateplantshutdownbytheinstallationofadditionalswitchesandredundantfusestoisolatetheControlRoomintheunlikelyeventofafire.Thenewcableroutingisbeingdoneinaccordancew'ithStLucieUnitNo1ampacityandtrayfillcriteria.Thesafetyrelatedswitchgears,MCC,and'ieselGeneratorpanelhavebeenreviewedtoaccountfortheeffectoftheweightsoftheaddeddevices.Basedontheinsignificantaddedweight,weconcludethereisnoimpact.totheexistingequipmentseismicqualifications.Therefore,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofanaccident,whetherpreviouslyevaluatedorofadifferenttypethenpreviouslyevaluatedandwill~otreduce,thesafetyoftheplant.

PCM142-185ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical-specifications,nordoesitrequirearevisionof,atechnicalspecification.ThismodificationwillbeperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecificationTS-3.4.3andTS-3.4.4.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorcommission'approvalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM155-185REACTORCLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGPIPEASSEMBLYTHECLOSUREHEADLIFTINGRIGASSEMBLYCONSISTSOFTHREEMAJORASSEM-BLIESNAMELYr'(1)THELIFTINGFRAMEASSEMBLY>>(Z)THElINKASSEMBLYWHICHINCLUDESTHEBOXGIRDERASSEMBLYANDTHEPIPEASSEMBLYrAND(3)THEPLATFORMASSEMBLY>>THEPIPEASSEMBLY.IS"ATTACHEDTOTHETRAMRAILANDTHETRAMRAILISATTACHEDTOTHEHOISTWHICHISATTACHEDTOTHEPIPE'SSEMBLY+THEASSEMBLYROTATESVIATHETRAMRAILANDALLOWSTHETENSIONINGDEVICESTOBEINPOSITION>THEINTENTOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOUTILIZETHEPIPERINGOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYASANAXRDISTRIBUTIONHEADERFORTHEPNEUMATICTUGGERSFOMHESTUDTENSIONINGDEVICES'HISENTAILSTHEINSTAILATIONOFAZ'IAMETERAXRSUPPLYNOZZLEANDTHREE1'IAMETEROUTLETNOZZLESFORTHEPNEUMATICTUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES>>THISWILLELIMINATETHEUSEOFXNDIVXDUAlSUPPLYLINESTOTHETUGGERSANDWILLREDUCEPERSONNELRADI-ATIONEXPOSUREANDHIlLALSOPROVIDEEASEINRIGGINGANDREMOVALOFTHETUGGERAIRSUPPLYLINES.OVERALL>>THISMODIFICATIONWILLEASEUPTHEENTIRESTUDTENSIONINGOPERATIONSSAFETYANALYSISWITHRFSPECTTOTITLEleOFTHFCODEOFFEDERALRfGULATION>>PART5859>>APROPOSEDCHANGESHALLBEDEEMEDTOINVOlVEANUNREVIEHEDSAFETYQUESTION>>(1)IFTHEPROBABILITYOFOGCURENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTXMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVI-OUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBEINCREASED>>OR(II)IFAPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTMAYBECREATED>>OR(III)IFTHEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATXONISREDUCEDTHEPROBABILITYORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOF.EQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANAL-YSISREPORTISNOTINCREASEDBECAUSETHEPIPERINGASSEMBLYTHATISBEINGMODIFIEDDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTIONANDDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFE%SHUTDOWNCAPABILXTYOFTHEUNIT>>THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTCREATEANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPCVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTBECAUSETHEADDEDNOZZLESAREWELDEDANDMADEASPARTOFTHEPIPEASSEMBLYWHICHDOESNOTPERFORMASAFETYRELATEDFUNCTION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFt)RANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSISNOTREDUCEDSINCETHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTREQUIREANYREVISIONTOANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSiTHEFOREGOINGCONSTITUTES>>PER16CFR56o55'B)rTHEWRXTTENSAFETYEVALUATIONHHICHPROVIDESTHEBASISTHATTHISCHANGEDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION>>THEREFORE>>PRIORCOMMISSIONAPPROVALISNOTREQUIREDFORTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISPC/Mo PCM169-185'ZURBINEGANTRYCRANEBRAKESYSTEM.ABSTRACTREASLN-85-72requestedengineeringtobeprovidedtoupgradetheUnitIturbinegantrycranebrakesystemtomeetthe"operatingcapabilitiesoftheexistingUnit2turbinegantrycranebrakesystem.Baseduponthedesignandhardware"providedbythecranevendor(Indusco),apneumatichydraulicsystemfunctionallyequivalenttothatutilizedontheUnit2turbinegantrycranewasimplemented.Tosupportthismodification,a10CFR50.59reviewwascompletedandtherespectivesafetyanalysiswhichisnowpartofthisdocumentwastransmittedbyRef.3.Thisdesignpackagefunctionstoendorsethebrakemodificationimplementedbythevendor.ThemodificationisconsideredNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedanddoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.RevisionIprovides'changestothedrawinglisttoreferenceattachedinstructionmanualsnotaddressedbyRevision0.Thisrevisiondoesnotchangetheoriginalscopeofwork.The10CFR50.59reviewandsafetyevaluationasprovidedbyRevision0,therefore,remainsvalidandisacceptable.Inaddition,nochangesto.theTechnicalSpecificationswererequiredbyRevision0orarerequiredbyRevisionlofthisdesignpackage.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheUnit1turbinebuildinggantrycraneislocatedontheturbinebuildingandassuchisnotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.Therefore,thismodificationaffectsonlyNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedQualityGroupDequipment.ThecranedesignrequirementsofNUREG0612"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"arenotapplicabletotheSt.Lucie1TurbineGantryCrane(FPLLetterL-81-276fromR.E.UhrigtoD.EisenhutdatedJuly2,1978).Basedonafailuremodeanalysis,failureoftheturbinegantrycranebrakingsystemasprovidedbythismodificationwillnotinhibittheoperationofanyexistingsafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Thenewbrakingsystemprovidesahydraulicbrakeforeachcranemotorthusprovidingcontroloflateralmovementofthecranealongitsrails.Failuretoprovidethisbreakingactionwillresultinaninabilitytoadequatelycontrollateralmovementofthecrane.Additionally,allnewelectricalcomponentsaddedbythismodificationarepoweredfromthecraneelectricalsystemwhich.ispoweredfromanonvitalsource.Thereforeanyfailuremodeanalyzedforthenewbrakingsystemwillnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Basedonthisinformationitcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexistsincetheconsequencesofallanalyzedaccidentsremainsunchanged.Additionally,withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionsareintroducedasaresultofusingthenewbrakesystem.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreducednorhavechanges'otheTechnicalSpecificationsbeenrequired.Inconclusion,thismodificationisacceptable-fromthestandpointof'uclearsafetysinceitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequirechangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.ThereforeimplementationofthismodificationwithoutpriorNRCapprovalisacceptable.

PCM174-185RCPOILLIFTSYSTEMPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENTINTRODUCTIONThisPC/Misfortheinstallationoftwenty(20)pressuresw'tchesbyBarksdaleModelB1T-A48SStoreplacetheexistingBarksdaleModel9048-4.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshal'edeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyouestion;(i)iftheprobab1'yofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanacc'dentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluateointheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossb-liryforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafety,AnalysisReportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecif'ationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesfor'hisconclusion.Thenewswitcheswillbemountedinthesameplaceandmannerastheexist-ingswitches,whicharemountedseismically.Bothswitcheshavethesameweight2.5lbs.Theydonotperformanysafetyfunctionandarenon-safetyrelated.ThisPC/Mdoes'otreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesofanytechnicalspecifications.jTheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspeci'fica'tions.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthipPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM178-985TIEBETWEENCONSTRUCTIONPIREMAINANDPLANTPIRELOOPAbstractThisPlantChange/ModificationisfortheconnectionoftheBackfitConstructionFireHaintotheStLucieUnits1and2FireWaterLoop-Thl.sconnectionconsistsoftwoseparatetie-insbetweenthefiremainandthefireloop.Thl.sPCMI.snotclassifiedasSafetyRelatedsincethefiremainandthefireloopdonotperformanysafetyfunction.Sincethefireloopprovidesprotectionforsafetyrelatedequipment,thisPCMisclassifiedasQualityRelated.Thl.sPCHprovidesadditionalfireprotectiontotheplantsincethesetie-l.nscreateanadditionalfirewatersupplytootherportionsofthePlant.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethefiremain/firelooptie-inisqualityrelatedandthismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentperformingasafetyfunction.Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincethefiremain/firelooptie-inhasno'afetyfunction.andnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.iiiThismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCHisnotrequired.

PCM179-185DIESELGENERATORCOOLINGSYSTEMVALVEREPLACEMENTABSTRACTThisengineeringpackagecoversthereplacementofseveralvalvesintheDieselGeneratorCoolingSystemandDemineralizedNakeUpWaterSystem.ThereplacementoftheDieselGeneratorCoolingSystemValvesisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedanddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.ThereplacementofthevalvesintheDemineralizedMakeUpWaterSystemisclassifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelated.SAFETYEVALUATIONThereplacementofvalvesintheDieselGeneratorCoolingWater'SystemandtheDemineralizedMake'pWaterSystemdoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59.ThereplacementofvalvesintheDemineralizedMakeUpWaterSystemhasnoeffectonnuclearsafetysincetheD.LWaterSystemisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentpreventionormitigationandfailureofthesystemwouldnotresultinareleaseofradioactivemateriaLThereplacementof.valvesintheDieselGeneratorCoolingSystemdoesnotincreasetheprobability'previouslyanalyzedaccidentssincetheD/Gsarenotutilizedindeterminingtheprobabilitiesofaccidents.Sincethevalvereplacementdoesnotchangetheoperationoroperabilityofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipmentimportanttosafety,theconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed,theprobabilityofandconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyanalyzedhavenotchanged.Likewise,thepossibilityofanewaccidentoranewmalfunctionhasnotbeencreatedsincetheoperationoroperabilityofthedieselsoranyotherpieceofequipmentimportanttosafetyhasnotchanged.Inaddition,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenchangedsincethismodificationdoesnotchangetheperformance,loadcapabilities,oroperatingcharacteristicsofthedieselgenerators.

PCM199-985WATERTREATMENTI'LANTREGENERATXONWASTENEUTRALIZATIONTANKMODIPICATIONABSTRACTThesubjectREArequestedaneutralizationtankbeaddedtotheWaterTreatmentPlant(WTP)tomeetcurrentDepartmentofEnvironmentalRegulation(DER)regula'tionsgoverningdischargeofhazardouswastes.Theneutralizationtankmodification(PC/M116-985)providesthenecessarydetailsforinstallationofthistankandtheassociatedpiping,equipmentandcomponentsnecessarytoallowforregenerationwastestobeautomaticallydirectedtothetankduring'theappropriatetimesintheregenerationprocess.Duringthecausticinjectionstepsofregeneration,causticsolutionsmustbedirectedtothetank.Theexistingsystem,however,isunabletoprovidethenecessaryflowsandpressuresrequiredtoaccommodatetheseregenerationstepsduetotheadditionalheadlossinthenewpipingruns.Thus,toaccommodatethenewarrangement,aboosterpumpmustbeaddedtothecausticdilutionwaterdemineralizedwatersupply.Inaddition,thecausticdilutionwaterflowcontrolvalveandflowindicator/transmittermustbereplacedtoaccommodatetheflowrequirements.Thissystemisnotrequiredforplantsafeshutdown;thereforethismodificationisnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedanditsimplementationdoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFEFYEVALUATIONThesubjectmodificationprovidesforadditionofaboosterpumpandflowcontrolvalveinthecausticdilutionwatersupplytotheWTP.Inaddition,themodificationprovidesforreplacementofcertaincausticdilutionwaterflowtransmittercomponentstoaccommodatetherequiredflowrates.AsdefinedinSection9oftheUnit1PSAR,theWTPanditsassociatedsystemsareclassifiedasnon-nuclearsafetyielatedandarenotrequiredtoperformasafetyfunction.Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis,asaddressedintheDesignAnalysis,themodificationhasnoaffectonnuclearsafety.Therefore,themodificationisadequatelyclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedQualityGroupD.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysh,itcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59isnotcreated.SincethemodificationaffectsonlytheWTPwhichisclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedandcannotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponentsasaddressedinthefailuremodeanalysis,theconsequencesofallanalyzedaccidentsremainsunchanged.Also,withrespecttonuclearsafety,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionsareintroducedasaresultofthis.designchange.Additionally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.Therefore,anunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexist.Sincethismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,norrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications,thismodificationisacceptablewithrespecttonuclearsafetythuspriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthemodification.

PCH202-185CCWSTRAINERBACKFLUSHDRAINAbstractThisengineeringdesignpackage(EDP)modifiestheCCWStrainerBackflushDrainpiping.Existingcastiron-andfiberglassdrainpiping,whichisrouteatotheCCWsump,willbereplacedwithstainlesssteelpipingwhichtiesintotheICWdischargeline.ThiswilleliminatethefloodingproblemintheCCWpitarea,whichiscausingcorrosionof=structuralsteelandpipingsupportsmountedonornearthefloor.~~ThisEDPisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthatthisEDP-doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59',aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviously'valuatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Themodificationincludedinthisengineeringdesignpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincetheconnectionofaCCWstrainerbackflushdrainlinetotheICWdischargelinewillhavenoeffectonthesafetyperformanceoftheICWorCCWsystemsoranyoftheircomponents.(ii)ThereisnopossiblityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevalutedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignoftheCCWstrainerbackflushsystem.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefined.inthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Implementationofthisengineeringdesignpackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommxsszonapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCSisnotrequired~

PCM004-186LUBEOILCENTRIFUGEANNUNCIATIONINTRODUCTIONModificationisrequiredtotheexistingTurbineLubeOilCentrifugecircuit.Atpresent,onlylocalannunciationisprovidedforTurbineLubeOilabnormalconditions.Amodificationtothepresentdesignisrequiredtotie-inthislocalsignaltotheannunciatorattheRTGB.Thiswillprovideinformationtoalerttheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressureorlowoiltemperature.SAFETYANALYSISWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation,Part50.59,a'proposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunc~nofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifa'ossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnot.involveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclusion.TheadditionalsignalprovidedattheRTGBenhancesthepresentsystembyprovidingturbinelubeoilcentrifugeannunciationunderabnormalconditions.Thisinformationalertstheoperatorofturbinelubeoilhighbackpressure.orlovoiltemperature.Inaddition,therearenosafetyconcernsassociatedviththecircuitrychangesandnevcablerouting,forthefollowingreasons:1~The~urbinelubeoilcircuitryisnon-safetyrelated.2.Thelocationofthecableroutingspecifiedinthebackfitsketchesvillnotdamageanysafetyrelatedequipment.Therefore,thismodificationvillnotincreasetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofanyaccident,vhetherpreviouslyevaluatedofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedandvillnotreducethesafetyoftheplant.~ThisPC/Mdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotreq'reachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,andpriorCommissionapproval'fortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM007-186NONRETURNVALVESACTUATIONSOLENOIDSABS1'RACfZnisengineeringpackagecoversthemodificationstoimprovetheperformanceoftheTurbineExtractionSteamReverseCurrentValves(NR4)onoverspeedturbinetrip.TnemodificationsanddetailsconsistoftheadditionofapressureswitchintheturbineOverspeedProtectionControl(OPC)headerinterlockedwithsix(6)NRV'sactuationsolenoidsandthereplacementofthepneumaticHRVtestvalveswitnelectric'estpushouttons.Presentlytheindividualsolenoidsareactuatedbyhighlevelswitcnesinstalledinthecorrespondingfeedwaterneaters.BasedonthedesignoftheMainTurbineanditsSubsystemsandtheextractionsteamlinesNRV's,thisEngineeringPackagehasbeenclassifiednon-safetyrelated.Primarily,theNRl'swillimprovetheclosingtimeonturbineoverspeedtrip.ThisisthemainobjectiveoftnisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10of.theCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanuneviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysis'eportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.'heSteamTurbineandReverseCurrentValvesarenonsafetyrelated.Theinstrumentationadditionsandchangestobeperformedhavenoimpactonanysafetyrelatedplantsystemsand/oroperations.Themodificationsimprovetheequipmentoperationwithoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.The,additionofthepressureswitch,thelocalelectrictestpushouttonandthedeletionofthepneumatictestvalvewillimprovetheturbineprotectionincaseofoverspeedtrip.Themodificationtothispackagewi'llnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident.Tnissystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigationscenarioandthereforethesystemsfailurewillhavenoimpactonplantsafeshutdown.TnismodificatonisnotdescribedinthetechnicalSpecificationsandtherefore,theimplementationoithisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoin~constitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwnicnprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapproval;for'the.implementationofthisPCHisnotrequired.Theturoinemi.ssilecriterionspecifiedinSe"tion3.5oftheOnit1FSARisno-applicabletothecomponentsaddedbythisPCM.

PCM015-986TELEPHONESYSTEMUPGRADEABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversthemodificationsanddetailsrequiredtosupporttheinstallation(byAT&T)ofanewA'T&TSystem85PBXTelephoneSystem.ThecentralequipmentforSystem85wil'1belocaedintheTelecommunicationEquipmentRoomsintheUnit1ServiceBuildingandUnit2D-13Building.Themodificationsanddetailsconsistofenlargementofthetelecommunicationroomstoaccommodatethenewequipment;installationofredundantairconditionerunitsforeachroomtosatisfyequipmentenvironmental-requirements;powersupplieswithemergencyback"up;racewaybetweenthetwotelecommunicationroomstoinstalltheAT&Tsuppliedfiberopticscable,andracewaybetweentheD-13Building,G-3BuildingandStart-upTrailerstoaccommodatetheAT&Tsuppliedmultipairtelephonecables.Basedontheimportanceofthetelephonesystemasoneoftheplantcommunicationmeans,th'isEngineeringPackagehasbeenclassifiedQualityRelatedtoenhancethesystemdesignandinstallationconfidence.Thenew"System85"willreplacetheexistingDimension600ElectronicStoredProgramPBXlocatedintheUnit1ServiceBuildingTelecommunicationsRoomandthePrivateAutomaticTelephoneExchange(PAX)locatedinUnit1ReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(Elev43'-0).Thisreplacementwillrequire.modificationofSection9.5.2"CommunicationSystems"oftheUnit1andUnit2FUSAR,Figures9.5-1and9.5-4,Table9.5-6oftheUnit2FUSARandSection3.8oftheUnit1andUnit2NuclearFireProtectionProgram.ToenergizetheSystem85telephoneequipmentandairconditionerslocatedintheUnitgServiceBuildinguponlossofnormaloff-sitepowerwillrequiremanualswitchingatPowerPanelPP-135locatedintheSecurityandRecordsBuilding.Resettingwillalsoberequireduponreturningofnormaloff-.sitepower.TheSysem85telephoneequipmentmodulesandairconditionerslocated'ntheUnit2D-13BuildingwillbeautomaticallysuppliedbytheNon-ClasslEdieselsupplyingtheD-13Buildinguponloss-ofnormalpower.

PCM023-186MAINFEEDWATERPUMPOILPRESSURESWITCHREPLACEMENTTheexistingMainFeedwaterPumplubeoilpressureswitchesareUnitedElectricSeries300.Themodel300hasbeendiscontinuedbythemanufacturerandsparepartsareveryscarceandareessentiallynot'vailable.Thisengineeringpackagecoversthereplacement,of(2)twopressureswitchesperpump(foratotalof(4)four)withnewupgradedseries400bythesamemanufacturerFBothoftheabovemodelshavecomparableoveralldimensions,weightandmountingfacilities,therefore,noothermodificationisneeded.Thefunctionofeachpressureswitchwillremainunchanged.Allswitcheswillhavead5ustabledifferentials.BasedonthedesignoftheMainFeedwaterPumpsanditssubsystems,thisEngineeringPackagehasbeenclassifiedasslatyRelated.SeeSection2.1.1foradditionalinformation.ThisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Thereplacementofthesepressureswitcheshasnaimpactonplantoperationanddoesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe.safetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafety'sdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreased,sincetheFeedwaterPumpanditssubsystemsarenon-safetyrelated.Thereforethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentperforminganysafetyfunction.TheFeedwaterPumpLubeOilSystemisnotusedinanyaccidentmitigationscenario,thereforethereisnopossibilityforcreatinganaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreport.Itsfailurewillhavenoimpactontheplantsafeshutdown.

PCM023-186ThismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsincethereplacementoftheMainFeedwaterPumplubeoilpressureswitchesimprovestheiroperationalqualitywithoutchangingtheoriginaldesignintent.TheTechnicalSpecificationsdonotaddresstheMFWpump/systemsurveillance.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM032-186EXCITERCOOLERVENTS&.DRAINSTUBINGMATERIALCHANGEThisEngineeringDesignPackagecoversthereplac'ementoftheExciterCoolerVentsandDrainsTubing.Theoriginaldesignprovidedfor1/2"coppertubingwhichissusceptibletodamageduetoabrasionandvibration.Thisdesignp~akac}eprovidesfortheinstallationof1/2"StainlessSteelTubingandoneadditionaltubers,supporttofirmlylocatethetubingawayfrompipecouplings.AlloftheeighttubingrunsinvolvedarelocatedinsidetheExciterHousing,eachrunapproximately12feetinlength.TheExciter,itscoolers,andthetubinginvolvedinthismodificationareallnonnuclearsafetyrelated,nonmeismic,andtheimplementationofthisdesignpackagedoesnotcreateanyfailuremodeswhichcouldadverselyaffectanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Theclassificationofthisdesignpackageisthereforenonnuclearsafetyrelated.TheDesignPackagewasreviewedusingthe10CFR50.59criteriaanditwasfoundthatthechangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionnorisaTechSpecchangerequired.ThereforepriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplementthisPC/M.Thesubjectmodificationinvolvesthereplacementof1/2"coppertubingwith1/2"stainlesssteeltubingcontainingTurbineCoolingWaterfromtheExciterCoolers.BoththeMainGeneratorExciterandtheTurbineCoolingWaterSystemareno~afety.related,no~eismicsystemswhichperformnoSafetyRelatedfunctions.AfailuremodesaneffectsevaluationwasperformedtodetermineifanysafetyrelatedcomponentsFrouldbeaffectedbythecomponentsmodifiedb~thischange.AfailureofhardwarefailureofthetubingwouldresultinpossiblemechanicaldamagetotheExciterfromhardwareimpactorwaterdamageduetoleakage.Afunctionalfailurewouldresultineithertheinabilitytoventordrainthecoolers,oracontainedlossofTurbineCoolingWaterfromtheCoolers.Noneoftheabovefailureswouldinanywayadverselyaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.BasedupontheSafetyclassificationoftheaffectedsystems,andtheresultsofthefailuremodeevaluation,theimplementationofthismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59because:1)Theconsequencesofanalyzedaccidentsarenotaffectedbecausenoequipmentrequiredtomitigateanalyzedaccidentsareinvolvedinthismodification.2)TheprobabilityofananalyzedaccidentorthepossibilityofanunanalyzedaccidentisnotincreasedbecausefailureoftheinvolvedcomponentsdoesnotaffectanyDBArequiredcomponents.3)TheTechSpecmarginofsafetyisnotdecreasedbecausenoTechSpecLimitsorequipmentareaffected.Sincethismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications,itmaybeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapproval.

PCM037-186PCBTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTDuetopendingEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyrulesoncontrolofPolychlorinatedBephenyls(PCB)thesematerialswillberemovedfromalloilfilledtransformers.TheMainNeutralGroundingTransformeratStLucieUnitNo1has-beenidentifiedascontainingPCB.ThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)coversthemodificationsanddetailsnecessarytoreplacetheexistingPCBfI.liedMa1nGeneratorNeutralGroundingTransformerwithasiliconfilledtransformer.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59asindicatedinSection3.0ofthisEDP.ThisPCMdoesnot1nvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,willnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation,nordoesitrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.Th1sEDPisnonmafetyrelatedinthattheGeneratorNeutralGrounding'ransformerprovidesnosafetymelatedfunctionandasthetiansformerislocatedintheTurbineBuilding,itdoesnothaveany1mpactorinteractionswithanysafetyrelatedequipment.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPedezalRegulat1ons,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveaaunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment-Importanttosafetyprev1ouslyevaluated1ntheanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysismportmaybecrPeted;or(111)1'fthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThismodificationconsistsofreplacementoftheexistingPCBfilledMaiaGeneratorNeutralGroundingTransformerw1thasiliconfilledtraasformer.Znallotheraspectsthereplacementtransformerisidenticalinsizeandelectricalcharacteristicsastheexistingtransformer-TheMainGeneratorNeutralGroundingTransformerispartofthehighresistancegroundingsystemconnectedby2500ampselfmooledbustotheMainGeneratorNeutrals.-TheNeutralGroundiagTransformer,locatedintheTurbineBu1lding,doesnotInteractwithanysafetyrelatedequipmeatorprov1deanysafetyrelatedfunction.Asanonmafetyrelatedsystem,theNeutralGroundingTransformerdoesnotI.ncreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Noaccidentevaluated1ntheFUSARtakescredI.tfortheNeutralGroundingTransformerandthismodificat1ondoesnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluated.

PCM037-186TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotmodifytheoperationofanyplantsystemorfunction.Therefore,itsmarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequi'reachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10'CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestion,andpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM043-186MISCELLANEOUSPIPING'SYSTEMSMODIFICATIONSThisEngineeringPackageisissuedforthepurposeofdocumentation(i.e..as-building)ofminormodificationsmadetovariouspipingsystem/supportsasaresultofdisassembly,inspection,repair,andreassemblyduringthe1985fallrefuelingoutage.ThemodificationswereinitiatedviatheFieldChangeRequestPHoticeformwhichwereWeviewedandapprovedbyEngineering.Themodificationsareclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedanddonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.NOTE:ThisPCMisfordocumentation{as&uilding)purposesonly.ThemodificationstotheessentialportionsoftheCCW,Sl,AFWandILRTsystems,asdescribedintheProjectScope,areclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedbecausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponent,inconjunctionwithaworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedbycorrespondingsectionsoftheFSAR,wouldresultintheinabilityoftheparticularsystemtoachieveitsdesignedsafetyfunction.AsdescribedintheDesignAnalysis,thesafetyrelatedmodificationswereperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofASMESectionillforClass2and3componentsandaredeemednottoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionforthefollowingreasons:i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR~y*environmentsincetherepairsincludedhereindidnotalterthefunctionofanyaffectedsystem,createnewsystemsorreducethedesignmarginofaffectedsystems.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsinceallrepairsandreplacementswereperformedinstrictaccordancewithalloriginaldesignbasesandapplicablecoderequirements.Sinceallpossibleaccidentsandmalfunctionsresultingfromthesesystemshave,previouslybeenanalyzed,therepairand/orreplacementofdegradedportionsofthesesystemsis~~~~rn~anydifferenttypesoffailures.iii)Themarginofsafetyforanytechnicalspecificationsdduetorepairand/orreplacementofpartsandcomponents,sincetheaffecteditemswererestoredtotheiroriginaldesignsafetymargin,asaminimum,ineverycase.iv)Allrepairs,replacements,andmodificationshavebeendeterminedtobethantheexistingcomponentsintermsofdesign,procurement,andinstallation.Thusthereliabilityoftheaffectedsystemshasnotdecreased..'IBasedontheaboveevaluations,andpursuantto10CFR50.59,theforgoingconstitutesthewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasisthatthesechangesvconsequentlypriorapprovalfrom-NRCfortheimplementationofthesemodificationsisnotrequired.

PCM071-186FHBHVACPENETRATIONBARRIERSABSTRACTIthasbeendeterminedthatsteelbarriersarerequiredfortnetwo(2)HVACpenetrationslocatedatelevation48ftoftheFuelHandlingBuilding(westexteriorwall).The.barriersarerequiredinordertopreventunauthorizedaccessintotheFHB.BothHVACpenetrationsareprotectedbyacontinuousL-shapedconcretetornadomissilebarrier,.cantileveredtwo(2)feetfromtheFHBexteriorwallandextendingdowntoapproximatelyone(1)footbelowthebottomofthepenetration.Foreaseofconstruction,theaccessbarrierswillbelocatedatthebottomofthetwo(2)'footopening"whichexistsbetweenthemissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall.TheexistingHVACsystemhasnotbeenaffectedbythismodification.BasedonthereviewoftheexistingHVACsystem,a40'eductionofthemissilebarrieropeningisacceptable.Asaresultoftheadditionoftheaccessbarriers,themissilebarrieropeningshavebeenreducedbyonly17K.Failureoftheaccessbarrierswillnotadverselyaffectthefunctionofanysafety-relatedsystemsorcomponents.However,since,tnebarriersarebeinginstalledinatornadomissilebarrierandtheFHBexteriorwall,thisPCMhasbeenclassifiedasQualityRelated.TnismodificationdoesnotaffectthestructuralcapabilityofthemissilebarrierortheFHBwall,nordoesitposeanysafetyhazards.ThisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Tneadditionoftneaccessbarriershasnoimpactonplantoperationanddoesnot'ffectanysafety'elatedequipment~SAFETYEVAlUATIONWithrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityof.occurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe.marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforany'technicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPCMdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionaecause:Theprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsince:a-Thefailureoftheaccessbarriersforthetwo(2)HVACpenetrationslocatedatelevation48ftoftneFuelHandlingBuildingwillnotadverselyaffectthestructural.capacity.ofthe.-.missilebarriernortheFHBwall,forwhichcertainqualitycontrolinspections(e.g.holesizeandverificationthatnorebariscut)willbeperformed.

PCN071-186b-Noeffectonequipmentorcomponentsperformingasafetyfunctionarelocatedbeneaththisaccessbarrier.c-TneHVACventilationsystemoperationhasnotbeenaffectedbythereductioninthemissilebarrieropening.Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincethismodificationwillhavenoimpa"tontheplansafeshutdown.LTnismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbytheadditionoftheseaccessbarriers.Tnereisnochangeontneexistingtechnicalspe"ificationduetotheimplementationofthisPCH.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwnicnprovidesthebasistnatthiscnangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPCN.

PCM074-186HEATERDRAINPUMPDEMINERALIZEDMATERSUPPLYABSTRACTThisdesignpackagepaovidestherequiredengineeringfor,addingpermanentpipingfromthedemineralizedwatersystemtotheUnit1heaterdrainpumps'echanicalseals.Thepipingwillmakeavailabletothesealsthenecessarybackupflushingwatermeetingtheappropriatechemistryrequirements.Thebackupwatersourceisrequiredduringinitialplantstartupwheneverthepumpssitidle.Basedonthefailuremodesanalysis.and10CFR50.59review,thismodificationdoesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipmentandisnotrelieduponforanyaccidentpreventionormitigation.ThusitdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandiscorrectlyclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelated.Implementationofthismodification,therefore,doesnotrequirepriorNRCapproyal.Sulement1ThispackagerevisionprovidesvalvedrawingsforvalvesaddedbythisPC/MandmocQfiestheexpirationdatetoreflectthecorrectformat.ThescopeofworkspecifiedbythisEngineeringPackagehasnotbeenaffectedbythisrevision'.Thesafetyclassificationandthesafetyevaluationasstatediscorrectandisnotimpacted.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheUnit1HeaterDrainPumpsarelocatedinaNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedsystemandassucharenotrequiredtofunctionduringanyexistinganalyzedaccidentscenario.Therefore,modificationstothesepumpsaffectonlyNon-.NuclearSafetyRelated,QualityGroupDequipment.Basedonthefailuremodeanalysis,failureofthedemineralizedwatersupplypipingcouldresultonlyinfailureoftheheaterdrainpumps.Sincethepipingandcomponentsarelocatedremotefromanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents,failureofthisequipmentwillnotinhibitoperationofanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59doesnotexist.oTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Sincethisdesignchangedoesnotalteroraffectequipmentusedtomitigateaccidents,theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanalyzedaccidentsremainsunchanged.oThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.ThereisnonewfailuremodeintroducedbythischangethathasnotbeenevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSAR.oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationshasnotbeenreduced.ThischangehasnoaffectonanyexistingTechnicalSpecifications.

PCM082-186MAINSTEAMPIPINGMODIFICATIONABSTRACTDuringtheas-buildingofPCM580-79,theas-builtinformationandfieldwalkdowasindicatedthatsomeoQtherestra1ntsonMSdrainlinesdidnotconformtothedes1gnanalys1s.Thestressanalysisperformedincorporatingtheas-builtinformationindicatedstressesinthepipingfortwostresscalculationsexceededtheallowablestresslimitsfortheOperat1onalBasesEarthquake(OBE)conditionwhilethestresslimitsfortheDesignBasesEarthquake.(DBE)coaditionweremet.Inordertocorrect,theoverstressconditioniathepip1ng,tworestraintsareaddedandtwoexistingrestraintsaremodifiedthroughthisengineeringdesignpackage(EDP).Thisissuewas,presentedtoPlantPersonnelviaFFLPowerPlaatEngineeriagMemoEPO86-1237.Thismemoaddressesthe"functionality"aspectsoftheMainSteamdra1npipingiaitspresentconfiguration.ThepipingsystemconsideredinthisEDPisNuclearSafetyClass2,QualityGroupBandSe1smicCategoryIpipingandhencethesupport/restraintsforthispipiagareclassifiedasNuclearSafetyClass2andSeismicCategoryI'.ThesafetyevaluationhasshowathatthisEDPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyandoperation.SafetAnalsesWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto1nvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportaattosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafeeyanalys1sreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanacc1dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviously1nthesafetyanalysisreport-maybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesaotinvolveanunrev1ewedsafetyquestionand.thefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclus1on:Thismodificat1onprovidestwonewrestraintsandadditionalrestraintfunctiontothetwoexistingrestraintsontheMSdrainlines.Thesemod1ficationswhenimplementedwillreducethestresslevelsinthepip1ngtotheacceptablestresslimitsestab11shedintheUSASB31.7Code,1969Edition.Theintegralattachments(lugs)weldedtothepipingcreateadditionalstressesinthepiping.However,thetotalpipingstressesincludingthoseduetotheweldedattachmenthavebeenshowatobewithinallowablestresslimits.Hence,theintegrityofthepressureboundaryofthe.pipinghasnotbeencompromisedandnonewfailuremechanismhasbeenintroduced.Therefore.,the.implementationofthisPCMdoesnot1acreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceorthe,consequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysesReport; PCM082-186(ii)Sincethepipestressesremainwithinthecodeallowablelimits,thismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossiblityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluated~previouslyintheSafetyAnalysesReport.(111)Themainsteamsystemasawholehasbeenconsideredinestablishingthebasesforseveraltechnicalspecifications.SincetheMSdrainlinepressureboundary1ntegrityhasnotbeenaffected,theimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecif1cation.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluat1onwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorcommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofth1sPCM1snotrequired.

PCM083-186LOWPOWERPEEDWATERCONTROLSYSTEMTheStLucieUnitNo1PeedwaterControlSystemconsistsoftwo(2)feedvaterregulatorswhichoperateInparallel.ThemainfeedvaterregulatorIBautomaticallycontrolledbyathree-elementfeedwatercontrolsystemandisresponsiveintherangeof15-100Xpoveroperation.By~assfeedvaterregulatorsaremanuallyoperatedduringplantstartmpintherangeof0-15Xpoveropera~on.Thezmodynamiccharacteristicsofthesteamgeneratorsatlovpowerloadsaresuchthatincreasedfeedwaterflowwilltendtoshrinkorlowerthesteamgeneratorlevel.Atthetimethermalequilibriumhasbeenze-establishedthelevelwilltendtoincreaseduetoswellingcharacteristics.Reactortripsthereforecouldresultfromeitherahighorlowsteamgeneratorlevel.ThenewLowPowerPeedvaterControlSystem(onefortheLCV-9005andoneforLCV-9006),vhichismicroprocessorbased,isdesignedtoprovidestableandautomaticcontroloftheby~assfeedvaterregulatorsatlovpowerloadsIntherangeof2-15X.Thesystemwill.receiveandprocesssystemvariablessuchassteamgeneratorlevel,feedvaterflow/temperatureandneutronfluxinordertoprovideforasmoothandsteadyoutputforautomaticcontroloftheby-passregulatorsandtosignifIcaatlyreducethefrequencyofreactortripsdurIngunitstart~p.ThisnewsystemIsconsideredtobeanextensionofthepresentPeedwaterRegulatingSystem,doesnotaffectothersafetyrelatedequipmentandassuchprovidesnosafetyrelatedfunctions.ArevievofthechangestobeimplementedbythIsPCMwasperfozmedagainsttherequirementsof10CPR50.59.AsindicatedinSection3.0ofthisPCH,thisPCMdoesnotInvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesItrequirearevisiontothetechnicalspecification;therefore,'priorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisPCM.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofPederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrenewedsafetyquestion;(I)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentozmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethenanyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeczeated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationIsreduced.1)TheprobabilityofoccurenceorthecoasequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportaattosafetypreviouslyevaluatediatheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreasedsincethisnevLowPowerPeedvaterControlSystem(LPPCS)IsaaextensionofthePeedvaterRegulatingSystemandasdescribedinPUSARSubsection7.7.1thIssystemsfunctionienotessential,forthesafetyoftheplant.TheinstallationoftheLPPCS'willprovidecontrolimprovementstomaintainsteamgeneratorvaterlevelatsetpointvalueduringunitstartswithsignificant..reductionInthenumberofreactortripeduetosteamgeneratorlevelexcursions.

PCM083-18611)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyin.thesafetyanalys1sreportisnotcreatedsince:ThisinstallationisinaccordancewiththeCodeofFederalRegulation'10CFR50.48andnoimpactisincurredbythisinstallation.ThenewequipmentmountingsandaddedcomponentshavebeenseismicallyanalyizedforadditionalloadingandithasbeenconcludedthattheseadditionsvillnotaltertheoriginalstressconditionsorthefundamentalfrequencyoftheRTGBBoards.Consequently,theseismicqualificationoftheRTGBoardsvillnotbeadverselyaffected.ModificationtotheRTGBoardshavebeendesignedinaccordancewithNUREG0700.Thisinstallation'isinaccordancewiththeCodeofFederalRegulation10CFR50.49andhasbeendeterminedtohavenoimpactontheEnvrionmentalQualificationcriteriabecausetheequipmentislocatedintheControlRoomwhichisamildenvironment.eTheLPFCS,whichisanextensionoftheFeedwaterRegulationSystemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnorformitigatingtheconsequencesofanaccident.111)Themarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationsisnotaffectedbythisPC/MsincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.The1mplementationofth1sPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischange.doesnotinvolve..anunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM086-186MISAPPLICATIONOFLIMITORQUEOPERATORSABSTRACTThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)replacesthemotorsfortheMainFeedwaterPlowControlStati~by-passvalves(MV-09-3andMV-09-4)motoroperators.ThereplacementoftheexistingmotorswithmotorshavinglowerRPMisrequiredtoreducethevalvestemspeed,tobewithinthelimitsrecommendedbythevalveoperatormanufacturer(Limitorque)forthetypeofoperator(SMB)involved.ThisEDPisclassifiednon-safetyrelatedsincetheMainFeedwaterFlowControlStations,wheretheaffectedvalvesareinstalled,doesnotperformanysafetyfunctionandareinthenon-safetyclassportionoftheMainFeedwaterSystem.ThesafetyanalysishascorrectlyconcludedthatnounreviewedsafetyconcernexistandnochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarerequiredasaresultofthismodification.Therefore,previousNRCapprovalfortheimplementationofthismodificationisnot'equired.ThisEDPhasnoimpactonplantsafetyand/oroperation.Revision1wasfo"theremovalofParagraph9.1whichrequiredaLimitorquerepresentativetoprovidetechnicalassistancefor'theimplementationofthisEP.Revision2addedtheRevision1descriptiontotheabstractandtheEngineeringapprovalsignaturetopageIII-i.Revisions1and2donothaveanimpactonthesafetyclassificationand/o"theresultsofthesafetyevaluationofthisEP.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchange'shallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanany.aevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanaIysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.isreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Theportionsofthefeedwatersystemwherethismodificationwillbeimplementedarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.

PCM086-186ii)Thepossiblityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpeificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.TheimplementationofthisPCNdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotnecessary.

PCM088-186ISOPHASEBUSDUCTJUMPERMODIFICATIONTheStLucieUnit1Isolate~aseBussuppliedbyWestinghousemakesuseofcablejumperstoprovideelectricalcontinuityateachhousingjointsothatthelongitudinalcurrentsflowingintheenclosureswillflowinaclosedloop.Thesecablesarecontinuouslyexposedtoweatherresultinginheating,overloadingandfurtherinsulationdegradation.Thishasresultedinreducedloadingontheunitwhilerepairs/cleaningtakeplace.ThisEPprovidesforthereplacementoftheexistingcablejumperswithlaminatedshunts,weldingadaptorbrackets(forcovers)ontothebusenclosureandinstallingcoversovertheshuntstoshieldthemfromtheweather.Thisengineeringpackageisconsiderednon-safetyrelatedinthattheequipmentbeingmodifieddoesnotinterfacewithanysafetyrelatedcomponentorfunction.Areviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythiswasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59.AsindicatedinSection3.0ofthisEngineeringpackage,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnicalspecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.-ISAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveandunreviewedsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheanalysisreportmaybeincr'eased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ITheIsolatedPhaseBusisdescribedinFSARSection8.2.Thiscomponenti.spartoftheoffsitepowersystemandisnotrequiredtomitigateanyaccident.ThelossofACpowerhasbeenaddressedinFSARSection15.2.9.'heresultsreachedinthatsection,namelythattheplantcanbesafelyshutdownandmaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition,isnotaffected.Infact,withtheadditionofthismodificationthereliabilit;yoftheoffsitepowersystemwillbeincreased.TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Thereplacementofthecablejumpershasnoimpactonanyplantsystemsandoperations.TheIsolatedPhaseBusisnotnecessarytomitigateormonitoranyresultofanaccident.Failureofthiscomponenthasnoimpact.,on.previouslygeneratedsafetyanalysisrepoits.Themarginofs'afetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotimpacted.

PCM088-186TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,Noaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedtakescreditfo"theisolate"PhaseBus.,Taismodification,toimproveoperabilitvandreliabilityo.tneIsolatedPhaseBus,doesnotaffectanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Assuch,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityooccu"enceortheconsequencesofanaccidento"malunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.TheIsolatedPhaseBus,aspartoftheoffsitepowersystem,isno-requiredtomitigateanyaccidentanddoesnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethenpreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificationdoesnotimpactanytechnicalspecificationandassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59,thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestions,andpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM090-186CLOSEINTERCEPTVALVE-CONTROLCIRCUITMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)providesfortheremovaloftheCloseInterceptValve(CIV)anticipatorycontrolcircuitfromtheWestinghouseDigitalElectro-hydrauli,c(DEH}turbinecontrolsystem.TheoriginalintentoftheCIVanticipatorycircuitwastoprovideatemporaryclosureoftheInterceptorValvesintheeventofaloadmismatchbetweenturbinesteamflowandgeneratedelectricaloutput.Thisparticularcircuitdoesnottakeintoaccountthedynamicresponseoftheturbinesteamcycles,'ordoestheDEHmodelP-2000containthenecessary'rogrammingsoftwaretoperformtherequiredcalculationstoautomaticallyad)usttheturbinegovernorvalvestothenewthermodynamicvalues.Thesefeatures,therefore,will,inmostcases,maintaintheInterceptorValvesclosedwitharesultanttripofboththeturbineandthereactor.TheCIVcontrolcircu1t1sadownstreamextensi.onoftheDEHoverspeedc'ontrolchannel.Systemfailurewouldnotimpactplantsafety,sincethissystemisneitherrequiredforsafeshutdownnordoesitperformanysafetyrelatedfunctions.HowevertheDEHControlSystemisrequiredtobeoperablebytheTechnicalSpecifications.Sincethismodif1cationimpactsthesubjectcontrolcircuit,thisengineeringdesignpackageshallbeclassifiedasanalityRelated.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPC/Mwasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59.AsindicatedinSection3.0ofthisPC/M,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoes.itrequirearevisi'ontothetechnicalspecification;therefore,priorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTi.tie10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment1mportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilStyforanaccidentormalfunct1onofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreatd;or(ii.i)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced;TheprobabilityofoccurrenceastheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalys1sReportisnotincreasedbythisPC/M.ThismodificationtotheCIVcontrolcircuitdoesnotchangeoraltertheturbine-generatormonitoringandcontrolsystem.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofatypedifferentthanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:

PCM090-186TheCIVcontrolcircuitisanindependentfunctiongeneratedbytheDEHcontrolsystemsoftware.Theremovalofthe,CIVanticipatoryfunctiondoesnotaltertheoperationoftheDEHcontrolsystem.Thismodification,whichwillremovethepartialloadmismatchcircuit,willreducethenumberofspuriousreactortripswhichwilloccurshouldtheInterceptorValvesfailtore-open.TheturbineoverspeedprotectionchannelstoboththeReheaterStopvalvesandtheInterceptvalvesandthemechanicaloverspeedprotectionchannelsarenotalteredbyimplementationofthiscircuitmodification.Therefore,themarginofsafetyforturbineruptureduetotheprobabilityofturbineoverspeedisnotreduced.The'mplementationofthis.PC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheStLucieUnit1TechnicalSpecifications."Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebases.thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired."

PCM093-186RTGBANNUNCIATORGROUNDDETECTIONABSTRACTPrimarypowerfortheRTGBAnnuniciatoractuationcircuitsisprovidedbytheplant125VDCungroundedpowersupply.Althoughtheplant125VDCungroundedpowersupplyisfurnishedwithagroundfaultdetectionsystem,thesegroundfaultdetectormodulesareineffectiveindetectingagroundfaultontheannunciator125VDCactuationsystem.TheRTGBannunciatorscontainaDCisolationcircuitwhichessentiallyseparatestheplant125VDCsyst:emfromtheannunciator125VDCactuationcircuit.Asingle'groundfaultoneitherthepositiveornegativeterminalofanungroundedsystemwillremainundetectedandthesystemwilloperatenormally.Intheeventofasecondgroundontheoppositepolarityline,ashortcircuitwillbecreatedcausinglineinterruptionbywayofthefuseswithresultantlossofthesystem.Correctiveactionfollowingacatastropicfailureisextremelydifficultsinceafaultwillnowexistonbothlines.Itisextremelyimportantthereforethatgroundfaultbedetectedandclearedassoonaspractical.EachRTGBAnnunciator(totalof6)willbefurnishedwithanindividualgrounddetector.Thesegrounddetectorswillmonitortheannunciator125VDCactuationsy'temforexcesscurrentleakagelevelstoground.Groundfaultindicationwillbeprovidedviaindicatinglampslocatedonthefrontofeachoftheground-detectormodules.Inordertoincreaseefficiencyintroubleshootingandlocatinggroundfaults,atotalofsixgrounddetectormoduleswillbeinstalledintheRTGboard101.Eachgroundfaultdetectorshalldetectthosegroundlevelleakagecurrentswhichmayexceedpresetvalues.Thismodi=icationwillim"roveboththeoperabilityandtheavailabil'tyoftheRTGBannunciatorsystem.Theannuncietorsservenoszetyre'ate"function.Howevesincethispackageinvolvesmodificationtothemair.co"t"o'oard,itmayrequireworkinandaroundsafetyrelatedsub-panels,compartments,etc.Therefore,thispackageisconsideredtobeQualityRelated.AreviewofthechangestobeimplementedbythisPCMwasperformedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50.59.AsindicatecinSection3.0ofthisPCM,this"PCMdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesitrequirearevisiontothetechnicalspecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisP&i.

PCM093-186SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfucntionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthe'marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ITheprobabilityofoccurrenceastheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotincreasedbythisPCM.TheimplementationofgroundfaultdetectorsdoesnotchangeoraltertheoperationoftheRTGBannunicatorsystem.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofatypedifferentthanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince.Thenew'quipmentmountinghasbeenseismicallyanalyzedforadditionalloadinginaccordancewithSt.LucieDesignCriteriaManual,SectionIandfoundnottohaveanyimpactontheseismicqualificationoftheboards.ThegrouncfaultdetectorswillbelocatedintheControlRoom,whichisconsideredtobeamileenvironment.Tneadd.zionofgroundrau'deecto"stotheannunciator125VDCsvstemwillenhancebot.".theoperab'lityactheavai'labilityoftheRTGBannunicatorsystem.Tneuseoffusesonthe125VDCcircuitprovidesforisolatingnon-classlEcircuitsfromClasslEandassociatedcircuits.IThegrounddetectormodulesandtheirmountingdeviceswereanalyzedanditwasdeterminedthattheywillretaintheirstructuralintegrityduringandfollowinganSS"".TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequire'achangetotnePlantTechnicalSpecifications."Theforgoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNuclearRegulatoryCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired."hy PCM095-186REPLACEMENTOFINSTRUMENTSCALESABSTRACTThisEngineeringDesignPackagecoversthereplacementofthescalesforthefollowinginstruments;indicatorTIA-1116,"QuenchTankTemperature,indicatorsPI-09-2A,2BandrecordersFR-09-2A,2B"Aux.F.W.Pumps2A42Bdischarge/TheindicatorsarelocatedontheRTGBoardwhiletherecordersarelocatedonthePostAccidentPanel-(PAP).Thepresentscalerangesontheseindicatorsandrecotdersdonotagreewiththeinstrumentranges.listedintheOctober1985RG1.97Rev.3,"ParameterSummarySheet"TypeDvariables.NonconformanceReports5287and0288(Attachments7.1and7.2)identifythediscrepanciesbetweentheexistingandtherequiredscaleranges.Asa.resultofthescalereplacementtheassociatedtransmittersFT-09-2AandFT-09-2BwiQrequirerecalibrationinordertoaccommodatetheextendedranges.ThisPCMisclassifiedasnuclear.safetyrelatedsincesomeoftheindicatorsandrecordersaremonitoringasafetyrelatedsystem.However,themodificationinitiatedbythisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAPETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingprovidesthebasesforthisconclusion:(i)Thismodificationprovidesnewscalesforexistinginstrumentsinordertoincreasetheviewingrangeoftheparameters,whileallthecomponentsandcircuitryremainunchanged.Therefore,theimplementationofthisPCMhasnoeffectonsafetyanddoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysesReport.(ii)Sincethecomponentsandcircuitryremain'nchanged,thismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccident'ormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysesReport.(iii)TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification,forthereasonsstatedabove.Theimplementa!ono:hisPCY.doesno";requireachangetoplanttechncialspecifica:!on.Theforgoingcons:itutes,per10CFR50.59(b),tnewrittensafetyevaluationwhichp!ovidesthebasesthe-.th!schangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyques-.ionandpriorNRCapp!ovalfortheimplementationoithisPMinotrequired.

PCM098-186HYDROGENPURGEPENETRATIONSThisEngineeringDesignPackage(EDP)allowsforthereplacementoftheinboardvalve(valveclosesttotheReactorContainmentVessel)onContainmentPenetrationsP-56,P-57andP-58,Theexistingvalveshaveflangedendsandthenewvalvesarebuttwelded.ThismodificationisbeingimplementedtoimprovetheContainmentVesselintegritywithrespecttopostaccidentleakageratesbyreplacingflangedconnectionswithweldedconnections.ThisEDPisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitmodifiesasafetyrelatedsystem,ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthatthisEDPdoesnotconstituteanyunreviewedsafetyquestions,nordoesitrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange,Therefoze,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEDP.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunzeviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentozmalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.ThereplacementvalvesforthismodificationareclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated,ASMESectionIII,Class2,QualityGroupB,becausetheyareReactorContainmentBuildingisolationvalves.Themodificationsincludedinthisengineeringdesignpackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedispotincreasedsincereplacementofthehydzogenpurgepenetrationsisolationvalvesdoes'otaffecttheirdualperfonnancerequirements.TheperformancerequirementforcontainmentisolationremainsintactandisperiodicallyverifiedbytestinginaccordancewithlOCFR50,AppendixJ.Theperformancerequirementforhydrogenpurgehasbeenverifiedasremainingacceptable.Thereisnopossib'itdfferenttvpethananmod'atiodoesnoOperatingP"o"edureo"modificationisaoeyforanaccidentormalfunctionoaypreviouslyevaluated.Taisc'nangaa"yex't'ngDesignCr'ez'a,Teen"ica'pe"'fice"'on.Thisfo"one=e=acme"..:o=exstingequipment.

PCM098-186(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotaffectthebas's=oranyTechnicalSpeci'ation,andthereforedoesnot"educethemarginofsafetvasdefinedinthebasisfo=an~~echricalSpecifications.ImplementationofthisEnginee'ngDesignPackagedoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTec'nnica'pecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFP50.59(b),'thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorachangetotheTechnicalSpecificaion;thuspriorCommissionapprovaifortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM106-186HIREXCITATIONSYSTEMABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationstotheTurbine-Generatorbrushlessexcitationsystem.ThebrushlessexcitationsystemwillbeupgradedtoaHighInitialResponse(HIR)BrushlessExcitationSystemwhichwillallowthegenerato~orespondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.A1argerpermanentmagnetgenerator,anewstatorcoilinbrushlessexciter,anewvoltageregulatorandanewvoltageregulatorenclosurewillberequiredtomodifythissystem.TheTurbineWeneratordoesnotperformasafetyrelatedfunction.ThemodificationstotheTurbineGeneratorareclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated.However,sincetherewillbemodificationstotheRTGBoards,thispackageisclassifiedasQualityRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionsincethemodificationsdescribedabovewillhavenoimpactonplantoperationsorsafetyrelatedequipment.Sulement1ThissupplementrevisedtheAbstractandProjectScopepages.Theoriginalsafetyevaiuationisnotaffectedbyth'supplement.Suelement2Th'ssupp'ementincorporatesthevendorietterdocumentingtheexcitercomponen.seria'umber>dawngsfc"irstaiiationofvoltageregulatorenciosure;fabrietiodrawngsfc"theHVAduct;testingandprotectionrequ'ementsfortheconcreteinsulationbeneaththevoitagereguiato"andreguiato"enciosure;revisiontodrawinglist.Theoriginalsaetyevaluationisno-affectecbythissuppiement.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysTsreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheTurbineGeneratorHighInitialResponse(HIR)brushlessexcitationsystemisnotasafetyrelatedsystem.Alargerpermanentmagnetgenerator(PMG),statorcoilinbrushlessexciterandvoltageregulatorwillreplacetheexistingequipmentandhaveno.impactonanyplantsystemoroperation.The.HWexcitationsystemallowsthegeneratortorespondquicklytochangesinsystemvoltage.

PCM106-186Subsection3.5.3.2oftheFSARaddressesExternalMissileswithsubpart(b)addressingTurbineMissiles,specifically,missilesgeneratedbythehighpressureturbinerotorandthelowpressureturbinediscs.Therearenochangestothehighpressureturbinerotor'northelowpressureturbinediscs.Themodificationsrequiredto'pgradethesystemincludeanewPMGrotor,PMGstatorandexciterstatorwhicharelocatedattheexciterend.Theconsequencesofturbinefailureandthepotentialfordamagetocriticalplantstructures,systems,andcomponentsfromtheresultingmissileshasnotbeenincreasedbythismod'fication.ThemodificatonstotheTubineGenerator,thevoltageregulator,thevoltag'eregulatorenclosu"eancthoHVACsvstemIntheTurb'neBuildingarenotsafetyrelatedandccnotaf=ectanyplantsystems.Thecablesforthelighting,receptaclesandpowe"feecsinthevoltagereguatorenclosureareroutedincabletrayandconduitintheTubineBuilding.Tneydonotrequireseism'csupportancdonotaffectsafetyrelatedeouipment.ThemodificationstotheRTGBoardswillinvolvethereplacemento:selectorswitcheswithanupdatedversion,thatisthesamesizeandhasanegligibleweightdifreentialastheexistingswitches,therelablingofannunciatorwindowsandtheactuationo.anexistingsparerelay,thatwillhavethesamecharacteristicsastheex'tingequipment.ThesemodificationsdonoteffectthesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheaffectedRTGBoards.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes~per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommi.ssionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM112-986TURBINEBUILDINGCRANEGURDERCONNECTIONANGLEMODIFICATIONSRecently,crackingandexcessivepryingdeformationwerenotedatsomeofthecranegirderconnectionsinthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1and2turbinebuildings.kn,evaluationoftheconditionconcludedthatthefailureswereattributabl'etotheinabilityoftheconnectionsatcolumnline20toslideasoriginallydesigned.=ThisPC/Mw111providemodificationstothecranegirderconnectionsatcolumnline20torestoreindependentthermalmovementbetweentheunits.Modificationswillalsobeimplementedattheothercranegirderconnectionsinthelaydownareatoprovidereinforcementforthoseconnectionswhichmayhavebeensub)ectedtooverstressasaresultofthethermalrestraintofthecranegirders.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoeffectonplantsafety.Theturbinebuildingsareclassifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelatedstructuresandthereforethemodificationdoesnotaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment..Theconnectionmodificationshavenoimpactonplantoperationexceptforrestrict1onsonthemovementoftheturbinegantrycraneswhilethemodificationsareinprogress.The'urbinebuildingshavebeendesignedforseismicloadingtopreclude-interactionwithad)scentSeismicCategoryIstructuresduringaseismicevent.Consequently,thisPC/HisclassifiedasQualityRelated.

PCMI'12-986SAFETYEVALUATIONSafetAnalsisWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshillbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisPC/MprovidesmodificationstothecranegirderconnectionsinthelaydownareabetweentheUnit1andUnit2turbinebuildingstorestoreindependentthermalmovementbetweentheunits.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thefollowingarethebasesforthisconclusion:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillbeperformedinaccordancewithQualityRelatedrequirements,hencetheseismiccapabilityoftheturbinebuildingsisnotcompromisedandtherecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentSeismicCategoryIstructures,systems,orequipment.(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslvsincetheturbinebuildingsarenon-safetyrelatedstructurescontain'ngnosafety-relatedequipment,hencethismodificationcanhavenoimpactonanysafety-relatedsystem.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed'safetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM116-1860TURBINECROSSUNDERPIPEREPAIRThisEngineeringDesignPackagecoversvariousrepairsnecessarytobeperformedintheHPturbineexhaustpipes.Theserepairsarenecessitatedbydamageduetowetsteamerosionofturningvanebracingbars,backingringsofcircumferentialwelds,andpipewali.Thecarbonsteelbracingbarswillbereplacedwithstainlesssteelbarswhicharemoreresistanttoerosionlcorrosiondamage.Thebackingringswillberemovedandanypipewalldamagewillberepairedt'orestorethe'crossunderpipetoacceptablethickness.Thismodificationisclassifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelatedanddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.OperationoftheHPturbineexhaustlineshasnotbeenaffected.Basedonfailuremodeevaluationand10CFR50.59reviews,ithasbeendeterminedthatnounreviewedsafetyquestionexistsasaresultofthischange.Therefore,priorNRCapprovaifortheimplementationofthismodificationisnotrequired.ThissupplementincorporatedY/estinghouseElectricCorp.commentsregardingtheuseofadifferen.typeofstainlesssteelmate.ialfortheturningvanebracingbars.Thi<<<pp1e"mentdoesnota=rectthesafetyeva1uatior..<VAThep.opose'ociica.ions.otheturbinecrossunderpipewil!resto.ethecomponen:stcoricinaldesicr:cn;igurationancprovideincreasecmarginagainstpre..atureerosionwearduetotheserviceconditions.Basedonthemostrecentinspectionthecarbonstee!bracingbarsor:theturningvanesmustbereplacedduetoextremeerosion.Theremai..ingnumberofbackingringsmustalsoberemovedtopreventturbulenceinsteamflowandsubsequentpipewallerosior,.Anyexistingpipewallerosionwillberepairedtorestorewailthicknesstothenominalvalue.TheSt.LucieUnit1HPturbinecrossunderpipeisdesignatedasnonnuclearsafetyrelated,QualityGroupD.Accordingly,themodificationstothecrossunderpipehavebeendesignatedasnon-nuclearsafetyrelated,QualityGroupD-Afailuremodeanalysishasdemonstratedthatthemodificationstothecrossunderpipeoranyofitscomponentswillhavenoeffecton,orinhibittheoperationof,anysafetyrelatedsystemsorcomponents.Thecrossunderpipeislocatedremotelyfromanysafetyrelatedequipmentandcannot.fallon,hit,orotherwiseaffectanysuchequipment.

PCM117-186EXTRACTIONSTEANPIPINGANDPITTING-NATERIALUPGRADEABSTRACTAruptureofane:<tracionsearnlineonunit1duringcycle7resultedinaforcedoutageandalossofappro:cimately~'Pfullpowerhours.Ane::aminationofthefailedpipeandafolio~-upengineeringevaluationconcludedthatErosion/Corrosionwas'hefailuremechanism.Erosion/Corrosionisanindustrywideproblemthatisuniqueto<<etsteampipingsystems.Erosion/Corrosionisanaceleratedformofcorrosioninducedbyflewduetothebreakdownofaprotectiveocidefilmfromthematerial'ssurface.ThisPC/MprovidesdetailsandinstrucionsforplantpersonneltoreplaceerodedcarbonsteelpipingandfittingsintheE::tractionSteamsystemsonan"as-needed"basis.Thefittingstobereplacedwill.be'dentfiedfollowingreviewofultrasonicinspectondataduringthe1<C7refuelingcutage.Thenewma'ralsspecifiedASTMP.-.a<NP'22(fIttings)andASTMA-~'(P22(piping)a.e,chromium-molybdenumalloysandwillprcvidesuperiorresstancetccorrosion/erosioneffects.Addi"iona'y.thenewma~eri=-;=canbewe'dedintathee::istincA-10~andA-1V~pip'ncanc-.t"ines.Theetentcfthereplacementrecreceachs'tua-iorwi'bebaseconinscec-'ndatareviewbyPower~lan=Enoiner.nc.T'~ee.'tentofthereplacemen-requ'.eandGea'scft.aeseeepacemeltsw'eaodedtcthepackagevatet'ploess~ThisPC/M'sSa-.etyRe'tedc~asscncnsesmic)sl.'s<<ems~as."Ncn-Nuc1ea.Safe-yRc1a-ed"snceQua'-yC.ourDpipinginNon-Nuclea.Basedonthe-.ai'remocesana'si5nd10CFR50'Prev'"ew"5smodificationdoesnotimpactanysafetyrelatedequipmentanc'snctrel'd~uponfo.anyaccidentpreventionormitiga'on.Thusitdoesnctco,.s-'."uteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Sincetherearenounrev'ewedsafetyquestions,andsincenochance>>iotechnica'pecificationsareinvo)ved,thisPC/Mmaybe'mplementedwithcutproirNRCapproval.SAFETYEUALL'P7IONTheUnit1E::rect'onSteamSystemisaNon-NuclearSafetyRelatedsystenandassuch'notrequiredtofunc"'r.duringanye>:istinganaly"edacc'dentscenario.Therefore,modaticnstothese,pipesaffectonlyNon-NuclearSafetyRela"ed,QualityC.oupDequipment.Themcdfica-'or,isamaterialupgradeonly.Thenewmateralhasbeer.shcwn,intheDesignAnalysis,cmeetalldesigr,requ,'rementsc<tneprevousmaterial.

PCM117-186Postul'atedfailuresoftheextractionsteamlinewouldhavenoimpactonsafeshutdownof-theplant,orsafetyrelatedsystems.Theextractionsteamlinesarenotusedtopreventpostulatedacidents,mitigatetheconsequencesofsuchacc.dents,maintainsafeshutdownconditions,or'adequatelystorespentfuel.Thefollowing,statementsdemonstratethatanunreviewedsafetyques"ion,asdefinedby10CFR50.59,does.notexist:Theprobablityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.importantosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport,hasnotbeenincreased.Failureofanextractionsteamlineisnotconside.edasanaccidentinitiat'geventorconsideredindetermining*theprobabilityofanaccident.Also,sincethisdesign.changedoesnotalteroraffectequipmentusedtomitigateaccidents,theprobabilityofmalfunc'.'onofequipmentimportanttosafetyrema'sunchangedThepcsibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferen"typethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetvan-lysisreporthasnotbeencreated;Thereisncnewfa'hathasno-beenAdd'ona'yonofailurmodeintrodcedbythischangeeva'ua"edprev'ouslyintheFSA.-",.'.uremodesana'=edytheFS.-".Rare~MIweI~Themare'cfsafetyasce!inedinthebasis(ehncapeelf:cationshasnotbeenreouced.fcranyThischangehasnoeffec"'nanyexisiinoSpec.-.icataonsanadoeno=requireanychangTechn'a'oecificaticns.Tehni.ca1esto.theSincencunreviewedsafteycuestionshavebeendeterninedtoexis,andsincenorevisionstotheTechnicalSpecfiatcnsa.erequired,NRCapprovalisnotrequiredpriortomp'mentaion.

PCM118-186REACTORCAVITYSEALRINGABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagemodifiestheSt.LucieUnit1ReactorCavitySealRing.Themodificationsconsistofenlargingthepenetrationsinthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallationandaddingpenetrationsandpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.'hiswaterprovidesadditionalshieldingwhiletheringisinplace.Thewatershallberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusionoftheoutage.Also,thecavitysea)ringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetoastainlesssteelbraidhose.ThecavitysealringbasedontheFSARisnon-nuclearsafetyrelated.SomequalityrequirementsareassignedtoassurethattheReactorCavitySealRingwillperformitsintendedfunction.Basedonafailuremodeevaluationanda10CFR50.59review,thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,norrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisengineeringpackage.SAFETYEVALUATIONThisEngineeringPackagemodifiedtheSt.LucieUnit1ReactoiCavitySealRing.Themodificationsconsistofenlargingthepenetrationsinthesealplateforthesealairlinestoensuretheairlinesarenotpinchedduringinstallationandaddingpenetrationsandpipeplugstothecavitysealringtoallowtheboxsectiontoroidtobefilledwithwater.Thiswaterpiovidesadditionalshieldingwhiletheringisinplace.ThewatershaQberemovedfromthetoroidattheconclusionoftheoutage.Also,thecavitysealringsealairlineshavebeenchangedbythevendorfromaneoprenehosetostainlesssteelbiaidhose.Basedontheaboveandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysisitcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.oTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.SincethereactorcavitysealringisnotconsideredbytheFSARindeterminingtheprobabilityofaccidents,possibletypesofaccidents,orintheevaluationofconsequencesofaccidents,itcanbeconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaccidentspreviouslyaddressedintheFSARremainsunchanged.

PCM118-186oThepossibQtyofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.Sincethesealingportionofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,thepossibilityofanacidentofadifferenttypehasnotbeencreated,oThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeen."educed.Again,sincethesealingpor'r,ofthecavitysealringhasnotchanged,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.10CFR50.59allowschangestoafacilityasdescribedintheFSARifanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationisnotrequired.Asshownintheprecedingsection=-,thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59thatpertainstoanunreviewedsafetyquestioncanbepositivelyanswered.Also,nochangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisrequiredbasedontheaboveevaluation.Inconclusion,thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptablefromthestandpointofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,anddoesnotrequireanychangetoTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthemodification.

PCM119-18610CFR50.49ENVIRONMENTALQUALIFICATIONLISTREVISIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackageprovidesthevehicleforupdatingseveralareasofequipmentqualification.Thispackageincludescorrectionstothe10CFR50.49list,changesinmaintenancerequirements,andvariousdocumentationpackagecorrections.ThisEngineeringPackage(EP)isconsideredNuclearSafetyRelatedbecauseitaffectsequipment'fallingunderthescopeof10CFR50.49.ThispackagedoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestionsinceitdealsstrictlywithenhancingthepresentdocumentationusedtoqualifyequipmentatStLucieUnitNo1andnophysicalplantmodificationsarerequiredbytheEP.ThesafetyevaluationofthispackageindicatesthatachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.Removalofequipmentfromthe10CFR50.49listdoesnotaffectplantsafetyandoperation.Sulement1ThisEPrevisionaddsterminalblockstothe10CFR50.49listandtheirassociatedEquipmentQualificationDocumentationPackage8770-A-451-17.0"AmeraceTerminalBlocks".TheequipmentandEQDocumentationPackagedoesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisEngineeringPackageprovidesforseveralchangestothepresentStLucieUnitNo.1's10CFR50.49list.Thisdocumentationwillaffectthefutureprocurementofvarioussafetyrelatedcomponentsandassistinvalidatingthecomponents'bilitytofunctionbefore,duringandafteradesignbasisaccident.Therefore,thisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.0Thedocumentationchangesaddressedinthispackagerangefromcorrectionsoftypographicalerrorsonthe10CFR50.49listtoadditionsanddeletionsofequipmentasaresultofEQdocumentationpackagesreviews.Noneofthechangesrequirephysicalmodificationtoanyplantsystem.Theydo,however,affectthefuturemaintenanceofvariousequipment.ThepossibilityofnewDesignBasisEvents(DBEs)notconsideredintheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethischangedoesnot-alteranyequipmentusedtomitigateaccidents.Thismodificationisanenhancementoftheenvironmentalqualificationdocumentationofvariousequipmentandinnowayaffectstheplantdesign.

PCM119-186DuetothefactthatthisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessentialtosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociatedwithachievingandmaintainingshutdowns,thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirements.ThereforetheproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandUFSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.Sincethismodificationinvolvesnophysicalmodificationstosafetyrelatedequipmentandchangesinthemaintenancescheduleswillnotresultinfailureofequipment,thedegreeofprotectionprovidedtoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipmentisunchanged.Removalofequipmentfromthe10CFR50.49listdoesnotaffectthe.plant'ssafety."Theprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentisunchanged.Theprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviously,evaluatedintheUFSARremainsunchanged.TheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARareunchanged.ThepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyzedintheUFSARisnotcreated.Basedontheabove,themodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseofthefollowingreasons:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceandtheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysis'eportwillnotbe'ncreasedbythismodificationbecauseit'oesnotaffecttheavailability,redundancy,capacity,orfunctionofanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.(ii)ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification..Function,mountingandtheabilitytowithstandharshenvironmentalconditionshavenotbeenalteredandthismodificationdoesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsincethismodificationdoesnotchangetherequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecifications.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM122-186PRESSURIZERMISSILESHIELDACCESSLADDERSAFETYCAGEThisdesignpackageconsistsofthefabricationandinstallationofapersonnelsafetycageforthepressurizermissileshieldaccessladderandmodificationoftheladder.Thesafetycagewillbeattached.totheladder.Themodificationoftheladderisrequiredtoprovidesafeaccesstothetopofthepressurizerwallaswellastothemissileshield.Thepersonnelsafetycagedoesn'tperformoraffectasafetymelatedfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedsincethereisapotentialthat,duringaseismicevent,thepersonnelsafetycagecoulddamagesafety-relateditemsthatareinthevicinity.QualityRelatedrequirementsareappliedtothisdesignThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmen&important.tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thepressurizermissileshieldaccessladderandsafetycagedonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedsystemorfunction.,However,thisPC/MisclassifiedasQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheaccessladderorsafetycageduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake)couldpotentiallyaffectasafetymelatedsystemorequipment,sincetheladderandcagearelocatedinthecontainmentbuildingwhichcontainssafetymelatedsystems.Consequently,theladderandsafetycagehavebeendesignedforthedesignbasisconditionsspecifiedintheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirementshavebeenimplemented,thusassuringtheintegrityoftheinstallationduringanydesignbasisevent.ThemodificationsincludedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ'pme-importanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreaseds'ncethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentrequiredtosnu-downtheplantancmonitortheplantinasafesnutdow"condit'on.

PCM122-186(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanacc'dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevauatecsincetheladderandcageperformnosafetyfunctionancnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperationaldesign.Failueoftheladderandcagecouldnotoccursincethemodificationhasbeen,designedforthedesignbasisconditions.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachange.toplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapproval.fortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM126-1860ABSTRACTAUXILIARYFEEDWATERACTUATIONSYSTEMDVMCIRCUITMODIFICATIONThisengineeringpackagecoversmodificationstotheSt.LucieUnit2AuxiliaryFeedwater.ActuationSystem(AFAS)thatwillallowtheuseofanexternalmetertomonitorthevariousinputsignals,pretripsetpoint,andtripsetpointvoltages.ThecurrentAFASsystemhasabuiltinDigitalVoltmeter(DVM)thatmonitorsvariousinputvoltages.HoweverthisDVMhasbecomeobsolete.ThemodificationdescribedinthisengineeringpackagewillallowtheuseofaportableexternalmetertobeusedinplaceofthebuiltinDigitalVoltmeter.ThisPC/MisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitmodifiesthesafetyrelatedAFAS.Themodificationshavebeenreviewedinaccordancewith10CFR50.59andhavebeenfoundtoneitherinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionnorrequireatechnicalspecificationchange.ThereforepriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplementthisPC/M.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheAuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystem(AFAS)cabinetcontains'llfoursafetychannelsofequipmentthatautomaticallyinitiateauxiliaryfeedwaterflowtoeitherorbothNSSSSteamGenerators.TheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemisactuatedbytheAFASwhenlossofnormalsteamgeneratorflowwouldcauseareactortripbytheRPSduetolowsteamgeneratorwaterlevel.TheDVMcircuitmodification.involvestheadditionoffuses,fuseholders,resistors,andanameplatetothetestcircuitinordertoprovideanexternaltestjackformonitoring.testfunctionsusinga.portableDVMinsteadofthebuiltinDVMthatcurrentlyexists.Thetestcircuitisdisconnectedfromtheoperating'circuitinnormaloperatingconditions.ThereforeanyfaultoccuringinthetestcircuitwhentheAFASisinnormaloperationwillhavenoaffectonthecapabilityof'theAFAStoperformitssafeguardfunction.ThefunctionalcapabilityoftheAFASwillremainthesameaf+erthemodificationthereforenochange,inthesafetymarginwilloccur.Thismodificationwillresultinnonewmalfuncti,ons.oraccidentstothesafetysystemsinceallthemodificationsaretothetestcircuitwhichwasp'reviouslyanalyzedtobedisconnctedfromthesafetyfunctionoperatingcircuitdurinonormalopera;ion.

PCM126'-186TheAFAS.es:circuitinconside.ednotobesafe.yrelatecsinceitdoesnotperformanysafetyfun".ior,.Howeverit15designedasanassociatedClassI"-circui.inordernottcdegadcthequalfice'onofthesafetyfunctioncircuitoftheAFAS.10CFR50.59allowschangestoafacilityifanunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysis,itcanbesta.edthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10.CFR50.59doesnotexistsince:(1)Thechangedescribedhereindoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport,(2)Thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreport,(3)Thechangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Inconclusion,thechangeproposedinthisdesignpackageisacceptablefromthestandpointofnuclearsafetyasitdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotchangetheTechnicalSpecifications.ThereforepriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredtoimplementthisprocedure.

IIPCM130-986NEUTRALIZATIONBASINCLOSUREMONITORINGWELLSABSTRACTThisengineeringpackagecovers.theinstallationoftwotemporarygroundwatermonitoringwellsinthevicinityoftheSt.LucieWaterTreatmentPlant.ThesewellswillbeusedtodemonstratetotheStateDepartmentofEnvironmentalRegulation(DER)thattheoperationofouracid/causticneutralizationbasinhasnotresultedinanygroundwatercontamination.Thetemporarymonitorwellsperformnosafetyrelatedfunctionandarelocatedawayfrom,andhavenoeffecton,anysafetyrelatedsystem.ThisPC/Misnon-safetyrelated,buthasbeenclassifiedas'QualityRelated'oensurethewellsarelocatedasspecifiedbytheencloseddesigndrawings.Theadditionofthesewellsdoesnotposeanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheNeutralizationBasingroundwatermonitoringwellsdonotperformanyplantsafety-relatedfunction.Theywillnotbelocatedinthevicinityofanysafety-relatedequipmentandtherefor'ewelldrillingoperationscannotadverselyimpact,safety-relatedfunctions.Acompletewellfailureorcollapsewillnotimpairthestructuralintegrityofplantfillmaterial;accordingly,safety-relatedstructuresorequipmentsupportedbytheplantfillwillnotbeaffected.Basedontheaboveevaluationandtheinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalyisit'canbed'emonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobabilityofoccurence'ortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfuntionofadifferenttypethananyevaluate'dpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.

PCM132-186EXCESSIVEAC/DCCONTROLVOLTAGEDROPABSTRACTAstudywasperformedbyEbascooatheStLuciePlantUnit1toaddresstheconcern(perINPOSER80-83)thatexcessiveAC/DCcontrolcircuitvoltagedropsatthecontrolpower'erminalsofthebreaker/combinationstareersmayleadtothefailureoftheequipmentccntactormechanism"tooperate.Thestudyidentifieddeficienciesinfour(4)controlcircuitloopswherethecalculatedcontrolcircuitloopresistancesexceedthemaximumallowableloopresistances.However,thestudyfoundthatduetoconservatismiathedesignofthecontrolcircuitcompoaents,therewillbesufficientvoltageatthemotorstartercoiltermiaalstoallowproperoperationofthevalvesduringundervoltageanddegradedgridvoltageconditions.Nevertheless,FPLhasdecidedtoimplementtherecommendatioasofthestudytoassurethereliabilityofthesecontrolcircuitloops.Thiseagineeringpackage(EP)providesfortheimplementationoftherecommendationsoftheEbascostudy.Theseconsistofreplacementofcontroltransformersfortwoofthefouraffectedcoatrolcircuitloopsandparallelingconductorsforselectedportionsofallfourcontrolcircuitloops.Thesemodificationswillensurethatthecalculatedloopresistanceswillbelessthanthemaximumallowableloopresistances.Thise"-gineeringpackageisconsideredsafetyrelatedinthatthecontrolcircuitloopsbeingmodifiedareforequipmentrequiredformitigat'oaofaaacideat;MainFeedwaterPumpDischageIsolatiorValvesMV<91}MV<9-2aa"Ma'r.FeedwaterIsolationValves,MV-09-7,MV&9-8~reviewofthechangestobeimplemeatedbyth's2'asperformedagainsttherequiremptsof10CFR50.59~AsindicatedinSectio"3.0ofthisEag'neer'ngPackage,thisPC/Mdoesnotinvolveanunreviewecsafetyquestion.hasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation,aordoesitrequirearevisior.totnetechnicalspecification;thereforepriorCommissionapprovalisnotrequ'recfo=implementationoit'nisPC/M.Supplement1AddendumTaissupplementincorporatedseismicandenvironmentalqualificationforreplacementtransformerandfuseblock.Theholdpointestablished.forthisinstallationhasbeenremovedandtheoriginalsafetyevaluationhasnotbeenaffectedbythissupplement.

PCM132-1863.0SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.AsaresultoftheAC/DCControlCircuitVoltageDropStudy(FLO62-8.5000Rl),itwasdeterminedthatthecalculatedactualcontrolloopcableresistanceforeachisolationvalveexceedsthemaximumallowablecontrolloopcableresistance.Althoughthisconditionexists,theconservatismofthecontrolcircuitcomponentsallows'hevalvestooperateduringundervoltageanddegradedgzidvoltageconditions.Thismodificationconsistsofimplementingtherecommendationofthestudywhichinclude;(1)replacingthe150VAcontroltransformerswitha500VAtransformerforMV-09-16MV-09-2controlcircuitloop,(2)parallelingconductorsforselectedportionsofthecontrolcircuitloopsforMV<9-1,MV-09-2,MV-09-7,andMV-09-8.Althoughthecalculatedvaluesindicatedinsufficientvoltagemayexistatthemotorstartercoils,.fieldtestswereperformedtodetermineifanactualdeficientconditionexisted.Theresultsofthesetests,documentedinAttachment8.3ofthevoltagedropstudy,concludedthatduetoconservatisminthedesignofthecontrolcircuitcomponents,therewillbesufficientvoltageatthemotorstartercoilterminalstoallowproperoperationofthevalvesduringundervoltageanddegradedgridvoltageconditions.TheoperationofthesevalvesasdescribedinUFSAP.Amendment4Section7.3.1.1.12and15.4.6.1isnotaffectedbythismodification.Infact,withtheimplementationofthismodification,thereliabilityoftheoperationofthesevalveswillbeincreased.Assuch,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyanddoesnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificationdoesnotimpactanytechnicalspecificationandassuchthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesfozanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CPR50.59thewrittensafety,evaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestions,andpriorCommisionapprovalofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM136-186REPLACEMENTOFSTEAMGENERATORLEVELTRANSMITTERSThisEngineeringPackagecoversthereplacementofthesteamgeneratorleveltransmitters.ThetransmittersprovideinputsignalstotheReactorProtectionSystem,AuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystem,SteamGeneratorLevelIndicatingControllerandHighSteamGeneratorTurbineProtectionCircuitry.TheexistingtransmittersarepartoftheReactorProtectionSystemandclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodificationisaone-for-onereplacementoftheexistingtransmitterswithRosemountModel1154DP4RAN0026transmitter,thesameclassificationapplies.Theexisting~iringisnotaffectedbythischange.Plantsafetyandoperationarenotaffected.Thesafetyevaluationofthispackageindicatesthatthetransmitters'eplacementdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,anddoesnotrequireachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecifications.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThemodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseofthefollowingreasons:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceandtheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreasedbythismodificationbecauseitdoesnotaffecttheavailability,redundance,capacity,orfunctionofanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbythismodification.Function,mountingandtheabilitytowithstandharshenvironmentalconditionshavenotbeenalteredandthismodificationdoesnotaffectanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

PCM136-186(iii)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsinceth'modificationinstalls"transmitterswithimprovedaccuracyandacceptableresponsetimewhichareseismicallyandenvironmentallyqualifiedtowithstandthenormalandaccidentcond'ionswhichareanticipated.ThepossibilitvofnewDesignBas'sEvents(DBEs)notconsideredintheFUSAP.isnotcreateds'ncethedesignphilosophyotheRPShasbeenpreviouslydiscussedintheFUSA"-.andisnotchangedbythereplacementoftheeight(8)leveltransmitters(LT-9013A,B,C,DandLT-9023A,B,C,D).Thismodificationisanenhancementofanexistingsystemasitfurnishesreplacementtransmitterswhichcoverboththenormalandhightransientlevelresponsesofthesteamgeneratorswithimprovedaccuracyandreliability.Duetothefactthat.thisEPdoesnotaffectormodifyanycablesessentialtosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociatedwithachievingandmaintainingshutdowns,thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirements.ThereforetheproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandFUSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.AccordingtotheFUSARSections7.1.1and7.2.1,theRPSisidentifiedhsaNuclearSafetyRelatedSystemsinceitmonitorsthesteamsupplysystemandeffectsreliableandrapidreactorshutdownifanyoneofacombinationofparametersdeviatesfromapreselectedopezatingrange.Hence,thisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.Sincethismodificationprovidesforaone-for-onereplacementofexistingleveltransmitterswithmorereliableandaccurateequipmentandinvolvesnoothermodificationstosafetyrelatedequipment,thedegreeofprotectionprovidedtonuclearsafetyrelatedequipmentisunchanged.TheprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARremainsunchanged.TheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFUSARareunchanged.ThepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyzedintheFUSARisnotcreated.TheimplementationofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM136-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,nordoesitcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewritten.safetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM139-186MASONRYWALLMODIFICATIONSCertainmasonrywallsrequireaclassificationupgradeasaresultoftheinstallationofsafetyrelatedequipmentintheirvicinity.23suchwallshavebeenidentified.ThisPCM,issuedinresponsetoJCOJPE-LR-87-001,Revis1on0,willprovidemodificationsto10oftheseupgradedwallstoenablethemtosatisfythestructuralacceptancecriteriaforsafetyrelatedwalls-ThisPCMdoes"motconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Themodificationwillensurethattheaffectedwallswillhaveno1nteractionwithsafetyrelatedequipmentandthereforehasnoeffectonplantsafety.Themodificationhasnoimpactonplantoperation.TheaffectedmasonrywallsandthestructuralmodificationstheretobeingimplementedbythisPCMhavebeenseismicallydesigned.Consequently,thisPCMisclassifiedasQualityRelated.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityof.occurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunct1onofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisPC/Mprovidesmodificationsto10masonrywallstoimprovethelateralloadcarryingcapabilitiesof.thesewalls.Itdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thefollowingarethebasesforthisconclusion:(1)Theprobab1lityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillbeperformedinaccordancewithQualityRelatedrequirements,hencetheseismiccapabilityofthe.affectedmasonrywallsisnotcompromised.Therefore,therecanbenoimpactonanyadjacentsafetyrelatedstructures,systems,orequipment.

PCM139-186(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferent'ypethananyevaluatedpreviouslysincethe.modificationwillensurethattheaffectedwallswil'avenointeractionwithsafetyrelatedequipmentandhencewillhavenoefrectonplantsafety.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyadefine"inthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Theimplementatio-ofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetcplanttechnicalspecificat'ns.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CPR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Hisnotrequired.

PCM140-186ANNUNCIATORNUISANCEALARMSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)coversthemodificationsoffiveannunciatorcircuitsintheMainControlRoom.Existinglogic,circuitconfigurationandcomponentswillbechangedintheReactorTurbineGenerator..Boards(RTGBs)soastoeliminateexistingnuisanceconditionscausedbyerroneousalarmindicationofthesefiveannunciatorcircuits.ByimplementingthisEP,thesecircuitswillbeconsistentwiththe"DarkAnnunciator"conceptwhichallowsforlightedannunciatorsduringoff-normalconditionsonly.ThisEPisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvestheinterposingofacontrolrelayinasafetyrelatedcircuit(hydrogenanalyzer)andtheextensionofsafetyrelatedpowersupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H).ThesafetyevaluationhasdeterminedthatthisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotrequireachangeintheplanttechnicalspecifications.ThisPCMmaybeimplementedwithoutpriorCommissionapproval.ThisEngineeringPackageRevisioncoversmodificationofthesixannunciatorcircuitsassociatedwithannunciatedwindowsP-30,P-35,P-36,P-42,9-40andX-5intheControlRoom.Thesemodifications,whichincluderelocationoflocalresetswitches,installationofreflashersandlogicmodifications,willeliminatethe;nuisancealarmstatusofthesixannunciators.ByimplementingthisPCMSupplement,thesesixannunciatorswillbebroughtintocompliancewiththe"DarkAnnunciator"conceptofNUREG0700"GuidelinesforControlRoomDesignReview"..TheoriginalSafetyEvaluationhasbeenrevised.TheSafetyEvaluationstillconcludes,however,thatthisEPdoesnot,involveandunreviewedsafetyquestion,orachangetothetechnicalspecifications.Therefore,priorcommissi'onapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthePCM.TheintentoftheoriginalSafetyEvaluationisnotaffectedbythissupplement.SAFETYEVALUATIONPithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59;aproposedchangedshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.

PCM140-186ThemodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackagedonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincetheannunciatorsservenofunctioninthecontrolofplantoperat'ionsorsafeshutdown.Electricalseparationisprovidedbetweenredundantsafetyrelatedwiringandcomponentsandannunciatorlogicwhichisseparatedtoprotectcontrolfunctionsfrombeingaffectedbyannunciationcircuitfailure.(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofanycontrolcircuitsorassociatedsystems.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafety.asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.SincethisEPaffectsequipmentthatisidentifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated(HydrogenAnalyzer)andrequirestheextentionofNuclearSafetyRelatedpowe'rsupplycables(10482E,10482L,and10485H),itisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.DuetothefactthattheFPdoesnot'nvolveanycablesessentialtosafereactorshutdownorsystemsassociatedwithachievingandmaintainingsafeshutdownconditions,thispackagehasnoimpacton10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirements.Therefore,theproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandStLucie-Unit1FSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.ImplementationofNuclearSafetyRelatedPCM140-186andSupplement1tothesamePCMdonotrequireachangetotheplanttechnical'pecificationsandmaybeimplementedwithoutpriorcommissionapproval.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMandSupplement1tothesameisnotrequired.

PCM14D-186PRESSURIZERLEVELINSTRUMFNTATIONMODIFICATIONREA-SLN-86-076ABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)modifiesthePressurizerLevelInstrumentationtoprovidetworedundantqualifiedchannelsofControlRoomindication(Sigmameters).Electricalisolatorswillbeinstalledsoastoseparatethenon-safety(control)loopfromtheupgradedNuclearSafetyRelatedPressurizerLevelInstrumentationloops.Existingpressurizerpressureandpressurizerlevelrecorderswillbereplacedwithnarrowcaseequivalentequipmentinordertoallowspacefortheinstallation,,ofnewSigmaindicators,inthefrontpanelofRTGB-103.Cable,conduit,penetrationsandcomponentswhichwillbepartoftheNuclearSafetyRelatedloopwillbere-taggedtoindicatethisupgrade.ThetwoupgradedchannelsofpressurizerlevelinstrumentationwillmeettherequirementsofRegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev3forVariableDCategory10ThisEPisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitprovidesanupgradeofanexistingsystemtoNuclearSafetyRelatedstatus.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthattheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforitsimplementationisnotrequired.ThisEPdoesnotadverselyaffectplantsafetyandoperationorimpactPlantTechnicalSpecifications.Supplement1tothisPCMisthevehiclefortheissuanceofarevisiontotheEnvironmentalQualificationDocumentationPackageandupdatingthe10CFR'0.49listtoaddresstheSafetyInjectionTanksamplelinecontainmentisolationvalves,FCV&3-1EandFCV-03-1F.ThesesolenoidvalveswereinstalledaspartofPCM314-77whichmovedtheSafetyInjectionTanksamplepointfrominsidetooutsidethecontainment.Thesecontainmentisolationvalvescontainlimitswitches(inthesolenoidassembly)asrequiredbyRegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev3forVariableBCategoryl.Theisolationvalvesarelocatedinapotentiallyharshenvironment,thustheyrequireEnvironmentalQualificationasrequiredby10CFR50.49.Nophysicalchanges'areneededtoaddressSupplement1ofthisPCMsincethequalifiedlimitswitcheswereinstalledaspartofPCM314-77.Revision1doesnotaltertheNuclearSafetyRelatedstatusof.thisEPsinceitonlyaffectsaNuclearSafetyRelatedEnvironmentalQualificationDocumentationPackage.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthattheimplementationofthePCMsupplementdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforitsimplementationisnotrequired'hisEPrevisiondoesnotadverselyaffectplantsafetyandoperationorimpactPlantTechnicalSpecifications.

PCM141-186SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction'fequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeinczeased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybecreated,or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.4TheproposedmodificationaffectsthePressurizerLevelInstrumentationandcontrolloopsinthatitprovidesfortheestablishment'ftworedundantNuclearSafetyRelatedpressurizerlevelindicationchannelsintheControlRoomsoastomeettherequirementsofRegGuide1;97.InaccordancewithRegGuide1.75,physicalseparationisprovidedbetweenthenonsafety(control)andthesafetyrelatedsegmentsoftheloop.Supplement1ofthisPCMisthevehicleforissuanceofarevisiontotheEgDocumentationPackageforValcorSolenoidvalvestoincludeSafetyInjectionTankSampleLineContainmentIsolationValvesinaccordancewith10CFR50.49.Supplement1servestoaddtheenvironmentqualificationoftheisolationvalvesintothedocumentsystemandhasnoimpactonplanthardwareorproceduresasdescribedintheUFSAR.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDBEpreviouslyaddressedintheUFSARisnotaffectedbythismodification.ThisEPwillinfactdecreasetheprobabilityofpressurizexlevelinstrumentationfailuresinceitprovidesforincreasedreliabilityintheeventasinglefailurebyfurnishingtworedundant,qualifiedchannels.ThepossibilityofnewDBEsnotconsideredintheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophyhasbeenpreviouslydiscussedintheUFSAR.Thismodificationisanenhancementtoapre-existingsystemandisbeingperformedtoprovideincreasedxeliabilityintheeventofasinglefailure.PressurizerLevelInstrumentationisidentifiedasPostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationandisrequiredtobeNuclearSafetyRelatedperRegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev3asitpertainstoCategory',TypeDvariables.Asthismodificationinvolvescablesessentia1toreactorsafeshutdown(EssentialEquipmentList8770-B-049,Rev0)andPostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentation(PAMI),allapplicable10CFR50Appendix"R"fireprotectionrequirementshavebeenidentifiedandaresatisfiedbythispackage(Section2.1.4).ThereforetheproposeddesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandUFSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.SincethispackagemeetstherequirementsofRegGuide1.97asitprovidesfortwoindependent,redundantNuclearSafetyRelatedchannelsofpressurizerlevelinstrumentation,thisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.Astheevaluationofsystemfailuremode(Section2.1.17)indicates,thispackageupgradesexistingredundant,independentpressurizerlevelinstrumentationloopsfromIA/IB(importanttosafety)toSA/SB(NuclearSafetyRelated)andprovidesadequateelectricalandphysicalseparation.Hence,thisisanenhancementtothepressuzizerlevelinstrumentationandincreasesthedegreeofprotectiontonuclearsafetyrelatedsystemsandequipment.Theprobabilityofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,remainsunchanged.Thepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyz'edintheUFSARisnotcreated.

PCM143-186PASSDISSOLVEDHYDROGENANALYZERTIE-INSAbstractThisEngineeringPackage(EP)coverstheinstallationoftie-instotheexistingUnitNo1PostAccidentSamplingSystem(PASS)foradissolvedhydr~oenanalyzer.lAreviewofthechangetobeimplementedbythisEPwasperformedagainsttherequirementsoi10CFR50.59.AsaresulttheinstallationofadisssolvedhydrogenanalyzerinthePASSisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated,doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion,doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecificationandwillnotaffectplantsafety(asaddressedinSection3,"SafetyEvaluation").However,thismodificationisqualityrelated,becauseitisrequiredbyNUREG0737formonitoringReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)chemistryandactivityresultingfromadesignbasisaccident.Thischangewillnotaffectplantoperations.PriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementationofthisEP.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)if'theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisrepormaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanvTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.Thismodificationinvolvesthenecessarytie-instotheexist'ngsystemincludingtubingandvalves.ThisE""ionlyfo=prov'sionstoinstallthedissolvedhydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated.ThisEPisclassifiedqualityrelatedbecauseitisrequiredbvNUP.EG0737formonitoringReactorCoolantSystemchemistryandactivityresultingfromadesignbasisaccident.Basedontheabove,thisengineeringdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincethisEPisonlyforprovisionstoinstallthedissolvedhydrogenanalyzerintheUnitNo1PASS.ThePASSisnon-safetyrelatedanditsnormalperformancerequirementshavenotbeenaffectedbythesetie-ins.Thereisnopotentialforthismodificationtointeractwith'afetyrelatedsystemfunctions.I~

PCM143-186(ii)The-possibilityforanaccidgntormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisEP,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.ImplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perlOCFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.r PCM146-186MISCELLANEOUSICWSYSTEMMODIPICATIONSABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageenablesminormodificationstobemadetotheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)systemresultingfromdisassembly,inspection,repairandreassemblvduringthe1987refuelingoutage.ThosemodificationsthatmeetthecriteriaestablishedbythisdesignpackageshallbeinitiatedviatheChangeRequest/Noticeformanddispositionedbyengineering.Thosemodificationswhichdonotmeetthecriteriaestablishedbythisdesignpackageshallbeimplementedunderseparatedesignpackages.ThosemodificationstotheessentialportionoftheICWSystemareclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelated,thereforethePC/Misclassifiedassafetyrelated.Modificationstothenon-essentialportionoftheICKSystemareclassifiedasnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedunlessthefailuremodeanalysisdeterminesanintelactionwithequipmentimportanttosafety.Ifso,qualityrequirementswillbeappliedandthemodificationclassifiedasQualityRelated.SincethePC/Mwillrestorethesystemtoitsoriginaldesignconfiguration,itdoesnotresultinanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SAFETYEVALUATIONThemodificationstotheessentialportionoftheICWsystemdescribedintheprojectscopeareclassifiedasnuclearsafety-relatedbecausethefailureofthemodifiedcomponentinconjunctionwiththeworstcasesinglefailureasanalyzedperFSARTable9.2.2wouldresultintheinabilityoftheICWsystemtoachieveitsdesignbasissafetyfunction.HistoricaGy,thetypesofmodificationstotheICWSystemresultingfromthedisassemblyandreassemblyofthepipingsystemforinspectionandrepairhavebeen:1.Modificationstopipeventanddrainlines(e.g.,replacementofcorrodedmaterial).2.Modificationstosupport/restraints(e.g.,documentationofweldsymbolsrequiredtoreassembleS/R's,excessivegapatS/Rbaseplates,replacementofcorrodedmaterial).3.WeldrepairtoICWpipe(e.g.,documentationofpipewelds).4.Pipeflangeboltingmaterialchangesorbolttorquevalvedocumentation.Asdescribedinthedesignbases,thesenuclearsafety-relatedmodificationsshallbemadeinaccordancewiththedesigncoderequirementsforSafetyClass3pipeandpipecomponentsandforSeismicClassIsupport/restraints.

PCM146-186Inaccordancewiththerequirementsspecifiedinthedesignbases.eachmodificationtnthenon-nuclearsafety-relatedportionoftheICIUsystemsnal'ave>fa!luremod=evaluationperformedtodetermineifthereareanyinterac'.ionswithsafty-relatedequipmentorfunctions.Sine=thenon-nuclearsafe~relatedportionoitheICYsystemisnotreliedupo:;.'oranyaccidentpreventionormitigation,failureswhicharedeterminedtcnotimpactthefunctionofthenuclearsafety-relatedportionoftheI:"4systemareacceptablevithregardtonuclearsafety.NoQualityRelatedrequirementswillbeappliedto.thedesignofthesemodifications.However,ifamodificationtothenon-nuclearsafetyrelatedportionoftheICLUsystemisdeterminedbythefailuremodeevaluationtointeractwithNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment,QualityRelated!equi!'ementswilloeappliedtothedesignofthesemodifications.Basedontheabove,itcanbedemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.i)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)evaluatedintheFSARisnotincreasedbecausenoDBA'sdealwithspecificICWcomponentfailures.ThemodificationsrestoretheICWsystemando!iginaldesignconditionandensureitssafetyfunctionwillbeperformed.ii)'TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreasedbecausethemodificationsproposedbythisdesignpackagearetopassivecomponentsonlyandtheywillbedesigned/implementedinaccordancewithsafetyclass/FSARrequirements.TheFSARdoesnotevaluatepassivecomponentfailures.iii)ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethemodificationspermittedbythisdesignpackagedonotaltertheICWsystemfunctionormodeofoperation.TheFSARevaluationoftheICWsystemenvelopesthefailureofthedescribedmodifiedcomponents.iv)Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforatechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Themodificationspermittedbythisdesignpackagehavebeenreviewedandfoundacceptable.Nochangestothedesignbasis,function,ormodeofoperationoftheICWsystemisproposed10CFR50.59allows'hangestoafacilityasdescribedintheFSARifan.unreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistandifachangeto.theTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.Asshovninthepreceedingsections,thechangeproposedbythisdesignpackagedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecauseeachconcernposedby10CFR50.59thatpertainstoanunreviewedsafetyquestioncanbepos!tivelyansweredsincethePC/i'eturnstheICWsystemtoitsdesignconditionandnoTechnicalSpecificationchangeisrequired.Inconclusion,thechangesproposedinthisdesignpackaage"areacceptablefromthestardpointofnuclearsafety,donotinvolveanunreviewe"safe'.yquestion.donotrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpec!fica'.!onsanddonotrequirepriorNRCapprovalpriortoin;plmen:a'.ion.

PCM148-186ICWISOLATIONVALVEREPLACEMENTABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageisissuedtoprovidedirectionforthereplacementofanyofthe30-inchand36-inchnormallyopenisolationvalvesintheIntakeCoolingNate."(ICN)system,asrequired.Theisolationvalvereplacementisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelated,anddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion."Normallyclosed"isolationvalvesmustbereplacdwithrubberlinedvalvesandarenotwithinthescopeofthisdesignoackage.SpecificationMN2.57whichisinaccordancewiththeorocurementspeciricationusedtoprocuretheoriginalvalves.Thenewvalveshavecaststainlesssteelbodies{ASI<IZoA-351GradeCF3M)whichprecludedete.iorationseenintheevistin~carbonsteI/rubberlinedvalves.Theprocurementspecificationspecifiedtherequi<rementthatthevalvesandextensionmustbecomcatiblewiththeexstingoperatars.Pressmeboundarycomponents!nstaQedaspartoitheintakeCooli'ngWatersyste<v:veredesi=..ed'fortheoilowin~:sfPesicHDassure2~i90Design<Tmcerat",."-<n5Chemistry:Seawaterwith"..0mavimumdisso.'vedchlorinePerFPLP.OC83918~<814PandPowerPlantEngineeringSpecificationMN2.57evisicn0,thevalves,vereboughttot<".erequirementsofAS'.<IESecL<onIIIforClass3components.Approoriateseismicrequirem<ents.veralsospecified.Thenewvalveswe.edesignediorthefollowingexternalenvironmentalconditions:Temperature,FPressure,psig30-120Atmosoheric100%Humidity,SaltLadenAtmosphereAQualityControlholdoointhasbeenassignedintheConstructionScopesectionfortheverificationthattheextensionbcnnetsupportingdetailsareapprovedbyengineeringpriortosystemturnoverinordertocomelywiththerequirementsofparagraph1.3.5.

PCM148-186SAFETYEVALUATIONThereplacementofisolationvalvesasdescribedintheProjectScopeisaNuclearSafetyRelatedmodificationbecauseitchangesvalveswhichformapartofthepressureretainingboundaryofaSafetyClass3/QualityGroupCsystem.Basedupontherequirementsof10CFR50.59,anunreviewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexistbecause:1.TheICNsystemisnotconsideredindeterminingtheprobabilityofdesignbasisaccidents(i.e.,LOCA,AISLB,LOOP,etc.).2.TheconsequenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttonuclearsafetyisnotmademoreseriousduetothedesignredundancyoftheICNsystem.TheseparationcriteriaismaintainedbythevalvesdesignedinaccordancewithASVlESectionIIIrequirements.3.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotcreatedbecausethefailureofanyofthesevalvesisapassivefailurewhichisenvelopedbytheevaluationsoftheFSAR.4.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofaTechnicalSpecificationremainsunchangedbecausetheredundancyoftheICWsystemismaintained.BasedontheaboveevaluationandinformationcontainedintheDesignAnalysis,themodificationcanbeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapprovalbecauseanUnreviewedSafetyQuest!ondoesnotexistandachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisnotrequired.

PCM151-186480VACLOADCENTER1B~2TRANSFORMERCOOLINGABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationtothe480Vac,1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanentsourceof240Vac,ClasslEpower-forthestationservicetransformer'scoolingfans.Thismodificationconsistsofinstallinganew,controlpowertransformer,completewithprimaryandsecondaryovercurrentprotection,intheexistingtransitioncompartmentof1B-2LoadCenterandtheinterconnectionofthispowersourceto-theexistingautomatic/manualcontrolschemeassociatedwiththecoolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassfiedasClasslE,seismicCategoryIequipmentandperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,thisPlantChange/Modification(PC/M)isclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelated.TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.ThemodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyin=-thesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.ThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationtothe480Vacua1B-2LoadCentertoprovideapermanentsourceof240Vac,Class1Epowerforthestationservicetransformer'scoolingfans.The1B-2LoadCenterisclassifiedasClass1E,seismicCategoryIequipmentandperformsasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,thisPC/Mhasbeenclassifiednuclearsafetyrelated'ndnuclearsafetyrelateddesignrequirementswereappliedtothisEP.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsince:Allmodificationsarebeingperformedonthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter.Theonlymodificationistorestoretheinstallationsimilartoitsoriginalcondition.Newcomponentsinstalledbythismodificationincludecurrentlimitingprimaryfusesandasecondarycircuitbreaker,whichprovideovercurrentprotectionofthenewcontrolpowertransformeranditssecondarycircuit.Shoul'dfailureofthenewcomponetsoccur,theywillberemovedfromtheirpowersourcebytheseprotect'vedeviceswithoutaffectingtherestofthe."B"electricalsyste=.A:sc,newcompone"tsareev'onme"tallyandseismicallyquaie'ctherequiredenviroxaetandw'-'1remainfunctionalduringprev'uslyevaluatedaccidents.'Theefore,theprobabilityofoccu=enceortheconsequencesofpreviouslyevaluatedaccidentsarenotincrease".

PCM151-186NewcomponentsarebeingprovidedbyBrownBoveri,formallvITE,theoriginalmanufacture-oftne1B-2LoadCenter.Inaddition,themannerinwhichthecomponentsaremountedispeBrownBoveri/industrystandardinstallationdetails.TheBrownBoveriAddendumtothe1B-2LoadCenterCertificateofConformance(ReferenceAttachment4)hasbeenreviewedandithasbeenverifiedthattheadditionofthenewcomponentsdoesnotaffecttheexistingequipment'senvironmentalorseismicqualification.Thus,thismodificationdoesnotcompromisetheoperation/reliabilityoftheexistinginstallationandtheequipmentwillfunctionduringaccidentsaspreviouslyevaluated.Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreatedsince:Allmodificationsarebeingperformedonaauxiliarysupportingfeatureofthe"B"loadgroupLoadCenter,1B-2,withnomodificationsrequiredtotheindependent,redundant"A"loadgroupLoadCenter,lA-2..Primaryandsecondaryovercurrentprotectionhavebeenprovidedforthenewcontrolpowertransformer.Allnewcomponentsandtheinterconnectingwiringareenvironmentallyandseismicallyqualifiedtotherequiredenvironmentandwillbeabletoprovidepowertothe1B-2LoadCenterstationservice'transformercoolingfanspostDesignBasisAccident.BasedonthisandParagraph3.3.3.,noaccidents/malfunctionsdifferent.thanthoseevaluatedpreviouslyarecreatedbythismodification.'hemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsincethemodificationensuresthattheequipmentwillfunctionaspreviouslyevaluatedduringoperation/accidents.Also,as1B-2LoadCentermustbedeenergizedpriortoperforminganywork,implementationofthisPC/MwillbecoordinatedwithPlantOperationssothecriteriaestablishedbytheplantTechnicalSpecifications,eg,Specification3/4.8,arenotviolated(ReferenceSection9.0).Therefore,theimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetotheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),'thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionand.priorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM153-186ROSEMOUNTANDVALCOREQENHANCEMENTSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)providesforthemodificationofseven(7)ValcorEngineeringCorporationsolenoidvalvesandtherelocationofone(1)Rosemount'leveltransmitter.ThesemodificationseliminatetheneedtoPatomeEPqualification(EQ)analysisonthisequipmentwhilebolsteringtheapplicablequal1f1cat1ondocumentationpackages.Th1sisaccomplishedbyraisingthetransmitterontheInstrumentRack50.1abovefloodlevelandaddingNAMCOControlsconduitsealassembliestotheelectricalpowerleadsofseven(7)Valcorsolenoidvalvestoprotectagainstingressofcontainmentchemicalsprayintothevalvecontrols.ThismodificationprovidesforincreasedprotectiontoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipmentandimprovesthemarginofsafetyofthepressurizerlevelinstrumentationandthehydrogensamplingsystem.TheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areunchanged.ThisPCMisclassifiedNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvesequipmentthatservestomitigatetheconsequencesofaDes1gnBasesEvent(DBE).EvaluationTheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireanychangetotheStLucie-UnitlTechnicalSpecifications.Themodifications,asprovidedbythispackage,donotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforthe1mplementationofthispackageisnotrequired.Plantsafetyandoperationarenotaffected.SafetWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionoftheequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased,or(11)ifapossibililityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviously1nthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebseesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheproposedmodificationaffectsthelocationofRosemountleveltransmitterLT-lllOXandtheelectricalcondu1tconnectiontoseven(7)Valcorisolationsolenoidvalvesinthehydrogensamplingsystem.TheprobabilityofoccurenceofanaccidentpreviouslyaddressedintheStLucie-UnitlUpdatedF1nalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)isnotincreasedbythismodification.ThisEPinfactdecreasesthepossibilityofRosemountleveltransmitters'ailurebyreducingtheprobabilityoffailureduetoflooding.ProbabilityoffailureoftheValcorsolenoidvalvesisreducedbyeliminating'helikelihoodoftheintrusionofchemicalsprayintheelectricalconduit.ThepossibilityofnewDBEsnotconsideredintheUFSARisnotcreatedsincethedesignphilosophiesofpressurizerlevelandhydrogenanalyzerhavebeenpreviouslyaddressedintheUFSAR.ThismodificationisanenhancementtoexistinghydrogenanalyzerisolationvalvesaswellaspressurizerleveltransmitterLT-lllOX.

PCM153-186DuetothefactthatthisEPinvolvescablesidentifiedasessentialtosafereactorshutdown(pressurizerleveltransmitterLT-1110X),Appendix"R"requirementshavebeenconsideredandaddressedinthispackage(Section2.1.6).Assuch,thedesignofthispackageisincompliancewiththeapplicablecodesandUPSARrequirementsforfireprotectionequipment.ThisEPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelatedsinceitinvolvespressurizerlevelinstrumentation(usedforsafereactorshutdown)andhydrogensampling/analyzer(usedforthemitigationof'adesignbasesevent).Astheevaluationoffailuremode(Section2.2.8)indicates,thedegreeofprotectiontoNuclearSafetyRelatedequipment(marginofsafety)isincreasedandtheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUPSARareunchanged.ThepossibilityofmalfunctionsofadifferenttypethanthoseanalyzedintheUPSARisnotcreated.TheimplementationofNuclearSafetyRelatedPC/M153-186doesnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,nordoesitcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Theforegoingconsitutes,per10CPR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM001-187IEBULLETIN85-03MOVSWITCHSETTINGSABSTRACTNRCIEBulletin85-03requiresthatoperatingnuclearplantsdevelopandimplementaprogramtoensure'.thatswitchsettingsonselectedsafety-relatedmotor-operatedvalves(MOV's)arecorrectlyselected,setandmaintainedtoaccommodatethemaximumdifferentialpressuresexpectedonthesevalvesduringallpostulatedeventswithinthedesignbasis.Itema)ofthebulletinrequiresthatthedesignbasisforthosehlOV'slocatedinAFC'ndHPSIsystemsbereviewedtodeterminethemaximumdifferentialpressureexpectedduringbothopeningandclosingstrokesforallpostulatedevents.ThiseffortwasperformedforSt.LucieUnitsIand2byCombustionEngineeringaspartoftheCEOwner'sGroup(CEOG)Tasks528and531.TheresultsoftheItema)weresubsequentlytransmittedtotheNRCviaFPLletterL-86-200,datedMay15,1986.Itemb)ofBulletin85-03requiresthatthelicenseeestablishthecorrectMCVswitchsettingsbasedonthepreviouslydeterminedmaximumdifferentialpressure.Allswitches,includingtorcueswitches,torquebypassswitches,positionlimit,positionindication,overloads,etc.,shallbe'onsidered.ThisdesignpackageprovidestheoverallswitchsettingguidelinesforeachV>OY,inadditiontothespecificdesigninformationnecessary.tosetboththeopenandclosetorquesvitchesandmet:herequirementsofBulietin85-03.OncethecorrectswitchsettingshavebeenincorporatedintotherespectiveAIC'V,Itemc)ofIEBu!letin85-03requiresthateachK!OYbestroketestedagainstthemaximumdifferentialpressureestablishedinItema)toverify'.'perability,Becauseallofthe%1OY'sassociatedwithBulletin85-"3aresafety-relatedthisengineringpackagehasbeenclassifieasnuclearsafty-re!ated.Areviewofthsw'tchsettingcangestobimpierne..tedbythisPC/illwasper'ormecagainsttherequirementsofIGCFR5~.59,.anditwasconciudedthatthesemodiiic-tionsdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetycuestionanddonotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.ThissupplementrevisesthetorqueswitchsettingsforvalveV-3650toaccountforactualfieldtesting.ThisconditionhadbeenpreviouslyjustifiedviaSafetyEvaluation3PE-Al-87-038,Pev.i.TheEngineeringPackagesafetyclassificationandsafetyevaluationareunaffected.SAFETYEVALUATIONlUithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalReulations,Part50.59,themodificationdescribedinthisengineeringpackagedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreased.ThisengineeringpackageonlyprovidesthenecessarydesigninformationrequiredtosetMOVswitchsettingsutilizingAIOVATSsignatureanalysistechniques.Therecommendedswitchsettingsareconsideredenhancementstotheexistingsettingstofurtherensurevalveoperability.Also;FSAR'designbaseswere PCM001-187reviewedtodeterminethemaximumloadingconditionsoneachMOVtoensuretheswitchsettingswereproperlyselected.Furthermore,Itemc)ofBulletin85<3requiresthateachMOVbestroketestedundermaximumdifferentialpressureconditionstoensurevalveoperability.ii)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcrested.Nohardwaremodificationsareperformed-aspartofthisPC/M.TheproposedMOVswitchsettingsalteraccidentmitigatingequipmenttofurtherenhanceoperability.However,malfunctionsoftheseNOV'sdonotinthemselvesinitiateanaccident.Therefore,nonewaccidentshavebeencreated.Additionally,thespecifiedmodificationsdonotintroduceanynewfailuremodesfortheequipment.Therefore,nodifferentmalfunctionsoftheequipmentthanthosepreviouslyanalyzedareintroduced.iii)Themarginofsafetyas=definedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.Thismodificationdoesnotimpact.theTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsfortheassociatedequipment.Valvestroketimesarenotimpacted.Therefore,themarginofsafetycontrolledbytheTechnicalSpecificationsispreserved.~~Inconclusion,thechangeproposedinthisengineeringpackageis.acceptablefromthestandpointofnuclearsafetydoesnotinvolveanunreviewecsafetyquestionandprior':RCapprovalforimplementationisnotrequired.

PCM005-187.NRCIEBULLETIN85-03-MOVPOSITIONINDICATIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationstothesafetyrelatedMotorOperatedValves(MOV's)in.theAux1liaryFeedwater(AFW)andtheHighPressureSafetyInfection(HPSI)systems.ThisEngineeringPackagewillprovidetheengineeringanddesigndeta1lsrequiredto1mplementtheclosetoopentorquebypassswitchandclosedpositionindicationwiringmodifications.TheMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystemsarerequiredforplantsafeshutdownandclassifiedasClass1E,areseismicallyqual1fiedandperformasafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,thisPC/MisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.ThisPC/Mdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionsincethemodificationsdescribedabovewillnothaveanadverseimpactonplantoperationsorsafetyrelatedequipment.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunrev1ewedsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ1pmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionof"a-differenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalys1sreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.Th1sEng1neeringPackageprovidestheengineeringanddesigndetailsrequiredtoinstalladditionalrotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestoMOV'sintheAFWandHPSIsystems.PC/M001-187increasestheclosedtoopentorquebypassswitchsettingswhich1mpacttheclosedpositionind1cat1nglight.Increasingthenumberofrotorsfromtwotofourvillallovthelimitswitchfortheclosedpositionindicating11ghttobelocatedonarotorotherthanthatusedforthetorquebypassswitch.Motormperatedvalvesthathavefourrotorswillonlyrequireinternalwiringchanges.Theadditionofthenewrotorsdoesnotaffecttheexistingequipmentqualifications.TheimplementationofthisEngineeringPackageincreasestheavailabilityoftheMOV'sduringsafeshutdownconditionsandimprovestheMOVpositionindicationprovidedtothecontrolroomoperators.TheMOV'sthatarebeingmodifiedperformsafetyrelatedfunctionsvithintheAFWandHPSIsystemsandaredesignedforoperationunderconditionsthatcouldbeimposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThisEPhasbeenclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.

PCM005-187Basedonthepreceeding,thefollowingconclusionscanbemade:(1)TherobabilitofoccurrenceortheconseuencesofanaPqccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety'reviously,evaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased,sincethemodificationstotheMOV'senhan'eestheoperabilityoftheequipment.Theadditionofrotorsand/orinternalwiringchangestothevalveswillpreventthepossibilityofinaccurateremoteclosedpositionindicationresultingfromtheincreasedbypass11mitswitchsettings.(11)Asaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibilityforaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificat1onaltersaccidentmitigat1ngequipmenttoenhancetheiroperation.Therewasnointroductionofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.(111)Th1smodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefined1nthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.ThesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolledbythevariousapplicableTechnicalSpecificationsismaintainedbythischange.TheproposeddesignensuresthattheMOV'swillfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnicalSpecificat1onsispreserved.ETheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM009-187OVERPRESSUREMITIGATIONSYSTEMMODIFICATIONSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)detailsthemodificationsrequiredontheOverpressureMitigationSystem(OMS)toprovidechangestothePowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)setpoints.ThenewsetpointsarederivedfromC~ustionEngineering'sreportonPressure/Temperature(F7T)limitsandLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)for10EffectiveFullPowerYears(EFPY).There-analysisoftheOMSsetpointsensuresthattheReactorCoolantSystemsPressurewillbemaintainedbelowtheapplicableP/Tlimitsduringtheoperatingperiodendingat10EFPY.ThenewP/Tlimitsareidentifiedtoprovideadequateprotectionagainstrapidpropogationofaflawinther'eactorvesselwithconsiderationgiventotheoptimizationofheatupandcooldownrates.TheOMSsetpointmodificationsareclassifiedQualityRelatedbecauseany'a1luretotheOMSsetpointb1stablealarmsundernormaloperatingconditionsoranticipatedtransientscanresultinexceedingasafetylimitspecifiedinsection3/4.4.13and3/4.4.14oftheTechnicalSpecifications.Furthermore,theOMSsetpointmodificationsaffecttheRTGBoardslocated1nthecontrolroom.ThisEPchangewillnotimpa1rtheeffic1entoperation.oftheOMS,nordoesitcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion,therefore,priorCommissionapprovalforitsimplementationisnotrequired.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreview'edsafetyquestion:(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyprev1ouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportmaybeincreased,or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafet~hnalyiksReportmaybecreated,or(111)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.TheOMSprotectstheRCSfrombeingpressur1zedbeyondthecurvesdefinedbytheminimumpressur1zationtemperaturecurvesoftheTechnicalSpecifications,whiletheRCSisatlowtemperatures.TheOMSachievesitspurposeofprotectingtheRCSfromoverpressur1zationatIow,non-ductiletemperaturesbycontinuouslycomparingactualpressurizerpressuretotwo(2)pressuresetpo1ntsandcorrespondingtemperaturesetpointsandbyactuatingthePORVswhenactualpressureapproachesthesesetpoints.ThepressureandtemperaturecomparisonsandPORVactuationarebothaccomplishedintwoindependentredundantOMStrainsponeforeachPORV.

PCM009-187TheP/TsetpointchangesoutlinedperthisEPpackageareclassifiedQualityRelatedbecauseanyfailuretotheOMSsetpointalarmsundernormaloperatingconditionsoranticipatedtransientscanresultinexceedingasafetylimitspecifiedinSection3/4.4.13and-3/4.4.14ofthe.TechnicalSpecifications.Inaddition,thesechangesalsoaffecttheRTGBoardslocatedinthe-ControlRoom.ThefollowingprovidestheJustificationthatanunreyiewedsafetyquestiondoesnotexist.i.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceozheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportantzosafetypreviouslvevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedbecausetheOMSmodificationservesonlytochangethesetpoinzsforthePORVswheneveranoverpressurizazioneventoccursinlowtemperaturemodeswhentheRCSmaybewatermolid.ThenewsezpoinzsforoverpressureprotectioninlowtemperaturemodesmaintainzhedesignphilosophyoftheOMSsyszem.iiThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreatedbecausethenewsetpointsallowbettercontroloverOMSeventsandpreventviolationofthe10CFRAppendixGpressure/temperaturelimitsduringtheoperatingperiodendingat10EFPY.TheCEreportprovidesassurancethatthesystemisabletoperformitsfunctionassuminganysingleactivecomponentfailureinadditionzothefailurethatinitiatedthe.pressuretransient.iiiThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedsince.thisOMSmodificationrevisesthesetpointsforthePORVstoactuatewheneveranoverpressurizationeventoccursinlowtemperaturemodesofoperationwhenzheRCSmaybewater-solid.TheproposedsystempreventsviolationoftheAppendixGpressure/temperaturelimitsduringanoperatingperiodendingaz10EFPY.TheimplementationofzheproposedLTOPsystemdoesnotresultinthereductioninamarginofsafety;instead,izprovidesadditionalsetpointsandtherebyincreasesthemarginofsafezy.ThisEPchangewillnotimpairtheefficientoperationoftheOMS.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequiredachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.AlthoughnewP/Tlimitsforreactoroperationarebeingdeveloped,thoseTechnicalSpecificationchangesapplytooperationbeyond7.4EFPY,andarenotdirectlyrelatedzothesetpointchangesaccomplishedbythisEP.Theforegoingconszituzes,per10CFR50.59(b),zhewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovideszhebasesthatthischangedoesnozinvolveanunreviewedsafezyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofzhisEPis.notrequiredonthatbasis..

PCM010-187PROTECTIVECOATINGSREPAIRAND/ORREPLACEMENTINREACTORCONTAINMENTBUILDINGJIBR1MCZThisengineeringpackagecoversthemaintenanceofServiceLevell~rotectivecoatingsonconcreteandsteelsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainmentBuilding.ThisproJectisclassifiedasqualityrelatedanddoes-notconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.F1NThefunctionofthecoatingsusedinsidetheRCBistoprovideprotectionagainstcorrosionandcontamination.Theonlysafetyrelatedaspect.isforthecoatingstoremainintactthroughoutadesignbasisaccidenttoinsurethatnoengineeredsafetyfeaturesareinterferedwith;ThecoatingstobeusedareDBAtestedandtheircomposition,functionalandtestingrequirementsareaddressedintheUnit1FSAR.Forthesereasonstheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofadesignbasisaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttothesafetyoftheplanthasnotbeenincreased.lnaddition,therewillcontinuetobenopossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctiondifferentthanthosepreviouslyevaluatedintheUnitIFSAR.Finally,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheplanttechnicalspecificationshasnotbeenreduced.Itisthereforeconcludedthattherepairand/orreplacementofprotectivecoatingsonsurfacesinsidetheReactorContainmentBuildingasoutlinedinthispackagedoesnotposeanunreviewedsafetyquestionpursuantto10CFR50.59.

PCM011-187CONDENSERHOTWELLNITROGENINJECTIONCONNECTIONSThisEngineeringPackage1stoprovideconnectionstothecondenserstoinfectnitrogenintotheco~denserhotwells.Testhaveshownthatinfectinglcfmofnitrogenintoacondensershellreducesthed1ssolvedoxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensatebyapproximately2ppb.ItistheorizedthatbecauseWolowair1n-leakageintothecondensers(condensersaredesignedbaseduponthefacttherewillbeairin-leakage),theflowofthenon-condensiblesintheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished;Therefore,oxygenisentrainedasthe'condensatedripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.Theinjectionofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondensertoestablishtheflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibleswithoutintroducingoxygenintothesystem.Areviewofthechangestobe1mplementedbythisEng1neeringPackagewasperformedagainsttherequirementsoflOCFR50.59.Asaresult,thesecondensermodificationsareclassifiedasnonmafetyrelated,donotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandwillnotaffectplantsafetyoroperation(asaddressedinSection3"SafetyEvaluation").SafetEvaluationMithrespecttoT1tle10oftheCodeofPederalRegualtion,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquest1on;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(111)ifthemarg1nofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificat1onisr8fuced.ThisEngineeringPackageistoprovideconnectionstothecondenserstoin)ectnitrogenintothecondenserhotwells.Testshaveshownthatinfecting1cfmofnitrogenintoacondensershellreducesthedissolvedoxygenlevelinthehotwellcondensatebyapproximately2.ppb.Itistheorizedthatbecauseoflowairin-leakageintothecondensers(condensersaredesignedbasedupon-thefacttherew111beairin-leakage),theflowofthenon-condensiblesintheairremovalsectionofthetubebundleisnotestablished.Therefore,oxygenisentrainedasthecondensatedripsthroughtheairpocketswhichformasaresultofthestagnantconditions.Theinfectionofaninertgassuchasnitrogenenablestheairremovalsectionofthecondensertoestablishtheflowrequiredtoremovenon-condensibleswithoutintroducingoxygenintothesystem.

PCM011-1.87Basedontheabovedescription,themodificationincludedinthisEngineeringPackage(EP)18consideredtobenon-'safetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveonunreviewedsafetyquestion,'ndthefollowingarebasesfor.thisJustification:1)'heprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequences.ofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.Thecondensersarenotusedinanysafetyanalysisforaccidentsormalfunctionofequipmentandassucharenon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.11)Thepossibilityforanacc1dentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotcreated.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationhavenosafetyrelatedfunctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthesystem.iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprov1desthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofth1sPCMisnotrequired.

PCM012-187ONEANDTWOFEEDWATERHEATERANDEXTRACTIONPIPESHIELDINGThisEngineeringPackageprovidesgenericdetailsfortherepa1rorreplacementofdamagedshielding'fortheExtractionStre'ssPipeandExpansionJointsandtheFeedwaterHeatersinsidetheCondenser..TheEngineeringPackageisclassifiedasnon-safetyrelatedsinceitisamodificationtoanon-safetyrelatedsystem.ThesafetyevaluationhasshovnthatthisEPdoesnotconstituteanyunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thissystemisnon-safetyrelatedandvillhavenoeffecton"equipmentvitaltoplantsafety.SafetEvaluationWithrespect.toTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofan~cidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanzkysisreportmaybeincreased;or(11)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpeciificationisreduced.ThisPCM1nvolvestherepairandreplacementoftheshieldingfortheextractionp1pingandfeedwaterheaterslocatedinthecondenser.Ithasbeenclassifiedasnon-safetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequ1pmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportsnot1ncreased.TheStLuci~UnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4readsasfollows:Exceptforaportionofthefeedwatersystempiping,thefeatures,componentsandsystemdescribedinthissectionservenosafetyfunctions1ncetheyarenotrequiredforsafeshutdownortomitigatetheeffectsofaLOCAandtheirfailurewillnotresultinthereleaseofsignificantuncontrolledradioactivity.TheStLucieUnitNo1FSAR,Section10.4.1describesthecondenserwheretheextractionpipingandlowpressureFeedwaterheaters1and2arelocated;Thissystemisnon-safetyrelatedandwillhavenoeffectonequipmentvitaltoplantsafety.(11)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationdonotperformanysafetyrelatedfunction.Nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofthecondenserortheextractionpiping.(111)Themargin.ofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythisPCM,sincethecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationarenotdirectlyincludedinthebasesofanyTechnicalSpecification.

PCM012-187TheimplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnica'pecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per'10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCM017-187eABSTRACTCCWHEATEXCHANGERS-SHELLSIDEDRAINADDITIONTHISENGINEERINGPACKAGEPRQViDESDETAILSFORTHEADDITIONOFTWOFLANGFDSIXINCHSHELLSIDEDRAINCONNECTIONSTOTHFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.THEDRAINSAREDESIREDTOIMPROVEFLUSHENGEFFECTIVENESSANDTOREDUCECRITICALF'ATHDRAINTINEBETWEENFLUSHESFOLLOWINGRETUBINGUNDERPC/M~40-183DURINGTHE1987UNIT1REFUELENSOUTAGE.THISMODIFICATIONIBCLASSIFIEDASNUCLEAP,SAFFTYRELATEDSiNCEiTAFFECTSTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYOFTHE=CONPONENTCOOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGERS.THECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANSERSFGRNAPOF;TIONOFTHECQI'1POh!ENTCOOLINGWATERANDINTAKECOGLINGWATFRSYSTEllSWHICHARECLASSIFIEDASQUALITYGROUPC,SEISNICBYSTEt'1S.THISPC/r'iHABBEENRFVEEWEDTGTHECRETER1ASETFOf'THErVIi>CFR50.59ANDHABBEENDF'TERMINEDNGTTQINVOLVEANUtVREVIE!VEDSAFETYQUESTION,NGRDGEBI7REQUIRFCl!ANSESTQTHFTCHtiiCALBF'ECIFICATIOt!B.'F;IGRCOMMIBSION"F'F'FOVALIBNGTREQUIREDORIMPLEMENTATIONGFTHISMODIFICATION.SAFETYEVALiJAT1GhlTHISi~1ODEF"ATIONCONSISTSONLYOFTHEADDITIONQFTWOSIXINCHF!ANGEDPEF'BT!iBDRAiNSTOTHEUhlDEFBIDEOFEACHCOt'IPONFh!7COOLINSWATERHEATEXCHANGERSHcLLTOREDUCEDRAINAGETIt!cEANDTGENPROVEFLUSHINGEFFECTIVENFBS.TH"NE4!DRAI!V1'!IL'ERFORtiNG"ACTIVc"SAFETYRELAT-DFUNCTIrtV.ON'TH=.='A:8IV=FJN~CTEONOFRETAININSTHEF'RESBJf>EBGUluDARYi!VTEPF'YQrTHECG!'1PONENTCOQ'k!SiVATERS.STEM.TH:St'1QD'~AiIGl<INUCLEARSAF7YRE'T"B~hiCE7AFr7>7HE,PRE:-8'JF:EPGUNDAr,'YOFTHECCWHEATEXHANGERSWHi:HAR=QUA'YSRQUc',BEESNICCO!'!PGNENTS'.REFFRENCEUNi71F.ARTABLE.:.:--2).BASEDQtTHEpOLLOWINGARGL'ENENTS,iiISDEMONSTRATEDTHATNQUNREVIEW"DBAFETYQUFSTIONSEXISTANDTHATTHEMGDi;ICATIONNAYBEINcLEMhlTEDWITHOUTPR>QRCONN>cSIONAPcROVALTHPROBABELITYOFOCCUR=filCEOF;THECONBEQUcNCcSOFANACCIDENTGFNALFUNCTEONOFEQ>JIPMENTIMPORTANTTGSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSIBRErORTHASNOTBEENINCREASED.THISMODIrECATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHEPROBABILITYOFOCCURcNCEOFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLYFVALUATEDSINCETHECCWHEATEXCHANSERSARENOTCONSIDEREDINDETERNININSTHEPROBABILETIc.SOFACCIDENTS.

THECONSEQUENCESOFPOSTULATEDACCiDENTSHAVENOTBEENMADc.MORESEVERESINCETHISMODIFICATIONDOESNQTAFFECTTHEFUNCTiONALPERFORMANCEOFTHECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGERSANDDOESNQTAFFECTANYOTHEREQUIPMENTWHICHWOULDMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCESOFPOSTULATEDACCIDENTS.-THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANPREVIOUSL'YEVALUATEDINTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSiSREPORTHASNOTBEENCREATED.THENEWFLANGEDDRAINCONNECTIONSARETYPICALINTERMSOFDcSIGNCODES70THEOTHERFLANGEDPIPINGINTHECOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMTHEREFORENONEWACCIDENTSQRMALFUNCTIONSAREINTRODUCED.-THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDiNTHEBASISFOR.ANYTECHNICALSPECIFiCATIQNHASNOTBEENREDUCED.THEMQDIFICATiONDESCRIBEDHEREININNOWAYAFFECTSANYTECHNICALSP"CIFICATIQN.10CFR50.5c'LLOlJSMODIDESCRIBEDiNTHEFSARWIUNREN'IEWED3'AFETYQUESTIFTECHNICALSPECIFICATARGUcMENTSDEMONTRATENQTRc(UIREDiTHEREFORc.WITHOUTPRIQcCQMMISSIONFICATIONSTONUCLEARFACILITIESASTHOUTPRIORCQtlMISSIOh)APPc,'OVALIFANIQhlISDEMONSTRATEDNOTTOEXISTAiv'DiQNSAREUt'jAF."ECTED.THEPRECEDt'lGTHATNOUNREViWEDSAFETYC!UESTiON=TQTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSTHISMQDFI'TIONMAYBEIt'iPLEMENTEDAPPROVAL.

PCM027-187MISCELLANEOUSSNUBBERMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisEPprovidesengineeringanddesignformi'scellaneousmodificationstosnubbersasaresultoftheinserviceinspectionfindings.Themodificationgenerallyincludesareplacement'oftheexistingsnubberand/oritscomponentswithanupgradedsnubberoritscomponentsofadifferentorsamemanufacturer.ThisEPhasbeenclassifiedasSafetyRelatedbecausethemodificationaffectssafetyrelatedpipingsystem.Themodificationshavebeenreviewedunderthecriteriaof10CFR50.59andnounreviewedsafetyquestionshavebeendemonstratedtoexist.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthisEPwillnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationassnubbershavenotbeenremovedoraddedtotheTable3.7-2bofthePlantTechnicalSpecification3-7.10.Supplement1,providesengineeringanddesignsformodificationtoadditionalsnubbersasaresultoftheInserviceInspectionfindings.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthissupplementwillrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecificationTable3..7-2aand2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetablestoincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraintMkNoRC-247-H3intheTable3.7-2b.However,perthefootnoteofthesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendmenttothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Supplement2providesengineeringanddesignsformodificationtoadditionalsnubbersasaresultoftheInserviceInspectionfindings.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthissupplementwillrequireachangetoplantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10toincludethesafetyrelatedsnubberforofthrestraintMkNoRC-247-H3inTable3.7-2b.'Howeverperthefttotesetables,asnubbermaybeaddedordeletedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendmenttothesetablesprovidedarevisiontothesetablesareincludedwiththenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Supplement3providesengineeringanddesignformodificationtotworestraintswhichwerefoundtohavebeendamagedduringtheinserviceinspection.

Thesafetyevaluation'hasshownthatthismodificationdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion;however,asindicatedimplementationofsupplement1and2ofthisPCMwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthissupplementwillnotrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecification.Supplement4providesengineeringanddesignformodificationstoadditionalsnubbersasaresultofInserviceInspectionsfindings.Theoriginalpipestressanalysis&pipesupportdesignhasnotbeenmodifiedforthisPC/M.TheimplementationofthissupplementdoesnotchangethepreviousconclusionthatTechnicalSpecificationSection3.7.10andtables3.7-2aor3.7-2brequiremodification.ThismodificationrequiresachangetoPlantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10,whichmustbeincludedinthenextLicenseAmendmentrequest.Thesafetyeva'luationhasshown,thatthemodificationsincludedinRevision4ofthisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Basedonthese'points,itisconcludedthatpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.Thissupplementhasnoadverseimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.TheimplementationofthisPC/MwillrequireachangetoPlantTechnicalSpecification.'SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)ifthe~robabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybe.increased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.ThisEPisformodificationofexistingrestraintstoeitherreplacesnubbersof'onemanufacturerwiththatofthesameorlargersizeandloadratingfromadifferentmanufacturerortoreplaceexisting'restraintcomponentswithadifferentdesign.ThisisrequiredtoresolverestraintanomaliesfoundduringtheInserviceInspectionoftherestraints.Thismodificationaffectssafetyrelatedpipingsystems.Accordingly,thismodificationisclassifiedassafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthefollowingarethebasisforthisjustification:

PCM027-187(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincetherestraintsystemsforthepipingwillremainfunctionallyidenticaltoexistingconfiguration.Inaddition,sincetherestraintconfigurationisnotchangedallpreviousanalysisconclusionsarestillvalid.(ii)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyin,thesafety.analysisreportisnotcreatedbecause,nochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesignofeitherthesnubbersortherestraintsand,thesystemremainsfunctionallyidenticaltotherequirementsspecifiedintheexistingstressanlaysisofrecord.(iii)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythismodificationbecausethereplacementcomponentsutilizedperformthesamerestrainingfunctionasthosetheyreplace.TheimplementationofthisPCMwillrequireachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationassnubbershavebeenremovedfromTable3.7-2bandaddedtoTable3.7-2aofthe'PlantTechnicalSpecification3.7.10.:ThesafetyrelatedsnubberforrestraintMarkNoRC-247-H3isrequiredtobeaddedtoTable3.7-2b.Asperthefootnoteofthesetables,snubbersmaybeaddedtoorremovedfromsafetyrelatedsystemswithoutpriorLicenseAmendmenttothesetablesprovidedarevisiontoTables3.7-2aand3.7-2bareincludedwiththe"nextLicenseAmendmentrequest.

PGM028-187REPLACEMENTOFRWTNOZZLEFORLINEI-3"-CS-46Th1sEngineeringPackage(EP)providesthedesignforthereplacementoftheRefuelingWaterTank(RWT)nozzlefor-lineI-3"-CS-46.-Theexistingnozzlehasextensivepittingandcorrosion,therefore1twasconsideredadvisibletoreplaceit.ThisEPisclassifiedasnuclearsafetyrelatedsinceitrepairsasafetyrelatedpieceofequipment.Thesafetyevaluat1onhasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstituteanyunreviewedsafetyquetsions,"nordoesitrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.Therefore,priorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementtionofthisPCM.ThisEPhasnoadverseimpactonnuclearplantsafetyandoperation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(1)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or{ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginof'safetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspec1ficationisreduced.Thismodificationreplacesa3inchnozzleintheRWTwithanidenticalnozzleexceptfortheweldingdetailwhichisequivalentbutnotidentical.ThisweldingdetailminimizesradiationexposurebyreducingweldingrequirementsinsidetheRWT.ThemodificationincludedinthisEngineeringPackageisconsideredtobesafetyrelatedanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:(1)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunct1onofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethereplacementofthenozzlevillnot.impactthequantityofwatersuppliestothechargingpumps'ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedsincenochangeshavebeenmadetotheoperationaldesign-oftheRUTandthenewnozzleisequivalentindesign.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecification.ImplementationofthisPCMdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),themittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPCMisnotrequired.

PCN032-187PRESSURIZERSURGELINESAMPLEVALVE(V1210)REPLACENHNTABSTRACTExistingpressurizersurgelinesamplevalveV1210isleaking,hasadamagedvalvestemandcannotberepaired.TnevalvewillbereplacedwithanewvalveoriginallyprocuredforUnit2forsimilarservice.TheReactorCoolantSystemandSamplingSysteminwhich~isvalveislocatedinsafetyrelated.Accordingly,thisEngineeringPackageisclassi.fiedasnuclearsafetyrelated.Thesafetyevaluationhasshownthat'thisEPdoesnotaconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.ThisEPneitherreducesthemarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification,norhasanyimpactontheplantsafetyandoperation.SAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpzeviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.Thissafetyrelatedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbecause:i)'heprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccident~rmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportismotincreased.Thereplacementvalvehasthesamequalificationforthelocationandserviceonthevalvewhichitreplaces.Totalfailureofthereplacementvalvewillresultinthesameconsequencesorthetotalfailureoftheexistingvalve.Totalfailuzeofthisvalvewillcauseasmalllossofcoolantwhichislimitedbyaorificetobelessthanthecapacityofasinglechargingpump.ThisconditioniswithintheexistingFSARAnalyses-ii)Thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.Thismodificationdoesnotchangethesystemfunctionordesign.Thismodificationisthereplacementofavalvewithasimilarbutnotidenticalvalve.Thefailuremodeofthisvalvewillbeidenticalwiththeexistingvalveand,asstatedabove,iswithintheFSARanlaysesiii)ThemarginofsafetyisdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythismodificationsincethevalveinvolveddoesnotformthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.

PCM032-187eTheimplementationofthisPQfdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovides.thebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalforimplementationofthisP(Hisnotrequired.

-87CONDENSEROUTLETTUBESHEET.ANDWATERBOXCOATINGS8ACTThisengineeringpackageaddress"theadditionofanepoxycoatingtothetothecondenseroutlettubesheetsandwaterboxes.Thismodificationwillenhancethecorrosionresistanceofthetubesheetsandwaterboxesandallowreductionofthecathodicprotectionsystempotentialsandcurrentdensities.Thecondensersandtheplantcirculatingwatersystemareclassifiedasnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedandtherefore,themodificationaddressedinthisengineeringdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Furthermore,theadditionofaprotectivecoatingtothecondenseroutlettubesheetsandwaterboxesdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.AFVALATINAsnotedinFSAR.Sections9.2.3and10A.5,thecondensersandcirculatingwatersystemperformnonuclearsafetyrelatedfunction.Afailuremodeevaluationoftheproposedcondenseroutlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshasdeterminedthereisnopotentialforinteractionwithequipmentorfunctionsimportanttonuclearsafety.Accordingly,themodificationaddressedbythisengineeringpackageis"classifiedasnonnuclearsafetyrelated.Basedontheaboveevaluationandinformationsuppliedinthedesignanalysis,ithasbeendemonstratedthatanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedby10CFR50.59doesnotexist.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased.Sincethereisnopotentialforinteractionbetweenthemodificationaddressedbythisengineeringpackageandequipmentoffunctionsimportanttosafety,previoussafetyanalysisrepor;evaluationsrelatedtosafetyremainunaffected.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctiondifferentthanthosepreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreated.nNonewaccidentsormalfunctionsassociatedwiththefailureofthecondenseroutlettubesheetandwaterboxcoatingshavebeencreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationhasnotbeenreduced.Sincethereisnopotentialforinteractionbetweenthemodificationaddressedbythisengineeringpackageandequipmentorfunctionsimportanttosafety,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinanyTechnicalSpecificationremainsunaffected.conclusion,themodificationproposedinthisengineeringpackageisacceptablefromstandpointofnuclearsafety,doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoes=otrequireachangetoanyTechnicalSpecifications.Accordingly,NRCapprovalpriortoimplementationisnotrequired.

PCM035-187REPLACEMENTOFRAYCHEMSPLICESANDCONAXCONDUITSEALSABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackagecoversmodificationstotheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociatedwiththesafetyrelatedinstrumentslistedintheEnvironmentalQualificationListfor10CFR50.49andlocatedintheReactorContainmentBuilding.ThisEngineeringPackagewillprovidetheengineeringand'esign'details'equiredtoimplementthereplacementofthebox'esthatareusedforsplicingtheConaxconduitsealpigtailcabletotheplantcableandreplacementofRaychemsplicesattheboxesandtheElectricalPenetrationAssemblies.Thema]orityofinstrumentslistedinAttachment7.4andtheirassociatedsplicesandconduitsealsareclassifiedasClass1E,areseismicallyqualifiedandperformasafetyrelatedfunction.AlltheinstrumentslistedinAttachment7.4arerequiredforplantsafeshutdown.Therefore,this'EPisconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.ThisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthemodificationsdescribedwerereviewedinaccordancewith10CFR50.59anddeterminedtohavenoadverseimpactonplantoperationsorsafetyrelatedequipment.TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecification.FThischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.Supplement1incorporatesadditionalsafetyrelatedinstruments,theirassociatedEquipmentQualificationDocumentationPackageandtheremovaloftheholdpointsforEquipmentQualificationDocumentat'ionPackagesfortheRaychemsplicesandtheConaxconduitseals.Theadditionalequipment,EQDocumentationPackageandremovalofholdpoints,doesnotaffecttheoriginalsafetyevaluation,exceptfortheremovaloftheholdpoints.Supplement2revisesattachment7.4andincorporatesdetaildrawingsfortheRaychemsplices.ThisadditionalinformationcompletesthemodificationscoveredinthisEPanddoesnotaffecttheconclusionsoftheoriginalsafetyevaluation.SafetyEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisreduced.

ThisEngineeringPackageprovidesthespliceinspectioncriteriaandtheengineeringanddesigndetailstoimplement,asrequired,thereplacementofspliceboxesandsplices.TheimplementationofthisEngineeringPackageincreasestheavailabilityoftheequipmentduringsafeshutdownconditionsbyimprovingthereliabilityofthesplicesattheequipmentandpenetration.Thismod'ificationshallbeimplementedprior.toenteringNode4.Theequipment,listedinAttachment7.4.1and7.4.3,whoseassociatedboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesneedreplacement,performsafetyrelatedfunctionswithinthevariousplantsystemsandaredesignedforoperationunderconditionsthatcouldbe'mposedbyaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThepowerandcontrolterminationsfortheequipmentlistedinAttachment7.4.2,thoughnon-safetyinnature,couldhaveanadverseaffectonthesafetyrelatedterminationsduetothehighenergylevelsassociatedwiththesenon-safetycircuits.Therefore,thesenon-safetycircuits(withtheexceptionoflowenergyannunciatorcircuitsandcircuitsid'entifiedviaFPLletterJPE-PSL-87-0787dated3/20/87),whichcouldbeenergizedfollowingaLOCAevent,havebeenprovidedwithsplicesorconnectors(asperChapter3,Section3.11.5.4ofthe'SAR),whicheffectivelyeliminatedthepotentialforadverseinteractionbetweensafetyandnon-safetyrelatedterminationsbyeliminatingthehighenergycircuitsfromtheharshLOCAenvironment.ThisEPhasbeenclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.Basedonthepreceeding,thefollowingconclusionscanbemade:I(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased,sincethemodificationstotheboxesand/orconduitsealsandsplicesassociatedwiththeequipmentlistedinAttachment7.4enhancestheoperabilityoftheequipmentinaharshenvironmentpostDBA.(ii)Asaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibilityforaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.Thismodificationaltersassociatedcomponentsofaccidentmitigatingequipmenttoenhancetheiroperation.Existingaccuracieswithrespecttocontrolormonitoringfunctionsoftheinstrumentationloops,undermodification,willnotbeaffectedbythischange.Thereisnointroductionofanynewfailuremodefortheequipment.(iii)ThismodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.ThesafetyfunctionthatiscontrolledbythevariousapplicableTechnicalSpecificationsismaintainedbythischange.Theproposeddesignensuresthattheequipmentwillfunctionasassumedduringanaccident.ThusthemarginofsafetyprovidedbytheTechnicalSpecificationsispreserved.

PCM035-187TheimplementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecification.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PCM044-187MSCVDISKNUTLOCKINGPLATEMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisEngineeringPackage(EP)istoreplacethelockingwasherandnutoneachMainSteamChelkValve(MSCV)diskstudwithanewlockingplateandnut.Theexistinglockingwasherdesignhasbeenadequateinservicebutisshowingsomewearindicatingthatreplacementwould'berequiredpriortotheendofthevalvedesignlife.Thenewlockingdevicewillprovideanenhancedmethodoflockingthenutandwillprecludethepossibilityofthenutrotatingand.allowingthedisktobecomeloose.ThevalvesconsideredinthisEPareintheMainSteamSystem.ThissystemisdesignatedasnuclearsafetyrelatedandseismicallyqualifiedontheASMESectionXICodeBoundarydrawings,andthereforethismodificationisclassifiedas'afetyrelated.ThesafetyevaluationhasshownthatthisEPdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorNRCapprovalisnotrequiredforimplementation.TheimplementationofthisEPwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.SafetEvaluationWithrespecttoTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulation,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion;(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybecreated;or(iii)&fthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificatgnisreduced.83>j~~ThemodificationsincludedinthisEngineeringPackageareforthereplacementofthelockingdeviceontheMSCVdisk/taillinkconn'ection.Thetwo(2)valvesaffectedareintheMainSteamSystem.Basedontheabovedescription,themodificatinincluded.inthisEngineeringPackage(EP)isconsideredtobesafetyrelated.ThisEPdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,andthefollowingarebasesforthisjustification:i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedsincethemodificationwilleliminatethepossibilityofthevalves'iskbecomingloosefromthemount.Accordingly,themodificationensuresreliableoperationofthevalvesandconsequentlyof'thesysteminwhichtheyareinstalled.

PCM044"187ii)Asaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethar.a..yevaluatedbecausethemodificationissimplytorepoftnevavewithacomponentwithahigherlevelofinthevalve.Nochangesaremadetotheopera'nasysteminwhichtnemodificationismade.il'yforanpreviouslyace2componetconservatismdes'gnoftneiii)Thismodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdef'nedinthebasisfo=anyTechnicalSpeci~icationbecauseitneitne"changesthedesignparameterorthelockingdevceno.doesitchangethesystemdesignfloworfunctionalrequiremets.TheimplementationofthisP'QIdoesnotrequi,reachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthMchangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPQfisnotrequired.

PC/MNo.046-187REACTORCONTAINMENTBUILDINGTELESCOPINGJIBCRANESEISMICRESTRAINTSABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageisbeingissuedinresponsetothecommitmentmadeinthedispositiontoplantNCR1-099.ThispackageaddressesthemodificationoftheseismicrestraintsontheReactorContainmentBuilding(RCB)TelescopingJibCraneanddoesnotconstituteanewdesign.Thespecifiedsliphookswouldnotengagetheexistingrestraintpadeyes.Theseismicrestraintsaredesignedtoholdthecraneinplaceduringadesignbasisearthquake.Thisengineeringpackagewilldocumentthedesignchangeandwillprovideguidelinesforestablishingamaintenanceproceduretoassurereinstallationoftheseismicrestraintsattheendofeachoutage.ThemodificationoftheseismicrestraintswascompletedunderthedispositiontoNCR1-099.Thejibcraneseismicrestraintsdonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedsincethereisapotentialthatduringaseismiceventthetelescopingjibcranecouldinteractwithsafety-relateditemsthatareinthevicinity.QualityRelatedrequirementsareappliedtothismodification.TheimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecifications.Thismodificationdoesnotaffectplantoperationsorsafety.ThisPC/MdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthereforedoesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.SAFETYEVALUATIONSafetAnalsisInresponsetoNCR1&99,thisengineeringpackageaddressesthemodificationoftheRCBTelescopingJibCraneseismicrestraints.Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theseismicrestraintsdonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedsystemorfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedasQualityRelatedsincefailureoftheseismicrestraintsduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.earthquake)couldpotentiallyaffectsafetymelatedsystemsorequipmentsincethejibcraneislocatedintheRCB.Consequently,therevisedrestraintshavebeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditionsspecifiedintheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrequirementshavebeenimplemented,thusassuringtheintegrityoftheinstallation.0095L'/0018L PCM087-187CODEBOUNDARYDRAWINGREVISIONCodeboundarydrawing8770-G-090isrevised/expandedto30sheetstoincludeallnuclearsafetyrelatedsystems.Thenewdrawingswillfacilitatetestingandexaminationunderthe"inserviceinspection-tenyearplan."Nounreviewedsafetyquestionsexistasdefinedby10CFR50.59,andnoTechnicalSpecificationsareimpactedbythismodification..Therefore,priorcommissionapprovalisnotrequired.NUCLEARSAFETYEVALUATIONCHECKLISTThewrittenevaluationoftheproposeddesignchangetodemonstratethatthechangedoesnotaltertheplantsdesignbasisandisboundedbythedesignanalysesisattachedtotheDesignEquivalentEngineeringPackage.Theanswersbelowaresupportedbythisevaluation.TYPEOFCHANGEYesNoxYesNoXYesNoYes.NoxAchange.totheplantasdescribedintheFSAR?AchangetoproceduresasdescribedintheFSAR?AtestorexperimentnotdescribedintheFSAR?~Achangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications?EFFECTOFCHANGEYesNoYesNoYesNoXYesNoXYesNoXYesNoX'esNoXWilltheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?WilltheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?MaythepossibilityofanaccidentwhichisdifferentthananyalreadyevaluatedintheFSARbecreated?WilltheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?WilltheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbeincreased?MaythepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetydifferentthananyalreadyevaluatedintheFSARbecreated?Willthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasestoanytechnicalspecificationbereduced'?

PCM097-187TECHNICALSUPPORTCENTERBLOCKWALLNO207AMODIFICATIONABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageaddressestheinstallationofastatusboardintheTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC),locatedatElev.62.00intheReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB).Theboardwillbeattachedtoamasonryblockwallandwillbeusedduringemergencydrillsandplantoperation,Theboardandwalldonotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedsincethereisapotentialforthewalltointeractwithsafetyrelateditems.Qual-tyRelatedrequirementsareappliedtothismodification.The..mpiementationofthisPC'Mdoesmod,reauireachanget.oolan~2hnca'peci:catons.Tnismodifcationdoesnot"fctplantoperationsorsafey.ThsPC.'2does..otconstituteanunre:iewedsafetyquestionandthereforedoesnotrequirepriorNRCapprovalsSAFETYEVALUATIONWithrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedto.involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentor-malfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslycalculatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Thestatusboardandmasonryblockwall207Adonotperformoraffectanysafety-relatedsystemorfunction.However,thisPC/Misclassifiedasqualityrelatedsincefailureofthewallduringadesignbasisevent(e.g.,earthquake)couldpotentiallyaffectsafety-relatedsystemsorequipment.Consequently,thewallhasbeenanalyzedforthedesignbasisconditionsspecifiedintheFUSARandQualityRelateddesignrquirementshavebeenimplemented,thusassuringtheintegrityoftheinstallation.Themodif'cationsincludedinthisPC/Mdonotinvolveanyunrev=ewedsafetyouestionsbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccideptormalfunctionofequipmentimportantto'afetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentreouiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

PCM097-187(ii)Thereisnopossibilitvforanaccidntormal'func.ionofadifferenttypethar.arypreviouslyevaluatedsincethestatusboardandmasonryblockwallperformnosafety.unctionandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperationaldesign.Failureofthewallcouldnotoccursincethemodificationhasbeenanalyzdforthedsignbasisconditions.(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotchangethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachange~toplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,per10CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandpriorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

PGM108-187TURBINEGANTRYCRANEMAINSHEAVENESTUPGRADEABSTRACTThisengineeringpackageisbeingissuedinresponsetoREASLN-S7-(Later).Thispackagewillprovidetheengineeringdocumentationrequiredformodificationstotheturbinegantrycranemainsheave-nest.Themodificationsarerequiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.TheturbinegantrycraneisclassifiedasNon-NuclearSafetyRelated.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedQualityRelatedtoprovideQ.C.inspectionofcriticalloadbearingweldsandassurerealignmentofthesheavenestshaft.Asafetyevaluationandfailuremodeevaluationhasdeterminedthatthemodificationsaddressedinthispackagedonotconstitute'anunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefiredin10CFR50,59.Furhermore,theimplementationofthisPC/Mdoesnotrequireachangeoplanttechnicalspec"ficatonsanddoesnotaffectplantoperationsorsafety.Basedontheabove,implementationofthisPC/MdoesnotrequirepriorNRCapproval.SAFETYEVALUATIONThispackageaddressestheturbinegantrycranemainsheavenestsupportplatemodificationsandsheavenestshaftreplacementrequiredbecauseofbearingfailuresonatleasttwosheaves.Withrespecttotitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations,Part50.59,aproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:(i)iftheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportmaybeincreased;or(ii)ifthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyreportmaybecreated;or(iii)ifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Theturbinegantrycranedoesnotperformoraffectanysafetyrelatedsystemorfunction.However,thisPC/MisclassifiedasQualityRelatedtoensureQ.C.inspectionoftheinstallation.Themodificationsincludedjnthi"PC/Mdonotinvolveanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsbecause:(i)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsecuencesofanaccidntormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedisnotincreasedsincethismodificationwillhavenoeffectonequipmentrequiredtoshutdowntheplantandmonitortheplantinasafeshutdownconditipn.(ii)Thereisnopossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanaryprviouslsevaluatedsincetheturbinegan.rycranedoesnotperformanysafetyfun"-onandnochangeshavebeenmadetoanyoperationaldesign.

PCM108-187(iii)Thismodificationdoesnotch=".gthemarginofsa.etyasdefinedinthebasis'oranytec'."",iclspecificatior.becausetheturbinegantrycraneisnotaddressedbyanytechnicalspecification.TheimplementationofthisPC/i8doesnotrequireachangtoplanttechnicalspecifications.Theforegoingconstitutes,perl0CFR50.59(b),thewrittensafetyevaluationwhichprovidesthebasesthatthschangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Furthermore,theimplementationofthisPC/t1doesnotrequireachangetoplanttechnicalspecifications.Basedontheabove,priorCommissionapprovalfortheimplementationofthisPC/Misnotrequired.

STLUCIEUNIT1CYCLE8SAFETYANALYSISREVIEWINTROOUCTIONTheSt.LucreUnit1Cycle8SafetyAnalysiswasperformdsupportoperationwith133assembliesofBatchHandalongwith84freshBatchKnaturaluraniumaxialblanketassemblies.ThirtysixoftheBatchKassembliescontainnobtrrnableabsorberrods,24assembliescontaineight4w/oGd203rods,andtheremainingBatchKassembliescontain484C-A1203rodsinadditiontoeightgadoliniabearin'grods.Thebottom.3.04inchesofthefuelrodiscomposedofalonglircaloyendcap'inordertoreducethepossibilityofdebrisrelatedfue'1rodfailures.ATechnicalSpecificationamendmentforthelongendcapchangewasissuedandis.foundinReference5.Inadditiontothischange,thereloadfuelischaracterizedbyanimprovedspacerspringdesignand,inthetopandbottomspacers,by'theadditionofbackupdimplesinthespacerperipheralrodcells.TheCycle8energyrequirementis10390EFPH,basedonane'nd-of-cycle7.burnupof9300EFPH.SAFETYEVALUATION'TheCycle':8SARcoversthefuelmanagement,fueldesignandev'atuationofthephysics.characteristies,shutdownmargib'alculations,powerdistributionsandpeakingfactorsthroughoutthecycle.CorePhysicshasperformed1)adetailedreviewofthevendor'smethodsandneutroniccalculations2)anindependentverificationofthevendorresultsbycomparingtheSARreportedphysicsparameterstothosecalcula'tedwiththecoremodelsgeneratedbytheCorePhysicsGroupdocumentedinReference6and,3)acomparisonofcalculatedvaluestotheplantTechnicalSpecificationsinregardstolimitingpowe~peakingfactors,moderatortemperaturecoefficients,shutdownmarginandlinearheatrates.Basedontheresultsoftheaforementionedevaluation,itcanbeconcludedthat:Ia)Thevendor'sphysicsdatawascalculatedwithapprovedmethodsanddocumented'satisfactorily.b)FPL'sindependentcorephysicsmodelsareinreasonableagreementwiththevendor'sresults,andc)Thecycle8reloaddesignmeetstheTechnicalSpecificationLimitswithregardstoFr,Fxy,HTC,minimumre'quiredshutdownmarginandmaximumlinearheatrate.

Sh2oBasedonprojectedburnups,5assemblies(4BatchH-IandIBatchH-4)willexceedthecurrentlyanalyzedmechanica1andradiologicaldesignlimitsof44,500NMO/NTUpriortotheend-of-cycle8.Themostlimitingofthesea'ssemblieswi11reachaburnupof44,500MMD/HTUat9450EFPHcycleexposure.Ananalysistoextendthemechanicalandradiologicalburnuplimitbeyondthecurrent,valuewillbeperformedpriortothattime.Asaresult,operationofcycle8withtheseassembliesinthecoredoesnotconstituteasafetyconcernupto9450EFPHandprovidedtheaforementionedanalysisiscompletedpriortothatcycleexposure'ndsho'ws.acceptableresults,wperationbeyond9450EFPHwillnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Asnotedintheintroduction,thereloadfueldesignincorporatesminormodificationstothefueldesignusedinCycle7.Theendcapinthereloadfuelislengthenedfrom0.4inchesto3.04incheswhiletheactivefuellengthisreducedbythesameamount,thereforemaintainingtheoveralllengthof.therod.ThischangehasbeenpreviouslyevaluatedandwasapprovedbytheNRC(Reference5).Thereloadfuelalsoincorporatesanimprovedspacerspringdesignandspacerbackupdimpleshavebeenaddedtothetopandbottomspacerperipheralcells.Theeffectofthesechangeshasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtohavenoadverseimpactrelativetothefueldesignbasis.TheCycle8safetyevaluationdemonstratedthatthesechangesareboundedbypre.vi.ousanalyses.TheSt.LucieUnitICycle8SafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)(ReferenceI),presentstheevaluationofthereloadcharacteristicswithrespecttothesafetyanalysispresentedforCycle6(Reference2)whichservesasthereferencecyc1e.Thebasi'softhesafetyanalysisforCycle8isthesameasthatusedforCycle6withtheexceptionoftheLocalPowerDensity(LPO)versusAxialShapeIndex(ASI)LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO).ThepeakpowerdensityduringCycle8couldincreaseoverthatassumedinthereferenceanalysessothatitisnecessarytolimitthemaximumpowerlevelwhenrelyingontheex-coredetectorsfordeterminationofthepeaklinearheatrate.AproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangewillreducethefractionofmaximumallowablepowerfrom0.88to0.85whenthein-c'oredetectorsareinoperable.TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangehasbeensubmittedtotheNRCperL-86-510datedDecember18,1986.NRCapprovalisexpectedbyFebruary28,1987.UntilapprovalofthisTechnicalSpecificationchange,thisSafetyEvaluationisonlyapplicableforreactoroperationupto40KratedpowerwhenthisTechnicalSpecificationisapplicable.Uponapprova1ofthisTechnica1Specif'icationchange,poweroperationabove40Kratedpowerupto100KratedpowerfortheSt.LucieUnit1Cycle8re1oadcoreisacceptableandwillnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

'SoThe.St.LucieUnit1Cycle8SARpresentstheevaluationandreviewoftheChapter15eventsforthereloadcore.FPLhasreviewedtheSARandhasdeterminedthatCycle8isboundedbytheresultsoftheanalysispresented'orCycle6withtheexceptionoftheReactorCoolantPumpRotorSeizureandtheCEAEjectionAccidentswhichwerere-evaluatedandre-analyzedrespectivelyandarepresentedintheSAR.TheReactorCoolantPump(RCP)RotorSeizurewasevaluatedto.assesstheeffectsofminorfueldesignchangesandincreased.axialpowerpeakingonthepercentoffueltoexperienceDAB.PressurecharacteristicsarenotaffectedbythesechangesandtheresultsareboundedbytheCycle6analysis.TheresultsoftheevaluationshowthatthepercentoffuelpredictedtoexperienceDNBiswellbelowthe10%,limitingcriteria.Off-sitedoseratesareasmallfractionof10CFR100doseguidelinesandareboundedbytheresultsofanalysispresentedinReference4.TheCEAEjectioneventwasreanalyzedusingthegenericallyapprovedmethodology(Reference3)andresultsshowsignificantmargintothelimitingcriteria.SincealltheeventshavebeenreviewedandprovedacceptableitcanbestatedthatforCycle8:tTheprobabi'1ityofoccurrenceor.the'consequencesofanac'cidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe,safetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfigurationoftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadverselyaffectthemechanicalintegritynorsignificantlychangethecoolantflowcharacteristicsthroughthecore.Themodeofoperationoftheplantremainsunchanged.Therefore,theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunction.ofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotimpacted.ThesafetyanalysisperformedfortheCycle8reloadcoredemonstratesthattheconsequencesof.an'accidentormalfunctionhavenotbeenincreasedbeyondthoseevaluatedinthepreviousanalyses.Apossibi1ityforanaccidentormalfunctionofa.differenttypethananypreviouslyanalyzedinthesafetyanalysisisnotcreated.

Sh4of4TheCycle8reloaddoesnotchangetheoverallconfigurationoftheplant.Theminorchangesinfueldesigndonotadverselyaffectthemechanicalintegritynorsignificantly.changethecoolantflowcharacteristicsthroughthecore.Themodeof'perationoftheplantremainsunchanged.Therefor'e,anewaccidentorequipmentmalfunctionhasnotbeencreated.iii.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforeveryTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced.There-evaluationoftheRCPRotors.eizureandthere-analysisoftheCEAEjectionaccidentshaveshownthattheresultsarewell'ithinthedesignbasis.Allothereventshavebeendeterminedto'beboundedbypreviousanalyses.Therefore,thereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnicalSpecificatiorlbasisforoperationofCycle8upto40K,ratedpower.WiththeproposedchangeintheLPOLCOimplemented,.thereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafetyrelativetotheTechnicalSpecificationbasisforoperationofCycle8uptolOOXratedpower.ConclusionIAsperFederalRegulation10CFR50.59(b),theaboveSafetyEvaluationprovidesthebasistoconcludethattheCycle8reloadconfigurationdoesnotinvolveanychangeswhichintroduceanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Therefore,implementationofthischangeispermissiblewithoutpriorNRCapproval..

@@ Line 26: / Line 26: @@
 ==1.5CONCLUSION==
-SOnthebasisoftheevaluationsandinformationpresentedinthisreport,plusoperatingexperiencewithhighdensityfuelstorageatStLucieUnit2andTurkeyPointUnit3,FPLconcludesthattheproposedmodificationofStLucieUnitNo.1spentfuelstoragefacilitiesprovidessafespentfuelstorage,andthatthemodificationiscong~tentwiththefacilitydesignandoperatingcriteriaasprovidedintheFSARandoperatinglicense.1.6REFERENCESStLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperatingLicensesDPR67,DocketNo.50-335.2~FPLletterL-86-250datedJuly2,1986.3~NuclearRegulatoryCommission,LettertoAllPowerReactorLicensees,fromB.K.Grimes,April14,1978,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.StLuciePlantUnitNo.1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.1-20076L/0011L 4Jg~l!,I 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1EXISTINGRACKSThespentfuelpoolatSt.LucieUnit1presentlycontainsspentfuelassemblystoragerackswhicharedesignedtoprovidestoragelocationsforupto728fuelassemblies.Theracksaredesignedtomaintainthestoredfuelinasafe,eoolable,andsubcriticalconfigurationduringnormalandabnormalconditions.Thepresentstorageracksarearectangulararraycomposedof14modules.Eachstoragerackmoduleisselfsupportingandrestsonstainlesssteelpads.Thepresentracksarefreestandinginthattheyareneitherboltednorweldedtothefloor,noraretheyattachedtothepoolwalls.Theinterfacewiththepoolboundariesisdesignedtotransfernormalandshearloadsviatheracksupportsintothepoolbottomslab.Eachfuelassemblystoragemoduleiscomposedofrectangularstoragecavitiesfabricatedfromone-quarterinchthickstainlesssteelplate,witheachcavitycapableofacceptingonefuelassembly.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitieshavelead-insurfacesatthetoptoprovideguidanceforinsertionoffuelassemblies.Thecavitiesareopenatthetopandbottomtoprovideaflowpathforconvectivecoolingofspentfuelassembliesthroughnaturalcirculation.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitiesareconnectedbyachevrongridstructuretoformmoduleswhichlimitstructuraldeformationsandmaintainanominalcenter-to-centerspacingof12.53inchesbetweenadjacentstoragecavitiesduringdesignconditionsincludingseismic.ForfurtherinformationontheexistingspentfuelstorageracksseeSection9.1.2intheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.2.2NEWHIGHDENSITYRACKSThenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracksconsistofindividualcellswith8.65inchby8.65inch(nominal)squarecross-section,eachofwhichaccommodatesasingleCombustionEngineeringorExxonPWRfuelassemblyorequivalent,fromeitherSt.LucieUnit1orUnit2.Atotalof1706cellsarearrangedin17distinctmodulesofvaryingsizesintworegions.Region1isdesignedforstorageofnewfuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235.Region1isalsodesignedtostorefuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235thathavenotachievedadequateburnupforRegion2.TheRegion2cellsarecapableofaccommodatingfuelassemblieswithvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithinanacceptableboundasdiscussedinthisreport.Forexample,correspondingto4.5and4.0percentinitialenrichments,theminimumrequiredburn-upsforsafestorageinRegion2are36.5and30.9MWD/KgU,respectively.Figure2-1showsthearrangementoftherackmodulesinthespentfuelpool.Thehighdensityracksareengineeredtoachievethedualobjectiveofmaximumprotectionagainststructuralloadings(arisingfromgroundmotion,thermalstresses,etc.)'andthemaximizationofavailablestoragelocations.Ingeneral,agreaterwidth-to-heightaspectratioprovidesgreatermarginagainstrigidbodytipping.Hence,themodulesaremadeaslargeaspossiblewithintheconstraintsoftransportationandsitehandlingcapabilities.2-10076L/0011L tty,gW"f AsshowninFigure2-1,there-are17discretemodulesarrangedinthefuelpool.Eachrackmoduleisequipped(seeFigures2-2and2-3)withgirdlebars,3/4-inchthickby3-1/2incheshigh.Thenominalgapbetweenadjacentmodulewallsis1-1/2inches.Themodulesmakesurfacecontactbetweentheircontiguouswallsatthegirdlebarlocationsandthusmaintainaspecifiedgapbetweenthecellwalls.Table2-1givestherelevantdesigndataoneachregion.Themodulesinthetworegionsareofeightdifferenttypes.Tables2-2and2-3summarizethephysicaldataforeachmoduletype.ThepoisoninRegions1and2isBoraflex.Theuseofthisabsorbermaterialistoprecludeinadvertentcriticality.0076L/0011L2-2Revision1 TABLE2-1DESIGNDATARegionMin.B-10FluxTrapCellPitchLoadingGap(nominalinch)(arealdensity)(nominalinch)10.128.86.020gm/cm.007gm/cm21.120.02-30076L/0011L TABLE2-2TABLEOFMODULEDATAMODULEI.D.NO.OFMODULESNO.OFCELLSINNWDIRECTIONNO.OFCELLSINEWDIRECTIONTOTALNO.OFCELLSPERMODULERegion1AlandA281Region1BlandB21090Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2131311710488Region2Fl1296-Region2GlandG2Region2*Hl121310896*Cellsmissinginthismoduleduetosparger.RefertoFigure2-1.0076L/0011LRevision1 TABLE2-3MODULEDIMENSIONSANDWEIGHTMODULEI.D.NOMINALCROSS%ECTION+DIMENSIONSN-SEWESTIMATEDDRYWEIGHT(lbs)PERMODULERegion1AlandA290-1/4"90-1/4"26,700Region1BlandB290-1/4"100-7/16"29,800Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2Region2FlRegion2GlandG2Region2Hl115-11/16"80-1/6"97-7/8"71-3/16"106-3/4"71-3/16"106-3/4"80-1/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"24,10021,500187200190800.22,300190800*Excludinggirdlebars0076L/0011LRevision1 U~,V')~U,UU N~-413/1B"REF78'8.7/8"~~87.7/8"~i444"(37-0")111/8"REF.CrrCC7crrCLUJC'C7LrrCC7rcrr8CASKAREAEl11x8E211x8Hl13x8-4x20113x8COrAl9x9REGION1A29x9REGION1CtCSCJ7Crr7cbCC7G112x9C113x9C213x9ll0CIll0C0C/7r~C0OQmmcrrez--IG)C~xz~O0zMC/7OXcrrErrcr7O4COcbCC7CC7r819x10REGION1G212x9C313x9C413x9Fl12x8D213x8D313x8B29x10REGION11~1/2"1~1/2"~106.3/4"~~115.11/16"115.11/16"90-1/4"51/255/8"REFCOTrC)COCC7r
+SOnthebasisoftheevaluationsandinformationpresentedinthisreport,plusoperatingexperiencewithhighdensityfuelstorageatStLucieUnit2andTurkeyPointUnit3,FPLconcludesthattheproposedmodificationofStLucieUnitNo.1spentfuelstoragefacilitiesprovidessafespentfuelstorage,andthatthemodificationiscong~tentwiththefacilitydesignandoperatingcriteriaasprovidedintheFSARandoperatinglicense.
+==1.6REFERENCES==
+StLucieUnitNo.1FacilityOperatingLicensesDPR67,DocketNo.50-335.2~FPLletterL-86-250datedJuly2,1986.3~NuclearRegulatoryCommission,LettertoAllPowerReactorLicensees,fromB.K.Grimes,April14,1978,"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"asamendedbytheNRCletterdatedJanuary18,1979.StLuciePlantUnitNo.1UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,DocketNo.50-335.1-20076L/0011L 4Jg~l!,I 2.0SUMMARYOFRACKDESIGN2.1EXISTINGRACKSThespentfuelpoolatSt.LucieUnit1presentlycontainsspentfuelassemblystoragerackswhicharedesignedtoprovidestoragelocationsforupto728fuelassemblies.Theracksaredesignedtomaintainthestoredfuelinasafe,eoolable,andsubcriticalconfigurationduringnormalandabnormalconditions.Thepresentstorageracksarearectangulararraycomposedof14modules.Eachstoragerackmoduleisselfsupportingandrestsonstainlesssteelpads.Thepresentracksarefreestandinginthattheyareneitherboltednorweldedtothefloor,noraretheyattachedtothepoolwalls.Theinterfacewiththepoolboundariesisdesignedtotransfernormalandshearloadsviatheracksupportsintothepoolbottomslab.Eachfuelassemblystoragemoduleiscomposedofrectangularstoragecavitiesfabricatedfromone-quarterinchthickstainlesssteelplate,witheachcavitycapableofacceptingonefuelassembly.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitieshavelead-insurfacesatthetoptoprovideguidanceforinsertionoffuelassemblies.Thecavitiesareopenatthetopandbottomtoprovideaflowpathforconvectivecoolingofspentfuelassembliesthroughnaturalcirculation.Thefuelassemblystoragecavitiesareconnectedbyachevrongridstructuretoformmoduleswhichlimitstructuraldeformationsandmaintainanominalcenter-to-centerspacingof12.53inchesbetweenadjacentstoragecavitiesduringdesignconditionsincludingseismic.ForfurtherinformationontheexistingspentfuelstorageracksseeSection9.1.2intheStLucieUnitNo.1updatedFSAR.2.2NEWHIGHDENSITYRACKSThenewhighdensityspentfuelstorageracksconsistofindividualcellswith8.65inchby8.65inch(nominal)squarecross-section,eachofwhichaccommodatesasingleCombustionEngineeringorExxonPWRfuelassemblyorequivalent,fromeitherSt.LucieUnit1orUnit2.Atotalof1706cellsarearrangedin17distinctmodulesofvaryingsizesintworegions.Region1isdesignedforstorageofnewfuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235.Region1isalsodesignedtostorefuelassemblieswithenrichmentsupto4.5weightpercentU-235thathavenotachievedadequateburnupforRegion2.TheRegion2cellsarecapableofaccommodatingfuelassemblieswithvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithinanacceptableboundasdiscussedinthisreport.Forexample,correspondingto4.5and4.0percentinitialenrichments,theminimumrequiredburn-upsforsafestorageinRegion2are36.5and30.9MWD/KgU,respectively.Figure2-1showsthearrangementoftherackmodulesinthespentfuelpool.Thehighdensityracksareengineeredtoachievethedualobjectiveofmaximumprotectionagainststructuralloadings(arisingfromgroundmotion,thermalstresses,etc.)'andthemaximizationofavailablestoragelocations.Ingeneral,agreaterwidth-to-heightaspectratioprovidesgreatermarginagainstrigidbodytipping.Hence,themodulesaremadeaslargeaspossiblewithintheconstraintsoftransportationandsitehandlingcapabilities.2-10076L/0011L tty,gW"f AsshowninFigure2-1,there-are17discretemodulesarrangedinthefuelpool.Eachrackmoduleisequipped(seeFigures2-2and2-3)withgirdlebars,3/4-inchthickby3-1/2incheshigh.Thenominalgapbetweenadjacentmodulewallsis1-1/2inches.Themodulesmakesurfacecontactbetweentheircontiguouswallsatthegirdlebarlocationsandthusmaintainaspecifiedgapbetweenthecellwalls.Table2-1givestherelevantdesigndataoneachregion.Themodulesinthetworegionsareofeightdifferenttypes.Tables2-2and2-3summarizethephysicaldataforeachmoduletype.ThepoisoninRegions1and2isBoraflex.Theuseofthisabsorbermaterialistoprecludeinadvertentcriticality.0076L/0011L2-2Revision1 TABLE2-1DESIGNDATARegionMin.B-10FluxTrapCellPitchLoadingGap(nominalinch)(arealdensity)(nominalinch)10.128.86.020gm/cm.007gm/cm21.120.02-30076L/0011L TABLE2-2TABLEOFMODULEDATAMODULEI.D.NO.OFMODULESNO.OFCELLSINNWDIRECTIONNO.OFCELLSINEWDIRECTIONTOTALNO.OFCELLSPERMODULERegion1AlandA281Region1BlandB21090Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2131311710488Region2Fl1296-Region2GlandG2Region2*Hl121310896*Cellsmissinginthismoduleduetosparger.RefertoFigure2-1.0076L/0011LRevision1 TABLE2-3MODULEDIMENSIONSANDWEIGHTMODULEI.D.NOMINALCROSS%ECTION+DIMENSIONSN-SEWESTIMATEDDRYWEIGHT(lbs)PERMODULERegion1AlandA290-1/4"90-1/4"26,700Region1BlandB290-1/4"100-7/16"29,800Region2Cl,C2,C3,C4Region2Dl,D2,D3Region2ElandE2Region2FlRegion2GlandG2Region2Hl115-11/16"80-1/6"97-7/8"71-3/16"106-3/4"71-3/16"106-3/4"80-1/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"115-11/16"71-3/16"24,10021,500187200190800.22,300190800*Excludinggirdlebars0076L/0011LRevision1 U~,V')~U,UU N~-413/1B"REF78'8.7/8"~~87.7/8"~i444"(37-0")111/8"REF.CrrCC7crrCLUJC'C7LrrCC7rcrr8CASKAREAEl11x8E211x8Hl13x8-4x20113x8COrAl9x9REGION1A29x9REGION1CtCSCJ7Crr7cbCC7G112x9C113x9C213x9ll0CIll0C0C/7r~C0OQmmcrrez--IG)C~xz~O0zMC/7OXcrrErrcr7O4COcbCC7CC7r819x10REGION1G212x9C313x9C413x9Fl12x8D213x8D313x8B29x10REGION11~1/2"1~1/2"~106.3/4"~~115.11/16"115.11/16"90-1/4"51/255/8"REFCOTrC)COCC7r
 +.os"10.12"PITCHGIROLEBARIttIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIoIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATIONREGION1FIGURE2-2 P'hh~~PPP>>fPPPPP-P'PPPPPIIh)~~I'P 04II8.86"PITCHGIRDLEBAR4IIIIIttIIILJIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIFLORIDAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANYST.LUCIEPLANTUNIT1TYPICALRACKELEVATIONREGION2FIGURE2-3 3.0NUCLEARANDTHERMAL-HYDRAULICCONSIDERATIONS3.1NEUTRONMULTIPLICATIONFACTORThefollowingsubsectionsdescribetheconditionsinthespentfuelpoolwhichareassumedincalculatingtheeffectiveneutronmultiplicationfactor(keff),theanalysismethodology,andtheanalysisresults.ThecriticalityanalysesofeachofthetwoseparateregionsofthespentfuelstoragepoolaresummarizedinTable3-1fortheanticipatednormalstorageconditions.ThecalculatedmaximumreactivityinRegion2includesaburnup-dependentallowanceforuncertaintyindepletioncalculationsand,furthermore,providesanadditionalmarginof0.00655kbelowthelimitingeffectivemultiplicationfactor(k~~)of0.95.Ascoolingtimeincreasesinlong-termstorage,decayofPu-ZOIresultsinasignificantdecreaseinreactivity,whichwillprovideanincreasingsubcriticalitymarginandtendstofurthercompensateforanyuncertaintyindepletioncalculations.Spacingbetweentwodifferentrackmodulesissufficienttoprecludeadversenuclearinteraction,sincetheminimumspacingbetweenracksisgreaterthanthedesignwatergapspacing.Region2canaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentsanddischargefuelburnups,providedthecombinationfallswithintheacceptabledomainillustratedinFigure3-1.Forconvenienceofreference,theminimumburnupvaluesinFigure3-1havebeenfittedbylineartangentsatvariousvaluesandtheresultsaretabulatedinTable3-2.Linearinterpolationbetweenthetabulatedvalueswillalwaysyieldvaluesonorconservativelyabovethecurveoflimitingburnups.ThesedatawillbeimplementedinappropriateadministrativeprocedurestoassureverifiedburnupasspecifiedindraftRegulatoryGuide1.13,Revision2.Administrativeprocedureswillalsobeemployedtoconfirmandassurethepresenceofsolublepoisoninthepoolwateratalltimes,providingafurthermarginofsafetyandassuringsubcriticalityintheeventoffuelmisplacementduringfuelhandlingoperations,asdiscussedinSection3.1.2.3.1.1.1NewFuelStorageinRegion2Criticalityanalysesconfirmthatacheckerboardpattern(fuelassembliesaligneddiagonally)providesanacceptablek~forthestorageoffreshfuelassembliesof4.5XenrichmentinRegion2.Thesecalculationsindicateanominalk~of0.819+0.025(95X/95X)whenfullyfloodedwithcleanunboratedwater.Thisvalueissubstantiallylessthanthelimitingkeffof0.95,evenwiththeadditionofareasonableallowanceforuncertainties.\WithBoraflexabsorberbetweenassemblies,conditionsdonotexistfortheappearanceofapeakinreactivityatlowmoderatordensities,andthefullyfloodedconditioncorrespondstothehighestreactivity(optimummoderation).Thus,thecheckerboardpatternofnew4.5XenrichedfuelinRegion2representsasafeconfigurationinconformancewithbothStandardReviewPlan(SRP)9.1.1and9.1.2.3-10076L/0011L L)~(~I$4'4%I'I~tJr~4(1v"k' 3.1.2PostulatedAccidentsAlthoughcreditforthesolublepoisonnormallypresentinthespentfuelpoolwaterispermittedunderabnormaloraccidentconditions",mostabnormaloraccidentconditionswillnotresultinexceedingthelimitingreactivity(keffof0.95)evenintheabsenceofsolublepoison.TheeffectsonreactivityofcredibleabnormalandaccidentconditionsaresummarizedinTable3-3.Oftheseabnormal/accidentconditions,onlyonehasthepotentialforamorethannegligiblepositivereactivityeffect.Theinadvertentmisplacementofafreshfuelassembly(eitherintoaRegion2storagecelloroutsideandadjacenttoarackmodule)hasthepotentialforexceeIingthelimitingreactivityshouldtherebeaconcurrentandindependentaccidentconditionresultinginthelossofallsolublepoison.Administrativeproceduresassurethepresenceofsolublepoisonatalltimesandwillprecludethepossibilityofthesimultaneousoccurrenceofthesetwoindependentaccidentconditions.ThelargestreactivityincreaseoccursforaccidentallyplacinganewfuelassemblyintoaRegion2storagecellwithallothercellsfullyloadedwithfuelofthehighestpermissiblereactivity.Underthiscondition,thepresenceofapproximately500ppmsolubleboronassuresthattheinfinitemultiplicationfactorwouldnotexceedthedesignbasisreactivityforRegion2.Withthenormalconcentrationofsolublepoisonpresent(1720ppmboron),k~islessthan0.80andthestoragerackswouldnotbecriticalevenifRegion2weretobefullyloadedwithfreshfuelof4.5Xenrichment.Thisconcentrationofsolubleboronalsoprecludesthepossibilityofexceedingthecriticalitylimitintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.SeeSection5.3fordiscussionsonAccidentEvaluations.3.1.3CalculationMethods3t103+]CriticalityAnalysisforRegion13.1.3.1.1NominalDesignCaseUndernormalconditions,withnominaldimensions,thekmvaluescalculatedbythreedifferentmethodsofanalysisareasfollows:AnalticalMethodBias-correctedk~CASMO-2E0.9313+0.0018AMPX-KENO(27-gpSCALE)0.9210+0.0084Diffusion/blackness0.9313theoryMaximumk~(95X/95X)0.93310.92940.9313TheAMPX-KENOcalculationsincludeaone-sidedtolerancefactor(13)correspondingto95Xprobabilityata95Xconfidence'limit..Forthenominaldesigncase,theCASMO-2Ecalculationyieldsthehighestreactivityand,therefore,theindependentverificationcalculationssubstantiateCASMO-2Eastheprimarycalculationalmethod.*DoublecontingencyprincipleofANSIN16.1-1975,asspecifiedintheApril4,1978NRCletter(Section1.2)andimpliedintheproposedrevision(draft)toReg.Guide1.13(Section1.4,AppendixA)~3-20076L/0011L 3.1.3.1.2BoronLoadingVariationTheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedinRegion1storagecellsarenominally0.075inchthick,withaB-10arealdensityof0.0238g/cm.Independent2manufacturin~tolerancelimitsare+0.007inchinthicknessand+0.009g/cminB-10content.Thisassurestha)atanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration(0.1158gramB-10/cm)andminimumBoraflexthickness(0.068inch)maycoincide,theboron-lO,arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.020g/cm.DifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculationsindicatethatthesetolerancelimitsresultinreactivityuncertaintyof+0.0021Akforboroncontentand+0.00445kforBoraflexthicknessvariations.3.1.3.1.3StorageCellLatticePitchVariationThedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassembliesinRegion1is10.12inches.Adecreaseinstoragecelllatticespacingmayormaynotincreasereactivitydependinguponotherdimensionalchangesthatmaybeassociatedwiththedecreaseinlatticespacing.Increasingthewaterthicknessbetweenthefuelandtheinnerstainlesssteelboxresultsinasmallincreaseinreactivity.Thereactivityeffectoftheflux-trapwaterthickness,however,ismoresignificant,anddecreasingtheflux-trapwaterthicknessincreasesreactivity.Bothoftheseeffectshavebeenevaluatedforindependentdesigntolerances.Theinnerstainlesssteelboxdimension,8.650+0.032inches,definestheinnerwaterthicknessbetweenthefuelandtheinsidebox.Forthetolerancelimit,theuncertaintyinreactivityis+0.00115kasdeterminedbydifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculations,withk~increasingastheinnerstainlesssteelboxdimension(andderivativelatticespacing)increases.Thedesignflux-trapwater.thicknessis1.120+0.040inches,whichresultsinanuncertaintyof+0.0043Qkduetothetoleranceinflux-trapwaterthickness,assumingthewaterthicknessissimultaneouslyreducedonallfoursides.Sincethemanufacturingtolerancesoneachofthefoursidesarestatisticallyindependent,thenactualreactivityuncertaintieswouldbelessthan+0.0043,althoughthemoreconservativevaluehasbeenusedinthecriticalityevaluation.3.1.3.1.4BoraflexWidthToleranceVariationThereferencestoragecelldesignforRegion1(Figure3-2)usesaBoraflexbladewidthof7.50+0.0625inches.ApositiveincrementinreactivityoccursforadecreaseinBoraflexabsorberwidth.Forareductioninwidthofthemaximumtolerance,0.0625inch,thecalculatedpositivereactivityincrementis+0.00175k.3.1.3.1.5StainlessSteelThicknessTolerancesThenominalstainlesssteelthicknessinRegion1is0.080+0.005inchfortheinnerstainlesssteelboxand0.020+0.003inchfortheBoraflexcoverplate.Themaximumpositivereactivityeffectoftheexpectedstainlesssteelthicknesstolerancevariations,statisticallycombined,wascalculated(CASMO-2E)tobe+0.00105k.3-30076L/0011L k't'A'yc,ICl'pp<,"-.qduTIgyIN''4stIl~Jk~1%.
 .1.3.1.6FuelEnrichmentandDensityVariationThedesignmaximumenrichmentis4.50+0.05wtXU-235.CalculationsofthesensitivitytosmallenrichmentvariationsbyCASMO-2Eyieldedacoefficientof0.00545kper0.1wtXU-235atthedesignenrichment.ForatoleranceonU-235enrichmentof+0.05inwtX,theuncertaintyonkcois+0.00275k.CalculationswerealsomadewiththeU02fueldensityincreasedtothemaximumexpectedvalueof10.811g/cm3(smeareddensity).Forthereferencedesigncalculations,theuncertaintyinreactivityis+0.00055koverthemaximumexpectedrangeofU02densities.3.1.3.1.7FuelPinPitchNormally,thefuelpinsinthelatticearearrangedona0.577inchlatticespacing.Forthemaximumexpectedtoleranceof+0.0023inch,thecalculateduncertaintyis+0.00245k.3.1.3.1.8EccentricPositioningofFuelAssemblyinStorageRackTheFuelAssemblyisassumedtobenormallylocatedinthecenterofthestoragerackcell.Calculationswerealsomadewiththefuelassembliesassumedtobethecornerofthestoragerackcell(four-assemblyclusteratclosestapproach).Thesecalculationsindicatedthatthereactivityincreasesveryslightly,asdeterminedbydifferentialPD$07calculationswithdiffusioncoefficients"generatedbyNULIFandablacknesstheoryroutine.ThisuncertaintyisincludedintheevaluationofthehighestpossiblereactivityoftheRegion1storagecells.3.1.3.1.9SummaryofRegion1Cri.ticalityResultsTable3-1demonstratesthattheCASMO-2EcalculatedresultsforRegion1storingfreshfuelat4.50w/oU-235enrichmentpluscalculationalbiasanduncertaintiesexhibitamaximumk~of0.9409whichallowsamarginof0.0091Qkbelowthelimitingeffectivemultiplicationfactorof0.95.3.1.3.2CriticalityAnalysisforRegion23.1.3.2.1NominalDesignCaseTheprincipalmethodofanalysisinRegion2wastheCASMO-2Ecode,usingtherestartoptioninCASMOtotransferfuelofaspecifiedburnupintothestoragerackconfigurationatareferencetemperatureof4oC(maximummoderatordensity).Calculationsweremadeforfuelofseveraldifferentinitialenrichmentsand,ateachenrichment,alimitingkmvaluewasestablishedwhichincludedanadditionalfactorforuncertaintyintheburnupanalysisandfortheaxialburnupdistribution.TherestartCASMO-2Ecalculations(cold,clean,rackgeometry)weretheninterpolatedtodefinetheburnupvalueyieldingthelimitingka>valueforeachenrichment,asindicatedinTable3-4.TheseconvergedburnupvaluesdefinetheboundaryoftheacceptabledomainshowninFigure3-1.*ThiscalculationalapproachwasnecessarysincethereactivityeffectsaretoosmalltobecalculatedbyKENO,andCASMO-2Egeometryisnotreadilyamenabletoeccentricpositioningofafuelassembly.3-40076L/0011L I'if'Itcl4fQ10f Ataburnupof36.5Mwd/kgU,thesensitivitytoburnupiscalculatedtobe-0.00746kperMwd/kgU.Duringlong-termstorage,thekcvaluesoftheRegion2fuelrackwilldecreasecontinuouslyfromdecayofPu-241,asindicatedinSection3.1.3.3.4.TwoindependentcalculationalmethodswereusedtoprovideadditionalconfidenceinthereferenceRegion2criticalityanalyses.Fuelof1.69Kinitialenrichment(approximatelyequivalenttothereferencerackdesignforburnedfuel)wasanalyzedbyAMPX-KENO(27-groupSCALEcross-sectionlibrary)andbytheCASMO-2EmodelusedfortheRegion2rackanalysis.Forthiscase,theCASMO-2Ek~(0.9304)waswithinthestatisticaluncertaintyofthebias-correctedvalue(0.9347+0.0064)(95K/95X)obtainedintheAMPX-KENOcalculations.ThisagreementconfirmsthevalidityoftheprimaryCASMO-2Ecalculations.ThesecondindependentmethodofanalysisusedwastheNULIFcodeforburnupanalysis,andforgeneratingdiffusiontheoryconstants(cold,clean)forthecompositionat36.5Mwd/kgUwithfuelof4.5Xinitialenrichment.Theseconstants,togetherwithblacknesstheoryconstantsfortheBoraflexabsorber,werethenusedinatwo-dimensionalPD$07calculationforthestoragerackconfiguration.Theresultofthiscalculation(keof0.8959)wassomewhatlowerthanthecorrespondingCASMO-2Ecalculationforthesameconditions(kaof0.9114)andthusalsotendstoconfirmthevalidityoftheprimarycalculationalmethod.3.1.3.2.2BoronLoadingVariationTheBoraflexabsorbersheetsusedintheRegion2storagecellsarenominally0.031inchthickwithaB-10arealdensityof0.0097g/cm2.Independentmanufacturinglimitsare+0.007inchinthicknessand+0.009g/cm3inB-10content.Thisassuresthatatanypointwheretheminimumboronconcentration(0.1158gB-10/cm)andtheminimumBoraflexthickness(0.024inch)maycoincide,theboron-10arealdensitywillnotbelessthan0.007g/cm.2DifferentialCASMO-2Ecalculationsindicatethatthesetolerancelimitsresultinanincrementalreactivityuncertaintyof+0.0036Qkforboroncontentand+0.0111QkforBoraflexthickness.3.1.3.2.3BoraflexWidthToleranceThereferencestoragecelldesignforRegion2(Figure3-3)usesaBoraflexabsorberwidthof7.25+0.0625inches.Forareductioninwidthofthemaximumtolerance,thecalculatedpositivereactivityincrementis0.0011Qk.3.1.3.2.4StorageCellLatticePitchVariationsThedesignstoragecelllatticespacingbetweenfuelassembliesinRegion2is8.86+0.04inches,correspondingtoanuncertaintyinreactivityof0.00165k.3.1.3.2.5StainlessSteelThicknessToleranceThenominalthicknessofthestainlesssteelboxwallis0.080inchwithatolerancelimitof+0.005inch,resultinginanuncertaintyinreactivityof+0.00025k.3-50076L/0011L
@@ Line 37: / Line 40: @@
 ~ll$lg' Aftertheaxialvelocityfieldisevaluated,thefuelassemblycladdingtemperaturecanbecalculated.Theknowledgeoftheoverallflowfieldenablespinpointingofthestoragelocationwiththeminimumaxialflow(i.e.,maximumwateroutlettemperatures).Thisiscalledthemost"choked"location.Inordertofindanupperboundonthetemperatureinatypicalcell,itisassumedthatitislocatedatthemostchokedlocation.Knowingtheglobalplenumvelocityfield,therevisedaxialflowthroughthischokedcellcanbecalculatedbysolvingtheBernoulliequationfortheflowcircuitthroughthiscell.Thus,anabsoluteupperboundonthewaterexittemperatureandmaximumfuelcladdingtemperatureisobtained.Inviewoftheaforementionedassumptions,thetemperaturescalculatedinthismanneroverestimatethetemperaturerisethatwillactuallyoccurinthepool.THERPOOL,basedonthetheoryofReference18,automatesthiscalculation.Finally,themaximumspecificpowerofafuelarrayqAcanbegivenby:where:qFxyqaveragefuelassemblyspecificpowerFxyradialpeakingfactorThedataonradialandaxialpeakingfactorsmaybefoundinTable3-10.Themaximumtemperatureriseofpoolwaterinthemostdisadvantageouslyplacedfuelassemblyiscomputedforallloadingcases.Table3-19,thirdcolumn,givestheoutputsfromTHERPOOLintabularform.3.3.3.CladdingTemperature~~~Havingdeterminedthemaximumlocalwatertemperatureinthepool,itisnowpossibletodeterminethemaximumfuelcladdingtemperature.AfuelrodcanproduceFoottimestheaverageheatemissionrateoverasmalllength,whereTtistfietotalpeakingfactor.Theaxialheatdissipationinarodisknowntoreachamaximuminthecentralregion,andtaperoffatitstwoextremities.Foraddedconservatism,itisassumedthatthepeakheatemissionoccursatthetopwherethelocalwatertemperaturealsoreachesitsmaximum.Futhermore,nocreditistakenforaxialconductionofheatalongtherod.Thehighlyconservativemodelthusconstructedleadstosimplealgebraicequationswhichdirectlygivethemaximumlocalcladdingtemperature,tc.Table3-19,fourthcolumn,summarizesthekeyoutputdata.Itisfoundthatthemaximumvalueofthelocalwatertemperatureiswellbelowthenucleateboilingconditionvalue.Theincrementalcladdingtemperatureistoosmalltoproducesignificantthermalstresses.3.4POTENTIALFUELANDRACKHANDLINGACCIDENTSThemethodformovingtheracksintoandoutofthespentfuelpoolisbrieflydiscussedinSection4.7.4.2.Themethodsutilizedensurethatpostulatedaccidentsdonotresultinalossofcoolingtoeitherthespentfuelpoolorthereactor,orresultinakeffinthespentfuelpoolexceeding0.95.3-160076L/0011L
 ~~
-.4.1RackModuleMishandlinThepotentialformishandlingofrackmodulesduringthererackoperationhasbeenevaluated.Atnotimewillthecaskhandlingcraneorthetemporaryconstructioncranecarryarackmoduledirectlyoverarackcontainingspentfuel.Theproceduresandadministrativecontrolsgoverningthererackoperationwillensurethesafehandlingofrackmodules.BoththetemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcranemeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSectionP.l.lofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"<19'ntheunlikelyeventthatarackshouldstrikethesideofanotherrackmodulecontainingfuelassemblies,theconsequencesofthispostulatedaccidentwouldbeboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.2TemporaryConstructionCraneDroDuringthererackoperation,atemporaryconstructioncranewillbeinstalledintheFuelHandlingBuilding.ThisinstallationwillbeperformedusingliftrigswhichmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofapostulatedaccidentduringthisinstallationareboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDro)Duringthere-rackingoperation,itwillbenecessarytoraiseandmaneuvertheoldracksoutofthespentfuelpoolinordertoinstallthenewspentfuelracks(SeeSection4.7.4).Thehandlingoftheseheavyloadswillbeaccomplishedbytheuseofatemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcrane.BothofthesecranesmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSection5.1.1ofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofdroppingarackintheSpentFuelPoolweredeterminedbyreviewingtheanalysisinFSARSubsection9.1.4fordroppingofthespentfuelcask.Theresultsofthiscaskdropanalysisdemonstratedthatthepoolfloorwouldremainelasticduringimpactandthatcrackswouldnotdevelop.Thiscaskweighssubstantiallymorethanasinglerackassemblyandhasasmallercrosssectionalareaforloaddistribution.Therefore,therackdropscenarioisboundedbythepreviousanalysisforacaskdropscenario,andlossofspentfuelcoolingfromlossofpoolwaterinventorywillnotoccurasaresultofarackdrop.3.5TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESThisproposedamendmentpermitsreplacementofthespentfuelpoolrackstoensurethatsufficientcapacityexistsforstorageofspentfuelatSt.LucieUnit1.Thenewracksincreasetheavailablestorageto1706spentfuelassembliesandisexpectedtoprovideadequatestoragespaceuntiltheyear2009.3-170076L/0011L I'NI'i,Kl's>""II.VII't~lf1'IB1 TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangesaredescribedbelow:1.Specification3/4.9.14BasesisrevisedtoreflecttheassumptionsusedincalculationsofdosesbasedontheDecayTimes.2.Specification5.6.1.a.lisrevisedtocorrespondtothe.StandardTechnicalSpecificationsforCombustionEngineeringPressurizedWaterReactors(NUREG-0212Rev2).3.Specification5.6.l.a.2isrevisedtoshowthenominalcenter-to-centerdistanceforthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.4.Specification5.6.1.a.3iseditedtodiscusstheboronconcentrationonly.5.Specification5.6.1.a.4iscreatedtoindicatethepresenceofBoraflexinthecells.6.Specification5.6.1.bandaccompanyingFigure5.6-1arecreatedtodefinethefuelenrichment/burnuplimitsforstorageineachregionofthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.7.Specification5.6.1ciseditoriallychangedfrom"b"to"c".8.Specification5.6.3ischangedtoshowthecapacityofthehigh-capacityspentfuelstorageracks.3.6REFERENCESFORSECTION3~~~1.A.Ahlin,M.Edenius,H.Haggblom,"CASMO-AFuelAssemblyBurnupProgram,"AE-RF-76-4158,Studsvikreport(proprietary).2.A.AhlinandM.Edenius,"CASMO-AFastTransportTheoryDepletionCodeforLWRAnalysis,"ANSTransactions,Vol.26,p.604,1977.3.M.Edeniusetal.,"CASMOBenchmarkReport,"Studsvik/RF-78-6293,AktiebolagetAtomenergi,March1978.4.Green,Lucious,Petrie,Ford,White,Wright,"PSR-63/AMPX-1(codepackage),AMPXModularCodeSystemforGeneratingCoupledMultigroupNeutron-GammaLibrariesfromENDF/B,"ORNL-TM-3706,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,March1976.5.L.M.PetrieandN.F.Cross,"KENO-IV,AnImprovedMonteCarloCriticalityProgram,"ORNL-4938,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,November1975.6.R.,M.Westfalletal.,"SCALE:AModularCodeSystemforPerformingStandardizedComputerAnalysesforLicensingEvaluation,"NUREG/CR-0200,1979.3-180076L/0011L jI-lllp't~',hVgyII1't W.A.Wittkopf,"NULIF-NeutronSpectrumGenerator,Fe~roupConstantGeneratorandFuelDepletionCode,"BAW-426,TheBabcock6WilcoxCompany,August1976.W.R.Cadwell,PD$07ReferenceManual,WAPD-TM-678,BettisAtomicPowerLaboratory,January1967.W.J.Eich,"AdvancedRecycleMethodologyProgram,CEM-3,"ElectricPowerResearchInstitute,1976.E.E.Pilat,"MethodsfortheAnalysisofBoilingWaterReactors(LatticePhysics),"YAEC-1232,YankeeAtomicElectricCo.,December1980.E.Johansson,"ReactorPhysicsCalculationsonClose-PackedPressurizedWaterReactorLattices,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.68,pp.263-268,February1985.H.Richings,SomeNotesonPWR(W)PowerDistributionProbabilitiesforLOCAProbabilisticAnalyses,NRCMemorandumtoP.S.Check,datedJuly5J1977.M.G.Natrella,ExperimentalStatistics,NationalBureauofStandards,Handbook91,August1963.J.M.Canoetal.,"SupercriticalityThroughOptimumModerationinNuclearFuelStorage,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.48,pp.251-260,May1980.NUREG-0800,U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,StandardReviewPlan,BranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,Rev.2,July1981.Singh,K.P.,JournalofHeatTransfer,TransactionsoftheASME,August1981,Vol.1-3,"SomeFundamentalRelationshipsforTubularHeatExchangerThermalPerformance."GeneralElectricCorporation,R&DDataBooks,"HeatTransferandFluidFlow,"1974andupdates.Singh,K.P.etal.,"MethodforComputingtheMaximumWaterTemperatureinaFuelPoolContainingSpentNuclearFuel,"HeatTransferEngineering,Vol.7,No.1-2,pp.72-82(1986).NuclearRegulatoryCommission,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NUREG-0612,July1980.3-190076L/0011L
+.4.1RackModuleMishandlinThepotentialformishandlingofrackmodulesduringthererackoperationhasbeenevaluated.Atnotimewillthecaskhandlingcraneorthetemporaryconstructioncranecarryarackmoduledirectlyoverarackcontainingspentfuel.Theproceduresandadministrativecontrolsgoverningthererackoperationwillensurethesafehandlingofrackmodules.BoththetemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcranemeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSectionP.l.lofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants"<19'ntheunlikelyeventthatarackshouldstrikethesideofanotherrackmodulecontainingfuelassemblies,theconsequencesofthispostulatedaccidentwouldbeboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.2TemporaryConstructionCraneDroDuringthererackoperation,atemporaryconstructioncranewillbeinstalledintheFuelHandlingBuilding.ThisinstallationwillbeperformedusingliftrigswhichmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofapostulatedaccidentduringthisinstallationareboundedbythecaskdropevaluationsdescribedinSection5.3.1.2.3.4.3LossofPoolCooling(StorageRackDro)Duringthere-rackingoperation,itwillbenecessarytoraiseandmaneuvertheoldracksoutofthespentfuelpoolinordertoinstallthenewspentfuelracks(SeeSection4.7.4).Thehandlingoftheseheavyloadswillbeaccomplishedbytheuseofatemporaryconstructioncraneandthecaskhandlingcrane.BothofthesecranesmeetthedesignandoperationalrequirementsofSection5.1.1ofNUREG-0612,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants."TheconsequencesofdroppingarackintheSpentFuelPoolweredeterminedbyreviewingtheanalysisinFSARSubsection9.1.4fordroppingofthespentfuelcask.Theresultsofthiscaskdropanalysisdemonstratedthatthepoolfloorwouldremainelasticduringimpactandthatcrackswouldnotdevelop.Thiscaskweighssubstantiallymorethanasinglerackassemblyandhasasmallercrosssectionalareaforloaddistribution.Therefore,therackdropscenarioisboundedbythepreviousanalysisforacaskdropscenario,andlossofspentfuelcoolingfromlossofpoolwaterinventorywillnotoccurasaresultofarackdrop.3.5TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESThisproposedamendmentpermitsreplacementofthespentfuelpoolrackstoensurethatsufficientcapacityexistsforstorageofspentfuelatSt.LucieUnit1.Thenewracksincreasetheavailablestorageto1706spentfuelassembliesandisexpectedtoprovideadequatestoragespaceuntiltheyear2009.3-170076L/0011L I'NI'i,Kl's>""II.VII't~lf1'IB1 TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangesaredescribedbelow:1.Specification3/4.9.14BasesisrevisedtoreflecttheassumptionsusedincalculationsofdosesbasedontheDecayTimes.2.Specification5.6.1.a.lisrevisedtocorrespondtothe.StandardTechnicalSpecificationsforCombustionEngineeringPressurizedWaterReactors(NUREG-0212Rev2).3.Specification5.6.l.a.2isrevisedtoshowthenominalcenter-to-centerdistanceforthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.4.Specification5.6.1.a.3iseditedtodiscusstheboronconcentrationonly.5.Specification5.6.1.a.4iscreatedtoindicatethepresenceofBoraflexinthecells.6.Specification5.6.1.bandaccompanyingFigure5.6-1arecreatedtodefinethefuelenrichment/burnuplimitsforstorageineachregionofthehighcapacityspentfuelstorageracks.7.Specification5.6.1ciseditoriallychangedfrom"b"to"c".8.Specification5.6.3ischangedtoshowthecapacityofthehigh-capacityspentfuelstorageracks.
+==3.6REFERENCES==
+FORSECTION3~~~1.A.Ahlin,M.Edenius,H.Haggblom,"CASMO-AFuelAssemblyBurnupProgram,"AE-RF-76-4158,Studsvikreport(proprietary).2.A.AhlinandM.Edenius,"CASMO-AFastTransportTheoryDepletionCodeforLWRAnalysis,"ANSTransactions,Vol.26,p.604,1977.3.M.Edeniusetal.,"CASMOBenchmarkReport,"Studsvik/RF-78-6293,AktiebolagetAtomenergi,March1978.4.Green,Lucious,Petrie,Ford,White,Wright,"PSR-63/AMPX-1(codepackage),AMPXModularCodeSystemforGeneratingCoupledMultigroupNeutron-GammaLibrariesfromENDF/B,"ORNL-TM-3706,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,March1976.5.L.M.PetrieandN.F.Cross,"KENO-IV,AnImprovedMonteCarloCriticalityProgram,"ORNL-4938,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,November1975.6.R.,M.Westfalletal.,"SCALE:AModularCodeSystemforPerformingStandardizedComputerAnalysesforLicensingEvaluation,"NUREG/CR-0200,1979.3-180076L/0011L jI-lllp't~',hVgyII1't W.A.Wittkopf,"NULIF-NeutronSpectrumGenerator,Fe~roupConstantGeneratorandFuelDepletionCode,"BAW-426,TheBabcock6WilcoxCompany,August1976.W.R.Cadwell,PD$07ReferenceManual,WAPD-TM-678,BettisAtomicPowerLaboratory,January1967.W.J.Eich,"AdvancedRecycleMethodologyProgram,CEM-3,"ElectricPowerResearchInstitute,1976.E.E.Pilat,"MethodsfortheAnalysisofBoilingWaterReactors(LatticePhysics),"YAEC-1232,YankeeAtomicElectricCo.,December1980.E.Johansson,"ReactorPhysicsCalculationsonClose-PackedPressurizedWaterReactorLattices,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.68,pp.263-268,February1985.H.Richings,SomeNotesonPWR(W)PowerDistributionProbabilitiesforLOCAProbabilisticAnalyses,NRCMemorandumtoP.S.Check,datedJuly5J1977.M.G.Natrella,ExperimentalStatistics,NationalBureauofStandards,Handbook91,August1963.J.M.Canoetal.,"SupercriticalityThroughOptimumModerationinNuclearFuelStorage,"NuclearTechnology,Vol.48,pp.251-260,May1980.NUREG-0800,U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,StandardReviewPlan,BranchTechnicalPositionASB9-2,Rev.2,July1981.Singh,K.P.,JournalofHeatTransfer,TransactionsoftheASME,August1981,Vol.1-3,"SomeFundamentalRelationshipsforTubularHeatExchangerThermalPerformance."GeneralElectricCorporation,R&DDataBooks,"HeatTransferandFluidFlow,"1974andupdates.Singh,K.P.etal.,"MethodforComputingtheMaximumWaterTemperatureinaFuelPoolContainingSpentNuclearFuel,"HeatTransferEngineering,Vol.7,No.1-2,pp.72-82(1986).NuclearRegulatoryCommission,"ControlofHeavyLoadsatNuclearPowerPlants,NUREG-0612,July1980.3-190076L/0011L
 '~TI*("~t~Uf'f~~'I~If~'I4 TABLE3-1SUMMARYOFCRITICALITYSAFETYANALYSESRegion1Region2Minimumacceptableburnup84.5XinitialenrichmentTemperatureassumedforanalysisReferencek~(nominal)CalculationalbiasUncertaintiesBiasB-10concentrationBoraflexthicknessBoraflexwidthInnerboxdimensionWatergapthicknessSSthicknessFuelenrichmentFueldensityFuelelementpitchStatisticalcombinationEccentricassemblypositionAllowanceforburnupuncertaintyTotalMaximumreactivity(with1720ppmsolubleboron)4'c0.93130.0013+0.0018+0.0021+0.0044+0.0017+0.0011+0.0043+0.0010+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0080+0.0003N/A0.9329+0.00800.9409(0.767)36.5Mwd/kgU4'c0.91140.0013+0.0018+0.0036+0.0111+0.0011+0.0016H'/A+0.0002+0.0027+0.0005+0.0024+0.0125negative+0.01830.9310+0.01250.9435(0.760)(1)Squarerootofsumofsquares.N/A-NotApplicable3-200076L/0011L

ML17221A605: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 03:21, 2 May 2018

Contents

Text

1.0INTRODUCTION

1.5CONCLUSION

1.6REFERENCES

3.6REFERENCES

Navigation menu

ML17221A605: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 03:21, 2 May 2018

Text

1.0INTRODUCTION

1.5CONCLUSION

1.6REFERENCES

3.6REFERENCES

Navigation menu

Search