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| issue date = 12/23/2005
| issue date = 12/23/2005
| title = IR 05000498-05-008, IR 05000499-05-008; 11/14 - 12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments
| title = IR 05000498-05-008, IR 05000499-05-008; 11/14 - 12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments
| author name = Paulk C J
| author name = Paulk C
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS
| addressee name = Sheppard J J
| addressee name = Sheppard J
| addressee affiliation = South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co
| addressee affiliation = South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Co
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:ber 23, 2005
[[Issue date::December 23, 2005]]


James J. Sheppard, President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company
==SUBJECT:==
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2005008; 05000499/2005008


P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483
==Dear Mr. Sheppard:==
On December 2, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed integrated report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 2, 2005, with you and members of your staff.


SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN ANDPERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2005008;
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.


05000499/2005008
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.


==Dear Mr. Sheppard:==
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
On December 2, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat your South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed integrated report documentsthe inspection findings which were discussed on December 2, 2005, with you and members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
 
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles J. Paulk, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-498; 50-499 Licenses: NPF-76; NPF-80


In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC PublicDocument Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC'sdocument system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
STP Nuclear Operating Company -2-Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2005008; 05000499/2005008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information DISTRIBUTION:
E. D. Halpin  Director, Division of Compliance &
Vice President, Oversight  Inspection STP Nuclear Operating Company  Bureau of Radiation Control P.O. Box 289  Texas Department of State Health Services Wadsworth, TX 77483  1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756 S. M. Head, Manager, Licensing STP Nuclear Operating Company  Brian Almon P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014  Public Utility Commission Wadsworth, TX 77483  William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 C. Kirksey/C. M. Canady  1701 North Congress Avenue City of Austin  Austin, TX 78701-3326 Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road  Environmental and Natural Austin, TX 78704  Resources Policy Director P.O. Box 12428 J. J. Nesrsta/R. K. Temple  Austin, TX 78711-3189 City Public Service Board P.O. Box 1771  Judge, Matagorda County San Antonio, TX 78296  Matagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Jack A. Fusco/Michael A. Reed  Bay City, TX 77414 Texas Genco, LP 12301 Kurland Drive  Terry Parks, Chief Inspector Houston, TX 77034  Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation Jon C. Wood  Boiler Program Cox Smith Matthews  P.O. Box 12157 112 E. Pecan, Suite 1800  Austin, TX 78711 San Antonio, TX 78205 Susan M. Jablonski A. H. Gutterman, Esq. Office of Permitting, Remediation and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius  Registration 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  Texas Commission on Environmental Washington, DC 20004  Quality MC-122, P.O. Box 13087 INPO  Austin, TX 78711-3087 Records Center 700 Galleria Parkway  Ted Enos Atlanta, GA 30339-3064  4200 South Hulen Suite 630 Fort Worth, TX 76109


Sincerely,/RA/Charles J. Paulk, ChiefEngineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor SafetyDockets: 50-498; 50-499Licenses: NPF-76; NPF-80 STP Nuclear Operating Company-2-
STP Nuclear Operating Company -3-Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (JXC2)
Branch Chief, DRP/A (CEJ1)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (TRF)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
DRS STA (DAP)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
ROPreports STP Site Secretary (LAR)
SUNSI Review Completed: cjp _ ADAMS: O Yes G No Initials: cjp ______
O Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive O Non-Sensitive SRI:EB1 RI:EB1 RI:EB1 RI:EB1 C:EB1 C:DRP/A C:EB1 JTapia/lmb GGeorge BHenderson DProulx CJPaulk CEJohnson CJPaulk
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ TRF for /RA/
12/22/05 12/22/05 12/21/05 12/22/05 12/22/05 12/23/05 12/23/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY  T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax


===Enclosure:===
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2005008; 05000499/2005008


===w/Attachment:===
==REGION IV==
Supplemental InformationDISTRIBUTION:E. D. Halpin Vice President, Oversight STP Nuclear Operating Company
Dockets: 50-498, 50-499 Licenses: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report No: 05000498/2005008;05000499/2005008 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: November 14 through December 2, 2005 Team Leader: J. I. Tapia, P.E., Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors: G. George, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 B. Henderson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Accompanied by: B. Smith, Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program J. Leivo, P.E., Contractor, Beckman & Assoc., Inc.


P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483S. M. Head, Manager, LicensingSTP Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014 Wadsworth, TX 77483C. Kirksey/C. M. CanadyCity of Austin Electric Utility Department721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704J. J. Nesrsta/R. K. TempleCity Public Service Board P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296Jack A. Fusco/Michael A. ReedTexas Genco, LP 12301 Kurland Drive Houston, TX 77034Jon C. WoodCox Smith Matthews 112 E. Pecan, Suite 1800 San Antonio, TX 78205A. H. Gutterman, Esq.Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004INPORecords Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064Director, Division of Compliance &Inspection Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of State Health Services 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756Brian AlmonPublic Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326Environmental and Natural Resources Policy Director P.O. Box 12428 Austin, TX 78711-3189Judge, Matagorda CountyMatagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City, TX 77414Terry Parks, Chief InspectorTexas Department of Licensing and Regulation Boiler Program P.O. Box 12157 Austin, TX 78711Susan M. JablonskiOffice of Permitting, Remediation and Registration Texas Commission on Environmental Quality MC-122, P.O. Box 13087 Austin, TX 78711-3087Ted Enos4200 South Hulen Suite 630 Fort Worth, TX 76109 STP Nuclear Operating Company-3-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (JXC2)Branch Chief, DRP/A (CEJ1)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (TRF)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)RITS Coordinator (KEG)DRS STA (DAP)J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)ROPreports STP Site Secretary (LAR)SUNSI Review Completed: cjp _ ADAMS:
Approved By: C. Paulk, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
O Yes G No Initials: cjp
______ O Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive O Non-SensitiveSRI:EB1RI:EB1RI:EB1RI:EB1C:EB1C:DRP/AC:EB1JTapia/lmbGGeorgeBHendersonDProulxCJPaulkCEJohnsonCJPaulk/RA//RA//RA//RA//RA/TRF for/RA/12/22/0512/22/0512/21/0512/22/0512/22/0512/23/0512/23/05OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax EnclosureENCLOSUREU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Dockets:50-498, 50-499 Licenses:NPF-76, NPF-80 Report No:05000498/2005008;05000499/2005008 Licensee:STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility:South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2Location:FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483Dates:November 14 through December 2, 2005 Team Leader:J. I. Tapia, P.E., Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors:G. George, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1B. Henderson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1Accompanied by:B. Smith, Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program J. Leivo, P.E., Contractor, Beckman & Assoc., Inc.Approved By:C. Paulk, ChiefEngineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000498/2005-08, 05000499/2005-08; 11/14 -12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, orExperiments.The report covered a 2-week period of inspection on site by a team of three region-basedengineering inspectors and one consultant. No findings of significance were identified. The
IR 05000498/2005-08, 05000499/2005-08; 11/14 -12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.


NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.
The report covered a 2-week period of inspection on site by a team of three region-based engineering inspectors and one consultant. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.


===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===B.Licensee-Identified Violations===
===Licensee-Identified Violations===
 
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure


=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
1.


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
IntroductionThe NRC conducted an inspection to verify that licensee personnel adequatelypreserved the facility safety system design and performance capability and that licenseepersonnel preserved the initial design in subsequent modifications of the systemsselected for review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safetyfunctions. This inspection also reviewed the licensee's programs and methods for monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basisfunctions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems,and barrier cornerstones.Licensee personnel based the probabilistic risk assessment model for the South TexasProject on the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safetyfunctions successfully. The team determined the area and scope of the inspection by reviewing the licensee's probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risksignificant systems, structures, and components. The team established this accordingto their ranking and potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/orinitiators. The team also used a deterministic approach in the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area history, and all modifications developed and implemented. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, andengineering and operating practices that licensee personnel used for the selected safety system and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accidentconditions. Acceptance criteria used by the team included NRC regulations, thetechnical specifications, applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable industry codes and standards, and industry initiatives implemented by the licensee's programs.
Introduction The NRC conducted an inspection to verify that licensee personnel adequately preserved the facility safety system design and performance capability and that licensee personnel preserved the initial design in subsequent modifications of the systems selected for review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safety functions. This inspection also reviewed the licensee's programs and methods for monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basis functions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier cornerstones.
 
Licensee personnel based the probabilistic risk assessment model for the South Texas Project on the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safety functions successfully. The team determined the area and scope of the inspection by reviewing the licensees probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risk significant systems, structures, and components. The team established this according to their ranking and potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/or initiators. The team also used a deterministic approach in the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area history, and all modifications developed and implemented.
 
The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that licensee personnel used for the selected safety system and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria used by the team included NRC regulations, the technical specifications, applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable industry codes and standards, and industry initiatives implemented by the licensees programs.
{{a|1R02}}
{{a|1R02}}
==1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments==
==1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments==
Line 69: Line 92:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team inspected the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of changes tofacility structures, systems, and components, risk-significant normal and emergencyoperating procedures; test programs; and the updated final safety analysis reports in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments." The team utilizedInspection Procedure 71111.02 for this inspection.The minimum sample size for this procedure is 6 evaluations and 12 screenings. Theteam reviewed 9 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to verify that licensee personnel had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC approval. The team reviewed 13 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, in  
The team inspected the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of changes to facility structures, systems, and components, risk-significant normal and emergency operating procedures; test programs; and the updated final safety analysis reports in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments." The team utilized Inspection Procedure 71111.02 for this inspection.
-2-which the licensee personnel determined that evaluations were not required, to ensurethat the exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of10 CFR 50.59. The team selected evaluations and screenings in the cornerstones of initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity, with the majority of evaluationsand screenings encompassing the mitigating systems cornerstone. The team selectively reviewed the licensee's design modifications and supportingdocuments associated with replacement of underground cables serving the 480 Vac loads in the essential cooling water (ECW) intake structure, replacement of Class 1E 480 Vac motor control center buckets, and Class 1E 120 Vac inverters. The review focused on the potential impact of the changes on the design and licensing basis, and post-modification testing of the cable and inverters. The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed. The team also reviewed and evaluated the most recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 programself assessment to determine whether licensee personnel conducted sufficient in-depth analyses of their program to allow for the identification and subsequent resolution of problems or deficiencies. In addition, the team reviewed the licensee's self assessment plan to verify the licensee's program in resolving issues associated with the application of the 50.59 process.
 
The minimum sample size for this procedure is 6 evaluations and 12 screenings. The team reviewed 9 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to verify that licensee personnel had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC approval. The team reviewed 13 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, in which the licensee personnel determined that evaluations were not required, to ensure that the exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The team selected evaluations and screenings in the cornerstones of initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity, with the majority of evaluations and screenings encompassing the mitigating systems cornerstone.
 
The team selectively reviewed the licensees design modifications and supporting documents associated with replacement of underground cables serving the 480 Vac loads in the essential cooling water (ECW) intake structure, replacement of Class 1E 480 Vac motor control center buckets, and Class 1E 120 Vac inverters. The review focused on the potential impact of the changes on the design and licensing basis, and post-modification testing of the cable and inverters. The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.
 
The team also reviewed and evaluated the most recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 program self assessment to determine whether licensee personnel conducted sufficient in-depth analyses of their program to allow for the identification and subsequent resolution of problems or deficiencies. In addition, the team reviewed the licensees self assessment plan to verify the licensees program in resolving issues associated with the application of the 50.59 process.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R21}}
{{a|1R21}}
==1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability==
==1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)The minimum sample size for this procedure is one risk-significant system for mitigatingan accident or maintaining barrier integrity.==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.21}}
The team completed the required sample size by reviewing the ECW and the emergency electrical systems. The primary reviewprompted parallel review and examination of support systems, such as, power,instrumentation and controls, cooling and related structures and components..1System Requirements
The minimum sample size for this procedure is one risk-significant system for mitigating an accident or maintaining barrier integrity. The team completed the required sample size by reviewing the ECW and the emergency electrical systems. The primary review prompted parallel review and examination of support systems, such as, power, instrumentation and controls, cooling and related structures and components.
 
===.1 System Requirements===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team inspected the following attributes of the selected systems:
The team inspected the following attributes of the selected systems:
: (1) processmedium (water, steam, air, electrical signal),
: (1) process medium (water, steam, air, electrical signal),
: (2) energy sources,
: (2) energy sources,
: (3) control systems,and
: (3) control systems, and
: (4) equipment protection. The team examined the procedural instructions to verify that instructions were consistent with actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The team also considered requirements and commitments identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings. In conjunction with the primary review, a parallel review and examination of support systems and related structures and componentswere also conducted.
: (4) equipment protection. The team examined the procedural instructions to verify that instructions were consistent with actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The team also considered requirements and commitments identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings. In conjunction with the primary review, a parallel review and examination of support systems and related structures and components were also conducted.


-3-
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.


====b. Findings====
===.2 System Condition and Capability===
No findings of significance were identified..2System Condition and Capability


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the selected systems to verifythat the capabilities of the systems were periodically verified. The team also reviewedsystem health reports, as well as a sample of the governing procedures anddocumentation for the control of calculations that were translated into values used inplant procedures. In addition, the team performed walkdowns of the selected systemsto ascertain the material condition of the systems.To assess the licensee's monitoring of the condition of underground cables, the teamreviewed a sample of insulation resistance test procedures, test results, and trending for the power cable serving the 4160 Vac ECW pump motors and the power cable serving the 480 Vac motor control centers in the ECW intake structure. The team also reviewed a sample of surveillances of the 13.8/4.16 kV engineered safety features transformers.
The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the selected systems to verify that the capabilities of the systems were periodically verified. The team also reviewed system health reports, as well as a sample of the governing procedures and documentation for the control of calculations that were translated into values used in plant procedures. In addition, the team performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ascertain the material condition of the systems.
 
To assess the licensees monitoring of the condition of underground cables, the team reviewed a sample of insulation resistance test procedures, test results, and trending for the power cable serving the 4160 Vac ECW pump motors and the power cable serving the 480 Vac motor control centers in the ECW intake structure. The team also reviewed a sample of surveillances of the 13.8/4.16 kV engineered safety features transformers.
 
The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.


The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documentsreviewed.The team also reviewed the operation of the systems by reviewing normal, abnormal,and emergency operating procedures. The review included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports, technical specifications, design calculations and drawings.
The team also reviewed the operation of the systems by reviewing normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures. The review included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports, technical specifications, design calculations and drawings.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified..3Identification and Resolution of Problems
No findings of significance were identified.
 
===.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed a sample of problems associated with the selected systems thatwere identified by licensee personnel in the corrective action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues and aging hardware.
The team reviewed a sample of problems associated with the selected systems that were identified by licensee personnel in the corrective action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues and aging hardware.


The sample included open and closed condition reports and their disposition via maintenance work orders, or apparent cause evaluations, as documented in the licensee's corrective action program. The sample covered the past 3 years and the documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report. Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," was used as guidance to perform this part of the inspection. The team reviewed a sample of licensee condition reports involving electricalcomponents and cable. The sample included conditions whereby cables in the underground duct bank to the ECW intake structure had become flooded, or had potential for flooding, and where the licensee had reported adverse trends of insulation  
The sample included open and closed condition reports and their disposition via maintenance work orders, or apparent cause evaluations, as documented in the licensees corrective action program. The sample covered the past 3 years and the documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report. Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, was used as guidance to perform this part of the inspection.
-4-resistance for underground cable serving 480 Vac ECW loads. The specific conditionreports the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.
 
The team reviewed a sample of licensee condition reports involving electrical components and cable. The sample included conditions whereby cables in the underground duct bank to the ECW intake structure had become flooded, or had potential for flooding, and where the licensee had reported adverse trends of insulation
 
resistance for underground cable serving 480 Vac ECW loads. The specific condition reports the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified..4System Walkdowns
No findings of significance were identified.
 
===.4 System Walkdowns===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected systems. The team focused on the installation, configuration, and visible material condition of equipment and components. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:The placement of protective barriers and systems,The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions,The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns, Accessibility and lighting for any required operator action,The material condition and preservation of systems and equipment, andThe conformance of the currently-installed system configuration to the design andlicensing bases.
The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected systems.
 
The team focused on the installation, configuration, and visible material condition of equipment and components. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:
The placement of protective barriers and systems, The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions, The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns, Accessibility and lighting for any required operator action, The material condition and preservation of systems and equipment, and The conformance of the currently-installed system configuration to the design and licensing bases.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified..5Design Review
No findings of significance were identified.
 
===.5 Design Review===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, andmechanical design of the selected systems and support systems. These reviewsincluded an examination of design assumptions, calculations, environmental qualifications, requir ed system thermal-hydraulic performance, electrical power systemperformance, control logic, and instrument setpoints and uncertainties. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, test procedures, and operating procedures that licensee personnel used during normal and accident conditions.The team also reviewed t he adequacy of the original system design to perform thedesign basis functions during normal, accident and post-accident conditions. The review included: design basis documents; specifications; reliability calculations;instrument uncertainty/setpoint calculations; uncertainty calculations related to  
The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, and mechanical design of the selected systems and support systems. These reviews included an examination of design assumptions, calculations, environmental qualifications, required system thermal-hydraulic performance, electrical power system performance, control logic, and instrument setpoints and uncertainties. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, test procedures, and operating procedures that licensee personnel used during normal and accident conditions.
-5-emergency operating instruction action levels; and schematic diagrams. The adequacyof the design and maintenance of selected support systems was also reviewed.In the electrical design portion of the inspection, the team selectively reviewed:
 
*The calculations demonstrating that adequate voltage would be provided to theECW pumps and motor-operated valves from the preferred (offsite) ac sources, and from the standby (onsite) diesel generator sources, under design basis conditions*The calculations demonstrating that the ampacities of the underground feedercables to the ECW pump motors and ECW motor control centers were adequate*The calculations demonstrating that the electrical protection for the ECW pumpmotors and feeder cables, and screenwash booster pump motor thermal overload protection, were adequate, and would preclude premature trip.*The calculation for sizing the Class 1E batteries and instrument bus inverters forboth design basis and station blackout conditions.The review was focused on the acceptability of design inputs, assumptions, andmethodology used in the calculations, translation of values to and from dependent documents, and the degree of design margin demonstrated by the results and conclusions. The specific calculations the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.
The team also reviewed the adequacy of the original system design to perform the design basis functions during normal, accident and post-accident conditions. The review included: design basis documents; specifications; reliability calculations; instrument uncertainty/setpoint calculations; uncertainty calculations related to
 
emergency operating instruction action levels; and schematic diagrams. The adequacy of the design and maintenance of selected support systems was also reviewed.
 
In the electrical design portion of the inspection, the team selectively reviewed:
* The calculations demonstrating that adequate voltage would be provided to the ECW pumps and motor-operated valves from the preferred (offsite) ac sources, and from the standby (onsite) diesel generator sources, under design basis conditions
* The calculations demonstrating that the ampacities of the underground feeder cables to the ECW pump motors and ECW motor control centers were adequate
* The calculations demonstrating that the electrical protection for the ECW pump motors and feeder cables, and screenwash booster pump motor thermal overload protection, were adequate, and would preclude premature trip.
* The calculation for sizing the Class 1E batteries and instrument bus inverters for both design basis and station blackout conditions.
 
The review was focused on the acceptability of design inputs, assumptions, and methodology used in the calculations, translation of values to and from dependent documents, and the degree of design margin demonstrated by the results and conclusions. The specific calculations the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.6. Safety System Inspection and Testing
No findings of significance were identified.
 
===6. Safety System Inspection and Testing===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting selectedcomponents for the selected systems and support systems. The review included theresults of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications and a selective review of inservice tests.
The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting selected components for the selected systems and support systems. The review included the results of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications and a selective review of inservice tests.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


-6-4OA6Management MeetingsExit Meeting SummaryThe inspection findings were presented by the team leader during an exit meeting onDecember 2, 2005, to Mr. James J. Sheppard and other members of licensee management staff. The team leader confirmed that proprietary information, while reviewed, had not been retained by the team.
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Management Meetings==
 
===Exit Meeting Summary===
 
The inspection findings were presented by the team leader during an exit meeting on December 2, 2005, to Mr. James J. Sheppard and other members of licensee management staff. The team leader confirmed that proprietary information, while reviewed, had not been retained by the team.


A-1ATTACHMENTPARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTEDLicenseeR. Aguilera, Radiological Manager, Radiological EngineeringT. Bowman, Manager, Operations D. Dayton, Electrical System Engineer G. Jones, Instrumentation and Control Design Engineer E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight E. Heacock, Electrical Design Engineer S. Head, Manager, Licensing J. Jump, Manager, Process Improvement Leadership Team Q. Lee, HVAC Design Engineer J. Loya, Licensing Engineer, 10 CFR 50.59 M. McBurnett, Manager, Quality and Licensing M. Meier, General Manager, Station Support L. Merritt, HVAC System Engineer W. Mookhoek, Senior Engineer, Quality and Licensing G. Parkey, Vice President, Generation M. Prinz, Electrical System Engineer D. Rencurrel, Manager, Plant Engineering K. Regis, Essential Cooling Water System Engineer R. Savage, Senior Staff Specialist P. Schimpf, Motor Test Engineer W. Schultz, Mechanical Design Engineer J. Sheppard, President and CEO K. Taplett, Licensing Engineer D. Towler, Manager, Quality B. Weigand, Electrical Design Engineer D. Weigand, Fire Protection Engineer J. Winters, Maintenance Rule Coordinator D. Zink, Electrical Design Engineer
ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Aguilera, Radiological Manager, Radiological Engineering T. Bowman, Manager, Operations D. Dayton, Electrical System Engineer G. Jones, Instrumentation and Control Design Engineer E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight E. Heacock, Electrical Design Engineer S. Head, Manager, Licensing J. Jump, Manager, Process Improvement Leadership Team Q. Lee, HVAC Design Engineer J. Loya, Licensing Engineer, 10 CFR 50.59 M. McBurnett, Manager, Quality and Licensing M. Meier, General Manager, Station Support L. Merritt, HVAC System Engineer W. Mookhoek, Senior Engineer, Quality and Licensing G. Parkey, Vice President, Generation M. Prinz, Electrical System Engineer D. Rencurrel, Manager, Plant Engineering K. Regis, Essential Cooling Water System Engineer R. Savage, Senior Staff Specialist P. Schimpf, Motor Test Engineer W. Schultz, Mechanical Design Engineer J. Sheppard, President and CEO K. Taplett, Licensing Engineer D. Towler, Manager, Quality B. Weigand, Electrical Design Engineer D. Weigand, Fire Protection Engineer J. Winters, Maintenance Rule Coordinator D. Zink, Electrical Design Engineer


=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
CalculationsEC-5000, Voltage Regulation Study, Revision 12, 11/04/05EC-5003-2, Cable Ampacity in Underground Ducts - Problems No. 5 through 10, Revision 8, 07/03/98EC-5008, Class 1E Battery, Battery Charger and Inverter Sizing, Revision 13, 02/02/05.
 
Calculations
EC-5000, Voltage Regulation Study, Revision 12, 11/04/05
EC-5003-2, Cable Ampacity in Underground Ducts - Problems No. 5 through 10, Revision 8,
07/03/98
EC-5008, Class 1E Battery, Battery Charger and Inverter Sizing, Revision 13, 02/02/05.
EC-5014, Maximum Length of Control Cables/Class 1E and non-Class 1E, Revision 4, 10/21/99
EC-5014, Maximum Length of Control Cables/Class 1E and non-Class 1E, Revision 4, 10/21/99
AttachmentA-2EC-5029, 4.16 kV Switchgear Relay Setting. Revision 5EC-5052, Degraded and Undervoltage Protection, Revision 5, 06/08/04
Attachment
EC-5029, 4.16 kV Switchgear Relay Setting. Revision 5
EC-5052, Degraded and Undervoltage Protection, Revision 5, 06/08/04
EC-5067, PSB-1 Test Results Analysis - Unit 1, Revision 0, 08/24/88
EC-5067, PSB-1 Test Results Analysis - Unit 1, Revision 0, 08/24/88
EC-5100, Standby Diesel Generator Transient Response Model, Revision 1, 04/07/00MC-6472, DVAC Calculation for AC Motor MOVs, Revision 0, 10/21/99
EC-5100, Standby Diesel Generator Transient Response Model, Revision 1, 04/07/00
MC-6472, DVAC Calculation for AC Motor MOVs, Revision 0, 10/21/99
3R289MC5633, Essential Cooling Water Pump Submergence, Revision 2
3R289MC5633, Essential Cooling Water Pump Submergence, Revision 2
MC-6476, Jacket Water and Lube Oil Cooler Performance, Revision 0
MC-6476, Jacket Water and Lube Oil Cooler Performance, Revision 0
Line 143: Line 214:
SP130(105), ECW Pump Trip Forcing Functions with 2" and 1/2" Vacuum Breakers, Revision 0
SP130(105), ECW Pump Trip Forcing Functions with 2" and 1/2" Vacuum Breakers, Revision 0
MC-6288, ECW Trip Forcing Functions with Vacuum Breakers, Revision 1
MC-6288, ECW Trip Forcing Functions with Vacuum Breakers, Revision 1
ZC-7028, Loop Uncertainty Calculation for Essential Cooling Water Pump DischargeTemperatures, Revision 1Engineering Evaluations05-07071-405-07303-605-07667-205-08601-2205-10323-101-19410-0Condition Reports05-8601-005-8601-5
ZC-7028, Loop Uncertainty Calculation for Essential Cooling Water Pump Discharge
99-12591-1
Temperatures, Revision 1
2-16395-1
Engineering Evaluations
03-10793
05-07071-4              05-07667-2                05-10323-1            01-19410-0
03-15730-305-10323-105-15263
05-07303-6              05-08601-22
05-15679
Condition Reports
96-04859-20
05-8601-0          05-10323-1           03-13839            05-09878          05-15209
97-1861303-1383903-18389
05-8601-5          05-15263             03-18389            05-11548          05-15242
05-01384
99-12591-1        05-15679            05-01384           05-11757          05-15317
05-01437
2-16395-1        96-04859-20          05-01437            05-11882         05-15453
05-0706705-0987805-11548
03-10793          97-18613            05-07067            05-12142          05-15685
05-11757
03-15730-3
05-11882
Preventative Maintenance Work Orders (PMWO)
05-1214205-1520905-15242
31904316               31915035                  31926532              31934141
05-15317
31911121               31919088
05-15453
Attachment
05-15685Preventative Maintenance Work Orders (PMWO)
Procedures
31904316 31911121 31915035 319190883192653231934141
0PGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program, Revision 30
AttachmentA-3Procedures0PGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program, Revision 300PGP03-ZM-0028, Erection and Use of Temporary Scaffolding, Revision 11
0PGP03-ZM-0028, Erection and Use of Temporary Scaffolding, Revision 11
0POP01-ZA-001, Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines, Revision 24
0POP01-ZA-001, Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines, Revision 24
0POP02-EW-00001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision 36
0POP02-EW-00001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision 36
Line 169: Line 240:
0PEP07-ZE-0008, Non-Intrusive Check Valve Testing, Revision 5
0PEP07-ZE-0008, Non-Intrusive Check Valve Testing, Revision 5
0POP02-0001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision36
0POP02-0001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision36
0PMP05-PK-1000, Auxiliary ESF Transformer Test, Revision 70PMP05-PM-4800, Motor Control Center Maintenance, ITE Gould, Revision10 0PMP05-ZE-0201, Insulation Resistance and Overpotential Testing of Cables and Buses,Revision 8 0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision11
0PMP05-PK-1000, Auxiliary ESF Transformer Test, Revision 7
0PMP05-PM-4800, Motor Control Center Maintenance, ITE Gould, Revision10
0PMP05-ZE-0201, Insulation Resistance and Overpotential Testing of Cables and Buses,
Revision 8
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision11
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision10
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision10
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision 9Design Change PackagesDCP 98-687-13, Replace Obsolete Class 1E MCC E2A2 and E2A4 ,Motor Controller and CircuitBreaker Units, Revision 0DCP 98-687-85, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E2A3, Revision 0
0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision 9
DCP 02-17395-12, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E1B1 Cubicle L3 and E1B1Cubicle Q4, Revision 0DCP 03-11137-9, Alternate Basket Assembly for the ECW Traveling Screen, Revision 0
Design Change Packages
DCP 98-687-13, Replace Obsolete Class 1E MCC E2A2 and E2A4 ,Motor Controller and Circuit
Breaker Units, Revision 0
DCP 98-687-85, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E2A3, Revision 0
DCP 02-17395-12, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E1B1 Cubicle L3 and E1B1
Cubicle Q4, Revision 0
DCP 03-11137-9, Alternate Basket Assembly for the ECW Traveling Screen, Revision 0
DCP 04-11533-7, Revise High Alarm Setpoint N2EWPDSH6859, Revision 0
DCP 04-11533-7, Revise High Alarm Setpoint N2EWPDSH6859, Revision 0
DCP 97-6297-85, EW Calculations, Revision 0
DCP 97-6297-85, EW Calculations, Revision 0
AttachmentA-4DCP 05-52-192, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for Actuator Spring for EWFV6934Valve, Revision 0DCP 04-168-194, Alternate Replacement for 1/2" Aluminum Bronze Ball Valve, Revision 0
Attachment
DCP 05-52-192, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for Actuator Spring for EWFV6934
Valve, Revision 0
DCP 04-168-194, Alternate Replacement for 1/2 Aluminum Bronze Ball Valve, Revision 0
DCP 04-5417-1, Class 1E Battery Charger Paralleling, Revision 0
DCP 04-5417-1, Class 1E Battery Charger Paralleling, Revision 0
DCP 04-5388-4, Install Diodes Across Battery Chargers E2D11-1 and E2D11-2 Alarm Relays,Revision 0DCP 02-3305-6, Install New 480V Power Cables to Class 1E MCC E1A3 to Replace theExisting Deteriorating Power Cables, Revision 0DCP 03-3600-03, Revise UFSAR Section 3.5.1.4 to Delete the Missle Barrier Function of theECW Door and Add New 3.7.4 TRM Section for ECW System Intake Structure which Include
DCP 04-5388-4, Install Diodes Across Battery Chargers E2D11-1 and E2D11-2 Alarm Relays,
Compensatory Measures to Restore the Door's Flooding Function, Revision13 DCP 04-1238-88, Replace the Class 1E NSSS Inverter Systems, Revision13
Revision 0
DCP 03-01705, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for 1-1/2 inch X 2-1/2 inch ECWRelief Valves (ASME Class 3), Revision 1DCP 03-15428, Alternate Repair Method for Backwash Arm of the ECW Self-Cleaning Strainer,Revision 2DCP 04-02317, Open RTD in 'C' Phase of ECW Pump 1A Motor, Revision 2DCP 05-07071, ECW Train 1B Piping Repair, Revision 3Modification Packages,,90075, Replace ECW Bellows to SBDG, Revision 0
DCP 02-3305-6, Install New 480V Power Cables to Class 1E MCC E1A3 to Replace the
Drawings00000E0AAAA, Sheet 1, Revision 19, Single Line Diagram, Main One Line Diagram, Units 1
Existing Deteriorating Power Cables, Revision 0
and 29-E-PKAA-01 #1, Revision 12, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1A
DCP 03-3600-03, Revise UFSAR Section 3.5.1.4 to Delete the Missle Barrier Function of the
ECW Door and Add New 3.7.4 TRM Section for ECW System Intake Structure which Include
Compensatory Measures to Restore the Doors Flooding Function, Revision13
DCP 04-1238-88, Replace the Class 1E NSSS Inverter Systems, Revision13
DCP 03-01705, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for 1-1/2 inch X 2-1/2 inch ECW
Relief Valves (ASME Class 3), Revision 1
DCP 03-15428, Alternate Repair Method for Backwash Arm of the ECW Self-Cleaning Strainer,
Revision 2
DCP 04-02317, Open RTD in C Phase of ECW Pump 1A Motor, Revision 2
DCP 05-07071, ECW Train 1B Piping Repair, Revision 3
Modification Packages,,
90075, Replace ECW Bellows to SBDG, Revision 0
Drawings
00000E0AAAA, Sheet 1, Revision 19, Single Line Diagram, Main One Line Diagram, Units 1
and 2
9-E-PKAA-01 #1, Revision 12, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1A
9-E-PKAB-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1B
9-E-PKAB-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1B
9-E-PKAC-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1C
9-E-PKAC-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1C
9E0DJAA#1, Sheet 1, Revision 18, Single Line Diagram 125 Vdc Class 1E DistributionSwitchboard E1A11 (Channel I)
9E0DJAA#1, Sheet 1, Revision 18, Single Line Diagram 125 Vdc Class 1E Distribution
AttachmentA-59E0PLAA#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1A9E0PLAB#1, Revision 14, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1B
Switchboard E1A11 (Channel I)
Attachment
9E0PLAA#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1A
9E0PLAB#1, Revision 14, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1B
9E0PLAC#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1C
9E0PLAC#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1C
9EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 1, Revision 22, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A19EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A19E0PMAB#1, Sheet 1, Revision 21, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A29E0PMAC#1, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1A39E0PMAD #1, Sheet 1, Revision 20, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B19E0PMAD #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B19E0PMAE #1, Sheet 1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B29E0PMAF #1, Sheet 1, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor ControlCenter E1B3Maintenance and Test RecordsStartup Test Item 1PM01-117355, 480 Vac Motor Control Center, Power Cable PM LC-E1B1-4Eto MC-E1B3-E1, performed 12/04/85EM-1-97000386, Clean/Inspect/Test MCC E1B3, performed 05/18/05 [includes insulationresistance (MeggerŽ) test of cables]EM-1-98000559, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 1C, performed
9EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 1, Revision 22, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control
05/26/05EM-2-EW-98000561, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 2B, performed
Center E1A1
05/26/05EM-1-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1A, performed 10/26/04
9EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control
AttachmentA-6EM-1-EW-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1A, performed 05/16/03EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1A, performed 04/16/02EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1A, performed 06/17/99EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1B, performed 05/20/05EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1B, performed 10/09/03EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1B, performed 01/02/01EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1B, performed 06/23/99EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1C, performed 05/26/05EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 1C, performed 11/11/03EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1C, performed 04/30/01EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 1C, performed 07/27/99EM-1-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 2A, performed 05/19/04EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2A, performed 06/20/03EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/26/01EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/03/99EM-2-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 2B, performed 12/09/04
Center E1A1
AttachmentA-7EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2B, performed 12/15/01EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2B, performed 07/24/00EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2B, performed 01/13/99EM-2-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECWPump 2C, performed 05/04/04EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2C, performed 10/21/02EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2C, performed 07/31/01EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,ECW Pump 2C, performed 02/18/00EM-2-PK-97000382, PM Work Order, Inspect/Test 13.8kV to 4160 Vac ESF Transformer E2A,performed 10/19/02Miscellaneous Documents
9E0PMAB#1, Sheet 1, Revision 21, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor Control
DCN CD-226, Add Note to the Drawing to Allow Up to an Additional 2" of Limestone GroundCover in the Protective Area, Revision 0 CR 05-11558, Request Civil Engineering Evaluate the Observed Conditions to Determine ifRework is Required to Meet the Design Criteria to Prevent Surface Water from Entering the
Center E1A2
Manholes, Revision 0PCF 101343 A, Remove Check Valve Internals, Revision 0
9E0PMAC#1, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor Control
Center E1A3
9E0PMAD #1, Sheet 1, Revision 20, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control
Center E1B1
9E0PMAD #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control
Center E1B1
9E0PMAE #1, Sheet 1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control
Center E1B2
9E0PMAF #1, Sheet 1, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control
Center E1B3
Maintenance and Test Records
Startup Test Item 1PM01-117355, 480 Vac Motor Control Center, Power Cable PM LC-E1B1-4E
to MC-E1B3-E1, performed 12/04/85
EM-1-97000386, Clean/Inspect/Test MCC E1B3, performed 05/18/05 [includes insulation
resistance (Megger') test of cables]
EM-1-98000559, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 1C, performed
05/26/05
EM-2-EW-98000561, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 2B, performed
05/26/05
EM-1-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 1A, performed 10/26/04
Attachment
EM-1-EW-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1A, performed 05/16/03
EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1A, performed 04/16/02
EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1A, performed 06/17/99
EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 1B, performed 05/20/05
EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 1B, performed 10/09/03
EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1B, performed 01/02/01
EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1B, performed 06/23/99
EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 1C, performed 05/26/05
EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 1C, performed 11/11/03
EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1C, performed 04/30/01
EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 1C, performed 07/27/99
EM-1-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 2A, performed 05/19/04
EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2A, performed 06/20/03
EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/26/01
EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/03/99
EM-2-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 2B, performed 12/09/04
Attachment
EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2B, performed 12/15/01
EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2B, performed 07/24/00
EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2B, performed 01/13/99
EM-2-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW
Pump 2C, performed 05/04/04
EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2C, performed 10/21/02
EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2C, performed 07/31/01
EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,
ECW Pump 2C, performed 02/18/00
EM-2-PK-97000382, PM Work Order, Inspect/Test 13.8kV to 4160 Vac ESF Transformer E2A,
performed 10/19/02
Miscellaneous Documents
DCN CD-226, Add Note to the Drawing to Allow Up to an Additional 2" of Limestone Ground
Cover in the Protective Area, Revision 0
CR 05-11558, Request Civil Engineering Evaluate the Observed Conditions to Determine if
Rework is Required to Meet the Design Criteria to Prevent Surface Water from Entering the
Manholes, Revision 0
PCF 101343 A, Remove Check Valve Internals, Revision 0
5R289MB1006, UFSAR Essential Cooling Water System, pages 4-139 to 4-143, Revision 5
5R289MB1006, UFSAR Essential Cooling Water System, pages 4-139 to 4-143, Revision 5
IRAGs 50.59, Programs Self-Assessment Plan, Revision 0
IRAGs 50.59, Programs Self-Assessment Plan, Revision 0
SPR 910401, Corrective Action Group Closure Documentation Checklist, Revision 0
SPR 910401, Corrective Action Group Closure Documentation Checklist, Revision 0
USQE 97-6297-7, Engineering Evaluation for Abandonment of 150 Ton Essential Chillers,Revision 001-9518-6, USFAR Change 01-9518-5 Increase in Pressurizer Water Level Above Program inMode 3, Revision 0
USQE 97-6297-7, Engineering Evaluation for Abandonment of 150 Ton Essential Chillers,
AttachmentA-8USQE 99-66-64, Replace Model E SG UFSAR Section 6.2.1 Containment LOCA/MSLBPressure/Temperature Analyses with Delta-94 SG Analyses, Revision 001-10770-2, Change UFSAR and Tech Spec to Reflect Rod Withdrawal Analysis Result,Revision 1101-14284-6, Change UFSAR Chapter 15 for OPDT/OTDT 2-second Time Constant Modification,Revision1302-19072-34, Unit 2 Main Turbine Generator Rotor Torsional Response Test, Revision 0
Revision 0
USQE 00-16902-6, Design Change to Declare One RHR Heat Exchanger as a Spare Train,Revision 0STP Probablistic Risk Assessment Level 1 Quantification, Revision 4
01-9518-6, USFAR Change 01-9518-5 Increase in Pressurizer Water Level Above Program in
Mode 3, Revision 0
Attachment
USQE 99-66-64, Replace Model E SG UFSAR Section 6.2.1 Containment LOCA/MSLB
Pressure/Temperature Analyses with Delta-94 SG Analyses, Revision 0
01-10770-2, Change UFSAR and Tech Spec to Reflect Rod Withdrawal Analysis Result,
Revision 11
01-14284-6, Change UFSAR Chapter 15 for OPDT/OTDT 2-second Time Constant Modification,
Revision13
2-19072-34, Unit 2 Main Turbine Generator Rotor Torsional Response Test, Revision 0
USQE 00-16902-6, Design Change to Declare One RHR Heat Exchanger as a Spare Train,
Revision 0
STP Probablistic Risk Assessment Level 1 Quantification, Revision 4
Plant Change Form 101343A
Plant Change Form 101343A
27-008-400, Essential Cooling Pond Fish Population Study, Revision 0
27-008-400, Essential Cooling Pond Fish Population Study, Revision 0
STP Nuclear Operating Company Letters:NOC-AE-05001894, "Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"NOC-AE-05001999, "Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"
STP Nuclear Operating Company Letters:
NOC-AE-05001819, "Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code"PM 05000352 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements forinverter 3E241EIV1201]PM 05000358 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements forinverter 3E241EIV1201 electrolytic capacitor replacement]4E510EQ1005, Revision 8, "Design Criteria for Class 1E AC Power Distribution," including
NOC-AE-05001894, Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
DCN 0300042.EMT917.03, Basic Test Equipment, Insulation Resistance and High Potential Testers [trainingpackage for EMTs].Setpoint Index Record Print Out 11/30/05, for ECW MOVs 0121,0137, 015; and ECWscreenwash booster Pumps 1A, 1B, 1C.Bechtel Letter ST-YS-HS-8958 dated 11/17/1986, Subject: HL&P's South Texas Project Units 1& 2, HVAC for EAB Battery Rooms Hydrogen Removal.OE 15631, "Breaker Cell Switch Failure Caused Essential Cooling Water Pump Trip," 08/14/03.
NOC-AE-05001999, Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
NOC-AE-05001819, Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
PM 05000352 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements for
inverter 3E241EIV1201]
PM 05000358 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements for
inverter 3E241EIV1201 electrolytic capacitor replacement]
4E510EQ1005, Revision 8, Design Criteria for Class 1E AC Power Distribution, including
DCN 0300042.
EMT917.03, Basic Test Equipment, Insulation Resistance and High Potential Testers [training
package for EMTs].
Setpoint Index Record Print Out 11/30/05, for ECW MOVs 0121,0137, 015; and ECW
screenwash booster Pumps 1A, 1B, 1
: [[contact::C.
Bechtel Letter ST-YS-HS-8958 dated 11/17/1986]], Subject: HL&Ps South Texas Project Units 1
& 2, HVAC for EAB Battery Rooms Hydrogen Removal.
OE 15631, Breaker Cell Switch Failure Caused Essential Cooling Water Pump Trip, 08/14/03.
Attachment
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:19, 22 December 2019

IR 05000498-05-008, IR 05000499-05-008; 11/14 - 12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments
ML053610004
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 12/23/2005
From: Paulk C
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To: Sheppard J
South Texas
References
IR-05-008
Download: ML053610004 (19)


Text

ber 23, 2005

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2005008; 05000499/2005008

Dear Mr. Sheppard:

On December 2, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed integrated report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 2, 2005, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles J. Paulk, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-498; 50-499 Licenses: NPF-76; NPF-80

STP Nuclear Operating Company -2-Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2005008; 05000499/2005008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information DISTRIBUTION:

E. D. Halpin Director, Division of Compliance &

Vice President, Oversight Inspection STP Nuclear Operating Company Bureau of Radiation Control P.O. Box 289 Texas Department of State Health Services Wadsworth, TX 77483 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756 S. M. Head, Manager, Licensing STP Nuclear Operating Company Brian Almon P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014 Public Utility Commission Wadsworth, TX 77483 William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 C. Kirksey/C. M. Canady 1701 North Congress Avenue City of Austin Austin, TX 78701-3326 Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Environmental and Natural Austin, TX 78704 Resources Policy Director P.O. Box 12428 J. J. Nesrsta/R. K. Temple Austin, TX 78711-3189 City Public Service Board P.O. Box 1771 Judge, Matagorda County San Antonio, TX 78296 Matagorda County Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Jack A. Fusco/Michael A. Reed Bay City, TX 77414 Texas Genco, LP 12301 Kurland Drive Terry Parks, Chief Inspector Houston, TX 77034 Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation Jon C. Wood Boiler Program Cox Smith Matthews P.O. Box 12157 112 E. Pecan, Suite 1800 Austin, TX 78711 San Antonio, TX 78205 Susan M. Jablonski A. H. Gutterman, Esq. Office of Permitting, Remediation and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Registration 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Texas Commission on Environmental Washington, DC 20004 Quality MC-122, P.O. Box 13087 INPO Austin, TX 78711-3087 Records Center 700 Galleria Parkway Ted Enos Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 4200 South Hulen Suite 630 Fort Worth, TX 76109

STP Nuclear Operating Company -3-Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)

DRP Director (ATH)

DRS Director (DDC)

DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)

Senior Resident Inspector (JXC2)

Branch Chief, DRP/A (CEJ1)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (TRF)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)

RITS Coordinator (KEG)

DRS STA (DAP)

J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)

ROPreports STP Site Secretary (LAR)

SUNSI Review Completed: cjp _ ADAMS: O Yes G No Initials: cjp ______

O Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive O Non-Sensitive SRI:EB1 RI:EB1 RI:EB1 RI:EB1 C:EB1 C:DRP/A C:EB1 JTapia/lmb GGeorge BHenderson DProulx CJPaulk CEJohnson CJPaulk

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ TRF for /RA/

12/22/05 12/22/05 12/21/05 12/22/05 12/22/05 12/23/05 12/23/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Dockets: 50-498, 50-499 Licenses: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report No: 05000498/2005008;05000499/2005008 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates: November 14 through December 2, 2005 Team Leader: J. I. Tapia, P.E., Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors: G. George, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 B. Henderson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 D. Proulx, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Accompanied by: B. Smith, Nuclear Safety Professional Development Program J. Leivo, P.E., Contractor, Beckman & Assoc., Inc.

Approved By: C. Paulk, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000498/2005-08, 05000499/2005-08; 11/14 -12/2/2005; South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2; Safety System Design and Performance Capability; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.

The report covered a 2-week period of inspection on site by a team of three region-based engineering inspectors and one consultant. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Introduction The NRC conducted an inspection to verify that licensee personnel adequately preserved the facility safety system design and performance capability and that licensee personnel preserved the initial design in subsequent modifications of the systems selected for review. The scope of the review also included any necessary nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components that provided functions to support safety functions. This inspection also reviewed the licensee's programs and methods for monitoring the capability of the selected systems to perform the current design basis functions. This inspection verified aspects of the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier cornerstones.

Licensee personnel based the probabilistic risk assessment model for the South Texas Project on the capability of the as-built safety systems to perform their intended safety functions successfully. The team determined the area and scope of the inspection by reviewing the licensees probabilistic risk analysis models to identify the most risk significant systems, structures, and components. The team established this according to their ranking and potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/or initiators. The team also used a deterministic approach in the selection process by considering recent inspection history, recent problem area history, and all modifications developed and implemented.

The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that licensee personnel used for the selected safety system and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria used by the team included NRC regulations, the technical specifications, applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, applicable industry codes and standards, and industry initiatives implemented by the licensees programs.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of changes to facility structures, systems, and components, risk-significant normal and emergency operating procedures; test programs; and the updated final safety analysis reports in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments." The team utilized Inspection Procedure 71111.02 for this inspection.

The minimum sample size for this procedure is 6 evaluations and 12 screenings. The team reviewed 9 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to verify that licensee personnel had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC approval. The team reviewed 13 licensee-performed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, in which the licensee personnel determined that evaluations were not required, to ensure that the exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The team selected evaluations and screenings in the cornerstones of initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity, with the majority of evaluations and screenings encompassing the mitigating systems cornerstone.

The team selectively reviewed the licensees design modifications and supporting documents associated with replacement of underground cables serving the 480 Vac loads in the essential cooling water (ECW) intake structure, replacement of Class 1E 480 Vac motor control center buckets, and Class 1E 120 Vac inverters. The review focused on the potential impact of the changes on the design and licensing basis, and post-modification testing of the cable and inverters. The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.

The team also reviewed and evaluated the most recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 program self assessment to determine whether licensee personnel conducted sufficient in-depth analyses of their program to allow for the identification and subsequent resolution of problems or deficiencies. In addition, the team reviewed the licensees self assessment plan to verify the licensees program in resolving issues associated with the application of the 50.59 process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability

The minimum sample size for this procedure is one risk-significant system for mitigating an accident or maintaining barrier integrity. The team completed the required sample size by reviewing the ECW and the emergency electrical systems. The primary review prompted parallel review and examination of support systems, such as, power, instrumentation and controls, cooling and related structures and components.

.1 System Requirements

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the following attributes of the selected systems:

(1) process medium (water, steam, air, electrical signal),
(2) energy sources,
(3) control systems, and
(4) equipment protection. The team examined the procedural instructions to verify that instructions were consistent with actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents. The team also considered requirements and commitments identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, technical specifications, design basis documents, and plant drawings. In conjunction with the primary review, a parallel review and examination of support systems and related structures and components were also conducted.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 System Condition and Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the periodic testing procedures for the selected systems to verify that the capabilities of the systems were periodically verified. The team also reviewed system health reports, as well as a sample of the governing procedures and documentation for the control of calculations that were translated into values used in plant procedures. In addition, the team performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ascertain the material condition of the systems.

To assess the licensees monitoring of the condition of underground cables, the team reviewed a sample of insulation resistance test procedures, test results, and trending for the power cable serving the 4160 Vac ECW pump motors and the power cable serving the 480 Vac motor control centers in the ECW intake structure. The team also reviewed a sample of surveillances of the 13.8/4.16 kV engineered safety features transformers.

The specific documents the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.

The team also reviewed the operation of the systems by reviewing normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures. The review included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports, technical specifications, design calculations and drawings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of problems associated with the selected systems that were identified by licensee personnel in the corrective action program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues and aging hardware.

The sample included open and closed condition reports and their disposition via maintenance work orders, or apparent cause evaluations, as documented in the licensees corrective action program. The sample covered the past 3 years and the documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report. Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, was used as guidance to perform this part of the inspection.

The team reviewed a sample of licensee condition reports involving electrical components and cable. The sample included conditions whereby cables in the underground duct bank to the ECW intake structure had become flooded, or had potential for flooding, and where the licensee had reported adverse trends of insulation

resistance for underground cable serving 480 Vac ECW loads. The specific condition reports the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The team performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the selected systems.

The team focused on the installation, configuration, and visible material condition of equipment and components. During the walkdowns, the team assessed:

The placement of protective barriers and systems, The susceptibility to flooding, fire, or environmental conditions, The physical separation of trains and the provisions for seismic concerns, Accessibility and lighting for any required operator action, The material condition and preservation of systems and equipment, and The conformance of the currently-installed system configuration to the design and licensing bases.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Design Review

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the current as-built instrument and control, electrical, and mechanical design of the selected systems and support systems. These reviews included an examination of design assumptions, calculations, environmental qualifications, required system thermal-hydraulic performance, electrical power system performance, control logic, and instrument setpoints and uncertainties. The team assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, test procedures, and operating procedures that licensee personnel used during normal and accident conditions.

The team also reviewed the adequacy of the original system design to perform the design basis functions during normal, accident and post-accident conditions. The review included: design basis documents; specifications; reliability calculations; instrument uncertainty/setpoint calculations; uncertainty calculations related to

emergency operating instruction action levels; and schematic diagrams. The adequacy of the design and maintenance of selected support systems was also reviewed.

In the electrical design portion of the inspection, the team selectively reviewed:

  • The calculations demonstrating that adequate voltage would be provided to the ECW pumps and motor-operated valves from the preferred (offsite) ac sources, and from the standby (onsite) diesel generator sources, under design basis conditions
  • The calculations demonstrating that the ampacities of the underground feeder cables to the ECW pump motors and ECW motor control centers were adequate
  • The calculations demonstrating that the electrical protection for the ECW pump motors and feeder cables, and screenwash booster pump motor thermal overload protection, were adequate, and would preclude premature trip.
  • The calculation for sizing the Class 1E batteries and instrument bus inverters for both design basis and station blackout conditions.

The review was focused on the acceptability of design inputs, assumptions, and methodology used in the calculations, translation of values to and from dependent documents, and the degree of design margin demonstrated by the results and conclusions. The specific calculations the team inspected are identified in the list of documents reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

6. Safety System Inspection and Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the program and procedures for testing and inspecting selected components for the selected systems and support systems. The review included the results of surveillance tests required by the technical specifications and a selective review of inservice tests.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspection findings were presented by the team leader during an exit meeting on December 2, 2005, to Mr. James J. Sheppard and other members of licensee management staff. The team leader confirmed that proprietary information, while reviewed, had not been retained by the team.

ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Aguilera, Radiological Manager, Radiological Engineering T. Bowman, Manager, Operations D. Dayton, Electrical System Engineer G. Jones, Instrumentation and Control Design Engineer E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight E. Heacock, Electrical Design Engineer S. Head, Manager, Licensing J. Jump, Manager, Process Improvement Leadership Team Q. Lee, HVAC Design Engineer J. Loya, Licensing Engineer, 10 CFR 50.59 M. McBurnett, Manager, Quality and Licensing M. Meier, General Manager, Station Support L. Merritt, HVAC System Engineer W. Mookhoek, Senior Engineer, Quality and Licensing G. Parkey, Vice President, Generation M. Prinz, Electrical System Engineer D. Rencurrel, Manager, Plant Engineering K. Regis, Essential Cooling Water System Engineer R. Savage, Senior Staff Specialist P. Schimpf, Motor Test Engineer W. Schultz, Mechanical Design Engineer J. Sheppard, President and CEO K. Taplett, Licensing Engineer D. Towler, Manager, Quality B. Weigand, Electrical Design Engineer D. Weigand, Fire Protection Engineer J. Winters, Maintenance Rule Coordinator D. Zink, Electrical Design Engineer

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Calculations

EC-5000, Voltage Regulation Study, Revision 12, 11/04/05

EC-5003-2, Cable Ampacity in Underground Ducts - Problems No. 5 through 10, Revision 8,

07/03/98

EC-5008, Class 1E Battery, Battery Charger and Inverter Sizing, Revision 13, 02/02/05.

EC-5014, Maximum Length of Control Cables/Class 1E and non-Class 1E, Revision 4, 10/21/99

Attachment

EC-5029, 4.16 kV Switchgear Relay Setting. Revision 5

EC-5052, Degraded and Undervoltage Protection, Revision 5, 06/08/04

EC-5067, PSB-1 Test Results Analysis - Unit 1, Revision 0, 08/24/88

EC-5100, Standby Diesel Generator Transient Response Model, Revision 1, 04/07/00

MC-6472, DVAC Calculation for AC Motor MOVs, Revision 0, 10/21/99

3R289MC5633, Essential Cooling Water Pump Submergence, Revision 2

MC-6476, Jacket Water and Lube Oil Cooler Performance, Revision 0

MC-6498, STP Pond Program, Revision 0

MC-6498, Essential Cooling Pond Thermal Performance Analysis, Revision 1

SP130(105), ECW Pump Trip Forcing Functions with 2" and 1/2" Vacuum Breakers, Revision 0

MC-6288, ECW Trip Forcing Functions with Vacuum Breakers, Revision 1

ZC-7028, Loop Uncertainty Calculation for Essential Cooling Water Pump Discharge

Temperatures, Revision 1

Engineering Evaluations

05-07071-4 05-07667-2 05-10323-1 01-19410-0

05-07303-6 05-08601-22

Condition Reports

05-8601-0 05-10323-1 03-13839 05-09878 05-15209

05-8601-5 05-15263 03-18389 05-11548 05-15242

99-12591-1 05-15679 05-01384 05-11757 05-15317

2-16395-1 96-04859-20 05-01437 05-11882 05-15453

03-10793 97-18613 05-07067 05-12142 05-15685

03-15730-3

Preventative Maintenance Work Orders (PMWO)

31904316 31915035 31926532 31934141

31911121 31919088

Attachment

Procedures

0PGP03-ZA-0090, Work Process Program, Revision 30

0PGP03-ZM-0028, Erection and Use of Temporary Scaffolding, Revision 11

0POP01-ZA-001, Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines, Revision 24

0POP02-EW-00001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision 36

0POP09-AN-02M3, Annunciator Lampbox 2M03 Response Instructions, Revision 17

0POP09-AN-02M4, Annunciator Lampbox 2M04 Response Instructions, Revision 18

0PSP11-ZE-0001, Check Valve Inspection, Revision 9

0PEP07-ZE-0008, Non-Intrusive Check Valve Testing, Revision 5

0POP02-0001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision36

0PMP05-PK-1000, Auxiliary ESF Transformer Test, Revision 7

0PMP05-PM-4800, Motor Control Center Maintenance, ITE Gould, Revision10

0PMP05-ZE-0201, Insulation Resistance and Overpotential Testing of Cables and Buses,

Revision 8

0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision11

0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision10

0PMP05-ZE-0203, Insulation Resistance Testing 4.16K and 13.8K Volt Motors, Revision 9

Design Change Packages

DCP 98-687-13, Replace Obsolete Class 1E MCC E2A2 and E2A4 ,Motor Controller and Circuit

Breaker Units, Revision 0

DCP 98-687-85, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E2A3, Revision 0

DCP 02-17395-12, Replace the Overload Heaters for MCC E1B1 Cubicle L3 and E1B1

Cubicle Q4, Revision 0

DCP 03-11137-9, Alternate Basket Assembly for the ECW Traveling Screen, Revision 0

DCP 04-11533-7, Revise High Alarm Setpoint N2EWPDSH6859, Revision 0

DCP 97-6297-85, EW Calculations, Revision 0

Attachment

DCP 05-52-192, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for Actuator Spring for EWFV6934

Valve, Revision 0

DCP 04-168-194, Alternate Replacement for 1/2 Aluminum Bronze Ball Valve, Revision 0

DCP 04-5417-1, Class 1E Battery Charger Paralleling, Revision 0

DCP 04-5388-4, Install Diodes Across Battery Chargers E2D11-1 and E2D11-2 Alarm Relays,

Revision 0

DCP 02-3305-6, Install New 480V Power Cables to Class 1E MCC E1A3 to Replace the

Existing Deteriorating Power Cables, Revision 0

DCP 03-3600-03, Revise UFSAR Section 3.5.1.4 to Delete the Missle Barrier Function of the

ECW Door and Add New 3.7.4 TRM Section for ECW System Intake Structure which Include

Compensatory Measures to Restore the Doors Flooding Function, Revision13

DCP 04-1238-88, Replace the Class 1E NSSS Inverter Systems, Revision13

DCP 03-01705, Special Treatment Requirement Exemption for 1-1/2 inch X 2-1/2 inch ECW

Relief Valves (ASME Class 3), Revision 1

DCP 03-15428, Alternate Repair Method for Backwash Arm of the ECW Self-Cleaning Strainer,

Revision 2

DCP 04-02317, Open RTD in C Phase of ECW Pump 1A Motor, Revision 2

DCP 05-07071, ECW Train 1B Piping Repair, Revision 3

Modification Packages,,

90075, Replace ECW Bellows to SBDG, Revision 0

Drawings

00000E0AAAA, Sheet 1, Revision 19, Single Line Diagram, Main One Line Diagram, Units 1

and 2

9-E-PKAA-01 #1, Revision 12, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1A

9-E-PKAB-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1B

9-E-PKAC-01 #1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear E1C

9E0DJAA#1, Sheet 1, Revision 18, Single Line Diagram 125 Vdc Class 1E Distribution

Switchboard E1A11 (Channel I)

Attachment

9E0PLAA#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1A

9E0PLAB#1, Revision 14, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1B

9E0PLAC#1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Load Center E1C

9EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 1, Revision 22, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1A1

9EPMAA-01 #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1A1

9E0PMAB#1, Sheet 1, Revision 21, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1A2

9E0PMAC#1, Sheet 1, Revision 13, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1A3

9E0PMAD #1, Sheet 1, Revision 20, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1B1

9E0PMAD #1, Sheet 2, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1B1

9E0PMAE #1, Sheet 1, Revision 16, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1B2

9E0PMAF #1, Sheet 1, Revision 17, Single Line Diagram, 480V Class 1E Motor Control

Center E1B3

Maintenance and Test Records

Startup Test Item 1PM01-117355, 480 Vac Motor Control Center, Power Cable PM LC-E1B1-4E

to MC-E1B3-E1, performed 12/04/85

EM-1-97000386, Clean/Inspect/Test MCC E1B3, performed 05/18/05 [includes insulation

resistance (Megger') test of cables]

EM-1-98000559, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 1C, performed

05/26/05

EM-2-EW-98000561, PM Work Order, DC Step Voltage Test/Trend, ECW Pump 2B, performed

05/26/05

EM-1-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 1A, performed 10/26/04

Attachment

EM-1-EW-98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1A, performed 05/16/03

EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1A, performed 04/16/02

EM-1-EW- 98000642, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1A, performed 06/17/99

EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 1B, performed 05/20/05

EM-1-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 1B, performed 10/09/03

EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1B, performed 01/02/01

EM-1-EW-98000643, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1B, performed 06/23/99

EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 1C, performed 05/26/05

EM-1-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 1C, performed 11/11/03

EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1C, performed 04/30/01

EM-1-EW-98000644, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 1C, performed 07/27/99

EM-1-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 2A, performed 05/19/04

EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2A, performed 06/20/03

EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/26/01

EM-2-EW-98000645, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2A, performed 02/03/99

EM-2-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 2B, performed 12/09/04

Attachment

EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2B, performed 12/15/01

EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2B, performed 07/24/00

EM-2-EW-98000646, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2B, performed 01/13/99

EM-2-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend, ECW

Pump 2C, performed 05/04/04

EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2C, performed 10/21/02

EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2C, performed 07/31/01

EM-2-EW-98000647, PM Work Order, Inspect/Insulation Resistance/Polarization Index/Trend,

ECW Pump 2C, performed 02/18/00

EM-2-PK-97000382, PM Work Order, Inspect/Test 13.8kV to 4160 Vac ESF Transformer E2A,

performed 10/19/02

Miscellaneous Documents

DCN CD-226, Add Note to the Drawing to Allow Up to an Additional 2" of Limestone Ground

Cover in the Protective Area, Revision 0

CR 05-11558, Request Civil Engineering Evaluate the Observed Conditions to Determine if

Rework is Required to Meet the Design Criteria to Prevent Surface Water from Entering the

Manholes, Revision 0

PCF 101343 A, Remove Check Valve Internals, Revision 0

5R289MB1006, UFSAR Essential Cooling Water System, pages 4-139 to 4-143, Revision 5

IRAGs 50.59, Programs Self-Assessment Plan, Revision 0

SPR 910401, Corrective Action Group Closure Documentation Checklist, Revision 0

USQE 97-6297-7, Engineering Evaluation for Abandonment of 150 Ton Essential Chillers,

Revision 0

01-9518-6, USFAR Change 01-9518-5 Increase in Pressurizer Water Level Above Program in

Mode 3, Revision 0

Attachment

USQE 99-66-64, Replace Model E SG UFSAR Section 6.2.1 Containment LOCA/MSLB

Pressure/Temperature Analyses with Delta-94 SG Analyses, Revision 0

01-10770-2, Change UFSAR and Tech Spec to Reflect Rod Withdrawal Analysis Result,

Revision 11

01-14284-6, Change UFSAR Chapter 15 for OPDT/OTDT 2-second Time Constant Modification,

Revision13

2-19072-34, Unit 2 Main Turbine Generator Rotor Torsional Response Test, Revision 0

USQE 00-16902-6, Design Change to Declare One RHR Heat Exchanger as a Spare Train,

Revision 0

STP Probablistic Risk Assessment Level 1 Quantification, Revision 4

Plant Change Form 101343A

27-008-400, Essential Cooling Pond Fish Population Study, Revision 0

STP Nuclear Operating Company Letters:

NOC-AE-05001894, Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

NOC-AE-05001999, Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

NOC-AE-05001819, Request for Relief from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

PM 05000352 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements for

inverter 3E241EIV1201]

PM 05000358 Information Form, printed 11/15/2005 [preventive maintenance requirements for

inverter 3E241EIV1201 electrolytic capacitor replacement]

4E510EQ1005, Revision 8, Design Criteria for Class 1E AC Power Distribution, including

DCN 0300042.

EMT917.03, Basic Test Equipment, Insulation Resistance and High Potential Testers [training

package for EMTs].

Setpoint Index Record Print Out 11/30/05, for ECW MOVs 0121,0137, 015; and ECW

screenwash booster Pumps 1A, 1B, 1

C.

Bechtel Letter ST-YS-HS-8958 dated 11/17/1986, Subject: HL&Ps South Texas Project Units 1

& 2, HVAC for EAB Battery Rooms Hydrogen Removal.

OE 15631, Breaker Cell Switch Failure Caused Essential Cooling Water Pump Trip, 08/14/03.

Attachment