ML20217Q894

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Responds to Transmitting follow-up Questions Re 980106 Meeting W/Representatives from Us Enrichment Corp,Doe & NRC at Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
ML20217Q894
Person / Time
Site: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date: 05/04/1998
From: Ten Eyck E
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To: Haberthy J
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
References
NUDOCS 9805110212
Download: ML20217Q894 (8)


Text

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May 4, 1998 Mr. John K. Haberthy priited Plant Guard Workers of America P.O. Box 1020 j Piketon, Ohio 45661 )

Dear Mr. Haberthy:

I am responding to your January 20,1998, letter which transmitted follow-up questions the United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) had as a result of the January 6,1998, meeting with representatives from the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS).

As discussed with you during the meeting, the NRC security requirements vary according to the risk posed by the radioactive material possessed. USEC is only authorized to possess low enriched uranium (LEU) which is NRC Category lli material. NRC has oversight responsibility for USEC's operations with LEU in those areas of the PORTS plant which are leased by USEC and certified by the NRC. DOE has oversight responsibility for the areas of the PORTd plant which are not certified by the NRC. USEC developed a physical protection plan for the protection of LEU which was approved by NRC. The requirements for the physical protection of LEU are contained in 10 CFR 73.67, " Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of moderate and low strategic significance." USEC is inspected against the requirements identified in the physical protection plan.

In addition to the concerns you presented to LMUS, your letter also identified concerns that the NRC has been asked to address. Enclosed are NRC's responses to those questions. As you will see in the enclosure, in responding to your questions, we have followed the same format as your January 14,1998, letter and listed the questions, along with the corresponding answer under topic titles. For some of the questions, we must defer to DOE since the question involves an issue under DOE regulatory jurisdiction. If you have any additional questions, please contact Ms. Rocio Castaneira of my staff at (301) 415-8103. j Sincerely, ,

Original Signed By Elizabeth O. Ten Eyck, Director Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION:

Docket 70-7002 MRC Flie Center 8 PuBLIC NMsS Dir. ofc. r/f CPoland RCastaneira FCSS r/f sPB r/f FCsS ticket file PHiland, Rill DHartland, Rlli

  • see previous concurrence OFC SPB 6 *SPB E SPB
  • Rill E *SPB FCSs NAME YFararij DHoadley DMartin JKnicely RPierson ETenhek DATE f / 28/98 3/16/98 / /98 3/18/98 3/18/98 [/ h /98 C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY g OFFICIAL RECORD COPYg:\upqwarsp.2 9805110212 900504 ADOCK 07007002 gg/

PDR S C PDR /,0 M f%)y'

r Mr. John K. Haberthy United. Plant Guard Workers of America P.*O. Box 1020 Piketon, Ohio 45661

Dear Mr. Haberthy:

- l am responding to your January 20,1998, letter which transmitted a urtesy copy of the letter

! and questions the United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGW wrote to Lockheed Martin l Utility Services (LMUS), as a result of the January 6,1998, meetin the UPGWA had with l

representatives from LMUS and staff from the Nuclear Regulato Commission (NRC) at the  !

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS).

As discussed with you during the meeting, the NRC securi equirements vary according to the L risk posed by the radioactive material possessed. The U ' ed States Enrichment Corporation i

(USEC) is only authorized to possess special nuclear m erial of low strategic significance L (LSNM) which is NRC Category lll material. The NRC as oversight responsibility for USEC's

operations with LSNM in those areas of the PORTS ant which are leased by USEC. The

- Department of Energy (DOE) has oversight respon )ility for the areas of the PORTS plant which are not leased by USEC. USEC developed a phy cal security plan for the protection of LSNM which was approved by NRC. The requirement or the physical security of LSNM are contained -

in 10 CFR 73.67, " Licensee fixed site and in-tr sit requirements for the physical protection of moderate and low strategic significance." U C is inspected against the requirements identified in the physical security plan.

In addition to the concems you presente to LMUS, your letter also identified concems that the NRC has been asked to address. Enc sed are NRC's responses to those questions. As you will see in the enclosure, in respondin to your questions, we have followed the same format as your January 14,1998, letter and lis d the questions, along with the corresponding answer under topic titles. For some of the uestions, we must defer to DOE since the question involves an issue under DOE regulatory ju diction. If you have any additional questions, please contact Ms. Rocio Castaneira of my sta at (301) 415-8103.

Sincerely, Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS

Enclosure:

As state DISTRIBUTION:

Docket 70-7002 NRC File Center PUBLIC NMSS Dir. Ofc. r/f CPoland

. FCSS r/f PB r/f FCSS ticket file PHiland, Rlli DHartland, Rlli

  • See previou concurrence ' /.A OFC SPB I *SPB E *SPB E 9 Rlll I MB hCSS NAME RCastaneira:ij DHoadley DMartin - Knicely Rbrson ETen Eyck DATE 8 //798' 3/16/98 3/16/98 3//Y98 3/$/98 / /98 C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COP OFFICIAL RECORD COPYg:\upqwarsp.2 g%(

p 1 l

~

l Mr. John K. Haberthy  ;

pited. Plant Guard Workers of America l

. Box 1020 Pik ton, Ohio 45661

Dear . Haberthy:

. l'am resp ding to your January 20,1998, letter which transmitted a courtesy copy of the letter '

and questio the United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) wrote to Lockheed Martin Utility Service LMUS), as a result of the January 6,1998 meeting the UPGWA had with representatives om LMUS and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusio Plant (PORTS).

As discussed with yo during the meeting, the NRC security requirements vary according to the risk posed by the radio tive material possessed. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)is only authorize o possess special nuclear material of low strategic significance (LSNM) which is NRC Cate ory lil material. The NRC has oversight responsibility for USEC's operations with LSNM in thos reas of the PORTS plant which are leased by USEC. The Department of Energy (DOE) ha oversight responsibility for the areas of the PORTS plant which are not leased by USEC. USEC d eloped a physical security plan for the protection of LSNM which was approved by NRC. The re iremants for the physical security of LSNM are contained ,

in 10 CFR 73.67, " Licensee fixed site a in-transit requirements for the physical protection of moderate and low strategic significance." SEC is inspected against the requirements identified in the physical security plan.

In addition to the concems you presented to LMU your letter also identified concerns that the NRC has been asked to address. Enclosed are N 's responses to those questions. As you will see in the enclosure, in responding to your questio , we have followed the same format as your January 14,1998, letter and listed the questions, al g with the corresponding answer under topic. titRs. For some of the questions, we must de to DOE since the question involves an issue under L7E regulatoryjurisdiction. If you have any a itional questions, please contact Ms. Rocio Castaneira of my staff at (301) 415-8103.

Sincerely, Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION:

Docket 70-7002 NRC File Center PUBLIC NMSS Dir. Ofc. r/f CPoland FCSS r/f SPB r/f FCSS ticket file PHiland, R3 DHartland, R3 7kntab M OFC - (kFPB [ S@ , h SPBD [ SPB FCSS NAME RCastaneira.ij bdley /hbn RPierson ETen Eyck DATE f h/98- @98 fh8 / /98 / /98 C =" COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY ,

J

. l RESPONSES TO UPGWA OUESTIONS TOPIC: FIREARMS TRAINING QUESTION:

Why have the guards at PORTS no longer been allowed to continue training with their weapons and instead allowed to fire their service weapons for qualification purposes only? Additional funds and time are requested for practice prior to qualifications.

RESPONSE

NRC regi .'Mions do not require firearms for guards at facilities that possess only Category lli material. CRice the armed guard force at PORTS is a DOE requirement, we will defer to DOE for a response to this question.

QUESTION:

Why is the guard force net receiving new or refresher training?

RESPONSE

As explained above, we will defer to DOE for a respaqe to this questiori.

.T_QP_lC: UNANNOUNCFD AUDITS QUESTION:

Wny does DOE notify sites of announced audits? Why are former employees of the site allowed to participa o in s3curity evaluations?

RESPONSE

We will defer to DOE for a response to this question.

IDPIC: OFFENSIVE SPO'S V. GRT

, QUESTION:

l Why do the offensive /SRT officers not receive training?

l l RESPONSE:

We will deSr to DOE for a response to this question.

TOPlQ;_CHEMICAUBIOLOGlQAL WEAPONS QUFS'iiON:

Wi y tis ha quards not reci,e , first responder training for Chemical / Biological Weapons Protection.

RESPONSE

We v/ill defer to DOE c a response to this question.

ENCLOSURE 1

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l 2

TOPIC: TOXICOLOGICAL SABOTAGE QUESTION:

In the first part of this discussion it is stated that "Our understanding is there is no resolution to the risk for substances on our site. There has been risk identified however, the risk has gone unanswered. Can you exp'ain?"

- RESPONSE:

USEC has an approved emergency plan in place at PORTS that handles emergency conditions at the plant. The plant has trained employees to respond to different emergencies. if an l emergency were to occur at the site that included toxic or radiological materials the plant would l follow the emergency plan and, if appropriate, the Emergency Operations Center would be 1 activated. Drills and exercises are conducted to test the response capabilities of emergency response personnel and to maintain and test procedures.

QUESTION: l We would like a copy of the chemical safety audit that was conducted the week of January 5, 1998.

' RESPONSE:

A copy of the chemical safety inspection report 92-01, for a chemical safety inspection con' ducted January 5-9,1998 at PORTS is enclosed.

TOPIC: RESPONSIBILITIES / JURISDICTION QUESTION:

Who is responsible for the boundary and perimeter road and makes sure there is protection for these areas? Who is responsible for the controlled access area fence (CAA)?

RESPONSE

The boundary of the DOE property remains under DOE oversight. Although access is shared between USEC and DOE, the perimeter road, which is maintained by USEC, still belongs to DOE. It is pa'. rolled at intervals as specified in the NRC-approved Physical Security' Plan'. The  !

CAA ft.)ce line also has patrols as specified in the Physical Security Plan. A recent physical

. protection inspecticn at PORTS found that the CAA perimeter fencing and related patrols were  ;

found to. meet the commitments contained in the Physical Security Plan. l QUESTION:

I What is the proper procedure for SNM shipments and whose responsibility is it? A scenario was presented regarding an SNM shipment. The guard present was told to allow the shipment to proceed even though an individual had just been apprehended in the area. This individual had driven through the fence and entered the limited area. A comment was made by an NRC representative at the January 6,1998, meeting that the fence line discussed in the scenario was  :

a moot point and an explanation of this remark is requested.

3

RESPONSE

The fence line is one of many layers of protection provided into the plant. The moot point comment only meant that NRC and DOE have the same requirements regarding the fence; thus, there is dual jurisdiction over the fer.ce. Additionally, the fence is a deterrent. It serves as a delay factor since it is not alarmed, monitored by CCTV, or under continuous observation. J l

TOPICr PROTECTION OF HEU CAT I AND 11 )

i QUESTION:

Since the transition between DOE and USEC the barrier is not being utilized at the level it needs to be.

RESPONSE

The plant is located within a Controlled Access Area (CAA) fence. The definition of CAA is any temporarily or permanently established area which is clearly demarcated, access to which is controlled and which affords isolation of the material or persons within it. Also, see the preceding respoase.

The guard force at PORTS performs random patrols inside as well as outside the CAA. At a recent physical protection inspection the CAA was toured and the fences, gates and vehicle barriers were all found to be intact and adequately maintained. The PORTS perimeter fencing is required to be maintained as a competent barrier and there is a maintenance program to assure j the fence is properly maintained. Part of the physical protection regulations for the protection of Category lli material require that the CAA be monitored with an intrusion device or other procedures to detect unauthorized penetration or activities (73.67(f)(2)). The random patrols l performed by the guard force meet that requirement.

TOPIC: RETRO-EUROPE We will defer to DOE for a response to this discussion.

TOPICE SEARCH PROCEDURES AND ENTRY EXIT PROCEDURES QUESTION:

Who regulates and is responsible for the entry and exit procedures and the search policy? What type of training should be provided for these procedures? Officers are not being formally trained

- in this area.TWhy was an NRC emplome not satisfied with the entry requirements when a representative from the NRC had previously stated that the entry and exit procedures were fine?

RESPONSE

NRC requirements are being met regarding entry and exit procedures for the NRC regulated areas of the facility and associated training. The NRC's position with respect to the adequacy of i entry and exit requirements and procedures is reflected in the NRC's inspection reports covering those areas.

i i

4 TOPIC: CLASSIFIED SECURITY CHECKS PATROLS

- QUESTION:

What type of security. checks do DOE and NRC like conducted while on patrols and while conducting classified security checks? The officers are not permitted to use discretion when j performing their tasks. j RESPONSE: q The commitments of guard patrols of the plc.nt, and of areas that maintain classified matter, are )

acceptable as stated in the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan for PORTS. The NRC l expects guards to use their experience and training in implementing their procedures to be sure

- that adequate patrols and security checks are conducted.

I The letter also implies that in order for the plant to achieve and maintain regulatory compliance  ;

without an increase in required funding, a job task analysis needs to be conducted using DOE's

- standards through the CTA. We will defer to DOE for a response to this question.

TOPIC: NFS SiilPMENTS QUESTION:

We will defer to DOE to respond to the first three paragraphs of this discussion. j The fourth paragraph asks if shipments are under DOE or NRC regulation, what plan is followed during the loading of the material at the X345 facility, and what is the attractiveness level of the material being shipped. .,

l

RESPONSE

Any shipments of low enriched material, originating from areas leased by USEC and certified by NRC, that are the responsibility of USEC, are regulated by NRC. The X-345 facility is retained by DOE; therefore, loading of shipments at the X-345 facility is ur. der the jurisdiction of DOE.

The attractiveness level of shipments depends on the level of the assay of the material being shipped. The higher the assay the more attractive the material. DOE is responsible for the  !

shipping of highly enriched uranium (HEU). .j TOPIC: HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM i

QUESTION:

What is NRC's position on PORTS continuing HEU refeed efforts, storing HEU from other sites, and continuing past the termination date?

Who are the individuals responsible for deciding when to discontinue tae processing of HEU?

Where are the 175 MT's of HEU in the United States stored? We understand that DOE and

' USEC owned material is stored together in the storage array and controlled under DOE orders.

We feel that the security should be shared by both DOE ar.d USEC.

- RESPONSE:  !

If USEC would like to possess HEU onsite that is under their control after DOE completes the l HEU down blending, they would have to meet the NRC requirements addressed in 10 CFR 73.45 and 73.46, for Category I material. For the remaining questions in this topic, we will defer 1

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.5 i to DCE.

TOPIC: X345 The X-345 facility is retained by DOE.. We will defer to DOE for a response to this topic.

l TOPIC: SWEEP OF X705 AND X326

. We will defer to DOE for a response to this topic.

1

-TOPIC: THE ISSUE OF THE MAP OF LFASE STATUS )

l

- QUESTION:

The DOE regulated areas are very scattered throughout PORTS. We are concerned about the

' level of protection DOE is receiving.

RESPONSE

There are a eas at PORTS that DOE has re. aired. These areas are under DOE jurisdiction.

We defer to DOE for further response to this question.

I m.