ML20215N916

Notice of Violation from Insp on 860923-1014

ML20215N916
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	11/04/1986
From:	Harrison J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215N912	List: IR 05000295/1986023 ML20215N911 ML20215N916
References
50-295-86-23, 50-304-86-22, NUDOCS 8611100068
Download: ML20215N916 (2)

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION Commonwealth Edison Company Docket No. 50-295 Docket No. 50-304 As a result of the inspection conducted ~on September 23 through October 14, 1986, and in accordance with " General Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforce-ment Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1985), the following violations were identified:

Technical Specifications 6.2. A states in part, " Detailed written procedures including applicable check off lists covering items listed below shall be prepared, approved, and adhered to:"

a. " Instrumentation operation which'could have an effect on the safety of

-the facility."

b. " Surveillance . . . Tests and experiments" Specifically loop test Procedure 25-MS-25 dated October 22, 1985 requires that impulse pressure to EHC transmitter be valved in at completion of transmitter replacement.

Contrary to the above properly detailed procedures for the following i incidents were not in use:

(1) On September 20, 1986, following the replacement of turbine pressure transmitter 2PT-MS24, an EHC transient occurred and the reactor i tripped. The event was due to a valving error whereby after

replacing transmitter 2PT-MS24 the instrument mechanic acting on

" skill of craft" impulse opened the test connection valve rather than the isolation valve as required by system design. This resulted in 2PT MS24 being isolated from the system which resulted

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in the reactor tripping. In. addition, test Procedure 2S-MS-25 was i inadequate in that it did not provide the instrument mechanic with more specific detailed instructions or check off points for valving the transmitter back into the system.

! (2) On September 22, 1986, an Operational Analysis Department (OAD) test engineer while investigating the degraded voltage problem, had opened a knife switch on 480v breakers 2472 circuitry. this prevented the auto closing of this breaker as required by design after bus 247 is tripped. This problem was subsequently identified by the operators

, performing an unrelated test.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1).

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8611100068 861104 i REG 3 ADOCK 05000295 G PDR j

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Notice of Violation 2 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

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NOV 4 tant Dated J. J. Harrison, Chief Engineering Branch l

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