ML20245C472

Partially Withheld Commission Paper Providing Staff Position & Recommendation for Revised Environ Qualification Extension Request post-851130 for Pilgrim

ML20245C472
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/22/1985
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML20244D847	List: BECO-85-213, Provides Update on Status of Testing of Items Covered by Util 850923 Environ Qualification Extension Request ML20244D843 ML20244E387 ML20245B767 ML20245B773 ML20245B789 ML20245B792 ML20245B795 ML20245B802 ML20245B818 ML20245B827 ML20245B953 ML20245B964 ML20245B978 ML20245C201 ML20245C220 ML20245C222 ML20245C233 ML20245C248 ML20245C264 ML20245C279 ML20245C294 ML20245C300 ML20245C326 ML20245C339 ML20245C358 ML20245C371 ML20245C382 ML20245C415 ML20245C449 ML20245C463 ML20245C472 ML20245D135 ML20245D179
References
FOIA-88-198, TASK-PINV, TASK-SE SECY-85-338A, SECY-85-338A-02, SECY-85-338A-2, NUDOCS 8904270172
Download: ML20245C472 (8)

Text

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1, POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)

November 22, 1985 SECY-85-338A For: The Commissioners i

From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

REVISED ENVIRONMENTAL -QUALIFICATION (EQ)

EXTENSION REQUEST POST-NOVEMBER 30, 1985 FOR THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION Puroose: To provide the staff position and recommendation for the above-stated EQ extension request,' as revised by the licensee's letter dated November 15, 1985.

Background:

By letter dated September 23, 1985, the Boston Edison Company-(BECo, the licensee) requested that the Coninission grant an extension beyond the currently approved November 30, 1985 deadline to no later than startup from Refueling Outage No. 7 (scheduled for September 1986) for environmental qualification of five i items of electrical equipment. The items for which the '

licensee requested the extension consisted'of eight Yarway level indicators, two Fenewall temperature switches, two control switches, one type S1 cable, and two type SIS cables.. As indicated by the licensee, these affected items were scheduled for testing with the expectation that test results would be obtained before November 30, 1985. _ . . ,

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M. Thadani, ONRR 49-27380 Information in this record was deleted n accordance with the F3eedom of Information Act, exemptient 2 090419 pga FOIA O '

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. The tomniissioners  ; By a letter dated October 30, 1985 to Chairman Palladino, the licensee requested that "the Commission delay' action on the staff's recommendation provided in SECY-85-338, until updated. testing information has been provided on November 15, 1985." Subsequently, by a letter dated November 15, 1985 (Enclosure 11, the licensee submitted additional testing information and revised the duration of the extension from almost a year to 'approximately 10 weeks for documentation of the test results for the remaining five items.

Discussion: in its November 15, 1985 letter the licensee provided an update on the status of testing and requested that the Commission approve an extension of the November 30, 1985 deadline to February 8,1986 for completing the qualification documentation.of the five remaining items. The licensee stated that the tests for item Nos. 2 and 5 (Fenewall temperature switches and S15 cables) have been successfully completed, but are lacking documentation of the tests. Item No.1 (Yarway level' indicating switches) has also been successfully tested, but some anomaly in the test results requires further evaluation. It is the licensee's judgement that the observed anomaly will be successfully resolved and the item successfully qualified. Similarly, the

- licensee has successfully completed the tests on the control switches in the closed contact position.

However, due to an inadvertent omission by the test laboratory, the tests for the switches in the open contact position are now scheduled for completion by November 22, 1985. The remaining item No. 4 (51 cable) is also scheduled to be tested on November 22, 1985.

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Recommendation: That the Cornission:

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.A;v m, Wil'liam J. Dircks-- _.

Executive Director for Operations i En' closures :

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Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly i

to the Office of~the Secretary ASAP. -We understand that OGC i is drafting an order which should be provided to the Commission on Monday November 25, 1985. We anticipate that this issue be acted on at affirmation on Tuesday, November 26, 1985.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OPE OI OCA OIA.

OPA REGIONAL OFFICES 1- EDO ELD '

ACRS ASLBP ASLAP SECY

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. ENCLOSURE 1.

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' November: 15', 1985 BEco 85-207 l

? Mr 'Domenic 8. Vassallo Chief E . Operating' Reactors Branch #2 ft Division of Licensing.

Office of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear = Regulatory Commission.

Hashington, D. C. 20555 License OPA-35 Docket 50-2931

Subject:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit #1 Environmental Qualification Extension Request

References:

1) BECo letter 85-170 dated September 23, 1985 H. D. Narrington to.N. J. Palladino.

2) BECo Letter 85-196 dated October 30, 1985-H. D. Harrington to N. J. Palladino

Dear Str:

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On September 23, 1985. In accordance with guidance provided by NRC Generic letter 85-15 Boston Edison Company requested an extension of the November 30, 1985 equipment qualification deadline for five items (consisting of 15 individual components) of equipment at Pilgrim Station. (Reference 1). As indicated therein all of the affected equipment was then schedulad for testing with the expectation that test results would be obtained before November 30, 1985.

.On October 30, 1985, Boston Edison.provided an update on the status of such testing and requested the Commission to defer action on the extension request while further test results were received and evaluated. (Reference 2). In that letter we committed to provide a further update by November 15, 1985.

The purpose of this letter is to provide that update. He are also revising our extension request reflecting the receipt and analysis of test results to date.

It is the intent of.this letter to request you to approve the extensions up to February 8,1986 for c~ompleting the documentation for all the 5 Items. This is based on our estimate that it will require approximately 10 weeks time from

. November 30, 1985 to have the complete documentation flie in place. He will of ' course, maintain the documentation flies in as complete a fashion as possible while awaiting final test reports.

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B05 TON COISON CONPANY Hr . Dc<neni c S. Va s sa l lo' l November 15, 1985 l Page 2 1

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' He will provide you with a final update prior to November 30, 1985 of results ,

of our evaluation of Item 1 and the two tests (Items 3 and 4) and our action 1 plan for final qualification if the tests turn out unsuccessful. I for the flye items of equipment covered by the September 23, 1985 extension request. Attachment I contains the latest information regarding the status of testing, along with revised dates regarding the amount of extension requested for each item. Specific Information concerning the two items for which >

testing still remains to be completed and for the one item where test results are still being evaluated is set forth below. As raay be noted, however, even for those items which have been (or will be) successfully tested, at least some period of extension hat been requested for the purpose of completing the documentat1on fIIe.

Item 3, the General Electric and Electroswitch Control Switches, was tested on November 7-9, 1985. This item included as part of the testing both the open and closed contact configuration of the switch. He successfully completed tes ting of the closed contact configurations on November 9,1985. However, the open contact configurations have not been fully tested due to inadvertent omission on the part of the test lab. The open contact testing has now been rescheduled foi completion by November 22, 1985. Based on the performance of the closed contact configuration, we believe that the open contact configuration of the switch will be successfully quallfled by testlog on that date. Should the testing be unsuccessful, our alternative would involve replacement of unquallfled switches by cualified replacements. These switches are currently installed in various safety systems and such replacement will require a plant outage. It should be noted that the quallfled replacements have long procurement lead times and a detailed schedule for the replacement contingency for these switches is being evaluated.

Item 4, the 51 cables, is scheduled for testing on November 22, 1985. He remain optimistic that the test will prove successful: however, our contingency plan will be to replace the unquallfled cables with qualified replacements. Such replacement is not expected to require a plant shutdown.

A detailed schedule for the replacement contingency for these cables is also being evaluated.

l Item 1. the Yarway level indicating switches, underwent testing on November <

13, 1985. Certain anomalies in the Initial test results are still being evaluated. Attachment I reflects an extension request based solely upon completion of documentation files; should further evaluation reveal that there are problems with the test, it may be necessary to revise this request, insofar as Boston Edison's modified extension request continues to depend la part upon test results and evaluation expected in the next week of so, we will commit to providing the NRC Staff with verbal status reports regarding test progross. He would anticipate providing a final written report on testing status prior to November 30, 1985. Given the pendency of the hovember 30, 1985 daadline, however, and the fact that extensions beyond that date wt11 be

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BOSTON CDISON COMPANY Mr. 00menic 8. Vassallo November 15, 1985 Page 3 recuired for documentation reasons even if all testing is successful, we would res,est the Comission's favorable consideration on as early a basis as possible of Boston Edison's trodified extension request as identified in Attachment I.

In conclusion, we believe that this modified extension request is in compilance with the Connission's guidelines as set forth in Generic t.etter i 85-15. As of this date, out of an initial listing of some 700 items requiring quellfication, we have now achieved compilance with all but 5 Items. For two of those the only deficiency is ccepletion of documentation f tles, the schedule for which is dictated by receipt of test reports, for the other items, the deficiency is the need to complete tests and evaluations (which we expect to complete by the required date) and thereaf ter to complete documentation files. He are also hopeful of Identifying a significantly shortened schedule, as compared to the current request of RTO #7, for '

achieving full qualification of these items even if the testing 'should not 01ove successful.

Should the Commission or the Staff have any questions regarding this extension request as modified, please contact me. i i

Very truly purs, e 1

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Attachments cc: Chairman of the Commission N. J. Palladino Ccemissioner J. K. Asselstine Commissioner f. H. Bernthat

. Commissioner T. H. Roberts Comi s sioner I.. W. Zech

.Hr. H. J. Otrcks Mr. H. R. Denton Dr. T. E. Hurley Mr. H, t.. Thompson i

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FRED 0'A 0F INF0PX4Tl0E ACT REQUEST '

Director Office of Administration [C74 4 g . /

U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 b #d M/@

In.re: Freedom of Information Act Request No. 88 ,_, Concerning Pilgrim Nuclear, Power Station

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the provisions of the Freedom.of Information Act, 5'U.S.C. $552 and Part 9, Subpart A of 10 C.F.R., it is requested that the records' identified below.be r.ade available for inspection and copying:

1. Records of any votes taken by the Commission, and records or transcripts of Commission meetings, with respect to the shutdown of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, or the restart thereof, on or after. April 12, 1986. i

2. All SECY papers, attachments thereto, records and other

- materials supporting or' forming the basis for positions ,

taken therein on the subject of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station', prepared on or after January 1, 1980.

3. All records prep ed or , dated on or after ,J nuar 1, 1980 (but excluding- ocum-en s included on DopK"et No. 0-293 accession lis ings available from th p ublic Doc ent Room) of NRC Regi I, the fice of the Executive Di ector for Operation the Offic of Inspecti'on and Enfor ment, th Office o Investigat ns, the OJIice of Nuclea Reacto Regulat)rds,theAdvn, Safegup theCompittee ory Offi e of Nuc} ear Materials for React Saf uards,S fety a J Operational Dati, an the NRC 1 the O fice for Eval ation Cent r which discuss, rpfe to, take Emer ency Operatior, pos tions on, or fc rm pPilgrim basis for decisions oncerning, t performance of Qhp Nuclear Power Station in the 11owing areas:

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A. Management B. :sta f fing C. Organization and Organizati... Structure D. Radiation Protection

g. Quality Assurance F. Surveillance G. Maintenance H. Of fsite Emergency Planning I. Fire Protection J. Security K. Management Response to N4C F y ;1atory Activities

4. All records of Region I, the Office of Suclear Reactor Regulation, the Commission, the Of fice cf Inspection and Enforcement, or other Staf f or Commiss on of fices relating to, discussing or forming the basis or support for, ' the Director 's Decision - ( DD-8 7-14 ) dated A; gust 21, 1987.

5. All records (other than those categories of documents excluded f rom Item 3) of any office referred to in Item 4, above, discussing, describing, assessi..g, evaluating, or otherwise relating to actions by the E- staff, FEMA, the ACRS, or other NRC or Commission of fices, to follow-up or monitor actions by Boston Edison Compa .y, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, other jurisdictions within the 10-mile emergency planning zone for Pilgrim N;: lear Power Station, to address issues raised in the Direct:r's Decision (DD 14) da.ed August 21, 1987.

6. All records of the NRC of fices referred to in Item 4 l discussing, describing, assessing or etaluating, or otherwise relating to actions of the NRC staf f to evaluate the July 1987 Restart Plan, and other actions by Boston Edison Company, its agents or contractors, relating to the restart of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power S ation.

7. All records of communications (whether written or oral and occurring from April 12, 1986 to the present) between any of fice of the NRC Staf f, or of the Concission or of fices reporting directly to it, and Boston Liison company, concerning the status or startup of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

8. All records of communications (whether written or oral, and occurring from April 12, 1986 to the present) between any-I office of the NRC Staf f or of the Comaission or of fices reporting directly to it, and FEMA, other Federal or State agencies or governmental entities, or persons concerning the status, startup, or issues relating tc startup, of the Pilgrim Nuclear Pownr Station.

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9. All records 'in the possession of any NRC Staf f or Cor. ;ssion-of fice pertaining to (a ) the evaluation by FEMA, NRC, cr any 1 other entity or agency, of the adequacy of offsite erergency-plans for the Pilgrim Saclear Power. Station, and (b) ; t.e conduct and/or evaluation of drills, full scale / full participation or partial scale / partial participation '

exercises. conducted or planned for the Pilgrim Naclear' Power Station.

For purposes of'this request, " record"~or " document" is i i de fined to include, but nc: be limited to, notes,.memorands, I reports, meeting minutes, legs, transcripts, letters, pos ;on or-policy papers, interpretations of requirements, and guidan:e documents, and ref ers to draf ts as well as any final versi . of I any record or document requested.

Sine ly, i' e.E e

Jo sAson, Esq; (202)944-438 GEJ/veg i

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i* 7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BOSTON EDISON COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-993 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, to the Boston Edison Company (BECo/ licensee) for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station located at the licensee's site in Plymouth County, Massachusetts.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT Identification of the Proposed Action The proposed action would grant a schedular exemption from certain specific requirements of Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50. Specifically an exemption was

- requested from Section IV.F.3 which requires that each licensee at each site shall exercise with offsite authorities such that State and local government emergency plans for each operating reactor site are exercised biennially, with full or partial participation by States and local governments, within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

The exemption would be responsive to the licensee's request dated September 17, 1987 The Need for the Proposed Action: -

The proposed exemption is needed because the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the local governments within the EPZ and the two emergency reception center communities are in the process, with the assistance of the licensee, of implementing numerous improvements in their offsite emergency preparedness programs. The impr.ovement effort is in response to a Federal Energency

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7590-01 7

Management Agency (FEMA) Interim Finding issued August 4.1987. That finding stated that offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness for Massachusetts was inadequate to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The licensee has informed the NRC that the improvement effort will continue until early 1988 and that, in view of the extensive ongoing efforts, the Connonwealth and local governments have indicated that they are not able to fully participate in an exercise during calendar year 1987.

l The last exercise conducted pursuant to Section IV.F.3 of Appendix E to 1

i 10 CFR Part 50 was held in September 1985. Literal compliance with Section IV.F.3 would not be possible without Commonwealth and local government participation.

Environmental Impact of the Proposed Action The proposed exemption constitutes a schedular exemption from conduct of an offsite full participation exercise in calendar year 1987.

Since the last full participation biennial exercise at Pilgrim (in September 1985), the Commonwealth has participated on a limited basis with the licensee in the December 1986 exercise a.nd the cuarterly onsite drills in 1987. The March and June 1987 drills also included limited participation by several of the towns within the EPZ. The towns within the EPZ have also cooperated in the fuil scale siren test conducted by FEMA in September 1986.

The Commonwealth has also participated in full participation exercises at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station in June 1987 and is scheduled to participate in a full participation exercise at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Generatino Station December 2, 1987.

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7590-01 The requested exemption is a temporary one and is necessary because ongoing emergency preparedness efforts will not be completed before early 1988. The licensee has made a good faith effort to comply with the regulation 'I by assisting in the ongeing improvements to the Commonwealth and local offsite emergency response programs. The extensive efforts required to upgrade the offsite plans, inclement the changes and conduct training preclude the conduct of a meaningful and effective full participation exercise in 1987. The probability of an accident will not be increased and thc post-accident radiological releases will not be greater than previorcly determined due to the proposed exemption, and the NRC wil1 determine thre there is adequate assurance of safety before plant restart is approved. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the propnsed exemption.

The proposed exemption does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Comission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed exemption.

I Alternative Use of Resources This action involves no use of resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

Agencies and Persons Contacted On August 4, 1987, FEMA provided information on the status of emergency preparedness at Pilgrim. This information was considered by the NRC in the evaluation of the requested exemption. '

i Finding of No Significant Impact -

The Commission has' determined not t!o prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed exemption.

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6 7590-01 Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, the staff concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this proposed action, see the licensee's letter dated September 17, 1987. This letter is available for public inspection at the Com'.ssion's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the Plymouth Public Library, 11 North Street, Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 02360.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this day of j 1987. I FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

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Morton B. Fairtile, Acting Director Project Director I-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II f

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UNITED STATES i e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

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.V Docket No. 50-293 i

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L Gk.42-L ] k Mr. William D. Harrington Senior Vice President, Nuclear Y. r' .A')kr '

Roston Edison Company A

800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199

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Dear Mr. Harrinaton:

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SUBJECT:

EMERr,ENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES (TAC 45971, 46042, 46114, 46330)

Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station During our tour of the pilgrim Station on February 25, 1986, Mr. Paul Leech and I observed that the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC) have been constructed in the new administration building on site.

We were also informed by your staff that the new offsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be completed and operational by May 21, 1986. Thus, your commitment in the Long Term Plan relative to completion of these facilities will be met.

The TSC, OSC, and EOF are the supporting Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) addressed in NUREG-0737 and its Supplement I as TMI Action Item III.A.I.2. We were also infomed by Mr. Kahler of your staff that the Meteorological Data Upgrade called for in TMI Action item III.A.P.2. was previously completed. Staff guidance relative to the Meteoroingical Data Upgrade was provided in Section 6.1.b. of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 and in NUREG-0654, " Radiological Emergency Response Plans."

The ERF and the Meteorological Data Upgrade will be audited against the staff's requirements in an ERF appraisal. The audit will be arranced by NRC Region I.

Since ly,

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.lohn 6 Zwolinski, Director BWR pro,iect Directorate #1 Division of BWR Licensing cc: See next page

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PLANT NAME: ?t L G It iM PROJECT MANAGER: 7. he.W # 4

1. Negotiated utility completion schedule:

Date 45 M I F-63 III.A.1.2. Technical Support Center C-46041 F-64 !!I.A.I.2, Operational Support Center c

%)l4 F-65 III.A.I.2, Emergency Operations Center C - M IOG @7C ,

46M D F-68 III.A.2.2, Meteorological Data Upgrade C, L. SR,t. sto Y IDE(~

Has utility met. or does it plan to meet, the above schedule? i

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2. Scheduled NRC ERF appraisal date (a combined inspection of the 4 MPAs) yy y p,7,, g , ,, IQp, If ERF cppraisal has been conducted, do any open issues remain? I i 3. How mar;y emergency drills have been conducted since,t utility's  ;

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August 11,.1986

. MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief . .

Technological Hazards Division Office of. Natural and Technological Hazards Program Federal Emergency Management Agency FROM: David B. Matthews, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

PILGRIM PETITION'

.i We recently received a petition to prohibit restart of the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. The petition, from Senator William B. Golden, et al, dated July 15, 1986, was filed on behalf of constituents living in the environs of the Pilgrim site and will be processed under our regulation 10 CFR 2.206.

Enclosed is a copy for your information and initial review. The portions relating to emergency planning were forwarded directly to members of your staff on August 4, 1986. The NRC is preparing an acknowledgement and we will be requesting your support in preparing a response to this petition in the near future.

Original Signed By:

David B. Matthews David B. Matt ~ news, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement )

Enclosure:

DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosure: '

Pilgrim Petition RWStarostecki, IE GESimonds, IE '

JGPartlow, IE JLieberman, 0GC  !

CONTACT: Gerald E. Simonds, IE BKGrimes IE PLeech, NRR 492-4870 ELJordan, IE PMcKee, IE SASchwartz, IE WDPaton, 0GC DBMatthews, IE DCS KEPerkins, IE DEPER R/F 1 l

JAAxelrad, IE EPB R/F CRVan Niel, IE FKantor, IE r

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Docket No. 50-293 LICENSEE: Boston Edison Company 4 l

FACILITY: Pilgrim Nuclear Power St6 tion I:

SUBJECT:

MEETING WITH BOSTON EDISON COMPANY RE Pfl.1 RIM STATION On July 30, 1986, I attended a me.: ting with Boston Edison Company representa-tives at the NRC Region I headquarters. The principal attendees are shown on the attached notice of the meetina. Also attached is the meetino acenda.

Region I will issue a meeting report.

The following items of information from the meeting are of particular interest to NRR:

1. On July 25 BECo had announced a decision by its Board of Directors to keep Pilgrim out of service in order to complete Appendix R fire protection modifications, refueling, and containment enhancement l measures. RECo indicated at the meeting that restart is likely in  !

February 1987, but it could be as late as May 1987.

2. The containment measures will relate to improvements in hydrogen control, venting and spray. The fire pump may be connected to the spray system.

3. An extensive startup proaram of several weeks is planned and there will be " hold points" during the startup, which will allow RECo and Region I to review the plant status before the startup continues.

! 4 In response to IE Information Notice 86-39. BECo has examined two RHR pumps and will examine two more. To date, no wear rinns defects have been detected visually but one bearing exhibited wear. A lower impeller wear ring has been sent out for further examination.

Original signed by:

Paul H. Leech, Pro,iect Manager BWR Pro.iect Directorate #1

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBllTION:

Docket > File: i Pilgrim File J. 7wolinski BWD#1 Reading File P. Leech R. Bernero C. Jamerson R. Houston l

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SUBJECT:

PETITION OF WILLIAM R. GOLDEN AND OTHERS F0; A SHOW CAUSE ORDER REGARDING PILGRIM STATION As requested by Phil McKee by telephone, we have prepared the enclosed draft response to the part o# a show cause petition by William B. Golden and others, dated July 15, 1986, which asserts inherent design deficiencies in the Pilgrim Station containment structure.

In the event we can be of further assistance in responding to the petition, olease contact Gus Lainas (X29680), Jerry Hulman (X27941) or J. Kudrick (X276?61 of my s9 ff.

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R'obert M. Bernero, Director Division of BWP Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated I

cc: J. Taylor 1 P. McKee l G. Klingler j G. Lainas l L. Hulman  !

J. Kudrick J. Zwolinski P. Leech j l

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Containment Structures 1 The petition asserts that the General Electric Mark I pressure-suppression -

system employed by the Pilgrim reactor contai's inherent design flaws which raise questions about its ability to withstand accidents. Generally, the concerns are related to:

(1) Design issues raised by Dr. S. H. Hanauer in the early 1970's, and (2) The Pilgrim containment capability for severe accidents.

The following discussion addresses each of these concerns:

HANAUER ISSUES - The petitioner's concerns are based on AEC memoranda dated prior to 1978. More specifically, the key reference is a memorandum written by Dr. S.. H. Hanauer in 19" which raised several questions on the viability of pressure suppression containment concepts. The majority of those concerns have been either directly or indirectly quoted in the petition. They include references to inherent design flaws, lack of adequate testing, steam bypass susceptibility, volume limitations causing overcrowding, and a stated concern about the overall viability of the Mark I design.

At the time these issues were raised, the then AEC staff set about evaluating each concern to ensure that adequate safety margins were being maintained on existing plants. Additionally, the AEC also had under investigation various technical matters that related to the safety of pressure suppression type containments for light water cooled reactor ants. Based on its review of

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a these efforts, the staff concluded that proper consideration nad been given to each of the technical concerns. This staff evaluation was documented in NUPEG-0474, dated July 1978: "A Technical Update on Pressure Suppression Type Containments in use in U.S. Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power P1 arts." As Enclosure A to this NUREG, a summary of NPC staff actions related to the technical issues identified ty Dr. Hanauer's memorandum of September 2U, 1972 was presented.

A review of the issues raised in the portion of the petition which are based on correspondence dated 1978 or earlier indicates that all of these issues have been addressed in NUPEG-0474 The conclusions remain valid today and they are equally applicable to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

The petition also references statements from NUPEG-0474 which relate to differ-ences between expected experimental results and actual test results. Specific comments in the pe'.ition were made indicating that surprises repeatedly oc-curred during the course of the various, then oncoing, test programs. The statements extracted from NUREG-0474 were made during 1978 when many of the test programs were in their early stages.

Since the issuance of NUREG-0474, the generic test programs related to the Mark I containment design and the NRC assessment of the tests have been completed.  !

These tests were a small portion of an extensive program which was conducted by the PWR Mark I owners group. The staff evaluation of this effort was reported L

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f in NUREG-0661. In addition,'a plant-specific analysis was performed for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station based on the final test results. Based on this analysis, design changes were proposed to restore the intended safety margins.

These changes have been both reviewed and approved by the staff, and modifi-cations have been implemented at Pilgrim. As a result, the Dilgrim containment has been demonstrated to be capable of accommodating design basis accidents with adeouate margin.

The petition refers to another of Dr. Hanauer's concerns related to the safety disadvantages of pressure suppression. containments. This issue related to bypass paths in BWR pressure suppression containments, ?nd was desi~gnated as l Generic Issue 61, "SRV l.ine Break Inside the Wet Well Airspace of Mark I and II Containments." The staff evaluation of this issue has recently been completed and the results were presented in NUREG/CR-4594, " Estimated Safety Significance

^# Generic.' Issue 61." Based on these resulte, the staff concluded that no new

. requirements were-justifief. and no further study of this safety issue was warranted based on an overall risk assessment. ]

l In summary, the petitioners have asserted that the pressure suppression con-tainment design is flawed and they have questioned the viability of this I

containment type. In response to these assertions we have shown that many of l the specific-concerns had been previously and satisfactorily addressed in .

NUREG-0474. For thost concerns identified since issuance of NUREG-0474, we have shown that a genitric program was conducted to determine the loads under investigation. Additionally, Pilgrim has implemented design changes based on the program results to fully establish design margins.

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o PILGRIM CONTAINMENT CAPABILITY FOP SEVERF ACCIDENTS - Assertions by the petitioners concerning the performance of the General Electric pressure-suppression containment were raised from the viewpoint of containment failure in the event of a severe accident. The petitioners assert that there is a

- tendency to underestimate the probability of various types of accidents, citinc among other things, the recent very severe accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. The petitioners also conclude that there is a high }

l probability that filgrim's Mark I containment structure will not withstand i various severe accident scenaries.

Although no PPA is available explicitly for the Pilgrim plant, other plant-l specific PDA's and assessme6ts of accident secuences at specific plants offer l insights relative to Pilgrim. First, the probability of accidents that could cha11ence a Mark I containment have been found to be ouite low, involving a multiplicity of failures before proceeding to a core-melt. Second, containment analyses and plant specific assessments at other BWRs indicate a rance of containment 'ailure probability estimates, assuming occurrence of a core melt accident.

A conditional Mark I containment failure probability was quoted as .9 by the petitioners as a basis for concern. This estimate W rives from the 1975 Peactor Safety Study, WASH-1400/NUREG-75/014, Table 5-3. The value reflects the assumptions and findinos for the surrogate BWR plant, Peach Bottom (a i

two unit plant also with Mark I containments) as it existed at the time of the study.

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-5 ProbaHlistic risk assessments (PRAs) have been found useful in licensing' and other regulatory activities in identifying vulnerabilities. Such assessments have been extensively reviewed for several plants. The numerical results of these assessments contain considerable uncertainties and it is not possible to concluoe with certainty that they are either excessively conservative or non-conservative. On balance, the Commission in August, 1085 conclu& d in its-3 Severe Accident Policy Statement that, based on the information available, the severe accident risks at all U.S. commercial light water react <rs were sufficiently low that no imediate action was required but that investigations of potential plant vulnerabilities would be undertaken.

The petitioners present no new information on the Pilgrim containment that was not known and resolved to the staff's satisfaction prior to issuance of the Commission's policy statement, other than a reference to the Chernobyl accident l 1

and an inaccurate comparison of rated containment pressures. (The 57 pounds per square inch ouoted for Chernobyl does not apply to the building structure that housed the reactor core.) Information on the Chernobyl accident has not demonstrated to date a defect in the Pilgrim design. The staff is continuing to evaluate the Chernobyl event relative to U.S. plants and expects to issue its report on this matter in a few months. The petitioners do reference factors "not taken into account" in PRAs from a Union of Concerned Scientists' i

l 1 " Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regardino Future Designs and Existing Plants," F.R.50,32138-32151, August 8, 1985.

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January, 1986 paper by S. Sholly and G. Thomoson that was submitted as comment on NUREG-0956, Draft For Comment. The factors identified include aging of l structures, technical specification violations and temporary exemptions l-thereto, construction defects and weaknesses, partial failure sequences, and l

external events. (Maay FRAs do take external events into account.) Petitioners l have not, however, presented evidence to demonstrate that these factors constitute a-sufficient contribution to public risk to warrant a show cause order for Pilgrim.

1 As part of the implementation phase of the Commission's Severe Accident Policy Statement, the NRC staff has identified a set of elements for particular consideration that have the potential for substantial improvement in the l

l mitigation capability of Mark I containments. These are based upon extensive research and analyses that provide improved undert:ending of the physical and chemical phenomena associated with severe core melt accidents. These elements were identified to the owners of boiling water reactors at a public meetinp )

on June 16, 1986 and include (1) hydrogen control, (2) drywell sprays, 1

(3) wetwell venting, (4) core debris control, and (5) development o' related l emergency procedures and operator training. The common thrust of these elements is to reduce substantially the likelihood of bypassing the large volume of water in the suppression pool which can act to remove large quantities of fission products that would be released from the reactor in a core melt accident.

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At a second public meeting on September 11, 1986 with the BWR owners, the latter presented a report on their " Evaluation of BWR Accident Mitigation Capability Pelative to Proposed NRC Changes", dated August 1986. This technical dialogue  !

between the staff and the owners is continuing and is planned to result in a set of proposed new requirements on the Mark I containments, including Pilgrim, tc be issued in December 1086 for comment in the form of a draft generic letter.

Boston Edison is an active participant with the other BWR owners in this

-evaluation effort. Tn addition, and specifically with respect to the Pilgrim Station, Boston Edison announced on July 25, 1986, that it is proceeding to implement certain modifications to the containment. This action will keep the plant shutdown until early 1987.

At a meeting with NRC on September 9,1986, Boston Edison stated that it plans to provide the capability to connect the fire water system to the DPP. system.

This would provide an additional source of water for the drywell sprays.

Provision will also be made for connecting fire truck pumping capabilitv to the RHR system. The installation cf a third diesel generator, which would be particularly helpful during station blackout conditions, is under serious consideration. Also, being considered is a reduction of the 24-hour period at the end of reactor operation when the containment is not presently required to be fully inerted. Procedure changes and training appropriate to all such plant l modifications will be implemented before plant startup. The NRC staff will I

monitor these modifications to assure that they do represent safety enhancements j and have no adverse safety impact on existing systems. I

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Petitioners also requested that the NRC recuire Boston Edison to submit a feasibility study on all possible structural modifications prior to NRC approval of specific modification proposals. At the present time neither Boston Edison nor the staff nor the petitioners have identified any structural modifications to the Pilgrim containment that would be warranted by severe accident considerations. This reouest is, therefore, denied.

CONCLUSION - The petitioners' assertions with respect to inherent design flaws in the pressure suppression system utilized at the Pilgrim plant have been previously reviewed and conclusions reached within the context of NRC regulations and guidance. Modifications to re-establish containment design margins have been implemented. Evaluations of the Mark I containment with respect to severe accidents are continuing: (1) through the implementation of the Commission Policy Statement on Severe Accidents: (2) through NRC staff and industry initiatives to improve containment performance for all BWR's; (3) through an i NRC appraisal of the Chernobyl accident; and, (4) through the licensee's initiative. In no case has sufficient evidence been presented that would indicate that the Pilgrim plant should not operate while resolution and risk reduction improvements are considered. That is, there is not sufficient evidence of either design flaws at Pilgrim, or high risk, which warrants a show cause order for the plant to remain closed or to suspend the operating license.

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.y.- EVALUATION OF 0FFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE AREA SURROUNDING THE-PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION Prepared for:

Boston Edison Company..

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i Impell Corporation i

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EVALUATION OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN 1HE AREA-SURROUNDING THE-PILGP.IM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 REPORT- 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 4 APPENDIX A - FEMA COMMENT' EVALUATION A-1 APPENDIX B - INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT B-1 APPENDIX C - EVALUATION OF SPECIAL POPULATION ISSUES C-1 i

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INTRODUCTION l l

. Boston Edison Company (BECo) contracted with Impell Corporation (Impell) to 1 provide Emergency Preparedness assistance relative to the resolution and implementation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) comments regarding the Massachusetts State, Area II, and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans.

Phase 1 cf that scope of work consisted of a review of the State of Massachusetts Emergency Preparedness Plan, Local Plans, NIAT Handbook, and the Area II Plan against the following:

1. FEMA Regional Assistance Committee comments contained in FEMA's letter to MCDA, dated October 30, 1985.

2. FEMA Final Assessment Report on the September 5,1985 Pilgrim Station Emergency Response Exercise.

3. Public hearings, comments identified by Goston Edison Co. in hearing transcripts or other documents.

4. Regulatory documents - (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP -1, Rev. 1, FEMA 10,44 CFR 350, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, as appropriate).

Emphasis was placed on reviewing those sections of the plans which are the subject of comments. The objectives of this review were to:

Ascertain the appropriateness of the FEMA comments / recommendations.

Make an independent assessment of the adequacy of the plans, and Evaluate the adequacy of responses as may have been incorporated in plan revisions subsequent to the comments.

On December 17, 1986 Impell represented by Mr. Kenneth Krasner and Mr. Rocco Campanelli commenced work on this review. This report constitutes the deliverable product of that phase of the work.

Section Two of this report details our findings and Section three is a summary of Impell's recommendations.

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l This project was divided into several independent tasks as follows:

Task 1

- Review of FEMA open items

, Task 2 l - Independent Assessment of the State Plan, the Area II Plan and the Local Plans l Task 3 l

- Evaluation of Special Population Needs Task 1 was a review of these open items identified by FEMA as needing resolution prior to proceeding with the 350 evaluation of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans. These open items were contained in two documents.

o Letter from E. Thomas (FEMA) to R. Boulay (MCDA) dated October 30, 1985 and o FEMA exercise evaluation of the 1985 Joint Exercise conducted on September 5, 1985.

The review was conducted by evaluating the FEMA comments against the Reference Documents. A determination was made as to the validity of the comment. If the comment was still valid, a suggested solution was offered and an estimate of the effort required to implement that suggestion was made.

The results of this task are contained in Appendix A. Appendix A is comprised of two (2) tables and four (4) attachments.

The tables separately address both of the documents mentioned above. Each of the tables contains the following information: i 0654 Eval Crit. - This is the paragraph number of Section II " Planning  ;

Standards and Evaluation Criteria" to NUREG 0654/ FEMA - REP - 1 Rev.1 i

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparation in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

FEMA Comment - This is a restatement of the FEMA Comment.

FEMA Eval. Doc - This is the document as listed in Att. 1 " Evaluation Document" which contained the FEMA Comment.

Ref. Doc. - This is the document as listed in Att 2 " Reference Document" to which the comment is applicable.

Valid (Y/N) - This is a statement of Impell's assessment whether or not the comment is still valid. This assessment is based upon a review of the applicable plans and procedures, some of which have undergone revision since the original comment was made, and of certain commitments made '

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Lev. Eff. Fix - This is the level of effort required, as defined in I Attachment 4, to either respond to the comment, if it is still valid, or '

to enhance that section of the plan or procedure, if the comment is no longer valid. In the latter case, incorporation of the "fix" is optional Comments / Reference Section - This is the proposed change to the plans l and/or procedures.

The attachments to Appendix A contain the following lists:

Att 1 Documents which formed the basis for the review and evaluation Att 2 Documents which were used as references Att 3 Documents which were referenced but were not included in our review due to their unavailability Att 4 Definition of the level of effort necessary to incorporate the suggested change Those open items which were identified in the 1985 Exercise Evaluation which either dealt with personnel performance, equipment deficiencies or other areas which were not directly attributable to plan inadequacies, were not included in the analysis.

Task 2 was an Independent Assessment of the State, Area II and Local Plans against NUREG 0654 planning standards. This assessment was performed solely by reviewing the documents as listed in Attachment 2 to Appendix A. Each planning standard was reviewed against the plans. If it was determined that the existing plans adequately addressed the planning standard, it was so stated. Where it was felt that the plans needed enhancement or had been previously identified by FEMA, suggested modification were included. The review conducted during this stage is included in Appendix B " Independent Assessment". This Appendix consists of two (2) tables:

Table 1 - State and Area II Plans Table 2 - Local Plans Task 3 contained in Appendix C, is an evaluation of the special population issue associated with a response to a nuclear emergency at the Pilgrim Station. This effort was not proposed in the original scope of work, however, w&s performed due to the need which was evident in the area surrounding Pilgrim. This evaluation contains the guidance included in FEMA Guidance Memorandum 24 " Radiological Emergency Planning for Handicapped Persons". In addition to those populations specified in the Guidance Memorandum, this evaluation also includes school children, hospital and nursing home patients, and prison or jail inmates as special populations.

This evaluation includes an assessment of the:

1) process for identification of the special populations;

2) public education and information programs

3) notification methods and procedures; and

4) protective response i.e. shelter or evacuate 3

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• r RECOMMENDATIONS This section details recommendations for improvement of the State, Area II and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans. These recommendations were generated as a result of the detailed review performed by Impell and consolidate the comments included in Appendices A, B, & C of this report.

The recommendations are broken down into two (2) categories as follows:

1. Improvements necesary for FEMA to complete the 350 certification process.

2. Improvements which would increase the overall quality of the plans and procedures.

1. Improvements for 350 Certification FEMA has identified several areas that required improvement prior to the completion of the 350 review process. These issues are itemized in FEMA'S October 30, 1985 letter to MCDA. FEMA has also identified certain plan inadequacies that required " Corrections Action" and " Areas Recommended for Improvement" in their final Assessment Report for the September 5,1985 Exercise.

The issues identified in these documents are detailed in Appendix A Tables 1 and 2. The tables also include suggested solutions to resolve the valid areas of concern and the level of effort required to implement the solution. The following summarizes our recommendations:

a. Improved Procedures for all emergency workers in the area of dosimetry, KI and exposure control.

b. Expanded procedures in the area of initial notification. Back-up notification methods need to be included. The area of " rapidly escalating" emergency, particularly if the state cannot be contacted in a timely manner needs to be clarified.

c. Resource lists and telephone lists need to be expanded. Letters of agreement must be developed with outside organizations.

d. More detailed recovery and reentry procedures need to be developed in the local plans. Reestablishment of the local government following evacuation needs to be considered.

e. NUREG 0654 cross references need to be developed for the local and area II plans.

f. More detailed information in the area of emergency worker training needs to be included,

g. The organizational structure of the local response organization and its relationship to other organizations needs to be better defined.

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2. Imorove Overall Plan / Procedure Ouality As.previously described, an independent assessment of the State Plan, Area II' plan and local plans was performed against the requirements of NUREG 0654. The results of _this effort are documented in Appendices B &

C to this report. The following recommendations summarize the comments e

detailed therein.

a. The implementation of Protective Action Recommendations (Sheltering or Evacuation) for special populations need to be more thoroughly addressed. Particular areas of concern include:

1) Identification of Special Population

2) Notification

3) Resource availability

4) Special methods for evacuation (Transit dependent, mobility impaired etc)

5) Training

6) Administration of KI for sheltered special population groups

b. The Area II Plan needs to be expanded and updated. The following specific suggestions are offered:

1) The format should be similar to the State Plan (Section numbers, Page numbers etc.)

2) 1986 population figures should be incorporated, both by sector and by planning area.

3) The relationship between the State, Area II and Local organization should be more clearly defined.

4) The Area II EOC organization and reporting structure should be defined.

5) Communications channels between the Area II EOC and other agencies and organizations needs to be defined in the form of a figure or chart.

6) Procedures in the form of checklists need to be developed for all emergency response personnel.

7) Resources and letters of agreement for supply of those q resources need to be presented. j

8) The Department of Public Works procedure is dated January 1982. This should be reviewed and updated.

9) A more detailed physical description of the Area II E0C should be included. )

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c. The-Local town plans need to be expanded and updated. In l

general, the town of Plymouth has the most extensive plan and should be used as a guide. The following specific suggestions are offered:

1) The format and content of all local town plans should be similar wherever possible.

2) Procedures for key individuals or agencies need to be included. These should be in a checklist format.

3) Detailed physical descriptions of the EOC's need to be included along with activation procedures as applicable.

d. The State Plan references Exhibit A-5 (which is applicable to Seabrook). Where appropriate, other Nuclear facilities need also be referenced and included i.e. Exhibit A-2 for Pilgrim.

Exhibit A-2 was not included in the copy of the State Plan but is said to be available at MCDA.

e. Procedures in the form of checklists should be developed for individuals and agencies on the State level within the emergency response organization.

f. The issue of Hanover Hall as a viable reception center needs to be addressed. Eventhough there is no " official" decision regarding the use of the mall, this item is listed here. If the

use of the mall is " officially" disallowed, this item should move to the top of the priority list.

g. Consideration should be given to the use of Plymouth County Resources in the terms of equipment and manpower.

He recommend that all the above recommendations be implemented, however,.

if certain constraints prevent this, the recommendations should be prioritized.in the order listed.

It is estimated that the total effort required to implement the ,

recommendations set forth in paragraph 1 and 2 above are as follows: ]

1. FEMA 350 Certification:

Approximately 6 to 8 man-months

2. Improved overall plan / procedure quality:

Approxima'tely 25 to 30 man-months These estimates were arrived at by considering each recommendation seperately. Savings can be realized if the entire effort is undertaken due to considerable duplication of effort.

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6fPENDIX A FEMA COMMENT EVALUATION Attachment 1 Evaluation Documents A-1 Attachment 2 Reference Documents A-2 Attachment 3 Unreviewed Documents A-3

, Attachment 4 Level of Effort Definition A-4 Table 1 Letter, October 30, 1985 A-5 Table 2 September 5, 1985 Evaluation A-11 I

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' ATTACHMENT 1

i. EVALUATION DOCUMENTS A. Regional Assistance' Committee (RAC) Review of Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Dated October 8, 1981.

B. FEMA Letter, Edward Thomas to Robert Boulay. Dated October 30, 1985.

C. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Letter, Robert Boulay to Edward Thomas. Dated June 6, 1986.

D. Federal Emergencv Management Agency's Final Exercise Assessment of the Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Performance Exercise for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth, Massachusetts. Conducted September 5, 1985, dated December 5, 1985.

A-1

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ATTACHMENT 2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS A. Town of Carver RERP B. Town of Duxbury RERP C. Town of Kingston RERP D. Town of Marshfield RERP E. Town of Plymouth RERP F. Town of Bridgewater RERP G. Town of Hanover RERP H. City of Taunton RERP I. All local RERP's J. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan, Appendix 3 to Hazard Specific Supplement No. 6 Radiological Emergency Response Plan Dated 4/86.

K. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan, Appendix 3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facilities. Section C Area II HCDA Operations Plan for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Dated - (unknown).

L. NIAT Handbook, July 1985 M. Public Informat?on Erochure (Revised 1986)

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ATTACHF.2NT.1-UNREVIEWED DOCUMENTS L

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.A. Basic Emergency Operations Plan for each if the five (5) EPZ towns and the three (3) host towns-B. Massachusetts Emergency Broadcast System Operational Plan C.- Statewide Emergency Medical Radio Frequency Plan D. Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency Emergency Operating Center Operations Plan E. Executive Order #144 Agency Procedures A-3

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, j ATTACHMENT 4

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. LEVEL OF EFFORT DEFINITIONS In categorizing the level of effort required to address the new emergency .

planning issues,.the following system was utilized:

A. Ouick Fix - these involve adding a sentence or a paragraph to one or more planning documents with no implementation being required.

B. ' Minor Effort - these involve rewrite of a procedure, checklist or a complete section of one or more planning documents. Minor interfaces and implementation is required. Effort required is less than forty (40) manhours.

C. Moderate Effort - these involve major rewrites and/or some additional resources. The actions involve short lead time. Some.

interfaces and implementation is required. More than 40, but less-than 100 manhours is required.

D. Maior Effort - these involve significant resource addition, long lead time items, begin interface and significant implementation efforts. More than 100 manhours are required.

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APPENDIX B INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT Table 1 - Independent Assessment of State and Area II Plans B-1 Table 2 - Independent Assessment of Local Plans B-17

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TABLE 1 STATE AND AREA II PLANS Plannina Standard A - Assianment of Responsibility A.l.a. Specific reference and discussion of Pilgrim Station should be included in the Area II Plan.

A.I.b. The E.R.O. for Area II should be identified and responsibilities by title should be delineated.

A.l.c. No block diagram presently exists in the Area II Plan. It should be included.

A.l.d. Adequate A.l.e. Adequate A.2.a. Cross reference of State Plan should refer to Table 4-1 instead of Table A-1. Area II Plan contains no matrix showing primary and secondary responsibilities.

A.2.b. Executive order 144 should be referenced and explained in Section 1.2 of the State Plan.

A.3. Need M.O.U. between USCG and Massachusetts. A summary table of all letters of agreement should be included on the signature page.

A.4. Adequate B-1

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1' Plannino Standar) B - On-Site Emercency ResDonse Organization Not applicable to State functions.

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B-2 I

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.1

'Plannino Standard C - Emeraency Resconse SueDort and Services C.I.a.: . Adequate C.1.b.. . Adequate C.1 c. Adequate"

'C.2.a. Adequate-C.2.b.  : Adequate -

. C. 3. Adequate C.4. Adequate list of agency contacts and phone numbers is recommended.

4 E l' B-3 l

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P_lannino Standard 0 - Emeroency Classification System D.1. Not applicable D.2. Not applicable D.3. Adequate D.4. Procedures in Area II Plan are not very detailed.

B-4

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l Plannino Standard E " Notification Methods and Procedures"

-E.1. Notification procedures do not clearly describe the process and'are conflicting between State and Area II Plans. Ex. Section'6.2 of the-State Plan indicates that the HDPH will verify the initial notification. PNPS procedures say that the State Police verifies the initial notification.

Communication equipment does not agree between State and Area II Plans. Area II plan says notification is performed via radio, PNPS says that a." Ring Down Phone" is used.

(Note: Section 6.3.2 of Appendix 3 refers to Attachment 1 to Exhibit A-5 which only applies to Seabrook).

E.2. Initial notification, back-up procedure and equipment is not clearly -

described in either plan. Call out list not available.

E.5. Page C-16 of Area II sti'es that~ sample messages are contained in Annex A. Arnex A does not have any sample messages.

E.6. Adequate E.7. Adequate (See E.5.)

B-5

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- Plannina Standard F - Emercency Communications F.1.a. Area II Plan does not contain up-to-date information on communication equipment.

F.1.b. Adequate F.1.c. Adequate. NIAT Handbook and State police notification procedures do not agree. NIAT Handbook refers to the use of beepers as the primary method of notifying DPH and telephone as back-up. State police refers to the use of telephone only.

-F.1.d. Adequate F.1.e. ' Exhibit A-2 is not included as part of the State Plan. Therefore, alerting prc,cedures could not be evaluated. (Also applicable to Area II).

F.2. Adequate F.3. Adequate l

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B-6 l

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Plannino Standard G - Public Education'Information G.1 Adequate G.2. Adequate - See comment for G.I.

G 3.a. Adequate - Exhibit A-2 (PNPS) is not included in Appendix 3 of State review.

G.4.a. Adequate G.4.b. Adequate G.4.c. Adequate - Rumor control is through the utility.

G.5. Adequate 1

1 j

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B-7

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-1 i

. Plannina Standard H - Emeroency Facilities and Ecuinment j H.1. N/A - Licensee 'only- '

H.2. N/A - Licensee only H.3. -Inadequate - a more detailed description of the Area II EOC is i needed including resources, equipment location of facility etc.

.H.4. State Plan refers to Table A~.3.1. which specifies emergency staffing-ot ERF's. This table does not exist in the State Plan.

Detailed staffing lists by. emergency classification is not available in Area II Plan.

H.S. N/A - Licensee only-H.6. N/A - Licensee only H.7. Specifics on who gets the dosimetry is lacking in Area II Plan.

l H.8. N/A - Licensee only H.9. N/A - Licensee only H.10. Adequate H.11. . Adequate H.12. Adequate B-8

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Plannina Standard I - Accident Assessment I.l. thru I.6. N/A - Licensee only I.7. Adequate - State plan calls for the use of aerial surveys for plume tracking. No specifics available on instrumentation and radiation protection of the flight crew.

I.8. No defined procedure for making PAR based upon plant conditions; ie:

evacuate 2-mile at the General Emergency.

I.9. Adequate I.ll. Adequate - Refer to I.7. for aerial survey considerations.

B-9

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Plannino Standard J - Protective Resoonse i

1 J.9. Inadequate. See comment for I.8.

No plans exist for recovery /re-entry relative to food stuffs and other ingestion pathway considerations.

{

J.10.a. Maps are not contained in the Area II plan, however, they do exist 8 and are located in EOC's and EOF.

J.10.b. Maps show population (1980) by sector. They do not contain.

information by evacuation areas. More recent population data should be used.

J.10.c. The needs of the special populations are not adequately addressed ie: notification, resources etc. See Appendix C of this report.

J.10.d. Same as J.10.c.

J.10.e. State policy is not to provide KI to the general public. Specific procedures for issuing and administering the KI to emergency workers or institutionalized personnel are not very clear.

J.10.f. See J.10.e.

J.10.g. The plans should contain more information on the resources necessary and instructions how to evacuate special populations.

J.10.h. Adequate J.10.i. Revising ETE's.

J.10.j. Adequate - Are there sufficient resources for traffic control, ie:

cones, barricades etc. available at the police barracks? DPW resource list was not included in Area II Plan. Incorporate MNG Plan in Area II Plan since they assist in this area.

J.10.k. DPH and traffic control procedure need to be revised to include traffic impediment contingencies, ie: how to communicate traffic problems, resources to remove impediment.

J.10.1. Revising ETE's J.10.m. Adequate. Table 2.5 is ultra-conservative.

J.11 Location of farms, dairy herds etc., are not specified in the State or Area II plan. State plan needs to be revised to include guidance in Guidance Memorandum IN-1 "The Ingestion Pathway".

J.12 Section on Reception Center in Area II Plan (Annex E) should be eliminated as it is contained in the Local Plans.

B-10

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1 Plannino Standard K - Radiological Exoosure Control K.3.a. Specific procedures for dosimetry distribution and exposure control ie: limits for exposure, need to be incorporated in' the plans.

K.3.b. Procedures for reading dosimeters and reporting readings are vague.

The procedure should give limits for reporting exposure ie: at.lR K.4 Adequate K.5.a. Adequate K.5.b. Adequate B-11 u, __ _ ___n -- - __ _ <

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i EliU10.iDa Standard L - Medical and Public Health Suenort

'L'.1. Area II Plan does not include a l'ist of' hospitals.

L.3. See L.1 above t

L.4; .See October 30, 1985 letter. Area II Plan assumes that only personnel in the town of Plymouth would need. assistance-(page C-190). -Other towns should be considered.

l 1-

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. o j Plannino Standard M - Recoverv/Re-Entry l

M.l. Adequate M.3. Adequate - the use of the utility representative in the recovery committee should be eliminated. Not required for a State recovery program.

M.4. Adequate j l

I B-13

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, s Plannina Standard N - Exercises and Drills N.l.a. Adequate N .1. b .~ ' Adequate N.2.a. Adequate N.2.c. Adequate N.2.d. Adequate-N.2.e. Adequate N.3. Adequate N.4. Adequate N.5. Adequate - however no corrective action responses as a result of the September 1985' exercise have been issued.

(NOTE: - The State and Towns in conjunction with the utility should consider developing a schedule matrix of all drills and exercises and issuing that matrix as an addendum to the plan annually).

1 B-14 1

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, Plannino Standard'O - Trainino 0.1.a. Adequate 0.1. b . Adequate'- no mention of training of UGCG, ambulance companies or other groups which are not Iart of the State or Local E.R.O.

(Also see October 30, 1985 19tter).

0.4. - The State Plan does not outline the training program. A list of lessons and content of the course.should be included. Consider developing a course / personnel matrix.

(Also see October 30, 1985 letter).

0.5. - Adequate u

4 B-15 i

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Plannino Standard P - Emeroency Plans P.l. 'Need matrix of individuals receiving specific training lesson plans.

P.2. Adequate.

P.3. Adequate P.4. No annual certification is mentioned in the plan.

P.S. No revision markings appear on any of the pages.

P.6. Adequate P.7. No listing of separate procedures is included in the Area II plan.

The list which appears in the State Plan is not complete.

P.8. The table of contents for the State and Area II Plans should use a consistent system for numbering sections and pages. The Area II plan does not contain a NUREG 0654 cross-reference.

P.9. N/A P.10. No specific procedure exists for verifying and certifying telephone numbers.

B-16

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TABLE 2 1

LOCAL PLANS Plannino Standard A - Assianment of Responsibility A.l.a. Adequate A.I.b. Lines of command and control are not clearly identified in the local plans. State plans indicate that the Chief Executive is in charge, yet the town plans do not reflect this.

A.1.c. Town of Carver plan does not contain a block diagram. Other block diagrams should clearly indicate lines of authority and lines of communication.

A.1.d. Local plans do not specify an individual who is in charge of town emergency response. The Block diagrams depict the " Board of  ;

Selectmen" having ultimate command and control responsibility. I A.l.e. Adequate A.2.a. Adequate. Although it is implied, it is not stated that the Civil Defense Director is in charge.

A.2.b. Adequate A.3. Need Letters of Agreements including any mutual aid agreements between towns.

A.4 The individual specified to provide 24-hour coverage is the Civil Defense Director. However, no plans are specified in case local resources become exhausted. Even though mutual aid agreements are referred to in the plans, no specific resources are mentioned.

i B-17 j l

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Plannino Standard B - On-Site Emeraency Organization Not applicable to Local Plans.

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B-18 4

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i-Plannina Standard C - Emeroency Resoonse Suecort and Resources C.1.a. N/A to Local Plans C.1.b. N/A to Local Plans C.1.c. Covered in Area II Plans C.2.a. Adequate - EOF does not have provisions for local representation.

C.2.b. N/A to Local Plans C.3. N/A to Local Plans C.4 See comment A-3 l

1 l

B-19 t ._ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____.1______._._..______.____.___._____._______________'_._..________._________.__

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Plannina Standard D - Emeroency Classification System D.1 N/A to Local Plans D.2 N/A to Local Plans D.3 Adequate D.4 Adequate B-2C

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..i : Plannina Standard-E'- Notification Methods and Procedures-E .' l '. Adequate; Marshfield Plan' (Annex A.. Section B) details the.

notification procedures for town officials for:each of the four (4) emergency classifications. ;This should be considered for the other four (4) EPZ towns.

l l E.2. Adequate E.3. N/A for Local Plans i- E.4. N/A for Local Plan 1 E.5. Adequate E.6. 1 Only Plymouth and iluxbury specify procedures for back-up public

, . noti fication.

., E.7. Covered'in State' knd Area II Plans 9;

B-21

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1

- Plannina' Standard F - Emeroency Communications- .

F .1. a '. . Adequate. Plymouth county radio net problems.should be investigated.

F .1. b . ' Adequate F.1.c. Not applicable

' F .1. d'. Not applicable

. F.1.e. Adequate F.1.f. N/A for Local Plans F.2. Adequate F.3. Adequate 1-1 1

l B-22 i.

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Plannino Standard G - Public Education and Information G.1. Adequate G.2' Adequate G 3.a. Adequate G.3.b. N/A for. Local Plans.

G.4.a. Local towns are not represented.

G.4.c. . Covered in State and Area II Plans G.5. N/A for Local Plans-

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B-23 c.___ . . . . ..

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i Plannina Standard H - Emeraency Facilities and Ecuiement H.l. N/A for Local Plans

. H.2. N/A for Local Plans H.3. Adequate H.4. Personnel (by title) who are required to report to the EOC are not stated. Where the local EOC's are not dedicated facilities, an activation procedure should be included in the plan. A listing of emergency equipment and communication capabilities at the local EOC should be included.

H.5. N/A for Local Plans H.6. N/A for Local Plans H.7. N/A for Local Plans i H.8. N/A for Local Plans H.9. N/A for Local Plans H.10. Adequate for radiological monitoring equipment, however other emergency (quipment is not addressed. Inventories are updated annually vice quarterly per 0654.

H.11. Inventory of emergency equipment is not included in the plan.

H.12. N/A for Local Plans l

B-24 i

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Plannina Standard I - Accident Assessment I.1. thru I.6. N/A for Local Plans I.7. N/A for Local Plans I.8. N/A for Local Plans I.9. N/A for Local Plans I.10. N/A for Local Plans I.11. N/A for Local Plans 1

l l

1 B 25 l

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, Plannina Standard J - Protective Resoonse )

J.1. N/A for Local Plans J.2. thru J.8. N/A for Local Plans J.9. Adequate J.10.a. Carver map (page 13 figure IV-1) is out of date. Does not show new Route 44.

J.10.b. Maps of population distribution are not included in Local Plans.

J.10.c. Adequate - Area II Plan has detailed special population information.

J.10.d. The entire process of determining those persons requiring special assistance is not very well defined. Resources and capabilities of handling special population needs to be defined. The Plymouth plan contains the most detailed write-up of the special populations.

However, the resources necessary to handle these special populations is not specified. Area II Plan has detailed listings of special facilities.

J.10.e. Guidelines and procedures for issuing and administering KI to emergency workers and institutionalized persons is not stated.

J.10.f. Policy is not to issue KI to general public. See comment J.10.e.

J.10.g. Relocation of transient dependent population is not adequately addressed. Resources and procedures for their use is not included.

J.10.k. The continued use of Hanover Hall as a relocation center needs to be addressed.

J.10.1 Revising E.T.E.'s J.10.j. Adequate. Need to address access control during a sheltering PAR.

State police procedure only talks of access control during evacuation.

J.10.k. Adequate J.10.1. Revising E.T.E.'s J.10.m. N/A for Local Plans J.11. N/A for Local Plans J.12. Adequate l B-26 i

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Plannino Standard K - Radiological Excosure Control K.1. &

K.2 N/A for Local Plans K. 3. a. - Adequate K.3.b. Adequate. However the term " frequently" for reading dosimeters-should be changed to "15 to 30 minutes".

K.4. No specific procedure exists for authorizing excess exposure. It's' implied that Area II retains this authority.

K.5.a. Adequate K.S.b. It is not clear where the emergency workers go for monitoring and decontamination.

B-27

_ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ . ._ ._ _ __

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I Plannino Standard L - Medical and Public Health Suenort' l

L.1. No list of hospitals capable of handling radiation and cont' amination victims is included in the Local Plans. Letters of agreement; with these hospitals should also be included. (See Area II commerr:)

L.2. N/A for Local Plans l L.3. .N/A for Local Plans L.4. List of-ambulance companies'and letters of agreement should be l included. (See Area II comment) 1 l

l B-28

, L --- . - _ . - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ . -

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n . .

! .47,

i. Plannina Standard M'- Recovery and Reentry Plannina and Post Accident Ooerations M.l. Recovery / reentry planning section should include a checklist for town officials. Consideration should be given to:the.

reestablishment of government officials following an evacuation.

B-29 I

/

/

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Plannino Standard N - Exercises and Drills N.l.a. Adequate N.l.b. Adequate N.2.a. Adequate

. N.2.c. Adequate N.2.d. Adequate N.3. Adequate N.4. Adequate N.5. Adequate B-30 f

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Plannina Standard 0 -' Radiological Emeraency-Resoonse Trainina

'0.1.a. N/A for Local Plans.

0.1.b. ~ See comment in State and Area II Summary

0. 2. . N/A for_ Local _ Plans 0.3. N/A for Local Plans 0.4. See comment in State and Area II Summary 0.5. Adequate. See' State and Area II Summary B-31

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Plannina Standard P - Responsibilities for Plannina Effort P.l. See comment in State and Area II Summary l P.2.. Adequate P.3. Adequate P.4. The Local Plans commit to an annual update, however it appears that their last update was in May of 1985.

P.5. Page numbers of Local Plans all irSicate Rev. 2, however specific changes to individual pages have not been identified and pages are not dated.

P.6. Although there is reference to the State RERP and Area II Plans throughout the Local Plans, there is no detailed listing of supporting plans and their source. It is included in the State Plan.

P.7. No such listing of procedures exists in the Local Plans.

l P.8. The Local Plans do not contain a NUREG 0654 cross-reference.

P.10. No provision is made in the Local Plans for updating telephone numbers.

B-32 l

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! APPENDIX C EVAli)ATION OF SPECIAL POPULATION ISSUES 1

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INTRODUCTION Following discussions with Mr. Roger Silva and Ms.'Cherie Fuller of the Emergency Preparedness Staff, and during our review of the' existing State, Area II and Local Pid.:; it became evident that additional planning needed to be done in the area of protective actions for special populations. Special populations as defined here and by FEMA in Guidance Memorandum No. 24 I

" Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped Persons" dated 4/11/84 includes the following:

o Sensory Impaired:

- deaf and hearing impaired

- blind and visually impaired o Movement Impaired:

- loss of normal mobility ranging from one who uses crutches to the quadriplegic who requires a wheel. I chair and special vehicle for movement in an '

emergency

- frail elderly persons 1

- life-support-system hindered o Mentally / Emotionally Impaired:

- retarded

- emotionally disturbed

, - senile

- extreme alcoholic / drug-abuse cases o Incarcerated Individuals:

- jails

- work farms o School Children:

- private schools

- public schools

- nursery / day care facilities This Appendix systematically evaluates the plans and procedures as they presently exist against the guidance identified in the Guidance Memorandum.

Where in Impell's opinicn, the information available did not adequately address the guidance, suggested enhancements are offered.

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I EVALUATION I. Identification of Soecial Peculation .

Guidance A means to systematically identify individuals within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) is established and maintained. The security of acquired information is assured.

Functional characteristics necessary to cope with a radiological emergency are determined for those identified. Individuals and organizations capable of assisting and the type of assistance required are determined. The accuracy of the data is periodically validated. This data base is integrated with the planning process and reflected in the plans and procedures.

Evaluation The Area II Plan states that "The special needs of persons within the EPZ who are hearing-impaired, mobility-impaired, non-english speaking or who have other special needs will be taken into consideration by each Town as reflected in the Local Plans". During a review of the Plans we were not able to verify if lists of special population groups exist, and if they do exist, are they current, and is there a system in place to maintain that list up-to-date. It is implied in the Plan that such lists do in-fact exist.

The special facility lists should include the primary and alternate contact, the number of persons in the facility (maximum) and the special transportation needs ie: ambulances, ambulettes, special medical considerations. The special population lists should also include special transportation requirements and special medical considerations.

II. Public Education and Information Guidelines Preparedness and self-protection information is related t0 and in a form useful to major handicap types. Efforts are made to include handicapped persons in developing information. Instructional materials are developed for three groups: Handicapped persons, the general public, and emergency workers. Products are disseminated using methods and charnels most likely to reach each group in the resident and transien'; population.

Evaluation The Emeraency Public Information brochure (Revised 1986) seems to be targeted toward tne general public. There is an enclosure which is designed to alert HCDA of any individual with a special need. It is not clear however, how this information is directed to the local level. There are also posters and signs which direct the transient C-2 x __ -__ _ _- a .

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population during an emergency. There does not appear to be any formalized education and information program in place for the institutionalized population as to how their needs will be met during an emergency.

III. Notification Methods and Procedures Guidelines Appropriate alert and notification (A & N) systems, including hardware and interpersonal communication, are in place to provide information in a form useful to major handicap types identified.

Methods for verifying warnings exist. The A & N system provides handicapped persons with directions for required actions.

Arrangt.ments for special notification and assistance for those requiring it are in place.

Evaluation .

Detailed plans for notifying and alerting certain groups of the special population do not seem to be in place. For example, the Area II Plan indicates that "special interpreters and TV overprinting will be provided for hearing impaired persons on all EBS television broadcasts during an emergency." However, it is not clear how the hearing impaired person would be alerted to turn on the television. There do not appear to be any plans ur procedures in place to determine the needs of special populations at the time of the emergency, ie: how many hospital patients are in need of assistance, number of homebound needing transportation, etc.

IV. Protective Resoonse Guidelines Protective action plans have been developed for all categories of handicapped individuals present in the EPZ and integrated into the general radiological emergency plan. Responsible and knowledgeable contacts to provide communication and physical assistance are identified for each handicapped individual. Agreements have been made with ambulance, transportation companies, and van drivers to l effectuate the transfer of those who need special transportation.

and route instructions are provided.

Special areas in reception centers have been set aside for the sensory and movement impaired, the elderly and retarded, and l registration, decontamination,and monitoring has been arranged for them. Agreements have been made with hospitals, mental hospitals, i nursing homes, and community mental health centers outside the EPZ l l to receive the severely movement impaired and emotionally l

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There does not appear to be any systematic method for protecting the special populations, with the exception of the children in school, who may be required to be dismissed early at a Site Area Emergency.

One group which can be classified as a special population group are L the transient dependent. The Plymouth Town Plan lists several staging areas where those persons in need of transportation will be directed. There.is no mention however of how those individuals are directed to the staging areas, nor is there any mention of how to determine the resources necessary to evacuate those people.

There are no letters of agreement in piace with ambulance companies.

There are no lists of reception hospitals for evacuated patients.

In general there are no lists of resources available to deal with the special populations.

In certain cases it may be advisable to shel'ter certain groups even though the general public may be evacuated. There does not appear to be an evaluation as to which facilities provide an effective shelter, ie: jails, interior portions of hospitals etc.

The policy in Massachusetts is to not administer radioprotective drugs to the general public. Is it also their intent to carry this policy to institutionalized persons who cannot or will not be evacuated? If not, then provisions should be made to store, distribute and administer KI to that segment of the population.

SUMMARY

In general, the handling of the special and handicapped population appears tc be done on an ad. hoc. basis with little advance planning being done. A great deal of effort needs to be placed in this area.

It is estimated that in order to completely satisfy the issue of special populations, the level of effort required would be approximately 6-8 man months. This would necessitate:

a) Identifying the individuals which comprise the special populations, including phone numbers, addresses and special needs; b) Identifying the resources necessary to satisfactorily evacuate and/or relocate these individuals; c) Entering into agreements with agencies which would be responsible for supplying these resources; d) Developing and implementing a training program for the special population groups; e) Establishing procedures for notifying individuals of an emergency and assessing the specific needs at that time; C-4 l

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f) Establishing procedures for evacuating each of the special i population groups; i q

g) Evaluating feasibility of sheltering in place, certain special 'l populations;

's) Establishing procedures for use'of KI by-sheltered special population groups.

It is e'.pected that assistance from outside organizations -1.e.. Commission fer the Handicapped, Lighthouse for the Blind, would be required and solicited in several of the above areas.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard W. Krimm '

Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Federal Emergency Management Agency FROM: Edward L. Jordan. Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

PILGRIM 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION An August 11, 1986 memorandum from David B. Matthews of my staff to Robert S.

Wilkerson of your staff forwarded a petition to prohibit the restart of the -

Pilgrim nuclear power plant. By memorandum dated October 16 we confirmed that FEMA would provide support in preparing a final response to this petition.

On January 14, 1987, FEMA staff informed us of a possible delay in providing their evaluation based on the receipt of additional information submitted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. We have recently determined that the restart date for Pilgrim has been delayed. As discussed with your staff, we understand that you will now provide your response to the NRC by March 31, 1987.

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Criginal Signed by Sheldon A. Schwarta Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Contact:

Gerald E. Simonds, IE 492-4870 Distribution:

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sen or wce Prevaen:-- Nuc' ear BECo 87- 078 Mr. William T. Russell 1 Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1-631 Park Avenue King of Prussia License DPR-35 Docket 50-293

Dear Sir:

In response to your April 7,1987 staff letter, Boston Edison reviewed the-current overall work plans for emergency preparedness. Based on that review, we request that you remove the date of August 12, 1987 for an Exercise at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station from the tentative schedule.

In addition, the Massachusetts Civil Defense Director, R. Boulay, has informed Mr. E. Thomas, Chief of Natural and Technological' Hazards Division, Region 1 Federal Emergency Management Agency, that he is not certain that his organization can support an exercise on August 12, 1987. '(see enclosure)

I will contact you with preferred Exercise dates in the near future.

b R. G. Bird TFF/ pac l cc: Ron Bellamy

! U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission L

Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Peter H. Agnes, Jr.

Assistant Secretary of Public Safety Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executi"e Office of Public Safety One Ashburton Place Room 2133 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Oo2 /_~.,

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EOSTON E0ISON COMPANY Page Two cc: Robert Boulay, Director Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and Office of Emergency Preparedness 400 Horcester Road P.O. !Jox 1496 Framingham, Massachusetts 01701-0317 Thomas P. Rodger, Director Area Two Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency P. O. Box 54 Bridgewater, Massachusetts 02324-0054 1

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RCDERT J. COULAY MICH AEt, S DU, AAntS ooviene rar m a April 10, 1987 MM APR151987 n.um Mr. Edward A. Thomas, Chief Natural and Technologies 1 Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency John W. McCormack Post Office and Court House Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Dear Mr. Thomast I am writing to address this egency's position regarding a graded exercise to test off-site emergency response to an accident at Pilgrim Nuclear Power station.

The Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and Office of Emergency Preparedness concura in the finding of Secretary of Public Safety Charles V. Berry's report to the Governor of December 16, 1986 that the existing plans for the Pilgrim Ep2 are presently inadequate, and that the power station should not restart until all health and anfety issues relating to its operation are resolved.

Therefore, we are not prepared to participate in an exercise and do not believe auch an event should take place before at least the following conditions have been met

-- State officials have had the oportunity to review FEMA's self-initiated review of plans for response to an accident at Pilgrim Station, l l

-- New editions of pilgrim radiological emergency response ]

plans have been prepared and reviewed by state and local  !

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-- State officiels are estisfied that all items which the Secretary's report to the Governor and any othera prepared by state, local, or private sources suggest should be addressed by the Boston Edison Company have been completed, including, but not limited to, installation of improved communications equipment, completion of a new Evacuation Time Estimate and Traffic Management Study, completion of a thorough Shn1ter Survey of the entire EpZ. i m pi c m o n i.a t i c.;n d a comprehensive and effective plan for relocating tr:noport dependant populations, and improved d=11 vary of omergency publio info netien.

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I hope that this letter clarifies the position of this agency regarding its participation in a graded exercios for Pilgrim Station. Please do not healtete to contact me if you have any questions regarding this matter. $

Since )

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cc: Assistent Secretary Peter W. Agnes, Jr.

Deputy Director John L. Lovering, MCDA/CEP Mr. Carl Gustin, Boston Edison Company Mr. Roger Silva, Boston Edise'n Company Chief Executives of Pilgrim EPZ and. Host Communities Area II Director Thomas P. Rodger, MCDA/CEP i

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.os--cw 4 Executive Ofhees 800 Boylston Stree:

Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Ralph G. Bird Senior %ce President - Nuclear jyng 4, jgg7 BECo. Ltr. 87-97 Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Emergency Prerar:dness and Radiological Protectict '#0'ich U. S. Nucle v Pejulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 License DPR-35 Docket No.: 50-293

Dear Dr. Bellamy:

Please forward the attached material to the Regional Director, FEMA, Region 1 for review, in accordance with accepted procedure.

By copy of'this letter this information is being transmitted to appropriate state and local agencies so that they may use it in updating sections of their plans found to contain outdated material.

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Ralp RGB/mg Attachments cc: Messrs. Peter Agnes, Jr. (with attachments)

Robert Boulay

Thomas Rodgers Al Slaney "

Daniel Daly David Vogler Joseph Costa Richard Levin "

David Malaguti David Canepa 1 Richard Johnson I

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EVACUATIONTIMEESTIMATE AND BEACHPOPULATIONSHELTERING The following information resolves FEMA concerns involving an updated Evacuation Time Estimate and the sheltering of beach populations within the EPZ. This information updates that presented in the 1981 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the 1985 Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Town of Carver, Duxbury, Kingston, Marshfield and Plymouth.

I. Evacuation Time Estimate A. Summary of the Issue An Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station was performed in 1981. This ETE was based upon the 1970 Census data. An updated ETE should be prepared based upon consideration of the most recent census data (1980), a traffic pattern analysis and a population density analysis (with attention to summer beach and tourist populations).

B. BECo. Response BECo. has contracted with KLD Associates (July 1986) to provide an updated ETE. This firm is recognized nationally as an expert in providing evacuation time estimates and comprehensive traffic management plans. Their computer models have been validated against Washington D.C. intercity traffic flows and are presently used by FEMA as part of their Integrated Emergency Management Information System (IEMIS). XLD has conducted ETE's for utilities including Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham), Public Service of New Hampshire (Seabrook), Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse) and Rochester Gas and Electric Co. (Ginna). Their analytical work has been substantiated by several ASLB hearing panels.

While the final ETE report for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant is j scheduled for receipt by BECo. in June 1987 (ref 1), substantial preliminary information was obtained during meetings and telephone conversations with KLD in May. The report's table of contents (attachment 1) and summary of analytical methodology (attachment 2) are provided as the results of these discussions. Information ]

gathered during these meetings and the final report will be made ~

available to the town and state emergency planning personnel.

Table 1 provides comparative Evacuation Time Estimates for several l nuclear facility sites using conservative assumptions (see the Table 1 footnotes). The Pilgrim estimates are on the low side of the norm and within the expected bounds for this population.

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n Table 1: ' Comparison of Evacuation Time Estimates Total Area Population.

Site ' Population 50. Miles Density- ETE Davis Besse 74431 180 413 5:15 Ginna 57437 160 360 5:00 Shoreham 159959 160 1000 4:35 Pilgrim 106100 180 589 4:40 Assumptions: 1. Total population is based upon a peak season scenaric.

2. ETE is based upon a simultaneous eva:uation of the entire EPZ.

3. The ETE reflects the planning basis of a rapidly escalating accident.

4. The ETE's presented here reflect the use of the IDYNEV Model and comparable methodologies.

The new eva:uation time estimates for.the Pilgr' site indicate that '

there is little variance fr(m the old estimates. These numbers include the 1980 census data, varied weather and road conditions, varied time of day and year, and updated beach population data.

While the new estimates are actually lower, direct comparisons between the old vs. new Pilgrim ETE should be ce 'ormed with caution because of changes in modeling technique which na.e only recently become available.

BECo. recognizes that the ETEs may need to be updated in the future to remain current with population shifts. In order to do this, arrangements have been made to procure the computer software and raw data which is specific to the Pilgrim EPZ.

With this package, emergency planning personnel will also have the capability to graphically demonstrate evacuation scenarios. The i software will display, in color, the movement of people in vehicles over the evacuation network, using animation techniques in a user-interaction mode. This resource will be made available to the local and state emergency planning personnel so that they may enter data into the modeling process and maintain an accurate assessment of Evacuation Time Estimates in the future. ,

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. C. Conclusion A new ETE has been generated using the most current population statistics (1980 census) and addressing recently identified issues that were outside the previous ETE work scope. -(1.e., evacuation of beach population, and adverse weather conditions). The results indicate that the updated statistics do not negatively affect evacuation planning which was done for the 1981 State and 1985 Town plans. The original evacuation planning of these documents therefore remains valid.

The new ETE information is being incorporated into BECo. planning documents and BECo. will make the study available to local and state emergency planning groups for inclusion into their plans.

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A. Summary of the Issue Transient beach / tourist populations need to be estimated and considered in emergency planning for events in which a shelter-advisory is recommended. Shelter resources should be identified to house _these persons.

8. BECo. Response Two elements are necessary for ensuring adequate planning for the sheltering of beach populations: 1) an estimate of the number of persons who will require sheltering'and 2) identification of the facilities for sheltering that population.

Estimates'for the population requiring sheltering are' contained in Section I, Evacuation Time Estimate of this submittal which discusses the ETE Report prepared by KLD Associates. Statistics for estimating the beach population are presented in Section 2, Demand Estimatien and Appendix H, Census Data of that report.

Sheltering of beach populations must consider beach / tourist population and populations of day workers in the region. The latter population has an indirect effect on sheltering beach populations because they will also occupy shelter space.

Estimates for the beach / tourist population and the regional day workers were taken from the KLD ETE Report and are presented in Table

2. Conservatively these numbers account for approximately 22,922 people, distributed over the four towns with recreational beach areas.

TABLE 2: Seacoast Area Populations (From KLD Associates ETE Study)

Day Workers Tourists / Beach Population Total Number Town In Seacoast Region In Seacoast Region of People Plymouth 6754 6341 13095 Kingston 1116 1220 2336 Duxbury 516 6145 6661 Marshfield 170 660 830 TOTALS 8556 14366 22922

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- In the early part of 1987, BECo. contracted with Stone and Webster to- .i conduct a comprehensive shelter study.in the beach area (ref. 3). .

Potential sheltering capabilities of municipal and commercial

-buildings along the Massachusetts coastline within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were identified. The towns in this region from, north to south, are: Marshfield, Duxbury, Kingston. and

! Plymouth. The coastline region shown is approximately one half mile to one mile wide and is shown in Figure 1.

The study conducted by-SWEC consisted of several steps. The first step was-to contact various local,' state, and federal organizations to gather background information, including previous sheltering studies. These organizations included the Region 1 Office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Massachusetts Civil-  !

Defense Agency'and Office of Emergency Preparedness (MCDA/0EP), and the American Red Cross. The Facility Survey Program (Ref. 4) 1' listings obtained from MCDA/0EP provided useful information for the study.

l The next step was to visit the Tax Assessors' offices at the town halls of the four towns. Available listings of all commercial

. properties and tax-exempt properties (e.g., municipal and church buildings) in the study region were examined. Maps were obtained for field use. Of particular. interest were the building address, construction characteristics, and available floor space. Each building.was then visually inspected to confirm the tax assessment information. -A list of potential shelters was developed from this information.

N'ithin the study region, Plymouth has a total potential sheltering area of approximately 2,370,000 square feet in 164 public shelters; Kingston has 122,000 square feet in 22 public shelters; Duxbury has 476.000 square feet in 60 public shelters; and Marshfield has 56,700 square feet'in 10 public shelters. The' number-of persons that can be sheltered in'a given area for a few hours can be estimated by dividing the potential sheltering area by a' factor in the range of ten to twenty square feet per person. The Facility Survey Program )

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Based upon the data available from the SWEC Shelter Study, Table 3 indicates the percent of available shelter space needed to shelter beach / tourist and regional worker population.

TABLE 3: Comparison of Shelter Capacity Versus Shelter Needs Total Potential .ied Shelter c ;tal Capacity: Shelter

1. of Persons Capacity:

(Assuming Day Workers Town 10 Ft.1/ Person) + Beach / Tourists Plymouth 233,000 6 Kingston 12,200 19 Duxbury 47,600 14 Marshfield 5,670 15 TOTALS 298,470 8

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Results of the SWEC Shelter Study, as summarized in Table 3, indicate that the Town of Kingston representing the worst case, would utilize only 19% of the total available space for sheltering beach and associated populations during an advisory. Other towns show significantly lower occupancy percentages, thus indicating a large surplus of sheltering capac1ty.

Per section A.3.8 of the 1981 Revision to the Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will evaluate which shelters of those identified warrant letters of agreement and make these arrangements to ensure their availability.

C. Conclusion-A shelter study was conducted to determine if adequate sheltering is available for the beach and tourist population. The results, summarized-in Table 3 above, indicate that on the ave age there is available approximately 12 1/2 times the shelter space required to-shelter those persons which comprise the beach / tourist oopulation.

This excess of' sheltering capacity for even the most conservative population estimates demonstrates that adequate planning is possible

'or sheltering beach / tourist transient populations.

III. References

1. Evacuation Time Estimate for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, KLD Associates, June 1987

2. Evacuation Time Estimate for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, HMM Associates, 1981

3. A Study to Identify Potential Shelters in the EPZ Coastline Region e of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Stone and Webster _

Engineering Corporation, April 1987

4. Reception and Care Facility Listing as of May 31, 1986, from Facility Survey Program of the Federal Emergency Management-Agency (1978 data).

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ATTACHMENT ~1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview of the Plan Update Process 1-1 1.2 1-1 Description of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 1-3 1.3 Preliminary Activities 1-5

2. DEMAND ESTIMATION 2-1 Trip Generation; Permanent Residents; Seasonal' Residents and Transients;. Summer Residents; Tourists at Beaches, Parks and Historical Sites; . Tourists at Hotels and Motels; Tourists at Camps and Campsites; Estimation of Day-Trippers and Elimination of Double-Counting; Employees; Other' Vehicles.

3.

ESTIMATION OF HIGHWAY CAPACITY 3-1 Capacity Estimations on Approaches to Intersections; Capacity Estimation Along

. Sections of Highway; General Considerations; Application to Pilgrim EPZ; Two-Lane Roads; Freeway Capacity; Freeway Ramps; Fog; Link Capacities-4.-

ESTIMATION OF TRIP GENERATION TIME 4-1 Background; Fundamental Considerations; Estimated Time Distributions of Activities Preceding Event 5; Time Distribution of the Notification Process; Calculation of Trip Generation-Time Distribution; Algorithm No. 1; Computed Time distribution of event k+1; Trip Generation Distributions for Week-end Scenarios; Trip Generation Distributions for Week-day Scenarios; Snow Clearance Time Distribution i

5. i DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR EVACUATION SCENARIOS 5-1 l

6.

TRAFFIC CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT TACTICS. 6-1

7. TRAFFIC ROUTING PLANS 7-1

8. ACCESS CONTROL WITHIN, AND AT THE PERIPHERY OF, THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ) AND DIVERSION ROUTES B-1 Identification and Installation of Control Devices

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-4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

Section Title Pace 9.

EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETE) FOR GENERAL POPULATION 9-1 Discussion of ETE; Example 1; Example 2; Example 3; Patterns of Traffic Congestion during Evacuation (Region 1, Scenario 1);

Evacuation Rates; Summary of Evacnation Time Analysis APPENDIX A - Glossary of Terms A-1 APPENDIX B - Traffic Assignment Model B-1 APPENDIX C - Traffic Simulation Model: I-DYNEV C-1 APPENDIX D - Detailed Description of Study Procedure D-1 APPENDIX E - Supporting Data E-1 APPENDIX F - Telephone Survey Instrument F-1 APPENDIX G - Tabulations of Telephone Survey Data G-1 APPENDIX H - 1980 Census Data H-1 I

APPENDIX I - Traffic Management and Control I-1 4 APPENDIX J - Description of Evacuation Routes J-1 APPENDIX X - Evacuation Route Maps K-1 APPENDIX L - Access Control L-1 ]

APPENDIX M - Estimated Traffic Demands at all Origin I Centroids, Loading Rates and origin- l Destination Patterns M-1 APPENDIX N - Network Link Attributes N-1 1

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. ATTACHMENT 2 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ETE PROCEDURE This attachment describes the activities performed in order to produce accurate estimates of evacuation times on the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for a nuclear power plant. These steps accurately reflect the process used by KLD Associates to provide the ETE study for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

Step 1 The first activity is to obtain data defining the spatial distribution of population within the EPZ. Specifically, obtain the population in each of 160 cells of a polar grid which is centered at the nuclear station, and consists of 22.5* sections and rings spaced one mile apart. Transient population characteristics must also be estimated on the same basis.

Step 2 The next activity is to examine a large-scale map of the EPZ. This map enables one to identify the access roads from each residential development to the adjoining elements of the analysis roadway network. This information is necessary in order to assign generated tri:s to the correct links of the network. This map also enables one to represent the geometrics of complex intersections properly in terms of their network configuration.

Steo 3 With this information absorbed, the next step is to conduct a physical survey I of the roadway system within the EPZ. The purpose of this survey is to determine the necessary measurements of roadway length and of the number of lanes on each link, the channelization of these lanes, whether or not there were any turn restrictions or special treatment of traffic at intersections and to gain the necessary insight required for estimating realistic values of roadway capacity. At each major intersection, take note of the traffic control device which was installed. In addition, determine whether or not, under emergency evacuation conditions, it would be possible to employ paved shoulders as an additional lane in the event such additional capacity was required.

Step 4 With this information, develop the evacuation network representation of the physical roadway system.

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. Step 5 With the network drawn, proceed to estimate the capacities of each link and to locate the centroids where trips would be generated during the evacuation process and then enter the analysis network.

Step 6 With all the information at hand, it is time to perform the effort of creating the input stream for the Traffic Assignment Model. This model was designed to be compatible with the Traffic Simulation Model used later in the project, in the sense that the input format required for one model was entirely compatible with the input format required by the other, thus avoiding duplication of effort. This step in the procedure is labor-intensive. Fortunately, this input stream need only be developed once; any changes made can be implemented quickly and at small cost. Thus, it is possible to execute these models on different scenarios with very little effort needed to modify the basic input stream to represent the specific attributes of each scenario.

Step 7 After creating the input stream by using PREDYN, execute the Traffic Assignment Model. This computer program contains upwards of 1,000 diagnostic inconsistencies and any other improper input. This diagnostic software produces messages which assist the user in identifying the source of the problem and guide the user in preparing the necessary corrections.

Step 8 With the input stream free of errer, execute the Traffic Assignment Model.

The Traffic Assignment program is a very efficient software code. l Step 9 ,

l The next activity is to examine critically the statistics produced by the .

Traffic Assignment program. This is a labor-intensive activity, requiring the direct participation of skilled engineers who possess the necessary practical experience to interpret the results and to determine the causes of any problems reflected in the result.

Essentially, the approach is to identify those " hot spots" in the network which represent locations where congested conditions are extreme. It is then necessary to identify the cause of this congestion. This cause can take many forms, either as excess demand due to improper routing, as a shortfall of capacity, or as a quantitative error in the way the physical system was represented in the input stream.

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. The examination of the Traffic Assignment output leads to one of two conclusions:

• The results are as satisfactory as could be expected at this stage of the analysis process, or j e Treatments must be introduced in order to improve the flow of traffic.

This decision requires, of course, the application of the user's judgment based upon the results obtained in previous applications of the Traffic Assignment Model and a comparison of the results of thit last case with the j previous ones. In the event the results are satisfactory, in the opinion of the user then the process continues with the exercise of the simulation model in Step 12. Otherwise, proceed to Step 10.

Step 10 There are many " treatments" available to the user in resolving such problems.

These treatments range from decisions to reroute the traffic by imposing turn '

restrictions where they can produce significant improvements in capacity, changing the control treatment at critical intersections so as to provide improved service for one or more movements, or in prescribing specific i treatments for channelizing the flow so as to expedite the movement of traffic along major roadway systems or changing the trip table. Such " treatments" take the form of modifications to the original input stream.

We then perform the modifications to the input stream, reflecting the control treatments described above. As indicated previously, such modifications are implemented quickly to the extent that more than one execution of the computer program is possible in a single day.

Step 11 As noted above, the physical changes to the input stream must be implemented in order to reflect the changes in the control treatments undertaken in Step ,

10. At the completion of this activity, the process returns to Step 8 where I' the Traffic Assignment Model is once again executed.

I Step 12 )

l The output of the Traffic Assignment Model includes the computed turn l movements for each link. If the user is executing the Traffic Assignment and the Traffic Simulation models in a single run, then this data is automatically accessed by the latter model. If the simulation model is executed separatcly,  !

the user must modify the input stream for the Traffic Assignment model by )

beginning in the turn-movement data, using PREDYN. l l

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. Step 13 After the input stream has been debugged, the simulation model is executed to provide the. user with detailed estimates, expressed as statistical measures of effectiveness (MOE), which describe the detailed performance of traffic operations on each link of the network.

jpp 14 In this step, the detailed output of the Traffic Simulation Model is examined

,in order to identify once again the problems which exist on the network. The results of the simulation model are extremely detailed and are far more accurate in their ability to describe traffic operations than those provided by the Traffic Assignment Model. Thus, it is possible to identify the cause of the problems by carefully studying the output.

Again, one can implement corrective treatments designed to expedite the flow of. traffic on the network in the event that the results are considered to be less efficient than is possible to achieve. In the event that changes are needed, the analysis process prcceeds to Step 15. On the other hand, if the results were satisfactory, then one can decide whether it is necessary to return to Step 8 to execute the Traffic Assignment Model once again and repeat the whole process, or to accept the final results as being the "best" that can be achieved within the reasonable constraints of budget and time allotments.

Generally, if there are no changes indicated by the activities of Step 14, then we can conclude that all results were satisfactory, and we can then proceed to document them in Step 17. Otherwise, we have to return to Step 8 in order to determine the effects of the changes implemented in Step 14 on the optimal routing patterns cver the 'tetwork. This determination can only be ascertained by executing the Traffic Assignment Model.

Step 15 This activity implements the changes in control treatments or in the assignment of destinations associated with one or more origins in order to improve the flow of traffic over the network. These treatments can also include the consideration of additional roadway segments to the existing analysis network in order to disperse the traffic demand and thus avoid the i focusing of traffic demand which can produce high levels of congestion.

Step 16 Once the treatments have been identified, it is necessary to modify the input stream accordingly. At the completion of this effort, the procedure returns to step 13 to execute the simulation model once more.

Step 17 The simulation results are then analyzed, tabulated and graphed. The results are then documented, as required.

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- ATTACHMENT 3 SHELTER STUDY TABLE OF CONTENTS Section LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES INTRODUCTION APPROACH Initial Work Municipal Tax Records Visual Inspection Shielding Factors

Residential Shelters Large Special-Needs Facilities RESULTS Public Shelters Residential Shelters

) Jordan Hospital l Plymouth County House of Correction

' REFERENCES LIST OF TABLES Number Title 1 Sample Shelter Survey Form 2 Plymouth - Characteristics of Potential Public Shelters 3 Kingston - Characteristics of Potential Public Shelters 4 Duxbury - Characteristics of Potential Public Shelters 5 Marshfield - Characteristics of Potential Public Shelters 6 Residences with Basements 7 Sheltering Characteristics of Special-Needs Facilities LIST OF FIGURES 1 Map of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station EPZ Area (showing shelter study region) 2 Jordan Hospital Sheltering Areas

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i MOBILITYIMIRED The following information resolves a FEMA concern involving the Mobility Impaired population within the Pilgrim EPZ. This Information updates that presented in the 1981 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the 1985 Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Towns of Carver Duxbury, Kingston, Marshfield and Plymouth.

A. Summary of the Issue Emergency Planning provisions for the mobility impaired (deaf and hearing impaired, transit dependent, handicapped) populations within the EPZ towns are inadequate. These populations need to be identified and planning performed to assure their safety during an emergency.

B. BECo. Response Boston Edison has developed a special needs survey (attachment 1) which was mailed to more than 35,000 households in May, 1987. The survey was designed to identify the number of persons that were mCbility impaired (visual, hearing, handicapped, transit dependent), or in need of special equipment to facilitate an evacuation. As of 6/1/87, approximately 1,200 persons have responded and indicated that some assistance would be required. In addition, advertisements have been placed in local papers requesting deaf and hearing impaired persons contact BECo. and make arrangements for emergency notification. To ensure cc-tinued identification of the mobility impaired EPZ residents, SECo. will implement an outreach program to periodically resurvey the area.

Survey responses by the public are being analyzed to cetermine the measures that must be taken to ensure that the mobility impaired are adequately notified and supported should protective a:: ion recommendations be made during an emergency.

BECo. is developing a computer database which will be used to track names, addresses, and special equipment provided to town residents. Equipment to be tracked includes Telecommunication Devices (TTDs) and telephone  !

amplification devices which will ensure that the hearing impaired are ,

notified. Additionally it is BECo.'s recommendation to the state that televised EBS messages should include closed captioned emergency  ;

instructions. ]

i Procedures will be developed to document BECo. administration of the mobility impaired program. Drsft sections of town and state plans have been submitted to them for their plans and procedures and await their review and comments. A synopsis of these follows.

1. Physically Impaired A list of physically impaired residents, compiled through the BECo.

survey, will be maintained by the Town Civil Defense Directors at the Emergency Operations Centers. Notification will be via the prompt public alerting system or previously determined means. Special arrangements necessary to support shelter or evacuation will be made (ref. Area II, Operations Plan,Section V.H.3.c).

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2. Transportation Dependent Mobility impaired persons requiring transportation, as identified by the BECo. survey, will be evacuated via buses, ambulances, or other appropriate vehicles, under the coordination of Area II and town Civil Defense Directors. Section A.3.8 of the 1981 State Plan contains a provision for the establishment of letters of agreement with private support companies for this purpose. Sufficient buses equipped for the mobility impaired (wheelchair capable) were ide1tified in the March 1987 HMM Bus Capability Study (Reference 1) which was prepared for BECo.. Table 1 presents a summary of that surrey.

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF TOTAL VEHICLES. CAPACITY OF EACH Average Seating Vehicle Capacity Ouantity Per Vehicle School Bus 1929 44 Transit Bus 1453 47 Wheelchair Van 51 15 Van 139 15 Mini Bus 54 20 Trolley Bus 36 30 Buses will initially report to Transportation Dispatch Centers within each town and be dispatched to staging areas for receipt of the transit dependent population. Persons transported will be taken to Reception Centers outside the EPZ per direction in the town and state plans.

C. Conclusion Mobility impaired persons within the EPZ have been identified and a program enacted to ensure their registry is updated. Notification of this segment of the EPZ population has been addressed, including the scheduled procurement of special communications equipment by BECo. Evacuation provisions will be addressed in the town plans. Wheel chair vans, buses, ambulances, etc. will be relied upon for the transport of these people.

Logistical studies confirm that adequate resources are available to support this effort.

D. References

1. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Bus Response Capability Study; HMM Associates, March 1987.

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. ATTACHMENT 1 L

SEECIAL NEEDS SURVEY F If you or someone who lives with you would need transportation assistance or notification assistance in the event an evacuation order were given; please completely fill out this card and return in the postage paid envelope enclosed.

Check, If Appropriate

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Mobility Impaired? . . . . . . . . . . used/needed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]

poi mamam If yes, specify Bedridden? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (( ))

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Phone: ( ) If yes, clarify Would you need a ride in the case of an Evacuation? . . . . [ ]

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SPECIALFACILITIES The following information resolves a FEMA concern involving Special facilities within the EPZ. This in"ormation updates that presented in the 1981 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the 1985 Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Towns of Carver, Ouxbury, Kingston, Marshfield and Plymouth.

A. Sunenary of the Issue The current State and Town plans do not adequately address sheltering or evacuation of special facilities (e,y. schools, day care centers, etc.).

Special facilities within the EPZ n wd to be identified and detailed plans developed for their emergency response.

B. BECo. Response Approximately 65 special facilities and 35 camps within the EPZ were identified by BECo. via listings from previous emergency plans, telephone book reviews, and contacts with professional agencies. The identified facilities were surveyed in April 1987 (Attachment 1) to determine each facility's present level of emergency preparedness, resources, points of contact, and special sheltering or evacuation requirements which must be considered during an emergency. The results of the survey were evaluated, facilities categorized, and generic plans developed for each category (e.g. schools, day care centers, summer camps, correctional institutions).

Meetings were held with each facility director to determine the need for site specific plans. For facilities verified in possession of adequate plars, no further action was taken. For facilities without plans, the generic plans were modified to 'nclude specific information such as facility director comments, checklists, telephone numbers, and detailed emergency response procedures. These are scheduled for distribution by the first week of June 1987 (ref 1-4 for example special facility plans).

The special facility survey results, particularly those requests that require special arrangements to support shelter or evacuation, will be made available to the town and state emergency planning agencies. Per section A.3.0 of the 1981 Revision to the Massachusetts Radiological i Emergency Response Plan, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will evaluate these needs and obtain the necessary letters of agreement to ensure support from the private sector. Additionally,Section V.H.3.e of the MCDA Area II Operations Plan contains the provision for the state to provide special transportation arrangements for institutionalized persons during an emergency.

BECo. has procured five hundred tone alert radios and will distribute these to identified special facilities requiring supplemental devices to  !

ensure notification in the event of an emergency. This system will be supported by a long term program that ensures tone alerts are maintained, tested and replaced when inoperable.

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. The effort to develop and improve plans and procedures for special facilities is an ongoing process. Attachment 2 is the listing of those facilities for which specific plans have been or are in the process of being developed.

A synopsis of typical special facility emergency response actions are provided by category as follows:

a. Schools Twenty-eight schools (attachment 2) were identified within the EPZ as of 5/22/87. Following notification, the Superintendent of Schools for each town notifies each Principal within his jurisdiction to take the recommended protective action. This would include implementation of early dismissal procedures, sheltering of students at schools or evacuating students to a reception center. Procedures to accomplish these protective actions are being developed by BECo. and the appropriate school officials and will be prov'ced to each facility.

If additional resources are necessary, the re:.esting principal (s) will contact the superintendent in the appro;-tate town who will contact the Area II EOC. Area II will be res;onsible for coordinating any additional resource needs.

b. Day Care Centers Twenty-cne day care centers (attachment 2) we e identified within the EPZ as of 5/22/87. Following notification, s eltering at Day Care Centers would be accomplished according to established Emergency Procedures. In the event that an evacuation is recommended, the Day Care Center Director, or his designee, would :e contacted by the Civil Defense Director located at the EOC. ~ e Day Care Center Director, under advisement of the Civil Defe se Director, would initiate established emergency procedures to effect an evacuation and relocation to the appropriate Reception Center.

If additional resources are necessary, the requesting Day Care Center Director (s) will contact the Superintendent of Schools in the appropriate town who will contact the Area II EOC. Area II will be responsible for coordinating any additional resource needs.

c. Summer Camps Thirty-five summer camps (attachment 2) were identified within the ,

EPZ as of 5/22/87. Following notification by the town civil defense director (s), camp directors will be instructed to either shelter or .

evacuate. Should an evacuation be directed, camp personnel will be  !

transported by camp owned buses or vans and private automobiles to the nearest potential public shelter and/or reception center. The town civil defense director (s) maintains a list which identifies the potential public shelters.

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d. Jails and Detention Centers There are two facilities which fit into this category and both are located within the town of Plymouth. These facilities are the Plymouth County House of Correction and the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Plymouth. They will be alerted of any emergency via tone alert radios. The Director of each of the facilities will be notified by the Plymouth Police of a recommendation to shelter or evacuate and will take appropriate protective actions according to procedure. The procedures are being developed by BECo. In coordination with the facility directors.

Reception for inmates, in the event of an evacuation, will be provided by the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Bridgewater. Transportation will be accomplished via buses and vans provided by each institution, with additional backup available from the National Guard. The local jails in each town do not need extensive planning because most prisoners are released after a few hours following posting of ball. If further detention is necessary they are transferred to the cour;ty facility.

e. Nursing Homes There are twelve nursing homes located in the EPZ which will be alerted of any emergency via tone alert radios. The nursing home director will receive notification of any emergency from the health director and will take the appropriate protective action according to procedure. The site specific emergency procedures are :eing developed by BECo. with input from the facility directer. In the event of an evacuation, residents who cannot be relocated by automobile will be moved by bus, ambulance, or other appropriate vehicle. Ambulance transportation will be provided by the Fire Department and coordinated with the Health Director.

f. Hospitals Jordan Hospital is the only hospital in the EPZ and it will be notified of an emergency via tone alert radios. In the event of an emergency at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, the hospital administrator would be notified by the Health Director. If  ;

evacuation is recommended, many of the patients would be evacuated by 1 private automobiles or buses in coordination with the Health 3 Director. Intensive care and orthopedic patients who need l life-support systems or special care in evacuation will be transported by the Fire Department Ambulance Service by ambulance or other appropriate vehicle and coordinated with the Health Director.

The protection factor afforded by hospital building structures would, in many cases, be sufficient to allow shelter-in-place as a ,

appropriate protective action. This will be evaluated by hospital administrators in coordination with local and state civil defense and health officials.

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. If necessary, patients of Jordan Hospital'would be evacuated to designated hospitals outside the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. Specific facility procedures are being developed by BECo. in concert with the hospital staff.

C. BEco. Conclusion BECo. has established a program to identify special facilitir. within the EPZ and incorporate them into the emergency planning process. Adequate emergency response plans for each special facility have either been verified or have been or are being developed by BECo. in coordination with the special facility director (s). The list of special facilities will be updated annually. Each facility plan will be on file with MCDA and the local EOC's, and will be periodically reviewed and updated.

D. References

1. Governor Winslow School, Marshfield, Mass., Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

2. Manomet Elementary School, Plymouth, Mass., Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

3. Pilgrim Manor Nursing Home, Plymouth, Mass., Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

4. Camp Wing, Duxbury, Mass., Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

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STTACHMENT 1

..' FACILITY MAME: '

. , ,' TYPE: i

, LOCAll0N: I I

FAClllTY ADMINISTRATOR:

• BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:

HoffE TELEPHONE NUMBER:

I j ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR:

BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

1 i

i 1.0 POPULATION i

1.1 MAXIMUM RESIDENT POPULATION 1.2 NAXINUM STAFF POPULATION l l l 1.3 NUMBER OF NON-AMBU'.ATORY PERSONS l

e 1.4 DO YOU HAVE ANY RESIDENTS THAT REQUIRE j

SPECIAL ATTENTION IN AN EVACUATION? l i

t.5 IF SO, HOW NANY?

1.6 PLEASE IDENTIFY THEIR RESPECTIVE SPECIAL ATTENTIONS I

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l 2.0 EVACUATION 2.1 DO YOU HAVE AN EVACUATION PLAN 7 f

! 2.2 WHERE WOULD RESIDENTS BE RELOCATED 7 2.3 DO YOU HAVE A LETTER OF AGREEMENT WITH THAT FACILITY?

2.4 DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTE AN EVACUATION?

I IF NOT, PLEASE IDENTIFY THESE CONSTRAINTS?

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2.5 HOW LON6 WOULD IT TAKE TO PREPARE THE RESIDENTS l FOR AN EVACUATION AND HAVE THEM READY TO BOARD

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l ENER6ENCY VEHICLES?

i. TIME NEEDED TO PREPARE (MINUTES)

DAY-TIME NIGHT TIME I

AM80LATORY NON-ANBULATORY BEDRIDDEN WHEEL-CHAIR 3.0 TRANSPORTATION 3.1 HOW MANY OF THE FOLLOWIN6 VEHICLES DO YOU HAVE AVAILABLE7 OWN AND H AVE ON-SITE LEASE FRON OTHERS AND STORED OFF-SITE VEHICLE TYPE Nt'MBER ' C APACITY' NUMBER CAPACITY

• BUSES ,

VANS AMBULANCES LIFT VANS PASSEN6ER I CARS ,

• IN PERSONS 3.2 HOW MANY ADDITIONAL VEHICLES. IF ANY WOULD BE NEEDED TO SERVICE THE TOTAL POPULATION OF YOUR FACILITY 7 CONSIDER THE NEED TO SUPPLY STAFF SUPPORT ENROUTE AND THE AVAILABILITY OF STAFF OWNED VEHICLES.

VEHICLE TYPE NUMBER CAPACITY (PERSONS)

BUSES VANS _

AMBULANCES LIFT VANS PASSEN6ER CARS e

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' l IF S0 IDENTIFY AND INDICATE NUMBER OF BUSES SUPPLIED

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j 4.1 UPON NOTIFICATION, WHAT OTHER INDIVIDUALS WILL YOU CALL 7

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i NAME TITLE EMER6ENCY FUNCTION i REPORTS TO i

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-s. SPECIAL' FACILITIES .j DUXBURY

. Day Care Centers:

Berrybrook School, Inc. (585-2307)

First Parish Nursery (934-6532)

Good Shepherd Nursery School (934-6007)

Learn in Play Preschool (585-9048)

North Hill Country (934-5800)

- Pied Piper Preschool (585-5070)

St. John's Nursery School (934-6523)

Schools:

Munch-Kin Montessori / Bay Farm Academy (934-7101)

- Ellison High School (934-6541)

Intermediate School (934-6521)

Chandler Street School (585-4318)

Elementary School (lower) (934-6528)

Elementary School (upper) (934-5667)

Nursina Homes:

Duxbury House Nursing Home (585-2397)

- Bay Path Nursing Home (585-5561)

Camos:

Blairhaven (934-5123)

Camp Wing (837-6144)

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' SPECIAL FACILIli[,3-MARSHFIELD Schools:

Governor Hinslow School (837-2871)

Camos:

Camp Daniel Webster

- Camp Millbrook i

i 1

l May 22, 1987

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SPECIAL FACILITIES PLYMOUTH Day Care Centers:

Cooperative Child Care (746-0612)

Happy Day Nursery School (746-0812)

Jack and Jill Nursery (224-2526)

- Kidsport, Inc. (747-4733)

Kinder Haus Nursery School (746-6038)

Seven Hills Nursery. School (746-4275)

Little People's Place (746-5989)

Kinder College, Inc. (224-8753)

Zion Christian Pre-School (746-3213)

Methodist Nursery School (746-7063)

Schools:

Pinewood School Montessori, Inc. (746-5127)

- Hedge School (746-1140)

(St. Peter's Kindergarten)

Cold Spring School (746-0708)

Oak Street School (746-1661)

Mt. Pleasant School (746-1097)

- West Elementary School (747-0435)

- Plymouth Carver Intermediate School (746-8450)

Federal 'rurnace School (746-5134) 130 Court Street (Pupil Personnel)

May 22, 1987 i

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SPECIAL FACILITIES PLYMOUTH Schools:'l(Continued)

Manomet. Elementary School (224-3940)

Indian Brook School (224-6753)

South School (224-8186)

Nathaniel Morton School (746-6500)

' Plymouth' Carver Regional HS (746-4700)

- Nursina Homes:

Plymouth Nursing Home (746-2085)

Mayflower House Nursing Home (746-4343)

Pilgrim Manor Nursing Home (746-7016)

Newfield House Convalescent Home (746-2912)

Happiness House Rest Home (746-2982)

Beverly Manor Home (747-4790)

Jails:

Plymouth County House of Correction (746-0610)

Town of Plymouth Jail (746-1212)

Hospitals:

Jordan Hospital (746-2000)

Hay 22, 1987 l

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SPECIAL FACILITIES PLYMOUTH CAmgu

- Blueberry Hill (746-3708)

Indian Head Resort (888-3688)

Ellis Haven (746-0803)

- Sandy Pond Campground (759-9336)

Pinewood Lodge' Trailer Park (746-3548)

Miles Standish SF (866-2526)

Plymouth Rock K0A Campground (947-6435)

- Camp Clark'(888-2290)

- Camp Massasoit (888-6484)

- Camp Squanto (224-2010)

- Camp Norse Boy Scouts (746-2256)

- Pinewood Camp (224-3480)

Camp Bournedale (888-2634)

- Camp Child (224-2080)

- Camp Dennen (888-1939)

Baird Center (224-3041)

Hind in the Pines Girlscout Center l

1

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May 22, 1987

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l SPECIAL' FACILITIES-l l-1 PLYMOUTH i

.Camos: (Continued)

Camp Dorothy-Carleton Timberland - Cedarwood

- Plymouth Recreation Center

- Camp H.M. Arthur

- Country Dance and Song Society of America May 22, 1987

55 .?"] J2::J:M2%5WW&iMt;%PD. a.::::,.:::,:n.:La.: :ac.;K,0.;3&w :sJr. L:: i-N%:.: , %Q::Bi. ,

i F Q' i s- ] i c . h w . .

SPECIAL FACILITIES l

KINGSTON i

Day Care Centers:

- - Growth Unlimited Pr eschool (585-5864)

- Sunny. Acres Schools:

-- Silver Lake Regional HS (585-6544)

- Kingston Elementary / Intermediate School (535-3821)

- Sacred Heart Elementary School (746-2113)

- Sacred Heart Junior / Senior HS (746-2374)

- Sacred Heart Pre - Primary School (746-0350)

Nursina Homes:

Provincial Residence (746-0570)

- Evanswood Retirement Apts. (585-2576)

Margaret H. Carter Vets Home (585-6028)

- Meadowcrest Apts. (585-8028)

- Blueberry Hill Rest Home (585-3657)

- Camos:

- Camp Hishannock (746-0790)

May 22, 1987

._14_

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SPECIAL FACILITIES l

)

CARVER I

l Day Care Centers: 1 1

- Captain Pal Preschool (866-5415) p -

Cranberry Crossings (866-2400)

Schools:

- Governor John Carver School (866-5361)

- Benjamin Ellis School (866-3348)

Nursina Homes:

I Hilltop Nursing Home (866-4548)

Camos:

- Camp Clear (866-4549)

Web of Life Outdoor Education Center (866-5353)

Cachalot Scout Reservation (295-2117)

Miles Standish State Forest (866-2526)

Shady Acres (866-4040)

- Jarvio Concho (866-4511)

- Pinewood Way (866-3392)

- Pine Acres Campground i

l

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May 22, 1987 ES L L.:.iW;L M D.i N h:.t.. G . W Ra M W W 14 sa i i:2uL s\% . 20mW::;W ~ i V

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,7 . July 21, 1987

.MEMnRANDUM FOR: Lawrence Shao, Director Division of Engineering and Systems Technology _

William F..Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects, RI FROM: Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects I/II

SUBJECT:

INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF PILGRIM SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGP/M On July 8, 1987, Boston Edison Company (BEco) submitted a detailed description of.the Pilgrim Safety Enhancement Program (SEP) to the NRC. (Copies of this submittal have bean provided to you separately; however, contents of this submittal are summarized in Enclosure.11 The submittal describes hardware changes that BECo has voluntarily elected to implement at-Pilgrim. BEco states in their submittal that none of the physical plant changes increases

.the probability or consequences of a design basis accident and that all'of the changes will result in a reduction in the frequency of core melt scenarios or an improvement in the performance of the containment response. RECo has advised the PM.that all of the changes could be implemented under the

. provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

BEco has advised the staff that they intend to implement these changes prior to restart of the Pilgrim facility / estimated by BEco to be in late September). In a July 16, 1987 conversation with Ralph Bird (REco Senior Vice-President - Nuclear), Dr. Murley committed to a prompt staff assessment of.these changes to determine' their safety impact and to evaluate the licensee's approach to~ their implementation. As a part of our initial assessment of these changes, a visit to the BEco engineering offices in Braintree, MA, is planned for July 22, 1987. Note that we expect to expend additional review effort subsequent to our return and that Region I plans additional inspections of SEP modification activities at the site.

I have directed the Pilgrim PM (Dick Wessman) to lead a multi-disciplined team including both NRR and Region I personnel to make this visit. Suggested representatives are identified in Enclosure 2. l j

To structure the team's effort and to allow me to report the results of this 1 initial assessment promptly to Dr. Murley and the utility, the guidelines and sunnary report femat of Enclosures 3 and 4 should be followed. Also included for infomation is guidance regarding 10 CFR 50.59 reviews extracted from the IE Manual (Enclosure 5).

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July 21, 1987 I appreciate your "short-fused" support on this effort. Please. contact B. Boger (X27415) or D. Wessman (X24937) if you have questions. TAC No. 65356 i1 is assigned to this effort.

J Steven A. Varga, Director l Division of Reactor Projects.I/II .

{

l

Enclosures:

I As stated 3 i

cc: T. Murley J. Sniezek /  :

l F. Miraglia j R. Starostecki '

A. Thadani

! . F. Rosa J. Craig W. Hodges J. Joyce J. Wiggins, RI C. Tinkler N. Su V. Thomas

0. Chopra L. Briggs, RI DISTRIBUTION Docket Files PO I-3 R/F SAVarga BABoger VNerses RHWessman MRushbrook DRPR: PDI-3 DRPR:PDI-3 DRPR:AD RI D .

RHWe sman:ah es BABoger a a 07 /87 VNerg/87 07/7U 07MU/87 07 /87 l

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2..

I appreciate your "short-fused" support on this e# fort. Please contact B. Boger (X274151 or D. Wessman IX 49371 if you haveMuestions. ' TAC No. 65356 is assigned to this effort.

Ste A. Varga, Director Di is n of Reactor Projects I/II

Enclosures:

As stated cc: T. Murley F. Miraglia R. Starostecki A. Thadani F. Rosa

• J. Craig W. Hodges J. Joyce.

J. Wiggins, RI C. Tinkler N. Su V. Thomas

0. Chopra L. Briggs, RI DISTRIRllTION Docket Files '

PD I-3 R/F SAVarga BABoger VNerses RHWessman MRushbrook RPR:PDI-3 ,P :)PDI-3 . D RI DRPR:DIR RHWessman:ah /ses ABoger SAVarga 07/-g87 07/p/87 07/p/87 07/ /87

EGEXHV.% JT .4;GM.?.h :.O - 9.34,"! % 5u % M n  ;.+.a . :: .s % ,x %::. a m . -a J a.n . .n E.<tesses t

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of Report 1.2 Scope of Report 1.3 Safety Enhancement Program Goals 1.4 Safety Enhancement Program Plant and Operational' Changes 2.0 OVERVIEW OF SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

2.1 Background

2.2- Safety Enhancements ,

3.0 DESCRIPTION

OF SPECIFIC PLANT SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS 3.1 General Considerations 3.2 Installation of a Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) 3.3 Containment Spray Header Nozzles 3.4 Add'itional Sources of Hater for RPV Injection and Containment f Spray

.. 3.5 Diesel Fire Pump for RPV Injection and Containment Spray 3.6. Diesel Pump Fire Pump Fuel 011 Transfer System 3.7 Backup Nitrogen Supply System 3.8 Blackout Diesel Generator Including Protected Installation

. Facilities  !

1 3.9 Automatic Depressurization System Logic Modifications 3.10 Addition of Enriched Boron to Standby Liquid Control System 3.11 ATHS Feedwater Pump Trip 3.12 Modifications to Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Turbine Exhaust Trip Setpoint l 3.13 Additional ATHS Recirculation Pump Trip )

4.0 DESCRIPTION

OF OPERATIONAL PLANT SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS

5.0 CONCLUSION

S

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ENCLOSURE 2 INITIAL ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS FUNCTIONAL AREA ORGANIZATION MEMPER Management / Coordination PC I-3/NRR R. Wessman Plant Systems- SPLB/NRR C. Tinkler Reactor Systems SRXB/NRR N. Su

- M : t =;...t. u un~ - IG/;G;. ~ W v%- :

Electrical SELB/NRR 0. Chopra Implementation /50.59 Mr Application DRS/RI L. B M }l t,%

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W..XDliX? , 58 T M,:'~1i & DDiG PL~:5.;iG.%dd2 NP lis.- .i.-u'a& hem & L G&d%Y . ' ' AM.W':: 4 Enclosure 3

.LNIT I AL ASFF9MFilT GL11 DELIrg_E; The following are suggested .guidelirios for use in condtic't of the.initiel. assessment. Any conclusions reached about the technical adequacy,or method of implementation of thn F<ECo SEP modifications are considered tentative. This assessment 2s_brint and cannot reflect an indepth technical review. disc to the constraints of time. Each SEP enhancement should be assessed with consideration of the following:

1. .What is the safety impact of the change when considerr-d ;+)nne or along with the other changes?- Does an "unreviewed safety

~

question" e::i s t ? (Criteria for determining whethne an unrevi 6esed safety questich exists are' defined in Paragraph (a)(2) of 10 CFR 50.59. Copy attached).

2. Is e change to the Technical Specifications required? (If the answer is "Yes" the modification and the proposed Technir=1 Specification change must be reviewed by the' staff before implementation).

3. For those items in which no Technical Specificatiori chalige is

' involved, should the licrrnsee be allowed to implement the change before staff review is complete?

4. Assess the adequacy of the licensee's evaluation and conclusions regarding each SEP item.

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i Enclosure 4.

Surv1ARY FEPnRT FOPthAT For each'SEP item you-assess, provide a bririf somn.ar y repor +.

using the following format. This is to facilitate manegement decisionm61ing and assure consistency in approach. Hopr:fu] 3 , . -

each summary won't require morc'than 1-2 pages.

1. - 'Summari:e the proposed SEP item.

2. Summari:e your conclusions regardinO each of the items in Enclosure 3.

3. Provido your recommendations for further FJRC action, or

- indicate if you believe no further action is warranted (other than routine inspection of the modification,'as elected by Reginn I).

4. Provide any addition'al comments you feel are appropyisto.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

%.y.....,/ Washington, D.C. 20555 INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 00AS{P 10 CFR 50.59 PART 9800 CFR DISCUSSIONS CHANGES TO FACILITIES, PROCEDURES AND TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS)

A. PURPOSE The purpose of this guidance is to clarify the specific 10 CFR 50.59 language relating to the type of proposed changes, tests, or experi-ments that require a record of the safety evaluation specified in 10 CFR 50.59(b). It is not intended that this guidance delineate specific licensee review criteria which may be used to identify pro-posed changes, tests, or experiments that require a safet evaluation as specified by 10 CFR 50.59(b).

~

B. POLICY

/

This' revision to this CFR Discussion does not represent a change in IE policy. The discussion section has been revised to clarify the application of 10 CFR 50.59 to controls for using jumpers / lifted leads and to procedure changes. Also, the 10 CFR 50.59 flowchart (Appendix

1) was updated.

C. APPLICABILITY: 2515 '

l D. DISCUSSION '

i

1. 10 CFR 50.59 is composed of three essential parts:

a. Paragraph (a)(1) is permissive in that it allows the licen-see to make changes to the facility and its operation as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) without prior approval, provided a change in Technical Specifications (TS) is not involved or an "unreviewed safety question" does not exist. Criteria for determining whether an unreviewed safety question exists are defined in Paragraph (a)(2).

b. Paragraph (b) requires that the licensee maintain records of changes made under the authority of Paragraph (a)(1). These i records must include a written safety evaluation which pro-vides the basis for determining whether an unreviewed safety question exists. Paragraph (b) also requires that a report (at least annually) of such changes be submitted to the PRC.

c. Paragraph (c) requires that proposed changes in Technical Issue Date: 01/01/84

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ " ~~~~~ ' ~ ~ ~

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. . CHANGES TO FACIL3T8ES, PROCEDURES

10 CFR 50.59 AND' TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS 1

< Specifications be ' submitted to the NRC as an application for [

license ' amendment. Likewise, proposed changes ; to ' the facil-ity or procedures and the proposed conduct of tests which

(

involve an unreviewed safety question must be submitted to the NRC as an application for license amendment.

2. It should be noted that. the safety evaluation required by 10 CFR 50.59 is only one of the several evaluations and reviews required by the NRC. Most' Technical Specifications require that onsite review groups review proposed procedures and modifications or changes to plant equipment or components affecting safety. These

~~

review requirements are applicable ~ whether or not the equipment or component is described in the SAR. As a result of the TS required reviews,'the need for a safety evaluation to meet 10 CFR

' 50.59 requirements may be identified. Appendix 1 delineates a typical overall review scheme at a facility.

3. This guidance is to be applied during inspection of facilities holding operating licenses under 10 CFR 50 and is primarily

• directed toward:

,- a. Changes made to those systems and- procedures descrited in the.SAR, and J b. ' Performance of tests nol o described in the SAR.

4. Within the context of this guidance : any proposed change to a system or procedure as described in the SAR either by text or [

drawings should be reviewed by the licensee to determine whether it involves an unreview'ed safety question. Changes may involve

. an unreviewed safety question even though they are "beyond the

~

second isolation valves," or they do not serve a normal safety-related function, since alteration may introduce an unreviewed safety question.

!' . Maintenance' activities - which do not result in a change to a '

system (permanent or temporary), or which replace components with .

replacement parts procured to the same (or equivalent) purchase specification, do not require a written safety evaluation to meet 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. However, if components described in the SAR are removed, or their function is altered, or if substi-tute components are utilized, or if changes remain following com-pletion of a maintenance activity, a safety evaluation is re-quired to meet the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and the change must be reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.59(b).

6. In all cases requiring a written safety evaluation, the safety evaluation must provide the basis for determination that the pro-posed change does or does not involve an unreviewed safety ques-tion. A simple statement of conclusion in itself is not suffi-cient; however, depending upon the significance of the change, the safety evaluation may be quite brief.

Issue Date: 01/01/84 -

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4 CHANGES TO FAC8LITIES, PROCEDURES AND TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS) 10 CFR 50.59

7. Listed below aro examples of various changes to facilities, systems, procedures, and tests which are typical of those requir-ing a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation and those which do not re-quire a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

a. Changes in the Facility As Described in the Safety Analysis Repo-t.

This pertains to any changes in the facility which alter the design, function, or method of performing the function of a component, system, or structure described in the SAR. This would apply to components, systems, and structures described either in the written portion of the SAR or in the drawings contained therein. Contrasting examples of each case are:

(1) Components. Replacement of thermocouple in the diesel high-bearing temperature automatic shutdown circuitry (if such a component were described in the SAR) with one made by the same manufacturer, but encompassing different response characteristics, would . require a safety evaluation to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

On the other hand, replacement of a thermocouple in

/ the diesel high-bearing temperature automatic shutdown circuitry (if such a component were described in the SAR) with one encompassing equivalent response charac-(. teristics, but made by a different manufacturer, would not require a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

(2) Systems.

~

Modifications of the diesel shutdown cir-cuitry (described in the SAR) to provide an automatic diesel shutdown on high-bearing temperature (shutdown  ;

feature not described in application) would require a safety evaluation to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. On the other hand, if the methods of initiating .

automatic diesel shutdown are not described in the SAR, specific automatic shutdown features may be rendered inoperable without the conduct of a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

(3) Structures. The erection of a concrete block shield wall within the containment building (shield wall is not described in the SAR) would require a safety evalu-ation to ineet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. On the other hand, deletion of a shield wall within the con- '

tainment building (shield wall not described in the SAR) would not require a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

(4) Jumpers / Lifted Leads. Licensee controls over jump- R ers lif ted/ leads should include a documented review R process consistent with the one presented in Appendix R Issue Date: 01/01/84

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• /

10 CFR 50.59 (AND TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS)

1. If it is determined that use of a jumper /lif ted R lead results in a change to the facility as de- R cribed in the SAR and that the resultant change R will impact on safety of operation, then a R safety evaluation is required. This approach R should apply to all types of temporary modifi- R cations. Generally, if a plant sy:; tem is R changed by use of jumpers /lif ted leads so that R it will function differently than described in R the SAR, a safety evaluation would be required. R On the other hand, use of jumpers / lifted leads R that result in plant conditions already analyzed R and approved by NRC would not require a safety R evaluation. For example, bypassing protection R channels in a manner already described in the R SAR would not constitute an unreviewed safety R question and would not require a safety evalu- R ation under the requirement.s of 10 CFR 50.59. R It is expected that only a small percentage of a R

~

. licensee's jumpers / lifted leads will require a R written safety evaluation R

/ b. Changes in Procedures As Described in the SAR. This pertains not only to procedures discussed in the initial operations and organizational chapters of the SAR, but also to other pro-cedural-type commitments, such as the emergency plan and modes -

and sequences of plant operation described in the SAR. If a R procedure results in a deviation from the steps listed in the R ,

~

SAR or will result in a system operation which deviates from R l the way that system is described in the SAR, then a a safety R {

evaluation should be performed. Contrasting examples of the R  : 1 above follow. R (1) If in the description of the radioactive waste system in the l SAR, the licensee states that the Shift Supervisor will authorize all radioactive liquid releases, a safety evalu-ation to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 would be required before assigning this function to another indivi-dual. On the other hand, if the SAR merely states that radioactive liquid releases will be authorized as detailed by plant procedures, the licensee's predesignation of the authorization function would not require a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

(2) If the reactor startup procedure, as described in the SAR, contains eight fundamental sequences, the licensee's deci-sion to eliminate one of the sequences would require a safety evaluation to meet the 10 CFR 50.59 requirements.

On the other hand, if the licensee consolidated the eight j fundamental sequences but did not alter the basic functions  ;

performed, it would not be necessary to conduct a safety -

evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

Issue Date: 01/01/84 .

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l CHANGES TO FACfLITfES, PROCEDURES ,

<-+ AND TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS) -

10 CFR 50.59

c. Conduct Tests and Experiments Not Described in the SAR. This

(. pertains to the performance of an operation not described in the SAR which could have an adverse effect on safety-related systems.

Contrasting examples of such tests or experiments are:

(1) Some plants in the startup testing program have performed a deboration to critical with all rods inserted. Since this test is performed without deference to the "one stuck rod l criterion," a safety evaluation to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 would be required if the test is not dolineated in the SAR. Since this test may decrease the margin of safety defined in the TS basis, it should, in' most in-stances, be classified as an unreviewed safety question. On the other hand, a test to demonstrate the calibration of the nuclear instrumentation system by performance of a secondary plant heat balance would not require a safety evaluation under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, even if such a test was not delineated in the SAR, since the test does not in-volve an abnormal mode of operation. ,

(2) A test to determine if the boric acid evaporator may also be

,. used for concentration of the steam generator blowdown ef-fluent (function not described in the SAR) would require a

. safety evaluation to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, since secondary system chemicals could possibly have a deleterious effect on some components within the reactor coolant pressure boundary. On the other hand, an experiment to determine the decontamination factor of the liquid waste concentrator with. influent activities of 10 2 Ci/ml and 10 5 Ci/ml would not require a safety evaluation under the

~

. requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 since such an experiment would not represent departure from normal operational modes.  ;

d. General Guidance. It should be noted that the SARs for a number of older facilities contain floor plans of onsite buildings that may include trivial detail such as the locating of dividing walls  ;

between various offices. From a rigid readir.g 10 CFR 50.59, it  !

is possible to infer that the removal of a dividing wall between two offices constitutes a change from the facility described in the SAR, and therefore requires a safety evaluation. However,  ;

the intent nf 10 CFR 50.59 is to limit the requirement for writ-ten safety evaluations to facility changes, tests, and experi-ments which could impact the safety of operations.

END Issue Date: 01/01/84

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CHANGES TO FACIL3T3ES, PROCEDURES .

a .

AND TESTS (OR EXPERIMENTS) -

10 CFR 50.59 l Chance procesall

\ Most Technical Specifications (15) reestre the Onsste Aeview Group to (1) review all processres and chenpes thereto that affect nuclear j safety, all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety. [

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " and all proposed changes to the f acility that affect nuclear safety ,

and (2) to reconnene in writing to the plant Superintendent approval l or disapproval of these proposals. .

u is tAe Safety Analysis Repor=s (5AR) affected?

(1) Does the proposal change the fact 11ty or procedures from their description in the 5AR?

(2) Does the proposal involve a test or esperiment not described in the 5 arf (3) Cowls the proposal affect nuclear safety in a way not previously evaluateg in the 5AR? Y , k g't '

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Any answer Yes < All answers No

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lls a enange in tne T5 involved?l 1P U.,, . j u T , ,\ 10 CTR 50.59 no longer applies. It is still necessary, however, to ask:

No Yes ,

'" 'O *s . E G, bc is a change in the T5 tavelved?

i' fes n No

. 1s an gpreviewee safety guestien involved?

i (1) 1s 15 probability of an occurrence or the constowences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously

, evaluated in the SAR increased?

(2) It the possfM11ty fee an accident or

.g malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR created?

(3) 1s the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification reduced? .

i most T5 reovire the Onsite Review Group to

,, ,,,,,,,. . . . render determinations in writing with regar1f to whether or not the proposed change constitutes an unreviewed safety question.

/

All answers No e Any answer Yes Most T5 reevire the Of f site Review Group to review proposed changes to procedures, envipmerit ,,,

or systems. and tests or experiments that involve an wareviewed safety owestion.

Locument the change. Include in these records a written safety evaluation " O P providin9 the bases for the dettreinstion Setseit the proposal to the that the change, test or esperiment oots b'RC for authorization, not involve en unreviewed safety ouestion. * ,

l Authorization receivec.j i v l l P*ec tee wit h the cheaMI- a i

! Most 15 reestre the Offsite Review Group to review tne safety evaluations 8...... for changes to procecures, ecutament or s.*sters. and tests or esperir.ents csunpleted under the provisions of 5C.59 to verify that such actions cie not constitute an vu eviewee safet, ovestion.

1 Al-1 Issue Date: 01/01/84

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/ UNITED STATES j g o,j - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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• • "* July 20,1987 i

NOTE T0: Charles Tinkler Tsung Ming Su

0. P. Chopra j i

FROM: Ashok Thadani  ;

SUBJECT:

UPCOMING TRIP TO PILGRIM The attachment identifies the plant enhancement being considered by BECo for implementation at Pilgrim. The purpose of your visit to Pilgrim is to a) understand the status of and schedule for each of the identified enhancements, b) identify / discuss any significant potential downside (for design base and beyond design base accidents) from any of the identified

~

modifications. The primary purpose of the trip is to understand the

- changes and their safety significance, and the secondary purpose is to review the licensee's 50.59 evaluation. Please note that it is important j

.- that your review truly be interdisciplinary and, thus, it becomes impera-tive that you collectively discuss the signific nce of each change.

/d Ashok Thadani

Enclosure:

As stated a cc: J. Craig/J. Kudrick W. Hodges/R. Jones F. Rosa / J. Knight L. Shao S. Varga M i R. Weisman

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

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1.1 . Purpose of Report p ]

1. 2 Scope of Report .f

. 1 i

1.3 Safety Enhancement Program Goals )

1.4 Safety Enhancement Program Plant and Operational Changes 2.0 OVERVIEW OF SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM l j

2.1 Background

2.2 Safety Enhancements f

)

3.0 DESCRIPTION

OF SPECIFIC PLANT SAFETY ENHANCEMENT' i 3.1 General Considerations

^

3.2 Installation of a Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) N'i d 3.3 Containment Spray Header Nozzles %r1/'bv i

- 3.4 Additional Sources of Hate}r for RPV Injection and Con Spray '7"ovklu/C4},.5%

3.5 Diesel Fire Pump for RPV Injection and Containment Spray $AhM

'7 3.6. Diesel Pump Fire Pump Fuel Oil Transfer System C /M f ' ^'

3.7 Backup Nitrogen Supply System MI bN/(d 0f*

3.8 Blackout Diesel Ge?erator Including Protected Installation

- Facilities (., d2 p rA 3,

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3.9 Automatic Depressurization System Logic Modifications-Qo ". .

lud&'W 3.10 Addition of Enriched Boron to Standby Liquid Control System , ,

3.11 ATHS Feedwater Pump Trip ISA 3.12 Modifications to Reactor Cpre Isolation Cooling System Turbine '

Exhaust Trip Setpoint . .) ^

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3.13 Additional ATHS Recirculation Pump Trip - Ow@I

4.0 DESCRIPTION

OF OPERATIONAL PLANT SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS S.0 CONCLUSIONS y wv..a . ~ . + .

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- _ NRC MILLSTONE 1 P02 }

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I b S er,'- THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS d .r tancurrvE DEPARTasENT

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W WICHAS'.1. OVKAKIS

wrwea ROBERT J. SCU' AY a

anaeron July 24, 1987 i

i Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator l

U.S. Nuclear Reguletory Commission, Region I l S31 Park Avenue Xing of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Thomas:

This in to advise you that in accordance wit'.h Msasachusotta law, St. 1979, c. 796, codified as Massachusetts 3sneral Laws c. 33 Appendix, section 13-2b, and federal regulations, 10 CFR 50.47 and 44 CFR 350.7, the Commonwealth of

sssachusotts has determined that the plume exposure pathway smargency planning zone for the Pilgrim Wuclear Power Station chould be reconfigure.

The recentagoA=d EPC -111 inuludw t.ls w unt.Arety of the towns of Corver and Marshfield, both of which presently have only a portion of their Jurisdiction within the EPZ.

. accordingly, based upon our analysis of local conditions and geographicci boundaries, the history of off-site emergency pisnning at Pilgrim Station, and our consideration of the views of stata, local, utility, and federal officials, we request shot you neknowledge this determination.

On July 14, 1987, we hold a cenaultation meeting in j

-: :cor c a nc'2 with 44 CFN 350.7 and 10 CFR 50.47 which was .

-:ltended by representatives of this egency, the Executive 0?* J ice of Public Safety, the U.S. Nucl.cer Regulatory q

Coasission, and the Boston Edison Company.

As discussed et the July 14 meeting. it la eleo our intention to designata other towns which have a portion of their geographical territory within ton miles of Pilgria Qrb

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Station ae part of the EP2.

aster we neve completed consultation with each ofThis deaiqngtign will taka nlace communities. the concerned ,

aattor. Thank you for your cooperation with this very important 1 j

Sinc ely, Robert J. av Director, i

cc: Assistant Secretary Pet.er W. Agneo, Jr.

Deputy Director John L. Lovering Acaistant Mr. Ralph Commissioner Bird, Boston Edison Gersid Parker. MnPH Company Area II Director Rodger Mr. Al Slaney. MCDA Area II C*a i o-J Executiven of Cerver end Marshfield Civil Defense Diroctors of Carver and Marshfield 9

_i________________. __:________.- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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July 24,1987 e

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard W. Krim Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological . Hazards Federal Emergency Management Agency FROM:

-Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection -

and Emergency Preparedness .

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j

SUBJECT:

CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING.AT PILGRIM The enclosed letter and attachments to NRC Chairman Zech dated June.12, 1987 from Mr. Carl D. O'Neil, Chairman Duxbury Emergency Response Plan Comit-tee express the comittee's concerns regarding the apparent lack of an adequate-radiological emergency response plan for evacuation of the town of Duxbury for incidents at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. Since the comittee's con-cerns are related to offsite emergency planning, we are forwarding a copy of

. Mr. O'Neil's correspondence to FEMA for your consideration. A copy of our response is also enclosed for your information.

Originalsigned by Frank J.Conget ..

Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Response Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

As Stated Distribution:

FJCongel, NRR w/o h D8Matthews, NRR

'FXantor, NRR CRVan Niel, NRR

• RTHogan, NRR

'RJBarrett, NRR LJCunningham, NRR RRBe11any, RI RHWessman, NRR Central Files PEPB R/F h A M I]!// /?

U IV IJW T w i 'Q PEPB:NRR PE hR C: NRR D:DREP:NRR RTHo an:bt FKihter BMatthews FJCongel i 7g) 07 87- 07&/87 07/glt/87 07/g/87 ,

"T'2/

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I August ~ 14,'1987 MEMORANDUM FOR: ' Steven A. Varga, Director p

Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

FROM: Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

.o

SUBJECT:

FEMA REPORT GW OFF' SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR PILGRIM Enclosed is the FEMA report titled, "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station" which was transmitted to the NRC by memorandum from Richard W. Krimm, FEMA dated August 6,1987. Based on a review -

of the overall state of offsite emergency preparedness, ' FEMA identified six

. issues regarding . offsite emergency planning and concluded that Massachusetts -

offsite emergency planning and preparedness are- inadequate to protect the-public health and safety in the event of an accident. at Pilgrim. The six issues identified by FEMA involve the evacuation of schools, a reception center for evacuees, the beach, special needs and transportation dependent population,.

and the overall lack of general progress in emergency planning.

We-recommend that you transmit the enclosed FEMA report to the licensee with a request that the licensee respond within 30 days with an action plan and schedule for assisting the Commonwealth and local governments in resolving the FEMA identified issues. The licensee should be informed that the restart .of the Pilgrim plant will include consideration of the FEMA identified emergency preparedness issues.

A draft transmittal letter is enclosed for your use. NRC Region I concurs.in the enclosed transmittal letter.

origan1 dead 45 r.3. comed '

Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosure 1:

FEMA memo & report to NRC FJCongel, NRR RHWessman, NRR

1. SMSohinki,OGC from R. W. Kriam dtd. 8/6/87 DBMatthews, NRR RJBarrett, NRR WDPaton, 0GC

- 2. Draft transmittal letter TTMartin, RI LJCunningham, NRR CRVan Niel, NRR RRBellasy, RI f FKantor, NRR WJLazarus, RI f 1

.RTHogen, NRR i-CA PEPJhRR /NRR D/DREP/NRRh FKWitor:sc tthews FJCongel 'J i 8/p./87 8/9 /87 8/p/87 9 A doin 1 > > s ~

v v YU f 7 ff 40 f .L 76~

L

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DRAFT Docket No. 50-293 Mr. Ralph G. Bird Senior Vice President-Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199

SUBJECT:

FEMA REPORT ON OFF!ITE EMERGENCY PLANNIM FOR PILGRIM

Dear Mr. Bird:

j Enclosed is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report titled, "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station," which was transmitted to the huclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by memorandum dated August 6,1987. Based on a review of the overall state of offsite emergency preparedness for Pilgrim, FEMA has concluded that Massachusetts offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness are inadequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This finding by FEMA supersedes FEMA's previous interim finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency preparedness for Pilgrim.

FEMA has identified six issues during the course of its review:

1

1. Lack of evacuation plans for public and private schools and daycare J l

centers. ]

2. Lack of a reception center for people evacuating to the north.

i

3. Lack of identifiable public shelters for the beach population.

4. Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the special r,eeds population.

I

);

3

.(

26 l

(, -

Ralph G. Bird ~2-

6. Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the transportation dependent population.

6. Overall lack of progress in p1,anning and apparent diminution in emergency preparedness .

i The FEMA report also addressed the seven alleged deficiencies in emergency planning identified in the July 15, 1986 petition to the NRC. FEMA found that while - these areas of plan weakness were not- sufficient to sustain the conten-tions raised in the petition, resolution of these weaknesses would enhance the State's ability to protect the public.

We view the emergency planning issues identified by FEMA to be a matter of serious concern. The determination to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve, We in part, consideration of the FEMA identified emergency planning issues.

are aware that you are providing assistance and information to the Conrnonwealth of Massachusetts pertaining to these issues. We request that you respond to us within 30 days with an action plan and schedule for assisting the State and local governments in completing the resolution of the FEMA identified emergency planning issues for Pilgrim.

Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

% August 18, 1987 r

Docket No. 50-293 Mr.. Ralph G. Bird Senior Vice President-Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199

SUBJECT:

FEMA REPORT ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY Pi.ANNING FOR PILGRIM

Dear Mr. Bird:

Enclosed is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report titled, "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,' which was transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by memorandum dated August 6. 1987. Based on a review of the overall state of offsite energency preparedness for Pilgrim, FEMA has concluded that Massachusetts offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness are inadequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This finding by FEMA supersedes FEMA's previous interim finding of adequacy regarding offsite emergency preparedness for Pilgrim.

FEMA has identified six issues during the course of its review:

1. Lack of evacuation plans for public and private schools and daycare centers.

2. Lack of a reception center for people evacuating to the north.

3. Lack of identifiable public shelters for the beach population. l

4. Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the special needs population, j

5. Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the transportation dependent population.  !

6. Overall lack.of progress in planning and apparent diminution in emergency preparedness.

l O.n 2 n ~ LL n ,

9 i f 0 tV T f ' V f

. l i August 18, 1987 1 2

The FEMA report also addressed the seven alleged deficiencies in emergency planning identified in William P. Golden's July 15, 1986 Petition to the NRC.

FEMA found that while these areas of plan weakness were not sufficient to sustain the contentions raised in the Petition, resolution of these weaknesses would enhance the Stete's ability to protect the public.

We view the emergency planning issues identified by FEMA to be a matter of serious concem. The determination to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve, in part, consideration of the FEMA identified emergency planning issues. We are aware that you are providing assistance and infonnation to the Connonwealth of Massachusetts pertaining to several of these issues. We request that you respond to us with an action plan and schedule for assisting the State and local governments in addressing the FEMA identified emergency planning issues for Pilgrim.

Please contact the Project Manager if you have questions.

Sincerely, N

Steven A. Varga, Director l Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION: PDI-3 R/F, RWessman, VNerses',' DMathews, BBoger, SYarga, Docket File 1

0FC :DREP  : D/C".P :PDI.3 :ACTDIR/PDI-3:AD/DRP :D:DRP  : : i

.....:............:............:............:............:............. . . .:........... j NAME :DMatthews :FCongel :RWessman:1m :YNerses :BRoger  :  : j DATE :08/ /87 :08/ /87 :08/ /87 :08/ /87 :08/ /87 :0 /ft/87  : .

l l

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY l

l 1

1.

,j August 18, 1987 2

The FEMA report also addressed the seven alleged deficiencies in emergency pland ng identified in William P. Golden's July 15, 1986 Petition to the NRC.

FEM nd that while these areas of plan weakness were not sufficient to sustain e contentions raised in the Petition, resolution of these weaknesses would enha e the State's ability to protect the public.

We view the eme ency planning issues identified by FEMA to be a matter of serious concem. he detennination to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve, in part, considerat of the FEMA identified emergency planning issues. We are aware that you ar roviding assistance and infonnation to the Commonwealth.

of Massachusetts pertai g to several of these issues. We request that you respond to us within 30 d s with an action plan and schedule for assisting the State and local governm ts in addressing the FEMA identified emergency planning issues for Pilgrim.

Please contact the Project Manage if you have questions.

Sincerely,

/

Steven A. rga, Director Division of actor Projects . I/II Office of Nucl Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBtfTION: PDI-3 R/F, RWessman, VNerses, DMathews, BBoger, SVarga, Docket File

)

i I

0FC :DREP

. > LM/ '

D/DREP :PDI-7 l A

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D:DRP  : :

... .:. .....t.j. .: ........:............:...........

NAME :DMatthews :FCongel :RWessman:1m :VNerses F :BBoger :SVarge  :

DATE :08/ /87 :08/ /87 :08/11 /87 :08/iT/87 :08//7/87 :08/ /87  :

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l

I

s d

August 18, 1987 2

..... ... ~ ,.._ - ,

The FEMA report also addressed the seven alleged deficiencies in emergency planning dentified in William P. Golden's July 15, 1986 Petition to the NRC.

FEMA foun that while these areas of plan weakness were not sufficient to sustain the ontentions raised in the Petition, resolution of these weaknesses would enhance e State's ability to protect the public.

We view the emerge planning issues identified by FEMA to be a matter of serious concern. Th determination to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve, in part, consideration f the FEMA identified emergency planning issues. We are aware that you are oviding assistance and information to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pertaini to several of these issues. We request that you respond to us within 30 day with an action plan ud schedule for assisting the State and local governmen in completing the resolution of the FEMA identified emergency planning ues for Pilgrim.

Please contact the Project Manager Frank Congel of the Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency P aredness if you have questions, ncerely, 15l Steve A. Yarga, Director Divisio of Reactor Projects - I/II Office o uclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION: PDI-3 R/F, RWessman, VNerses DMathews, BBoger, SYarga, Docket File OFC :DREQ :A )I. /PDI-3:A P :D:DRP  : :

.....:.R...Q:f.g:./DREP[I..j::.PDI-3

.. . .g. . . . . ....: ....... . , .:............:...........

NAME :DMattheks :FCongelftII :RWessman:1 . t s . r  : j

. . . .. : . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . .. . . . . . .. . : . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . J S V a rg a '

DATE :08/13/87 :08/ n /87 :08/ 6 /87 :08/16'87 :08/8/87 :08/ /87  :

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY I

I

l i

1. o UNITED $TATES g

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W g

j NUCLEAR REGULAT ORY COMMISSION W ASHINGToN, t C.20555 August 24, 1987 g....+,/ j l

Docket No. 50-293 i l

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Murley* J. Partlow* R. Capra J. Sniezek* F. Congel* W. Butler ,

F. Miraglia* W. Russell

• J. Stolz l R. Starstecki* S. Black

• E. Adensam i D. Crutchfield* G. Lainas L. Rubenstein i L. Shao* F. Schroeder B.J. Youngblood C. Rossi*

THRU: ptd Victor Nerses, Acting Director

(" P V.dDivision roject Directorate I-3 of Reactor Projects I/II FROM: Richard Wessman, Project Manager Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Proiects I/II

SUBJECT:

DAILY HIGHLIGHT PILGRIM - INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM On August 21, 1987 the staff issued the initial assessment of the Pilgrim Safety Enhancement Program. This program, including several significant changes to the Mark I containment (e.g. direct torus vent to plant stack) was submitted to the staff for information July 8,1987. The submittal describes hardware changes that BECo has voluntarily elected to implement at Pilgrim.

BECo stated in their submittal that none of the physical plant changes increases the probability or consequences of a design basis accident and that all of the changes will result in a reduction in the frequency of core melt scenarios or an improvement in the perfonnance of the containment response.

The staff's initial assessment has been conducted to provide an understanding of the SEP modifications and assess the safety significance of those changes, when considered singularly or along with other changes. In its response, the staff has infonned BECo that we are not prepared to endorse the use of the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) at this time. Additionally, the staff stated that installation of the DTVS cannot be made under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 and requested BECo provide answers to a number of questions regarding this system. Most of the other proposed modifications were found acceptable by the staff.

The Pilgrim plant is presently shutdown and the licensee expects to be ready to restart the facility by mid-October 198 Richard H. Wessman, Project Manager Project Directorate I-3

(>Dil/d340 "O Division of Reactor Projects I/II

-- a U / $V U)f ' 'f

October 16, 1987 Docket No. 50 293 -

Mr. Ralph G. Bird Senior Vice President. Nuclear .

800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199

SUBJECT:

FEMA MEMORANDUM ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR PILGRIM

Dear Mr. Bird:

Enclosed is a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 1 memorandum dated September 29, 1987 which discusses offsite emergency planning, issues concernino the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The memorandum clarifies FEMA's position concerning the corrective actions for the major areas of concern identified by FEMA in its August 4, 1987 finding on offsite emergency preparedness for Pilgrim. FEMA states that, followino the submittal of revised.

plans by the Commonwealth for review by FEMA, the correction of some issues will require an evaluation of plan changes while others will require demonstration of the changes in a drill or exercise.

We urge you to continue your ongoing efforts to assist the Conrnonwealth and local governments in improving their emergency plans in response to the issues identified by FEMA. As previously indicated, restart of the Pilgrim plant will involve the consideration of the FEMA identified emergency planning issues.

Sincerely.

Onginal signed by:

Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: see next page

Enclosure:

As Stated DISTRIBUTION: Docket File 50 293, PDI-3 r/f, RWessman, BBoger, SVarga, RBellamy, RI, WRussell, RI, SCollins, RI, FCongel, NRR, RHogan, NRR, BClayton, WPaton. 0GC, ca. nut %t a.a.

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OFC :PDI-3 :ACT/DIR :A :D/DRP  :  :  ::

NAME :RWessman  : MS Boger :SVarga  :  :  :

.....:............:.................[.......:

DATE :st O /g- :10//G/ @ :/0// /)[',[ h.,g..

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l l

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800 Boyhtoo street .

Boston, Massachusetts 02199 I

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Dear Dr. Bellamy:

for review, in accordance with acceptedFEMA. . procedure.Please Region 1 f'

By. copy of this letter this information is being t plans found to contain outdated material.

ropriate r

• l Rai E. Biro ~

RGB/mg  !

Attachments cc: .

Messrs.;

Peter Agnes.Boulay Robert Jr. (with attachments)

• Thomas Rodgers "

,Al Slaney "

' Daniel.0aly i "

sDavid Vogler, "

> Joseph Costa: "

' Richard Levin' "-

40 avid Malagut "

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~F,- An Evacuation Time' Estidate (ETE) for.e.the'P,11 grim Nuclear Power

. ~

Station was ps/fo~rmedi'in1981. :This 'ETErwas. based upon the 1970 Census data / ;An' updsted ETE should be pregiared . based upon .

considerattori of' the' most '~recent census data (1980)... a traffic pattern' analysis! a'nd a population density-analysts. (with attention to sumer beach and.tou'rlst populations). .

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, . . , .z, Bi< BECo? Reshoise

• I ** # ~

is- BECo. has contracted,wlth.KLD Associates Lluly 1986);<,to provide an

' pdated'ETEf u Th15' firm if reco'gritzed nat'lonally as an expert in providing evacuation ~.ttme' estimates and comprehen:lve traffic management plansNThbir computer models, have.been validated against Washington D.C. Intercity traffic flows.and 'are presently used by FOM as part of' their Integrated Emergency Management Information System (IEHIS)'. KLD has conducted ETE's for utt11 ties including Long l Island Lighting'Co.'(Shoreham) Pubitt Service of New Hampshire (Seabrook) Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse) and Rochester Gas and . ~

Electric Co.-(Ginna). Thelr. analytical work has been substantiated by several ASLB hearing panels.

While the final ETE report for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant is scheduled for receipt by BECo. In . lune 1987 (ref 1), substantial prettmlnary information was obtained during meetings and telephone conversations with KLD in Hay. The report's table of contents (attachment 1) and summary of analytical methodology (attachment 2) are provided as the results of these discussions. Information gathered during these meetings and the final report will be made available to the town and state emergency planning personnel, j Table 1 provides comparative Evacuation Time Estimates for several nuclear facility sites using conservative assumptions (see the Table 1 footnotes). The PtIgrim estimates are on the low side of the norm and within the expected bounds for this population.

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construction characteristics, and available floor space.NEach I butid,lngWas"-then visually' ins'pected to confirm the tax assessment l informattoriQ'A list of: potential., shelters ~

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! , "thaththe Town of Kingston repriien' ting the worst case, would utilize

/ only!19% of the : tota 1Ea' v allable'.,' spa e fo'r. sheltering beach and

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.I .; .'1. ' Evac'uitton'.1 Time ; Estimate for,the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Statto.

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m- KLDe,4: ' Associates, Qune ;1987. .- "

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2. Evacuation' Time Estimate for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, HMM Associates, 1981 .

3. EtStuoyedentif.yrPatwnu a vmeWeWi nMhli"EP F"CNRtfi n e tRegiornoft.thesPAftmt aduclerriemserxStationF.St6ntaitnd* Web s te r

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4. Reception and Care Facility Listing as of May 31, 1986, from.

Facility Survey Program of .the federal Emergency Management Agency (1978 data).

')Q..... .L DUXBURY RRE DEPARTMENT k-+

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DUXBURY,-MASSACHUSETTS 02331

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CARL D,ONUL Wtu1AMl.HARRIMAN h CHIEF DEPUTY CHIEF June 12,- 1987 1r?. Governor Dikakin: -

SBsed are copies of two reports frirn th'e Duxbury Bnergency Response Plan nurmittee, a py cf a letter that the Ovvinittee' has sent to Mr. Sweeney, President of Boston Edison, d a letter fzun the Duxbury Board

• of Selectmen to Mr. Silva of Boston Edison. Rey are fogows:

i'. Letter to David Vogler, Gaiman of the Duxbury Doard of Selectmen, dated l5/28/07 -

Subject:

Oomnents of Duxbury Energency Response Plan Oxraittee to Radiological Bergency Response Plan Draft prepared by Boston Diison dated 5/87. . ,

2 A copy of a letter dated 6/4/87, to Mr. Stephen J. Sweeney, President of Boston Edison. ( h e enclosure noted in this letter is the letter listed in Item 1 above.)

3. A letter to David Vogler, m ai2ran of the Duxbury Board of Selectmen, dated 5/29/87.

Bis is a suntaary of the results of the work completed to date by the.Duxbury Dnergency Response Plan Ommittee over a 10-conth period. (his Cbmittee was appointed by the Duxbury Board of Selectmen.)

4 letter to Ibger E. Silva, Bnergency Preparedness Q)ordinator, Pilgrim Station, Doston Edison dated 6/5/87 frun the Duxbury Board of Selectman. ,

v. bury is one of the towns within the 10-mile Dnergency Preparedness Zone around pilgrira I.

the present time there is no designated evacuation destination for all of the citizens Duxbury, Kingston, part of Plymouth, and part of Marshfield. We assume that as either ected or appointed officials or interested media personnel that this would be one of your jor concerns. Our comnittee has concluded, af ter a 10-nonth study, that the present I acuation plans are unworkable, our town is comnitted to a workable evacuation plan, we expect to receive your cocments soon as possible. (Na form letters please.)

OUR COMMITIEE EXpBCTS PERSWAL OEMDUS mud AIL LIgra) m, ando Zeca, NRC Patriot lodger tn. Edward Kennedy Duxbury Clipper en. John Kerry WATD ang. Gerry Studds Boston Globe In. William Golden Boston Herald ang. Edward Markey Stephen Sweeney lelun O'Brien, Mariner Selectnen:

.tarles Barry Kingston Yours tru ", I eter Agnes Plynouth aul levy abert Boulay, MCD Carver Marshfield

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[4 dward homas, FB1A Carl D. O'Neil ,

trry Wstello 01airnnn Duxbury Dnergency Respanse illiam Kane plan Cormuttee, Fire Chief, Dir.

xnes Asselstein, NRC of Civil D2fense 3pt. of Public Health Mary Dinan, Vice Olairperson Duxbury e em % pem

p. -. .

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L Mailing List for Pilgrim Nuclear Correspondence -

Chief Carl D. O'Neil Al Slaney

' . Civil Defense Director Massachusetts Civil Defense Duxbury Fire Department Agency, Area II Duxbury, MA 02331-1153 Mass Correctional Institute P.O. Box 54 Bridgewater, MA 02324 Robert J. Boulay Ron Varley Director, Civil Defense Agency Emergency Preparedness 400 Worcester Road,P.O. Box 1496 Group Pramingham, MA 01701-0317 P11grm Station

• Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Ed Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agenc William Kane 422 John McCormack Building [d c" Boston, MA .# ' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory y7 Commission 631 Park Ave

• Charles Barry-

• Peter Agnes Ralph G. Bird Assistant Secretary of Public Safety Senior Vice President 1 Ashburton Place Boston Edison Boxton, MA 02108 800 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02199 Lando Zech U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Representative Gerry E. Studds Senator _ Edward M. Kennedy 1501 Longworth HOB 113 Russell Building U.S. House of Repres,entatives U.S. Senate Washington,D.C. 20515 Washington, D.C. 20510 Senator John Kerry Senator William Golden t 164 Russell Building Massachusetts Senate .

U.S. Senate State House Washington, D.C. 20510 Boston, MA 02108 Representative Charles Mann House of Representatives Cong. Edward Markey State House 1501 1.ongworth HOB 1 Boston, MA 02108 U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 j

Dept. of Public Health Mr. Stephen Sweeney, Pres. J 100 Cambridge Street /Saltonstall Bldg. Boston Edison Boston, Mass. 02110 800 Boylston St., Bost.'n,Ma. 02199

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I Jh.>t.n /r : - ' Chief Executive Civil Defense 'C; rmtor ,1 1 Carver Daniel D. L Daly Jr. ' Chair:ran- David ' Pierce Board of Selectmen -P.O. Box 253 11 , Town Hall, Blain Street Carver.-MA 02330 l

Ca rve r .'tA' 02330

• s Duxbury David .* ogler. Chairnnn Fire Chief Carl O Jet!

%ard of Select:nen - P.O. Box 1153- '

Tos.n ibil, 87P, Tremont. S t.ree t '

Fire Department Hdqtrs.

' Duxbury, . m 02332 Duxbury, m . 02331-1153 liingston' Joseph Costa, Chairuan Robert'A, Stulliken Board of Selectmen Town House l

Tot.n Hall,'03 Green Street Green Street i

!'tngston', M 02364 Kingston, 214 02364'

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Richarr: Levin, Chairman Daniel McGonagle Board -)f Selectmen . 107 St.agecoach Dr:ve Tot.n 1611, 870 Morasne Street Starshfield, M 0:0250 Marshfield, SLA 02050 Plymouth D.svid F. Malaguti. Chairman J Douglas Hadfield B.sard af Selectmen >1emorial Hall

.a n Rail, !! Lincoln Street 83 Court Street _j c'. pnoui n , 't; 0 360 P!:nouth, stA C2360 ,

i Bridge at,r Dw 1d 7.tne;u . Cha i m.u) Donald E. Ford B., art af Sel.st:nen SS Roi.ayne Paris Tas.n ibil Br:d.gewater, ?t; 0230 ;

C idge'..ater, m 0032; '

Town /c;ty Chief E.ecutive Cis il Defense Diretor Taunton Richard Johnson, Mayor Robert C. Spearin City of Taunton 15 St=ner Street City Hall,15 Sum:ner Street Taunton, m 02780 Taunton, >14 02780 t

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Press'& News Notice for Pilgrim Nuclear' Correspondence-Patriot Ledger

- Duxbury Clipper

- Boston Globe

- Boston Herald I.. ..

Brockton Enterprise WATD WRKO, Jerry Williams O

__.-____________.._____________m_________ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .m_____ __ .___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ .

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+f s ,- c ' q UNITED STATES NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION p/ff" s, j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Il(Nj l October 26, 1987 lC NOTE T0: F. Miraglia, NRR R. Starostecki, NRR S. Collins, RI FROM: Bruce A. Boger, Assistant Director for Region I Reactors Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 SUB1ECT: RESPONSE TO MASSACHUSETTS 2.206 PETITION OF OCTOBER 15, 1987 REGARDING PILGRIM On October 23, 1987, representatives of Plant Systems, CGC, Emergency Preparedness, and Region I (by telephone) met with the Pro.iect Manager and I to discuss the proposed schedule and approach to the response to the Massachusetts 2.206 Petition of October 15, 1987. Assignments and due dates for inputs to the PM are shown on the Enclosure. Several initial observations regarding our approach are made:

-The initial response to Petitioners (letter of receipt) needs to be issued promptly. It must put the issue of Petitioners' request for preventing any BECo actions leading to restart (Power Ascension Program) in perspective with current plant activities that appear to be leading to restart.

-The management issues appear to call for a response similar to our response of Aucust 21, 1987 to Senator Golden.

-Plant Systems will have to deterinine if the containment concerns are essentially the same as the issues dealt with in our response to Senator Golden on August 21, 1987 If additional issues must be dealt with, additional time will be required for their portion of the response.

-Emergency preparedness issues in this Petition are different than those issues raised by Senator Golden, and a conclusion regarding these issues may not be possible at this time.

The point of contact for this activity will be R. Wessman. The TAC number to be used is 66425.

/ 1 Bruce A. Bog r. Assistant Director j for Region I Reactors j Division of Reactor Projects I/II J

\

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

T. Murley A. Thadani R. Wessman W. Russell J. Craig J. Kudrick S. Varga F. Congel L. Chandler D. Matthews W. Paton L. Doerflein

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-4 ENCLOSURE 1-

' INITIAL ASSIGNMENTS AND MILESTONES

'Due=

Rere. Area

- Initial Task assignments 20/23C

-Restart perspective for receipt letter 10/27 RI 20/28 PM Receipt letter to.OGC 11/3 PM' Receipt letter to Dr. Murley for signature-11/6

' PM Introduction- 11/6 RI Management (Incl. SALPs, security,' enforce. 11/13 SPLB PRA

• SPLB Containment Adequacy 10/30 Assess if issues similar to Golden 11/13 If like Golden, devel. response .

If unlike Golden, provide approach & sched. 10/30-Emergency Preparedness 11/6 PEPB-Integrate inputs and provide to OGC 11/20 PM Remaining milestones are primarily dependent on completion of the

~

- containment adequacy area, but a dispatch target of early December is desired.

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UNITED STATES 8 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E WASHINGT oN. D. C. 20555 in. 5.,

,, 'f November 9,19b f

%,...ket Doc

.. No. 50-293 r R. Capra L. Crocker MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Murley* J. Partlow J. Snierek* . lieugungW - W. Butler

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• yT. Miraglia*

• J. Roe ecAg C. Stahle R. Starostecki* S. Black * # J. Stolz 3

S. Varga* B. Boger* . Adensam D. Crutchfield* G. Lainas* - H. Berkow it F. Schroeder ., W. Troskoski

. #... g L. Shao*..

y'gi,g ,o % a" C.;,Rossi*ggy' ..%., G. Holahan . e 51 A. Thadani' J. Richardson W. Lanning N ' R. Cooper l

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Carl Stahle, Acting Director m e Project Directorate 1-3 F MA*M THRU:-" "

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W Division of Reactor Projects I/II

. Richard H.' Wessman, Project 'Manager ,.

'k FROM:

Project Directorate I-3

• Division of. Reactor Projects I/II' F wym -

SUBJECT:

DAILY HIGHLIGHT N 9? ' .-

. . .axy n 9 PILGRIM STOP WORK ORDER .

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'f! - . .u,. ,.

.d On November 9, 1987 Ralph Bird (Senior Vice President - Nuclear) issued a stop k work order for maintenance and modification activities at Pilgrim. This was in response to his determination that the BEco standards of excellence were h';m not being met by onsite personnel as indicated by several incidents occurring V over the weekend. These incidents include (1) taped over lock on a high radiation area door on the refueling ficor; (2) the removal of ductwork by k maintenance personnel that would have led to a breech in a vital area barrier;

$, (3) a small radioactive spill caused, in para, by the installation of a RHR valve (part of Safety Enhancement Program modification to provide V 'g,]k W cross-connect between RHR and fire water sptems) without any packing; and (4)

"di n. a missed RPS surveillance. ... g.&' % % f k m m g k@.. fyg h$p.;engQpyJp., .

cpy'hby: +sNone of these incidents appear to have resulted in an actual event with safety

.f W 24'",- consequences not does there appear to be any direct linkage between the

. % . g s.3 incidents. BEco management has sent GE and Bechtel craft personnel home until Pg Thursday. BEco is evaluating the incidents.and. developing an action plan to f W> S,e deal with these issues.. The resident inspectors are following the lice

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- A"The facility has been shutdown since April 1987 due to management, emergency j

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"" planning, and technical issues.' BEco recently' completed core reload and vessel reassembly. ~ , 3dy py , + je

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Richard H. Wessman, Senior Proiect Manager

a C Project Directorate I-3 JL%+iM,M 3%y s _4 Division of Reactor, Projects

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, _y 3#r 7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r,

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

-l February 5,1988 9

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cf PFMORANDUM FOR: Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects I/II ff FROM: Bruce A. Boger, Assistant Director for Region I Reactors Division of Reactor Projects I/II

SUBJECT:

PILGRIM FIRE PROTECTION LICENSING ACTIONS Pilgrim currently has thirteen licensing actions that will have to be resolved prior to a restart decision by the staff. Five of these involve fire protection issues for which CMEB has lead responsibility for our review. (One of the five is essentially complete and the Tech. Spec. package is in OGC.) A sixth fire protection issue involves a proposed Exemption to Appendix R requirements relating to safe shutdown. The SER on this proposed exemption is being completed by SPLE.and no technical, procedural, or schedular concerns are evident. ,

R. Wessman and D. Mcdonald met with C. McCracken and D. Notley of the CMEB to review the five issues being reviewed by the CMEB and agree to target dates for completion of the staff effort. Enclosure 1 sunnarizes the status of these actions. We believe the target dates for completion of our effort will not place us on the utility's " critical path."

We indicated in the enclosure that one item (seals-4-inch and under) is waiting for a submittal. We have just received the submittal and provided it to D. Notley. Two ether :lems (Control Room Floor, and Combustible loadings in the RB and Torus Room) may not be acceptable to the staff. We are continuing our dialogue with BEco regarding these three issues. We have contacted BEco management to ensure BECo is giving proper attention to fire protection issues and are continuing our dialogue with BECo regarding these issues.

Bruce A. Bo , Ass'istant Director for Region I Reactors Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/ enclosure:

C. McCracken J. Durr (RI)

D. Notley A. Krasopoulos (RI)

L. Shao J. Craig J. Richardson S. Collins (RI)

N (RI)

R. Blough O. Gormley

.c.c 11 , , A u d- 7 /3Y v 917 ' ' T ~ !  :

i Enclosure 1 PILGRIM FIRE PROTECTION LICENSING ACTIONS i

'2ER LIC i IAC DATE DAIE SUBJECT / REMARKS 53416 10/28/87- 03/15/88 3 Appendix R exemptions' involving-RB and torus fire areas and combustible loadings. SER of

10/28 required clarification. O .'

Gormley revising SER to reflect clarifications.of 11/24/87 meeting with BECo. Transitory loads info-received from BECo 1/19/88. BECo proposing combustible loads that may not be acceptable. CMEB (Notley) to review SER rewrite and assure technically ' acceptable '-

before it goes to OGC.

54610 12/23/87 02/15/88 Tech. Spec. Amendment package sent to OGC 01/22/88.

65962 03/01/88 04/01/88 3 Appendix R exemptions involving power supplies in Aux. Building.

Initial'CMEB review indicates BECo request of 8/10/87 probably acceptable.

66913 03/15/88 04/01/88 Control Room Floor. Seals found by inspectors that do not meet 3-hour basis of exemption granted in 1981. BECo submittal of 12/8/87 proposes treating control and cable spread room as common area. Initial CMEB review indicates probably unacceptable.

Additional information needs and staff position for restart unknown.

03/15/88 04/01/88 Seals inch and undet. BECo submittal expected by 2/8. (Review target dependent on this date).

Generic approach subject of topical review, results of which are not expected for 3-6 months.

Plant specific staff position for restart is unknown.

9 .,

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• SOSTON EDISON COMPANY eco envLSTmN eTRest S CSTO N. M AS S ACH US ETTS D 2119 ,

WILLlAM O. MARRIN97DN 1

BECo 85-196-  !

October 30, 1985 Nr. N. J. Palladino, Chairinan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington 0.C. 20555 License DPR-35 Docket 50-293

Subject:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit #1 Environmental Qualification Extension Recuest

Dear Chairman Palladino:

Boston Edison has become aware that the NRC Staff has recommended denying Boston Edison's September 23, 1985 request for extension of the November 30, 1985 equipment qualification deadline. We have reviewed the SECY document containing this recommendation (SECY 85-338 dated October 24, 1985) and believe the Staf f's reconenendation is both premature and wasteful of Boston Edison and NRC resources. It is also contradictory to the guidance imparted by Generic Letter 85-15 which required filing of extension requests by September 30, 1985 for the NRC to now deny such a request as being, in effect, filed too soon. J renun t that the_ Conunissionjia! r FHan on the Staf f recommendation while Boston Edison has the opportunity to receive and evaluate test results which will enable us either to withdraw the request in wnoir v, in part or to furnish a revised implementation schedule based upon those test results.

In support we would note that of the 5 items in the extension request, we have within the past few days successfully completed the tests on items 2 and 5, i.e., the temperature switches and the SIS cables. The tests on item 1 (Yarways) and item 3 (control switches) are expected to be completed by November 11, 1985 and November 5,1985 respectively. The test on ites 4 is currently scheduled for November 22, 1985. Boston Edison remains hopeful that the remaining 3 tests will prove successful thus allowing withdrawal of the extension request in its entirety (except perhaps with regard to closing the documentation files on the items that had just been tested). It has been our j intent to provide the Commission with a status report of all tests as of '

November 15, 1985, when we would have completed all but the test on the 51 cable. At that time, we would also expect to be in a position to request a more limited extension for any of those items which in fact will require an l extension, i

11/1....To EDO for Appropriate Action...Cpys to: RF..85-930 On> >>1- J -- f /0 o m tryv Q)  ;

n, Mr. N. J. Palladin' Chairman October 30, 1985

' Psge 2 h closing, we request that the Comission delay action on the Staf f's recommendation provided in SECY 85-338 until updated testing information has been provided on November 15, 1985. The Comission will then be able to act on the extension request as modified with the updated information, and this will preclude the necessity of re-submitting entirely new extension requests which would be administrative 1y wasteful to both Boston Edison and the NRC.

Boston Edison believes it has followed a prudent and conservative course and complied with the NRC's guidance in Generic Letter 85-15 in filing extension requests early as it did in order to cover the contingency situation created by testing that was not yet complete. We believe that a deferral of Comission action is entirely reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

Very truly yours, William D. Harrington Senior Vice President - Nuclear l

)

/1mc cc: Commissioner J. K. Asselstine Commissioner F. M. Bernthal Commissioner T. M. Roberts Commissioner L. W. Zech Mr. W. J. Dircks Mr. H. R. Denton Dr. T. E. Murley Mr. H. L. Thompson I

h .- IN RESPONSE, PLEAS l: } E ,

1. UNITED STATES REFER TO: M851326

1. #c 'acoq% ' ' ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.- p ,,

W ASHIN GT oN, D.C. 20555 g . I-l:

December 5, 1985

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OFFICE OF THE

• SECRETARY MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Executive Director p for Operations Herzel H.E. Plaine, General Counsel FROM: Ug(gG. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - AFFIRMATION / DISCUSSION AND VOTE, 4:00 P.M., TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1985, COMMISSIONERS' CONFERENCE ROOM, D.C.

OFFICE (OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTENDANCE)

LYhisportionofrecord"outsidescope"ofrequest7 II. SECY-85-33BA - Revised Environmental Qualification (EO) i Extension Request Post-November 30, 1985 for the Pilgrim l Nuclear Power Station .

The Commission, by a 3-2 vote (with Chairman Palladino and Commissioners Bernthal and Asselstine agreeing), approved issuing an order denying a request from Boston Edison Company to extend the EQ deadline from November 30, 1985 to February 8, 1986. Commissioners Roberts and Zech would have granted the extension toCommissioner allow documentation of test results to be Zech would also have granted an completed.

extension to allow completion of testing on one piece of -

equipment.

Iri:fr.t'.iun in th3 rewrd was deleted i . :.n me rK "1 Ru&m ci Idcr.nUon .

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r a (Subsequently, on November 27, 1985 the Secretary signed the Order.)

cc: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech Commission Staff Offices PDR - Advance DCS - 016 Phillips 0.<

_-____-______--________-________.____-Q

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. JtR 011987 MEMORANDUM FOR

Richard W. Krimm Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological u Hazards Programs Federal Emergency Management Agency-FROM: Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness- J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

OFFSITE. EMERGENCY PLANNING AT PILGRIM Enclosed are two letters-from Ralph G. Bird of Boston Edison that provide the following reports for the Pilgrim nuclear power. plant: Evacuation Time Esti-mate and Beach Population Sheltering, Mobility. Impaired Special Facilities

'and Northern. Reception Center. Since FEMA has the-lead responsibility for the evaluation of offsite plans and as the reports address issues of offsite pre-paredness, :I am transmitting Mr. Bird's letters and the attached reports' to you. These reports can.be used by you _in connection with your ongoing review. ,

of emergency preparedness issues at Pilgrim, as described in your memorandum of

' March 31, 1987 regarding the Pilgrim 2.206 petition.

Also enclosed for your information is .a' copy of a letter from Mr. Bird to Peter W. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of Massachusetts that discusses these reports.

odrinal signed by F. J. Ceasei

. Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Frctection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

DISTRIBUTION w/o attachments to FEMA Ltes.

As Stated FJCongel, NRR WLazarus, RI DBMatthews, NRR PEPB R/F CONTACT: Rosemary T. Hogan, NRR RJBarrett, NRR 492-4866 LJCunningham, NRR CRVan Niel, NRR FKantor, NRR DISTRIBUTION:

RTHogan, NRR WDPaton, OGC RHWessman, NRR Central Files

\ A )L PEPB/NRR RR PE8/'NRR D/DREP/NRRQ FJCongel RTHogan:sc CAyutNiel C tthews 6/.24 /8 7 67$o/87 6/q' /87 6/p/87 l 2 711

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FOR REGION a I REAGIUR5 - 6.,,, ,

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3 6/23/87 FE% Submittal ptachlist i

QRNERAL pHILLeCJ4tY Response to each of the fin innues needs to be structured in suob a annner that they reference the existing energency planning docunents in desoribing the onpabilities to respond adequately to an emergency should it occur today.

kherent possiblo the nspanse should pwvide nfennces to the axisting o i emeranor planning docunents.

1

1) 27E

-the conclusion is that the atisting iTE is adequate and there is no further action nquired.

2) Beach population / Sheltering this response needs to identify the following itees:

-the beaches in question and their location.

-the mssber of people using the beechos that require sheltering e.g. those )

that do not han sooens to permanent structures.

-the location of saceptable shelters by area.

-the process by edstoh the individuals at the beaches are ande em of the-location of these shelters. l

-is there any Lapact on teses naources nquind to respondo and if so o 1

are these resources available to the tones, and if not, uhat ocupensating measune BEco has in place to addnse this issus.

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3) hbbilltr Inpnind/Tnnsport Dependent this response needs to identify the following itaan:

-an overview of previous and current studies on this issue.

-a description of the surny process And utilization of the intonation to respond to the mbllity impnind (explain how the pennind disonpancy betwen toses and state pslans is actually addressed in the planning process and that it does not present a real roadblock to the laplementation of protection sotlans).

-provide details that desoribe the utilization of the staging areas for the transportation dependent population and whether the existing planning process adequately ackinsnes this groqp of people.  ;

-provide a antrix of naources n needs. l

-is there any inpact on toun naources required to napondo and if so, are l thees resources avmilable to the tosato and if noto khet oosperaating i messuns R500 has in place to address this issue, l

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? 4) Special ikollities This naponse needs to identify the following itaas:

A discussion on the cane anund Areaso to include:

-loostian and type of facility.

-available structures suitaMe for sheltering.

-ntaber of individuals utilising facilities.

4ecoription of evacuation and shelter procedures in place that would be utillsed to protect the users of these facilitien. \

-in there any Lapact an coun renoutues required to respond, and if so, an these neouwes availaMe to the toness and ifnot,edat ocapensating sensures asco has in place to address this issue.

A discussion on the tone alert ndic pmann to include:

o

-identification of the nnaber of radios required.

description of the existing program that annune tone alert radios are provided and wrksMe on an ongoing basis.  ;

A dinoussian on the echools (public/ private) and day care centers, to include:

-desoriptian of the existing procedures that are in place and would be impiamented.

4escription of the population for enok school and the nquisite buses nquind for evacuation.

-description of the location at the buses and arnngaments for their une }

(bus natrix). '

-is then any impnet on toun nsourcen nquired to respond, and if ser an these neouwee available to the toun, and if noto uhat compensating measures JE00 han in pison to addtwes this issue. .

A discussion an the two axisting lookups and tw Jells in the RPZo to include:

-description of the existing procedures that an in place and would be isplanentad. }

-is there any inpact on town neoumes requind to respondo and if i sou are these renoutses available to the tone, and if not, uhat  !

compensating nesaures asC6 has in place to address this issue. l A discussion an the nursing homeer to include:

-description of the existing proceduns that are in p1nor and neuld be implemented.  !

-description of the loontion of the ambulances /other nkielen and )

arnntements for their use (vehicle matrix).

-assurances that transportation resources alloosted for these facilities do not conflict with those oaanitted to other tao 111 ties. i

-is then any impact on coun naounes requimd to roependo and if I soo are these resourses ava21able to the tekno ani if noto Nhat compensating measuns 25C0 has in place to address this issue.

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Ms response needs to identifr the following itaas: k 1 -a description of facility estrangements.

I -a description of the equipment and persannel necessary to run the facility.

-a description of personnel training.

e description of the capaM11ty to activate the facility and monitor 23 of the population designated to respond to the center within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

-the final prutuot should reseable that usually aubaitted by the state, 3

-