ML17056B478

Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Rept 1991.

ML17056B478
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	12/31/1991
From:	NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
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ML17056B479	List: ML17056B478 ML18038A489
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NUDOCS 9111070055
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EnclosuretoNMP2L1324r,I.'KNEMILEPOINT-UNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYREPORT19919iii070055911030PDR,ADOCK05000410K~'8'~~PDRDocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-69

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage1of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:86-013,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX109N/AVariousTemporaryTestEquipmentforPower~AscensionTestingDescriptionofChange:Thischangewasfortheinstallationandremoval(afterthefirstfuelcycle)oftemporarytestequipmentrequiredforpowerascensiontesting.Potentiometers,thermocouples,electricalcabinets,andassociatedcables,conduits,andsupportsweretemporarilyinstalledtomonitorthefollowing:ReactorinternalsvibrationRecirculationpipingthermalexpansionBalanceofPlantsystemspipingthermalexpansion(withindrywell)BalanceofPlantsystemspipingvibration(withindrywell)BalanceofPlantsystemsmonitoredincludedmainsteam,feedwater,reactorwatercleanup,mainsteamsafety/reliefvalves,reactorcoreisolationcooling,residualheatremoval,highpressurecorespray,andlowpressurecorespray.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Noneoftheinstalledtemporarytestequipmenthadanyaffectonsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Theequipmentinstallationwasreviewedtoassureseismicadequacy.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage2of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-001Mod.PN2Y86MX084N/AControlRoom/RemoteShutdownRoomPanelsHumanPactorsLabelingStudy~ImplementationDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationincorporatedhumanfactorschangestomimic,markerplates,andINOPwindowlegendinsertsincontrolroompowergenerationcontrolcenterpanelsandremoteshutdownroompanels.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationensuresthattheconfigurationofthecontrolroomandremoteshutdownroompanelsisconsistentwiththehumanfactorguidelinessetforthintheapplicablesectionsoftheHumanFactorsManual,andimplementscommitmentsidentifiedinNMPCletterstoNRCdatedApril14,1986(NMP2L'685)andJune9,1986(NMP2L0737).Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage3of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-086,Rev.1Hod.PN2Y87HX040N/AStandbyDieselGeneratorAdditionofEmergencyDieselGeneratorSignalstoPermanentPlantGETARs(Divi.sionI,II,III)DescriptionofChange:Thismodificationaddedthefollowingdieselgenerator(D-G)signalstothepermanentplantGETransientAnalysisRecordingSystem(GETARS)forthepurposeofhavingtheGETARSasthedatarecorderofthedieselgeneratorsignalsforDivisionI,II,IIIstandbydieselgenerators:frequency,watts,vars,ACvoltage,phasecurrents,exciterfieldvolts,startindication,andspeedindication.FortheDivisionIandIIdieselgenerators,newpanels2EGP*PNL101and103replacedexistingpanels2EGS*XC01andXC03,andreliable120VoltAC(UninterruptablePowerSupply)wasbroughtintoexternallypowerthevoltage,watt,var,andexciterfieldvoltagetransducers.Thiswasperformedtoensurethattheyoperateduringthe10secondD-Gstartingtime.Thismodificationsimplifiescurrentdieselgeneratorsurveillancerequirementsbyeliminatingtheneedforinstallationoftemporarytestequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThedesignbasisisinaccordancewithIEEE308-CriteriaforClass1EElectricalSystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations,IEEE384-CriteriaforIndependenceofClass1EEquipmentandCircuits,andRegulatoryGuide1.75.Allcomponentsaddedinthismodificationareformonitoringpurposesonlyanddonotresultinanyfunctionalchangestothecontrolsystems.ThesecomponentsareeitherClass1EorhaveappropriateisolatingdevicesinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.75.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage4of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-089,Rev.1Gale.No.12177-ES-235,Rev.1N/ASecondaryContainment(ReactorBuilding)SecondaryContainmentDesignBasis(NegativePressureDrawdownTime)DescriptionofChange:Ananalysiswasperformedtocalculatethetimenecessaryforthestandbygastreatmentsystem(SGTS)toactivateandre-establishthesecondarycontainmentpressureof-0.25incheswatergaugeorless.ThisevaluationwasoriginallyreportedinletterNMP2L1177datedOctober26,1988.Thisletterstatedthatthesetpointontheunitcoolerswaschangedto88'Fandthereactorbuildingunitcoolers413A/BchangedtosimultaneouslystartonaLOCAsignal.Asubsequentrevisiontotheevaluationhasdeterminedthattheabove-statedactionswerenotnecessary.Inlieuofthechanges,thefollowingalternateactionswereimplemented:1~2~3~4.MonitorreactorbuildingtemperatureMonitorservicewatertemperatureVerifyATbetweenreactorbuildingtemperatureandservicewatertemperatureis>16'FVerifybuildingtemperatureis>85'FSafetyEvaluationSummary:Verifyingthattheabove-statedconditionsweresatisfiedassuredthatthesecondarycontainmentdrawdownanalysiswasvalid.ThischangedidnotaffectthedesignfunctionoftheSGTSanddidnotaffectsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant'asedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage5of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:87-128Mod.PN2Y87MX125Figures5.4-13d,5.4-13e,5.4-13gSystem:TitleofChange:ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR/RHS).ToPreventAnnunciatorWindowRHRSteamTrapTroublefromAlwaysBeinginanAlarmedState-Equipment2RHS*PNL100DescriptionofChange:Duetocommonlevelswitches,annunciatorwindow5601660(RHRSteamTrapTrouble)wasalwaysinanalarmstateunlessbothdivisionsofRHRwereoperatinginthesteamcondensingmode.Sincethisoperatingconfigurationisrare,thismodificationinterlockedlevelswitches2RHS-LS78A&Band2RHS-LS97A&BwiththeirrespectivesteamlinedrainSOVs,whicharenormallyclosedwhennotoperating.Thiswillpreventeitherdivisionlevelswitchfromsettingoffthecommonalarmwhennotbeingused.Thismodificationadded/revisedinternalandfieldwiringat2RHS*PNL100,2RHS-LS78A&Band2RHS-LS97A&B,andaddedfourisolatingMDRrelaystoprovidethenecessarycontroltointerlockthelevelswitches.Also,doublefuseswereaddedtoisolateCategoryIpanel2RHS*PNL100fromtheaddedMDRrelays.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheaddedMDRrelaysinCKT2RHSB57areforannunciationonlyandarenotrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.IfoneofthefourMDRrelaycoilsfailedtoopenorclose,therewouldbenoeffectonanyoperatingmodeorimpactontheDivisionIIbus.IfCKT2RHSB57wasrenderedinoperativebecauseofblownfuses,thesolenoidvalves2RHS*SOV71A,71B,73Aand73B,whicharemanuallyoperatedopeninthesteamcondensingmode,wouldimmediatelybede-energizedandclosed,therebyisolatingthesteamdrainlinesfromthereactorbuildingequipmentdrains.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion./

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage6of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-133,Rev.1Mod.PN2787MX197Figure9.3-9bDrywellDrains(DER)Deletionof2DER-ED5309,2DER-ED5312DescriptionofChange:AsreportedinletterNMP2L1177,datedOctober26,1988,anequipmentdraininthesecondarycontainment(2DER-ED5309)wascappedtopreventradiationlevelsinexcessofdesignlimitsduetoshinefromthetraversingin-coreprobecubiclebelow.Thismodificationwasrevisedtoincludecappingofequipmentdrain2DER-ED5312,andsealingofbothdrainlineswithICMSproduct90.Inaddition,drainline2CES-001-101-4originallydraininginto2DER-ED5312wasreroutedto2DER-ED5307.TheUSARchangesassociatedwiththismodificationwereincorporatedinUSARRevision0.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationisnon-nuclearsafetyrelatedandhasnointerfacewithsafety-relatedsystems.Thismodificationresultsinalong-termALARAbenefitasitwillreduceradiationlevelsatEL261'fthesecondarycontainment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage7of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-153Mod.PN2Y87MX231Figure10.1-3hMainSteamBypassAround2MSS-AOV92AandBDescriptionofChange:Problemswereexperiencedwhenplacingthemoistureseparatorreheaters(MSRs)inservice.Whenactuationwasrequired,2MSS-AOV92Afailedtoopenand2MSS-AOV92Bopenedunacceptablyslow,resultinginasteamhammereventandreactortransient.Thismodificationinstalleda2-inchbypasslinewithamanualisolationvalvearoundeachAOV92.ThemanualvalveinthebypasslinearoundAOV92Aislabeled2MSS-V395andtheother2MSS-V396.Thebypasslinesareusedtowarmupthepipingdownstreamofvalves92A&Bandequalizepressureacrossthem.Afterthesteampipinghaswarmedup,thecondensatedrainedoff,andthepressureequalized,2MSS-AOV92AandBareopened.Onceopen,themanualbypassvalvesareclosed.USARRevision0revisedFigure10.1-3htoreflecttheinstallationofthebypasslinesandmanualvalves.ThisSafetyEvaluationSummarywasinadvertentlyomittedfromtheUSARRevision0SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport,andisthereforebeingreportedatthistime.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationisnon-safetyrelatedandisnotrequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.SecondarycontainmentbypassleakageisnotincreasedsincethebypasslinesaredownstreamoftheMSIVs,andthephysicalandprocesscharacteristicsofthebypassleakagepatharenotchanged.Thepipingdownstreamofthemanualvalvesisseismicallysupported,sothatfailureintheCategoryIIpipingwillnotdamageadjacentQACategoryIpipingorcomponents.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryRepoxtPage8of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-177Mod.PN2Y87MX004N/ABiologicalShieldMall(BSM)ClearanceProblemBetweenShieldPlugsandPipesDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationx'emovedaportionofshieldplugs2ISC*SHLD12APand2ISC*SHLD12BP,locatedinsidebiologicalshieldwallopenings.Thiswasnecessarytoprovideadequateclearancebetweentheshieldplugsandpipingtoallowthepipetomoveupwardduringheatupandplantoperationwithouthittingtheshieldplugs.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Removingaportionoftheshieldplugswillnotaffectsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplantandwillnotimpactotherequipment.TheincreasedaxeaofthetwoBSWpenetrationswillhaveanegligibleaffectonradiationlevelsinthedrywell.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage9of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-001,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y87MX143Figures5.4-2b,5.4-2cReactorRecirculationVibrationSensorAdditiontoRecirculationPumps2RCS*P1A/BDescriptionofChange:Experiencefromotherplantshasshownreactorrecirculationpumpsfailingduringpowerascensiontestingduetoexcessivevibration.Toalleviatethisconcern,avibrationmonitoringprogramfortherecirculationpumpswasimplemented.Vibration(acceleration)anddisplacement(proximity)sensorswereinstalledontherecirculationpumps,withthenecessaryhardwareformountingtheassociatedcircuitsfortheadditionalvibrationmonitoringinputs.ThischangeencompassesatemporarymodificationthatwasaddressedinSafetyEvaluationNo.87-106,whichwaspreviouslyreportedinletterNMP2L1239datedJune11,1990.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationisnon-safetyrelatedandisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.Theadditionofavibrationmonitoringprogramisexpectedtogiveearlydetectionofanyabnormalvariationinpumpperformanceintermsofshaftx,ydisplacementandx,yaccelerationduringrecirculationflowcontrolvalvethrottling,therebyreducingtheprobabilityofpumpfailure.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage11of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-.053,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y87MX208Sections6.4,9.2,9.4,9.5,9A,9B,12.3N/ARevisedFloorPlanforRoomsAdjacenttoControlRoomDescriptionofChange:ThefloorplanintheControlRoomareawasrevisedtoreducetheamountofpersonneltrafficandeasecongestion.Thefollowingchangeswereimplemented:1.Thepresentkitchenareawaschangedtoaworkreleaseoffice.2~Thenewkitchen/operationallunchroomwaslocatedintheareavacatedbytheI&Cshop.(TheI&CshopwasrelocatedfromEl.306'ntheControlBuildingtoEl.261'ntheServiceBuildingbyModificationNo.PN2Y87MX187.)3.ALadiesRestRoomwasconstructed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationwillhelptoalleviatethepersonnelcongestionproblemsintheControlRoomarea.ThemodificationstothesafetyrelatedportionsoftheControlBuildingHVACandsafetyrelatedstructuralcomponents(i.e.securitydoors)areinconformancewithcurrentdesigncriteria.Thesechangesdonotimpactothersafetysystemsoraffectsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.IlluminationwithinthemodifiedareasmeetsorexceedstherequirementsoftheIlluminatingEngineeringSocietyLightingHandbook.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage10of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-024,Rev.2Mod.PN2Y89MX033Figures1.7-1e,9.3-20aInstrumentNitrogen(GSN)Abandon2GSN-SOV154In-PlaceandInstallNew2GSN-SOV167DescriptionofChange:Duringprimarycontainmentinerting,theexistingsolenoidvalve2GSN-SOV154malfunctionedandfailedtosupplynitrogentooperatevalve2GSN-PCV124,thusstoppingnitrogenflowtoinerttheprimarycontainment.Replacementoftheexistingsolenoidvalvewouldresultinextensiveskidrework.Therefore,valve2GSN-SOV154wasabandonedin-place,andnewvalve2GSN-SOV167wasinstalledbetweenvalves2GSN-CV155and2GSN-PV124.Newstainlesssteeltubingalsowasinstalledfrom2GSN-V130to2GSN-CV155.Thischangewasoriginallyinstalledasatemporarymodification,andreportedinletterNMP2L1239datedJune11,1990.Thismodificationisnowpermanent.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepurposeofvalve2GSN-SOV154istoclosethenitrogenheadervalve2GSN-PV124ifnitrogengastemperaturedropstothelowtemperaturesetpoint.Thisisasafeguardfeaturethatpreventstheflowoflowtemperaturenitrogengasintothepipingdistributionsystemintheeventofatrimheaterfailure.Newvalve2GSN-SOV167willperformthesamedesignfunctionasabandonedvalve2GSN-SOV154,thusallowingprimarycontainmentinerting.Thischangedoesnotaffectsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Allworkassociatedwiththismodificationwasperformedintheyardarea.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage12of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-088,Rev.0and1Mod.PN2Y87MZ035Table7.5-1,Sh.1ServiceWater(SWP)ExpandScalefor2SWP*FI13A/Band2SWP*FI201A/BDescriptionofChange:Flowindicators2SWP*FI13A/Bmonitorandindicatetheflowofservicewatertotheresidualheatremovalheatexchangers.TosatisfyRegulatoryGuide1.97requirementstoread110%ofdesignflow,thescalesforflowtransmitters2SWP*FT13A/Bandflowindicators2SWP*FI13A/Bwereexpandedtoa0-10,000gpmrange.Inaddition,tomaintaincompliancewithhumanfactors,thescalesontheindicatorsattheremoteshutdownpanelforservicewaterflowtotheRHRheatexchangers,2SWP*FI201A/Bwerealsoexpandedto0-10,000gpm.ThischangewaspartiallyaddressedinSafetyEvaluation88U-326,whichwaspreviouslyreportedinletterNMP2L1210,datedOctober25,1989.USARTable7.5-1,Sh.1,wasrevisedinUSARRevision1"toreflectthismodification.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationrecalibratedandinstallednewscalesandlegendsonsafetyrelatedinstruments.Thischangedoesnotaffectthesafetyfunctionoftheservicewatersystemoraffectanyothersafetysystems.Operabilityoftheinstrumentswasaffectedonlyduringimplementationofthemodification.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage13of166Safety.EvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88U-329ECN>>WSS-030Figure11.4-1dRadioactiveSolidWasteAs-BuiltRevisiontotheRadioactiveSolidWasteSystemDescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedUSARPigure11.4-1dtoreflecttheas-buildconfigurationoftheradioactivesolidwastesystem,depictingthevendor-furnishedprogrammablecontrollerandassociatedinterfacewiththeflowswitch/indicator2WSS-PS167/2WSS-FI167intheextruderevaporatorlubeoilsystem.USARFigure11.4-1dwasrevisedinUSARRevision0toreflectsafetyevaluation88U-329.Thesafetyevaluationsummary,forthisdocumentation-onlychange,wasinadvertentlyomittedfromthesummaryreportsubmittedonApril28,1989.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisisadocumentation-onlychangetoreflecttheas-builtconfigurationofvendor-furnishedequipment,toshowtheinterfacebetweenthesystemprogrammablecontrollerandthelubeoilsystemflowmonitoringinstrumentationonthesystemP&ID.Therewasnoworkassociatedwiththischange,sincetheequipmentwassuppliedbythe.vendor.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage14of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:89-017,Rev.1,2,and3TemporaryMods.89-059,91-005,91-022USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/ACirculatingWaterAcidTreatmentManual,DirectAcidInjectiontoCirculatingWaterDescriptionofChange:AsreportedinletterNMP2L1258,datedOctober31,1990,underSafetyEvaluation89-017,atemporarymethodofsupplyingacidtothecirculatingwatersystemwasimplemented.Acidinjectionwasperformedatthecoolingtowerthroughtheuseofacommercialtanktruckandatemporarypumpingsystemdeliveringacidtothedischargeflumes.Revision1toSafetyEvaluation89-017addressedreplacingthetanktruckwithatemporarystoragetank(8000gal).Revision2addressedaPerm-A-Dikecontainmentbasininstalledaroundthestoragetankandapenetrationthroughthescreenhousewestwall.Inaddition,Revision3addresseddrainingandtransferoftheacidintanks2WTA-TK1A,Btoatankertruckviatemporaryroutingofpipingfromthetanks'ischargetothetankertruckfillconnection.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Acidtreatmentofthecirculatingwaterisutilizedtomaintaincleanheatexchangersurfacesandtopreventbiologicalgrowthwithinthecirculatingwatersystem'scondenser.Thesetemporarymodificationsprovideanalternatemethodofperforminganonsafety-relatedfunctionthatwillnotimpactthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Thestoragetankisdesignedforthesafestorageofhazardouschemicals,andthecontainmentbasinwillcontainthecontentsofthetankintheeventofitsrupture.Theinstallationofthestoragetankandcontainmentbasinwillhavenoimpactonsitefloodingconditions.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage15of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-029,Rev.1N2-OP-33Rev.41.12-11,6.3-18HighPressureCoreSpray(CSH)HPCSKeepFillSystemAlternativewhilePump(2CSH*P2)isInoperableDescriptionofChange:ThisevaluationwasinresponsetoNRCNoticeofViolation50-410/89-05-03andallowstheHPCSsystemtoremainoperablewhenthesystempressurepump(2CSH*P2)isinoperative,providedthefollowingrequirementsaremaintained:Thesystemsuctionisalignedwithcondensatestoragetank2CNS-TK1B,Thewaterlevelin2CNS-TK1Bis47feetorgreater,Thesystempipingfromthepump2CSH*P1dischargevalvetothesystemisolationvalveisvented(atthehighpointvents)every12hours,andThe"highpointventlevellow"switch(2CSH-LS143)alarmisoperableandnotinalarm.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TomaintaintheHPCSsysteminanoperableconditionthesystempump(2CSH*P1)dischargepipingmustbefullofwatertopreventwaterhammeruponsysteminitiation.Withthesystempressurepump2CSH*P2inoperable,maintenanceoftherequirementsoutlinedaboveensuresthatthesystempipingisfullofwateruptotheoutboardisolationvalve(2CSH*MOV107).WhiletheHPCSsystemiskeptfullofwaterbyalignmenttotheCST(2CNS-TK1B)asdescribedabove,waterhammerandHPCSresponsetimearenotchanged.Furthermore,thischangewillnotaffectTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage16of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-046Mod.PN2Y88MX158Figure7.3-2,Sh.1HighPressureCoreSpray(CSH)AddKeylockTestSwitchinHPCSInjectionValveLogicDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledatestswitchincircuit2CSHN05,oncontrolroompanel2CEC*PNL625,toallowfunctionaltestingoftheHPCSinjectionvalve2CSH*MOV107duringcoldshutdown.Thiseliminatedtheneedtoliftleadstoperformthevalvetest,thushelpingpreventoperatorerror.Whenthetestswitchisinthetestposition,astatuslightwillbeilluminatedinthecontrolroomonpanel2CEC*PNL601.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationenhancesoperationoftheHPCSsystembyeliminatingtheneedforliftingleadstoperformsurveillancetesting,thuspreventingthepotentialfornotrelandingliftedleads.Thismodificationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.WhiletheHPCSsystemisin"test,"itwillbedeclaredinoperableandtheappropriateactionofTechnicalSpecification3/4.5.2followed.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage17of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-047,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y89MX038(Partial)Section9.3FloorDrainsReplacementofMiscellaneousCannedSumpPumpsDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationreplacedfifty-sevenexistingfloordrainsumppumpswithstandardoff-the-shelfsubmersiblepumps.Oneadditionalpumpwasaddedintheturbinebuilding.Thesumplevelswitcheswerereplacedwithfixedlevelswitchesthatareactuatedbypressureandarelesssusceptibletodamage.Also,thecheckvalveswhichpreventbackflowintothesumpsfromthedrainheaderwerereplacedwithballcheckvalves.Inlinestrainersandpipingsupplyingcoolingwatertothebearingsweredeletedsincethenewpumpsdonotrequiretheselines.Floordrainsumpsinthereactorbuilding,turbinebuilding,radwastebuilding,andothermiscellaneousbuildingsareaffected.USARRevision3reflectsthoseportionsofthemodificationcompletedpriortoApril30,1991.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theequipmentinvolvedinthismodificationservesnosafetyrelatedfunction,anditsoperationorfailuretooperatedoesnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipment.Thefunctionoftheexistingfloordrainsystemandtheparametersunderwhichitoperatesarenotchanged.Theonlychangeisintheequipmentmanufactureandmodelthatcarriesoutthefunctionsofthesystem.Thenewequipmentwillbemorereliablewhichwillenhancetheperformanceofthesystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

4 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage18of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-062DRFL12-078515.0-9,15.0-12,15.1-8andTable15.0-3(ChangesincorporatedinUSARRev.2,underSafetyEvaluation90-066Rev.1)System:TitleofChange:VariousTransientRe-AnalysistoDispositionTestDataDescriptionofChange:Thelicensing-basistransientanalysesdocumentedinUSAR'Chapter15usednominalparameterstocalculatethechangeincriticalpowerratio(deltaCPR).BasedupontheanalysesinChapter15,theoperatinglimitminimumcriticalpowerration(OLMCPR)wasestablishedintheplantTechnicalSpecifications.SomeoftheseparametersasmeasuredduringthestartuptestsdeviatedsignificantlyfromthenominalvaluesusedintheChapter15transientanalyses.Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluationwastodemonstratetheacceptabilityofthedeviation.Theparametersofspecificconcernare(1)mainstreamlinepressuredrop,(2)turbinesteambypasscapacity,and(3)feedwatercontrollerrunoutflow.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheUSAR-documentedtransientanalyseswereperformedusingthepreviouslyapprovedREDY/ODYNmethodology.Inordertoeitherreviseorconfirmthelicensing-basisOLMCPR,theUSARwasreviewedtoidentifythosetransientswhichrequiredreanalysis.FivelimitingtransienteventswhichdeterminedtheOLMCPRTechnicalSpecificationswerere-analyzedwiththeactualmeasuredvaluesformainsteamlinepressuredrop,turbinesteambypasscapacity,andfeedwatercontrollerrunoutflow.There-analysisusedtheGEMINImethodology.GEMINIhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCforgenericapplication.Inallcasesforcoreflowupto100%,thecurrentTechnicalSpecificationoperatinglimitswereshowntobebounding.TheOLMCPRisadequateinassuringthattheMCPRduringanyeventisnolowerthanthesafetylimitof1.06.Theeffectofreducedmainsteamlinepressuredroponsteamlinesstresseswasalsoevaluated.Itwasdeterminedthatsteamlinestressesareacceptablewiththerestrictionthattheplantcannotexceed75%powerwithanysteamlineisolated.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage19of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-064Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX122Figures9A.3-5,9A.3-6,9A.3-7,9.5-1d,9.5-1f,9.5-2a,Tables9.5-3Sh3,9.5-3aSystem:TitleofChange:FireProtectionWaterInstallationofNewFireProtectionStandpipesDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledsevennewhosereelstationsatlocationswithinthescreenwellbuilding/turbinebuildingandaccesspassageway.Fivehosereelstationswereinstalled(2eachinthescreenwellbuilding,3eachintheturbinebuilding)which,alongwiththepresentlyinstalledhosereelstations,effectivelycoveredthefollowingfirezones:752NZ,727SW,728NZ,722NZ,723NZ,724NZ,and725NZ.Theremainingtwohosereelstationswereinstalledintheaccesspassagewaytoeffectivelycoverfirezones611NWand715NZ.Withtheimplementationofthismodification,NMPCmeetstherequirementsofNFPA14Section3.2.1.Inaddition,anexemptiontoNFPA14Section4-7.1hasbeentakenregardingmandatorypressurelimitingdevicesonnewandexistinghosereelstations.ThisexceptionisdescribedonUSARTable9.5-3Sh.3.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theinstallationofthesehosereelswillnotaffecttheheavyloadscriteria,TechnicalSpecificationsortheEnvironmentalProtectionPlan.Theinstallationcomplieswithexistingdesignandconstructionspecificationsandcodes.TestingofpipingandcomponentsisperformedasrequiredbyEngineeringinstallationinstructionsandspecifications.FireProtectiontrainingandproceduresarereviewedandrevisedasnecessarytoinsurethattheyaddressthismodification.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion./

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage20of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-065,Rev.1Mod.PN2787MX032Table3.9A-12,Figures9.1-5a,9.1-5bSystem:TitleofChange:SpentFuelPoolCooling(SFC).Eliminationof6SFCAnti-SiphonCheckValvesDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationeliminatedsixanti-siphoncheckvalvesoriginallyinstalledonreturnlinestothespargersintheSpentFuelPool(2SPC*V300A&B),ReactorRefuelingCavity(2SFC*V301A&B),CaskHandlingArea(2SFC*V302)andReactorInternalsStoragePit(2SFC*V303).Thevalveswereremovedandthesmallborenipplescapped.Anti-siphonprotectionfortheSpentFuelPoolwasprovidedbydrillingthroughasidewalloneachdowncomerandinstallinghalf-couplings,shortone-inchpipenipples,anddownturnedelbowstoform"downspouts".Anti-siphonprotectionfortheCaskHandlingAreafillanddrainlinewasprovidedbychangingvalve2SFC*V255fromnormallyclosedtonormallyopenedandremovingtheplug.Theanti-siphonfunctionfortherefuelingcavityandtheinternalsstoragepitwasprovidedbyrequiringoperatoractiontoopenexistingmanualventvalves2SFC*V306,V307,orV308whenrequired.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theanti-siphonprotectionrequiredforthespentfuelpoolisbeingprovidedbypassivepipingsystems.Intheeventtheventordownspoutweretobecomeplugged,theSARallowsforafailureoftheanti-siphondevicebyrecognizingthatthesystemincorporatescontrolroomalarmedpoolwaterlevel,watertemperature,andbuildingradiaitonlevelmonitoringsystemsthatwillinitiateoperatorcorrectiveaction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage21of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-067,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX188Figures10.1-7f,10.1-7g,10.1-7p,10.1-7q,10.1-7r,10.2-3,10.4-12System:TitleofChange:ExtractionSteam(ESS)ClosureofExtractionSteamIsolationValvesfromSeparateRelaysDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationaddedtwo(2)additionalmasterturbinetriprelaysintheEHCCabinet2CEC-PNL848andsix(6)turbinetripauxiliaryrelaysineachoftherelaycabinets2CEC-PNL856and2CEC-PNL857.TurbinetripauxiliaryrelayswillbeenergizedbytheirdedicatedMasterTurbineRelayandcontrolpowersupply.Allextractionsteamisolationvalves,non-returnvalvesandotherequipmentcontrolsassociatedwiththemasterturbinetripwereregroupedbytheirstringssothatintheeventofthefailureofoneMasterTurbineTripRelayorturbinetripauxiliarycontrolcircuittheotherstringswouldnotbeaffected.ThischangereplacedatemporarymodificationthatwasaddressedinSafetyEvaluationNo.87-045(ModificationNo.PN2Y87MX041).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationdoesnotchangethefunctionofmasterturbinetripnortheparametersunderwhichitoperates.ThismodificationincreasestheoverallreliabilityofESSfeedwaterheatingduringnormaloperationandminimizesthepotentialturbineoverspeedandwaterinductionduringMasterTurbineBustripping.Noneofthesafetyrelatedstructures,systemsorcomponentsareimpactedbythismodification,andthereisnoaffectonsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage22of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-075,Rev.0,3,4and5Mod.PN2Y87MX038(Partial)Figures9.5-26,9.5-35CommunicationsAdditionofCommunicationEquipmentDescriptionofChange:ThismodificationaddedGaitronic/Communicationcapabilitiesinvariousplantareasbyaddingphonejacks,speakers,speakervolumecontrols,handsets,strobelights,associatedwiringandconduit,andadministrativecontrolsasrequired.ThemodificationsatisfiedthecommitmentaddressedinLER87-025,andincorporatedimprovementsidentifiedfromsystemverificationtesting,siteoperatingexperience,andNRCEmergencyPreparednessExerciseInspection(10/29/86).OneofthepowersourcesfortheGaitroniccommunicationssystemis2VBB-UPS1C.ThisUPSiscurrentlyloadedtofullcapacity.Therefore,portionsofthismodificationwillnotbemadepermanentuntilpowerismadeavailablefrom2VBB-UPS1C.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationenhancescommunicationcapabilitiesfortheperformanceofsurveillancetesting,enablespersonneltorespondtoalarmsinareaswithinherentlyhighnoiselevels,andaddscommunicationequipmentinareasthathavebeenidentifiedasneedingcommunicationcapabilities.Thesechangesdonotdiminishthecapabilityoftheplantcommunicationsystemstoprovideeffectiveandreliablecommunicationscapabilitynecessaryforplantpersonnelduringtimesof:1)plantaccidentsandtransientscombinedwithtotallossofoffsitepowerand2)useoftheremoteshutdownpanelforaplantshutdown.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage23of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-076,Rev.3Mod.PN2Y88MX190Figure1.2-15,7.7-36,7.7-37ProcessComputer3DMonicoreCoreMonitoringSystemDescriptionofChange:ThismodificationinvolvedinstallinganewDigitalEquipmentCorporationComputerSystemincludingaMicrovax3800,twoVax3100workstationswithprinters(oneinthecomputerroomandoneinthecontrolroom)andanRS232LinkbetweentheexistingPMScomputerandthenewMicrovax3800with3DMonicoreSoftware.Sixadditionalpowercableswererunfrom2VBS-PNLC102(UPS1G)tothecomputerroomfornewreceptacles.Aprintercableandacommunicationscablewererunfromthecomputerroomtothecontrolroom.The3DMonicoresoftwarewasinstalledonthenewMicrovax3800computer.Twonewcontrolroomannunciators"PMS-3DCoreMarginAlarm"and"PMS-3DPCRATAlarm"replacedexistingannunciators"PMS-NSSLPRMAlarm",and"PMS-NSSProgramAlarm"onPanel842.Also,thesparediskdrivewasdaisy-chainedtotheexistingdiskdrivetoactasaback-up.SafetyEvaluationSummary:GeneralElectrichasperformedananalysisthatconcludesthatthe3DMonicoremodelismoreaccuratethantheallowancesmadeforinthepreviousprocesscomputerPlsoftwarenuclearmodel,therebyjustifyingitsusewithcurrentmargins.FurtheranalysisispresentedintheGeneralElectricReportNEDE-20340-3ClassIII,April1986Rev1-ProcessComputerEvaluationAccuracy.Thenew3DMonicoresoftwareonthePMScomputerwillnotadverselyimpacttheexistingPMScomputerperformance,andhasnoaffectonsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.IntheeventthattheMicrovax3800computerislost,analternatemethodhasbeenprovidedthatwillallowcoremonitoringcalculationstobeperformedwithina24hourperiodfollowingthelossofthemainsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage24of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-077,Rev.2EDC2M00328CN/ALiquidRadioactiveWaste(LWS)LiningofRegenerantEvaporatorReboiler(2LWS-E7)TubesDescriptionofChange:Thin-walledtubingwasinstalledwithintheexistingdeterioratedtubesoftheregenerantevaporatorreboiler(2LWS-E7).Thenewtubing,madeofASMESA286TP446,wasinsertedandthenexpandedmechanicallysuchthattheinnertubeisheldfirmlyinplacebycompressiveforcescausedbytheoriginaltube,ensuringmetal-to-metalcontact,androlledatthetubesheetsforsealing.Thepurposeofthisrepairwastoallowthereboiler(2LWS-E7)tobeplacedinserviceinasafeandreliablemannerwithoutcross-contaminationfromtheradioactivesideprocesstothecleansidesteam.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thenewliningoftheregenerantevaporatorreboilertubesassurespressureintegritybetweentheradioactiveworkingfluid,tubeside,andthecleanshellsidesteam.Theoveralltubestrengthisstillderivedfromtheoriginaltubes,whiletheliningservestoprovidethepressureboundaryforareaswheredeteriorationbycorrosionpittinghascausedrandomwallthinning.Possiblecontaminationofthe"cleansteam"sideofthereboilerduetotubefailurehasbeenevaluatedpertherequirementsofIEBulletin80-10.Precautionshavebeenimplementedtolimitcontaminationshouldthereboilerbeoperatedwithleakingtubes.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage25of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-078,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX1059.1-7,9.1-23Appendix9C,9C.8-1;Figure5-4System:TitleofChange:ReactorBuildingCranesandElevatorsPermitTravelofPolarCraneMainHoistOverSpentFuelPoolRestrictedAreaDescriptionofChange:Duringnormalfuelhandlingoperationsthespentfuelpoolgatesaremovedfromtheirnormalpositiontotheirstoredpositiononthesideofthefuelcaskstoragepool.Eventually,spentfuelinthefuelpoolwillextendintothesafeloadpaththatthespentfuelgatemusttravel.Thismodificationaddedarestrictionareabypassswitchtoallowbypassingoftheinterlocksthatcontrolmovementofthepolarcranemainhoistoverthespentfuelstoragepool,therebyenablingtheReactorBuildingpolarcrane(RBPC)tooperateoverthespentfuelpoolandthespentfuelifnecessary.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationwasaddressedinalicenseamendmentrequestsubmittedtotheNRCbyNMPCinletterNMP2L1203datedJuly26,1989,andsupplementedbyletterNMP2L1221datedDecember14,1989.TheNRCacceptedthischangewiththeissuanceofLicenseAmendmentNo.20onJuly17,1990.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage26of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-002Mod.PN2Y86MZ0849.2-8,9.2-9,9.2-10;Figure9.2-2,Sh.4System:TitleofChange:PGCC/ServiceWater-HumanFactorsChangesDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationchangednameplatesandannunciatorwindowengravingsonmaincontrolroompanel2CEC*PNL601forservicewatersupplyheaderinstrumentation.Thesechangesweremadetomaintainconsistencybetweenthesystemlogicdiagram"condition"descriptions,paneldrawings,andactualfield-installedmarkerplatesandannunciatorwindows.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationdoesnotaffectthedesignorfunctionoftheservicewatersystem.ThemarkerplateandannunciatorwindowchangesweremadetomaintaintheconsistencyrequirementsoftheNMPCHumanFactorsManualandrecommendationsofNUREG-0700.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage27of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-006Mod.PN2YSSHX159Figures1.2-1,9A.3-1SecurityFenceFree-StandingE-FieldandNuisanceFenceDescriptionofChange:,Thismodificationincludedrelocating(approximately1,000')"E-Field"mountedonthenorthsecurityfencetoafreestanding"E-Field"midwaybetweentheinnersecurityfenceandtheouternuisancefenceonthenorthperimeterofUnit52;addinganewnuisancefence(approximately1,100')ontheeastperimeterofUnit52,fromtheexistingSecurityBuildingtothenorthperimeterfence;relocating(approximately1,100')"E-Field"mountedontheeastsecurityfencetoafreestanding"E-Field"midwaybetweentheinnersecurityfenceandthenewouternuisancefenceontheeastperimeterofUnit52;relocatingexistingditch,manhole,andconcretedrainpipeapproximately12'otheeastoftheirpresentlocation;filledinexistingareaswiththematerialremovedforthenewdrainagearrangement;relocatedexistingfirehydrantNo.703toalocationoutsideofthenewnuisancefenceontheeastperimeter;removedinsulatedstoragebuilding,andremovedadditionsonthewestwallofthemainpipefabricationbuilding.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theconstructionactivitiesandsitechangesdonotresultinsignificantelevationchanges.Therelocationoftheexistingdrainageditchdoesnotaffectthegeneralsitegradingandwillnotaffectthedrainageofthesurroundingarea.ThesitechangesalsodonotadverselyaffecttheexteriorbarriersaroundtheplantbuildingsthatareusedtodivertthePMPfloodfromtheimmediatewatershedencompassingthesite.Therelocatedfirehydrant703willcontinuetoprovidecoveragetothesameareaaswaspreviouslyprotectedwithoutcausinghydrantspacingproblemsornewunprotectedhazards.Hydrant703isnotprotectingsafety-relatedequipment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage28of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:90-008Rev.1and2Mod.PNZY86MZ041Figures6.2-71a,6.2-71bContainmentAtmosphereMonitoringSystem(CMS)TitleofChange:ModificationandRelocationofPrimaryContainmentHumidityAnalyzersDescriptionofChange:DuringperformanceoftheApril1986IntegratedLeakRateTest(ILRT),threeofthesixhumidityanalyzersfailedduetothecompoundedeffectsofhighparticulate(dust)levelsinthedrywell,highhumidityinthesuppressionchamber,lackofa"trackandhold"featureontheanalyzers,andtheinaccessibilityofequipmenttothetestengineersduringthetest.Tocorrectthesedeficiencies,theanalyzerswereseparatedfromthesensorsandrelocatedoutsidetheprimarycontainment.Todothis,fournewjunctionboxeswereaddedoutsidetheprimarycontainment,andtheexistingdatacabletothesensorsinsidetheprimarycontainmentwerereplacedwithanew14conductorcable.Also,aremoteoperatedvacuumpumpwitha5to10micronnon-hygroscopicfilterwasmountedattheinlettoeachsensor.Thismodificationalsoprovideda0to10VDCoutputtoutilizethe"trackandhold"featureofthecontrolunit.Themodificationalsoaddedprimaryfuseprotectiontocablenumbers2CMSNNC501and510goingtoprimarycontainmentpenetrations2CES-Z40Eand35E,respectively.ThiswasdonetocomplywithRegulatoryGuide1.63.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodification,whichreconfiguresthenon-safetyrelatedhumidityanalyzersusedfortheILRT,hasnoimpactonthesafetyoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Workontheaffectedprimarycontainmentelectricalpenetrationswasperformedwithapprovedgoverningprocedures,andappropriateleakratetestingwasperformedtoensureprimarycontainmentintegrity.Theaddedelectricalcablesineachpenetrationareenergizedonlyduringshutdownconditions;therefore,electricalpenetrationovercurrentprotectionduringanaccidentisofnoconcern.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage29of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:90-011Rev.1Mod.PN2Y89MZ089Figure10.1-5eCondensateBoosterPumpLubeOil(CNO)TitleofChange:CondensateBoosterPumpLubeOilSystemModificationsDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationreplacedtheexistingthree-wayvalveswithseparateisolationvalvesforeachfilter.Thisarrangementallowstheoperatortoplacethecleanfilterinoperationpriortoisolatingtheotherfilter.Topreventoverpressurization,intheeventbothfilterpathsareinadvertentlyclosed,areliefvalvewasinstalledupstreamofthefilterisolationvalves.eInadditiontotheabove,thefollowingchangesweremadeaspartofthismodification:Ventanddrainvalveswereinstalledoneachfilter.Previously,onlyventanddrainplugswereprovidedtothefilterhousing.Thechangeimprovedthemaintenanceofthefilters.2~Thesetpointforpressuredifferentialindicatingswitches2CNO-PDIS3A/B/Cwerecalculatedandrevisedconsistentwiththeotherchanges.3.TopreventactuationofthePDISduetooscillationsinthepressurereadings,snubberswereinstalledoneachPDIS.4~Addedaccesscoverstotheoilsumps(2CNO-TK1A/B/C)tofacilitatemaintenanceofthestrainerswithoutdismantlinganypiping.5.A3/4-inchvalvedconnectionwasprovidedonthesumpforconnectingaportablepurifierinthefuture.Theexistingsumpdrainconnectionwillbeutilized.6.EditorialChanges-Checkvalves2CNO-V2A/B/CandV3A/B/CwereincorrectlyshowninFSARFigure10.1-5easnormallyclosed(i.e.,areaisdarkened).

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage30of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-011Rev.1DescriptionofChange:(continued)ThismodificationwasalsoneededtopreventnuisancealarmsintheControlRoomcausedbytheactuationofPDIS3A/B/C.Thisconditionwascorrectedbythechangesdescribedabove.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangesimplementedbythismodificationdonotadverselyimpactthedesignfunctionoftheCNOsystem.Themodificationimprovestheoverallreliabilityofthesystembypreventingthefiltergasketfailure.Theeliminationofnuisancealarmshelpsalleviatethehumanfactorsconcerns.Noneofthesafety-relatedstructures,systemsorcomponentsareimpactedbythismodification.Themodificationdoesnotadverselyimpactthecapabilitytoshutdowntheplantsafelyandtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdown'ondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage31of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:XmplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-014Mod.PN2788MX166Figures1.2-28,12.3-21,12.3-54System:TitleofChange:N/AProvideEmergencyEgressfromtheRoofofServiceWaterPumpBaysDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledastandarddetailegressladderontheoutsidewalloftheservicewaterpumproomextendingfromelevation280'owntothegroundfloorofthescreenwellbuilding(elevation261').Theadditionofthisladderprovidesfreeandunobstructedegressfromtheroofoftheservicewaterpumpbaysincaseofanemergency.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisnon-safetyrelatedminormodificationdoesnotimpactthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Failureoftheegressladderwouldnotaffecteithertheflooratelevation261'rtheeastwall,whicharesafetyrelated.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage32of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-017DRFAOO-835-5N/AFeedwaterFeedwaterPumpLoosePartAnalysisDescriptionofChange:OnDecember26,1989,NMP2wasshutdownduetoexcessivefeedwatersystemvibration.Uponinvestigation,itwasdiscoveredthatthefeedwaterpumps,2FWS-P1A,B,andCweredamaged.Thisdamagewastheresultofthedislocationineachpumpofarectangularpieceoftheflowsplitterapproximately5"X3"X7/8"thickinsize.Thepartsseparatedfrompumps2FWS-P1CandBwererecoveredessentiallyintact,butweredamaged.Thepartfrom2FWS-P1Awasnotrecovered.Thisanalysisassumedthatthepart/partswereinthefeedwaterpipingandcouldtravelwithsystemflow.Thepurposeofthisevaluationwastodeterminethepossiblesafetyconsequencesofcontinuedoperationofthefeedwatersystemwiththeloosepart.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theexistenceofthelostpartfromfeedwaterpump2FWS-P1Adoesnotpresentasafetyconcern.Theeffectoftheloosepart(s)onfeedwaterheating,feedwaterflow,primarycontainmentisolationandRPVwaterlevelwasanalyzedandfoundtobeacceptableandboundedbyexistingUSARanalysis.ThelostpartwasadditionallyanalyzedbyGeneralElectric(GE)intermsifitseffectonceinsidethevessel.GE'sanalysisconcludedthatthelostpartwillnotbeaconcernintermsof:1.Thepotentialforfuelbundleblockageandsubsequentfueldamage.2.Thepotentialforcontrolrodinterference.3.Thepotentialforcorrosionorotherchemicalreactionwithreactormaterial.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthecontinuedoperationofthefeedwatersystemwiththelostpartdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage33of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-018Mod.PN2Y88MX197Figures9.3-11eand10,1-8cRadwasteAuxiliarySteam2ASR-V34andV35DrainLinesDescriptionofChange:Theradwasteauxiliarysteamheadersuppliessteamtotheradwasteevaporatorsaspartofradwasteprocessing.Thismodificationprovideddrainlinerunsfromthetwosteamheaderdrainvalves,2ASR-V34and2ASR-V35,todrains2DFW-DNF0801and2DFN-ED3402respectively,todraincondensatefromthesteamheader.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationdoesnotaffectsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Shouldafailureofadrainlineoccur,theeffluentwouldberecoveredbythefloordrainsystem,thesamesystembeingutilizedbythepiping.Thiswouldnotcauseareleaseofanyradioactivematerial.Nopotentialsafetyhazardsorsysteminteractionsarecreatedbythischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage34of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-019,Rev.0,1,and2Mod.PN2Y89MZ018Pigures9.1-5c,9.1-5d,9.1-6,Sh.4System:TitleofChange:SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanup(SFC)~SPCFilterDischargeStrainerDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledone"Y"typestrainerandbypassinthecommon8"diameteroutletlinefromtheSFCfilter/demins(2SFC-FLT1A,B)outsidetheequipmentcubicle.Thisstrainertrapsresinpowderthatmayescapethedemineralizerresinbedsduringpre-coatingoperations.Adifferentialpressuretransmitterinitiatesalocalalarmandasystemalarminthecontrolroomforexcessivepressuredropacrossthestrainer.Strainerblowdownisdirectedtotheradwastesystem,andacondensatewaterconnectionwasprovidedforstrainerbackwash.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationwasmadetothenonsafety-.relatedcleanupsectionoftheSFCsystem,outsideoftheCategoryIisolationvalves2SFC*AOV153,154.ItwillhelpensurethatSPCpoolwaterqualityismaintainedafterfilter/deminbackwashandpre-coatoperation.Revision1tothesafetyevaluationaddressedrelocationofsprinklerpipeandheadstoprovideclearanceforthebypassline.Revision2addressedanadditionalchangetoUSARFigure9.1-5ctodepicttheblowdownvalveairoperator,andachangetoFigure9.1-5dtodepictthetie-intotheexistingfilter/demindrainline.Thismodificationhasnoimpactonthesafety-relatedfuelpoolcoolingfunctionoftheSFCsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage35of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-025Rev.1Mod.PN2Y89MZ040Figure10.1-6BFWSPeedwaterRemovalofTestConnectionValves2PWS*V16Cand2PWS*V18CDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationremovedatestconnectioninthefeedwatersystem(PWS)thatwasnolongerrequiredandwasintheremovalpathofthemainsteam(MSS)safetyreliefvalves(SRV).Theconnectionwascutoffatthesmallborepipingnipplecomingoffthecouplingonlargeboreline2FWS-012-34-1,cappedandsocketwelded.Apipesupportwasremovedasitwasnolongerrequired(BZ-409EE).MetalreflectiveinsulationofthePWSsystempipingwasmodifiedtosuitthenewconfiguration.ThissafetyevaluationalsocorrectedthecodeclassbreakshownonUSAR~~~~~~~Figure10.1-6bforfiveremainingtestconnectionsthatwerenotremovedbythismodification.Forsmalllines(equivalenttooneinchsize),thefirstinterveningvalvebetweenthesmallborelineandthelargeborehasthelowercodeclassdesignation(i.e.,Class2ratherthanClass1).ThisisconsistentthroughoutNMP2onthelinesoneinchandlessthatarevents,drains,tests,samples,andfillconnectionsoffoftheRCPB.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theinstallationmeetssystemdesignpressureandtemperaturerequirementsanddoesnotaffectthesafeoperationofthesystem.Thisinstallationhasnoimpactonothersafety-relatedsystems.Thischangewillnotaffectanyelectricalcircuits,fireprotection,electricalorlightingcircuits.Thisinstallationwasaccomplishedusingsite-approvedproceduresandincludednormalQA/QCinvolvement.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage36of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-027Mod.PNZY88MX069Figure9.2-17a,9.2-18,Sh.1;15.7-6System:TitleofChange:CondensateMakeupandStorage(CNS)CondensateStorageTankLevelSetpointChangeDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationclearednuisancealarm851518(CondensateStorageTank1A/BLevelHigh)byrecalibratingthealarmsetpoint.Theoperatingbandwasrevisedbythechangeoutof4levelswitchesfromfloattypeswitchestopressuretypeswitches.Thesepressuretypeswitchesexpandedthecontrolrangeofthecondensatestoragetank(CST)makeupvalve2CNS-AOV123andraisedtheCSTlowlevelalarmsetpointtobeconsistentwithnormaloperationalmakeuprequirements.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thecondensatestoragetanks(2CNS-TK1A/B)capacitiesaredesignedtomeettherequirementsofmakeupwaterforsafeguard(RCIC&HPCSpreferredsource),normal,andrefuelingconditions.TheCSTsarenon-safetyrelated,non-seismictanksandnocreditistakeninanytransientoraccidentanalysisforCSTwaterinventoryforHPCSorRCICoperability.TheCSTsarethepreferredsourceofwaterforRCICandHPCSduetothesuperiorwaterqualitycomparedtothesuppressionpool.RaisingtheCSThighlevelsetpointswillnotaffectthesafeguardswaterstoragerequirement.Also,thecondensatestoragetanks'uptureanalysisdescribedinUSARSection15.7.3.1.5isbasedonreleaseofthefullvolume(900,000Gal)ofbothtanksascalculatedfromoveralltankdimensions,andisthereforeunaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage37of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-028Mod.PN2YSSMX156Table3.9B-2V,Figure9.3-17aStandbyLiquidControl(SLS)AdditionofTestConnectionsforValves.2SLS*V12and2SLS*V14DescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledtestconnectionstoprovidealeakpathduringreverseflowtestingofcheckvalves2SLS*V12and2SLS*V14.Thetestconnectionsallowthevalvestobetestedquarterly,asrequiredbyASMESectionXI,andfulfillacommitmentmadeintheISI/ISTplantohavetheseinstalledbythefirstrefueloutage(ReliefRequestSLSVRR2).ThetestconnectionsarelocatedinaflangedpipespoolwhichreplacedanexistingspoolatthedischargeofeachSLSpump.Thetestconnectionforeachcheckvalveconsistsofasock-o-let,piping,2valves,coupling,andpipeplug.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThetestconnectionsareinstalledinanASMEIIIClass2,safetyrelatedsystem.Thematerialsofconstructionarecompatiblewiththeexistinginstallation.Thetestconnectiondesignissimilartothatusedonothersafetyrelatedsystemsthroughouttheplant,butincorporatestheuseofstellitefreevalvesasanefforttoreducecobaltsourcesintheplant.Theadditionalweightofthetestconnectionschangedtheas-builtnozzleloadsonpumps2SLS*P1Aand2SLS*P1B,butiswithintheallowablelimits.Theinstallationmeetssystemdesignpressureandtemperaturerequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage38of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-030,Rev.2Mod.PN2Y87MX035Chapters1,6,7,8,9,10,11,18VariousDetailedControlRoomDesignReview(DCRDR)ModificationsDescriptionofChange:Changesweremadeinthecontrolroom,remoteshutdownroom,andrelayroomtoresolvehumanengineeringissuesconsistentwithNUREG-0700guidelines.Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedhumanengineeringdiscrepancies(HED's)whichwererequiredtobecompletedduringthefirstrefuelingoutageconsistentwiththerequirementsoflicensecondition2.C.(9),asstatedintheNRC'sSSER5,Section18.1.HumanfactorissuesdiscoveredsubsequenttotheissuanceofSSER5werealsoevaluated.AppropriatechangesweremadetositeoperatingprocedurestoreflecttheresolutionofHED's(annunciatorwindowlabelchanges,additionofnewinstrumentation,computerpointIDchanges,etc.).Theeffectthesechangeshaveonplantequipmentduringtheimplementationphasewasaddressedviathesignoffofequipmentout-of-servicetagsbyoperations.Theoperabilityofequipmentaddressedbyplanttechnicalspecificationsandanyrequiredcompensatoryaction(enteringofactionstatements)duringtheimplementationphasewasalsoaddressedbyoperations.UponcompletionoftheimplementationoftheresolutionoftheHED's,appropriateretestingwasperformedtoensurethatplantequipmentwasproperlyrestoredtoitsoriginalconfigurationpriortodeclaringassociatedequipment/systemsoperable.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheresolutionoftheHED'sisconsistentwithNUREG-0700guidelinesandwillenhancetheabilityoftheoperatortorespondtotransientsandaccidentsbyimprovingtheoperator/machineinterface.AmechanismfortheNRCstafftomonitorandreviewchangestoHEDsisdescribedinLicenseAmendmentNo.24(issuedonDecember18,1990),whichdeletedLicenseCondition2.C(9).Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage39of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-031,Rev.1EDC2M10064Figures9.5-1d,9.5-1e,9A.3-6System:PireProtectionWater(FPW),PireProtectionFoam(PP)TitleofChange:ChangeFoam/WaterPireHoseReelWaterSupplyIsolationValvesfromNormallyOpentoNormallyClosedDescriptionofChange:TheUnit2TurbineBuildingisequippedwithfoam/waterfirehosereel(F/WFHR)stationsthatprotecttheturbinegeneratoratvariouselevations.TheseFHRstationsareusedinmanualfirefightingaroundtheturbinegeneratorandhavethecapabilitytoprovideeitherwaterorwaterwith3Xfoamconcentration.Thefireprotectionwater(PPW)andthefireprotectionfoam(PPF)systemsmeetattheP/WPHRsandareseparatedbyanormallyclosedfoamblockingvalveandcheckvalve.AproblemwasidentifiedwherebylowexpansionproteinfoamfromtheFPPsystemhadleakedintotheFPWsystembyleakingpastthefoamblockingvalves,checkvalvesandthroughthenormallyopenP/WFHRwatersupplyisolationvalves(WSIVs)ateachofthe14F/WFHRs.Toalleviatethisproblem,theF/WFHRWSIVswerechangedfromthenormallyopenpositiontothenormallyclosedposition.Inaddition,drawingEB-22E(USARFigure9A.3-6)wascorrectedtoshowfirehosereelFHR-7asawaterhosereelratherthanafoamsystemhosereel.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ChangingtheF/HFHRWSIVsfromthenormallyopentothenormallyclosedpositionwillensurethatfoamfromthePPPsystemwillnotenterthelowerpressureFPWsystem,whichcouldcausepossibleadverseaffectsonsystemreliabilityandoperability.NoneofthefirezonesprotectedbytheF/WFHRsandFHR7containsafeshutdownequipment.TheclosedWSIVsareincloseproximitytotheFHRanglevalve,andareeasilyopenedmanually.PirebrigadepersonnelweretrainedregardingthechangeinnormalWSIVposition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage40of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-033Mod.PN2Y88MX174Figure8.3-6Sh16&17StandbyDieselGeneratorsModifyDiv.IandIIDieselGeneratorStartingCircuitDescriptionofChange:DieselGenerators2EGS*EG1and2EGS*EG3utilizedualclass-IEemergencystart/runcircuitry(primaryandback).Also,eachdieselgeneratorutilizesanon-1Estart/stopcircuitformanualstart/stopandtesting.DuringFMEA(failuremodesandeffectanalysis)update,itwasdiscoveredthatthelossofoffsitepower(LOOP)signaltodieselgeneratoremergencystart/runcircuitisnotsealedin;aspuriousenergizationofnon-1Edevicescouldshutdownthediesels.ThisdesigndeficiencywasuncoveredduringaFMEAupdateandwasaddressedinLER88-44,Revision1.Thismodificationperformedthefollowing:Backedouttemporarymodifications88-192,88-193,88-206,and88-207,asdescribedinLER88-44Revision1.2.Addedaclass1EHFAlatchingrelayinboth4160Vswitchgears.Thisrelayisdedicatedtostartthedieselgeneratoruponlossofoffsitepower.TheLOOPsignalwillbesealed-inbytheHFAlatchingrelayandacontinuoussignalwillbeavailablefordieselemergencyrunningcircuitry.Therelayisresetbyaclosedsignalofeitherthenormaloralternateoffsitepowerfeederbreakers.Thismodificationensuresthatcommonmodefailureofnon-1Edeviceswillnotshutdowndieselswhentheyarerunninginemergencymodewithoffsitepowernotavailable.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationwasperformedtoensurecompliancetoRegulatoryGuide1.53forsinglefailurecriteriaforstandbydieselgenerators.Themodificationimprovesthesafety-relatedfunctionofthestandbydieselgenerators.Theseal-infunctionofthismodificationfortheLOOPsignalissimilartotheLOCAsignalpreviouslyanalyzed.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage41of166SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-034,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y88MX110Figures5.4-2b,5.4-2c,9.2-3bSystem:TitleofChange:ReactorRecirculation(RCS)ReactorRecirculationPumpStuffingBoxModificationDescriptionofChange:ReactorrecirculationpumpsatLaSalle1andWNP-2,withbasicallythesamestuffingboxdesignasNineMilePoint2,haveexperiencedfailuresofthemountinghardwaresecuringtheupperwearringandbearingassemblytothestuffingbox.Asaresultofthesefailures,thestuffingboxdesignwasrevisedtoincreasethenumber,changethematerialandthreadtype,andchangethesizeofthewearringmountingcapscrews.Inordertofacilitatemotorremovaltogainaccesstothestuffingboxes,severalsmallborepipesandconduits,aswellastheirsupports,wereredesigned.Additionalchangesincludedthefollowing:Replacedtheexistingsingleplanevibrationmonitorswith2monitorsinstalledindifferentplanes,90'romeachother.Addedathermocoupletomeasurethesealwaterinlettemperatureforeachrecirculationpump.Relocatedanexpansionjointclosertothecoolerononeofthelinestoacooleronthe"B"recirculationpumpmotor.Mademinorchangestothesaddlesusedtoremoveandinstallthepersonnelairlock.MademinorrevisionstoremovablehandrailsandgratingtoreduceexposuretimeduringinstallationandremovaloftheremovablesealundertheRCSpumps.ModifiedthereactorrecirculationpumpmotorhandlingcarttoprovideredundantliftingcapacityinaccordancewithNUREG-0612.