IR 05000298/2023010
| ML23135A107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/2023 |
| From: | William Schaup NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Dia K Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| References | |
| IR 2023010 | |
| Download: ML23135A107 (1) | |
Text
May 17, 2023
SUBJECT:
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000298/2023010
Dear Khalil Dia:
On April 7, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On April 6, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Billy Chapin, General Manager for Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or the significance of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Cooper Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Cooper Nuclear Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, William T. Schaup, Team Leader Inspection Programs & Assessment Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000298 License No. DPR-46
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000298
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-010-0002
Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District
Facility:
Cooper Nuclear Station
Location:
Brownville, NE
Inspection Dates:
March 20, 2023, to April 6, 2023
Inspectors:
R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Cauffman, Reactor Operations Engineer
K. Chambliss, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Tejada, Physical Security Inspector
Approved By:
William T. Schaup, Team Leader
Inspection Programs & Assessment Team
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Manage and Control System Lineups Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000298/2023010-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71153 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1.a, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to implement Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.3. Specifically, during pre-coat operations of the B filter demineralizer train of fuel pool cooling, equipment operators failed to control plant status resulting in control room operators taking actions to prevent the loss of the decay heat removal system available to cool the reactor.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000298/2022-002-00 LER 2022-002-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station, Manual Core Spray Injection to Restore Skimmer Surge Tank Level 71153 Closed
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the corrective action programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the control rod drive mechanism.
Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the license's processes for use of operating experience.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licenses identification and correction of problems identified through review of audits and self-assessments.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000298/2022-002-00, (ADAMS Accession No. ML22353A123), Manual Core Spray Injection to Restore Skimmer Surge Tank Level. The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under the Inspection Results Section. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Effectiveness of Problem Identification: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in this area adequately supported nuclear safety. Overall, the team found that the licensee was identifying and documenting problems at an appropriately low threshold that supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues: Overall, the team found that the licensee was appropriately prioritizing and evaluating issues to support nuclear safety. Of the samples reviewed, the team found that the licensee, in general, correctly characterized condition reports as to whether they represented conditions adverse to quality, and then prioritized the evaluation and corrective actions in accordance with program guidance.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions: Overall, the team concluded that the licensee's corrective actions supported nuclear safety. The licensee generally developed effective corrective actions for the problems evaluated in the corrective action program. They generally implemented these corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. Finally, it was determined that the licensee reviewed the effectiveness of these corrective actions appropriately.
Having said this, the team did identify instances where condition reports were closed following the immediate correction of an issue, without careful consideration as to what was the issue that needed to be resolved. The team brought these instances to the licensee's attention as examples of a broke fix mentality. The team cautioned the licensee that if not properly managed, this could result in more safety significant issues in the future.
As part of this inspection, the team selected the control rod drive mechanisms for a focused review within the corrective action program. A sample of condition reports were reviewed for the adequacy of your evaluation process for placing conditions into the corrective action process, and the corrective actions taken. We also reviewed your use of operational experience and 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance" with respect to this system. Finally, we performed walkdowns of accessible portions of this system. Based on these walkdowns, the material condition of this system appeared to be adequate.
Corrective Action Program Assessment: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined the licensee's corrective action program complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards. The licensee's implementation of the corrective action program adequately supported nuclear safety. The team found that management's oversight of the corrective action program process was effective.
Assessment 71152B Operating Experience: The team reviewed a variety of sources of operating experience including 10 CFR Part 21 notifications and other vendor correspondence, NRC generic communications, and publications from various industry groups including INPO and EPRI. The team determined that Cooper Nuclear Station staff is adequately screening and addressing issues identified through operational experience that apply to the station and that this information is evaluated in a timely manner once it is received.
Self-Assessments and Audit Assessment: The team reviewed a sample of the licensee's departmental self-assessments and audits to assess whether they regularly identified performance trends and effectively addressed them. The team also reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had an effective departmental self-assessment and audit process.
Assessment 71152B Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The team interviewed approximately 50 individuals in group sessions of varying sizes. The interviews were conducted in person. The purpose of these interviews was to evaluate the willingness of the licensee's staff to raise nuclear safety issues, either by initiating a condition report or by another method, to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at resolving identified problems, and to evaluate the Cooper Nuclear Station's safety-conscious work environment (SCWE). The focus group participants included personnel from Security, Radiation Protection, Electrical/Mechanical Maintenance, Instrumentation and Controls, and Emergency Preparedness. Overall, the Cooper Nuclear Station was found to have an adequate SCWE.
Willingness to Raise Nuclear Safety Issues: In all the interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to SCWE. Individuals in these groups expressed a willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns and other issues through at least one of the several means available.
Overall, the team concluded that all work groups at the Cooper Nuclear Station maintained a healthy safety-conscious work environment.
Employee Concerns Program: The team looked at the Cooper Nuclear Station's Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The team interviewed the ECP coordinator and reviewed several investigations. Overall, the team determined that the program was adequate. It was noted that for the last couple of years, the licensee managed the ECP remotely from Nebraska Public Power District's offices in Columbus, NE. As a result, only a couple of the people interviewed knew who the ECP coordinator was. They did, however, know how to contact the ECP coordinator. However, the licensee explained to the team that they had decided to assign a new ECP coordinator that will be stationed at the plant. Having the ECP coordinator at the plant will raise the visibility of the program.
The team noted that through the discussions that the Team had with the plant staff, most, if not all, felt comfortable raising concerns through their own supervision and did not feel the need to use the Employee Concerns Program. This observation was reflected in the fact that the Cooper Nuclear Station had a low numbers of ECP cases on file.
Failure to Manage and Control System Lineups Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000298/2023010-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71153 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1.a, "instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to implement Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.3. Specifically, during pre-coat operations of the B filter demineralizer train of fuel pool cooling, equipment operators failed to control plant status resulting in control room operators taking actions to prevent the loss of the decay heat removal system available to cool the reactor.
Description:
On October 22, 2022, Cooper Nuclear Station was in Mode 5 and was using fuel pool cooling (FPC) as the only means of decay heat removal. Residual heat removal shutdown cooling was out of service due to the sequential load testing and other planned maintenance activities.
During this time, operators were pre-coating the B filter demineralizer train of FPC in preparation for placing a third FPC pump into service. During the evolution, the equipment operator reported that valve FPC-AOV-AO18B failed to indicate fully open in response to the PRECOAT START pushbutton command. The operator indicated that they expected a fully open indication on the control panel. The evolution was stopped, and the valve team was called in to assess why the valve didnt open.
The valve team worker investigating valve FPC-AOV-AO18B found it stuck shut on its seat, with a pneumatic demand to open the valve applied. The valve team worker subsequently used a prybar to free the valve from its stuck shut position to allow the valve to open thereby establishing a precoat flow path.
Operators then held a second briefing and decided to continue with the evolution assuming valve FPC-AOV-AO18B was now reasonably expected to function correctly, but they did not evaluate the possible impact should the valve fail to shut during the RETURN TO HOLD pushbutton command. The operators had the valve team worker remain in the vicinity, outside the high radiation area and controlled surface contamination area where valve FPC-AOV-AO18B was located. This was done, as a precaution, to address any additional issues with the valves operation.
With the valve open and after completing the filter demineralizer precoat portion of the evolution, the RETURN TO HOLD pushbutton command was initiated which automatically shuts valve FPC-AOV-AO18B and opens valve FPC-AOV-AO11A to pressurize the filter demineralizer from the FPC. However, valve FPC-AOV-AO18B failed to shut automatically, while valve FPC-AOV-A011A automatically opened.
This created an uncontrolled discharge path from the FPC to the radwaste waste precoat tank that exceeded the normal FPC inventory control methods. This path rapidly lowered the skimmer surge tank level and overflowed the radwaste waste precoat tank. Operations personnel had been unaware of this potential flow path created by both valves (FPC-AOV-AO18B and FPC-AOV-AO11A) being open at the same time.
While attempting to isolate the discharge path, control room operators observed the skimmer surge tank level lowering to the point where the operating FPC pumps were approaching the low skimmer surge tank FPC pump trip setpoint. To avoid tripping the FPC pumps and losing decay heat removal to the reactor core, operators manually initiated core spray train 'A' to restore the skimmer surge tank level.
After approximately 8 minutes, equipment operators were able to isolate the discharge path by closing valve FPC-AOV-AO18B. This was after trying unsuccessfully to close valve FPC-AOV-AO11A in the discharge path which was unable to shut against the differential pressure created by system flow. This was an additional unanticipated condition that operators encountered during this event.
Valve FPC-AOV-AO18B was closed by the valve team worker using a prybar and bleeding off air using a zero-positioner calibration adjustment.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable station procedures, work orders, and corrective action documents and identified the following:
Station Procedure 2.0.3, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 106, a quality-controlled procedure establishes requirements for the Operations crew.
The following requirements are discussed under section 2.4.3 Control Room Supervisor (CRS) responsibilities:
Step 2.4.3.8 states one of the responsibilities of the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) is to ensure all plant manipulations are in accordance with approved station documents.
and Step 2.4.3.9 states, in part, the CRS is to remain cognizant of plant evolutions and system status.
The following requirements are discussed in section 3.4 Conservative Decision Making:
Step 3.4 states, Manage risk by understanding and controlling plant status to ensure operating margin is maintained.
Step 3.9 states, Develop and implement a plan that includes contingencies and compensatory measures.
Step 3.11 states, Control configuration through rule-based methodologies.
and Step 3.8.5 states, Do not proceed in the face of uncertainty.
Station Procedure 0.31.1, Configuration Control During Maintenance Activities, Revision 10, a quality-controlled procedure that establishes requirements for plant manipulations, requires the following:
Step 2.3 states, "In the event a technician find himself of herself in an unfamiliar or unsafe condition, he or she should stop work and consult Shop Supervision."
Based upon the above information, the inspectors determined that the licensee had established procedures as required by technical specification 5.4.1.a. and Regulatory Guide 1.33, section 1.a to address "Authorities and Responsibilities for Safe Operation and Shutdown."
The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse causal analysis report for the event and interviewed individuals from the on-shift operations crew and their management. All individuals interviewed stated that they were unaware of the drain path that was established from the skimmer surge tank due to aligning the plant for pre-coating the demineralizer.
Additionally, operations personnel were unaware a failure of FPC-AOV-AO18B could result in a loss of decay heat removal during the pre-coat evolution. Furthermore, operations management stated they would have made different decisions regarding plant alignment if the drain path was understood.
The members of the on-shift operations crew, and their management, were unaware of the method used by the responding valve technician to both open the stuck valve and subsequently close the same valve during the pre-coat and post-drain event.
Additionally, the licensed operator controlling the pre-coat evolution recognized an error in the procedure; however, the licensed operator did not stop the evolution despite the procedure error.
The inspectors determined the on-shift operations crew and management were unaware of plant system status and did not stop proceeding in the face of uncertainty during the pre-coat evolution, contrary to the requirements of the stations procedure for the conduct of operations.
Corrective Actions: The licensee visually inspected a portion of the fuel bundles around the core periphery and cross the core and inspected the steam dam and found no evidence of debris that could possibly lead to any fuel channel blockage.
The licensee plans to revise operating procedure 2.5FPC.F/DB prior to the next refueling outage to maintain the discharge path to the Radwaste Waste Pre-coat tank isolated by removing control air to valve FPC-AOV-AO11A prior to selecting the RETURN TO HOLD pushbutton command. Then after valve FPC-AOV-AO18B is verified shut, control air would be restored to valve FPC-AOV-AO11A to allow the valve to open.
The licensee replaced valve FPC-AOV-AO18B. The licensee plans on implementing a periodic replacement schedule or taking steps to establish a preventative maintenance task for this component based on EPRI guidance to enhance reliability.
Similar actions were initiated to address the A filter demineralizer train.
Corrective Action References: CR-CNS-2022-05293, CR-CNS-2022-05294, CR-CNS-2022-05296, CR-CNS-2023-01757, and CR-CNS-2023-01842
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had failed to implement Step 3.4 of station procedure 2.0.3 to control plant status to ensure operating margin is maintained during pre-coat operations of the B filter demineralizer train and was therefore a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, during pre-coat operations of the B filter demineralizer train of FPC, equipment operators failed to control plant status resulting in control room operators taking actions to prevent the loss of the only decay heat removal system available to cool the reactor.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Safety SDP. The issue was determined to be a shutdown related finding requiring the use of IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The finding was assessed under IMC 0609 Appendix G Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Exhibit 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions, and considered to be a loss of residual heat removal transient initiator. Because the initiator occurred when the refuel canal/cavity was flooded and when the upper internals were not installed, the finding screened to Green and was determined to be of very low safety significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, equipment operators failed to stop when vale FPC-AOV-AO18B failed to indicate open and did not ensure that the risks were evaluated and managed before proceeding with the pre-coat procedure.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 1. addresses Administrative procedures and Section 1.a, addresses Authorities and Responsibilities for Safe Operation and Shutdown.
The licensee established Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.3, Rev. 106, to address authorities and responsibilities for safe operation and shutdown. Procedure 2.0.3, Rev. 106, Step 3.4 requires managing risk by understanding and controlling plant status to ensure operating margin is maintained.
Contrary to the above, on October 22,2022, the licensee failed to implement Step 3.4 of procedure 2.0.3. Specifically, during pre-coat operations of the B filter demineralizer train of FPC, equipment operators failed to control plant status resulting in control room operators taking actions to prevent the loss of the only decay heat removal system available to cool the reactor.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On April 6, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. Billy Chapin and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective
Action
Documents
CR-CNS-20XX-
XXXXX
2017-00553,2018-05169,2018-05866,2018-06436, 2018-06439,
2019-00251,2019-00288,2019-00289, 2019-00290, 2019-01277,
2019-03930,2019-04137, 2019-04194,2019-04317,2019-05776,
2019-06278, 2020-00075,2020-00181,2020-00914,2020-02088,
20-02902,2020-03275,2020-03279,2020-03282, 2020-03340,
20-03677,2020-03696,2020-05113, 2020-05668,2020-05934,
21-00153,2021-00187, 2021-00604,2021-00617,2021-01483,
21-01511, 2021-01876,2021-01894,2021-01932,2021-01995,
21-02019,2021-02100,2021-02143,2021-02413, 2021-02531,
21-02864,2021-02908,2021-02926, 2021-03416,2021-03676,
21-03751,2021-03791, 2021-03793,2021-03816,2021-03819,
21-03932, 2021-04117,2021-04132,2021-04461,2021-04490,
21-04530,2021-04544,2021-04631,2021-04902, 2021-04922,
21-04939,2021-04967,2021-04979, 2021-04983,2021-05067,
21-05207,2021-05212, 2021-05246,2021-05298,2021-05311,
21-05315, 2021-05316,2021-05368,2021-05373,2021-05411,
21-05424,2021-05579,2021-05594,2021-05691, 2022-00050,
22-00064,2022-00137,2022-00152, 2022-00163,2022-00289,
22-00585,2022-00604, 2022-00637,2022-00701,2022-00702,
22-00753, 2022-00754,2022-00767,2022-00769,2022-00774,
22-00842,2022-00878,2022-00996,2022-01102, 2022-01313,
22-01380,2022-01433,2022-01572, 2022-01618,2022-01643,
22-01925,2022-02000, 2022-02017,2022-02094,2022-02148,
22-02184, 2022-02210,2022-02216,2022-02221,2022-02582,
22-02584,2022-02724,2022-02802,2022-02960, 2022-02961,
22-02962,2022-03021,2022-03087, 2022-03200,2022-03304,
22-03469,2022-03470, 2022-03479,2022-03501,2022-03653,
22-03684, 2022-03734,2022-03993,2022-04072,2022-04186,
22-04284,2022-04363,2022-04481,2022-04560, 2022-04596,
22-04654,2022-04822,2022-04908, 2022-04949,2022-05007,
22-05293,2022-05294, 2022-05296,2022-05456,2022-05710,
22-05964, 2022-06139,2022-06143,2022-06147,2022-06154,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22-06162,2022-06240,2022-06593,2022-06689, 2022-06712,
22-06810,2022-06812,2022-06814, 2022-06878,2023-00189,
23-00397,2023-00399, 2023-00628,2023-00731,2023-00988,
23-01170, 2023-01171,2023-01385,2023-01423,2023-01690,
23-01757
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting
from
Inspection
CR-CNS-20XX-
XXXXX
23-01411,2023-01743,2023-01750,2023-01757, 2023-
01768,2023-01786
Drawings
FD2600AW SH 3
Control Operation Chart Cooper Fuel Pool Filter/Demineralizer
11/24/1969
Revision 1
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2021-0085-001
Vulnerability review for OE-2021-000083 EN 55095, Part 21
Report Flowserve Actuator Failure Due to Loose CAM Pins
04/16/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2021-0085-002
Vulnerability review for Interim Part 21 55126 Crane Nuclear,
Weld Procedures
04/07/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2021-0085-003
Vulnerability review for EN 55167 Part 21 - AMETEK
SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS FAILURE OF AMETEK 300V, 250A
CLAMP DIODESAMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS, OE-
21-000208
06/08/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2021-0085-004
Vulnerability review for NRC Part 21 2021-23-00 - Flowserve
Limitorque supplied DC Motor
01/04/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2022-0026-001
Vulnerability review for NRC Part 21 2021-28-00, NLI-STM15-
15M20 and NLI-STM48-14M20
03/22/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2022-0026-002
Vulnerability review for NRC Part 21 2021-27-00, Engine
Systems - Check Valve PN ES150359
03/22/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2022-0026-003
Vulnerability review for NRC Part 21 2021-29-00, Degraded
Snubber SF1154 Hydraulic Fluid, Batch No. 18CLVS431
03/22/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2022-0026-004
Vulnerability review for OE-2022-000053 Paragon Part 21 10 CFR Part 21 Notification - Sub-component Part Recall;
Inadequate
Varistor Sizing Utilizing P/N: V180ZA10P; NLI Project 052-15515
- Entergy River Bend PO: 10322999; Chiller Control Upgrade
05/24/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
(2014)
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2022-0026-005
Vulnerability review for NRC Part 21 EN 55749 - Emerson
TopWorx Limit Switch PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF
DEVIATION. OE-2022-000078
05/24/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
LO-2022-0026-006
Vulnerability review for NRC Part 21 Event Notification 55784 -
TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER FAILURES - OE-2022-000122
05/31/2022
Miscellaneous
Radiation Protection Program Annual Report (2021)
Miscellaneous
Radiation Protection Program Annual Report (2022)
Miscellaneous
CAP Desktop Guide 3
Miscellaneous LO 2020-0200
Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls and Occupational
Dose Assessment
Miscellaneous LO-2021-0209
NRC PI Occupation Exposure Control Effectiveness
Miscellaneous Quality Assurance
Audit Report 20-03
Purchasing Material, Equipment, and Services
Miscellaneous Quality Assurance
Audit Report 22-02
Corrective Action Program
Miscellaneous Quality Assurance
Audit Report 22-04
Radiological Controls
Miscellaneous Quality Assurance
Audit Report 22-06
Document Control ad Records
Miscellaneous SD74
Siemens Model Series 74 Valve Positioner and Motion
Transmitter
Rev. 19
January
2011
Procedures
0-CNS-FAP-LI-001
Performance Improvement Review Group (PRG) Process
Procedures
0-CNS-LI-100
Process Applicability Determination
Procedures
0-CNS-LI-102
Corrective Action Process
Procedures
0-CNS-LI-104
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process
Procedures
0-CNS-LI-118
Cause Evaluation Process
Procedures
0-CNS-LI-121
Trending and Performance Review Process
Procedures
0-CNS-LI-123-02
Safety Culture Reviews
Procedures
0-CNS-OE-100
Operating Experience Program
Procedures
0-EN-OP-117
Operations Assessment Resources
Procedures
0.5.OPS
Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability
Determination
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
0.QA.01
CNS Quality Assurance Program
Procedures
10.33
Core Reload Process
Procedures
2.2.22
Vital Instrument Power System
Procedures
2.2.74
Standby Liquid Control System
Procedures
2.2.8
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
20
Procedures
2.5FPC.F/DB
Fuel Pool Cooling Demineralizer B
04/13/2022
Procedures
3-CNS-DC-141
Design Inputs
Procedures
6.1RPS.301
Manual Scram Functional Test (DIV 1)
Procedures
6.1RPS.302
RPS Primary Containment High Pressure Channel Calibration
(DIV 1)
Procedures
6.1RPS.303
Turbine Supply Pressure Permissive Channel Calibration (DIV 1)
Procedures
6.1RPS.305
MSIV Channel Logic Test (DIV 1)
Procedures
6.1RPS.312
RPS Instrument Channel Response Time (Shutdown) (DIV 1)
Procedures
6.1RPS.313
RPS Electrical Protection Assemblies Calibration and Functional
Test (DIV 1)
Procedures
6.1RPS.314
RPS Channel Test Switch Functional Test (DIV 1)
Procedures
6.2RPS.301
Manual Scram Functional Test (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.2RPS.303
Turbine Supply Pressure Permissive Channel Calibration (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.2RPS.305
MSIV Channel Logic Test (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.2RPS.311
RPS Instrument Channel Response Time (Run Mode) (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.2RPS.312
RPS Instrument Channel Response Time (Shutdown) (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.2RPS.313
RPS Electrical Protection Assemblies Calibration and Functional
Test (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.2RPS.314
RPS Channel Test Switch Functional Test (DIV 2)
Procedures
6.HPCI.311
HPCI Turbine Trip and Initiation Logic Functional Test
Procedures
6.HPCI.313
HPCI (< OR = 165 PSIG) Beginning of Cycle Test
Procedures
6.HPCI.318
HPCI Simulated Actuation Test (IST)
Procedures
6.RCIC.309
RCIC (< OR = 165 PSIG) Beginning of Cycle Test
Procedures
6.RCIC.314
RCIC Simulated Actuation Test (IST)
Procedures
6.RPS.302
RPS Primary Containment High Pressure Channel Calibration
(DIV 2)
Procedures
Radiological Control
Procedures
9.RADOP.1
Radiation Protection at CNS
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
9.RADOP.1
Radiation Protection at CNS
Procedures
9.RADOP.1
Radiation Protection at CNS
Procedures
Procedure 2.0.3
CNS Operations Manual
08/01/2022
Procedures
SURVEILLANCE
PROCEDURE
6.HPCI.103
HPCI 1ST AND 92 DAY TEST MODE
05/20/2020
Procedures
SURVEILLANCE
PROCEDURE
6.HPCI.312
HPCI PUMP LOW DISCHARGE FLOW CHANNEL
CALIBRATION
07/26/2021
Self-
Assessments
Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment 2022
Self-
Assessments
LO 2020-0201-004
Material Control and Accounting Snapshot Self-Assessment
Self-
Assessments
LO-2020-0201-007
Material Control and Accounting Snapshot Self-Assessment
Work Orders
4704824
Work Orders
4842178
Work Orders
4842179
Work Orders
5096367
Work Orders
5114873
Work Orders
211505
Work Orders
211506
Work Orders
211507
Work Orders
283518
Work Orders
5311650
Work Orders
5389704
Work Orders
5402365
Work Orders
5463564
Work Orders
5463873
Work Orders
5465353
Replace Positioner FPC-A0-18A
Work Orders
5466950
Replace Positioner FPC-AO-18B