ONS-2014-161, Submittal of the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites)

Submittal of the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites)

ML14364A213
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	12/19/2014
From:	Batson S Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2014-161
Download: ML14364A213 (103)

Text

Scott L. Batson DUKE Vice President Oconee NuclearStation ENERGY, Duke Energy ONOIVP 17800 RochesterHwy Seneca, SC 29672 o: 864.873.3274 ONS-2014-161 f. 864.873.4208 Scott.Batson@duke-energy.com December 19, 2014 ATTN: Document Control Desk 10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Duke Energy Carolina, LLC (Duke Energy)

Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 Renewed License Numbers DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55

Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Station, Submittal of the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites)

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuantto Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichiAccident, dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340

2. NEI Letter, ProposedPath Forwardfor NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379 & ML13102A142

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic,"as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations,dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331

4. Duke Energy Letter, Seismic Hazardand Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(o Request for Information Pursuantto Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regardingRecommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichiAccident, dated March 31, 2014 ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A024 Ladies and Gentlemen, On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Request for Information per 10CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1) to all power reactor licensees. Enclosure 1 of that request, contained guidance for each licensee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to perform a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening.

In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) requested NRC agreement for an alternative schedule which delayed the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an updated ground motion attenuation model could be completed. NEI proposed that descriptions of subsurface materials and properties and base case velocity profiles be submitted to the NRC by September 12, 2013, with the remaining seismic hazard and screening information submitted by March 31, 2014. Duke Energy submitted the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for the Oconee station (Reference 4) on March 31,2014. P 10

ONS-2014-161 Page 2 Oconee Nuclear Station, ESEP Report December 19, 2014 Reference 1 requested that prior to completion of the risk evaluation, if appropriate due to a higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, licensees are to provide interim evaluations and identify actions taken or planned. Reference 2 provided the NRC with proposed guidance to address this action, referred to as an Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP).

In Reference 3, the NRC agreed with the alternate schedule and the ESEP guidance (EPRI Report 3002000704) submitted by Reference 2 .

The ESEP Report for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 was prepared in accordance with the endorsed guidance and is provided as Attachment 1 to this letter.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact David Haile with Oconee Regulatory Affairs, at (864) 873-4742.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 19, 2014.

Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station

Attachment:

1. Oconee Nuclear Station, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

ONS-2014-161 Page 3 Oconee Nuclear Station, ESEP Report December 19, 2014 cc:

Mr. Victor McCree, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 Mr. William Dean, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. James R. Hall, Project Manager (ONS)

(by electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop O-8B1 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Nicholas DiFrancesco, Project Manager (Seismic Walkdowns and Reevaluations)

(by electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop O-13C5 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

ONS-2014-161 Page 4 Oconee Nuclear Station, ESEP Report December 19, 2014 bxc:

T.P. Gillespie (EC07H)

T.D. Ray (ON01VP)

R.H. Guy (ON01VP)

T.L. Patterson (ON01VP)

C.T. Dunton (ON01El)

D. C. Jones (ON01 El)

R. P. Childs (ON03MC)

D. M. Hubbard (ON03PC)

C.J. Wasik (ON03RC)

D.C. Haile (ON03RC)

M.C. Nolan (EC05P)

J. A. Olivier (EC2ZF)

C.J. Thomas (EC01T)

D.H. Llewellyn (EC09E)

G.D. Robison (EC09E)

P. F. Guill (EC01T)

ONS Master File (ON02DM, File OS 801.01)

ELL (EC2ZF)

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT November 24, 2014 Revision 1 Duke Energy Oconee Nuclear Station Page 1 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE AND O BJECTIVE ............................................................................................... 4 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES ...................... 4 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL .................................................................. 6 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL .................................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL Developm ent .............................................................................................. 7 3.1.2 Pow er-Operated Valves ..................................................................................... 8 3.1.3 Pull Boxes ........................................................................................................ 8 3.1.4 Term ination Cabinets .......................................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrum entation Indicators .................................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ........................................................... 8 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Im plem entation ....................................................................................................... 9 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS) ........................................................ 9 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee ................................................................. 9 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) .................................................. 11 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) .................................................................... 15 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected ................................................................................. 15 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) ..................................... 17 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH ................................................................. 17 6.1 Sum m ary of M ethodologies Used .......................................................................... 18 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process ........................................................................................ 19 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determ ination ............................................................................... 20 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL ......................................... 20 6.5 Seism ic W alkdow n Approach ................................................................................ 20 6.5.1 W alkdow n Approach ....................................................................................... 20 6.5.2 W alkdow ns and W alk-Bys ................................................................................. 22 6.5.3 Significant W alkdow n Findings ........................................................................ 22 6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ..................................................................................... 22 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays ............................................................................ 23 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) ................................ 23 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S ..................................................................................................... 24 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns ...................................... 24 7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out ......................................... 24 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS ............................................................................... 24 8.1 Supporting Inform ation ......................................................................................... 24 8.2 Identification of Planned M odifications ................................................................. 26 8.3 M odification Im plem entation Schedule .................................................................. 26 Page 2 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments ................................................................. 26 9.0 REFEREN CES ...................................................................................................................... 27 APPENDICES APPENDIX A ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX D ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX E ONS FLEX Flow Paths (Unit 1 Only)

FIGURES Figure 4-1. ONS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4] ...................................................... 10 Figure 4-2. ONS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Form [4] .................................................... 11 Figure 4-3. ONS SSE (5% Dam ping) [4] ...................................................................................... 12 Figure 4-4. ONS SSF-SSE (5% Dam ping) ................................................................................... 13 Figure 4-5. O NS SSE (5% Dam ping) .......................................................................................... 14 Figure 4-6. Comparison of ONS GMRS, SSF-SSE, and SSE (5% Damping) ................................ 14 Figure 5-1. ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM (5% Damping) ............................................................ 17 Figure 6-1. Comparison of ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE ....................................... 19 TABLES Table 4-1. ONS SSF-SSE (5% Dam ping) [21] ............................................................................ 13 Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSF-SSE and SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping) ...... 15 Table 5-2. ONS SSF-RLGM and Balance of Plant RLGM (5% Damping) ..................................... 16 Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions ........................................................... 27 Page 3 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The ONS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.

This summary is derived from the ONS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3] (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [22], [23], and [24]), and ONS Calculation OSC-11217, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) [18].

The strategies described below are typical for Units 1, 2, and 3. During Phase 1, steam generator heat removal is achieved via the existing Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)

Page 4 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) Pump with suction from the buried Condenser Circulating Water system injecting into steam generators. Additionally, the Main Steam (MS)

Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) are throttled to control Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown.

The Phase 2 Primary FLEX path employs a tap off of the Station ASW lines via the credited B.5.b connection located in the Auxiliary Building. The Phase 2 Alternate FLEX path employs taps off of the SSF ASW lines via new FLEX mechanical connections located in the Auxiliary Building. During Phase 2 the ADVs are also required for system depressurization to support a portable diesel-driven low-pressure pump with suction from Lake Keowee through the Oconee Intake Canal or from Chemical Treatment Pond 1 (CTP-1) to provide steam generator heat-removal capability. The Phase 3 strategy is to sustain and enhance the Phase 2 strategy with portable National Response Center equipment using the same connections.

RCS borated makeup during Phase 1 is achieved via the existing SSF Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump taking suction from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and injecting into the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seals. RCS inventory and pressure control relies on isolating RCP seal return and RCS Letdown, operating and isolating SSF Letdown, operating SSF Pressurizer Heaters, and operating Power-Operated Relief Valves.

The Phase 2 strategy supplies RCS borated makeup water with a portable diesel-driven high-pressure pump with suction from a new connection off the Borated Water Storage Tank piping and injecting into existing RCS injection header and/or RCP seal injection header vents and drains. All connection points are located inside the Auxiliary Building.

Vents and drains located in the East Penetration Room provide connection points for the Primary FLEX strategy; while West Penetration Room vents and drains provide connection points for the Alternate FLEX strategy.

Also during Phase 2, RCS inventory and pressure control strategies rely on isolating RCP seal return and RCS Letdown, isolation of SSF Letdown, operating Head and High Point Vent Valves if needed, and isolating or venting Core Flood Tanks to prevent nitrogen intrusion into the RCS. The Phase 3 strategy is to sustain the Phase 2 strategy with portable National Response Center equipment using the same connections.

Spent Fuel Pool Make-up is not required during Phase 1. Phase 2 strategy uses a portable diesel-driven low-pressure pump to supply SFP makeup water; taking suction from Lake Keowee via the Oconee Intake Canal or CTP-1 and injecting directly into the pool. The Phase 2 Primary FLEX strategy involves all portable equipment. The Phase 2 Alternate FLEX strategy connects to an existing safety grade SFP fill pipe. The Phase 3 strategy is to sustain and enhance* the Phase 2 strategy with portable National Response Center equipment using the same connections.

Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the ONS FLEX OIP submittal [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], [23],

and [24], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries, equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoring Page 5 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I instrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containment integrity.

Flow diagrams showing the Unit 1 FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix E.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The complete ESELs for Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3 are presented in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively. The ESEL for the SSF is presented in Appendix D.

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2, and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the ONS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], [23], and [24].

The OIP provides the ONS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the ONS OIP [3] and supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [22], [23], and [24]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704.

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance and are a subset of those outlined in the ONS OIP

[31 and subsequent updates [22], [23], and [24].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the ONS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [22], [23], and [24] as described in Section 2.

Page 6 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

• Structures (e.g., containment, Reactor Building, Control Building, Auxiliary Building, etc.)

• Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

• Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, RCPs and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

8. There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. Additionally, the scope of components assumes that no Phase 2 or 3 FLEX actions will be required to maintain containment integrity.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the ONS OIP [3] and subsequent updates

[22], [23], and [24] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.

Page 7 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that

"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the ONS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves:

• Power-operated valves that remain energized during the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1 that are re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets which are necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the ONS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [22], [23], and [24] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Page 8 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports ..." are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in the FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow paths are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL was developed based upon a success path which has been identified to minimize the reliance on installed equipment and infrastructure following a beyond design basis (BDB) seismic event. Reliance on fewer components and infrastructure reduces the number of components exposed to the BDB seismic event that must function to accomplish the strategy and therefore increases the confidence of success. The chosen success path is comprised of components from the primary FLEX strategy, the alternate FLEX strategy, or pieces from both for each safety function identified.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The ONS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) was included in the ONS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the ONS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The ONS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

The ONS Control Point is located at Elevation 753', which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings for each Unit.

Page 9 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Table 2-4-1. UHRS and GMRS for Oconee.

Freq. (Hz) 104 UHRS (g) 10- UHRS (g) GMRS (g) 100 2.55E-01 8-37E-01 3.96E-01 90 2.56E-01 8.46E-01 4.00E-01 80 2-61 E-01 8.66E-01 4.09E-01 70 2-73E-01 9.18E-01 4.32E-01 60 3-05E-01 1.05E+00 4.92E-01 50 3.81E-01 1.34E+00 6.24E-01 40 4.78E-01 1.67E+00 7-79E-01 35 5-17E-01 1.78E+00 8.34E-01 30 5.46E-01 1.85E+00 8.68E-01 25 5.58E-01 1.85E+00 8-74E-01 20 5.54E-01 1.82E+00 8.60E-01 15 5-10E-01 1.65E+00 7.81E-01 12.5 4-75E-01 1-52E+00 7-22E-01 10 4.32E-01 1.36E+00 6.50E-01 9 4-01E-01 1.26E+00 6.-OE-01 8 3.71E-01 1.15E+00 5.51E-01 7 3.39E-01 1.04E+00 4.99E-01 6 3.03E-01 9.22E-01 4.43E-01 5 2.62E-01 7-88E-01 3-79E-01 4 2.t 1E-01 6.19E-01 2.99E-01 3.5 1.88E-01 5-41E-01 2.63E-01 3 1-58E-01 4.48E-01 2.18E-01 2.5 1.29E-01 3.59E-01 1.76E-01 2 1.17E-01 3.13E-01 1.54E-01 1.5 9A8E-02 2.40E-01 1-20E-01 1.25 7.96E-02 1.95E-01 9-79E-02 1 6.91 E-02 1.62E-01 8.21 E-02 0.9 6-73E-02 1.57E-01 7.96E-02 0.8 6.53E-02 1.51E-01 7.68E-02 0.7 6.22E-02 1.43E-01 7-27E-02 0.6 5.71E-02 1.30E-01 6.61E-02 0.5 4.93E-02 111E-01 5.66E-02 0.4 3.94E-02 8.87E-02 4.53E-02 0-35 3-45E-02 7-76E-02 3.96E-02 0.3 2.96E-02 6.65E-02 3.39E-02 0.25 2.46E-02 5.55E-02 2.83E-02 0.2 1.97E-02 4.44E-02 2.26E-02 0.15 1.48E-02 3.33E-02 1.70E-02 0.125 1.23E-02 2.77E-02 1.41E-02 0.1 9.85E-03 2.22E-02 1.1 3E-02 Figure 4-1. ONS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Form [4].

Page 10 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I ONS GMRS 0.9 0.S5 GMRS, - / -

0.735 "-

0.7 0.65 .. .

0.6  :

0-33 0..5 _

U 0.4 0.45 - ---

.9 0.33'"#

0.3 -  :

0.2*

0.2 0.13 0.1 ..

0.05 I 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. ONS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Form [4].

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

ONS has two distinct spectra for structures founded on rock; one for the SSF and one for the remainder of the plant (hereinafter referred to as SSF-SSE and SSE, respectively). Digitized SSE frequency and acceleration values from the ONS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-3, which is Table 3.1-1 from [4]. Digitized SSF-SSE frequency and acceleration values from the ONS Specification OSS-027B.00-00-0002, Figure 5 [21] are shown in Table 4-1. The SSF-SSE and SSE are plotted in Figures 4-4 and 4-5, respectively.

A comparison of the ONS GMRS plotted against the SSF-SSE and SSE is shown in Figure 4-6.

Page 11 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I Table 3.1-1. SSE for Oconee (AMEC, 2012)

Freq (lHz) SSE (g) Freg (Hz) SSE (g) Freq (Hz) SSE (g) Freg (Hz) SSE (g) 0-2 0.02 3.38 0.1421 8.6 0.1157 15.4 0.1018 0.27 0.028 3.48 0.1411 8.8 0.1151 15.6 0.1015 0.37 0.0379 3.58 0.1402 9 0.1145 15.8 0.1012 0A7 0.0452 3.6 0.14 9.2 0.114 16 0.1009 0.57 0.0521 3.7 0.1392 9.4 0.1134 16.2 0.1007 0.67 0.0587 3.8 0.1384 9.6 0.1129 16.4 0.1004 0.69 0.06 3.9 0.1376 9.8 0.1124 16.6 0.1001 0.79 0.0673 4 0.1368 10 0.1119 16.7 0.1 0.89 0.0744 4.1 0.1361 10.2 0.1114 100 0.1 0.99 0.0813 4.2 0.1353 10.4 0.1109 1.09 0.0882 4.3 0.1347 10.6 0.1105 1.19 0.095 4.4 0.134 10.8 0.11 1.29 0.1017 4.5 0.1333 11 0.1096 1.39 0.1083 4.6 0.1327 11.2 0.1092 1.49 0.1148 4.7 0.132 11.4 0.1087 1.57 0.12 4.8 0.1314 11.6 0.1083 1.67 0.1248 4.9 0.1308 11.8 0.1079 1.77 0.1295 5.2 0.1292 12 0.1075 1.87 0.1341 5.4 0.1281 12.2 0.1071 1.97 0.1387 5.6 0.1271 12.4 0.1067 2 0.14 5.8 0.1261 12.6 0.1064 2.1 0.1416 6 0.1252 12.8 0.106 2.2 0.1432 6.2 0.1243 13 0.1056 2.3 0.1447 6.4 0.1234 13.2 0.1053 2.4 0.1461 6.6 0.1226 13.4 0.1049 2.5 0.1476 6.8 0.1218 13.6 0.1046 2.6 0.1489 7 0.121 13.8 0.1043 2.68 0.15 7.2 0.1203 14 0.1039 2.78 0.1487 7.4 0.1195 14.2 0.1036 2.88 0.1475 7.6 0.1188 14.4 0.1033 2.98 0.1463 7.8 0.1182 14.6 0.103 3.08 0.1452 8 0.1175 14.8 0.1027 3.18 0.1441 8.2 0.1169 15 0.10241 3-28 0.1431 8.4 0.1163 15.2 0.1021 1 Figure 4-3. ONS SSE (5% Damping) (4].

Page 12 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Table 4-1. ONS SSF-SSE (5% Damping) [21].

Frequency Spectral Acceleration (Hz) (g) 0.25 0.05 2.5 0.32 9 0.27 33/PGA 0.10 ONS SSF-SSE (5% Damping)

C3 C2

-Qt 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-4. ONS SSF-SSE (5% Damping).

Page 13 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I ONS SSF-SSE (5% Damping) 1)1- + +-+-F I Till *-~J----i-i II. -I ~-f-~--i---h~*+/-1

[I

[

0.2U Pr k

0.nA. ---.----l- I . I .I - , - i- -i ! i iA I.

C

/

L.

A I I I I

/

F,

+-+-t-~ I I 0.1; K

N 0.01' , Mm I I I I i b0.1 I !0 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-5. ONS SSE (5% Damping).

ONS GNMS vs SSF-SSE and SSE 0-9 0.85 MRS -

o.s 1SSF-SSE 0.75 -SSE --- _

0.4 -"

0.65 a

0.3 --

a)

C, 0.4 C) 0.35 0.3 -" -' ".- -

0.2 or_ I 0.05 *op ,-

I 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-6. Comparison of ONS GMRS, SSF-SSE, and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 14 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratios of the GMRS to the SSF-SSE and SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range are shown in Table 5-1. The largest ratios of the GMRS to the SSF-SSE and SSE in the 1 to 10 Hz range are at 10 Hz. The spectral acceleration ratio is 2.62 for the SSF and 5.80 for the remainder of the plant. The RLGM is therefore determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 2.0, as limited per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. Digitized SSF-RLGM and balance of plant RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM are plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSF-SSE and SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping).

Frequency GMRS SSF-SSE Ratio SSE Ratio (Hz) (g) (g) GMRS/SSF-SSE (g) GMRS/SSE 1 0.082 0.153 0.536 0.081 1.012 2 0.154 0.267 0.577 0.14 1.100 3 0.218 0.312 0.699 0.146 1.493 4 0.299 0.301 0.993 0.137 2.182 5 0.379 0.292 1.298 0.13 2.915 6 0.443 0.285 1.554 0.125 3.544 7 0.499 0.279 1.789 0.121 4.124 8 0.551 0.274 2.011 0.118 4.669 9 0.6 0.27 2.222 0.115 5.217 10 0.65 0.248 2.621 0.112 5.804 Page 15 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I Table 5-2. ONS SSF-RLGM and Balance of Plant RLGM (5% Damping).

Acceleration Acceleration Frequency SSF-RLGM RLGM (Hz) (g) (g) 0.333 0.126 0.069 0.5 0.175 0.095 1 0.306 0.164 2 0.535 0.280 3 0.625 0.292 4 0.601 0.274 5 0.584 0.261 6 0.570 0.250 7 0.558 0.242 8 0.549 0.235 9 0.540 0.229 10 0.496 0.224 11 0.460 0.219 12 0.429 0.215 13 0.402 0.211 14 0.379 0.208 15 0.358 0.205 17.5 0.317 0.200 20 0.284 0.200 22.5 0.259 0.200 25 0.238 0.200 27.5 0.220 0.200 30 0.205 0.200 31 0.200 0.200 100 0.200 0.200 Page 16 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM 5

100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

ISRS for ESEP evaluation of components located outside the SSF were estimated by scaling the ONS design-basis SSE ISRS by the RLGM scale factor of 2.0.

Components inside the SSF were previously evaluated to the demand in ONS Calculation OSC-11188 [10], Attachment 3. The SSF component evaluations were performed to a higher demand than the SSF-RLGM and the existing evaluations meet the intent of the ESEP requirements and methodology.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM and SSF-RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape and SSF-RLGM special shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM or SSF-RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Page 17 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [8].

6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the ONS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9].

ONS used a SPRA to address the IPEEE. The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.

ONS also performed a SMA in support of the SPRA and to comply with NUREG-1407 [5] and GL 88-20 Supplement 4 [6]. The SMA is described in ONS Calculation OSC-10225, Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations [19]. The SMA consisted of screening walkdowns and anchorage calculations. As summarized in OSC-10225 [19], the SMA was based on the median spectral shape for rock sites from NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants [11]. The screening for the SMA was completed using the EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening criteria for 0.80g spectral acceleration relative to the ground motion spectrum. For a NUREG/CR-0098 [11] median spectral shape for rock sites, 0.80g peak spectral acceleration corresponds to 0.38g PGA. The components included in the SMA were also checked for anchorage HCLPF capacity exceeding 0.38g PGA using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. A relay review was included in the Oconee Supplemental IPEEE Submittal Report [20]. Thus any component meeting the IPEEE SMA screening criteria has a HCLPF capacity exceeding 0.38g PGA based on the median NUREG-0098 [11] spectrum.

Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum (anchored at 0.38g) used as the RLE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum. It is seen that the RLE envelopes the SSF-RLGM and RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 0.4 Hz. The RLE is slightly less than the RLGM at frequencies below about 0.4 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no ONS ESEL items with natural frequencies in this frequency range. Component anchorages for ESEL components in the IPEEE which were not evaluated to the median NUREG/CR-0098 [11] rock site response spectrum anchored at 0.38g (e.g., Auxiliary Building Surrogate, Steam Generator Logic Cabinets) are also shown to have HCLPFs greater than the RLGM per ONS Calculation OSC-10225

[19], Attachment 2. Therefore, all of the ESEL components which were evaluated for IPEEE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

Page 18 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM vs IPEEE RLE too Freqency (Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of ONS SSF-RLGM and RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

Duke Energy previously performed a seismic evaluation documented in ONS Calculation OSC-11188 [10], Attachment 3 for ONS. The seismic capacity evaluation used the CDFM HCLPF methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. Included in the evaluation are all of the SSF ESEL components and several of the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building ESEL components.

The seismic capacity evaluation [10] assesses the components to higher demands than the RLGM. Review of the evaluations for all of the components screened using the seismic capacity evaluation [10] were performed in order to verify that the SSF-RLGM and RLGM demands are bounded by the existing evaluation. Therefore, all of the ESEL components which were evaluated in the OSC-11188 [10], Attachment 3 are screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.38g PGA. The RLE is equal to the SSF-RLGM and RLGM at frequencies above about 0.4 Hz. Therefore, any components whose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPF calculations. The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM and SSF-RLGM peak spectral accelerations. The SMA anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except Page 19 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 for equipment in the Auxiliary Building for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE per ONS Calculation OSC-10225 [19]. Therefore ESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEE SMA, met the screening caveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.

The seismic capacity evaluation [10] assesses the components to higher demands than the RLGM. Based upon the explanation provided in Section 6.1, all of the ESEL components which were evaluated in OSC-11188 [10],

Attachment 3 are screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The results of the existing evaluation capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL, in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL, in Appendix C for the Unit 3 ESEL, and Appendix D for the SSF ESEL. HCLPF capacities were determined for the components that were not screened out using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] CDFM methodology and RLGM/SSF-RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations. HCLPF values for these components are included in Appendices A through D.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL Components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL [7], Table 2 4. For components not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary Building or Reactor Buildings, the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 2.0 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix 0., and the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for the Page 20 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I SMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonablyaccessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactiveenvironments. Seismic capabilityassessment of components which are inaccessible,in high-radioactiveenvironments, or possibly within contaminatedcontainment, will have to rely more on alternatemeans such as photographicinspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis,and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiringan electricianor other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panelsfor detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonablebasisfor assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis"should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capabilitypreparatorywork (Step 3) by reference to drawings,calculationsor specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panelsfor this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representativecomponent can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At leastfor the one component of each type which is selected, anchorageshould be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedureshould be performed in an ad hoc manner.

For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/orspecifications. If a one-to-one correspondenceis found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedurefor inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionableconstruction practices arefound then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in Page 21 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 criteriafor that component, potentialSI [Seismic Interaction1 ]

problems, situationsthat are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areasof seriousseismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increasein sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages,etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsiblefor the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidancefor sampling selection."

6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys Many of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performed and documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have a specific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.

Masonry walls were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of masonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonry walls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in the IPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.

6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM. No significant walkdown findings were observed.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous ONS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following steps:

EPRI 3002000704 [2], page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "... to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "... deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]."

Page 22 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1

" Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions;

• Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in ONS Calculation OSC-11188 [10], Attachment 6. HCLPF results and key failure modes for ESEL items not included in the previous ONS IPEEE evaluations are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A, B, C, and D.

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays Twenty-one relays in the ESEL associated with the FLEX Phase 1 response required functional evaluations. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7].

Specific seismic qualification test-based capacities were available for the relays in existing plant documentation. Relay capacity to demand evaluations were performed by comparing the test-based relay seismic capacities with the in-cabinet seismic demand. The in-cabinet demand was determined by scaling the ISRS by the in-cabinet amplification factors from EPRI NP-6041-SL [7],

Appendix Q. In each case, the capacity exceeded the demand.

The relay functional evaluations are documented in ONS Calculation OSC-11188

[101, Attachment 3.

6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1, Appendix B for Unit 2, Appendix C for Unit 3, and Appendix D for the SSF. The following notes apply to the information in the tables:

" For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

• For items screened out using OSC-11188 [10], Attachment 3, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per OSC-11188." The functional failure mode (as determined in OSC-11188 [10])

is also provided.

• For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening tables, the screening levels are provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI NP-6041."

Page 23 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I

" For items where interaction with masonry walls controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - Block Walls."

• For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

" For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional Failure."

• For items where relay function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Relay Chatter."

7.0 Inaccessible Items 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items in Unit 1 were accessible for walkdowns.

All ESEL items in Unit 2 were accessible for walkdowns with the exception of three transmitters (2FDWLT0066, 2FDWLT0O67, and 2RCLT0072). These three components were evaluated in OSC-11188 [10], Attachment 3 and meet the RLGM demand. However, these components were not walked down during the most recent Unit 2 outage. Based upon similarity to Units 1 and 3 and based upon the general lack of interaction issues found with transmitters in the Reactor Buildings, these components are judged as adequate without walkdown.

Additionally, 2FDWLT0066 and the general area around it were included in the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdowns.

All ESEL items in Unit 3 were accessible for walkdowns.

7.2 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out There are no additional components remaining to be walked down in Unit 1, Unit 2, Unit 3, or the SSF.

8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information ONS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

Page 24 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 The ESEP is part of the overall ONS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]

concluded that the "... fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for ONS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to ONS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

• Safety factors applied in design calculations;

• Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;

" Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;

• Broadening criteria for ISRS;

• Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications;

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis;

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards; Page 25 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);

• Bounding testing requirements; and

• Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. In order to complete the ESEP in an expedited amount of time, the RLGM used for the ESEP evaluation is a scaled version of the plant's SSE rather than the actual GMRS. To more fully characterize the risk impacts of the seismic ground motion represented by the GMRS on a plant specific basis, a more detailed seismic risk assessment (SPRA or risk-based SMA) is to be performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]. As identified in the ONS Seismic Hazard and GMRS submittal [4], ONS screens in for a risk evaluation. The complete risk evaluation will more completely characterize the probabilistic seismic ground motion input into the plant, the plant response to that probabilistic seismic ground motion input, and the resulting plant risk characterization. ONS will complete that evaluation in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI's letter dated April 9, 2013 [13]

and endorsed by the NRC in their May 7, 2013 letter [16].

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications There are no required modifications at ONS to be made for components reviewed to date to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule There are no required modifications at ONS to be made for components reviewed to date to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.4 Summary of Planned Actions There are no planned actions as a result of the ESEP.

Page 26 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I 9.0 References

1) Letter from NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) to All Power Reactor Licensees et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," March 12, 2012.

2) Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1- Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, May 2013, 3002000704.

3) Letter from Scott L. Batson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Renewed License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC.

4) Letter from Scott L. Batson to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Renewed License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated March 31, 2014, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC.

5) Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

6) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 88-20 Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR 50.54(f), June 1991.

7) A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

8) Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

9) Oconee Nuclear Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)

Submittal Report, dated December 21, 1995, Duke Power, Seneca, SC.

10) Duke Energy Calculation OSC-11188, ONS Fukushima NTTF 2.1 Seismic Vendor Support Documentsfor GMRS, Revision 2, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC.

11) Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0098.

Page 27 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I

12) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, Nuclear Energy Institute to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

13) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, Nuclear Energy Institute to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations,"

April 9, 2013.

14) Letter from NRC (E Leeds) to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

15) Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, 1025287.

16) Letter from NRC (E Leeds) to NEI (J Pollock), "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.

17) Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December 2009, EPRI 1019200.

18) Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL), Duke Energy, Seneca, SC, Revision 0, OSC-11217.

19) Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC, Rev. 0, 2011, OSC-10225.

20) Letter from W. R. McCollum Jr. to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Oconee Nuclear Station, Docket Nos.: 50-269, -270, -287; Oconee Supplemental IPEEE Submittal Report," dated December 15, 1997, Duke Power, Seneca, SC.

21) Specification for the Seismic Displacements and Response Spectra for the Turbine, Auxiliary, Reactor, and Standby Shutdown Facility Buildings, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC, Rev. 8, 2005, OSS-027B.00-00-0002,

22) Letter from Scott L. Batson, Duke Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Renewed License Nos.

DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 29, 2013, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC.

Page 28 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I

23) Letter from Scott L. Batson, Duke Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Renewed License Nos.

DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; "Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2014, ONS-2014-029, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC.

24) Letter from Scott L. Batson, Duke Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Renewed License Nos.

DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Seneca, SC.

Page 29 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I Appendix A ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 30 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 1 BAG BD 1UB1 Ul CONTROL RM UNIT BOARD AB EL.822, COL.N73 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2273-2277 0.25 Anchorage 1UB1

. .. ... ..... . .... ... . .......... ... ... ..._ . ... . . .... .. ..... ..* .= . .... ......

2 BAG BD ."I1UB2 U1 CONTROL RM UNIT BOARD AB EL.822, COL.N73 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2273-22 77 00.25 Anchorage ...

1UB2*-1 . .. * . ...

AB-- .L. , .... _2..vail.......aila.... ..... . . . . .

3 BAG BD 1VB2 CONTROL BOARD IVB2 AB EL.822, COL.P72 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2281-2285 0.25 Anchorage 4 Walk* by.

..:.BAG.

,.:* ........ .BED i,

• 1V3.

. .L.. . CONTROL

.:: * ........ BOARD0IVB3 L

. ... . . . .. .. AB A..B.

EL.822,,COLP72..

Available *Available Available

.. .. . . lWa...

okC8377, pg 2281 -2285 0.25s

., i*:.: ,,  :* Anchorage .A;*.......

5 BS PT 0230 RB PRESSURE (POST- AB EL.809, COLQa66 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP 6041 ACCIDENT MONITORING)

AB * . ..EL.809,

> .. . . jCOLs0

,... .:. . ... !.Available. . ........ ..

Available . ....

".Walkdown *. *. . .. :

6 BS PT 0231" :RB PRESSURE (POST- OSC-11188, Att 6: >RLGM. Screened per EPRI NP-6041 ACCIDENT MONITORING) 7 CCW FT 0225 SSF ASW FLOW AB EL.796, COL.X69A Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 191-195 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Interaction - Block Walls 8 EL CA SGLC1 STEAM GEN A & B LEVEL AB EL.809, COL.$72 Available Available Walk-by *OSC-8377, pg 2102-2106 >RLGM Screen.ed per IPEE CONTROL CABINET SGLC-1 9 EL MX IXO 600/208 VOLT MOTOR AB EL.796, COL.P72 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2457-2461 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CONTROL CENTER 1XO i* .!:: .........

i"AR.I:~::: EL.796, COL0L;72. *:.Available .::. : Ayailable'. .*iW.alk-by

..~~~~~

~~~~

..~~~~~

10 : EL> MX 1XP 600/208 VOLT MOTOR 9OSC8377, pg 2ý467,-2470 >RLGM Screeneýd per IPEEE CONTROL CENTER 1XP 11 EL PL 1KVIA 120VAC VITAL OSC-8377, pg 1251-1254 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE j~:.

INSTRUMENTATION PWR PANEL BOARD #1KVIA AR EL.809, COL.P72 Available Available NWalk-by 12 EL PL 1KVIB 120VAC VITAL OSC-8377, pg 1255-1258 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE INSTRUMENTATION PWR PANEL BOARD #1KVIB

• .. ... . b .. ... _ _ ] ,.::.... ..... ............

1KVIC 120VAC VITAL AR EL.809, COL.Qa72 Available Available Walk-by 13 EL PL OSC-8377, pg 1259-1262 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE INSTRUMENTATION PWR PANEL BOARD #1KVIC C.g.

osc-8377 ,pg 1141

... 1145 .

-14 ICC.:. . CA ".0.001A ICC MONITORING SYSTEM AB EL.822, COL.Qa7l Av',ilable Available Walk-by 1141-1145. >RLGM Screen*d per IPEEE¢

" ... .,, -- ".~. TRAIN ACABINETI..

Page 31 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NIORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 15 ICC CA 00018 ICC MONITORING SYSTEM AB EL.822, COL.Qa71 Available Available Walk-by OSC- 8377, pg 1146-1149 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE TRAIN 8 CABINET 16 ICC MI ICCA ICC TRAIN A ELECTRONICS AS EL.822, COL.Q72 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188,-ýAtt. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PACKAGE (IN IVB3) 17 ICC MI ICCB ICC TRAIN B ELECTRONICS AS EL.822, COL.P72 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PACKAGE (IN 1VB3)

.:NN:7 ..... ... ........ VN* ~ . . NN 4

N.E.. ........ . . .  :.u**.:

i8 "<LPI TK. 0001 BWST AB.. EL.796, YARD Available' Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pgi:343-134! 5 >RLGM " Screened per'0SC-11..188 Anchorage 19 PPS CA 0002 RPS A/ES Al AS EL 822, COL.R73 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.21 Anchorage

.... ...... . . ........ ll...... .. ... ... ....... . . -- . ---

... - " .. . .. . . . . ..... * ...i.... . . . ... * . . . ... ...............

..... .......... .....,*...... .~~~~~~

20 PPS CA 0006 RPS C/ES C1 . AR EL 822, COL.R73 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, AUt.6 ,:,. 0.21 *NAnchorage 21 PSW MX 1XPSW 1XPSW AS EL.783, COL.P63 Standby Operating Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.27 Anchorage 22

• iRC.. PS 0453 HOTLEGALVLTRANSHYD ' AB.* EL.809, COLR69.. Available Available .. Walkdown .. OSC-11188Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 i"

.* *  ;.'," 1:'*'* ISOLATO R 2  :' ,: " " ,"* . ' .i:. .;q. ' * ... "' :i .. * " * " :::... . .

23 RC PS 0457 RV HEAD B LVL TRANS HYD AB EL.809, COL.R69 Available Available Walkdown OSC- 11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 ISOLATOR 3 24 PT 0244 .CW. RSPRSUE.....TRAIN.A.AR E . . .: A a bev*a.lable ........ ..... , pg ,93..1.3.

24 RC PT 0244 WR RCS PRESSURE TRAIN A AR EL.809, COL.Q71 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 1934-19348 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 25 RC PT 0245 WR RCS PRESSURE TRAIN B AB EL.809, COL.Q71 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg*1939-194*3 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

0. 3 Anchorage 26 RPS . AF NIl. NI-i PRE AMPLIFIER .... A EL.809, COL.Q72 Available Available ... Walkdown . OSC-11188, Att. 6 27 RPS AF N12 RPS NI-2 PRE AMPLIFIER AR EL.809, COLQ72 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.35 Anchorage

.28 CCW VA . . 0269 A.S/G FDW CONTROL . RB:' EL.777 350 , R45'. Closed Throttled Walkdown OSC 11188 .Att. 6 >RLGM> Screened. per EPRI NP-6041

..>RLGM"" Screened 1per EPRI NP-6041 29 CF VA 0001 1A CFT OUTLET RB EL.777, 135o, R50 Open Closed Walkdown OSC-111g8, Att 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NPE6041

• ' 30 . ICF *N VA 0002 18 CFT OUTLET RB EL.797 35', R50' Open C0osed Walkdown OSC411188 Att. 6 31 FDW LT 0066 S/G 1A LEVEL RB EL.777, 290°, R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-111B8, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure Page 32 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 32 "Dw LT. 0067 S/G/ 1B LEVEL RB EL.777, 100', R50' Available .Available Walkdown >RLGM.:" Screened per OSC-11188

>.::*OSC-ll188tAtt 3

.: '

• unctional k i.5::** Filure>

33 FDW VA 0347 1B S/G INLET BLOCK ON EL.825, 90', R40' Open Throttled Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 EMERG HDR 4

34 HP VA ..0003 1 L/D COOLER OUTLET (PENE lA EL.777 165', R4S' Open closed Walk-by OSC-8377, p1'109 -1096: >RLGM Screened: per IPEEEi.

3 #6) 35 HP VA 0004 13 L/D COOLER OUTLET (PENE EL.777, 165%, R45' Open Closed Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 1097-1099 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

1. 6) 36 HP VA 0020 RCPSEALRETURN (PENE#7) *EL.797 300' R55': Open Closed Wa*kdown, OSC..1,8, Att. 6 4-tLGMI Screened per EPRI NP-6041 37 HP VA 0398 RC MAKEUP PUMP TO RCP EL.777, 320', R30' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188 Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 SEALS BLOCK 38 HP VA 0426 RC LETDOWN TO SPENT FUEL EL.777, 65', RSO'  :<Clote p l Walkdown OSC 11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Scre~ened per EPl 1?6041

, .. ::::.i.  : o :. *..: . ':*

POOL.  :.

39 HP VA 0428 RC LETDOWN RETURN ISO VLV EL.777, 15', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 40 HPI;I PU 0005 U-i SSF RC MAKEUP PUMP EL,.77,'315°, R35. Offs On . . .. ...

-'Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 1038-10.41 >RLG.M S.creened pe. OSC 11188 Anchorage 3 41 MS PT 0277 S/G B OUTLET STEAM EL.825, 110', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC 11188 Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PRESSURE TRAIN A 7

• .... " .. NP-604.

424 MS PT '027S "/G B OUTLET STEAM EL.S25 70o, RSO' Available5 Available; Wýa lkdokmn OSC-111..

. t.. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PRESSURE LOOP 8 i 43 MS PT 0279 S/G A OUTLET STEAM EL.825, 270', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 PRESSURE TRAIN A 44 MS #PT 0280 S/GA OUTLETSTEAM EL825, 27.0' R50' Available Available Walkdown~ OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PRESSURE LOOP B

,,L

,45RC ;: LT 0004PI ... LEVEL T NA L 45 RC LT 0004P1 PZR LEVEL 1, TRAIN A HI/LO EL.797, 290°, R50' Available Available Walk-by OSC 8377, pg 1874-1878 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

46

• R.C.,.:..L*T : 0004P 2 P:i.:tZR LEVEL.2,..TRAIN A,;HI/.L,,.,.

EL.797, 270., R50. Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Atm 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 33 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 47 RC LT 0004P3 PZR LEVEL 3, TRAIN B HI/LO RB EL.797, 250°, RSO' Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 1879-1883 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 48 RC LT 0072 .... Ul SSF PRESSURIZER LEVEL. RB EL.797; 2700, RS0' Available. Available. Walkdown OSC 11188, Att. 3 >RLGM .. Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure 49 RC PT 0225 U1 RC LOOP A PRESSURE RB EL.825, 270', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC 11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure Available .. Available so0.RC PT 0226 01 RCLOOP B PRESSURE RB EL.825, 90', RSO' Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Fqctional I Failure Available Available 51 RC RD 0005B REACTOR COLD LEG 1A WR RB EL.797, 3100, R35' .1.. ........ .... -L::,:.1

. Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

. ... .. ... 4;L;...L.  : Fu.if* nctional Failure . "

TEMP 2 Available Available  :..,I.., ... .. :. *Functional

.2.L.:.

... . .. ..*Failure 52 RC RD 0006A Ul REACTOR COLD LEG A WR RB EL.797, 260, R30' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att.. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP I,... : .. .........

............. I.. ,.,:. .... . . ...... .,,... ,.. .*....... ............

L....i ..:*..... ........

Functional Failure 53 RC RD 0007B REACTOR COLD LEG 1B WR RB EL.797, 50', R35' Walkdown .OSC-11188,

.. ..... ... .... Att.

.........3 ,r-.. >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

.. ! :TEMP

..... 2 . " .* *:.:,:* . Functional Failure Available Available 54 RC RD 0008A REACTOR COLD LEG 1B WR RB EL.797, 100%, R30' .Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP 1 Functional Failure Aviabe...

. . .. .A lable . .......

..... .. ... .:.. ...... . .. ..... ..-I . .

55 RC RD 0034A REACTOR COOLANT LOOP A RB EL.844, 2900, R20' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure 56 RC RD 0084B REACTOR COOLANT LOOP A RB EL.844, 290', R20' Available Available Walkdown OSC-1.188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Available Available.\ Functional Failure 57 RC RD 0085A REACTOR OUTLET LOOP B RB EL.844, 70°, R20 Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM

>RLGM Screened Screened per per 05C-11I18Q OSC-11188

• Functional Failure .. :

Available Available Functional Failure 58 RC RD 00858

• . ." 'REACTOR. " OUTLET. LOOP -; B RB EL.844, 700, R20' Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 59 RC VA 0004 PZR POWER RELIEF BLOCK RB EL.844, 250°, R30' Open Closed Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 1980-1982 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Walk-bd 60 RC VA 0066 **.PZR ...:.

• POWER

. ... RELIEEVALVE.

. ..-; :...*: .* .. : . . . RB EL.824, 250", R30' Closed Open OSC-8377, pg 1992-1994 >RLGM .Sreenedr per IPEEE 61 RC VA 0155 IA OTSG HOT LEG VENT RB EL.825, 2700, R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 VALVE Page 34 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY

..62 .RC VA 0156 1AOTSG HOT LEG VENT RB - EL.825, 27,;..R50' Closed .Open Walkdown OSC-1:i188, Att.6 >RLGM Screened-per EPRI'NP-6041

. BLOCK.VALVE.

6 RC.......VA ... 0157 HOT....

B.. .8LEG .VENT..

. RB.. ..

90. Clo d O. n .. C..... A..6 L.. Screne per... E N........

63 RC VA 0157 1B HOT LEG VENT RB EL.825, 90%, R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 64 RC VA 1.0158 .. *11B HOT LEG VENT BLOCK ... RB.. EL.825, 90T, R50' , Closed .*Open . Walkdown ..: SC-11188, Att. 6 * >RLGM Screenedl per EPRI NP-604 65 RC VA 0159 RX VESSEL HEAD VENT VLV RB EL.844, 75', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 1RC-159 66 RC VA :0160 RX VESSEL HEAD VENT VLV RB EL.844, 75% R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

- 1RC-160 "

67 SF VA 0082 SFP TO RCMU PUMP BLK RB EL.?77, 45', R45' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

-68 SF VA 0097 SPENT FUEL POOL TO RC RB EL.777, 0', R55' Closed Open Walkdown OSC 11188. AtE_ 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP 6041

" "MAKEUP SUPPLY ISOLATION  :?

.. .. .. . . . VALVE. .. .. ...... ..... .... ... . ... . .. . ...

• HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.20g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

• • Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per IPEEE - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per OSC-11188 - Indicates that the component was evaluated in OSC-11188, Attachment 3 and therefore meets the RLGM demand. For this case, the Key Failure Mode(as determined in OSC-11188) is also reported.

Screened per EPRI NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

Interaction - Block Walls - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional Failure - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

Relay Chatter - Indicates that relay chatter is the governing failure mode for the component.

Page 35 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I Appendix B ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 36 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID SiTATE STATE OR WALK-BY BAG BD 2UB1 U2 CONTROL RM UNIT BOARD AB EL.822, COL.N73 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4604-4608 0.25 Anchorage 2UB1 EL822. COLN73 Available Available Walk-by 2 BAG BD 2UB2 U2 CONTROL RM UNIT BOARD AB OSC-8377, pg 4604-4608 0.25 Anchorage 2UB2 EL.822, COL.P74 Available Available Walk-by 3 BAG BD 2VB2 CONTROL BOARD 2VB2 AB OSC-8377, pg 4612-4616 0.25 Anchorage 4 BS PT 0230 " RB PRESSURE (POST- A8 EL.809, COL.S76 Available Available Walkdow rn "OSC-11188, Att. 6 - >RLGM* Screened per EPRI NP 6041 ACCIDENT MONITORING) 5 BS PT 0231 RB PRESSURE (POST- AB EL.809, COL.R81 Available Available Walkdow OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 ACCIDENT MONITORING) .*2,'.

6 CCW FT 0225 SSF ASW FLOW AB EL.796, COL X76A Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 191-195 >RL'M Screened p OSC 11188

....

• Interaction:' Block Walls 7 EL CA SGLC2 STEAM GEN A & B LEVEL AB EL.809, COL.S75 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4429-4432 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CONTROL CABINET SGLC-2 O.C-8377, pg 4754-4758 .>RLGM 8 EL MX 2XO 600/208 VOLT MOTOR AB EL.796, COL.P73 Available Available Walk-by Screened per IPEEE.'

CONTROL CENTER 2XO OSC-8377, pg 4764-4768 >RLGM 9 EL MX 2XP 600/208 VOLT MOTOR AB EL.796, COL.Q73 Available Available Walk-by Screened per IPEEE CONTROL CENTER 2XP

. . . .. . ..i. . ... .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . ..... . . . . ... . ........ . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .

OSC-8377, pg 3657-3660 >RLGM 10 EL PL 2KVIA 120VAC VITAL AB EL.809, COLP74 Available Available Walk-by Screened per 5PEE 8 INSTRUMENTATION POWER PNLBD 2KVIA OSC-8377, pg 3661-3664 >RLGM 11 EL PL 2KVIB 120VAC VITAL AB EL.809, COLJ74 Available Available Walk-by Screened per IPEEE INSTRUMENTATION POWER PNLBD 2KVIB OSC-8377, pg 3665-3668 >RLGM 12 EL PL 2KVIC 120VAC VITAL AB EL.809, COL.Qa74 Available Available Walk-by Screened per IPEEE INSTRUMENTATION POWER PNLBD 2KVIC 13 ICC CA 0001A ICC MONITORING SYSTEM AB EL822, COL.P74 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 3557-3561 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE TRAIN A CABINET 14 ICC CA 0001B ICC MONITORING SYSTEM AB

• EL.822, COL.P74 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 3562-3565 >RLGM Screened periP.EE.

TRAIN B CABINET Page 37 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 15 LPI TK 0001 BWST AB EL.796, YARD Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 3744-3746 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage 16 PPS CA 0002 RPS A/ES Al AS EL 822, COL.R73 Available Available Walkdown OSC-111.8, Att. 6 0.21 Anchorage 17 PPS CA 0006 RPS C/ES C1 AS EL 822, COL.R73 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.21 Anchorage

='":..

18 PSW MX 2XPSWA 2XPSWA AS. EL.783,'COL. Qa82 Standby Operating Walkdown OSC-11188, At, 6 0.29 Anchorage 19 RC PS 0453 HOT LEG A LVLTRANS HYD AB EL.809, COL.R77 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 ISOLATOR 2 Available Available Walkdown:

20 RC

• PS ,? ... 0457 RV HEAD B LVL TRANS HYD AS EL.809, COL.R77 OSC-11188, Att 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 ISOLATOR 3 21 RC PT 0244 WR RCSPRESSURE TRAIN A AB EL809, COL.Qa76 Available Available Walk-by OSC-B3778 pg 4272 4276 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

• i:............. ..... ...

22 RC PT 0245 WR RCS PRESSURE TRAIN B AS EL.809,.COLQ76 Available Available . Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4277-4281 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

.., . .LP .,

C A ailabl Available..

-.. a....n.....

23 RPS AF Nil NI-1 PRE AMPLIFIER AB EL.809, COL.P74 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Alt. 6 0.35 Anchorage

,EL.:809, COL.P74 " Available Available Walkdown

24 RPS AF N12 RPS NI-2 PRE AMPUFIER AS OSC-11188, Att."6 0.35 Anchorage 25 CCW VA 0269 A S/G FDW CONTROL RB EL.777, 350', R45' Closed Throttled Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 oSC- At.....6 . >RLGM

... creened pe....EPR.NP. .

26 CF VA 0001 2A CFT OUTLET EL777, 135', R50' Open Closed Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6'. >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041.

SRB 27 CF VA 0002 28 CFT OUTLET EL797, 35', R50' Open Closed Walkdown OSC- 11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 RB L....

7...

7. 2 ....... ... Available. . a.. d.. . . ..:. *:" * "**.......... .... ...... . I........

28 ... ,FDW LT 0066 S/G 2A LEVEL EL.777, 2400,.R45' Available Available Walkdown None >*RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure RB  :......... i .. . .............. ... . ... ...... .....

29 FDW LT 0067 S/G 2B LEVEL EL.777, 100', R50' Available Available Walkdown None >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure RB ~ ~ ~~~..

"*;*:*~

. .... . . ~~~~

.30 FDW VA. 0347**** 26 S/G EFDW HDR (PENE #17) EL.825,90*t, R40' Open Throttled Walkdown OSC11188 At. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.. :: . ? .. * . " ... * + :.*. . .

..:". ...:.. .. . . INLET.BLK ' .  :* ... * ,...... .*  : . ....... *t..z ft> *.. . . .-

31 HP VA 0003 2A L/D COOLER OUTLET (PENE RB EL.777, 165', R45' Open Closed Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 3512-3514 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

1. 6) 732:i ... H.P .: VA.:. I0004 *::."..:2B .L/DCOOLE.R ouTILET,(iPENE)

RB 4EL777, 165W,R45.':Open Closed Walk-by. OSC-8377; pg 3515-3517 >."RLGM Screened per IPEEE

i:*

• i

  : ; ;* .6i :

1. 6  :: **

• Page 38 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NIORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID Si*ATE STATE OR WALK-BY 33 HP VA 0020 RCP SEAL RETURN (PENE N7) RB EL.797, 300, R55' Open Closed Walkdown OSC-11188, At. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

'... .W 34 HP VA "0398 ".RC MAKEUP PUMP TO RCP RB EL.777, 320', R30' .Closed Open Walkdown OSC-1118,:Att. 6 >RLGM Screened pe EPRI NP-6041 SEALS BLOCK ... ,. ..  ::. .**  :* . . * .:............. .... .. . , . *  : .ii:!*. .. .

35 HP VA 0426 RC LETDOWN TO SPENT FUEL RB EL.777, 65', RSO' Closed Open Walkdown ............

OSC-11188 .k .i6 .' .i ...

. . A~tt >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 POOL 36

3. HP ' VA 0428  :"RC LETDOWN RETURN RB EL.777, 15', R50' Closed - Open Walkdown 0SC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGMý. Screened per EPRI NP-6041:Y ISOLATION 37 HPI PU 0005 U-2 SSF RC MAKEUP PUMP RB EL.777, 315', R35' Off On Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 3457-3460 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage 38 M:S PT 0277 S/G B OUTLET STEAM RB EL.825, 110', RSO' Available Available .. ':Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PRESSURE TRAIN A 39 MS PT 0278 S/G B OUTLET STEAM RB EL.825, 70', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188,

... ... . ........ . . Att.

.. .6. . .." " ".. ...

..  :* >RLGM ~~~~~~~~~~~....... ,

Screened . per.....EPRI.........

NP-6041

• PRESSURE LOOP B 40 MS PT 0279 S/G A OUTLET STEAM RB EL.825, 240', R50' Available Available .Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 : >RLGM Screened per'" "EPRI

". . ... ..." " " " '* " ":".NP-6041 PRESSURE TRAIN A 41 MS PT 0280 S/G A OUTLET STEAM RB EL.825, 270%, R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-111B8, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 PRESSURE LOOP B 0004P1 PZR LEVEL TRAIN A HI/LO RB EL.797, 115', R' Available .Available Walk-by 142 RC LT OSC-8377, pg 4211-4215 >RLGM Screened

• per IP.FE 0004P2 PZR LEVEL TRAIN A HI/LO RB EL.797, 90', R50' Available Available Walkdown 43 RC LT OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 0004P2 PZRLEVEL TRAIN B HI/LO RB EL.797, 75', R50' Available Available Walk-byn 44' RC LT OSC-8377, pg 4216-4220 >RLGM

• Screened per IPEEE

~~

............ ~~~

L ,=... .. ... ........... .... ....................... . ......

0072 U2 SSF PRESSURIZER LEVEL RB EL.777, 70', R50' Available Available Walkdown . .. .. . . ... . . i .: ' ": '* ". " :

45 RC LT None >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure 46 RC PT 0225 U2 RC LOOP A PRESSURE RB EL.797, 270', RSO' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, At.3 >RLGM Screened per OSCE-1118 Functional Failure 47 RC PT 0226 U2 RC LOOP B PRESSURE RB EL.825, 90', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure 48 RC RD 0005B REACTOR COLD LEG 2A WR RB EL.797,310', R35' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3. >RLGM " Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP 2 Functional Failure Page 39 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION N'ORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID S$'ATE STATE OR WALK-BY 49 RC RD 0006A REACTOR COLD LEG 2A WR RB EL.797, 260', R30' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 5RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP 1 Functional Failure

... . . . . ....... ....... .... .. . . . .................. .. ...:...:..::7  :... . ..~. . :7~~~~

50 RC RD 0007B :REACTOR COLD LEG 28 WR RB EL.797, 50', R35' Available Available ~ Walkdown OSC-.1188, Att. 3 >RLGM, Screened per.OSC.11188 TEMP 2

...........(. .. ...

.. ... . .. ... ... ......-....Functional

......Z Z .. .. Failure; 51 RC RD 0008A REACTOR COLD LEG 28 WR RB EL.797, 100', R30' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP 1 Functional Failure OSC-11188, Att, 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 52 R.C RD 0084A REACTOR COOLANT LOOP A7 RB EL.844, 290',::1*'.: Available AvailIble Walkdown

.. . ....* {:,* ........ . . ........T........ . ....... ... ....... .... . : "Functional Failure 53 RC RD 0084B REACTOR COOLANT LOOP A RB EL.844, 290', R20' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att, 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure

.. ::." ......... . . .  :- . . . . . .. .V

'54 RC RD 0085.A REACTOR OUTLET LOP. B RB EL.844, 70°, R20 Available;. Available Walkdown OSC-11188,A.3 ,>RLGM Screened per bSC-11/8B Functional Failure 55 RC RD 0085B REACTOR OUTLET LOOP B RB EL.844, 70', R20' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure RB EL.844, 110', R30' Open Closed Walk-by 56 RC VA 0004 PZR POWER RELIEF BLOCK OSC-8377, pg 4317-4319 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE RB EL.844, 110', R30' Open Closed Walk-by 57 RC VA 0066 PZR POWER RELIEF VALVE OSC-8377, pg 4329-4331 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 58 RC VA 0155 2A HOTLEG VENT RB EL.825, 270', R50' Closed .. Open ::. " " Walkdownl OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM . Screened.. per EPRINP-6041 59 RC VA 0156 2A HOT LEG VENT BLOCK RB EL.825, 270', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

............":Tg:::* *-: " ...... . ...:........  :.. . ........ ...

60 RC VA: 01P7 :20 HOTLEG VENT RB EL.825, .R5O. Closed Open . Walkdown OSC-11188*Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

........, ..

• i .. .... "... .. . . *' . .. . ..;., . .. . . . / .

61 RC VA 0158 2B HOTLEG VENT BLOCK RB EL.825, 90', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 62 RC VA 0159 RX VESSEL HEAD VENT VLV

2RC-159 .

RB

,~ EL.844, 90°, R50' Closed>>

• Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 63 RC VA 0160 RX VESSEL HEAD VENT VLV RB EL.844, 90', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2RC-160

-:7. ...... .  : ..-* .... ...

!:::F .. ........ ......:*:*... . ...

64 SF VA .. 0082 SFPTO RC M/U PUMP BLOCK RB EL.777 45', R45 ' Closed :,,,<2,Open , Walkdown OSC-11188, Att.66 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.. C1: ::,*t.. ..... SN  : .6 65 SF VA 0097 SFP TO RC M/U PUMP BLOCK RB EL.777, 0', RSS' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 40 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY

• HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.20g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

• • Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per IPEEE - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per OSC-11188 - Indicates that the component was evaluated in OSC-111g8, Attachment 3 and therefore meets the RLGM demand. For this case, the Key Failure Modejas determined in OSC-11188) is also reported.

Screened per EPRI NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

Interaction - Block Walls - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional Failure - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

Relay Chatter - Indicates that relay chatter is the governing failure mode for the component.

Page 41 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Appendix C ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 1 BAG BD 3UB1 U3 CONTROL RM UNIT BOARD AB EL.822, COL.N89 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6792-6796 0.25 Anchorage 3UB1 EL.822, COL.N89 Available Available Walk-by pg 6792-6796

.OSC-8377 2 BAG BD 3UB2 U3 CONTROL RM UNIT BOARD AB  :. C,.. 2 67

...... 0.25 Anchorage 3UB2 3 BAG BD 3VB3 CONTROL BOARD 3VB3 AB EL.822, COL.P89 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6797-6801 0.25 Anchorage 4 BS PT 0230* RB:PRESSURE (POST- AB EL.809, COL.S81 Available Available Walkdown OSC411188, Att. 6 .RLGM Screened per EPRI NP 6041 ACCIDENT MONITORING) 5 BS PT 0231 RB PRESSURE (POST- AB EL.809, COL.R96 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 ACCIDENT MONITORING) ... .* . ..

6

• CCW*

FT

.0225

.SSF.ASW FLOW AB EL.796, COL.X91A Available. . Availablce: Walk-by . OSC-8443, pg 202-206, >RLGM ~sScreened per OSC-11 188 Interaction -Block Walls 7 EL CA SGLC3 STEAM GEN A & B LEVEL AB EL.809, COL.N91 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6641-6644 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CONTROL CABINET SGLC-3 B EL MX 3XO 600/208 VOLT MOTOR AB EL.796, COL.Qa9O Available Available Walk-by 0SC-8377, pg 6940-6945 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CONTROL CENTER 3XO ' . .. :. .

9 EL MX 3XP 600/208 VOLT MOTOR AB EL.796, COL.Qa9O Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6951-6955 >RLGM Screened per IPEFE CONTROL CENTER 3XP

::"i.. :"T ......... ......."... ....

10. EL*, PL Y"3KVIA " 20VAC VITAL . AB EL809, COLP88 Availble* *ailable .Walk-by. i..  :.bSC-8377, pg 58505853. >RLGM Screened. per IPEEE

• INSTRUMENTATION PWR..'

.NLBD 11 EL PL 3KVIB 120VAC VITAL AB EL.809, COL.Q88 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 5854-5857 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE INSTRUMENTATION PWR PNLBD 12 EL PL 3KVIC AC VITAL BUS PWR PNL AB EL.809, COL.Qa88 Available .. Available Walk-by OSC-8377 pg 5858-5861 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 13 ICC CA 0001A ICC MONITORING SYSTEM AB EL.822, COLS89 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 5739-5742 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE TRAIN A CABINET 14 ICC. CA 0001B ICC MONITORING SYSTEM AS EL.822, COL.S88 jAvailable Available Walk-by OSC.8377pg5743-5746 K >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

• .*.. -TRAIN BCABINET 15 LPI TK 0001 BWST AB EL.796, YARD Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 5928-5930 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage Page 43 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE :" : " : ..STATE  :* :. OR WALK-BY

i=.":::...... .......

Available Available Walkdown 16 PPS CA 0002 RPS A/ES Al AS EL.822, COL.Qa89 OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.21 Anchorage 17 PPS CA 0006 RPS C/ES C1 AS EL.822, COL.Qa88 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.21 Anchorage

18. PSW MX 3XPSW 3XPSW AS :EL.783, COL.Qa§7  :. Standby Operating WValkdown 0SC-ili88, Att:'6 .K 0.27 :AnchorageS 19 RC PS 0453 HOT LEG A LVLTRANS HYD AB EL.809, COLR92 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Art. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 ISOLATOR 2 20 RC  :.PS 0457 RV HEAD B LVLTRANS HYD : AS EL.809,;COL.R92 Available Available .Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened pet EPRI NPL6041 ISOLATOR 3. .... . , " . *LM Screee pr .

21 RC PT 0244 WR RCS PRESSURE TRAIN A AS EL.809, COL.R9O Available Available Walk-by OS C-8377, pg 6483-6487 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

22. RC PT 0245 WR RCS PRESSURE TRAIN B AS EL.809, COL.Qa9O Available Available "Walk-by OS C-8377, pg 6488-6492 >RLGM .: *Screened per IPEEE 23 RPS AF Nil NI-1 PRE AMPLIFIER CHANNEL AS EL.809, COL.$89 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.35 Anchorage A

...... .i ...... -:*;

24 RPS .AF N12 RPS NI-2 PRE AMPLIFIER AS EL.809, COL.R88 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 0.35 Anchorage L. ....... Screen-ed pe r.EPR....

25 CCW VA 0269 3A S/G FDW CONTROL RB EL.777, 350', R45' Closed Throttled Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

. ..i-. ....

-* ......... .... .. >RLGM ...Screened per:E*PRi NP-604".1, 26 CF 0001 3A CFT OUTLET RS

.. *....... . VA .. . .. ... .... ..: _:... _..

. . .: ......I'l.....

EL.777, 135', R50' Open

.. ... I... .

Closed Walkdown OSC-11188, AtL6 27 CF VA 0002 3B CFT OUTLET RB EL.797, 35°, R50' Open Closed Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 0066 :SG7 3A LEVEL. V <C ' R. E. ....... R ... . a

28. FDW :LT 006.: A EVL S/ IS EL.777, 270', 135Y ". Available Available *Walkdo~wn OSC-1I188, Att. 3 >RLGM . Screened perOSC-1.1188 Functional Failure 29 FDW LT 0067 S/G 38 LEVEL RS EL.777, 100', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure

. *:.. . . . ... ..;......... ~~~~~.. ,.- , . . . .. .. . . . . . . .: . . . . . ... . *. . . . .

30 FDW VA .0347 3BS/G EMERG HDR PENE RBS EL.825, 90', R40 . Open. Throttled .,Walkdown OSC-11188, Att, 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (l,1,7) INLET BLOCK ." . '..

31 HP VA 0003 3A L/D COOLER OUTLET (PENE RS EL.777, 165', R45' Open Closed Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 5697-5699 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

1. 6) .":"' "" ".*

.32 HP VA :0004 31BL/D COOLER OUTLET (PENE RS EL.777,;165', R45 Walk by OSC 8377,.pg 5700-5702:

Open RLGIM' Screenedper IPEEE S Screened.....p.r...,.,. ......

33 HP VA 0020 RCP SEAL RETURN (PENE #7) RB EL.797, 300', R55' Open Closed Walkdown OSC-11188, Att, 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 44 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY . . .... . .. . . . .....

. ... ..... -L*------...........

34 HP. VA .0398 RC MAKEUP PUMP TO RCP RB EL.777, 320', R30' :Closed Open

• Walkdown . OSC-11188, At. 6 *RLGM* Screened per EPRI NP-6041 SEALS BLOCK ..

.. ....... ... :i .. 4. ..... ...... ... . ..

i L 35 HP VA 0426 RC LETDOWN TO SPENT FUEL RB EL.777, 65', RSO' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 POOL S..... ........ . .

36" HP VA 0428 RC LETDOWN RETURN R8' EL.777, 15°, R50' Closed' .:: .Open Walkd6wn .' OSC-11188:':6 .. 6 >RLGM " 5creened per EPRI NP-6041.'

ISOLATION 37 HPI PU 0005 U-3 SSF RC MAKEUP PUMP RB EL.777, 315', R35' Off On Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 5683-5687 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage

. .. e ., .A W..n .... ... . . . . tt:..6.

38" MS PT 0277 SG B OTLT STM PRESS TRAIN A RB A EL.825, 110%, R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

....  : *.."'...-L. _.. .... .

39 MS PT 0278 SG 8 OTLT STEAM PRESSURE RB EL.825, 70', R50' Available Available

..... ..Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 LOOP B

.. .. . . .. i. . .

40 MS. . PT 0279 SG A OTLT STM PRESS TRAIN A RB ,. EL.825, 240',:R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 41 MS PT 0280 SG A OTLT STEAM PRESSURE RB EL.825, 270', RSO' Available A >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 LOOP B ..,,.*

.. S * .. . . .. . .... .....* .......... . . . . -_

• 42. - .'RC .L . 0004P1 PZR LEVEL 1 TRAIN A HI/LOS RB EL.797, 115° R50' Available Available Walk by OSC-83.77, pg 6423-6427 >RLGM . Scree ned per IPEEE 43 RC LT 0004P2 PZR LEVEL 2 TRAIN A HI/LO RB EL.797, 90', RE0' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188 Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 44.< RC LT 0004P3 :PZR LEVEL 3 TRAIN B Hi/LO Availabla Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6428-6432K

.. . ...* . . ......* .:... ~....

RB EL.797, 75, R50' Available >RLGM Screened per IPEEE.

45 RC LT 0072 U3 SSF PRESSURIZER LEVEL RB EL.777, 70', R50' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure vailable vailail Walkdwn Walkdown K'*OSC-11188, Ol1-11188, Att, Att. 33 '

46 RC PT 0225 U3 RC LOOP A PRESSURE'K RB EL.797, 270', R50' Available A .' ':. .

>RLGM Sreened per OSCP11188

,Funct ional Failure 47 RC PT 0226 U3 RC LOOP B PRESSURE RB EL.825, 90', RSO Available A Walkdown OSC-11188, AUt.3 >RLGM Screened per OSC011188 Functional Failure

• . .. .. ...... . . . .. . ' .. .. .. . ii: . . . . . . .. ÷* : = - i i:. . . .

48 RC RD. 0005B , REACTOR.COLD.LEG3AWR RB EL.797, 31W0R35' Available A Walkdown. OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM . Screened per OSC-11188..

...... '. .MP..........

.... ... .... .. .. K 'K, ~ ~'* "",""*, unctional Failure "

R .B.... ...... R*.Al ......... .... ... d..

49 RC RD 0006A U3 REACTOR COLD LEG A WR RB EL.797, 260', R30' Available A, Walkdown OSC-11188, AUt.3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP 1 Functional Failure Page 45 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 0007B REACTOR COLD LEG 3B W RB EL.797, 50', R35' Available *

• Available .. Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 50 RC RD TEMP 2 ... .... i........... ...... ... .. .... I ...... Functional Failure

.. '.. . A.... ....

51 RC RD 0008A REACTOR COLD LEG 38 W EL.797, 100 R30 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 TEMP 1 Functional Failure 52 RC RD 0084A REACTOR COOLANT LOOF A RB EL.844, 2900,R20' Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188E Att. 3 ~>RLGM Screened per OSC 11188 SFunctional Falure-w

\ . **

... ... ..  : ii .:

53 RC RD 0084B REACTOR COOLANT LOOF A RB EL.844, 290', R20' Available Available Walkdown OSC11188 At. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC.11188

. . ... ....... ... .. . . . - .: . . . . .. Functional Failure 5$4 RC RD Q00BSA REACTOR OUTLET LOOP B ..... . ... . . *RB. . ...... .... EL.844, '... .70°, .. R20'

.. .. . . . Available

. . . . . . "Available

. . . . . . . .

• Walkdown . . ............. OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

. ..: Functional Failure

. ,* * .*.... .. "......" 05C-11188, Att. :3 55 RC RD 0085B RC HOT LEG B WR TEMP RB EL.844, 70', R20' Available Available Walkdown >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Functional Failure

. .. >R.m Screened per IPEEE 56 0004 *..... ... . . .. RB:.... . EL.844, .:: . *..

... R30' 110', ... .. . * ..Open

. . :: . . : Closed ..... : iii: Walk-byd '.  ::

RC VA . .PZR... .. . POWER

...... :... . RELIEF

.... .?C I:BLOCI,

.......... OSC-8377 pg 6529-6531 57 RC VA 0066 PZR POWER RELIEF VALVE RB EL.844, 110', R30' Open Closed Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6541-6543 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

........... . ... . ... ...... . .. .:. i::,*  :,* .... . .. ....... .... *.... ... . .........

58, RC VA,1 0155 3A HOT LEG VENT.. RB EL.825 270', R50,. ' Closed.. . Open: Walkdown OSC-11188, At. 6 '>RLGM, Screened per EPRI NP-6041

¢ .- . .. * . >. ...... . . . . . .

59 RC VA 0156 3A HOT LEG VENT BLOCK RB EL.825, 270', RSO, Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGIM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 60 ,RC VA 0157*. ,:*... ... . 3B HOT... LEG ... ... VENT

. :.*i: i.... .. RB EL.825, 90', RSO' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6

. ........ . EL 90., R Closed...... Opn >RLGM

>RLGM Screened Screened per per EPRI EPRI NP-6041 NP-6041 61 RC VA 0158 3B HOT LEG VENT BLOCK RB EL.825, 90', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 RLGM ... . Screened per EPR. NP-6041 62 RC VA 0159 RX VESSEL HEAD VENT RB EL.844, 90', R50' Closed Open Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 Open 63 RC VA 0160 RXVESSEL HEAD VENT RB EL.844, 90', R50' Closed Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 6 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Open . SC-1188 Att. . 6 .

OSC-11188, OSC-11188, Art.AUt.66 Screened per 64 SF VA 0082 SEP,,4T0 RC M/U PUMP BL( OCK RB EL.777, 45, R45' Closed Walkdown >RLGM

>RLGM Screened per EPRI EPRI NP-6041 NP-6041 65 SF VA 0097 SFP TO RC M/U PUMP BL(OCK RB EL.777, 0°, R55' Closed Open Walkdown Page 46 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS Unit 3 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME BLDG LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY

• HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.20g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

• • Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per IPEEE - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per OSC-11188 - Indicates that the component was evaluated in OSC-111ig, Attachment 3 and therefore meets the RLGM demand. For this case, the Key Failure Modefas determined in OSC-11188) is also reported.

Screened per EPRI NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

Interaction - Block Walls - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional Failure - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

Relay Chatter - Indicates that relay chatter is the governing failure mode for the component.

Page 47 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Appendix D ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 48 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 1 0 CCW CD 0001 SSF HVAC CONDENSER 1 EL.817, COL.E16 Off On Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 3-7 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage i* *........ ....

• Walk'-by 2 0 CCW CD 0002 SSF HVAC CONDENSER 2 EL.817, COLEIS Off On "OSC-8377, pg 8*1:1 .Mi.... Screened per OSC-1 1188.

Anchorage 3 0 CCW FT 0072 SSF HVAC SERV WTR PMP EL.797, COL.D16 Available Available Walkdown OSC- 11188, Att, 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 FLOW Screened per EPRI NP-6041 L . .. . . ...... . . . .. .., . . . . . ... .. ...:.... ... .... .. . . . .. .. ,..... . . . . .. :7........... .... .,,, . . . .. ......

...., . . ~ ~~~

.4 0 ccW 'PU *0002 .SSF ASW PUMP EL.754, COL.E17 " . Off On Wallk-by OSC-8377, pg 16-,19 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per.EPRI NP-6041 5 0 CCW PU 0004 HVAC SERVICE WTR PUMP 2 EL*754 COL.iG Off On Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 24-27 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

'6 0 CCW PU 0005 DIESEL ENGINE SERVICE EL.754, COL.E16 Off On Walk-by OSC-8377o pg 28-31 >RLGM Screened per OSC-111885;'

WATER PUMP Screened per EPRI NP-6041 7 0 CCW VA 0277 HVAC CONDENSER 2 3-WAY EL.817, COL.E16 Throttled Throttled Walkdown OSC 11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 INLET Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Walkdown* OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM . ,Screened perOSC-11188 8 " 0 CCW VA., 0280:, HVAC CONDENSER 134WAY EL817, COL.E16 ... Throttled

• Throttled.

INLET Screened per EPRI NP-6041 9 0 DA TK O00A DIESEL STARTING AIR TANK A EL.777, COL.FIO Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 525 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.I . ... .. ..... OSC-8443, pg 525

• 10 0 DA, TK 0008 DIESEL STARTING AIRTANK B EL.777, COL.F1O Available. Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 525 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188.

. .... Screned per EPRJNP-6.04. .

Walk-by 11 0 DA TK 00OC DIESEL STARTING AIR TANK C EL.777, COL.F10 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 525 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

?5."Walk by .. : oSC-B443, pg"525 12 .:. 0 DA TK 0000 DIESEL STARTING AlRkTANK D EL.777 COL.F1O Available Available >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041<

13 0 DJW HX OO0A A DIESEL ENGINE JACKET EL.777, COLE10 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 32-34 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 WATER COOLER Screened per EPRI NP-6041

~-r~~

": . .. =.~~~~ . .... . ........... : I ............

14 0 . DJW. HX *000B . B DIESEL ENGINE JACKET EL.777, COL.E13 .. Available Available. Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 35-37 >RLGM. *-**Screened per OSC-11188

'WATER*COOLER . . Screened per EPRINP-6041

..,1

.... ..... .C. .. ..... Availa e .Av.ai.... b W DCSF 125VDC DISTRIBUTION EL.777, COL.F1S Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 15 0 EL LX CENTER DCSF Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 49 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY

. .. .... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

16 0 EL PL DCSF 125 VDC POWER PNL BRD EL.777, COL.E15 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 530-533 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 DCSF. Screened per EPRI NP-6041 17 0 EL PL DCSF1 125 VDC DISTRIBUTION EL.777, COL.Fl1 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 534-537 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 CENTER DCSF-1 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 18 0 EL PL KSF 208/120VACSSF VITAL P.WR EL.777, COL.D16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 538-542

• RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

'. "PNL(GRAY) .

. ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

.Screened .. .i .'.per

.: _.:.EPRI

. ::, NP-6041_.._.:.i....

19 0 EL PL KSFC 120VAC VITAL CONTROL PWR EL,777, COLD014 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 7223-26 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 PNLBD KSFC Screened per EPRI NP-6041 20 0' EL SH DGSWGR DIESELGENERATOR EL.777, COL.Fli Available. Available Walk-by : .OSC-8443, pg 543-549 >RLGM . Screened perOSC- 11188 SWITCHGEAR .: ... S.Relay Chatter."

21 0 EL TF KSF FEEDER TO SSF 208/120VAC EL.777, COL.D16 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 PANELBOARD KSF Screened per EPRI NP-6041 22 0: DF6. PU 0005 SSF DIESEL ENGINE FUEL OIL' EL.777, COLE9 .,. Available Available Walk-by OSC-w43;~w.5o:553' Screened per OSC-11188 TRANSFER PUMP . '4.

• Screened per EPR, NP-6041 23 0 FO TK 0003 SSF FUEL OIL DAY TANK EL.777, COL.D9 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 38-40 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 44'.

4>.*,

444,'...... ... .  :. . ..

24 0 FO TK 0004 SSF DIESEL ENGINE FUEL OIL EL.785, COLF9 Available Available Walk-by DSC-8377, pg 41-43 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 STORAGE TANK (BELOW GRADE) Screened per IPEEE 25 0 NI CA 0225 SSF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT EL.777, COL.F11 Available Available Walk-by >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 OSC-8443, pg 526-529 RACK Screened per EPRI NP-6041 26 0 SSF BA DCSF<. DCSF SSF NORMAL BATTERY EL.777, COLF15 Available Available Walkdown DSC-111988 Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Wa ......

27 0 SSF BA DCSFS DCSFS SSF STANDBY BATTERY EL.777, COL.F13 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.W.alkdown 28 *..0. 5SF BC CSF. CSF SSF BATTERY CHARGER EL.777, COL.E16 Available Available OSC-11188, Att 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-1 1188 4

" Screened per EPRI NP-6041, Walkdown 29 0 SSF BC CSFS CSFS 125VDC STBY BATT CHGR EL.777, COL.E16 Available Available OSC-11188 Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Walkdown. >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

.30 0 SSF B1 KSFI: KSF1 SSF STATIC INVERTER .'K' . EL.777 COL ES . Available : 'Available OSC-11188, Att. 3 *.4 .:. *. . ....*::*N. P .:04

. . Screenedjper EpRiNP-6041,..

Page 50 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 31 0 SSF BI KSF2 KSF2 SSF STATIC INVERTER EL.777, COL.E14 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.... . .. .  :.. *.* . . *'* i:... ::

IS: CA 0002 sSF PZR HEATER CABINET EL.:77",.C0L.F10 :: :Avvailable Available. Walk-by OSC-8377, pg. 73M8-731  : >RLGM:.*:. Screened per OSC-11188 'i

,.Screened per.EPRI NP-6041 5SF CA 0003 SSF PRESSURIZER HEATER EL.777, COL.F1l Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 CABINET (PHC1) Screened per EPRI NP-6041 SSF;: CA IC2 5SF IC2 CABINET. EL.797, COL.015 Aivailable Available Walk by OSC 8377,: pg 7203-7206,. >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

.: Screened per EPRI NP-6041.

SSF CA MEC MISC. EQUIPMENT CABINET EL.797, COL.E15 Aivailable Available Walk-by OSC08377, pg 7203-7206 >RLGM Screened per OSC- 11188 (MEC) SSF (EOC) SYSTEM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 5SF DE DOOA SSF DIESEL ENGINE A (16CYLQ EL.777, COL.D12 Standby O'bperating Walk-by OSC83;77, g 86 90 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage SSF LX OXSF 600V LOAD CENTER OXSF EL.777, CDL 015 A~vailable Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 (SSF) Screened per EPRI NP-6041 SSF Mx PXSF sF 6.00VMCC PXSF EL-777, C&L1`13 Av,,~flable Available .Walkdown. v:OSC11188, Att. 3 >RLGM . Screened perOSC-11188 i Screened per EPRI NP-6041 5SF MX XSF 600V MCC XSF EL.777, COL.D15 Avvailable Available Walk-by OSC08377, pg 7500-7504 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 SSF PL SSFCP SSF CONTROL PANEL EL,797, COIL.014 A~"ailable Available. Walk by OSC-8377, pg 7372.7375 >RLGM 'Screened perOSC 1188 Scree*ned per EPRI NI 041 SSF SH OTS1 OTS1 SSF ESSENTIAL SWGR EL.777 COL3E14 Av :ailable Available Walk by OSC-8377, pg 7303-7307 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 4160V Relay Chatter SSF TF PXSF SSF 4160/600V

• EL777, COL.D1E Av,ailable Available Walkdo-y OSC-11188 Att. 3,,. >RLGM Screened: per OSC-11188."

TRANSFORM ER PXSF' Anchorage 43 0 VS AH 0042 AHU 0-42 HEATING AND A/C EL.817, COL*E16 Avvailable Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 562-567 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SSF BUILDING (ON AHU42) Anchorage 44 0i VS .< AHI 0044EXI.. SSF CONST VENT SUPPLY FAN EL8177COL.D15. Off On Walkdby.: OSC-8443 pg 568-571. >RLGM  :.1Screened perOSC-11188 Anchorage" ,:,

45 0 VS AH 0044EX3 SSF ON LINE VENT SUPPLY EL.817, COLE16 A Off On Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 572-575 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 FAN Anchorage Page 51 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. I ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY Walk-by,.. OSC-8443, pg 576-57*9 Screend per OSC-l*188

,46 0 , VS AH 0044EX4 SSFENGINEEXFAN., .EL.777, COL.E10.,.. Available Available >RLGM(

A.. .:.... Anchorage 47 0 VS DA ID01 SSF INLET DAMPER ID-1 (AH EL.817, COL.D14 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 601-603 Screened per OSC-11188 EXHAUST FAN AH0044EX4) Functional Failure

.... . . ........ >RLGM E. 7,..C.D.. :.. Closed:.. Op .... . I,pg 604-606

..I....... I.*

48 0. VS DA ID01E ACTUATOR FOR INTAKE EL.817, COL.1D14 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, >RLGM:::. Screenedper OSC-11188 B Functional Failure Z ..

............... ................. SSF-ID-A.&

..DAMPER ....

..*............... __.. ..I ........

EL.817, COL.D14 Closed Open 49 0 VS DA ID01W ACTUATOR FOR INTAKE Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 607-609 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 DAMPER SSF-ID-C & D .EL.817, COL.D14 Closed Open Functional Failure 50 0.,.: VS DA ID02 INLET DAMPER ID-2: (SSF AH Walk by OSC-8443, pg 610-612 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 EXHfAN AH0044EX3) ,. EL.817, COL.D14 Closed Open ...... Functional Failure 51 0 VS DA ID02A ACTUATOR FOR INLET EL.817, COL.D14 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 613-615 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 DAMPER SSF-ID2 (EXH FAN Functional Failure AH0044EX3) >RLGM EL.817, COL.D14 Closed >RLGM 52 0 VS DA ID03 SSF INLET DAMPER ID-3 (AH Open Walk- by. OSC-8443, pg 616-6182 Screened per OSC-1.1188 EXHAUST FAN AH0044EX1) Functional Failure 53 0 VS DA ID03A ACTUATOR FOR INLET EL.817, COL.D14 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 619-621 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 DAMPER SSF-ID3 (EXH FAN Functional Failure AHO044EX1) 54

• 0 VS,. DA XD01* SSF EXH DAMPERXO-1 (AH EL.817, COL.D9 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 628-630 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188.

4...

EXH. FAN:AH0044EX4), . Functional Failure 55 0 VS DA XD01E ACTUATOR FOR EXH DAMPER EL.817, COL.D9 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 631-633 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SSF-XD-A&B Functional Failure Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 634-636 >RLGM Screene*d per OSC-11188 :.:

.56 0 Vs "DA XD01W ACTUATOR FOR EXH:DAMPER EL.817, COLD9 CIos'ed ,Open.'

Functional Failure:

SSF-XD-C&D 57 0 VS DA XD03 SSF EXH DAMPER XD-3 (AH EL817, COL.D9 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 640-642 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 EXH FAN AH0044EX1) Functional Failure 58 0" VS DA XD03A ACTUATOR FOR EXH.DAMPER EL.817, COL.D9 Closed Open Walk-by *OSC-8443, pg 643-645 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

:,* :. ÷ SSF-XD3 (EXH FAN Functional Failure .::

.. :AHOO44X 59 0 VS PE SSFPE01 SSF SUMMER VENT. SYSTEM EL.817, COL.E14 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 (VH) EXHAUST FAN (SSF-XF-3) Functional Failure Page 52 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NORMAL DESIRED W,ALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE 0IR WALK-BY 60 0 VS PE'.... SSFPE02 SSF AIR CONDITIONING. EL.817, COL.E16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

.. SYSTEM.(VH) CONTROL *.. i Functional Failure PANEL WIRING 61 0 VS PL CPO1AH2 CONTROL PNL FOR SSF-AH-42 EL.817, COL.E16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 663-666 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 (CP-1) Screened per EPRI NP-6041

".>1r*..........

. .:: .. ... *....... ... ......... i.............. y?:. ............ * ...... ". " '".... .. i7' ......

62 0 VS PS SSFPS01 SSF CONSTANT VENTILATION EL.817, COL.E15 Available Available Walk-by

.......... , .. OSC-8443,

,.: .*. pg 667-671

. ........... >RLGM *Screened

• : .: per

, OSC-11188

.SYSTEM SUPPLY.PAN -:  :...7'Functional Failure 63 0 VS PS SSFPS02 5SF SUMMER VENTILATION EL.817, CDL.ElS Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443,...pg 667-671 . >RLGM . .

Screened . OSC-11188 per j SYSTEM SUPPLY FAN Functional Failure 64 0 VS PS SSFPS03 SSF ON-LINE VENTILATION EL.817, COL.D15 Available Available Walk-by, OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 7<** . ' Funtional Failure 4 SYSTEM SUPPLY FAN 65 0 VS

'*:.. PS *.1.:17.'..

. ...

• SFPS04. SSF CONSTANT. ..VENTILATION EL.817,

....... COL.E13 . Available

. . .7. Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SYSTEM EXHAUST FAN Functional Failure

":: . " ... "1: -

' ..... . ...-  : ....... .. .... ".. . . . . . "'7...*

.i ":" "

6 0 VS PS SSFPS05 SSF SUMMER VENTILATION EL.817, COL.E13 Available Available Walk-by " OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SYSTEM EXHAUST FAN Functional Failure 67 0 VS PS SSFPS06 SSF ON-LINE VENTILATION EL.817, COL.E13 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11 .188 SYSTEM EXHAUST FAN Functional Failure

.68 0 VS PS SSFPS07 SSF ENGINE VENTILATION EL.877, COL.D13 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 5546-558 >RLGM: Screerned per OSC-11188 SYSTEM<EXHAUST FAN . ... . Fu ctional Failure..

69 0 VS PS SSFPS08 SSF AIR CONDITIONING EL.817, COL.D16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 667-671 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SYSTEM (VH) CONTROL Functional Failure PANEL WIRING

/ " :  :" .V *  :. " * '" .-..

.70 '0. VS '1] SSFCT1 - . HVAC TEMPERATURE ' - EL:817, COLE16

• Available ... . Available. Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 672-676 >RLGM Screened perOSC-11188 CONTROLLER (FOR SSF-AH-42)  :

ScreFunctional Failure . .

.' .. .. :. . ,.. . 4... .

71 0 VS TT SSFCT2 HVAC TEMPERATURE EL.817, COL.D14 Available Available Walk-by 0SC-8443, pg 677-681 >RLGM Screened per 0SC-11188 CONTROLLER (FOR SSF-CP-1) (AIR INTAKE Functional Failure 72 1.. Walk-by.*, OSC 8443, pg5308-512 * >RL-GM .Screened perOSC-11188 CCW PL 0268 REMOTE STARTER EL.754, COLE16 "Available . "Available.

• . :i::..*

.. " " " ":. - ... .. iScreen~ed per EPRI NP-6041 .

S. .........:

ENCLOSURE

• .:L; .*FORo:.:**:(

.. ICCW-268 °. ... 1i.7.- ....-- - ....----*  :. :"

.. .." .o _. '7 77'*. .

Page 53 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NORRMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID STATE STATE OR WALK-BY 73 1 CCW PL 0287 REMOTE STARTER EL.754, COL.E16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2027-2031 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 ENCLOSURE FOR 1CCW-287 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 74 1 CCW, VA 0268 SSF ASW PUMP TO SG SUPPLY EL.754, COL.E17 Closed Throttled Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188  !

.. Screened:per EPRI NP-6041 75 1 CCW VA 0287 SSF ASW PUMP TO SG EL.754, COL.E17 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 517-520 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SUPPLY BLOCK Screened per EPRI NP-6041 76 1 EL.. MX 1XSF 600V MCC PANEL:I XSF EL817, COL.F15 Available Available: Walk-by OSC-8377; pg 2522-2526 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage .

..:.............. ........... ... . . .!* ** > , .....*...........i:: ..............: .. .. . ...* .... . ..

77 1 EL MX 1XSF1 208V MCC 1XSF-1 EL.797, COL.D16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 7505-7510 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage

78 1 EL' MX IXSFA 208V MCC 1XSFA* E.17,COL.F15 " Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2517-2521 .>RLGM .. Screened perOSC-11188-,>'

.. .. Screened per EPRI NP-6041 1XSF 600/208V XFMR 1XSF EL.817, COL.F15 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 2527-2531 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 79 1 EL TF (30KVA/3PH/6OHZ) Screened per EPRI NP-6041 80 1* SSF TN TB1XSFG 1XSFG01 ENCLOSURE EL777, COL.014 Available Available. Walkdown *OSC-11188 Att. 3. >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 01 01 ~ ~~~~..

• .: ......... " .< . " ... ::*"... 7

i. Anchorage.

81 2 CCW PL 0268 REMOTE STARTER EL.754, COL.E16 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 508-512 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 ENCLOSURE FOR 2CCW-268 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.82 2.. CC7W PL 0287 REMOTE STARTER EL.754, COL.E16 Available Available. Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4364-4367 .>RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 ENCLOSURE FOR 2CCW-287 .. ." S "Screened per.EPRI NP-6041 A.

83 2 CCW VA 0268 SSF ASW PUMP TO SG SUPPLY EL.754, COL.E17 Closed Throttled Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.... ,v..: '*. -..........-.

...... '....."T* ... **:.;.........7... "  :".......*"

• 84 2 CCW VA. 0287 SSF ASW PUMP TO SG EL.754, COL.E17 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 521-524 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SUPPLY BLOCK "- . ."Screened per EPRI NP-6041 85 2 EL MX 2XSF 600V MOTOR CONTROL EL.817, COL.F15 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4814-4818 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 CENTER Anchorage 7> , ..:....* .

86 :2 EL ....MX 2XSF1 206Y.MOTOR CONTROL EL.797, COL16 Avail able Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 7505-7510 . RLGM Screened per OSC 11188 CENTER Anchorage

. .. .... 9 7 ..

87 2 EL MX 2XSFA 208V MOTOR CONTROL EL.817, COL.F15 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4809-4813 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 CENTER Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Page 54 of 99 Attachment I to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 ONS SSF ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL UNIT SYS TYPE NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME LOCATION NOl RMAL DESIRED WALKDOWN SEWS HCLPF* KEY FAILURE MODE**

ID SiTATE STATE OR WALK-BY 88 _2ý , EL < TF.  :*' 2XSF... 4 600/208V XFMR.,2XSF EL.817, COL.FI5 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 4819-4823 >RLGM Screened per oSc11188 (30KV,/3PH/60HZ) >. -. .. ......... _ .  : . .. . * :: . _ . ...Screened. . i:, per. EPRI ., NP-6041 ::

89 2 SSF TN TB2XSFG 2XSFG01 ENCLOSURE EL.777, COL.D14 Available Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att. 3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 01 Anchorage

. . . .. ..........:.::1**

90 3 CCW PL 0268 REMOTE STARTER EL.754, COLD17. Available Available Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 508-512 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

...... .:*: ~~~~~~..

.......ENCLOSURE ............FOR 3CCW-268 ... :* ..! i~ *  : , ** *, SScreened per EPRI NP-6041.

91 3 CCW PL 0287 REMOTE STARTER EL,754, COL.D17 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6569-6572 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 ENCLOSURE FOR 3CCW-287 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 92 3 CCW VA 0268 SSF ASW PUMP.TO SG SUPPLY EL.754, COL.E16 Closed Throttled" Walkdown OSC-11188, Attý:3 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 L. Screened per EPRI NP-6041 93 3 CCW VA 0287 SSF ASW PUMP TO SG EL.754, COL.E16 Closed Open Walk-by OSC-8443, pg 517-520 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 SUPPLY BLOCK Screened per EPRI NP-6041

.... .... "  :... .. . . .. 7 " . . . ..... " .. .  :. .. .. .. . ..:i~ :* ... . ..

3XSF 600JVMCC 3XSF .... EL.817, COL.F1S.I Available .:..Availablei Walk-by 0SC-8377, pg 7002-7005 * >RLGM . Screened per osC-i 1188

94. .3 EL:: MX

~~~~~~~~~

• ............ ~~~~~~~~

. . . .... .............. ... ....... * : ........... .. . .. Anchorage . . . . . . ..

95 3 EL MX 3XSF1 208V MCC 3XSF-1 EL.797, COL.D17 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 7505-7510 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 Anchorage

.96 3 EL MX 3XSFA 208V MCC 3XSF EL,817, COL.F15 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 6996-7000 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188

. .. Screened per EPRI NP-6041 97 3 EL TF 3XSF 600/208V XFMR 3XSF EL.817, COL.F15 Available Available Walk-by OSC-8377, pg 7006-7010 >RLGM Screened per OSC-11188 (30KVA/3PH/60HZ) Screened per EPRI NP-6041 98 3 SSF TN TB3XSFG . 3XSFG01 ENCLOSURE EL.777, COL.D14 . Available .. Available Walkdown OSC-11188, Att 3 >RLGM Screen6d per OSC-11188

.. . .o 4* ..iAnchorage.

• HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.20g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

• Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per IPEEE - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per OSC-11188 - Indicates that the component was evaluated in OSC-11188, Attachment 3 and therefore meets the RLGM demand. For this case, the Key Failure Mode(as determined in OSC-11188) is also reported.

Screened per EPRI NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

Interaction - Block Walls - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional Failure - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

Rplav rhatter - Indicates that relaw thatter is the govmrnina failure mode for the comonennt.

Page 55 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 Appendix E ONS FLEX Flow Paths (Unit 1 Only)

Page 56 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 1 RCS - Phase I - Unit 1 SG FEED - Phase 1 - Unit 1 ADVs to Reduce SG Pressure -

RCMU SGMU Phase 1 & 2 - Unit 1

1. OFD 104A-1.1 1. OFD 133A-2.1 1. OFD 122A-1.1

2. OFD 101A-1,5 2. OFD 133A-2.5

3. OFD 101A-1,4 3. OFD 121 D-1.1 Prevent Nitroeen IntrusIon from

4. OFD 100A-1.3 4. OFD 121 B-1.5 CFTs Into the RCS - Phase 2 - Uni RC Letdown (Pressure Boundary) 1

1. OFD 100A-1.3 5. OFD 121B-1.3 1. OFD 102A-1.3 (Seal Isolation)

2. OFD 100A-1.1 SG FEED - Phase 2 - Unit I Reduce RCS Pressure - Phase 2 -

(Letdown Isolation) SGMU Primary FLEX Path Unit 1

3. OFD 102A-1.1 1. OFD 121D-1.2 1. OFD 10OA-1.1 (Pressure Boundary) 2. OFD 121D-1.1

4. OFD 101A-1.4 3. OFD 121B-1.5 SSF Fuel Oil - Phase I - Units 1. 2.

(Pressure Boundary) (Pressure Boundary) &_3 S. OFD 1O0A-1.2 4. OFD 121B-1.3 1. OFD 135A-1.2 (Pressure Boundary)

6. OFD 102A-1.3 SG FEED - Phase 2 - Unit 1 SSF Fuel Oil - Phase 2 - Units 1. 2.

(Pressure Boundary) SGMU Alternate FLEX Path &_3

7. OFD 101A-1.1 1. OFD 133A-2.5 1. OFD 13SA-1.2

8. OFD 101A-1.5 2. OFD 121 D-1.1

9. OFD 104A-1.1 3. OFD 121B-1.S SSF Diesel Eneine Jacket Water RC Pressure Control (Pressure Boundary) System - Phase 1 - Units 1. 2. & 3

1. OFD 100A-1.2 4. OFD 121B-1.3 1. OFD 138A-1.1

2. OFD 100A-1.1 (Pressure Boundary) SSF HVAC - Phase 1 - Units 1.2. &

3. OFD 11OA-1.1 3

1. OFD 133A-2.5 RCS - Phase 2 - Unit 1 2. OFD 116N-1.1 RCMU (Primary [Train A] &

Alternate FLEX Paths [Train BJ) SSF Diesel Eneine Lube Oil System

1. OFD 102A-1.1 - Phase 1I- Units 1. 2. & 3

2. OFD 102A-1.2 1. OFO 1351B-1.4 (Pressure Boundary)

3. OFD 104A-1.2 SSF Diesel Eneine.Turbo Charmers (Pressure Boundary) - Phase 1 - Units 1. 2. & 3

4. OFD 101A-1.3 1. OFD 137D-1.3 (Pressure Boundary

5. OFD 101A-1.4 SSF Startine Air System - Phase I

6. OFD 100A-1.3 -Units 1. 2. &3 (Path A for Primary & 1. OFD 137D-1.1 Alternate FLEX strategies - 2. OFD 137D-1.2 seal injection lines)

7. OFD 100A-1.1 SFP - Phase 2 - Units 1 & 2 (Path Bfor Primary & SFP Primary FLEX Path Alternate FLEX strategies - 1. OFD 104A-1.1 header injection lines)

8. OFD 101A-1.5 (Pressure Boundary)

Page 57 of 99 Attachment 1 to Letter ONS-2014-161