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| number = ML100740388
| number = ML100740388
| issue date = 03/18/2010
| issue date = 03/18/2010
| title = 03/03/2010 Summary of Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company to Discuss Digital Upgrade and Eagle-21 Portion of Reactor Trip System at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. ME1778 and ME1779)
| title = Summary of Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company to Discuss Digital Upgrade and Eagle-21 Portion of Reactor Trip System at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
| author name = Wang A
| author name = Wang A
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 18, 2010 LICENSEE:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March   18, 2010 LICENSEE:       Pacific Gas and Electric Company FACILITY:       Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 SUB~IECT:     
Pacific Gas and Electric Company FACILITY:
Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
OF MARCH 3, 2010, MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO DISCUSS DIGITAL UPGRADE AT DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. ME1778 AND ME1779) On March 3, 2010, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Commission (NRC) and representatives of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, licensee) at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint l\Iorth, 11555 Rockville
OF MARCH 3, 2010, MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO DISCUSS DIGITAL UPGRADE AT DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. ME1778 AND ME1779)
: Pike, Maryland.
On March 3, 2010, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, the licensee) at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint l\Iorth, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. This was the second meeting held to discuss the digital upgrade of the reactor trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). PG&E discussed the architecture that PG&E will propose to the NRC for the replacement of the Eagle 21 portion of the DCPP process protection system. A list of attendees is enclosed.
This was the second meeting held to discuss the digital upgrade of the reactor system and the engineered safety features actuation system at the Diablo Canyon Power (DCPP). PG&E discussed the architecture that PG&E will propose to the NRC for replacement of the Eagle 21 portion of the DCPP process protection system. A list of is At the meeting, the licensee presented meeting slides entitled, "Diablo Canyon Power Process Protection System Replacement," dated March 3, 2010, which are available in Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession ML100690392.
At the meeting, the licensee presented meeting slides entitled, "Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Process Protection System Replacement," dated March 3, 2010, which are available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML100690392. A summary of the items discussed at the meeting is provided below:
A summary of the items discussed at the meeting is provided Scope PG&E provided clarification of the scope of the proposed upgrade. The existing Eagle 21 system which provides trip status and parameter input signals to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), which in turn performs the reactor trip and engineered safety feature actuation functions is to be replaced with a combination Tricon Triconex (software-based computer system) and CS Innovations Advanced Logic Systems (ALS) (field programmable gate array or FPGA-based) system. The licensee plans to retain the analog SSPS protection system for now. Therefore, the proposed modification is a partial reactor protection system upgrade that does not include the voter functionality which will continue to be performed by the SSPS system. Diversity The proposed design includes the use of the ALS FPGA technology for those safety functions that currently require manual operator actions (MOAs) in the event of a software common-cause failure. DCPP stated that the new system will rely on the built-in diversity capability of the ALS in order to eliminate the need for MOAs. As such, it will be necessary for the license amendment request (LAR) to reference the ALS topical report (TR) in order to credit its built-in diversity features.
Scope PG&E provided clarification of the scope of the proposed upgrade. The existing Eagle 21 system which provides trip status and parameter input signals to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), which in turn performs the reactor trip and engineered safety feature actuation functions is to be replaced with a combination Tricon Triconex (software-based computer system) and CS Innovations Advanced Logic Systems (ALS) (field programmable gate array or FPGA-based) system. The licensee plans to retain the analog SSPS protection system for now.
This TR is scheduled to be submitted to the NRC for a safety evaluation later this year. The signals requiring diversity include containment pressure, reactor coolant system
Therefore, the proposed modification is a partial reactor protection system upgrade that does not include the voter functionality which will continue to be performed by the SSPS system.
-2 flow, and pressurizer pressure.
Diversity The proposed design includes the use of the ALS FPGA technology for those safety functions that currently require manual operator actions (MOAs) in the event of a software common-cause failure. DCPP stated that the new system will rely on the built-in diversity capability of the ALS in order to eliminate the need for MOAs. As such, it will be necessary for the license amendment request (LAR) to reference the ALS topical report (TR) in order to credit its built-in diversity features. This TR is scheduled to be submitted to the NRC for a safety evaluation later this year. The signals requiring diversity include containment pressure, reactor coolant system
The safety actuations requiring this diversity are containment spray, safety injection, and reactor trip. Cross-Divisional Communications The licensee stated that the proposed design will not include cross-divisional communication links. The DCPP design is maintaining communication independence between safety divisions.
 
Also, because there is no voter function in the proposed design, there will be no requirement for interdivisional communications.
                                                -2 flow, and pressurizer pressure. The safety actuations requiring this diversity are containment spray, safety injection, and reactor trip.
This is expected to simplify the review process. Non-Safety Related Maintenance Terminal The DCPP design will have non-safety-related (NSR) maintenance terminals connected to the safety system at all times. There will be a separate maintenance terminal for each of the four divisions.
Cross-Divisional Communications The licensee stated that the proposed design will not include cross-divisional communication links. The DCPP design is maintaining communication independence between safety divisions.
Each of the proposed maintenance terminals will serve as the interface for both the Tricon system and the ALS system for the associated division.
Also, because there is no voter function in the proposed design, there will be no requirement for interdivisional communications. This is expected to simplify the review process.
Safety-related to NSR One-Way Communications The proposed design includes a communications link to the existing Process Plant Computer (PPC) system. The licensee stated that this was to be a one-way communications pathway from the safety-related system to the PPC. The licensee also stated that to enforce this, one or more port aggregator devices, similar to devices previously approved for communication isolation, will be included in this design. Class I to Class II Boundary The proposed design also includes a fiber optic communication link from the Class I Tricon to a Class II Tricon Remote Chassis. This remote chassis will be classified as NSR and the communications link would be reviewed in a manner similar to the safety-related to NSR PPC links described above. This is a two-way communications link and the design details of this link including protocols, communication architecture, and communication software controls would be subject to a detailed evaluation by the NRC staff. Software Development PG&E stated the initial software development will be performed by the vendor Invensys.
Non-Safety Related Maintenance Terminal The DCPP design will have non-safety-related (NSR) maintenance terminals connected to the safety system at all times. There will be a separate maintenance terminal for each of the four divisions. Each of the proposed maintenance terminals will serve as the interface for both the Tricon system and the ALS system for the associated division.
Upon turnover of the system to the licensee for operation, either PG&E or Invensys will perform the activities associated with software maintenance and operation.
Safety-related to NSR One-Way Communications The proposed design includes a communications link to the existing Process Plant Computer (PPC) system. The licensee stated that this was to be a one-way communications pathway from the safety-related system to the PPC. The licensee also stated that to enforce this, one or more port aggregator devices, similar to devices previously approved for communication isolation, will be included in this design.
The NRC staff informed the licensee that because of this approach, the review would include an assessment of the licensee's software control programs, as well as coordination activities that would be necessary for both parties to maintain consistent configuration control over the systems software components.
Class I to Class II Boundary The proposed design also includes a fiber optic communication link from the Class I Tricon to a Class II Tricon Remote Chassis. This remote chassis will be classified as NSR and the communications link would be reviewed in a manner similar to the safety-related to NSR PPC links described above. This is a two-way communications link and the design details of this link including protocols, communication architecture, and communication software controls would be subject to a detailed evaluation by the NRC staff.
-3 Security PG&E presented slides containing material covering both the security guidance addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and the cyber security regulation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks." While the 10 CFR 73.54 regulation will ultimately be important for the utility to address, compliance to the regulation will not be included under the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing review. In addition, the NRC staff stated that the security provisions of RG 1.152 that cover the operational phases (i.e., Regulatory Positions 2.6 -2.9) were expected to be removed in the next revision to the RG. The NRC staff noted that a focus of the Part 50 review would be on protection of the development environment (for both operating system and application software) from introduction of undocumented code, protection of the system's reliable operation from the effects of undesirable behavior of connected systems and protection of the system from unintended access. With regard to TRs that vendors may submit, the NRC staff noted that an essential item for the vendor was demonstration that the development environment was protected.
Software Development PG&E stated the initial software development will be performed by the vendor Invensys. Upon turnover of the system to the licensee for operation, either PG&E or Invensys will perform the activities associated with software maintenance and operation. The NRC staff informed the licensee that because of this approach, the review would include an assessment of the licensee's software control programs, as well as coordination activities that would be necessary for both parties to maintain consistent configuration control over the systems software components.
PG&E stated that it is approximately 20 months behind schedule and that the LAR supporting this change is now scheduled to be submitted in May 2011. The NRC staff noted that the priority for reviews is based on a first-in basis and that other licensees have indicated plans to submit licensing actions for digital upgrades.
 
PG&E stated it plans to submit its depth analyses shortly. The NRC staff reminded PG&E that the NRC will not accept for review any amendment that references an unapproved topical. Members of the public were in attendance, however, no public Meeting Feedback forms were received.
                                                  -3 Security PG&E presented slides containing material covering both the security guidance addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and the cyber security regulation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks." While the 10 CFR 73.54 regulation will ultimately be important for the utility to address, compliance to the regulation will not be included under the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing review. In addition, the NRC staff stated that the security provisions of RG 1.152 that cover the operational phases (i.e., Regulatory Positions 2.6 - 2.9) were expected to be removed in the next revision to the RG. The NRC staff noted that a focus of the Part 50 review would be on protection of the development environment (for both operating system and application software) from introduction of undocumented code, protection of the system's reliable operation from the effects of undesirable behavior of connected systems and protection of the system from unintended access. With regard to TRs that vendors may submit, the NRC staff noted that an essential item for the vendor was demonstration that the development environment was protected.
PG&E stated that it is approximately 20 months behind schedule and that the LAR supporting this change is now scheduled to be submitted in May 2011. The NRC staff noted that the priority for reviews is based on a first-in basis and that other licensees have indicated plans to submit licensing actions for digital upgrades. PG&E stated it plans to submit its defense-in depth analyses shortly. The NRC staff reminded PG&E that the NRC will not accept for review any amendment that references an unapproved topical. Members of the public were in attendance, however, no public Meeting Feedback forms were received.
Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1445, or Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.
Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1445, or Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.
Alan Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-275 and List of cc w/encl: Distribution via LIST OF MARCH 3, 2010, MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NAME J. Hefler B. Haynes S. Zimmerman S. Sykes E. Quinn S. Sorensen C. Vitalbo G. Clefton D. Raleigh K. Schrader S. Patterson R. Stattel W. Kemper A. Wang N.Carte G. Singh T. Mossman S. Wyman DIGITAL UPGRADE OF EAGLE 21 SYSTEM DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 AFFILIATION ALTRAN INVENSYS INVENSYS INVENSYS ALTRAN CS Innovations Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Institute Scientech PG&E PG&E NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC Enclosure
                                                    ~\)-\~
-3 Security PG&E presented slides containing material covering both the security guidance addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and the cyber security regulation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks." While the 10 CFR 73.54 regulation will ultimately be important for the utility to address, compliance to the regulation will not be included under the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing review. In addition, the NRC staff stated that the security provisions of RG 1.152 that cover the operational phases (i.e., Regulatory Positions 2.6 -2.9) were expected to be removed in the next revision to the RG. The NRC staff noted that a focus of the Part 50 review would be on protection of the development environment (for both operating system and application software) from introduction of undocumented code, protection of the system's reliable operation from the effects of undesirable behavior of connected systems and protection of the system from unintended access. With regard to TRs that vendors may submit, the NRC staff noted that an essential item for the vendor was demonstration that the development environment was protected.
Alan Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323
PG&E stated that it is approximately 20 months behind schedule and that the LAR supporting this change is now scheduled to be submitted in May 2011. The NRC staff noted that the priority for reviews is based on a first-in basis and that other licensees have indicated plans to submit licensing actions for digital upgrades.
 
PG&E stated it plans to submit its depth analyses shortly. The NRC staff reminded PG&E that the NRC will not accept for review any amendment that references an unapproved topical. Members of the public were in attendance, however, no public Meeting Feedback forms were received.
==Enclosure:==
 
List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
 
LIST OF ATTENDEES MARCH 3, 2010, MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (PG&E)
DIGITAL UPGRADE OF EAGLE 21 SYSTEM DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 NAME                           AFFILIATION J. Hefler                     ALTRAN B. Haynes                     INVENSYS S. Zimmerman                   INVENSYS S. Sykes                       INVENSYS E. Quinn                       ALTRAN S. Sorensen                   CS Innovations C. Vitalbo                     Westinghouse G. Clefton                     Nuclear Energy Institute D. Raleigh                     Scientech K. Schrader                   PG&E S. Patterson                   PG&E R. Stattel                     NRC W. Kemper                     NRC A. Wang                       NRC N.Carte                       NRC G. Singh                       NRC T. Mossman                     NRC S. Wyman                       NRC Enclosure
 
                                                        -3 Security PG&E presented slides containing material covering both the security guidance addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and the cyber security regulation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks." While the 10 CFR 73.54 regulation will ultimately be important for the utility to address, compliance to the regulation will not be included under the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing review. In addition, the NRC staff stated that the security provisions of RG 1.152 that cover the operational phases (i.e., Regulatory Positions 2.6 - 2.9) were expected to be removed in the next revision to the RG. The NRC staff noted that a focus of the Part 50 review would be on protection of the development environment (for both operating system and application software) from introduction of undocumented code, protection of the system's reliable operation from the effects of undesirable behavior of connected systems and protection of the system from unintended access. With regard to TRs that vendors may submit, the NRC staff noted that an essential item for the vendor was demonstration that the development environment was protected.
PG&E stated that it is approximately 20 months behind schedule and that the LAR supporting this change is now scheduled to be submitted in May 2011. The NRC staff noted that the priority for reviews is based on a first-in basis and that other licensees have indicated plans to submit licensing actions for digital upgrades. PG&E stated it plans to submit its defense-in depth analyses shortly. The NRC staff reminded PG&E that the NRC will not accept for review any amendment that references an unapproved topical. Members of the public were in attendance, however, no public Meeting Feedback forms were received.
Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1445, or Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.
Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1445, or Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.
IRA! Alan Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-275 and List of cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
IRA!
PUBLIC RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource GSingh, NRRlDE/EICB RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource RidsOgcRp Resource TMossman, NRRlDE/EICB RidsNrrDeEicb Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource SWyman, NRRlDE/EICB RidsNrrDorlLpl4 Resource NCarte, NRRIDE/EICB CSteger, NRR RidsNrrPMDiabloCanyon Resource RStattel, NRRIDE/EICB L Trocine, EDO RIV ADAMS Accession Nos. Meetino Notice ML09209415, Meeting Summary ML100740388, Handouts ML092440508 OFFICE NRRlLPL4/PM NRRlLPL4/LA NRRlLPL4/BC NRRlLPL4/PM NAME AWang JBurkhardt MMarkley AWang DATE 3/17/10 3/16/10 3/17/10 3/18/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy}}
Alan Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323
 
==Enclosure:==
 
List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC                                 RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource         GSingh, NRRlDE/EICB RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource         RidsOgcRp Resource                   TMossman, NRRlDE/EICB RidsNrrDeEicb Resource                 RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource         SWyman, NRRlDE/EICB RidsNrrDorlLpl4 Resource               NCarte, NRRIDE/EICB                 CSteger, NRR RidsNrrPMDiabloCanyon Resource         RStattel, NRRIDE/EICB               LTrocine, EDO RIV ADAMS Accession Nos. Meetino Notice ML09209415, Meeting Summary ML100740388, Handouts ML092440508 OFFICE       NRRlLPL4/PM             NRRlLPL4/LA               NRRlLPL4/BC             NRRlLPL4/PM NAME         AWang                   JBurkhardt                 MMarkley               AWang DATE         3/17/10                 3/16/10                   3/17/10                 3/18/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy}}

Latest revision as of 19:16, 21 March 2020

Summary of Meeting with Pacific Gas and Electric Company to Discuss Digital Upgrade and Eagle-21 Portion of Reactor Trip System at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
ML100740388
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/18/2010
From: Wang A
Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:
Wang, A B, NRR/DORL/LPLIV, 415-1445
References
TAC ME1778, TAC ME1779
Download: ML100740388 (5)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 18, 2010 LICENSEE: Pacific Gas and Electric Company FACILITY: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 SUB~IECT:

SUMMARY

OF MARCH 3, 2010, MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO DISCUSS DIGITAL UPGRADE AT DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. ME1778 AND ME1779)

On March 3, 2010, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, the licensee) at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint l\Iorth, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. This was the second meeting held to discuss the digital upgrade of the reactor trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). PG&E discussed the architecture that PG&E will propose to the NRC for the replacement of the Eagle 21 portion of the DCPP process protection system. A list of attendees is enclosed.

At the meeting, the licensee presented meeting slides entitled, "Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Process Protection System Replacement," dated March 3, 2010, which are available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML100690392. A summary of the items discussed at the meeting is provided below:

Scope PG&E provided clarification of the scope of the proposed upgrade. The existing Eagle 21 system which provides trip status and parameter input signals to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), which in turn performs the reactor trip and engineered safety feature actuation functions is to be replaced with a combination Tricon Triconex (software-based computer system) and CS Innovations Advanced Logic Systems (ALS) (field programmable gate array or FPGA-based) system. The licensee plans to retain the analog SSPS protection system for now.

Therefore, the proposed modification is a partial reactor protection system upgrade that does not include the voter functionality which will continue to be performed by the SSPS system.

Diversity The proposed design includes the use of the ALS FPGA technology for those safety functions that currently require manual operator actions (MOAs) in the event of a software common-cause failure. DCPP stated that the new system will rely on the built-in diversity capability of the ALS in order to eliminate the need for MOAs. As such, it will be necessary for the license amendment request (LAR) to reference the ALS topical report (TR) in order to credit its built-in diversity features. This TR is scheduled to be submitted to the NRC for a safety evaluation later this year. The signals requiring diversity include containment pressure, reactor coolant system

-2 flow, and pressurizer pressure. The safety actuations requiring this diversity are containment spray, safety injection, and reactor trip.

Cross-Divisional Communications The licensee stated that the proposed design will not include cross-divisional communication links. The DCPP design is maintaining communication independence between safety divisions.

Also, because there is no voter function in the proposed design, there will be no requirement for interdivisional communications. This is expected to simplify the review process.

Non-Safety Related Maintenance Terminal The DCPP design will have non-safety-related (NSR) maintenance terminals connected to the safety system at all times. There will be a separate maintenance terminal for each of the four divisions. Each of the proposed maintenance terminals will serve as the interface for both the Tricon system and the ALS system for the associated division.

Safety-related to NSR One-Way Communications The proposed design includes a communications link to the existing Process Plant Computer (PPC) system. The licensee stated that this was to be a one-way communications pathway from the safety-related system to the PPC. The licensee also stated that to enforce this, one or more port aggregator devices, similar to devices previously approved for communication isolation, will be included in this design.

Class I to Class II Boundary The proposed design also includes a fiber optic communication link from the Class I Tricon to a Class II Tricon Remote Chassis. This remote chassis will be classified as NSR and the communications link would be reviewed in a manner similar to the safety-related to NSR PPC links described above. This is a two-way communications link and the design details of this link including protocols, communication architecture, and communication software controls would be subject to a detailed evaluation by the NRC staff.

Software Development PG&E stated the initial software development will be performed by the vendor Invensys. Upon turnover of the system to the licensee for operation, either PG&E or Invensys will perform the activities associated with software maintenance and operation. The NRC staff informed the licensee that because of this approach, the review would include an assessment of the licensee's software control programs, as well as coordination activities that would be necessary for both parties to maintain consistent configuration control over the systems software components.

-3 Security PG&E presented slides containing material covering both the security guidance addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and the cyber security regulation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks." While the 10 CFR 73.54 regulation will ultimately be important for the utility to address, compliance to the regulation will not be included under the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing review. In addition, the NRC staff stated that the security provisions of RG 1.152 that cover the operational phases (i.e., Regulatory Positions 2.6 - 2.9) were expected to be removed in the next revision to the RG. The NRC staff noted that a focus of the Part 50 review would be on protection of the development environment (for both operating system and application software) from introduction of undocumented code, protection of the system's reliable operation from the effects of undesirable behavior of connected systems and protection of the system from unintended access. With regard to TRs that vendors may submit, the NRC staff noted that an essential item for the vendor was demonstration that the development environment was protected.

PG&E stated that it is approximately 20 months behind schedule and that the LAR supporting this change is now scheduled to be submitted in May 2011. The NRC staff noted that the priority for reviews is based on a first-in basis and that other licensees have indicated plans to submit licensing actions for digital upgrades. PG&E stated it plans to submit its defense-in depth analyses shortly. The NRC staff reminded PG&E that the NRC will not accept for review any amendment that references an unapproved topical. Members of the public were in attendance, however, no public Meeting Feedback forms were received.

Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1445, or Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.

~\)-\~

Alan Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323

Enclosure:

List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

LIST OF ATTENDEES MARCH 3, 2010, MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (PG&E)

DIGITAL UPGRADE OF EAGLE 21 SYSTEM DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 NAME AFFILIATION J. Hefler ALTRAN B. Haynes INVENSYS S. Zimmerman INVENSYS S. Sykes INVENSYS E. Quinn ALTRAN S. Sorensen CS Innovations C. Vitalbo Westinghouse G. Clefton Nuclear Energy Institute D. Raleigh Scientech K. Schrader PG&E S. Patterson PG&E R. Stattel NRC W. Kemper NRC A. Wang NRC N.Carte NRC G. Singh NRC T. Mossman NRC S. Wyman NRC Enclosure

-3 Security PG&E presented slides containing material covering both the security guidance addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," and the cyber security regulation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 73.54, "Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks." While the 10 CFR 73.54 regulation will ultimately be important for the utility to address, compliance to the regulation will not be included under the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing review. In addition, the NRC staff stated that the security provisions of RG 1.152 that cover the operational phases (i.e., Regulatory Positions 2.6 - 2.9) were expected to be removed in the next revision to the RG. The NRC staff noted that a focus of the Part 50 review would be on protection of the development environment (for both operating system and application software) from introduction of undocumented code, protection of the system's reliable operation from the effects of undesirable behavior of connected systems and protection of the system from unintended access. With regard to TRs that vendors may submit, the NRC staff noted that an essential item for the vendor was demonstration that the development environment was protected.

PG&E stated that it is approximately 20 months behind schedule and that the LAR supporting this change is now scheduled to be submitted in May 2011. The NRC staff noted that the priority for reviews is based on a first-in basis and that other licensees have indicated plans to submit licensing actions for digital upgrades. PG&E stated it plans to submit its defense-in depth analyses shortly. The NRC staff reminded PG&E that the NRC will not accept for review any amendment that references an unapproved topical. Members of the public were in attendance, however, no public Meeting Feedback forms were received.

Please direct any inquiries to me at 301-415-1445, or Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.

IRA!

Alan Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323

Enclosure:

List of Attendees cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource GSingh, NRRlDE/EICB RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource RidsOgcRp Resource TMossman, NRRlDE/EICB RidsNrrDeEicb Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource SWyman, NRRlDE/EICB RidsNrrDorlLpl4 Resource NCarte, NRRIDE/EICB CSteger, NRR RidsNrrPMDiabloCanyon Resource RStattel, NRRIDE/EICB LTrocine, EDO RIV ADAMS Accession Nos. Meetino Notice ML09209415, Meeting Summary ML100740388, Handouts ML092440508 OFFICE NRRlLPL4/PM NRRlLPL4/LA NRRlLPL4/BC NRRlLPL4/PM NAME AWang JBurkhardt MMarkley AWang DATE 3/17/10 3/16/10 3/17/10 3/18/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy