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| issue date = 03/26/1990
| issue date = 03/26/1990
| title = Responds to NRC 890222 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-17.Corrective Actions:Personnel Verified Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch in Proper Position & Operator Procedure 0-1.1 Changed as Indicated
| title = Responds to NRC 890222 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-17.Corrective Actions:Personnel Verified Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch in Proper Position & Operator Procedure 0-1.1 Changed as Indicated
| author name = MECREDY R C
| author name = Mecredy R
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
| addressee name = RUSSELL W T
| addressee name = Russell W
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| docket = 05000244
| docket = 05000244
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 16
| page count = 16
}}
}}
See also: [[followed by::IR 05000244/1989017]]


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONST$&TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION
ESSION NBR:9004040007             DOC ~ DATE: 90/03/26  NOTARIZED: NO            DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester                 G  05000244 AUTH. NAME            AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.         Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
DEMONST$&TIONSYSTEMREGULATORY
RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT, AFFILIATION RUSSELL,W.T;         Region 1, Ofc of the Director                                                R
INFORMATION
 
DISTRXBUTION
==SUBJECT:==
SYSTEM(RIDS)ESSIONNBR:9004040007
Responds 50-244/89-17.
DOC~DATE:90/03/26NOTARIZED:
to NRC  890222    ltr re violations noted in Insp    Rept DISTRXBUTION CODE: IE01D          COPIES RECEIVED:LTR       ENCL  0  SIZE:
NOFACIL:50-244
TITLE: General     (50  Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Vi lation Response, NOTES:License Exp      date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72)..             05000244,']
RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester
RECIPIENT               COPIES            RECIPIENT          COPIES ID  CODE/NAME            LTTR ENCL      ID  CODE/NAME       LTTR ENCL PD1-3 PD                                JOHNSON,A INTERNAL'EOD                           1          AEOD/DEIIB              1 AEOD/TPAD                   1          DEDRO                  1 NRR SHANKMAN,S               1          NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10        1 NRR/DOEA DIR 11              1          NRR/DREP/PEPB9D        1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11             ,2
GAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION
                                      '1 NRR/DRIS/DIR            1 NRR/DST/DXR 8E2                          NRR/PMAS/ILRB12      l NUDOCS=ABSTRACZ             1          OGC/HDS2                1 REG FIXE'-     ~02~         1          RES MORISSEAU,D        1 RGN1    FILE    01          1 EXTERNAL: LPDR                          1          NRC PDR NSIC                        1 legs p]5 7~                                                                          '-'
MECREDY,R.C.
                                                                                                  .A NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
Rochester
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WAS'ONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME
OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR              23  ENCL
RECIPIENT,
 
AFFILIATION
I
RUSSELL,W.T;
~
Region1,OfcoftheDirectorSUBJECT:RespondstoNRC890222ltrreviolations
 
notedinInspRept50-244/89-17.
f f A'f f~ ff ff      RTC If f,i i  'TAN I
DISTRXBUTION
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION    ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14849-pppg March 26, 1990                      TCKCRHONC ARCA COOK 71K 546 2700 Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region    I 475  Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
 
ENCL0SIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp
==Subject:==
Rept/Notice
Response to Notices of Violation Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-17 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
ofVilationResponse,
 
DOCKET05000244RNOTES:License
==Dear Mr. Russell:==
Expdateinaccordance
 
with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72)..
This    letter is in response to the February 22, 1989 letter from Jon R. Johnson, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3 to Robert E. Smith, Senior Vice President,             RG&E, which transmitted Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-17.               In that report, two violations were identified. The following provides                    a  reply to the violations pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201.
05000244,']
RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATIONS During inspection at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant from December 12, 1989 through January 8, 1990, the following violations were identified and evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C):
RECIPIENT
A. 10  CFR      50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,      and  the Ginna Quality Assurance Manual, Section 16, require prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality including failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.
IDCODE/NAME
Contrary to the above, a safety injection system design deficiency was not promptly identified and corrected when corporate engineering was notified on or before October 20, '989          that failure of the safety injection block/unblock switch could block automatic safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure or low steam line pressure.           Corporate engineering did. not conclude that this problem existed at Ginna until about November 17, 1989, and site technical personnel were not informed about the deficiency until December 19, 1989.
PD1-3PDINTERNAL'EOD
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
AEOD/TPAD
/0040 ">0V07  200 ADOCI''=000:..44 c'OR FDC                            ~
NRRSHANKMAN,S
                                                                ~    Qo
NRR/DOEADIR11NRR/DREP/PRPB11
                                                      ~l"
NRR/DST/DXR
 
8E2NUDOCS=ABSTRACZ
4 B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the Ginna Quality Assurance Manual, Section 5, require activities affecting quality to be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings which include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities        have been  satisfactorily accomplished.
REGFIXE'--~02~RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 1989, maintenance was  performed on a safety-related motor-operated valve in the safety injection system in accordance with a procedure which included an inappropriate torque specification.
LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1111,2'111111RECIPIENT
This  is  a  Severity Level  V violation  (Supplement  I).
IDCODE/NAME
RESPONSE  TO VIOLATION A RG&E  Position on Existence of Violation Rochester    Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) concurs that a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVI occurred.        RG&E recognizes      that communication      between    corporate engineering and site personnel on issues of potential safety significance should be formalized. Our efforts to address this concern are provided in Section 4, "Long Term Enhancements".      As explained below, RG&E also believes that with respect to the issue identified on October 20, 1989, we acted in a manner consistent with the safety
JOHNSON,A
    .significance of the matter.
AEOD/DEIIB
: 2. Reason for Violation As Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-17 (p. 7) indicates, RG&E    received notice on October 20, 1989, from Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) of an apparent generic design deficiency related to the type of safety injection (SI) block/unblock switch used at various Westinghouse reactors.      The Westinghouse letter, dated October 12, 1989, concluded that a "single failure of the switch (Westinghouse OT2) could block either the automatic low pressurizer pressure or the low steamline pressure SI signal in both trains" [emphasis supplied]. The letter also' stated that the probability of switch failure was "10        10 '/yr" :and that, while a design change was recommended, the situation was "not an immediate safety concern."
DEDRONRR/DLPQ/LPEB10
In addition, the Westinghouse letter referred to a Licensee Event Report (LER), No. 88-007-00, submitted by Wisconsin, Electric Power Company (Wisconsin Electric) on September 16, 1988, concerning the same issue at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Point Beach). The Wisconsin Electric LER concluded      that "this condition will not have a significant impact on the health and safety of the general public or the employees of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant."
NRR/DREP/PEPB9D
 
NRR/DRIS/DIR
The LER noted    that the Point  Beach  facility was operating at  100%   capacity  when  the concern  was  identified and that design change would      not'e  made  until the next scheduled outage.
NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
Upon  receipt of the Westinghouse notification on October 20, 1989,   RG&E (corporate) initiated a timely review for applicability to Ginna Station. Based on the Wisconsin Electric LER and on Westinghouse's calculation of the low probability of switch failure,       it  was apparent that the matter did not constitute an immediate safety concern.
OGC/HDS2RESMORISSEAU,D
When  it  was identified that the switch configuration was applicable to Ginna Station, an internal engineering recommendation was made consistent with the guidance of the Westinghouse letter and attached LER, that an EWR be initiated. This was completed on November 17, 1989. This recommendation was then evaluated within Nuclear Safety and Licensing, resulting in a discussion with site technical support personnel relative to this situation on December 19, 1989.           On December    20, site personnel initiated a Ginna Station Event Report per Procedure A-25.1 (Event No. 89-168). The event report indicated that the site Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) had, on December 20, 1989, concluded that plant operation could continue for the following reasons:
NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111l11legsp]57~'-'.ANOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
very low    (i.e., 10 'o
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWAS'ONTACT
: 1. Westinghouse stated that the. probability of failure was 10 '/yr);
THEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE
: 2. Emergency Operating Procedures directed Operators to use manual SI initiation where indicators show automatic initiation has failed;
YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION
: 3. A  separate  automatic  SI  initiating  mechanism would activate when containment pressure reached 4 psig;
LISTSFORDOCUMENTS
: 4. During depressurization, a bistable light will'lert operators of a blocked SI signal; and
YOUDON'TNEED!OTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
: 5. Visual verification of the SI switch plunger position indicates that the contacts are in the proper position.
LTTR23ENCL
The violation states that the time between October 20, 1989, when RG&E (corporate) was notified by Westinghouse, and the communication of this information to the site technical staff on December 19, 1989, shows that the SI design deficiency was not promptly identified and corrected, and indicates problems in communication between corporate engineering and site personnel. While RG&E does not deny this violation, we believe that the actions taken by RG&E were appropriate in view of RG&E's preliminary conclusion that the issue did not constitute an immediate safety concern.
I~
 
ROCHESTER
RG&E  believes that Appendix B, Criterion XVI does not establish a precise time limit for resolution of safety issues.       Rather, issues      such as "promptness"     or "timeliness" are subjective matters that inherently depend upon the safety significance of the situation. Given that RGGE had a documented      recommendation from Westinghouse that no immediate safety concern existed (as corroborated by the Point Beach LER), its actions toward resolution of the issue were prompt and timely.                   Any other interpretations of Criterion XVI would be counter to public health and safety because it would require licensees to treat all deficiencies or non-conforming items the same (i.e., regardless of safety significance).
GASffA'ff~ffffRTCIff,ii'TANIANDELECTRICCORPORATION
This same basic philosophy was affirmed in an analogous context 'in recent guidance issued by NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation '(NRR). Specifically, on July 19, 1989, Dr. T.E. Murley, Director, NRC/NRR, sent a memorandum to all of the regional administrators entitled "Guidance on Action To Be Taken Following Discovery of Potentially Nonconforming Equipment." In his memorandum, Dr. Murley stated that "[t]here is no generally appropriate timeframe in which operability determinations should be made."         For equipment which is "clearly inoperable," an immediate declaration of inoperability should      be  made    and    the    appropriate    technical specifications followed. However, Dr. Murley's memorandum contrasts this situation with those where equipment nonconformances simply raise the issue of operability.
~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,
In such situations Dr. Murley states that:
N.Y.14849-pppg
operability determinations should be made by licensees as soon as racticable, and in a timeframe commensurate with the a licable e ui ment's im ortance to safet        usin the best information available,(e.g., analyses, a test or partial test,         experience with operating events, engineering judgement or a combination    of the factors)         (emphasis supplied).
March26,1990TCKCRHONC
Although this guidance relates to timing of operability determinations,   it is equally appropriate with respect to resolution of open items under Criterion XVI. Consistent with this philosophy and based on the best information available, future cases of this type will be resolved "as soon as practicable" and in a time commensurate with the safety significance of the matter. Communication between corporate and site personnel will be initiated promptly once applicability to Ginna Station is determined.
ARCACOOK71K5462700Mr.WilliamT.RussellRegionalAdministrator
Corrective Ste s Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved Corporate and site technical staff and the PORC have reviewed the circumstances surrounding the potentially generic design deficiency related to the control room SI block/unblock switch.         As stated in LER 89-016, the.
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
following actions were taken:
Commission
 
RegionI475Allendale
Knowledgeable personnel inspected the plunger  position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch and verified    that the switch contacts were in the proper position.
RoadKingofPrussia,Pennsylvania
  ~   Operating   Procedure 0-1.1 (Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown) was changed to add the following note and check-off to Step 5.11.6:
19406Subject:ResponsetoNoticesofViolation
NOTE:   Prior to placing the SI Block/Unblock Switch to the normal position, station an operator inside the MCB in direct observation of the SI Block/Unblock Switch to observe that both plunger tips are recessed inward after the switch is placed. to normal position.-
Inspection
Block switch plunger t'ips position inward
ReportNo.50-244/89-17
  ~   An RG&E operator aid tag was placed on the .MCB adjacent to the SI Block/Unblock Switch denoting the note- from 0-1.1.
R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Russell:ThisletterisinresponsetotheFebruary22,1989letterfromJonR.Johnson,Chief,ProjectsBranchNo.3toRobertE.Smith,SeniorVicePresident,
  ~   An RG&E operator aid tag was also placed inside the MCB adj acent    to the rear of the SI Block/Unblock Switch stating the following: This is the switch we verify that the plunger's tips are recessed inward when the switch is placed to normal (labeled LAK) .
RG&E,whichtransmitted
A spare switch of similar design has been placed in the Control Room for the purpose of training the operators to recognize the differences in plunger position.
Inspection
These    actions are considered adequate        to provide reasonable assurance of SI system operability until the situation can be permanently dispositioned. Finally, EWR 5025 was initiated to provide for the installation of independent SI block/unblock switches for each SI train which is planned for the 1991 refueling outage.
ReportNo.50-244/89-17.
: 4. Corrective Ste s Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violation RG&E has recently taken steps        to upgrade the overall corrective action program for Ginna Station. The need for improvements was noted during the course of the RHR System Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI), and is also considered appropriate due to RG&E's initiation of a comprehensive      Configuration Management/Design Basis Program.      We are working with the NUMARC Design Basis Issues Working Group to develop an improved problem identification and resolution program.
Inthatreport,twoviolations
The improved program     will:
wereidentified.
  ~   Improve the process      of identifying, analyzing,   and resolving problems;
Thefollowing
 
providesareplytotheviolations
    ~   Improve the    RG&E internal review process,   including formalized means of communication between corporate engineering and site personnel on issues of potential safety significance; and Part of the implementation of this effort will include specific procedural upgrades,         enhancement   of our corrective action tracking system, and the issuance of a corporate policy which addresses problem identification and reporting.       We believe that this broad effort, when fully implemented, will improve our capability to consistently identify and disposition potential safety issues commensurate with their significance.
pursuantto10CFR2.201.RESTATEMENT
: 5. Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved Long term and short term actions and schedules have been described      above.       Formal  guidance    concerning communication between corporate and site personnel on identified problem issues is under development, and is targeted for completion by July 1990.
OFVIOLATIONS
RESPONSE    TO VIOLATION B Rochester Gas and      Electric concurs with this violation    as stated below.
Duringinspection
Reason  for Violation Rochester Gas and    Electric agrees that, Ginna Station does not have  an established written policy regarding consideration of inherent inaccuracy of calibrated measuring and              test, equipment (M&TE) when developing acceptance criteria.
attheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantfromDecember12,1989throughJanuary8,1990,thefollowing
As- a common    practice, torquing methods address only instru-ment   "indication" and are not meant to include the instrument accuracy. This practice is based on the fact that torque is only a general indicator of bolting pre-load because of the inaccuracies,       e.g.,   lubrication, thread fit, thread condition, etc., inherent in the torque equation.             When highly accurate bolt pre-loading is required, means other than torque is used, i.e., stud elongation to determine bolt pre-load.
violations
The Corrective Ste s Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved Due to the successful completion of post maintenance testing, no action regarding the valve packing adjustment has been taken.
wereidentified
A-1603.4, "Work Order Scheduling" was revised to require work and testing to be completed on individual trains prior to starting maintenance on a redundant train.
andevaluated
 
inaccordance
' The Corrective Ste s Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violation
withtheNRCEnforcement
: 1. Administrative procedure A-1603.3, "Work Order Planning" will be revised to state a Ginna Station policy regarding consideration of M&TE inherent inaccuracy and provide direction for development'f acceptance             criteria utilizi'ng this equipment.
Policy(10CFR2,AppendixC):Contrarytotheabove,asafetyinjection
: 2. A new  procedure  for packing adjustment is being  developed to provide specific direction for adjustment of valves repacked under the Valve Packing Improvement Program and to provide a method of maintaining and updating valve packing data.
systemdesigndeficiency
The Date When Full Com liance    Will Be  Achieved The anticipated effective date  of the above procedures is  May 1, 1990,   for the  maintenance  procedures and June  30, 1990, for the administrative procedure.
wasnotpromptlyidentified
Very  truly yours, Robert C. Me  dy Division  Manager Nuclear Production GJWN093 Enclosures xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission     (original)
andcorrected
Document  Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Allen R. Johnson .(Mail Stop  14D1)
whencorporate
Project Directorate I-3 Washington, D.C. 20555 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
engineering
Bishop, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds 1400 L. Street, N.W.
wasnotifiedonorbeforeOctober20,'989thatfailureofthesafetyinjection
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Ginna  NRC  Senior Resident Inspector
block/unblock
 
switchcouldblockautomatic
~l 0}}
safetyinjection
actuation
onlowpressurizer
pressureorlowsteamlinepressure.
Corporate
engineering
did.notconcludethatthisproblemexistedatGinnauntilaboutNovember17,1989,andsitetechnical
personnel
werenotinformedaboutthedeficiency
untilDecember19,1989.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation
(Supplement
I).~Qo~~l"/0040">0V07200c'ORADOCI''=000:..44
FDCA.10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XVI,andtheGinnaQualityAssurance
Manual,Section16,requirepromptidentification
andcorrection
ofconditions
adversetoqualityincluding
failures,
malfunctions,
deficiencies,
defective
materialandequipment,
andnonconformances.  
4
B.10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
V,andtheGinnaQualityAssurance
Manual,Section5,requireactivities
affecting
quality-tobeaccomplished
inaccordance
withinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawingswhichincludeappropriate
quantitative
orqualitative
acceptance
criteriafordetermining
thatimportant
activities
havebeensatisfactorily
accomplished.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember15,1989,maintenance
wasperformed
onasafety-related
motor-operated
valveinthesafetyinjection
systeminaccordance
withaprocedure
whichincludedaninappropriate
torquespecification.
ThisisaSeverityLevelVviolation
(Supplement
I).RESPONSETOVIOLATION
ARG&EPositiononExistence
ofViolation
Rochester
GasandElectricCorporation
(RG&E)concursthataviolation
ofAppendixB,Criterion
XVIoccurred.
RG&Erecognizes
thatcommunication
betweencorporate
engineering
andsitepersonnel
onissuesofpotential
safetysignificance
shouldbeformalized.
OureffortstoaddressthisconcernareprovidedinSection4,"LongTermEnhancements".
Asexplained
below,RG&Ealsobelievesthatwithrespecttotheissueidentified
onOctober20,1989,weactedinamannerconsistent
withthesafety.significance
ofthematter.2.ReasonforViolation
AsInspection
ReportNo.50-244/89-17
(p.7)indicates,
RG&EreceivednoticeonOctober20,1989,fromWestinghouse
ElectricCorporation
(Westinghouse)
ofanapparentgenericdesigndeficiency
relatedtothetypeofsafetyinjection
(SI)block/unblock
switchusedatvariousWestinghouse
reactors.
TheWestinghouse
letter,datedOctober12,1989,concluded
thata"singlefailureoftheswitch(Westinghouse
OT2)couldblockeithertheautomatic
lowpressurizer
pressureorthelowsteamline
pressureSIsignalinbothtrains"[emphasis
supplied].
Theletteralsostatedthattheprobability
ofswitchfailurewas"10'10'/yr":andthat,whileadesignchangewasrecommended,
thesituation
was"notanimmediate
safetyconcern."
Inaddition,
theWestinghouse
letterreferredtoaLicenseeEventReport(LER),No.88-007-00,
submitted
byWisconsin,
ElectricPowerCompany(Wisconsin
Electric)
onSeptember
16,1988,concerning
thesameissueatthePointBeachNuclearPlant(PointBeach).TheWisconsin
ElectricLERconcluded
that"thiscondition
willnothaveasignificant
impactonthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublicortheemployees
ofthePointBeachNuclearPlant."  
'
TheLERnotedthatthePointBeachfacilitywasoperating
at100%capacitywhentheconcernwasidentified
andthatdesignchangewouldnot'emadeuntilthenextscheduled
outage.UponreceiptoftheWestinghouse
notification
onOctober20,1989,RG&E(corporate)
initiated
atimelyreviewforapplicability
toGinnaStation.BasedontheWisconsin
ElectricLERandonWestinghouse's
calculation
ofthelowprobability
ofswitchfailure,itwasapparentthatthematterdidnotconstitute
animmediate
safetyconcern.Whenitwasidentified
thattheswitchconfiguration
wasapplicable
toGinnaStation,aninternalengineering
recommendation
wasmadeconsistent
withtheguidanceoftheWestinghouse
letterandattachedLER,thatanEWRbeinitiated.
Thiswascompleted
onNovember17,1989.Thisrecommendation
wasthenevaluated
withinNuclearSafetyandLicensing,
resulting
inadiscussion
withsitetechnical
supportpersonnel
relativetothissituation
onDecember19,1989.OnDecember20,sitepersonnel
initiated
aGinnaStationEventReportperProcedure
A-25.1(EventNo.89-168).Theeventreportindicated
thatthesitePlantOperations
ReviewCommittee
(PORC)had,onDecember20,1989,concluded
thatplantoperation
couldcontinueforthefollowing
reasons:1.Westinghouse
statedthatthe.probability
offailurewasverylow(i.e.,10'o10'/yr);2.Emergency
Operating
Procedures
directedOperators
tousemanualSIinitiation
whereindicators
showautomatic
initiation
hasfailed;3.Aseparateautomatic
SIinitiating
mechanism
wouldactivatewhencontainment
pressurereached4psig;4.Duringdepressurization,
abistablelightwill'lert
operators
ofablockedSIsignal;and5.Visualverification
oftheSIswitchplungerpositionindicates
thatthecontactsareintheproperposition.
Theviolation
statesthatthetimebetweenOctober20,1989,whenRG&E(corporate)
wasnotifiedbyWestinghouse,
andthecommunication
ofthisinformation
tothesitetechnical
staffonDecember19,1989,showsthattheSIdesigndeficiency
wasnotpromptlyidentified
andcorrected,
andindicates
problemsincommunication
betweencorporate
engineering
andsitepersonnel.
WhileRG&Edoesnotdenythisviolation,
webelievethattheactionstakenbyRG&Ewereappropriate
inviewofRG&E'spreliminary
conclusion
thattheissuedidnotconstitute
animmediate
safetyconcern.  
RG&EbelievesthatAppendixB,Criterion
XVIdoesnotestablish
aprecisetimelimitforresolution
ofsafetyissues.Rather,issuessuchas"promptness"
or"timeliness"
aresubjective
mattersthatinherently
dependuponthesafetysignificance
ofthesituation.
GiventhatRGGEhadadocumented
recommendation
fromWestinghouse
thatnoimmediate
safetyconcernexisted(ascorroborated
bythePointBeachLER),itsactionstowardresolution
oftheissuewerepromptandtimely.Anyotherinterpretations
ofCriterion
XVIwouldbecountertopublichealthandsafetybecauseitwouldrequirelicensees
totreatalldeficiencies
ornon-conforming
itemsthesame(i.e.,regardless
ofsafetysignificance).
Thissamebasicphilosophy
wasaffirmedinananalogous
context'inrecentguidanceissuedbyNRC'sOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation
'(NRR).Specifically,
onJuly19,1989,Dr.T.E.Murley,Director,
NRC/NRR,sentamemorandum
toalloftheregionaladministrators
entitled"Guidance
onActionToBeTakenFollowing
Discovery
ofPotentially
Nonconforming
Equipment."
Inhismemorandum,
Dr.Murleystatedthat"[t]hereisnogenerally
appropriate
timeframe
inwhichoperability
determinations
shouldbemade."Forequipment
whichis"clearlyinoperable,"
animmediate
declaration
ofinoperability
shouldbemadeandtheappropriate
technical
specifications
followed.
However,Dr.Murley'smemorandum
contrasts
thissituation
withthosewhereequipment
nonconformances
simplyraisetheissueofoperability.
Insuchsituations
Dr.Murleystatesthat:operability
determinations
shouldbemadebylicensees
assoonasracticable,
andinatimeframe
commensurate
withthealicableeuiment'simortancetosafetusinthebestinformation
available,(e.g.,
analyses,
atestorpartialtest,experience
withoperating
events,engineering
judgement
oracombination
ofthefactors)(emphasis
supplied).
Althoughthisguidancerelatestotimingofoperability
determinations,
itisequallyappropriate
withrespecttoresolution
ofopenitemsunderCriterion
XVI.Consistent
withthisphilosophy
andbasedonthebestinformation
available,
futurecasesofthistypewillberesolved"assoonaspracticable"
andinatimecommensurate
withthesafetysignificance
ofthematter.Communication
betweencorporate
andsitepersonnel
willbeinitiated
promptlyonceapplicability
toGinnaStationisdetermined.
Corrective
StesWhichHaveBeenTakenandtheResultsAchievedCorporate
andsitetechnical
staffandthePORChavereviewedthecircumstances
surrounding
thepotentially
genericdesigndeficiency
relatedtothecontrolroomSIblock/unblock
switch.AsstatedinLER89-016,the.following
actionsweretaken:  
Knowledgeable
personnel
inspected
theplungerpositionoftheSIBlock/Unblock
Switchandverifiedthattheswitchcontactswereintheproperposition.
~Operating
Procedure
0-1.1(PlantHeatupFromColdShutdowntoHotShutdown)
waschangedtoaddthefollowing
noteandcheck-off
toStep5.11.6:NOTE:PriortoplacingtheSIBlock/Unblock
Switchtothenormalposition,
stationanoperatorinsidetheMCBindirectobservation
oftheSIBlock/Unblock
Switchtoobservethatbothplungertipsarerecessedinwardaftertheswitchisplaced.tonormalposition.-
Blockswitchplungert'ipspositioninward~AnRG&Eoperatoraidtagwas.placedonthe.MCBadjacenttotheSIBlock/Unblock
Switchdenotingthenote-from0-1.1.~AnRG&EoperatoraidtagwasalsoplacedinsidetheMCBadjacenttotherearoftheSIBlock/Unblock
Switchstatingthefollowing:
Thisistheswitchweverifythattheplunger's
tipsarerecessedinwardwhentheswitchisplacedtonormal(labeledLAK).AspareswitchofsimilardesignhasbeenplacedintheControlRoomforthepurposeoftrainingtheoperators
torecognize
thedifferences
inplungerposition.
Theseactionsareconsidered
adequatetoprovidereasonable
assurance
ofSIsystemoperability
untilthesituation
canbepermanently
dispositioned.
Finally,EWR5025wasinitiated
toprovidefortheinstallation
ofindependent
SIblock/unblock
switchesforeachSItrainwhichisplannedforthe1991refueling
outage.4.Corrective
StesWhichWillBeTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation
RG&Ehasrecentlytakenstepstoupgradetheoverallcorrective
actionprogramforGinnaStation.Theneedforimprovements
wasnotedduringthecourseoftheRHRSystemSafetySystemFunctional
Inspection
(SSFI),andisalsoconsidered
appropriate
duetoRG&E'sinitiation
ofacomprehensive
Configuration
Management/Design
BasisProgram.WeareworkingwiththeNUMARCDesignBasisIssuesWorkingGrouptodevelopanimprovedproblemidentification
andresolution
program.Theimprovedprogramwill:~Improvetheprocessofidentifying,
analyzing,
andresolving
problems;  
~ImprovetheRG&Einternalreviewprocess,including
formalized
meansofcommunication
betweencorporate
engineering
andsitepersonnel
onissuesofpotential
safetysignificance;
andPartoftheimplementation
ofthiseffortwillincludespecificprocedural
upgrades,
enhancement
ofourcorrective
actiontrackingsystem,andtheissuanceofacorporate
policywhichaddresses
problemidentification
andreporting.
Webelievethatthisbroadeffort,whenfullyimplemented,
willimproveourcapability
toconsistently
identifyanddisposition
potential
safetyissuescommensurate
withtheirsignificance.
5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedLongtermandshorttermactionsandschedules
havebeendescribed
above.Formalguidanceconcerning
communication
betweencorporate
andsitepersonnel
onidentified
problemissuesisunderdevelopment,
andistargetedforcompletion
byJuly1990.RESPONSETOVIOLATION
BRochester
GasandElectricconcurswiththisviolation
asstatedbelow.ReasonforViolation
Rochester
GasandElectricagreesthat,GinnaStationdoesnothaveanestablished
writtenpolicyregarding
consideration
ofinherentinaccuracy
ofcalibrated
measuring
andtest,equipment
(M&TE)whendeveloping
acceptance
criteria.
As-acommonpractice,
torquingmethodsaddressonlyinstru-ment"indication"
andarenotmeanttoincludetheinstrument
accuracy.
Thispracticeisbasedonthefactthattorqueisonlyageneralindicator
ofboltingpre-loadbecauseoftheinaccuracies,
e.g.,lubrication,
threadfit,threadcondition,
etc.,inherentinthetorqueequation.
Whenhighlyaccurateboltpre-loading
isrequired,
meansotherthantorqueisused,i.e.,studelongation
todetermine
boltpre-load.
TheCorrective
StesWhichHaveBeenTakenandtheResultsAchievedDuetothesuccessful
completion
ofpostmaintenance
testing,noactionregarding
thevalvepackingadjustment
hasbeentaken.A-1603.4,
"WorkOrderScheduling"
wasrevisedtorequireworkandtestingtobecompleted
onindividual
trainspriortostartingmaintenance
onaredundant
train.
'TheCorrective
StesWhichWillBeTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation
1.Administrative
procedure
A-1603.3,
"WorkOrderPlanning"
willberevisedtostateaGinnaStationpolicyregarding
consideration
ofM&TEinherentinaccuracy
andprovidedirection
fordevelopment'f
acceptance
criteriautilizi'ng
thisequipment.
2.Anewprocedure
forpackingadjustment
isbeingdeveloped
toprovidespecificdirection
foradjustment
ofvalvesrepackedundertheValvePackingImprovement
Programandtoprovideamethodofmaintaining
andupdatingvalvepackingdata.TheDateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedTheanticipated
effective
dateoftheaboveprocedures
isMay1,1990,forthemaintenance
procedures
andJune30,1990,fortheadministrative
procedure.
Verytrulyyours,RobertC.MedyDivisionManagerNuclearProduction
GJWN093Enclosures
xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
(original)
DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555AllenR.Johnson.(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate
I-3Washington,
D.C.20555NicholasS.Reynolds,
Esq.Bishop,Cook,PurcellandReynolds1400L.Street,N.W.Washington,
D.C.20005-3502
GinnaNRCSeniorResidentInspector
~l0
}}

Latest revision as of 10:54, 4 February 2020

Responds to NRC 890222 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-17.Corrective Actions:Personnel Verified Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch in Proper Position & Operator Procedure 0-1.1 Changed as Indicated
ML17261B023
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/1990
From: Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: Russell W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 9004040007
Download: ML17261B023 (16)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONST$&TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ESSION NBR:9004040007 DOC ~ DATE: 90/03/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT, AFFILIATION RUSSELL,W.T; Region 1, Ofc of the Director R

SUBJECT:

Responds 50-244/89-17.

to NRC 890222 ltr re violations noted in Insp Rept DISTRXBUTION CODE: IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL 0 SIZE:

TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Vi lation Response, NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).. 05000244,']

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-3 PD JOHNSON,A INTERNAL'EOD 1 AEOD/DEIIB 1 AEOD/TPAD 1 DEDRO 1 NRR SHANKMAN,S 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 NRR/DOEA DIR 11 1 NRR/DREP/PEPB9D 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 ,2

'1 NRR/DRIS/DIR 1 NRR/DST/DXR 8E2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 l NUDOCS=ABSTRACZ 1 OGC/HDS2 1 REG FIXE'- ~02~ 1 RES MORISSEAU,D 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 NRC PDR NSIC 1 legs p]5 7~ '-'

.A NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WAS'ONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 23 ENCL

I

~

f f A'f f~ ff ff RTC If f,i i 'TAN I

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14849-pppg March 26, 1990 TCKCRHONC ARCA COOK 71K 546 2700 Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject:

Response to Notices of Violation Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-17 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Russell:

This letter is in response to the February 22, 1989 letter from Jon R. Johnson, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3 to Robert E. Smith, Senior Vice President, RG&E, which transmitted Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-17. In that report, two violations were identified. The following provides a reply to the violations pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201.

RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATIONS During inspection at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant from December 12, 1989 through January 8, 1990, the following violations were identified and evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C):

A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and the Ginna Quality Assurance Manual, Section 16, require prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality including failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.

Contrary to the above, a safety injection system design deficiency was not promptly identified and corrected when corporate engineering was notified on or before October 20, '989 that failure of the safety injection block/unblock switch could block automatic safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure or low steam line pressure. Corporate engineering did. not conclude that this problem existed at Ginna until about November 17, 1989, and site technical personnel were not informed about the deficiency until December 19, 1989.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

/0040 ">0V07 200 ADOCI=000:..44 c'OR FDC ~

~ Qo

~l"

4 B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the Ginna Quality Assurance Manual, Section 5, require activities affecting quality to be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings which include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, on December 15, 1989, maintenance was performed on a safety-related motor-operated valve in the safety injection system in accordance with a procedure which included an inappropriate torque specification.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

RESPONSE TO VIOLATION A RG&E Position on Existence of Violation Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) concurs that a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVI occurred. RG&E recognizes that communication between corporate engineering and site personnel on issues of potential safety significance should be formalized. Our efforts to address this concern are provided in Section 4, "Long Term Enhancements". As explained below, RG&E also believes that with respect to the issue identified on October 20, 1989, we acted in a manner consistent with the safety

.significance of the matter.

2. Reason for Violation As Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-17 (p. 7) indicates, RG&E received notice on October 20, 1989, from Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) of an apparent generic design deficiency related to the type of safety injection (SI) block/unblock switch used at various Westinghouse reactors. The Westinghouse letter, dated October 12, 1989, concluded that a "single failure of the switch (Westinghouse OT2) could block either the automatic low pressurizer pressure or the low steamline pressure SI signal in both trains" [emphasis supplied]. The letter also' stated that the probability of switch failure was "10 10 '/yr" :and that, while a design change was recommended, the situation was "not an immediate safety concern."

In addition, the Westinghouse letter referred to a Licensee Event Report (LER), No. 88-007-00, submitted by Wisconsin, Electric Power Company (Wisconsin Electric) on September 16, 1988, concerning the same issue at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Point Beach). The Wisconsin Electric LER concluded that "this condition will not have a significant impact on the health and safety of the general public or the employees of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant."

The LER noted that the Point Beach facility was operating at 100% capacity when the concern was identified and that design change would not'e made until the next scheduled outage.

Upon receipt of the Westinghouse notification on October 20, 1989, RG&E (corporate) initiated a timely review for applicability to Ginna Station. Based on the Wisconsin Electric LER and on Westinghouse's calculation of the low probability of switch failure, it was apparent that the matter did not constitute an immediate safety concern.

When it was identified that the switch configuration was applicable to Ginna Station, an internal engineering recommendation was made consistent with the guidance of the Westinghouse letter and attached LER, that an EWR be initiated. This was completed on November 17, 1989. This recommendation was then evaluated within Nuclear Safety and Licensing, resulting in a discussion with site technical support personnel relative to this situation on December 19, 1989. On December 20, site personnel initiated a Ginna Station Event Report per Procedure A-25.1 (Event No.89-168). The event report indicated that the site Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) had, on December 20, 1989, concluded that plant operation could continue for the following reasons:

very low (i.e., 10 'o

1. Westinghouse stated that the. probability of failure was 10 '/yr);
2. Emergency Operating Procedures directed Operators to use manual SI initiation where indicators show automatic initiation has failed;
3. A separate automatic SI initiating mechanism would activate when containment pressure reached 4 psig;
4. During depressurization, a bistable light will'lert operators of a blocked SI signal; and
5. Visual verification of the SI switch plunger position indicates that the contacts are in the proper position.

The violation states that the time between October 20, 1989, when RG&E (corporate) was notified by Westinghouse, and the communication of this information to the site technical staff on December 19, 1989, shows that the SI design deficiency was not promptly identified and corrected, and indicates problems in communication between corporate engineering and site personnel. While RG&E does not deny this violation, we believe that the actions taken by RG&E were appropriate in view of RG&E's preliminary conclusion that the issue did not constitute an immediate safety concern.

RG&E believes that Appendix B, Criterion XVI does not establish a precise time limit for resolution of safety issues. Rather, issues such as "promptness" or "timeliness" are subjective matters that inherently depend upon the safety significance of the situation. Given that RGGE had a documented recommendation from Westinghouse that no immediate safety concern existed (as corroborated by the Point Beach LER), its actions toward resolution of the issue were prompt and timely. Any other interpretations of Criterion XVI would be counter to public health and safety because it would require licensees to treat all deficiencies or non-conforming items the same (i.e., regardless of safety significance).

This same basic philosophy was affirmed in an analogous context 'in recent guidance issued by NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation '(NRR). Specifically, on July 19, 1989, Dr. T.E. Murley, Director, NRC/NRR, sent a memorandum to all of the regional administrators entitled "Guidance on Action To Be Taken Following Discovery of Potentially Nonconforming Equipment." In his memorandum, Dr. Murley stated that "[t]here is no generally appropriate timeframe in which operability determinations should be made." For equipment which is "clearly inoperable," an immediate declaration of inoperability should be made and the appropriate technical specifications followed. However, Dr. Murley's memorandum contrasts this situation with those where equipment nonconformances simply raise the issue of operability.

In such situations Dr. Murley states that:

operability determinations should be made by licensees as soon as racticable, and in a timeframe commensurate with the a licable e ui ment's im ortance to safet usin the best information available,(e.g., analyses, a test or partial test, experience with operating events, engineering judgement or a combination of the factors) (emphasis supplied).

Although this guidance relates to timing of operability determinations, it is equally appropriate with respect to resolution of open items under Criterion XVI. Consistent with this philosophy and based on the best information available, future cases of this type will be resolved "as soon as practicable" and in a time commensurate with the safety significance of the matter. Communication between corporate and site personnel will be initiated promptly once applicability to Ginna Station is determined.

Corrective Ste s Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved Corporate and site technical staff and the PORC have reviewed the circumstances surrounding the potentially generic design deficiency related to the control room SI block/unblock switch. As stated in LER 89-016, the.

following actions were taken:

Knowledgeable personnel inspected the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch and verified that the switch contacts were in the proper position.

~ Operating Procedure 0-1.1 (Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown) was changed to add the following note and check-off to Step 5.11.6:

NOTE: Prior to placing the SI Block/Unblock Switch to the normal position, station an operator inside the MCB in direct observation of the SI Block/Unblock Switch to observe that both plunger tips are recessed inward after the switch is placed. to normal position.-

Block switch plunger t'ips position inward

~ An RG&E operator aid tag was placed on the .MCB adjacent to the SI Block/Unblock Switch denoting the note- from 0-1.1.

~ An RG&E operator aid tag was also placed inside the MCB adj acent to the rear of the SI Block/Unblock Switch stating the following: This is the switch we verify that the plunger's tips are recessed inward when the switch is placed to normal (labeled LAK) .

A spare switch of similar design has been placed in the Control Room for the purpose of training the operators to recognize the differences in plunger position.

These actions are considered adequate to provide reasonable assurance of SI system operability until the situation can be permanently dispositioned. Finally, EWR 5025 was initiated to provide for the installation of independent SI block/unblock switches for each SI train which is planned for the 1991 refueling outage.

4. Corrective Ste s Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violation RG&E has recently taken steps to upgrade the overall corrective action program for Ginna Station. The need for improvements was noted during the course of the RHR System Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI), and is also considered appropriate due to RG&E's initiation of a comprehensive Configuration Management/Design Basis Program. We are working with the NUMARC Design Basis Issues Working Group to develop an improved problem identification and resolution program.

The improved program will:

~ Improve the process of identifying, analyzing, and resolving problems;

~ Improve the RG&E internal review process, including formalized means of communication between corporate engineering and site personnel on issues of potential safety significance; and Part of the implementation of this effort will include specific procedural upgrades, enhancement of our corrective action tracking system, and the issuance of a corporate policy which addresses problem identification and reporting. We believe that this broad effort, when fully implemented, will improve our capability to consistently identify and disposition potential safety issues commensurate with their significance.

5. Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved Long term and short term actions and schedules have been described above. Formal guidance concerning communication between corporate and site personnel on identified problem issues is under development, and is targeted for completion by July 1990.

RESPONSE TO VIOLATION B Rochester Gas and Electric concurs with this violation as stated below.

Reason for Violation Rochester Gas and Electric agrees that, Ginna Station does not have an established written policy regarding consideration of inherent inaccuracy of calibrated measuring and test, equipment (M&TE) when developing acceptance criteria.

As- a common practice, torquing methods address only instru-ment "indication" and are not meant to include the instrument accuracy. This practice is based on the fact that torque is only a general indicator of bolting pre-load because of the inaccuracies, e.g., lubrication, thread fit, thread condition, etc., inherent in the torque equation. When highly accurate bolt pre-loading is required, means other than torque is used, i.e., stud elongation to determine bolt pre-load.

The Corrective Ste s Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved Due to the successful completion of post maintenance testing, no action regarding the valve packing adjustment has been taken.

A-1603.4, "Work Order Scheduling" was revised to require work and testing to be completed on individual trains prior to starting maintenance on a redundant train.

' The Corrective Ste s Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violation

1. Administrative procedure A-1603.3, "Work Order Planning" will be revised to state a Ginna Station policy regarding consideration of M&TE inherent inaccuracy and provide direction for development'f acceptance criteria utilizi'ng this equipment.
2. A new procedure for packing adjustment is being developed to provide specific direction for adjustment of valves repacked under the Valve Packing Improvement Program and to provide a method of maintaining and updating valve packing data.

The Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved The anticipated effective date of the above procedures is May 1, 1990, for the maintenance procedures and June 30, 1990, for the administrative procedure.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Me dy Division Manager Nuclear Production GJWN093 Enclosures xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (original)

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Allen R. Johnson .(Mail Stop 14D1)

Project Directorate I-3 Washington, D.C. 20555 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.

Bishop, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds 1400 L. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Ginna NRC Senior Resident Inspector

~l 0