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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20148S271 | |||
| issue date = 01/28/1988 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-346/88-04 on 871209-880108.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Activities Re Allegation | |||
| author name = Guldemond W, Landsman R | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000346 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-346-88-04, 50-346-88-4, NUDOCS 8802020375 | |||
| package number = ML20148S246 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 13 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000346/1988004]] | |||
=Text= | |||
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION | |||
REGION III | |||
Report No. 50-346/88004(DRP) Operating License No. NPF-3 | |||
Docket No. 50-346 | |||
Licensee: Toledo Edison Company | |||
Edison Plaza | |||
300 Madison Avenue | |||
Toledo, OH 43652 | |||
Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 | |||
Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio | |||
Inspection Conducted: December 9, 1987 through January 8, 1988 | |||
M | |||
Inspector: R.B.Landspn | |||
Approved By: . G. u demond, Chie / .2g-gg | |||
Reactor Projects Branch 2 Date | |||
Inspection Sumary | |||
Inspection from December 9, 1987 through January 8, 1988 (Report | |||
No. 50-346/88004(DRP)) | |||
Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection of activities with regard | |||
to an allegation. | |||
Results: Two violations were identified (failure to follow procedures - | |||
Paragraph 2.a (1) (a) and failure to take prompt and effective corrective | |||
' | |||
actions after the procedural violation had been identified by the quality | |||
organization - Paragraph 2.a (1) (c)). | |||
8802020375 080128 | |||
gDR ADOCK 05000346 | |||
PDR | |||
, | |||
.-,er,-,, - , - - - - , - . , --, , -- | |||
, | |||
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DETAILS | |||
1. Persons Contacted | |||
a.. Toledo Edison Company (TED) | |||
* L. Storz, Plant Manager | |||
L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director | |||
D. Briden, Safety Review Board Chainnan | |||
G. Grime, Industrial Security Director | |||
M. Schefers, Information Management Director | |||
* G. Honma, Compliance Supervisor | |||
R. Butler I&C Superintendent | |||
C. Daft, Technical Planning Superintendent | |||
S. Zunk, Nuclear Group Ombudsman | |||
* D. Harris, Manager Quality Systems | |||
S. Filippucci, Nuclear Security Superv hor | |||
J. Dillich, Technical Support Manager | |||
D. Hallenbeck, Quality Systems Specialist | |||
M. O'Reilly, Attorney | |||
K. Dunn, Document Control Supervisor | |||
J. Hainline, Coordinator in Systems and Procedures | |||
T. Davis, Coordinator in Document Control | |||
i | |||
S. Goldstein, Systems and Procedures Manager | |||
l M. Roder, Administrative Procedure Coordinator in Technical Support | |||
i C. Zimmerman, Safety Review Board Clerk | |||
l | |||
D. Levering, Systems and Procedure Supervisor | |||
l b. USNRC | |||
l | |||
l | |||
* P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector | |||
! D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector | |||
l M. Farber, Reactor Inspector | |||
' | |||
C. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist | |||
I. Villaiva, Reactor / Nuclear Engineer | |||
c. Other (Former TED Contract Employee) | |||
< | |||
D. Till, Administrative Procedure Coordinator in Technical Support | |||
* Denotes those present at the exit meeting conducted telephonically | |||
on January 27, 1988. | |||
2. Allegation Followup | |||
l (Closed) RIII-87-A-0095: During the period from June 23 through | |||
I November 10, 1987, the NRC received a number of concerns from a former | |||
f employee at Davis-Besse. These concerns were reviewed by Region III | |||
i | |||
both in-office and onsite with the following results: | |||
2 | |||
6 . .. . . | |||
. | |||
. ._ | |||
l | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
. | |||
. | |||
a. Concern No. 1 | |||
Revision 27 to site administrative procedure AD-1805, "Procedure | |||
Preparation and Maintenance," dated May 19, 1987, was improperly | |||
processed in that the procedure was issued without the Quality | |||
Assurance (QA) Director's signature, contrary to the requirements of | |||
Section 5 of Toledo Edison's Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual. | |||
(1) Findings: In evaluating this concern, the inspector reviewed | |||
Nuclear Group Procedure NG-AV-115, "Preparation and Control of | |||
Nuclear Group Division and Department Procedures," Revisions 26 | |||
and 27 of site administrative procedure AD-1805, "Procedure | |||
Preparation and Maintenance," and the administrative paperwork | |||
associated with the review and comment on Revision 27 to | |||
AD-1805. In addition, numerous individuals involved in | |||
preparing, reviewing, resolving comments on, and approving | |||
Revision 27 to AD-1805 were interviewed. Based on these | |||
activities the following information was obtained: | |||
(a) NG-AV-115 is one of the controlling documents which imposes | |||
the requirements of the NRC approved Quality Assurance Program | |||
on preparation of Nuclear Group Procedures, and changes | |||
thereto. One of the requirements of NG-AV-115 is that | |||
all procedures and procedure changes affecting quality be | |||
approved by the Quality Assurance Department (QAD) prior | |||
to issuance and iniplementation. This requirement existed | |||
in Revision 26 to AD-1805 (a subordinate document) and was | |||
reflected in a then information-only site document | |||
entitled, "Test and Procedures Index" (T&PI), which | |||
identified those procedures requiring QAD approval. | |||
AD-1805 was identified on the T&PI as requiring QA | |||
approval. | |||
l The NRC does not specifically require this degree of in-line | |||
Quality Assurance Department (QAD) involvement in procedure | |||
preparation and change as part of the Quality Assurance | |||
regulations contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B; however, | |||
, | |||
10 CFR 50 Appendix 8, Criterion V, does require that | |||
l activities affecting quality be conducted in accordance | |||
l with approved procedures. Thus, the procedure approval | |||
l | |||
requirements contained in both NG-AV-115 and AD-1805, | |||
l Revision 26 represent a conservative application of NRC | |||
l requirements. This degree of conservatism in procedural | |||
L control is not uncommon in the nuclear industry. | |||
l Revision 27 to AD-1805 was originated by the Technical | |||
Support Department. One of the changes proposed by | |||
Revision 27 was the deletion of QAD in-line approval of | |||
procedures and procedure changes. During the Revision 27 | |||
i review process, which, in accordance with NG-AV-115, | |||
l Revision 26 to AD 1805, and the T&PI, required QAD | |||
approval, QAD identified this change as unacceptable. | |||
3 | |||
: | |||
. | |||
9 | |||
Ensuing attempts by both the Production and Quality | |||
departments at resolving QAD's corrments were unsuccessful, | |||
and, on April 27, 1987, the draft Revision 27 was | |||
submitted to the site Safety Review Board (SRB) for | |||
resolution. | |||
The SRB met on May 8, 1987, and, as indicated in the | |||
Procedure Development Form (PDF) for Revision 27, determined | |||
that NG-AV-115 would have to be revised to reflect the | |||
reduced level of QAD involvement in procedures and procedure | |||
changes before Revision 27 to AD-1805 could be approved and | |||
issued. The PDF was not signed by the QAD Director at this | |||
time because the requisite changes had not been made to | |||
NG-AV-115. The draft Revision 27 with SRB comments and the | |||
PDF without the QAD Director's signature were returned to the | |||
site Technical Support Group for continuing coordination of | |||
the revision process. On May 13, 1987, the Technical Support | |||
Manager signed the Revision 27 cover sheet indicating that | |||
the revision was ready for issuance. The Plant Manager also | |||
signed the cover sheet on May 13, approving its issuance and | |||
implementation. This signature process was reperformed on | |||
May 19, 1987. The second signatures by the Plant and Technical | |||
Support Managers were not required, and their purpose could | |||
not be determined. At the time of both signings, NG-AV-115 | |||
still required QAD approval of the revision. This approval | |||
had not been obtained as indicated by the lack of the QAD | |||
Director's approval signature. The failure to obtain required | |||
QAD Director approval prior to issuance of Revision 27 to | |||
AD-1805 was a violation of existing controlling procedures | |||
and was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V | |||
(346/87004-01(DRP)). | |||
(b) During the interviews conducted regarding the circumstances | |||
surrounding the inappropriate approval and issuance of | |||
Revision 27 to AD-1805, the following pertinent information | |||
was identified: | |||
1. The Technical Support Manager signed the cover sheet | |||
on May 13, 1987, based on verbal confirmation that all | |||
comments had been resolved, | |||
ii. The Plant Manager signed the cover sheet on May 13, | |||
1987, believing that the SRB had resolved QAD comments. | |||
He further stated that at the time he signed the cover | |||
sheet, he was unaware that a prerequisite revision to | |||
NG-AV-115 was required. | |||
4 | |||
. | |||
. . _ _ - _ _ - _ - | |||
* | |||
1 | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
iii. On May 13, 1987, during the administrative processes | |||
supporting implementation of Revision 27 to AD-1805, | |||
including updating the T&PI, the fact that QAD had not | |||
approved the revision was brought to the attention of | |||
the Document Control (DC) Group, which was responsible | |||
for further processing and distribution, and the | |||
Systems and Procedures (S&P) Group, responsible for | |||
updating the T&PI. DC returned the procedure to | |||
Technical Support for resolution of this discrepancy | |||
prior to distribution. | |||
iv. On May 14, 1987, an S&P Group supervisor signed the | |||
PDF with the notation to proceed with processing | |||
without QA concurrence, | |||
v. Technical Support determined that QAD was not prepared | |||
to accept the necessary changes to NG-AV-115 to support | |||
implemeritation of Revision 27 to AD 1805. | |||
Based on the results of interviews as discussed above, the | |||
lack of QA approval had been identified to at least three | |||
organizations assigned key functions in the procedure | |||
implementation process. Notwithstanding, Revision 27 to | |||
AD-1805 was issued on May 19, 1987. | |||
(c) On May 19, 1987, QAD discovered that Revision 27 to AD-1805 | |||
was issued without its approval. Further attempts to resolve | |||
the concerns with Technical Support failed and, on June 26, | |||
1987, QAD issued Potential Condition Adverse to Quality | |||
Report (PCAQR) 87-0322. This PCAQR was still open at the | |||
time of the inspection. A memorandum proposing escalation | |||
to a Management Corrective Action was prepared by the | |||
Director, QAD, on August 6,1987. The purpose of this | |||
memorandum was to bring this issue to the attention of the | |||
Nuclear Group Vice President for resolution. This memorandum | |||
was not issued. The failure to take prompt and effective | |||
corrective action for the identified violation is a violation | |||
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (50-346/87-004-02(DRP)). | |||
(d) QAD indicated during interviews that it is currently | |||
reviewing all procedures and changes issued under | |||
Revision 27 to AD-1805 to ensure that ouality requirements | |||
were not deleted fro.n site procedures. To date, no safety | |||
issues have been identified. | |||
(2) Conclusions: Based on the above information, the following | |||
conclusions were reached: | |||
(a) The changes made to AD-1805 by Revision 27 reduced | |||
the level of QAD involvement in the procedure control | |||
process. | |||
5 | |||
l | |||
- - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |||
> | |||
. | |||
,. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
(b) Revision 27 to AD-1805 was implemented in violation of | |||
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM) requirements. | |||
This failure to adhere to the NQAM is a violation of NRC | |||
requirements. | |||
(c) The issuance of Revision 27 to AD-1805 in violation of | |||
NQAM requirements represents a deficiency in quality | |||
programs at Davis Besse'in that the discrepancy leading to | |||
the violation was identified in accordance with approved | |||
practices prior to issuance and appropriate actions to | |||
establish compliance were not taken. | |||
(d) Senior licensee management failed to take action to resolve | |||
a significant policy issue difference between the production | |||
organizatica and the independent quality organization, | |||
despite the fact that the issue had been identified to at | |||
least three cognizant organizations. This represents a | |||
violation of NRC corrective action requirements and, more | |||
importantly, points to a weakness in management performance, | |||
b. Concern No. 2 | |||
Documentation of S&P supervisory direction to process Revision 27 to | |||
AD-1805 without qAD approval was taken from the alleger by site | |||
se',urity when the alleger was escorted from the site. | |||
(1) Findings: The alleger was escorted from the site on May 16, | |||
1987, and the subject document was taken by security. During | |||
this inspection, a copy of this document was provided by the | |||
Davis Besse Ombudsman to the inspector. It is conmon practice | |||
for licensee organizations to recover licensee documents from | |||
individuals removed from the site. NRC regulations do not | |||
prohibit this. | |||
(2) Conclusions: The concern was substantiated; however, there was | |||
no regulatory issue involved. The alleger's implication of | |||
attempted coverup was not substantiated, as the subject document | |||
was readily produced by the licensee, | |||
c. Concern No. 3 | |||
Starting January 15, 1987, new revisions to procedures were not | |||
entered on the T&PI as required. | |||
(1) Findings: As noted above, the T&PI was an information-only | |||
document and not subject to Quality Assurance Program controls. | |||
l Notwithstanding, the inspection disclosed that during this time | |||
l period, the responsibility for the T&PI was transferred from the | |||
l | |||
SRB Clerk to DC and then to S&P, new computer systems were | |||
installed to track the T&PI, and DC was issuing new procedure | |||
manual indexes for site manuals. These changes were not | |||
proceduralized until Revision 27 to AD-1805 was issued, with | |||
the result that lines of responsibility were not clearly defined, | |||
l | |||
6 | |||
! . _ . - _ - . . | |||
.__ ___-________ _-___ - | |||
. | |||
_ | |||
. | |||
Some omissions to the T&PI did occur; however, a licensee audit | |||
in-March-April 1987 identified these, and necessary corrections | |||
were made. | |||
(2) Conclusions: .The inspection substantiated that omis; ions | |||
occurred in the T&PI; however, interviews indicated that the | |||
problem had been identified by the licensee prior to the | |||
alleger's employment and that necessary corrective actions were | |||
in progress. Additionally, this issue is not a regulatory | |||
concern, | |||
d. Concern No. 4 , | |||
Inaccurate information was provided by S&P to management for reports | |||
on the status of assigned tasks. | |||
(1) Findings: Personnel interviewed denied that this occurred. | |||
No written evidence could be found con.erning this issue. | |||
(2) Conclusions: This concern could not be substantiated. The | |||
alleged inaccurate information does not address regulatory or | |||
safety issues. Additionally, the alleger stated he was not aware | |||
of any problems with either associated records or records | |||
alterations. | |||
e. Concern No. 5 | |||
An S&P supervisor directed the S&P staff to delay updating the | |||
computer data base used to track the procedure numbering system. The | |||
alleger was discouraged from bringing concerns to S&P and other | |||
management, and, when the alleger did discuss the situation with an | |||
S&P manager, was "chewed out." | |||
(1) Findings: During the time frame in question, in an effort | |||
at more clearly establishing lines of responsibility, site | |||
management assigned S&P to issue, track, and revise indexes of | |||
procedure numbers. The responsibility for issuing naw procedure | |||
indexes was later returned to DC. During this period an S&P | |||
supervisor purportedly was heard to comment that "if S&P doesn't | |||
do a good job on issuing procedure indexes, maybe DC will take | |||
the responsibility back". The supervisor denied having made this | |||
statement when confronted with it but did attribute the comment | |||
to the S&P Manager. Based on interviews with the alleger and | |||
several co-workers, the computer data base was updated regularly | |||
in spite of the perceived direction to the contrary from | |||
' | |||
management. | |||
l | |||
Interviews with S&P supervisors and managers ano the alleger | |||
disclosed that S&P management did approach the alleger to | |||
discuss this issue after he brought it to the attention of his | |||
! supervisor. | |||
l | |||
l 7 | |||
-. -. __ | |||
- - - _ . . .- . , - - - . . | |||
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . | |||
. | |||
.. | |||
! | |||
(2) Conclusions: The concern that S&P management made statements | |||
that the S&P staff could interpret as direction to delay computer | |||
data base updates was substantiated. Notwithstanding, S&P did | |||
maintain the data base. In addition, S&P management made itself | |||
available to the alleger to discuss his concerns. Thus, the | |||
second portion of this concern was not substantiated. | |||
f. Concern No. 6 | |||
The rules * a not adhered to as illustrated by the following | |||
examples: | |||
- | |||
Improper processing of Procedure AD-1805. | |||
- The alleger was directed to not properly update the procedure | |||
numbering system. | |||
- The alleger was directed to deviate from the established | |||
procedure for updating the Test and Procedure Index. | |||
- Security wasn't infonned that the alleger was fired on May 15, | |||
1987; thus, it allowed him to come onsite on May 16, 1987. | |||
(1) Findings- The inspector reviewed the first three items above | |||
. | |||
in conjunction with inspection of other concerns. See previous | |||
discussion in this report. | |||
The inspector's review of the last item determined that the | |||
alleger was not fired on May 15, 1987. The alleger was | |||
repeatedly instructed by supervision not to come to work on | |||
Saturday, May 16, 1987. The alleger disobeyed the directive and | |||
came in to do additional work. After purportedly disrupting | |||
work in DC he was asked tn leave the site. At that time, | |||
termination proceedings were initiated by the alleger's | |||
supervisor and site access privileges were denied. | |||
(2) Conclusions: The conclusion:; regarding the first three items | |||
are discussed above and within this report. The last item was | |||
not substantiated. | |||
g. Concern No. 7 | |||
Insufficient time was expended on the development of a new | |||
maintenance procedure for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. | |||
Had the procedure been developed earlier, two previous failures would | |||
not have occurred. Also, the plant was inappropriately allowed to | |||
operate with the pump out of service. | |||
(1) Findings: The inspector datermined that the motor-driven | |||
auxiliary feedwater pump failed to operate twice, as stated by | |||
the alleger. | |||
8 | |||
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
- | |||
.. | |||
Following the June 1985 loss of feedwater event, the licensee | |||
initiated steps to install a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater | |||
pump to supplement the two existing steam-driven auxiliary | |||
feedwater pumps. Installation of this new pump was completed | |||
_ | |||
on January 10, 1986, without a maintenance procedure in place. | |||
On January 4, 1987, the ticensee issued the pump vendcr's manual | |||
with a licensee-cover sheet as an approved maintenance procedure. | |||
Subsequent to the May 10, 1987 second failure, a licensee | |||
maintenance procedure was issued on May 13, 1987. This procedure | |||
was in the review cycle at the t!me of the May 10, 1987, failure. | |||
Interviews indicated that the procedure issuance was expedited | |||
after the event. | |||
The first "failure" (January 11,1986) was not, in fact, a | |||
failure. Rather, the control room operator became worried when | |||
the pump apparently did not start when he initiated the starting | |||
circuit. The plant at the time was In Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. | |||
Had the operator been properly trained on a new modification, | |||
he would have known that there was a 12-to 16-second time delay | |||
in the starting circuit to permit the bearing oil pump to | |||
develop normal oil pressure. This prelubrication is necessary | |||
before starting the main electrical motor. | |||
The second "failure" (May 10,1987) of the motor-driven | |||
auxiliary feed water pump also occurred while the unit was in | |||
cold shutdown. This failure occurred while operators were | |||
performing a valve lineup in preparation for placing the steam | |||
generators into wet layup and was also due to operator error. | |||
In this instance, an operator mistakenly shut a pump suction | |||
valve and caused the pump to seize. The pump was subsequently | |||
repaired and is presently operational. | |||
(2) Conclusions: The staff determined that the alleger was not | |||
Enowledgerile about the Davis-Besse auxiliary feedwater system. | |||
A maintenance procedura would not have prevented the problems | |||
involving the new motor-driven pump, as the problems were in no | |||
way related to maintenance. Finally, the plant was not allowed | |||
to operate while the pump was not operational. | |||
h. Concern No. 8 | |||
s Starting the plant nad a higher priority than quality. The alleger | |||
presented no specific information to support this concern, and | |||
indicated it was only an opinion based on "gut instinct" and information | |||
ebtained from co-workers. | |||
(1) Findings: The alleger's concern is based on hearsay information | |||
obtained from conversations with co-workers. The alleger had no | |||
first-hand knowledge of any startup irregularities, since the | |||
plant was either at full power or being taken off-line for a | |||
planned extended maintenance outage during his employment. | |||
9 | |||
- .. . . . . . _. ._ _ _ _ _ - | |||
_ | |||
. | |||
. | |||
The inspector's review indicated that the alleger's concerns | |||
regardir;g startup were based or. his understanding of the June 9, | |||
1985 event. After the event, Toledo Edison provided a | |||
Course-of-Action Plan to the NRC to improve the performance at | |||
the plant. The plan was designed to resolve NRC concerns and | |||
' | |||
provide assurance that no undue risk to the health and safety | |||
of the public would result from the resumption of power | |||
generation. The NRC independently reviewed the status of the | |||
actions required to be completed prior to restart and concluded | |||
that licensee commitments had been satisfied, that necessary | |||
plant systems were tested prior to use, and that the plant was | |||
ready for power operations. Additionally, the NRC provided | |||
24-hour :nspection coverage during the initial plant restart | |||
operation to ensure a safe plant startup and noted no instances | |||
in which quality was sacrificed to satisfy schedular | |||
requirements. | |||
(2) Conclusions: Based on the extensive NRC reviews and inspection | |||
activity that went into the Davis-Besse restart after the long | |||
* | |||
outage, the inspector could find no basis for this concern, | |||
i. Concern No. 9 The Temporary Procedure Modifications (T-Mods) Log may | |||
not have been kept up to date after the alleger's termination. There | |||
is also no one onsite with knowledge of how T-Mods are incorporated | |||
into specification revisions. | |||
(1) Findings: T-mods are temporary procedure changes. Currently, | |||
they are called temporary approvals (TAs). Along with the name | |||
change, the responsible group for processing these changes | |||
changed from the Station Review Board (SRB) Clerk to Document | |||
Control (DC) to S&P. These changes occurred in 1986. | |||
The mechanism to handle these changes was generally described in | |||
l site Procedure AD-1805, Revision 25. Up to April 7, 1986, the - | |||
l SRB Clerk issued T-Mod numbers. These modifications were | |||
l sequentially numbered after final approval of the changes by the | |||
Plant Manager. The Clerk logged each approved modification in a | |||
log book on her desk. The numbers were also entered into the old | |||
PRIME compui.er system. The Clerk would then forward the procedure | |||
change package to DC for processing. These T-Mods remained open | |||
until a new revision to the affected procedure was issued which | |||
incorporated the T-Mod. The SRB Clerk would then close the | |||
T-Mod. Some T-Mods are still open today. | |||
Revision 26 to Procedure AD-1805, dated April 7, 1986, changed | |||
this mechanism and required that DC now issue the modification | |||
numbers and keep the log of the new TAs. Since the procedure | |||
wasn't very explicit, DC issued TAs without numbers. If the | |||
TA was not incorporated into a procedure change within the | |||
allowable 14 day timeframe, it ws voided. DC had made up | |||
a separate control log book of 1.nese TAs. It was in the | |||
process of computerizing this tracking system duririg the time | |||
of the alleger's employment. | |||
10 | |||
l | |||
! | |||
. | |||
f | |||
. | |||
J | |||
Concurrently, Systems and Procedures (S&P) was in the process- | |||
of taking over the T-Mod Log from the SRB Clerk and the TA Log | |||
from Document Control. A new computer system (VAX) was to be | |||
used by S&P to do this.. However, as it wasn't fully operational, | |||
the numbers had to be entered into the old PRIME computer system | |||
to ensure that no data was lost. | |||
It wasn't until Revision 27 to AD-1805 was implemented that a | |||
detailed TA numbering system was initiated. The first TA number | |||
was issued on May 20, 1987. | |||
In view of the transition which took place during the alleger's | |||
term of employment the inspector could understand why the | |||
alleger was concerned. This system as described was in fact | |||
confusing. When the alleger left the site, the transition was | |||
still in progress. After the alleger's termination, the | |||
individuals in DC and S&P who originally had these assignments | |||
kept the logs up to date. Subsequently, a Toledo Edison | |||
employee was given the full-time assignment to keep the T-Mods | |||
and TAs up to date. | |||
(2) Conclusions: The concern was not substantiated. | |||
J. Concer_n No. 10 | |||
Security did not remove the parking sticker from the alleger's car | |||
when the alleger was terminated. | |||
(1) Findings: The staff determined that Davis-Besse parking | |||
stickers only allow one to park in the owner-controlled | |||
parking areas outside of the protected area. NRC security | |||
authority begins at the fence of the protected area. | |||
(2) Conclusions: The explanation of this concern was discussed | |||
with the alleger during the November 10, 1987 interview. The | |||
alleger acknowledged that the NRC's jurisdiction doesn't extend | |||
to the owner-controlled area rnd stated that no further action | |||
was required, | |||
k. Concern No. 11 | |||
The Ombudsman's Report No. 39 response on the alleger's concerns has | |||
questionable independence and accuracy. The Ombudsman did not | |||
properly record the alleger's concerns. The Ombudsman should have | |||
informed the alleger of the Whistle-Blowers Act. | |||
(1) Findings: The Ombudsman Program at Davis-Besse is a licensee | |||
initiated program designed to provide an additional forum for | |||
employees to express concerns about activities and events. It | |||
has no regulatory basis. The program does not require that | |||
investigations of concerns be independent of the focus of the | |||
concerns, although that would be the ideal condition. | |||
11 | |||
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.. | |||
.. | |||
The program does require that the concerns of individuals be | |||
directed to a responsible Nuclear Group Director for | |||
investigation and resolution. Based on inspector review, the | |||
alleger's concerns were directed to the appropriate level of | |||
management. After discussions with cognizant individuals | |||
onsite, it appears that the resolution of Ombudsman's Report | |||
No. 39 was not done by an independent source. The prime author | |||
of the report was the alleger's second-level supervisor. | |||
Based on the inspector's review of this concern, the following | |||
observations were made: | |||
1. Several sessions between the NRC and the alleger were | |||
required to obtain a full characterization of the alleger's | |||
concerns. The concerns listed in the report appear to be a | |||
reasonable approxiination of the concerns expressed to the | |||
NRC. No evidence of coverup or deliberate | |||
misrepresentation was discovered. | |||
ii. The responses made to the Ombudsman Report were not based | |||
on an in-depth, comprehensive independent effort, with the | |||
result that definitive answers were not provided to the | |||
alleger by the licensee. | |||
With regard to the Whistle-Blowers Act, the inspector determined | |||
that the licensee is in compliance with NRC regulations, Part 19 | |||
of 10 CFR, which require that each licensee post current copies | |||
of Form NRC-3, which states that if an employee believes he has been | |||
discriminated against for talking to the NRC, the employee may | |||
file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor within 30 days | |||
of the occurrence. The inspector determined that the alleger was | |||
required to take site training on the Ombudsman's program as well | |||
as on Part 19 and did pass a written test on this subject. | |||
(2) , Conclusions: The first portion of the alleger's concern was | |||
substantiated. The second portion of the concern was not | |||
l, substantiated in that the Ombudsman reasonably characterized the | |||
l alleger's concerns. With regard to the Whistle-Blowers Act, the | |||
inspector concluded that the olleger was made aware of the | |||
provisions of the Act via mechanisms other than the Ombudsman | |||
Program and that these mechanisms satisfy existing regulatory | |||
requirements. | |||
l. Concern No. 12 | |||
l The alleger has been "blackballed" from future employment at | |||
j Davis-Besse as a result of going to the NRC with concerns about the | |||
plant. The company also intentionally led the alleger on with | |||
promises of future employment for the sole purpose of eclipsing the | |||
30-day statute of limitations that the Department of Labor has for | |||
investigating allegations of discrimination. | |||
12 | |||
_ | |||
-. | |||
* | |||
. | |||
(1) Findings: NRC regulations prohibit discrimination against | |||
current employees for engaging in certain protected activities. | |||
One protected activity is providing the Commission information | |||
about possible violations of NRC requirements. The alleger | |||
provided the NRC with information about the plant; however, this | |||
was after his employment was terminated and after the alleger | |||
had been placed on the Denied Access List. | |||
An employee who believes that he has been discriminated against | |||
may seek a remedy for the discrimination through an administrative | |||
proceeding of the Department of Labor. This proceeding must be | |||
initiated within 30 days after the alleged violation occurs. The | |||
alleger stated that he did go to the Department of Labor; however, | |||
he contacted it well after 30 days from being discharged. Thus, | |||
the Department of Labor dismissed the case based on the fact that | |||
the 30 days had expired. | |||
Nevertheless, from interviews with personnel involved with the | |||
alleger onsite and from reviewing documents onsite, there are | |||
indications that the I&C Department wanted to hire the alleger | |||
after he was escorted offsite May 16, 1987. In fact, it appears | |||
that it was attempting to do so only to find out that the | |||
alleger was on the Plant Denied Access List. Thus, the alleger | |||
couldn't have been hired even if a position was open. | |||
The staff could only find that individuals onsite probably | |||
informed the alleger that they would attempt to obtain other | |||
site employment in some other group. Co-workers attempted | |||
to obtain employment for the alleger in their group. In fact, | |||
the alleger was told privately that if a position opened up, | |||
an offer would be made; however, a position never opened up. | |||
(2) Conclusions: The first portion of the concern was not | |||
substantiated in that, based on discussions with cognizant | |||
personnel, the alleger did not bring concerns to the NRC until | |||
after termination proceedings were completed. Regarding the | |||
second portion, no positive evidence could be found that the | |||
alleger was led to believe, by the Company, that there would be | |||
a future job at Davis-Besse. There is evidence that individuals | |||
attempted to hire him, but failed. | |||
3. Exit Interview | |||
During a conference call / telephonic exit interview with licensee | |||
representatives identified in paragraph 1, the inspector sumarized the | |||
scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of | |||
this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did | |||
not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection | |||
could be considered proprietary in nature. | |||
13 | |||
.. . | |||
. | |||
j | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 05:37, 27 October 2020
ML20148S271 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Davis Besse ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/28/1988 |
From: | Guldemond W, Landsman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20148S246 | List: |
References | |
50-346-88-04, 50-346-88-4, NUDOCS 8802020375 | |
Download: ML20148S271 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1988004
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/88004(DRP) Operating License No. NPF-3
Docket No. 50-346
Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652
Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1
Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio
Inspection Conducted: December 9, 1987 through January 8, 1988
M
Inspector: R.B.Landspn
Approved By: . G. u demond, Chie / .2g-gg
Reactor Projects Branch 2 Date
Inspection Sumary
Inspection from December 9, 1987 through January 8, 1988 (Report
No. 50-346/88004(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection of activities with regard
to an allegation.
Results: Two violations were identified (failure to follow procedures -
Paragraph 2.a (1) (a) and failure to take prompt and effective corrective
'
actions after the procedural violation had been identified by the quality
organization - Paragraph 2.a (1) (c)).
8802020375 080128
gDR ADOCK 05000346
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DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
a.. Toledo Edison Company (TED)
- L. Storz, Plant Manager
L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director
D. Briden, Safety Review Board Chainnan
G. Grime, Industrial Security Director
M. Schefers, Information Management Director
- G. Honma, Compliance Supervisor
R. Butler I&C Superintendent
C. Daft, Technical Planning Superintendent
S. Zunk, Nuclear Group Ombudsman
- D. Harris, Manager Quality Systems
S. Filippucci, Nuclear Security Superv hor
J. Dillich, Technical Support Manager
D. Hallenbeck, Quality Systems Specialist
M. O'Reilly, Attorney
K. Dunn, Document Control Supervisor
J. Hainline, Coordinator in Systems and Procedures
T. Davis, Coordinator in Document Control
i
S. Goldstein, Systems and Procedures Manager
l M. Roder, Administrative Procedure Coordinator in Technical Support
i C. Zimmerman, Safety Review Board Clerk
l
D. Levering, Systems and Procedure Supervisor
l b. USNRC
l
l
- P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector
! D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector
l M. Farber, Reactor Inspector
'
C. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist
I. Villaiva, Reactor / Nuclear Engineer
c. Other (Former TED Contract Employee)
<
D. Till, Administrative Procedure Coordinator in Technical Support
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting conducted telephonically
on January 27, 1988.
2. Allegation Followup
l (Closed) RIII-87-A-0095: During the period from June 23 through
I November 10, 1987, the NRC received a number of concerns from a former
f employee at Davis-Besse. These concerns were reviewed by Region III
i
both in-office and onsite with the following results:
2
6 . .. . .
.
. ._
l
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
a. Concern No. 1
Revision 27 to site administrative procedure AD-1805, "Procedure
Preparation and Maintenance," dated May 19, 1987, was improperly
processed in that the procedure was issued without the Quality
Assurance (QA) Director's signature, contrary to the requirements of
Section 5 of Toledo Edison's Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual.
(1) Findings: In evaluating this concern, the inspector reviewed
Nuclear Group Procedure NG-AV-115, "Preparation and Control of
Nuclear Group Division and Department Procedures," Revisions 26
and 27 of site administrative procedure AD-1805, "Procedure
Preparation and Maintenance," and the administrative paperwork
associated with the review and comment on Revision 27 to
AD-1805. In addition, numerous individuals involved in
preparing, reviewing, resolving comments on, and approving
Revision 27 to AD-1805 were interviewed. Based on these
activities the following information was obtained:
(a) NG-AV-115 is one of the controlling documents which imposes
the requirements of the NRC approved Quality Assurance Program
on preparation of Nuclear Group Procedures, and changes
thereto. One of the requirements of NG-AV-115 is that
all procedures and procedure changes affecting quality be
approved by the Quality Assurance Department (QAD) prior
to issuance and iniplementation. This requirement existed
in Revision 26 to AD-1805 (a subordinate document) and was
reflected in a then information-only site document
entitled, "Test and Procedures Index" (T&PI), which
identified those procedures requiring QAD approval.
AD-1805 was identified on the T&PI as requiring QA
approval.
l The NRC does not specifically require this degree of in-line
Quality Assurance Department (QAD) involvement in procedure
preparation and change as part of the Quality Assurance
regulations contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B; however,
,
10 CFR 50 Appendix 8, Criterion V, does require that
l activities affecting quality be conducted in accordance
l with approved procedures. Thus, the procedure approval
l
requirements contained in both NG-AV-115 and AD-1805,
l Revision 26 represent a conservative application of NRC
l requirements. This degree of conservatism in procedural
L control is not uncommon in the nuclear industry.
l Revision 27 to AD-1805 was originated by the Technical
Support Department. One of the changes proposed by
Revision 27 was the deletion of QAD in-line approval of
procedures and procedure changes. During the Revision 27
i review process, which, in accordance with NG-AV-115,
l Revision 26 to AD 1805, and the T&PI, required QAD
approval, QAD identified this change as unacceptable.
3
.
9
Ensuing attempts by both the Production and Quality
departments at resolving QAD's corrments were unsuccessful,
and, on April 27, 1987, the draft Revision 27 was
submitted to the site Safety Review Board (SRB) for
resolution.
The SRB met on May 8, 1987, and, as indicated in the
Procedure Development Form (PDF) for Revision 27, determined
that NG-AV-115 would have to be revised to reflect the
reduced level of QAD involvement in procedures and procedure
changes before Revision 27 to AD-1805 could be approved and
issued. The PDF was not signed by the QAD Director at this
time because the requisite changes had not been made to
NG-AV-115. The draft Revision 27 with SRB comments and the
PDF without the QAD Director's signature were returned to the
site Technical Support Group for continuing coordination of
the revision process. On May 13, 1987, the Technical Support
Manager signed the Revision 27 cover sheet indicating that
the revision was ready for issuance. The Plant Manager also
signed the cover sheet on May 13, approving its issuance and
implementation. This signature process was reperformed on
May 19, 1987. The second signatures by the Plant and Technical
Support Managers were not required, and their purpose could
not be determined. At the time of both signings, NG-AV-115
still required QAD approval of the revision. This approval
had not been obtained as indicated by the lack of the QAD
Director's approval signature. The failure to obtain required
QAD Director approval prior to issuance of Revision 27 to
AD-1805 was a violation of existing controlling procedures
and was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V
(346/87004-01(DRP)).
(b) During the interviews conducted regarding the circumstances
surrounding the inappropriate approval and issuance of
Revision 27 to AD-1805, the following pertinent information
was identified:
1. The Technical Support Manager signed the cover sheet
on May 13, 1987, based on verbal confirmation that all
comments had been resolved,
ii. The Plant Manager signed the cover sheet on May 13,
1987, believing that the SRB had resolved QAD comments.
He further stated that at the time he signed the cover
sheet, he was unaware that a prerequisite revision to
NG-AV-115 was required.
4
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1
~
.
iii. On May 13, 1987, during the administrative processes
supporting implementation of Revision 27 to AD-1805,
including updating the T&PI, the fact that QAD had not
approved the revision was brought to the attention of
the Document Control (DC) Group, which was responsible
for further processing and distribution, and the
Systems and Procedures (S&P) Group, responsible for
updating the T&PI. DC returned the procedure to
Technical Support for resolution of this discrepancy
prior to distribution.
iv. On May 14, 1987, an S&P Group supervisor signed the
PDF with the notation to proceed with processing
without QA concurrence,
v. Technical Support determined that QAD was not prepared
to accept the necessary changes to NG-AV-115 to support
implemeritation of Revision 27 to AD 1805.
Based on the results of interviews as discussed above, the
lack of QA approval had been identified to at least three
organizations assigned key functions in the procedure
implementation process. Notwithstanding, Revision 27 to
AD-1805 was issued on May 19, 1987.
(c) On May 19, 1987, QAD discovered that Revision 27 to AD-1805
was issued without its approval. Further attempts to resolve
the concerns with Technical Support failed and, on June 26,
1987, QAD issued Potential Condition Adverse to Quality
Report (PCAQR) 87-0322. This PCAQR was still open at the
time of the inspection. A memorandum proposing escalation
to a Management Corrective Action was prepared by the
Director, QAD, on August 6,1987. The purpose of this
memorandum was to bring this issue to the attention of the
Nuclear Group Vice President for resolution. This memorandum
was not issued. The failure to take prompt and effective
corrective action for the identified violation is a violation
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (50-346/87-004-02(DRP)).
(d) QAD indicated during interviews that it is currently
reviewing all procedures and changes issued under
Revision 27 to AD-1805 to ensure that ouality requirements
were not deleted fro.n site procedures. To date, no safety
issues have been identified.
(2) Conclusions: Based on the above information, the following
conclusions were reached:
(a) The changes made to AD-1805 by Revision 27 reduced
the level of QAD involvement in the procedure control
process.
5
l
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>
.
,.
.
.
(b) Revision 27 to AD-1805 was implemented in violation of
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM) requirements.
This failure to adhere to the NQAM is a violation of NRC
requirements.
(c) The issuance of Revision 27 to AD-1805 in violation of
NQAM requirements represents a deficiency in quality
programs at Davis Besse'in that the discrepancy leading to
the violation was identified in accordance with approved
practices prior to issuance and appropriate actions to
establish compliance were not taken.
(d) Senior licensee management failed to take action to resolve
a significant policy issue difference between the production
organizatica and the independent quality organization,
despite the fact that the issue had been identified to at
least three cognizant organizations. This represents a
violation of NRC corrective action requirements and, more
importantly, points to a weakness in management performance,
b. Concern No. 2
Documentation of S&P supervisory direction to process Revision 27 to
AD-1805 without qAD approval was taken from the alleger by site
se',urity when the alleger was escorted from the site.
(1) Findings: The alleger was escorted from the site on May 16,
1987, and the subject document was taken by security. During
this inspection, a copy of this document was provided by the
Davis Besse Ombudsman to the inspector. It is conmon practice
for licensee organizations to recover licensee documents from
individuals removed from the site. NRC regulations do not
prohibit this.
(2) Conclusions: The concern was substantiated; however, there was
no regulatory issue involved. The alleger's implication of
attempted coverup was not substantiated, as the subject document
was readily produced by the licensee,
c. Concern No. 3
Starting January 15, 1987, new revisions to procedures were not
entered on the T&PI as required.
(1) Findings: As noted above, the T&PI was an information-only
document and not subject to Quality Assurance Program controls.
l Notwithstanding, the inspection disclosed that during this time
l period, the responsibility for the T&PI was transferred from the
l
SRB Clerk to DC and then to S&P, new computer systems were
installed to track the T&PI, and DC was issuing new procedure
manual indexes for site manuals. These changes were not
proceduralized until Revision 27 to AD-1805 was issued, with
the result that lines of responsibility were not clearly defined,
l
6
! . _ . - _ - . .
.__ ___-________ _-___ -
.
_
.
Some omissions to the T&PI did occur; however, a licensee audit
in-March-April 1987 identified these, and necessary corrections
were made.
(2) Conclusions: .The inspection substantiated that omis; ions
occurred in the T&PI; however, interviews indicated that the
problem had been identified by the licensee prior to the
alleger's employment and that necessary corrective actions were
in progress. Additionally, this issue is not a regulatory
concern,
d. Concern No. 4 ,
Inaccurate information was provided by S&P to management for reports
on the status of assigned tasks.
(1) Findings: Personnel interviewed denied that this occurred.
No written evidence could be found con.erning this issue.
(2) Conclusions: This concern could not be substantiated. The
alleged inaccurate information does not address regulatory or
safety issues. Additionally, the alleger stated he was not aware
of any problems with either associated records or records
alterations.
e. Concern No. 5
An S&P supervisor directed the S&P staff to delay updating the
computer data base used to track the procedure numbering system. The
alleger was discouraged from bringing concerns to S&P and other
management, and, when the alleger did discuss the situation with an
S&P manager, was "chewed out."
(1) Findings: During the time frame in question, in an effort
at more clearly establishing lines of responsibility, site
management assigned S&P to issue, track, and revise indexes of
procedure numbers. The responsibility for issuing naw procedure
indexes was later returned to DC. During this period an S&P
supervisor purportedly was heard to comment that "if S&P doesn't
do a good job on issuing procedure indexes, maybe DC will take
the responsibility back". The supervisor denied having made this
statement when confronted with it but did attribute the comment
to the S&P Manager. Based on interviews with the alleger and
several co-workers, the computer data base was updated regularly
in spite of the perceived direction to the contrary from
'
management.
l
Interviews with S&P supervisors and managers ano the alleger
disclosed that S&P management did approach the alleger to
discuss this issue after he brought it to the attention of his
! supervisor.
l
l 7
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- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
..
!
(2) Conclusions: The concern that S&P management made statements
that the S&P staff could interpret as direction to delay computer
data base updates was substantiated. Notwithstanding, S&P did
maintain the data base. In addition, S&P management made itself
available to the alleger to discuss his concerns. Thus, the
second portion of this concern was not substantiated.
f. Concern No. 6
The rules * a not adhered to as illustrated by the following
examples:
-
Improper processing of Procedure AD-1805.
- The alleger was directed to not properly update the procedure
numbering system.
- The alleger was directed to deviate from the established
procedure for updating the Test and Procedure Index.
- Security wasn't infonned that the alleger was fired on May 15,
1987; thus, it allowed him to come onsite on May 16, 1987.
(1) Findings- The inspector reviewed the first three items above
.
in conjunction with inspection of other concerns. See previous
discussion in this report.
The inspector's review of the last item determined that the
alleger was not fired on May 15, 1987. The alleger was
repeatedly instructed by supervision not to come to work on
Saturday, May 16, 1987. The alleger disobeyed the directive and
came in to do additional work. After purportedly disrupting
work in DC he was asked tn leave the site. At that time,
termination proceedings were initiated by the alleger's
supervisor and site access privileges were denied.
(2) Conclusions: The conclusion:; regarding the first three items
are discussed above and within this report. The last item was
not substantiated.
g. Concern No. 7
Insufficient time was expended on the development of a new
maintenance procedure for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
Had the procedure been developed earlier, two previous failures would
not have occurred. Also, the plant was inappropriately allowed to
operate with the pump out of service.
(1) Findings: The inspector datermined that the motor-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump failed to operate twice, as stated by
the alleger.
8
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
..
Following the June 1985 loss of feedwater event, the licensee
initiated steps to install a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater
pump to supplement the two existing steam-driven auxiliary
feedwater pumps. Installation of this new pump was completed
_
on January 10, 1986, without a maintenance procedure in place.
On January 4, 1987, the ticensee issued the pump vendcr's manual
with a licensee-cover sheet as an approved maintenance procedure.
Subsequent to the May 10, 1987 second failure, a licensee
maintenance procedure was issued on May 13, 1987. This procedure
was in the review cycle at the t!me of the May 10, 1987, failure.
Interviews indicated that the procedure issuance was expedited
after the event.
The first "failure" (January 11,1986) was not, in fact, a
failure. Rather, the control room operator became worried when
the pump apparently did not start when he initiated the starting
circuit. The plant at the time was In Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.
Had the operator been properly trained on a new modification,
he would have known that there was a 12-to 16-second time delay
in the starting circuit to permit the bearing oil pump to
develop normal oil pressure. This prelubrication is necessary
before starting the main electrical motor.
The second "failure" (May 10,1987) of the motor-driven
auxiliary feed water pump also occurred while the unit was in
cold shutdown. This failure occurred while operators were
performing a valve lineup in preparation for placing the steam
generators into wet layup and was also due to operator error.
In this instance, an operator mistakenly shut a pump suction
valve and caused the pump to seize. The pump was subsequently
repaired and is presently operational.
(2) Conclusions: The staff determined that the alleger was not
Enowledgerile about the Davis-Besse auxiliary feedwater system.
A maintenance procedura would not have prevented the problems
involving the new motor-driven pump, as the problems were in no
way related to maintenance. Finally, the plant was not allowed
to operate while the pump was not operational.
h. Concern No. 8
s Starting the plant nad a higher priority than quality. The alleger
presented no specific information to support this concern, and
indicated it was only an opinion based on "gut instinct" and information
ebtained from co-workers.
(1) Findings: The alleger's concern is based on hearsay information
obtained from conversations with co-workers. The alleger had no
first-hand knowledge of any startup irregularities, since the
plant was either at full power or being taken off-line for a
planned extended maintenance outage during his employment.
9
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_
.
.
The inspector's review indicated that the alleger's concerns
regardir;g startup were based or. his understanding of the June 9,
1985 event. After the event, Toledo Edison provided a
Course-of-Action Plan to the NRC to improve the performance at
the plant. The plan was designed to resolve NRC concerns and
'
provide assurance that no undue risk to the health and safety
of the public would result from the resumption of power
generation. The NRC independently reviewed the status of the
actions required to be completed prior to restart and concluded
that licensee commitments had been satisfied, that necessary
plant systems were tested prior to use, and that the plant was
ready for power operations. Additionally, the NRC provided
24-hour :nspection coverage during the initial plant restart
operation to ensure a safe plant startup and noted no instances
in which quality was sacrificed to satisfy schedular
requirements.
(2) Conclusions: Based on the extensive NRC reviews and inspection
activity that went into the Davis-Besse restart after the long
outage, the inspector could find no basis for this concern,
i. Concern No. 9 The Temporary Procedure Modifications (T-Mods) Log may
not have been kept up to date after the alleger's termination. There
is also no one onsite with knowledge of how T-Mods are incorporated
into specification revisions.
(1) Findings: T-mods are temporary procedure changes. Currently,
they are called temporary approvals (TAs). Along with the name
change, the responsible group for processing these changes
changed from the Station Review Board (SRB) Clerk to Document
Control (DC) to S&P. These changes occurred in 1986.
The mechanism to handle these changes was generally described in
l site Procedure AD-1805, Revision 25. Up to April 7, 1986, the -
l SRB Clerk issued T-Mod numbers. These modifications were
l sequentially numbered after final approval of the changes by the
Plant Manager. The Clerk logged each approved modification in a
log book on her desk. The numbers were also entered into the old
PRIME compui.er system. The Clerk would then forward the procedure
change package to DC for processing. These T-Mods remained open
until a new revision to the affected procedure was issued which
incorporated the T-Mod. The SRB Clerk would then close the
T-Mod. Some T-Mods are still open today.
Revision 26 to Procedure AD-1805, dated April 7, 1986, changed
this mechanism and required that DC now issue the modification
numbers and keep the log of the new TAs. Since the procedure
wasn't very explicit, DC issued TAs without numbers. If the
TA was not incorporated into a procedure change within the
allowable 14 day timeframe, it ws voided. DC had made up
a separate control log book of 1.nese TAs. It was in the
process of computerizing this tracking system duririg the time
of the alleger's employment.
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Concurrently, Systems and Procedures (S&P) was in the process-
of taking over the T-Mod Log from the SRB Clerk and the TA Log
from Document Control. A new computer system (VAX) was to be
used by S&P to do this.. However, as it wasn't fully operational,
the numbers had to be entered into the old PRIME computer system
to ensure that no data was lost.
It wasn't until Revision 27 to AD-1805 was implemented that a
detailed TA numbering system was initiated. The first TA number
was issued on May 20, 1987.
In view of the transition which took place during the alleger's
term of employment the inspector could understand why the
alleger was concerned. This system as described was in fact
confusing. When the alleger left the site, the transition was
still in progress. After the alleger's termination, the
individuals in DC and S&P who originally had these assignments
kept the logs up to date. Subsequently, a Toledo Edison
employee was given the full-time assignment to keep the T-Mods
and TAs up to date.
(2) Conclusions: The concern was not substantiated.
J. Concer_n No. 10
Security did not remove the parking sticker from the alleger's car
when the alleger was terminated.
(1) Findings: The staff determined that Davis-Besse parking
stickers only allow one to park in the owner-controlled
parking areas outside of the protected area. NRC security
authority begins at the fence of the protected area.
(2) Conclusions: The explanation of this concern was discussed
with the alleger during the November 10, 1987 interview. The
alleger acknowledged that the NRC's jurisdiction doesn't extend
to the owner-controlled area rnd stated that no further action
was required,
k. Concern No. 11
The Ombudsman's Report No. 39 response on the alleger's concerns has
questionable independence and accuracy. The Ombudsman did not
properly record the alleger's concerns. The Ombudsman should have
informed the alleger of the Whistle-Blowers Act.
(1) Findings: The Ombudsman Program at Davis-Besse is a licensee
initiated program designed to provide an additional forum for
employees to express concerns about activities and events. It
has no regulatory basis. The program does not require that
investigations of concerns be independent of the focus of the
concerns, although that would be the ideal condition.
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The program does require that the concerns of individuals be
directed to a responsible Nuclear Group Director for
investigation and resolution. Based on inspector review, the
alleger's concerns were directed to the appropriate level of
management. After discussions with cognizant individuals
onsite, it appears that the resolution of Ombudsman's Report
No. 39 was not done by an independent source. The prime author
of the report was the alleger's second-level supervisor.
Based on the inspector's review of this concern, the following
observations were made:
1. Several sessions between the NRC and the alleger were
required to obtain a full characterization of the alleger's
concerns. The concerns listed in the report appear to be a
reasonable approxiination of the concerns expressed to the
NRC. No evidence of coverup or deliberate
misrepresentation was discovered.
ii. The responses made to the Ombudsman Report were not based
on an in-depth, comprehensive independent effort, with the
result that definitive answers were not provided to the
alleger by the licensee.
With regard to the Whistle-Blowers Act, the inspector determined
that the licensee is in compliance with NRC regulations, Part 19
of 10 CFR, which require that each licensee post current copies
of Form NRC-3, which states that if an employee believes he has been
discriminated against for talking to the NRC, the employee may
file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor within 30 days
of the occurrence. The inspector determined that the alleger was
required to take site training on the Ombudsman's program as well
as on Part 19 and did pass a written test on this subject.
(2) , Conclusions: The first portion of the alleger's concern was
substantiated. The second portion of the concern was not
l, substantiated in that the Ombudsman reasonably characterized the
l alleger's concerns. With regard to the Whistle-Blowers Act, the
inspector concluded that the olleger was made aware of the
provisions of the Act via mechanisms other than the Ombudsman
Program and that these mechanisms satisfy existing regulatory
requirements.
l. Concern No. 12
l The alleger has been "blackballed" from future employment at
j Davis-Besse as a result of going to the NRC with concerns about the
plant. The company also intentionally led the alleger on with
promises of future employment for the sole purpose of eclipsing the
30-day statute of limitations that the Department of Labor has for
investigating allegations of discrimination.
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(1) Findings: NRC regulations prohibit discrimination against
current employees for engaging in certain protected activities.
One protected activity is providing the Commission information
about possible violations of NRC requirements. The alleger
provided the NRC with information about the plant; however, this
was after his employment was terminated and after the alleger
had been placed on the Denied Access List.
An employee who believes that he has been discriminated against
may seek a remedy for the discrimination through an administrative
proceeding of the Department of Labor. This proceeding must be
initiated within 30 days after the alleged violation occurs. The
alleger stated that he did go to the Department of Labor; however,
he contacted it well after 30 days from being discharged. Thus,
the Department of Labor dismissed the case based on the fact that
the 30 days had expired.
Nevertheless, from interviews with personnel involved with the
alleger onsite and from reviewing documents onsite, there are
indications that the I&C Department wanted to hire the alleger
after he was escorted offsite May 16, 1987. In fact, it appears
that it was attempting to do so only to find out that the
alleger was on the Plant Denied Access List. Thus, the alleger
couldn't have been hired even if a position was open.
The staff could only find that individuals onsite probably
informed the alleger that they would attempt to obtain other
site employment in some other group. Co-workers attempted
to obtain employment for the alleger in their group. In fact,
the alleger was told privately that if a position opened up,
an offer would be made; however, a position never opened up.
(2) Conclusions: The first portion of the concern was not
substantiated in that, based on discussions with cognizant
personnel, the alleger did not bring concerns to the NRC until
after termination proceedings were completed. Regarding the
second portion, no positive evidence could be found that the
alleger was led to believe, by the Company, that there would be
a future job at Davis-Besse. There is evidence that individuals
attempted to hire him, but failed.
3. Exit Interview
During a conference call / telephonic exit interview with licensee
representatives identified in paragraph 1, the inspector sumarized the
scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of
this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did
not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection
could be considered proprietary in nature.
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