ML12240A010

Crystal River, Unit 3 - Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Safety Issues Resolution Branch (Ssib) Technical Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)

ML12240A010
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/21/2012
From:	Franke J A Progress Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F0812-03, TAC ME6527
Download: ML12240A010 (8)

Text

SProgress EnergyCrystal River Nuclear PlantDocket No. 50-302Operating License No. DPR-72August 21, 20123F0812-03U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001Subject: Crystal River Unit 3 -Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRCSafety Issues Resolution Branch (SSIB) Technical Review of the CR-3 Extended PowerUprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)References: 1. CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -LicenseAmendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (ADAMSAccession No. ML 112070659)2. Email from S. Lingam (NRC) to D. Westcott (CR-3) dated June 29, 2012, "CrystalRiver, Unit 3 EPU LAR -Draft RAI from GSI-191 (GL 2004-02) Branch (TAC No.ME6527)"3. NRC to CR-3 letter dated July 17, 2012, "Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear GeneratingPlant -Request For Additional Information For Extended Power Uprate LicenseAmendment Request (TAC No. ME6527)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12194A417)Dear Sir:By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) requested a license amendment toincrease the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to3014 MWt (Reference 1). On June 29, 2012, via electronic mail, the NRC provided a draft request foradditional information (RAI) related to NRC Generic Safety Issue 191, "Assessment of DebrisAccumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance," needed to support the SSIB technicalreview of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) License Amendment Request (LAR) (Reference 2).By teleconference on July 10, 2012, FPC discussed the draft RAI with the NRC to confirm anunderstanding of the information being requested. On July 17, 2012, the NRC provided a formal RAIrequired to complete its evaluation of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 3).The attachment, "Response to Request for Additional Information -Safety Issues Resolution BranchTechnical Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR," provides the CR-3 formal response to the RAI.This correspondence contains no new regulatory commitments.If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott, Superintendent,Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4796.Sinc y,Jon .FrankeV, e Presidentcrystal River Nuclear PlantJAF/gweAttachment: Response to Request for Additional Information -Safety Issues Resolution BranchTechnical Review of the CR-3 EPU LARxc: NRR Project ManagerRegional Administrator, Region IISenior Resident InspectorState ContactCrystal River Nuclear Plant15760 W. Powerline Street Crystal River, FL 34428 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 23F0812-03STATE OF FLORIDACOUNTY OF CITRUSJon A. Franke states that he is the Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant for FloridaPower Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with theNuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statementsmade and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information,and belief.FrankeJ Vice PresidentCrystal River Nuclear PlantThe foregoing document was acknowledged before me this G / day of2012, by Jon A. Franke.Signature of Notary PublicState of FloridaW0z LPRI *..:(Print, type, or stamp CommissionedName of Notary Public)Personally ProducedKnown -OR- Identification FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72ATTACHMENTRESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION-SAFETY ISSUES RESOLUTION BRANCH TECHNICALREVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment3F0812-03 Page 1 of 3RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -SAFETY ISSUES RESOLUTION BRANCH TECHNICAL REVIEW OFTHE CR-3 EPU LARBy letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) requested a license amendmentto increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts(MWt) to 3014 MWt (Reference 1). On June 29, 2012, via electronic mail, the NRC provided adraft request for additional information (RAI) related to NRC Generic Safety Issue 191,"Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,"needed to support the Safety Issues Resolution Branch (SSIB) technical review of the CR-3Extended Power Uprate (EPU) License Amendment Request (LAR). By teleconference on July10, 2012, FPC discussed the draft RAI with the NRC to confirm an understanding of theinformation being requested. The following provides the CR-3 formal response to the RAIneeded to support the SSIB technical review of the CR-3 EPU LAR. For tracking purposes, eachitem related to this RAI is uniquely identified as SSIB X-Y, with X indicating the RAI set and Yindicating the sequential item number.SSIB RAIsSSIB 1-1With regard to resolving issues identified in the NRC Generic Safety Issue 191, "Assessment ofDebris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance," Attachment 5 of theoriginal EPU LAR dated June 15, 2011, Section 2.8.5.6.3 cites NRC correspondence datedOctober 2, 2009 (Farideh E. Saba (NRC) Letter to Jon A. Franke (Progress Energy)), CrystalRiver Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant -Partial Close out and Request for AdditionalInformation Related to Generic Letter 2004-02 (TAC NO. MC4678), ADAMS Accession No.ML092670261) to show that with the exception of in-vessel downstream effects, CR-3 hasresolved the issues identified in Generic Safety Issue- 191.Consistent with the guidance in the NRC staff s safety evaluation on Nuclear Energy Institute[NEI]-04-07, the equipment in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containmentspray system, such as pumps and valves, at CR-3 has been evaluated for the effects of debris inthe recirculated fluid that bypasses (or passes through) the suction strainers. The power upratesubmittal states that valves and piping are being added to the ECCS to support a passive cross-tiebetween the decay heat removal/low-pressure injection system and reactor cooling systemhot-leg B. Please describe the method(s) used to evaluate the new piping system components forblockage and wear and the results of those evaluations.Response:The new valves for the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System cross-tie and the hot leg injection(HLI) modification have been assessed for blockage and erosive wear against the wear andplugging criteria of NRC approved topical report WCAP-16406-P-A, "Evaluation ofDownstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191," (Reference 2). Figure 1, "ProposedLow Pressure Injection System Cross-Tie and Hot Leg Injection Simplified Diagram," illustratesthe new valves and instrument sensing lines proposed for installation in the CR-3 LPI Systemcross-tie and HLI modification.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment3F0812-03 Page 2 of 3The new LPI cross-tie modification design includes the following:* Two Flex Wedge normally open, 10 inch gate valves (DHV-501, 601). The valves provide afull port flow path through the cross-tie line. Plugging and wear impact are not consideredcritical per Section 8.2, "Valves," of WCAP-16406-P-A." Two Y-pattern manual 10 inch globe valves (DHV-500, 600). These manual valves will belocked in a throttled position following flow balancing of the system. It is expected thatthese valves will be throttled approximately 50% open to establish at least 3000 gpm. FPChas assessed the plugging and wear impact of these valves and concluded that adequatemargin exists to account for fine tuning of the valve throttle position during flow balancing.These valves will meet the plugging and wear acceptance criteria of Sections 7.3.3, "FlowArea Evaluation for Plugging and Wear," and 7.3.2, "Erosive Wear," of WCAP-16406-P-A,respectively.* Two Y-pattern globe style, 10 inch stop check valves (DHV-510, 610). These valves willchange position based on pump discharge flow and prevent reverse flow through an idlepump, if necessary. Since these check valves are > 1 inch, and the minimum required flowthrough the valves is normal LPI System flow (i.e., > 0.42 ft/sec), plugging and wear impactare not considered critical per Section 8.2 of WCAP-16406-P-A.The new HLI line modification design includes the following:" Two normally closed motor-operated, parallel slide, 6 inch gate valves (DHV-514, 614). Thevalves are required to open in certain post-accident scenarios to support boron precipitationmitigation in the core. These gate valves are > 1 inch and are either fully open or fullyclosed; thus, plugging and wear impact are not considered critical per Section 8.2 of WCAP-16406-P-A.* One manual normally open, 6 inch Flex Wedge gate valve (DHV-615) provides a full portflow path through the new HLI line. This gate valve is > 1 inch and is normally fully open;thus, plugging and wear impact are not considered critical per Section 8.2 of WCAP-16406-P-A." Two normally closed, 6 inch, nozzle check valves (DHV-611, 612) will open to pass processflow in certain post-accident scenarios to support boron precipitation mitigation in the core.Since these check valves are > 1 inch, and the minimum required flow through the valves is400 gpm (i.e., > 0.42 ft/sec), plugging and wear impact are not considered critical per Section8.2 of WCAP-1 6406-P-A." Two normally closed, 8 inch, T-pattern, manual globe valves (DHV-9, 48) in the processlines to the spent fuel pool and the borated water storage tank. These normally closed testvalves are > 1.5 inches; thus, plugging and wear impact are not considered critical perSection 8.2 of WCAP-16406-P-A." The new LPI System pressure instruments (DH-64-DPT, DH-65-DPT, DH-66-PT, and DH-67-PT) utilize 0.5 inch, stainless steel tubing for impulse sensing lines to connect to the LPISystem piping downstream of. throttle valves DHV-500 and DHV-600. Since the impulsesensing instrument lines are static fluid lines and have no discernible flow, the only credible U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment3F0812-03 Page 3 of 3method causing the instrument sensing lines to become plugged would be caused by settlingdebris in the lines. Therefore, the LPI System cross-tie line modification design includesconnecting the 0.5 inch sensing line perpendicular to the main 10 inch LPI System piping atthe pipe horizontal center-line, which will ensure the sensing lines remain water-solidminimizing the possibility of debris entrapment and settling in the sensing lines. Thus, theLPI System pressure impulse sensing line design meets the criteria specified in Section 8.6.6,"Sensing Line Evaluation," of WCAP-16406-P-A.References1. FPC to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 -License AmendmentRequest #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate." (ADAMS Accession No.ML1 12070659)2. Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-16406-P-A, "Evaluation of Downstream SumpDebris Effects in Support of GSI-191," Revision 1, March 2008. (Proprietary)

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONCRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72FIGURE 1PROPOSED LOW PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM CROSS-TIE AND HOT LEG INJECTION SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM I .I .Figure 1Proposed Low Pressure Injection System Cross-Tieand Hot Leg Injection Simplified DiagramNOTES:1. ITEMS IN RED ARE NEW.2. ITEMS IN BLACK ARE EXISTING.3. INSTRUMENT VALVES NOT SHOWN FOR CLARITY.PROPOSED INSTALLATION