NSD-NRC-98-5554, Forwards W Responses to FSER Open Items on AP600.Summary of Enclosed Responses,Fser Open Item Number,Associated Oits Number & Status to Be Designated in W Status Column of Oits Encl in Table 1

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Forwards W Responses to FSER Open Items on AP600.Summary of Enclosed Responses,Fser Open Item Number,Associated Oits Number & Status to Be Designated in W Status Column of Oits Encl in Table 1
ML20202A924
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 02/02/1998
From: Mcintyre B
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Quay T
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NSD-NRC-98-5554, NUDOCS 9802110021
Download: ML20202A924 (18)


Text

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Westinghouse Energy Systems Bm 355 ,

Pittstugh PennsyNrna 15230 0355 EleCfIlc C0fp0I8tl0D l

DCP/NRCl243 '

NSD-NRC 98-5554 Docket No.: 52 003 February 2,1998 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 NITENTION: T. R. QUAY

SUBJECT:

AP600 RESPONSE TO FSER OPEN ITEh1S

Dear hir. Quay:

Attachment 1 of this letter provides the Westinghouse responses to FSER open items on the AP600.

A summary of the enclosed responses is provided in Table 1. Included in the table is the FSER open item number, the associated OITS ,1 umber, and the status to be designated in the Westinghouse status column of OITS.

The NRC should review the enclosures and infonn Westinghouse of the status to be designated in the "NRC Status" column of OITS.

Pleas, contact me on (4 ') 174-4334 if you have any questions concerning this transmittal. -

ArAf Ilrian A. McIntyre, hianager Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing jml Enclosure

- cc: W. C. Iluffman, NRC (Enclosure)

T. J. Kenyon, NRC (Enclosure) j~ @ g J. hi. Sebrosky, NRC (Enclosure)

D. C. Scaletti, NRC (Enclosure)

N. J. Liparuto, Westinghouse (w/o Enclosure)

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NSD.NRC-98 5554 2- February 2,1998 Table 1 List of FSER Open items included in Letter DCP/NRCl243

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FSER Open item OITS Number Westinghouse status in OITS

  • 480.1131F 6555 Action N t

480.1137F 6561 Confirm W 4F5.1.138F 6562 Action N 480.ll40F 6564 Action N 480.1142F 6566 Confirm W ,

480.1143F 6567 Confirm W 480.ll50F 6574 Confirm W 480.ll63F 6587 Confirm W b

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February 2,1998

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NRC FSEFi OPEN ITEM Question: 480.1131F (OITS #6555)

Why is the format of the surveillance requirements for TS 3.5.8 different from that for TS 3.5.77

Response

The first 3 surveillances of LCO 3.5.8 are identical to the first 3 LCO 3.5.6/ 3.5.7 surveillances, except that "lRWST and cavity" have replaced " cavity," since, during refueling, the IRWST water may be moved to the refueling cavity. His transfer of water is acceptable provided the combined volume, boron concentration and temperature meet surveillance limits.

SSAR Revision: None.

480.113 F 1 W wesunnuse

NRC FSER OPEN ITEM Question: 480.ll37F (OITS #6561)

The Applicable Safety Analyses discussion in the BASES for TS 3.6.4 states that the external pressure load from inadvertent containment spray system actuation was evaluated it is the staff's understanding that inadvertent contain.:nent 4 pray was not a credible event for AP600. Please provide )

an explanation of this statemer.t. )

Responset As agreed at the NRC / Westinghouse meeting of January 28,1998, the reference to inadvertent l Containment Spray Actuation will be removed from the BASES for TS 3.6.4, because inadvertent '

containment spray actuation is not a credible event for AP600.

SSAR Revision: See attached markup.

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conteu m.rt rressure B 3.6.4

. BASES APPLICABLE The containment was also designed for an external pressure {

SAFETt ANALYSES load equivalent to 3.0 psig. The limiting negative pressure {

(continued) transient is a loss of all AC power sources coincident with  !

extreme cold weather conditions which cool the external surface of the containment vessel. The initial pressure condition used in this analysis was 0.2 psig. This resulted in a minimum pressure inside containment, as illustrated in reference 1, which is less than the design l load. Other external pressure load events evaluated I include:

Failed fan cooler control Halfunctional of containment purge system Inadvertent Incontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) drain Inadvertent Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) actuation

_ Ind;;-t:nt Centdd. ?-=y eye += M+"*+4 =

Since the containment external pressure deign limits can be met by ensuring compliance with the initial pressure condition, NUREG 1431 LCO 3.6.12 Vacuum Relief System is-not applicable to the AP600 containment.

Containment pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Stetement.

I LC0 Maintaining containment pressure at less than or equal to the LCO upper pressure limit ensures that, in the event of a DBA, the resultant peak containment accident pressure wiil f- remain below the containment design pressure. Maintaining containment pressure at greater than or equal to the LC0 lower pressure limit ensures that the containm nt will not exceed the design negative differential pressure following negative pressure transients.

APPLICABILIT( In H00ES 1, 2, 3, and 4. a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. Since maintaining containment pressure within limits is essential to ensure initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses are maintained, the LCO is applicable in H0 DES 1, 2, 3. and 4.

(continued)

A h AP600 B 3.6 25 08/97 Amendment 0

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NRC FSER OPEN ITEM i I"

Question: 480.1138F (OITS #6562)

The Applicable Safety Analyses discussion in the BASES for TS 3.6.5 states that such things as worst single failures of Residual Heat Removal and the Containment Sprav System were considered in the postulated DBAs. This discussion is clearly not applicable to AP600 and shouH be corrected.

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Response

The BASES for TS 3.6.5 his been modified in response to FSER Open item 480.1088, sabinitted in f DCP/NRCll80 on December 12,1998. 'Ihe description of the inoperable systems resulting from ths worst single failur; assumed in the applicable safety analyses was modified to state-

"The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment Engineered f m JF) systems, assuming the loss of x Class IE Engineered Safety Features Act i (ESFAC) Division, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in ossive Containment Cooling System flow path being rendered inoperaMe "

l No additional modificatbns are requiud.

L SSAR Revision: None.

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i NRC FSER OPEN ITEM Queman: 480.1140F (OITS #6564)

The Applicable Safety Analyses discussion in the BASES for TS 3.6.6 states "The anrJyses and evaluations assume a unit specific power level of 1933 MWt, one passive containment conditiens of 120 F and 1.0 psig." This statement does not make sense as written and should be corrected.

Response

The statement above has been removed from the BASES for TS 3.6 6 in response to FSER Open item 480.1088, submitted in DC~2/NRCll80 on December 12,1998, No additional modification is required.

SSAR Revision: None.

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NRC FSER OPEN ITEM Ouestion: 480.1142F (OITS #6566) [

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He words "with the reactor shutdown"in the applicability statement of TS 3.6.7 and itt BASES are unnecessary and should be deleted.

[ Response:

As agreed at the NRC / Westinghouse meeting of Jar:ary 28,1998, the words "with the reactor shutdown" will be removed from the applicability statement of TS 3.6.7 and its BASES.

SSAR Revision: See attached markup E

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. 3.6.7 3.6 CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS 357  : Passive Containment Cooling Syster (PCS) Shutdown LCO 3.6.7 The passive containment cooling system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: H00ES 5 and 6 wMh-re::to" thetdar, and with the calculated reactor decay heat > 6.0 MWA, ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION -COMPLETION TIME A. One passive A.1 Restore flow path to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> containment cooling OPERABLE status, water flow path inoperable.

B. Water storage tank B.1 Restore water storage 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> temperature not tank to OPERABLE status.

within limit.

OR Water storage tank volume not within limit. .

b AP600 3.6 16 08/97 Amendnent 0 AP01steenesect19030007 #C742597

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B 3.6.7 BASES (continued) s

,APPLIqABILITY OPERABILITY of the PCS is requi'.ed in HODES 5 and 6 *+th feacte-sHntdown and the calculated reactor decay heat greater than 6 MWt for heat removal in the event of a loss of nonsafety decay heat removal capabilities.

With the decay heat less than 6 MWt, the decay and sensible

! 2at can be eas,,y removed from containment with air cooling g alone.

The PCS requirements in H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are specified in LCO 3.6.6, Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) - 2 Operating.

ACTIONS A.1 With one passive containment cooling water flow path inoperable, the affected flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this degraded condition, the remaining flow path is capable of providing greater tha'. '00% of the heat removal needs after an accident. h 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time was chosen in light of the remaining heat removal capability and the low j probability of DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 If the coc, ling water tank is incperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The tank may be declared inoperable due to low water level or tehiperature out of limits. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the remaining heat removal cap 6bility of the system and the

, availability of cooling water from alternate sources.

(continued)

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b AP600 B 3.6 39 08/97 Amendment 0 4Bc.n4 F-3 1

NRC FSER OPEN ITEM -

Question: 480.1143F (OITS #6567)

TS 3.6.7 and its corresponding DASES should be consistent. The TS references water storage tank volume, whereas, the BASES discusses IRWST level. The correct tenninology should match the display of the instrumentation used in the control room.

Response

As agreed at the NRC / Westinghouse meeting of January 28,1998, the BASES of TS 3.6.7 will be revised to refer to IRWST " volume" instead of " level."

SSAR Revision: See attached markup l

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B 3.6.7 4

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY OPERABILITY of the PCS is required in H0 DES 5 and 6 with the i

reactor shutdown and the calculated reactor decay heat greater than 6 MWt for heat removal in the event of a loss of nonsafety decay heat removal capabilities.

With the decay hest less than 6 MWt, the decay and-sensible heat can be easily removed from containment with air cooling alone.

The PCS requirements in H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are specified in LC0 3.6.6, Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) -

Operating.

ACTIONS A.1 With one passive containment cooling water flow path inoperable, the affected flow path must ta restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this degraded condition, the remaining flow path is capable of providing greater than 100% of the heat removal needs after an

, accident. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time was chosen in light of the remaining heat removal capability and the low

j probability of DBA occurring during this period.

l B.1 If the cooling water tank-is incperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The tank may be kclared Q% [

4 inoperapie due to Iow water W or temperature out of limits. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the remaining heat removal capability of the system and the availability of cooling water from alternate sources.

6 (continued)

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b AP600 B 3.6 39 08/97 Amendment 0

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NRC FSER OPEN ITEM >

Question: 480.1150F (OITS #6574)

TS 3.6.8, LCOs (a) and (b), should have similar wording (i.e.,3.6.8b should read: One door in each air !ack closed or, if open, the containment air locks shall be clear of obstructions such that an air lock door can be closed prior to steaming into the containment).

Response

As agree at the NRC / Westinghouse meeting of January 28,1998, the wording for TS 3.6.8, LCO (b),

will be made similar to the wording of LCO (a) as suggested above.

SSAR Revision: See attached markup.

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t 480.1150F-1 3 Westing ,ouse

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Containment Penetrations 3.6.8 1

- 3.6 : CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.8E Containment Penetrations LCO 3.6.8- The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:-

a. -The equipment hatches closed and _ held in place by

-[four) bolts or, if-open, clear of obstructions such-

-that the hatches can be closed prior-to steaming into the containment.

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b. One door-in each air lock closed [;or,(the containment air I)cks shall-be clear of obstructions such that they can :)e closed prior to steaming into the containment.
c. The containment spare penetrations, if open, shall be clear of obstructions such that the penetrations .can be closed prior to-steaming into the containment. '
d. Each penetration providing direct access from the-containment' atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:
1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange. or equivalent, or
2. capable of being closed by- an OPERABLE Containment Isolation signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.  !

ACTIONS

_ .COISITION- REQUIRED ACTION- COMPLETION TIME rA. One or more A.1 Restore containment 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> containment penetrations to penetrations not in- required status, required status.

(continued) h AP600 -

3.6 16 08/97 Amendment 0

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f. y Question: 480.ll63F (OITS #6587)

Table 16 31 should be corrected to indicate two AC power sources [2(1)] for reduced inventory conditions.

Response

As agreed at the NRC / Westinghouse meeting of January 28,1998, this editorial comment will be incorporated.

SSAR Revision: See attached markup K

T Westinghouse

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16. Technical Specificatiors L

Table 16.31 LIST OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION SHORT TERM WAILABILITY CONTROLS Systems, St vetures, Components Number MODES Trains (a) Operation (b) 1.0 Instrumentation Systems 1.1 DAS ATWS Mitigation 2 1 1.2 DAS ESF Actuation 2 1,2,3,4,5,6 (3) 2,0 Plant Systems 2.1 RNS 1 1,2,3 l 2.2 RNS - RCS Open 2 5,6 (2,3) i 2.3 CCS - RCS Open 2 5,6(2,3) 1 2.4 SWS RCS Open 2 5,6 (2,3) 2.5 PCS Water Makeup Long Term Shutdewn i 1,2,3,4.5,6 (4) 2.6 MCR Cooling - Long Term Shutdown i 1,2,3,4,5,6 2,7 I&C Room Cooling Long Term Shutdown 1 1,2,3,4,5,6 2.8 Hydrogen Ignitors 1 1,2,5,6 (2,3) 3.0 Electrical Pou r Systems 3.1 AC Power Supplies 1 1,2,3,4,5 l l 3.2 AC Power Supplies RCS Open A(1) 5,6 (2,3)

! 3.3 AC Power Supplies - Long Term Shutdown i 1 1,2,3,4,5,6 i 3.4 DC Power Supplies - DAS 2 1,2,3,4,5,6 (3)

Aloha Notes:

(a) Refers to the number of trains covered by the availability controls.

(b) Refers to the MODES of plant operation where the availability controls apply, Notes:

(1) 2 of 3 AC power supplies (2 standby diesel generators and I offsite power supply).

1 (2) MODE 5 with RCS open.

(3) MODE 6 with upper internals in place and cavity level less than full.

(4) MODES 5 and 6 with the calculated care decay heat greater than 6 MWt.

Revision: 19 December 31,1997 16.3-4 { WeStiflgtlouSe go. I/6 3 F-2