ML20203D458

Discusses Enforcement Conference Conducted on 980120 Re Routine Insp Repts 50-361/97-24 & 50-362/97-24 on 971117- 1205 & Forwards Notice of Violation

ML20203D458
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	02/18/1998
From:	Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20203D462	List:
References
50-361-97-24, 50-362-97-24, EA-97-585, NUDOCS 9802260065
Download: ML20203D458 (6)

See also: IR 05000361/1997024

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February 18, 1998 i

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EA 97 585

Harold D. Ray, Executive Vice President

Southern California Edison Company

San Onofro Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674 0128

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOt.ATION

(NRC Inspection Report No. 50 361/97 24; 50 362/97 24)

[

Dear Mr. Ray:

,

This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the NRC's Region IV

office in Arlington, Texas on January 20,1998, and to the supplementalinformation Southern

California Edison Company (Edison) provided in its letter dated February 3,1998. The

conference was held to discuss the results of a routine inspection conducted on November 17 .

through December 5,1997, at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The findings from

the inspection were discussed with your staff during a telephonic exit briefing on December 18,

1997, and documented in the subject inspection report dated December 24,1997.

Based on the information developed during the incpection and the information that Edison

provided during the conference and in its February 3 letter, the NRC has determined that

violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of

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Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detailin the subject

inspection report. The most significant violation involves a failure to protect safeguards

information. Specifically, a Safeguards Contingency Plan was lost and has not been recovered.

During the conference, Edison's position was that there is sufficient justification to believe the

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loss of the Safeguards Contingency Plan was an inadvertent act, and not a deliberate attempt by

an unauthorized person to gather information about the Edison security contingency plans.

Edison noted that although the plan contains much information about how the security

organization would respond to various events, the plan does not contain every key detail.

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Edison also stated that its program for the control of safeguards information substantially

exceeds regulatory requirements and that the loss of the plan was an anomaly As a result,

Edison concluded that the violation should be classified at Severity Level IV because it was an

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isniated personnel error, aggressive corrective action was taken, the loss was not indicative of a

programmatic breakdown or a loss of safety function, and it was not willful.

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No' withstanding Edison's position, the circumstances involving the location, duration (until

idemification), and the importance of the information are significant. The plan was lost from a

building located outside the protected area, up to one month had passed before Edison

discovered that the plan was missing, the plan has not yet been recovered, and the plan

contains significant safeguards information. These factors create the potential for security to be

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compromised; and a violation of this type is considered significant. Therefore, this violation has

been categorized at Severity Level lll in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and

Procedure for NRC Enforcement Ac6ons"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is

considered for a Severity Level lll violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of

escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was

warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in

Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Edison's corrective actions included immediately

initiating a significant inyc&tigation, taking aggressive measures to find the plan, immediately

implementing securny compenuatory measures, notifying the NRC, enhancing requirements for

controlling safeguards information, soliciting the assistance of the entire site population, revising

the plan, and relocating some key security contingency equipment. The NRC has concluded

that Edison's corrective actions were sufficiently prompt and comprehensive, and that Edison is

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deserving of corrective action credit.

Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition

of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized not to propose

a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil

penalty.

The attached Notice contains three additional violations involving failures to: (1) secure -

contingency weapons in two instances, (2) report to the NRC the discovery of weapons that

were out of the control or physical custody of security personnel, and (3) provide emergency

power supply to a small portion of the intrusion detection system. In accordance with the

enforcement policy, each of these four violations has been classified at Soverity Level IV.

During the conference, Edison stated that these remaining violations were either not violations

or, for those issues which Edison agreed were violations, satisfied the enforcement policy

criteria for non cited violations (NCV). Edison's arguments are addressed below.

Regarding the failure to secure contingency weapons, Edison agreed that a severity level IV

violation occurred but that it met the enforcement policy criteria for NCV. However, the NRC has

determined that the corrective' actions for the first instance of this violation (July 30,1997) cculd

reasonably be expected to have prevented the second instance (November 7,1997).

Therefore, this does not meet the criteria for treatment as an NCV.

Regarding the failure to report the loss of the security computers, Edison's position was that its

compensatory measures takeil were adequate, and therefore the failure of the security comput0r

did not have to be reported consistent with Edison's reporting procedurei While the NRC still

has questions about the adequacy of the compensatory measures,Section IV.D of the

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Enforcement Policy states that a licensee will not normally be cited for a failure to report a

condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event that it failed

to report. As such, no violation is being cited for this issue.

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Regarding the failure to report the discovery of the unlocked and unattended contingency

weapons, Edison argued that insufficient guidance exists for what constitutes the " loss" of a

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weapon. The NRC's position is that the weapons were out of the control and physical custody of

security personnel inside the protected area on July 30,1997, and thersfore, in accordance with

Edison's reporting procedure, required a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report.

Regarding the failure to provide emergency power supply to one portion of the intrusion

detection system, Edison's position was that this violation satisfied the enforcement policy

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criteria for and should be characterized as an NCV. The NRC's position is that, although

Edison's long term corrective action (a permanent engineered fix) was appropriate, the

immediate corrective actions were inadequate in that no interim measures were taken to

immediately return to compliance (i.e., to provide backup power supply or uninterruptible power,

or implement compensatory measures) until the permanent engineered fix could be

implemented. As a result, the violation continued to exist for several weeks after discovery.

Therefore, this violation does not meet the enforcement policy criteria for an NCV.

Regarding the imprcper implementation of compensatory measures during times when the

security computers were not functioning, Edison's position was that no regulatory violation

occurred because compensatory measures were properly implorr.ented. However, during the

inspection, the NRC inspector requested that security personnel demonstrate satisfactory

performance of three different patrol routes for a simulated computer outage, Edison secunty

personnel did not properly complete two of the threa patrol routes within the allotted time.

During the conference, Edison did not adequately show that these failures were isolated and the

NRC requested further information regarding the control of the security procedures and

guidance that ensure compensatory measures are adequately implemented in its February 3,

1998, letter, Edison provided further information regarding the adaquacy of its procedures and

the adequacy of the compensatory measures taken duiing the computer outages. However, the

NRC does not have sufficient information to determinc whether a violation occurred, and this

issue will be tracked as an Unresolved item pending further review.

Edison's February 3 letter also provided comments to the inspection report. The comments

reasserted Edison's perspective on the issues discussed during the predecisional enforcement

conference. We acknowledge Edison's position, and we provided the NRC's position in the

inspection report and, where appropriate, we are responding to Edison's positions in this

enforcement action. We have determined that there were no factual errors in the inspection

report; therefore, a revision to the report will not be issued.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to

determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory

requirements.

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In accordance with 10 CPR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response will be placed + 'he NPC Public Document Room.

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Sincerely,

if OV

[y Ellis W. Merschoff

Regional Administrator

Docket Nos.: 50-361; 50-362

License Nos.: NPF 10; NPF 15

Enclosure: Notice of Violation

t

Chairman, Board of Supervisors

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County of San Diego

1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335

San Diego, California 92101

Alan R. Watts, Esq.

Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart

701 S. Parker St. Suite 7000

Orange, California 92868-4720

Sherwin Harris, Resource Project Manager

Public Utilities Department

City of Riverside

3900 Main Street

Riverside, California 92522

R. W. Krieger, Vice President

Southern California Edison Company

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

P.O. Box 128

San Clemente, California 92674 0128

Stephen A. Woods, Senior Health Physicist

Division of Drinking Water and

Environmental Management

Nuclear Emergency Response Program

California Department of Health Services

P.O. Box 942732, M/S 390

Sacramento, Ca!'fornia 94334 7320

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Mr. Gary D. Cotton, Sr. Vice President

Energy Supply

San Diego Gas & Electric Company

P. O. Box 1831

San Diego, California 92112-4150

Mr. Steve Hsu

Radiological Health Branch

State Department of Health Services

l P.O. Box 942732

l Sacramento, California 94234

Mayor

City of San Clemente

100 Avenida Presidio

San Clemente, California 92672

Mr. Truman Burns \Mr. Robert Kinosian

California Public Utilities Commission

505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102

San Francisco, California 94102

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bec w/ Enclosure:

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SECY EC's: Rl, Rll, Rill

CA PA (0 2G4)

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DEDO (017G21) OE (0 7HS)

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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