ML18012A135

LER 96-001-00:on 960110,RAB Door Was Found Blocked Open That Resulted in Entry Into TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Controls.Installed Plant Mod That Provides Alarming Capability for RAB.W/960209 Ltr

ML18012A135
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/08/1996
From:	DONAHUE J W, VERRILLI M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-017, HNP-96-17, LER-96-001, LER-96-1, NUDOCS 9602150020
Download: ML18012A135 (8)

Text

G~iP ave'REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM (RIDS)I<<j ACCESSION NBR:9602150020 DOC.DATE: 96/02/08 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERR L~I,M.Carolina Power&Light Co.DONAHUE,J.W.

Carolina Power&Light Co.REQ~P.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400

SUBJECT:

LER 96-001-00:on 960110,RAB door was found blocked oPen tnat resulted in entry into TS 3.0.3.Caused by inadequate controls.Installed plant mod that provides alarming capability for RAB.W/960209 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 g RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-'D INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LE,N QQ~D/RA FILE CE NR DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCEiJ H NOAC POORE,W.NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 D U NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT.415-2083)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAi NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Carolina Power tk Light Company PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 FEB 0 9 l996 William R.Robinson Vice President Harris Nuclear Plant Serial: HNP-96-017 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 R-0 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report.is submitted.

This report concerns a Reactor Auxiliary Building door that was found blocked open which resulted in an entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3.Sincerely, J.W.Donahue General Manager Harris Plant Enclosure c:, Mr.S.D.Ebneter (NRC-RII)Mr.N.B.Le (NRC-PM/NRR)Mr.D.J.Roberts (NRC-HNP)9602150020 960208 PDR ADOCK 05000400 PDR Gi".21~~J~II State Road 1134 New Hill NC Tel 919362.2502 Fax 919362.2095

NRC FORM 366 g-95)U.S.LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30I96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY UIFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT4)F33), US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

1VASHINGTON, OC 20555400), AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO)ECT 13)5(h 0104).OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON.

OC 20503.FACILITY NAME 11)Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 DOCKET NUMBER{2)50-400 PAGE (3)1OF3 TITLE (4)Reactor Auxiliary Building door found blocked open resulting in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3.MONTH DAY YEAR 10 96 EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 96-001-00 MONTH BAY YEAR 96 REPORT DATE (7)FACILITY NAME FACILITY NAME OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)DOCKET NUMBER 05000 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)'100e/20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)

(2)lii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)

(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)

(4)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 OTHER W Specrfy In Abstract belo or m NRC Form 366A THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more)(11)NAME LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)TELEPHONE NUMBER l)rCIude Area Code)Michael Verrilti Sr.Analyst-Licensing COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES (919)362-2303 CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRQS ,rs CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED l14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On January 10, 1996 at 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br />, a door in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), which serves as a boundary for the RAB Emergency Exhaust System, was found blocked open with a plastic clock face cover by the NRC Resident Inspector.

With this door open, testing determined that the Technical Specification (TS)requirement for the RAB Emergency Exhaust System to maintain a negative pressure of 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere would not have been met had the system been needed.This condition constituted an entry into TS 3.0.3 since both trains of RAB Emergency Exhaust were affected, and is therefore being reported per, 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

The cause of this condition was inadequate controls to ensure that the doors serving as RAB Emergency Exhaust System boundaries are closed or properly controlled.

Investigation into the event could not conclusively determine if the door was intentionally blocked open, which would indicate personnel error or if the clock face cover had fallen to the fioor and was then wedged under the door during a subsequent opening.P Corrective actions will include installing a plant modification that provides alarming capability for RAB Emergency Exhaust System boundary doors and further emphasizing their closure requirements.

Tl N RM M.)

NRC FORM 366A I4.95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME II)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit 41 TEXT frf mort space rs rtrfvdtd, vst tdS(iooo!cop ts of A'RC Farm SSW Ill)OOCKET 50400 LER NUMBER I6)SEQUENTIAL REYISION NUMBER NUMBER 96-001-00 PAGE I3)2 OF 3 EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On January,'10, 1996 the plant was operating in Mode-1 at 100%power.At 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br />, door¹591, in the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), which serves as a boundary for the RAB Emergency Exhaust System (EIIS Code VF), was found blocked open by the NRC Resident Inspector.

The bottom of the door had a plastic face cover from a nearby hanging wall clock wedged between it and the floor, blocking it in the opened position.This condition was observed at 0845 hours0.00978 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.215225e-4 months <br /> by a Chemistry Technician, but this individual incorrectly assumed that the control room was aware of, and that permission had been granted for the door to be open.The door remained open until observed by the NRC resident inspector during a plant walk-down, at which time he contacted the control room and at 1028 the door was closed by an auxiliary operator.The door had been observed closed at approximately 0800 that morning during auxiliary operator rounds.To assess the impact on RAB Emergency Exhaust System operability, testing was performed, which concluded that the Technical Specification (TS)requirement for the RAB Emergency Exhaust System to maintain a negative pressure of 1/8 inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere, would not have been met had the system been needed.This condition constituted an entry into TS 3.0.3 since both trains of RAB Emergency Exhaust were affected, and is therefore being reported per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

CAUSE: The cause of this condition was inadequate controls to ensure that doors serving as RAB Emergency Exhaust System boundaries are closed or properly controlled.

Investigation into the event could not conclusively determine if the door was intentionally blocked open, which would indicate personnel error or if the clock face cover had fallen to the floor and was then wedged under the door during a subsequent opening.Personnel that had access to this portion of the RAB on January 10, 1996 were identified and interviewed to determine if the door was blocked open intentionally.

None of these personnel acknowledged blocking the door open and only the Chemistry Technician and auxiliary operator that closed the door, acknowledged observing it in the blocked open position.The inadvertent TS 3.0.3 entry occurred because both trains of RAB Emergency Exhaust were affected during the time period that door¹591 was blocked open.SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event.During the approximate 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time period that door¹591 was blocked open, the normal RAB ventilation system was in service and no increase in effluent radiation levels were detected.Testing performed during the investigation revealed that had a design basis accident occurred, even with Normal RAB Ventilation secured and door 591 open, adequate air flow into the RAB Emergency Exhaust System boundary would have existed, thus ensuring that no unfiltered gaseous effluent would have been released from the RAB.V8 3 A(4-5)

NRC FORM 366A l4-95)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERj TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME II)Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant~Unit 0'1 TEXT pr more space r's rervi ed, vse eddebrvl cepms of NRC perm 36QI)1 7)DOCKET 50100 LER NUMBER (6)00 96-001 YEAR SLGUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER PAGE)3)3 OF 3 PREVIOUS SIMILAR LERs: LER¹90-10 was submitted on April 7, 1990.This LER identified the initial deficiency concerning a lack of control for doors serving as RAB Emergency Exhaust System boundaries.

Corrective actions included the original development of administrative controls for these doors.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1.A memorandum was distributed to site personnel on January 11, 1996 relating the requirements associated with the RAB boundary doors.This memorandum will be read, signed by each employee and returned to their supervisor, to acknowledge an understanding of the RAB boundary door closure requirements.

Acknowledgement of these requirements (signing the memo)was also incorporated into the plant access badging process on January 22, 1996.2.The Chemistry Technician that observed the blocked open door and failed to contact the control room was counseled.

This was completed on January 10, 1996.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED: 1.A plant modification will be installed that provides alarming capability for RAB Emergency Exhaust System boundary doors.This modification will be completed by September 30, 1996.2.Training will be performed as an interim action, to re-emphasize the requirements for RAB Emergency Exhaust System doors, including the need for closure verification following entrance and exit.This training will be completed by February 29, 1996.EIIS CODES: Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System-VF NR M A)4)

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