ML17299A856: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 12/02/1985
| issue date = 12/02/1985
| title = Special Rept (1-SR-85-027):on 851030,diesel Generator a Failed to Start from Control Room While Performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01.Caused by Faulty Fiber Optic Cable.Cable Replaced
| title = Special Rept (1-SR-85-027):on 851030,diesel Generator a Failed to Start from Control Room While Performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01.Caused by Faulty Fiber Optic Cable.Cable Replaced
| author name = VAN BRUNT E E
| author name = Van Brunt E
| author affiliation = ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
| author affiliation = ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
| addressee name = MARTIN J B
| addressee name = Martin J
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
| docket = 05000528
| docket = 05000528
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o.BOX 52034~PHOENIX.ARIZONA 85072-2034 December 2, 1985 ANPP 34143 EEVB/GEC Mr.John B.Martin, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368
{{#Wiki_filter:Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 December 2, 1985 ANPP 34143 EEVB/GEC Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 1 Docket No.STN 50-528, License No.NPF-41 Special Report-Diesel Generator Failure to Start During Surveillance Testing File: 85-020-404
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-41 Special Report Diesel Generator Failure to Start During Surveillance Testing File:   85-020-404


==Dear Mr.Martin:==
==Dear Mr. Martin:==
Attached please find a Special Report (1-SR-'85-027) prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.This report discusses a diesel generator start failure during Surveillance Testing.If you have any questions, please contact me.EEVB/GEC/rw Attachments Very truly yours, z=py~8 WJ~p E.E.Van Brunt, Jr.Executive Vice President Project Director cc: R.P.Zimmerman (all w/a)A.L.Hon E.A.Licitra A.C.Gehr INFO Records Center 85121001'28 851202 PDR ADOCK 05000528 8 PDR gk'h) el V J l f~c>>-/)~>t J'\y Attachment to ANPP 34143 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DIESEL GENERATOR FAILED TO START DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING Docket No.STN 50-528 License No.NPF-41 Special Report 1-SR-85-027 At 0420 on October 30, 1985, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 when Diesel Generator"A" failed to start from the Control Room while performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01 (Emergency Diesel Generator A Start and Load 4.8.1.1.2.a).
 
At 0450, an attempt was made to start the diesel from the local control station, but it again failed to start.The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor complied with Technical Specifications (T.S.)3.8.1.1, ACTION a, by verifying the operability of the remaining A.C.power sources.The cause of the unsuccessful start was a faulty fiber optic cable failing to actuate the 86S1Y relay (test mode starting relay).The failure of the 86S1Y relay to actuate simulated a nonessential trip to the diesel engine control logic, with no actual trip signal present, and prevented test mode operation.
Attached please find a Special Report (1-SR-'85-027) prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.                         This report discusses a diesel generator start failure during Surveillance Testing.
Since nonessential trips are bypassed in an emergency condition, this fiber optic cable failure would not have prevented an emergency (accident) start.The opposite train diesel generator was proven operable in accordance with procedure 41ST-'1ZZ02, satisfying T.S.3.8.1.1., ACTION a.This was not logged as a valid test or failure in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e.(2)of Regulatory Guide 1.108, and a substantiating Engineering Evaluation Report was written.The faulty fiber optic cable was replaced and Diesel Generator"A" was declared OPERABLE at 0358 on October 31, 1985.Diesel Generator"A" had been unavailable for 23 hours and 38 minutes.Plant Change Request PCR-85-13-DG-058 was initiated on November 1, 1985, to modify the fiber optic system to increase its reliability There have been two failures in the last 100 valid tests.The current surveillance test interval is every 14 days and is in conformance with Regulatory Position C.2.d.(2)of Regulatory Guide 1.108.
If you have any questions,     please contact me.
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Very     truly yours, z=py~8               WJ ~p E. E. Van     Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/GEC/rw Attachments cc:   R. P. Zimmerman (all w/a)
A. L. Hon E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INFO Records Center 85121001'28 851202 PDR   ADOCK 05000528 8                   PDR gk
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Attachment to ANPP 34143 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DIESEL GENERATOR FAILED TO START DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING Docket No. STN 50-528 License No. NPF-41 Special Report 1-SR-85-027 At 0420 on October 30, 1985, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 when Diesel Generator "A" failed to start from the Control Room while performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01 (Emergency Diesel Generator A Start and Load 4.8.1.1.2.a). At 0450, an attempt was made to start the diesel from the local control station, but   it again failed to start. The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor complied with Technical Specifications (T.S.) 3.8.1.1, ACTION a, by verifying the operability of the remaining A.C. power sources.
The cause   of the unsuccessful start was a faulty fiber optic cable failing to actuate the 86S1Y relay (test mode starting relay). The failure of the 86S1Y relay to actuate simulated a nonessential trip to the diesel engine control logic, with no actual trip signal present, and prevented test mode operation. Since nonessential trips are bypassed in an emergency condition, this fiber optic cable failure would not have prevented an emergency (accident) start. The opposite train diesel generator was proven operable in accordance with procedure 41ST-'1ZZ02, satisfying T.S. 3.8.1.1.,
ACTION a. This was not logged as a valid test or failure in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e.(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108, and a substantiating Engineering Evaluation Report was written.
The faulty fiber optic cable was replaced and Diesel Generator "A" was declared OPERABLE at 0358 on October 31, 1985. Diesel Generator "A" had been unavailable for 23 hours and 38 minutes.
Plant Change Request PCR-85-13-DG-058 was   initiated on November 1, 1985, to modify the   fiber optic system to increase   its reliability There have been two   failures in the last 100 valid tests. The current surveillance test interval is every 14 days and is in conformance with Regulatory Position C.2.d.(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108.
 
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Latest revision as of 11:44, 29 October 2019

Special Rept (1-SR-85-027):on 851030,diesel Generator a Failed to Start from Control Room While Performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01.Caused by Faulty Fiber Optic Cable.Cable Replaced
ML17299A856
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 12/02/1985
From: Van Brunt E
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Martin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
(1-SR-85-027), (1-SR-85-27), ANPP-34143-EEVB, NUDOCS 8512100128
Download: ML17299A856 (4)


Text

Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.o. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 December 2, 1985 ANPP 34143 EEVB/GEC Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-41 Special Report Diesel Generator Failure to Start During Surveillance Testing File: 85-020-404

Dear Mr. Martin:

Attached please find a Special Report (1-SR-'85-027) prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2. This report discusses a diesel generator start failure during Surveillance Testing.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours, z=py~8 WJ ~p E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/GEC/rw Attachments cc: R. P. Zimmerman (all w/a)

A. L. Hon E. A. Licitra A. C. Gehr INFO Records Center 85121001'28 851202 PDR ADOCK 05000528 8 PDR gk

'h)

V J el l

f

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~ > t J'\

y

Attachment to ANPP 34143 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DIESEL GENERATOR FAILED TO START DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING Docket No. STN 50-528 License No. NPF-41 Special Report 1-SR-85-027 At 0420 on October 30, 1985, Unit 1 was in Mode 4 when Diesel Generator "A" failed to start from the Control Room while performing Surveillance Test Procedure 41ST-1DG01 (Emergency Diesel Generator A Start and Load 4.8.1.1.2.a). At 0450, an attempt was made to start the diesel from the local control station, but it again failed to start. The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor complied with Technical Specifications (T.S.) 3.8.1.1, ACTION a, by verifying the operability of the remaining A.C. power sources.

The cause of the unsuccessful start was a faulty fiber optic cable failing to actuate the 86S1Y relay (test mode starting relay). The failure of the 86S1Y relay to actuate simulated a nonessential trip to the diesel engine control logic, with no actual trip signal present, and prevented test mode operation. Since nonessential trips are bypassed in an emergency condition, this fiber optic cable failure would not have prevented an emergency (accident) start. The opposite train diesel generator was proven operable in accordance with procedure 41ST-'1ZZ02, satisfying T.S. 3.8.1.1.,

ACTION a. This was not logged as a valid test or failure in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e.(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108, and a substantiating Engineering Evaluation Report was written.

The faulty fiber optic cable was replaced and Diesel Generator "A" was declared OPERABLE at 0358 on October 31, 1985. Diesel Generator "A" had been unavailable for 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> and 38 minutes.

Plant Change Request PCR-85-13-DG-058 was initiated on November 1, 1985, to modify the fiber optic system to increase its reliability There have been two failures in the last 100 valid tests. The current surveillance test interval is every 14 days and is in conformance with Regulatory Position C.2.d.(2) of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

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