ML19319B804

RO NP-33-77-57:on 770818,decay Heat Pump 1-2 Inoperable Due to Closed Injection Valve DH1A.Caused by Personnel Closing Valve During Surveillance Test.Valve Immediately Opened.Event Will Be Discussed W/All Operators

ML19319B804
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/13/1977
From:	Batch S, Lingerfelter J TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19319B701	List: ML19319B700 ML19319B804
References
NUDOCS 8001270270
Download: ML19319B804 (2)

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) SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATiON FOR LER NP-33-77-57 DATE OF EVENT: August 18, 1977 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Decay Heat Pump 1-2 inoperable due to injection valve closed Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The plant was in Mode 2, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 2045 hours0.0237 days <br />0.568 hours <br />0.00338 weeks <br />7.781225e-4 months <br /> on August 18, 1977 the Auxiliary Building operator discovered injection valve DHlA closed which rendered Decay Heat Pucp 1-2 inoperable. This placed the Station in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2 which requires both Decay Heat Pumps to be operable in Mode 2, startup.

The Shift Foreman was infor=ed and the Control Room operator i=cediately opened the valve. This returned Decay Heat Pu=p 1-2 to operability and removed the Station from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.

Designation of Acparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence has

been deter =ined to be personnel error in the closure of the valve DHlA. The valve was closed at 1152 hours0.0133 days <br />0.32 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.38336e-4 months <br /> on August 15, 1977, prior to the performance of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems Monthly Test, ST 5051.01. The surveillance test does not require

he valve to be closed, but the operator closed the valve for additional assurance of isolarion frcm the Reactor Coolant System. The test operates the Decay Heat Pumps in recirculation of the Borated Water Storage Tank; the isolation valve need not and should not be closed. Reactor Coolant System pressure in Modes 1 thru 3 exceeds pump discharge pressure and prevents injection into the Reactor Coolant System.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to Station personnel. Decay Heat Pump-1-1 was available to operate in the event of an accident.

Corrective Action: The valve was immediately opened and control power removed. ,

The Operations Engineer vill discuss this event with all operators to prevent I recurrence.

) Failure Data: One previous Decay Heat Pu=p inoperability was partially caused by personnel error in a valve lineup (NF-33-77-26) . No previous closures of  ;

DElA have occurred. l l

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