ML20215N511
| ML20215N511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1986 |
| From: | Dungan K, Milke J, Mowrer M PROFESSIONAL LOSS CONTROL, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215N505 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8611060155 | |
| Download: ML20215N511 (60) | |
Text
i Attachment I-to llazards Analyses of
, posecreaseONAL LOSS CONTseOL, INC. Seabrook Station Charcoal Filter Units ,
YAEC 1571 Evaluation of Charcoal Filter Unit Fires at Seabrook Station September 29, 1986 Prepared by: / 4*t/. -
James A. Milke, P.E.
Reviewed by: i h Michae l E .' Mowrer , P.E.
Approved by:
nneth W.
h Dungan,
,7-
.E.
8611060155 861009 3 PDR ADOCK 0500 F
P. O. Box 44G e Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831 e (615) 482 3541
'r
Table of Contents Subject Page I n t r od u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background....................................................... 1 Discussion....................................................... 5 Conclusions..................................................... 11 An al ys i s Met hod ol ogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Append i x A Combust i on of Wood Cha rcoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ap pendi x B 1
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INTRODUCTION This report describes an engineering analysis conducted to characterize the hazard of a fire involving the charcoal filter units at the Seabrook sta-tion. An unsteady-state heat conduction analysis has been perfonned to predict the local temperature rise in the plate steel housing exposed to a j charcoal filter fire for each of seven air handling units.
BACKGROUND l Charcoal filter beds are installed in the seven (7) air handling units identified in Table 1. Inside the housing are numerous charcoal filter bed cells. The number of cells within a housing enclosure ranges from 4 to
- 28. The charcoal ignition source is assumed to be external to the unit.
The configuration of air cleaning systems is such that the charcoal absorb-ers are preceded by HEPA filters. The HEPA filter mounting frame is a i
steel structure with 22 inch x 22 inch openings. Therefore, no larger burning material than one HEPA filter size could enter the carbon b ed .
Anything larger would be stopped by the HEPA mounting frame structure even if it would penetrate the preceding components. This was the reason for the selection of a 24 inch x 24 inch exposure to a single carbon cell for I both the FST test and subsequent engineering analysis.
An unsteady-state heat conduction analysis was perfonned on the steel hous-ing. Since the heat conduction within the steel plate occurs very rapidly, a lumped heat capacity approach could be applied to simplify the mathema-tics involved. The steel housing was considered to receive radiant heat from the burning charcoal bed. Radiative and convective heat losses from the steel housing to the surroundings were included. A detailed descrip-tion and the equations for the analysis are included in Appendix A.
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TABLE 1 DIMENSIONS OF CHARC0AL SECTION OF UNITS l Unit A B C i
i PAH-F-16 5'1" 12'2" 26'7" EAH-F-9 5'1" 5'6" 3'6" EAH-F-69 i
i FAH-F-41 5'1" 10'3" 14'8" l FAH-F-74 i
! CAP-F-40 5'1" 10'0" 9'11" f CAH-F-8 2'6" 5'4" 8'0" 1
J
! I e
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C ,
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s B
4 i
) A 1
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TABLE 2 (Table 1 from September 15,1986, " Iodine Adsorber Fire Test" by Nuclear Consulting Services, Inc.)
08PS942 Test Date 3 Sept 1986 Carbon ignition followed by residual heating (i.e. air flow continued but heat off).
Method: ASTM D3466 except: 40 FPH, 2 inch bed depth and fast heat up Material: Dry air and NUSORB KITEG II Lot 45/10 Starting cor.dition: 25'c
- Ignition occurred at an upper bed (outlet) temperature of approximately 400*C, lower bed (inlet) temperature of 285'C, air inlet temp. 285'C.
Temperatures after ignition:
Within Carbon Bed Time (Min.) Outlet Side ('C) Inlet Side (*C) 0:15 790 1:00 255 700 920 2:00 650 3:00 850 640 800 4:00 730 5:00 800 760, '
6:00 805 __
790 790 7:00 835 I
8:00 780 860 9:00 790 920 790 10:00 950 11:00 780 980 730 12:00 1050 -
15:00 800 purple smoke 780 450 20:00 375 30:00 250 210 150 60:00 100 135 3
FIGURE 1 1200 1000-800- fr m NSC, Inc. test of Sept. 3,1986 U
- L g 600-P o.
2 400-Y 200-0 i i i i i i 10 20 30 40 50 60 TIME (MIN.)
Temperature History in Charcoal Bed '
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j DISCUSSION
- The temperature rise of the steel housing on the seven charcoal filter units of concern is presented in Tables 3 through 7. As noted in ' the j tables, the maximum localized housing temperature' for Units PAH-F-16 (see 1
Table 3), CAP-F-40 (see Table 5), FAH-F-41 and FAH-F-74 (see Table 6), are i .
4 l within 50*F of one another (between 411 and 461*F).. The surface tempera-
- tures present a minimal hazard to fixed equipment or cabling unless mounted i directly on the housing, as well as to personnel, unless they came into contact with the enclosure itself.
t j The maximum localized temperature predicted for Units EAH-F-9 and EAH-F-69 is 704 F (see Table 4). The increased temperature is due to the reduced
} size of the housing, which includes less steel through which t'he heat can
! be diffused. Still, this temperature would not appear to be at a level or l exist for a sufficiently long duration to pose a serious exposure condi-tion, unless the materials of concern are in direct contact with the hous- .
Il ing.
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j Finally, because of the different air flow arrangement, the maximum temper-
] ature to the top of the enclosure for CAH-F-8 is 638'F (see Table 7). This temperature is due to the relatively small size of the enclosure unit as j well as the location of the exposed side being the top of the enclosure.
l Being located on the top, the convective heat losses are substantially reduced from that of a side.
1 I 4 4
- As noted in the tables, the analysis was teminated at 60 minutes. Extend- i ing the duration beyond 60 minutes is not necessary since the steel temper-
- i. ature is declining 15 to 20 minutes into the incident with no action other j than shutting down the related fan within 5 minutes of the fire initiation.
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TABLE 3 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE VS.
TIME IN UNIT PAH-F-16 UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT MAXIMUM PAH-F-16 LOCAL PAH-F-16 LOCAL TIME HOUSING TEMP. TIME HOUSING TEMP.
(MIN) (DEG F) (MIN) (DEG F) 1 94 31 351 2 104 32 342 3 115 33 334 4 128 34 326 5 142 35 318 6 159 36 309 7 178 37 301 8 199 38 293 9 223 39 285 10 249 40 277 11 278 41 270 12 310 42 262 13 337 43 255 14 359 44 248 15 376 45 241 16 390 46 234 17 399 47 227 18 406 48 221 19 409 49 214
-- 20 411 - 50 208 21 410 51 202 22 408 52 197 23 404 53 191 3
24 400 54 186 25 394 55 181 1 26 388 56 176-27 381 57 171 28 374 58 167 29 366 59 163 30 359 60 158 6
TABLE 4 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE VS, TIME IN UNITS EAH-F-9 and EAH-F-69 UNITS MAXIMUM UNITS MAXIMUM EAH-F-9, EAH-F-69 LOCAL EAH-F-9, EAH-F-69 LOCAL TIME HOUSING TEMP. TIME HOUSING TEMP.
(MIN) (DEG F) (MIN) (DEG F) 1 121 31 544 2 152 32 532 3 186 33 520 4 222 34 508 5 261 35 497 6 303 36 486 7 349 37 475 8 398 38 464 9 449 39 454 10 503 40 444 11 559 41 434 12 617 42 424 13 657 43 415 14 684 44 406 15 698 45 398
- 16 704 46 390
- 17 704 47 382 18 699 48 374 19 691' 49 367 20 682 50 360 21 670 51 353 22 659 52 347 23 646 53 341 24 633 54 335
- 25. 620 55- 329 26 608 56 324 27 595 57 319 28 582 58 315 29 569 59 310 30 556 60 306 1
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TABLE 5 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE VS.
TIME IN UNITS FAH-F-41 and FAH-F-74 UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT MAXIMUM FAH-F-41, FAH-F-74 LOCAL FAH-F-41, FAH-F-74 LOCAL TIME HOUSING TEMP. TIME HOUSING TEMP.
(MIN) (DEG F) (MIN) (DEG F) 1 96 31 369 2 106 32 359 3 118 33 350 4 132 34 340 5 148 35 331 6 167 36 321 7 188 37 312' 8 212 38 303 9 239 39 294 10 269 40 285 11 302 41 276 12 339 42 267 13 369 43 259 14 394 44 251 15 412 45 243 16 426 46 235 17 436 47 227 18 442 48 220 19 445 49 213 20 445 50 206 21 443 .51 199 22 440 52 192 23 435 53 186
- 24 428 - 54 180 25 421 55 ~174 26 414 56 169 27 405 57 163 28 397 58 158 29 388 59 153 30 378 60 148 i
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TABLE 6 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE VS.
TIME IN UNIT CAP-F-40 UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT MAXIMUM CAP-F-40 LOCAL CAP-F-40 LOCAL TIME HOUSING TEMP. TIME HOUSING TEMP.
(MIN) (DEG F) (MIN) (DEG F) 1 97 31 382 2 109 32 372 3 122 33 363 4 137 34 353 5 155 35 343 6 175 36 334 7 197 37 325 8 222 38 316 9 251 39 306 10 282 40 298 11 316 41 289-12 354 42 280 13 385 43 272 14 410 44 264 15 429 45 256 16 443 46 248 17 452 47 241 18 458 48 234
- 19 461 ~ 49 227 20 460 50 220 21 458 51 213 22 454 52 207 23 449 53 201 24 443 54 195 25 435 55 189 26 427 56 184 27 419 57 178 28 410 58 173 29 401 59 169 30 391 60 164 9
W
TABLE 7 LOCAL HOUSING TEMPERATURE VS.
TIME IN CAH-F-8 UNIT UNIT MAXIMUM UNIT MAXIMUM CAH-F-8 LOCAL CAH-F-8 LOCAL TIME HOUSING TEMP. TIME HOUSING TEMP.
(MIN) (DEG F) (MIN) (DEG F) 1 106 31 486 2 124 32 472 3 144 33 459 4 168 34 445 5 197 35 432 6 229 36 419 7 266 37 406 8 307 38 393 9 354 39 380 10 405 40 368 11 460 41 356 12 519 42 344 13 565 43 332 14 597 44 321
' 15 619 45 310 16 632 46 299 17 637 47 288
" 18 637 - 48 ~ 278 19 633 49 268 20 626 50 258 21 617 51 248 22 606 52 239
~23 594 53 230 24 582 54 221 25 569 55 213
'26 555 56 204 l 27 542 57 196 1 28 428 58 183 l 29 514 59 181 l 30 500 50 174 10 I
CONCLUSIONS Based upon conservative, worst case calculations, the following conclusions are drawn from a fire involving the charcoal cells in the air handling units:
- 1. The worst case maximum localized steel plate housing temperature was calculated to be 704*F. This temperature is substantially below that required for structural failure of the steel housing.
- 2. Structural failure of any steel beam or column in the vicinity of these filter units cannot be caused by heat transfer from the filter housing.
- 3. The maximum radiant heat emissive flux from the housing at 704*F, calculated to be less than 10 kW/m2, is less than half the criti-cal radiant flux necessary to ignite the worst case cable jacket materials as detennined by EPRI sponsored tests at Factory Mutual Research Corporation (EPRI NP-1200 part 1).
Therefore, the hazards posed by the heating of the steel housing fran a charcoal bed filter cell fire will not jeopardize the safe shutdown of the pl ant. ,
File Ref: SE-02-02-103 11
APPENDIX A
_ APPENDIX A ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY The unsteady heat conduction analysis used for this study is described in detail in this appendix. A lumped heat capacity approach was utilized, v.alid as long as the heat conduction is sufficiently fast, as compared to the rate of heat transfer to the object (the appropriateness of the lumped heat capacity approach is reviewed later in this appendix).
Figure A-1 depicts the heat transfer to the steel hou' sing. The net heat transfer to the steel acts to increase the internal energy of the steel, resulting in a temperature rise. This can be described in equation [1] as:
d $
(cYr "ORF - Qu- Oc [1]
where:
O g, = Radiative heat transfer from fire (W)
Og = Radiative heat loss from steel to surroundings (W)
Oc = Convective heat loss from steel to surroundings (W)
Ts = Steel temperature ( C) t = Time (sec.)
p = Steel density (7700 kg/m3)
C, = Steel specific heat (520 J/kg C)
V = Steel volume (m3)
It should be noted that conductive losses through the steel to the remain-der of the housing have been neglected. This assumption is conservative by ignoring heat which diffuses throughout the assembly.
A-1
l Figure A - 1 Heat Transfer Process
@gt Q R L.
/
NRs
&c Oc Steel Charcoal
\
Housing '
Oc = convection heat loss Ogg = radiation heat loss Q,
g = radiation from fire l
A-2
The three terms involving radiation or convection heat transfer will now be described.
Radiation Heat Transfer from Fire In general, radiation heat transfer between two finite, non-black bodies is g.iven by:
g , c- (Tc4 - Ts4) g
+ +
ec es where:
6 = Stefan-Boltzmann Constant (5.67 x 10-8 W/m2ag)
Tc = Charcoal temperature ( K)
Ts = Steel temperature ( K) ec = Charcoal emissivity.(assume .75)
Ac = Area of burning charcoal (m2)
Fcs = View factor (assume 1.0) es = Steel emissivity conservatively approximated as 0.8 (1)
As = Area of steel (m2)
The surface area of steel directly exposed to the radiant heat from the charcoal filter bed cell fim varied for the five distinct Unit types. For each unit, the area can be calculated as the product of dimensions "A" and "B" from Table 1, except for Unit CAH-F-8 where the area is the product of dimensions "A" and "C".
The view factor can be determined using graphs and view factor algebra.
Because of the steel area being appreciably greater than the exposing char-coal bed area, the view factor was approximated as 1.0. It should be noted that since the steel and charcoal are finite ir size, the view factor is actually slightly less than 1.0. Estimation of the view factor of 1.0 is ~
conservative, i.e., this will lead to a greater steel temperature.
A-3
The charcoal emissivity is assumed to be 0.75, as suggested by Evans and Emons (2). The burning charcoal surface area (Ac) was conservatively assumed to be 0.465 m2 (26 inches square) which is larger than the maximum possible fire exposure (22 inches square) to the charcoal bed. The char-coal temperature is a function of time, as provided in the test report sum-marized in Table 2 of this report (3). The temperatures used in this anal-ysis were measured within the charcoal bed on the outlet side. This set of temperatures was the highest of any of the temperatures measured, thereby yielding a conservative prediction of the steel temperature. This is also conservative since the temperature used is an interior temperature as opposed to a surface temperature (which the radiation is dependent on) which would be cooler.
Radiative Heat Loss Since the temperature of the surroundings of the steel housing, other than the burning charcoal filter bed cell, is assumed to be unaffected by the fire, the surroundings will remain cool in comparison to the steel plate.
As a result, radiation heat transfer will occur from the steel to the sur-roundings, resulting in a net heat loss from the steel. Since the sur-roundings are infinite in size as compared to the housing, the radiative heat loss is given by:
Qg = es Asr(Ts4-Tg 4) [3]
where:
Tg = Room temperature (*K)
Ts.es and a were defined previously for equation [2]. A room temperature of 27'C (81 F) was arbitrarily selected for use in the calculations.
The radiative heat loss is assumed to occur on both sides of the steel housing.
A-4
Convective Heat Loss p.,
As long as the surrounding air temperature is less than the steel tempera-ture, free convection heat transfer will occur. Due to the forced air flow of 40 ft/ min. through the charcoal filter bed and within the housing during the first five minutes after ignition, forced convection heat transfer also can be expected. The addition of forced convection will lead to an en-hanced convective heat loss from the steel. For the purpose of this analy-sis, the forced convection was neglected, since the forced air stream can be expected to be heated, as documented in the test report. It should be noted that the heated air temperature is expected to be less than the steel temperature. Thus, neglecting the forced convection heat transfer is con-se rvative.
The free convection heat' transfer will occur due to the heating of the air adjacent to the steel plate, resulting in air movement due to a buoyancy c hange. Equation [4] describes the free convection heat loss.
Oc = hAs(o T) [4]
where:
h = Convection heat transfer coefficient (W/m2 og)
AT = Temperature difference between steel and ambient air (*K).
The convection coefficient can be approximated as 4.5 W/m2 K (1). This value can be checked use empirically derived values for the coefficient, where the convecting fluid is air (1).
0.95 (AT)l/3 for vertical plate (1.43 '(oT)l /3 for horizontal plate The condition of a horizontal plate is present for unit CAH-F-8. The value of the convection coefficient will be reviewed after the steel temperature is estimated, so that the temperature difference can be evaluated.
A-5
l i In the case of the units where the exposed housing surface is vertical (PAH-F-16, EAH-F-9, EAH-F-69. FAH-F-41, FAH-F-74 and CAP-F-40), the free convection heat transfer is assumed to occur on both sides of the housing.
Unit CAH-F-8, with the exposed horizontal surface, the free convection is assumed to occur .only from the top surface. Free convection will al so exist from the lower surface, but at a much reduced rate due to the con-vecting air moving in opposition to smoke produced by the burning char-coal. In all cases, the ambient air temperature is arbitrarily assumed to be 27 C (81 F).
Solution for Steel Temperature The steel temperature can be determined by substituting equations [2], [3]
and [4] into equation [1]. The derivative, dTs, can be replaced by a Ts.
dt 4t An iterative solution technique can be applied to determine Ts after a time ~
duration of interest. For this study, a total time of 60 minutes was con-sidered. In general, the equation for Ts is given as:
11 A Ts
- V ~ 1$e 1 -es es AsGs4 - D - 4 Ms Us - Ta N-
- e cAc AC esAs Since stimates for the steel temperature are now available, the validity of two key assumptions can be checked. One assumption considered the rate of conduction heat transfer within the steel to be much greater than the radiation and convection heat transfer on the steel boundary. The second assumption stated that the convection heat transfer coefficient was 4.5 W/m2 K'. The second assumption will be addressed first, since the examina- ,
tion of the first assumption requires the convection coefficient to be known.
The convection heat transfer coefficient can be detennined from equation l
[5]. Considering the temperature difference to be 200 C (an approximate :
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average temperature difference during the 60-minute exposure), the convec- )
tion coefficient is actually 5.5 W/m2 *K for the vertical plate and 8.43 !
W/m2 oK for the horizontal plate- Thus, use of the value of 4.5 W/m2 og for the convection coefficient underestimated the convective heat loss, yielding greater steel temperatures. Since the assumption of 4.5 W/m2 og is shown to be conservative, without grossly underestimating the convective
- h. eat loss, the assumption is considered valid.
The validity of the fi rst and more important assumption can now be assessed. The comparison of rates of conduction to convection and radia-tion heat transfer can be performed by evaluating the parameter, HL/k as ;
noted in equation [7]:
h<0.1 [7]
where:
H = Combined radiation and convection heat transfer coefficient 4 (W/m2 *K) !
L = Characteristic dimension of steel (m) k = Steel thermal conductivity (W/m *K)
The combined radiation and convection heat transfer coefficient is given as:
H = hc + hg+hr e [8]
where:
hc = 4.5 W/m2 og h gg = h s-TA h
M
= 0" IC-TS h,u can be re-expressed as:
ss c (Ts -T,4) eA 4 h RL-
0 "'-
Is - Tg TS-Tg Similarly, hu is:
h = o-(Tc4 - Ts4)
RF 1-ec 1 1-es (Q +
Ac
+
- A)(IC*Is) ss A-7
Assuming an average s". eel temperature of 500 K, average charcoal tempera-ture of 1000 'K, and room temperature of 300 Kh g and ha r can be evalu-ated, using the values for all other parameters which were previously pre-sented.
h a = 56.8 W/m2(
h ar = 36.4 W/mEK Thus, the sum of the heat transfer coefficients is 97.7 W/m2 og, The characteristic dinension of the steel (L) is the ratio of the volume to the surface area. h this case the characteristic dimension is the plate .
thickness, i .e. , 0.001 m (1/4 inch).
Assuming the steel conductivity is estimated as 25 W/mK,
!!L ,97.7 x .001 = 0.004 < 0.1 F 25 Thus, the assumption of the rate of heat conduction being substantially greater than that of the convection and radiation heat transfer is appro-priate.
The convective and radiative losses can also be compared to assess the sen-sitivity of the analysis to the selected room temperature. For illustra-tion purposes if the assumed room temperature is increased from 81 *F to 120 "F (27 C to 49 'C), the maximum localized housing tempe rature increases by only approximately 20 *F.
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Selected References
- 1. Holman, J.P., Heat Transfer, 6th Edition, New York, McGraw Hill,1986.
- 2. Evans, D.D. and Emmons, " Combustion of Wood Charcoal," Fire Research, 1, (1977), p. 57-66. (see Appendix B) 3.. Nuclear Consulting Services, Inc., " Iodine Adsorber Fire Test," Sep-tember 15, 1986 (unpublished).
File Ref: SE-02-02-103 A-9 J
APPENDIX B
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i1 Nuclear Consultinn U Attachment II to Hazards Analyses of C Services, Inc. seadrook station P o pox 2D 51 COLUMBUS. oHlo 43229 '
, YAEC 1571 Iodine Adsorber Fire Test 1
performed for Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
New Hampshire Yankee under PO No. 46114 15 Sept 1986 DISTRIBUTION YAEC: D.H. Pepe (3) + (1) by Telefax PLC:- H.E. Howrer (1) by Fed. Exp.
NUCON: P.G. Lafyatis H.N. Magnus !
J.H. Stephens W.P. Freeman J.L. Kovach 08PS942 HF 08PS942/01 o
08PS942/01 Introduction The impregnated carbon used in the various air cleaning systems is typically protected from fire by water deluge systems. The initiation of the water deluge normally takes place by temperature rise signal. This type of fire control has several inherent problems:
a) temperature rise will indicate only major, fully developed fire b) water distribution in pleated carbon beds is non uniform c) very large amounts of potentially contaminated water are generated.
To avoid these problems a system test was performed to evaluate the detection of carbon oxidation by C0 monitoring and to throttle-carbon fires by stopping forced airflow through the carbon bed. Tests were perfromed in both the ASTM ignition test rig and in the Fire Wind Tunnel (FWT) to evaluate C0 penetration and temperature generation.
Description of the Equipment & Procedures
- 1) The ASTM D3466 Test Rig which consists of heated air flow through a carbon bed with inlet air, inlet carbon bed and outlet carbon bed temperature measurement. The test is normally performed at 100 FPM velocity, however, for these tests the airflow was reduced to 40 FPM which is the design velocity of I the Seabrook air cleaning systems. The bed depth normally is 1.0 inch deep for these tests. Two inch deep beds of 50 ml (^E5g) of carbon was used. {
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- 2) The NUCON fire wind tunnel (FWT) consists of an adjustable flow blower !
followed by an indirect fired natural gas furnace to heat the air, and an '
adjustable plenum to hold a 24 inch X 24 inch face area adsorber specimen, and the commensurate reduction for outlet ducting.
For these tests a 4.0 inch deep carbon bed was used filled with 25 KI and 2% l TEDA impregnated carbon. The inlet temperature to the carbon bed was monitored at a single point in the center area four inches from inlet face of the adsorber. The outlet face of the adsorber was instrumented at 4.0 inches away from the adsorber with five thermocouples. The C0 monitor (an infrared sensor type) was taking samples 2 feet down stream from the filter outlet face in the 10 inch reduced duct section.
The adsorber full weight before fire was 65.8 lbs empty weight 18.4 lbs as is carbon weight 47.4 lbs dry carbon weight (less H 0) 7 43 6 lbs When the test was performed, the gas heater was turned on maximum heat to accomplish as fast heat-up as possible. Air flow was maintained for five minutes after fire was detected, then airflow was. stopped and the carbon bed inlet and outlet temperatures monitored for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The carbon bed was removed from the FWT and weighed.
e 08PS942/01 Test Results The test (result of the carbon burning test) in the ASTM rig was conducted until all.of the carbon was consumed at 40 FPH velocity. The temperatures of the inlet and outlet carbon bed are shown on Table 1.
The results of the fire wind tunnel (FWT) test are shown on Table 2 and on Figure No. 1.
The pertinent values are as follows:
CO of 50 ppm at 11 minutes CO off scale (200+ ppm) at 19 minutes Fire in carbon bed at 19:15 - 19:45 minutes Airflow stopped at 24 minutes Maximum Temperature 4.0 inches from outlet face 375*C Temperature at 1.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> after ignition with no air flow 200*C 4.0 inches from outlet face Carbon loss, total test duration (excluding moisture and 2% TEDA which would evaporate in test) 4.53 lbs Carbon monoxide signal sharply increasing at inlet temperature of 175*C Filter frame (304 SS) bright red at 24 minutes l
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l l 08PS942/01 i Evaluation of the Test Results The configuration of air cleaning systems is such that the iodine adsorbers are preceded by HEPA filters. The HEPA filter mounting frame is a steel structure with 22 inch X 22 inch openings, therefore, no larger burning material than one HEPA filter size could enter from the carbon bed, anything larger would be stopped by the HEPA mounting frame structure even if it would penetrate the preceding components. This was the reason for the selection of a 24 inch X 24 inch carbon section for the FWT test.
The Seabrook procedure is based on shut down of the airflow 5 minutes after a C0 i alarm. However, to maintain conservatism in the test, the airflow was shut down NOT 5 minutes after CO alarm, but 5 minutes after actual burning of the carbon in the test section. Even under these conditions the maximum temperature at 4.0 inches from the outlet face of the adsorber was only 375'C, and the temperature started to drop as soon as the blower was shut off. It is important to note that no isolation dampers were closed in the inlet and outlet of the FWT, thus natural air convection was maintained during the test even with the blower shut off, which is another conservatism because most air cleaning systems are equipped with outlet dampers and several are isolatable on both inlet and outlet side.
The ASTM test rig data indicates (from Table 1) that even with airflow maintained, approximately one hour is needed to burn 2.0 inch depth of carbon.
While the results from the FWT test indicate that if airflow is stopped five minutes after carbon burning only approximately 10% of the carbon is burned in one hour. While if the carbon monoxide signal is used for system isolation, the fire itself will probably be prevented.
The sharp increase in CO concentration at 175'c inlet air temperature was also determined in the ASTM test rig at 40 FPM and it indicated' sharp rise at 175'C inlet air temperature while autoignition did not take place until in excess of ;
250*C inlet air temperature. 1 Conclusions and Recommendations j l
Carbon monoxide monitoring is a very good detection method of carbon oxidation l PRIOR TO ACTUAL selfsustained burning of the' carbon. Isolation of the system )
indicating fire within five minutes of C0 signal will probably prevent development of selfsustaining carbon fire. Isolation of the system can, after the fire develops during air flow, result in sharp temperature drop upon isolation of the air flow. The maximum temperature 4 inches downstream of the burning carbon bed with air flow at 40 FPM was 375*C.
Based on these results it is recommended that C0 monitors be installed in the housing at outlet of the housing and another preferably in the inlet area (just
, upstream from carbon beds at the top of housing, since CO is lighter than air)
The system should be isolated within five minutes of a C0 signal of 50 ppa maximum.
. _- .- . _ - -- A
Table ~1 Test Date 08PS942 3 Sept 1986 Carbon ignition followed by residual heating (i.e. air flow continued but heat ott).
Method: ASTM D3466 except: 40 FPM, 2 inch bed depth and fast heat up Material: Dry air and NUSORB KITEG II Lot 45/10 Starting condition: 25'c Ignition occurred at an upper bed (outlet) temperature of approximately 400*C, lower bed (inlet) temperature of 285'C, air inlet temp. 285'C.
Temperatures after ignition:
Within Carbon Bed Time (Min.) Outlet Side ('C) Inlet Side (*C) 0:15 790 255 1:00 700 920 2:00 650 850 3:00 640 800 4:00 730 800 5:00 760 805 6:00 790 790 7:00 835 .780 8:00 860 790 9:00 920 790 10:00 950 780 11:00 980 730 12:00 1050 800 purple smoke 15:00 780 450 20:00 375 250 30:00 210 150 60:00 100 135
08PS942/01 Table 2 FWT Test Data Maximum of five (5)
Time (Min.) COLeve1[ ppm Inlet Temp ("C) Outlet Temps. (*C) 0 2 28 28 4 5 75 35 7 10 125 35 10 00 --- 40 11 28 150 --
12 38 ---
40 13 44 ---
40 14 60 160 --
15 78 ---
45 16 102 ---
45 17 146 170 --
18 172 ---
50 19 Off Scale 50 Smoke coming out of test rig exhaust 20 175 200 23 250 375 24 Shut down fan and furnace Filter frame top glowing red 26 375 320 28 350 ---
30 ---
260 33 320 250 35 300 ---
36 300 ---
38 280 ---
40 275 225 44 260 225 47 250 220 75 205 195 Bot.ts inlet and outlet temperatures at 4.0 inches from filter face in the flow directicn.
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ATTACHMENT B TO SBN-1208 A
1 i
MARKUP OF AFFECTED PAGES OF "SEABROOK STATION FIRE PROTECTION -
l' 0F SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY
-(10CFR50, APPENDIX R) REPORT i
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TABULATION 3.3.9.3 CONTROL BUILDING - EL. 75'-0" HVAC EQUIPMENT & DUCT AREA FIRE AREA: CB-F-3B-A A. EQUIPMENT AND CABLES LOCATED IN THE FIRE AREA Train A Train B Description Equip. Cable Description Equip. Cable None None B. ANALYSIS The HVAC Equipment and Duct Area CB-F-38-A does not contain any cables or equipment which are required for safe shutdown from the RSS facilities.
A' fixed fire suppression system in accordance with Append,ix R paragraph ,
III.G.3 has not been provided in this area which contains equipment required '
for the main control room ventilation system. j Detectors are provided throughout the area. I C4m ~~Me. Abh 'is p~a bSL A t G & R -8 L '. ru_ Ae h eDn.
b^M i b*J C. EVALUATION u The Appendix R paragraphs III.L alternative shutdown capability requirements are satisfied.
Deviations from Appendix R, paragraph III.G.3, fixed fire suppression requirement, exist in the HVAC equipment and duct area. This deviation is justified based on the analysis and our assertion that additional modifica-tion would not enhance protection safety.
3 3-11
TABULATION 3.2.7.1 B. ANALYSIS
- 1. General Area Analysis The following protective measures are inherent in the existing contain-ment design:
- a. The significant in situ combustibles are limited to the reactor coolant pump lubricating oil, hydraulic snubbers, and cables in trays,
- b. An oil collection system is provided for the reactor coolant pumps.
[ ,
,4 c.. Each hydraulic snubber contains 3.5 gallons of a high flash point, T& high auto ignition point silicon-based hydraulic fluid. The snub bers are designed to withstand an SSE without failure. Even if T
-f leaks were to develop, studies performed at Factory Mutual Research Corporation have shown that a heat flux of 16 kW/M2 is necessary g) to ignite a high flash point hydraulic fluid similar to the silicon-
,g based fluid. _It would require the introduction of a transient
& combustible to containment to provide this heat flux.
Y g d. Containment is inaccessible during normal operation with the-ex-g ception of operator tours. Because of this, transient combustibles e are not considered as a fire hazard. This absence of transient f combustibles removes the ignition source for the cables and the 8 hydraulic fluid.
<v 9'
- e. Prior to plant start-up administrative controls will assure the
.I removal of transient combustibles which could be brought into con-tainment during plant shutdowns.
00 i '~Y N Qj 2. System Analysis se C a. Containment Structure Cooling Units CAH-AC-1A through IF O (Fans CAH-FN-1A through IF, Speed Changers CAH-JV3-43 through g c) CAH-JV8-43 and CC Flow Switches CC-FISL 2122 through CC-FISL-t 4 2224)
Cables for the redundant cooling unit fans, speed changers and flow switches are routed through trays and conduits from the g-o penetration where they enter-containment to the cooling units.
The trays are separated by concrete floors except between Columns 2 and 4, Columns 5 and 6, Columns 7 and 8, Columns 12 and 13, fgi)f . Columns 14 and 15, and Columns 17 and 18 where there is grating.
C U (L [1 Between Columns 2 and 4, the Train B trays are 'a minimum of 12' Q* above floor elevation (-) 26'-0" and a maximum of 19' above floor elevation (-) 26'-0". The Train A trays are a minimum k of 11' above the grating elevation O'-0*. There is a minimum of 18' of vertical separation between the redundant trays. Even if the redundant trays are affected by a fire, only two Train B 3.2-15
4 i
TABULATION 3.2.7.17 B. ANALYSIS
- 1. General Area Analysis
- a. Mechanical Penetration Area (PP-F-XX-Z) ,
l The mechanical penetration area is a Class 1 concrete structure which for safe shutdown has a primary purpose of protecting the ,
containment isolation valves for component cooling, charging pumps and RHR. The area is sectioned into compartments,. separated by con-crete walls, with small openings for access. This configuration
- would most probably limit a fire caused by transient combustibles to j one zone in the area. l The area contains no in situ combustibles with the exception of cable in trays. Only Train A safe shutdown cables are. routed in trays.
All Train B safe shutdown cables are in conduits.
Personnel access to the radioactive areas will be limited to oper- l ator tours.
Detectors are provided throughout the area. ,
l
- b. Containment Fan Enclosure Area and Containment Annulus (CE-F-1-Z) l The containment f an enclosure area is ,a Class 1 concrete structure I which for safe shutdown has a primary function of providing protec-3 tion for the redundant cooling and air handling- equipment for the 4 RHR, C B S , SI equipment vaults; the charging pump rooms; and the mechanical penetration area. The area is approximately 112 feet 4
long by 21 feet wide by 29'-6" high with a floor area of 3000 sq.
f t. and volume of 90,000 cu. f t.
. The in situ combustibles consist of cables in trays and charcoal in
- filters.
There are a total of seven cable trays which are stacked four high for the Train A trays and three high for . the Train B trays. The bottom tray in each stack is an enclosed instrumentation cable tray.
The trays are a minimum of 13'-6" above the floor. There is approxi-mately 275 lineal f t. of uncovered cable tray containing a total of 80 cables. With the exception of three cables, the Train B cables for the fans are routed in one-hour, fire-rated barriered conduits from the point where they enter- the area to the equipment.
tu5o j The charcoal filters which contain JfMT lbs. of charcoal each are not required for safe shutdown nor are they within 30 ft. of the cooling units. % odd s hn% o e nc4\ Vh dek ek* om spb i nh k. p & o d.tt .
Detectors are' provided throughout the area.
f i
3.2-75 4
n-. ..n ,
i e PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING ZONE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION (PAB ZONE)
B. ANALYSIS ,
i
- 1. Ceneral'AreaAnalysis
- a. The PAB is a Class 1 concrete structure . which contains the above listed equipment and cable required for safe shutdown. The PAB has been divided into several zones for fire protection analysis, with '
intervening walls, floors and ceilings of poured concrete.
- b. The significant in situ combustibles consist of 0.25 gallon of. oil in each of the two baron injection pumps; 1.0 gallon of oil in the monorail crane hoists; 1.0 gallon of oil in each of the two chiller pumps; 0.25 gallon of oil in each of the two reactor makeup water pumps; 1.0 pound of grease in each of the two boric acid transfer pumps; 1.0 gallon of oil in each of the four primary component cooling pumps; 0.5 gallon of oil in each of the two flash tank distillate pumps- and 19,000 pounds of insulation for cables in trays. The ana ysis of.the in situ fire load provided by the cable in trays is contained in the " Zone Analyses". An analysis of the Design Basis Fires for the remaining combustibles is contained in the " Fire Protection Program Evaluation of Comparison to Branch 7C Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A" and is summarized as
. follows:
,{ 0
,c 7 1) Elevation 7'-0" and Below
'9 {g a) Fire Zone PAB-F-1A-Z ho Total fire loading for 2.5 gallons of' oil is 375,000 Btu (chiller pumps CS-P-7A, and CS-P-7B and reactor makeup water pumps RMW-P-16A and RMW-P-16B).
c b) Fire Zone PAB-F-1J-Z
,, Limited in situ combustibles in pumps.
0 l
] 11, c) Fire Zone PAB-F-lK-Z g4 No combustibles s
co D 3.2-189
PAB ZONE f
B. ANALYSIS (cont'd)
- 1. General Area Analysis (cont'd)
- 2) Elevation 25'-0" a) Fire Zone PAB-F-2A-Z Limited in situ combustibles in pumps.
, b) Fire Zone PAB-F-2B-Z Total fire loading for 2.0 pounds of grease is 36,000 Btu (boric acid transfer pumps CS-P-3A and CS-P-3B).
c) Fire Zone PAB-F-2C-Z Total fire loading for 5.25 gallons of oil is 787,500 Btu (PCCW pumps CC-P-llA, llB, llc and 11D; 3-1/2 ton monorail crane hoist CS-CR-13; 4-1/2 ton monorail crane hoist CS-CR-5; boron injection pumps SI-P-4A and SI-P-48). l
- 3) Elevation 53'-0" a) Fire Zone PAB-F-3A-Z Total fire loading for 1.0 gallon of oil is 150,000 Btu (flash tank distillate pumps ~SS-P-171A and SB-P-171B).
b) Fire Zone PAB-F-3B-Z Total fire loading for 0.5 gallon of oil is 75,000 Btu (4-1/2 ton monorail crane hoist - CS-CR-6) and for 50 pounds of Class A material is 400,000 Btu. C AP-9-wo ,(,b o o n bs c.hcate d . Sa.o o p e3We A Fhe. AMd.'a n Ap hbh ;
. c. The Train A safe shutdown cables are{ Touted in trays.
The Train B l safe shutdown cables are routed in conduits with a one-hour, fire- ;
rated barrier from the fire area boundary where they enter the. PAB @
to the fire area boundary where they exit or the equipment at which 7 they terminate, except as discussed in the zone analyses.
- d. Detectors are provided in all' zones of the PAB with the exception F of Fire Zones PAB-F-1B-Z, PAB-F-lF-Z and PAB-F-1K-Z. .j )
1 i e. Suppression is provided in Fire Zone PAB-F-2C-Z. Details are -j-provided in the zone analysis.
- e % g.e- % g _,.a
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3.2-190 T
PAB ZONE i
B. a/
l ANALYSIS (cont'd) l j 2. Fire Analyses (cont'd) i 4
- h. Fire Zone PAB-F-3B-Z (Tabulation 3.2.7.72) 4
- 1) Specific Zone Analysis
} This zone at Elevation 53'-0** of the PAB is bounded by concrete l floor, ceiling and walls _(South, East and West) and is contig-uous to fire zone PAB-F-3A-Z to the North. The northern bound-ary consists of a full height partition wall. There are pene-trations for ducts and pipes to other fire zones. The zone is
! approximately 88' long by 75' wide by 26' high with a floor area of 6500 sq. f t. and a volume of 168,200 cu. ft.
l Combustibles are limited to 0.5 gallon of oil for a fire load-4 ing of 75,000 Beu, 50 pounds of Class A material for a fire j loading of 400,000 Btu and cables in open trays for a total fire loading of 4000 Btu per sq. f t. of floor area. Coe-F-Mo i bDetectors boo k c.he.eJL % %%3L A %&a..% A og .. p g pAA %
are provided throughout the zone. t A g. ,
- 2) System Analysis " ^
- a) Primary Component Cooling Water (CC) System >
Redundant transmitters and cables for head tank level logic' are in proximity. Failures in these transmitters or cables could initiate a spurious lo-lo head tank level isolation signal. This in turn would result in closure of the PCCW containment isolation valves. These valves are only re-quired when it is necessary to maintain containment habit-able for containment entry to manually operate the RHR iso-lation valves and the SI accuinulator isolation valves. The circuitry for these valves is not affected by a fire in i this area; hence, they would be operable from the MCR.
Therefore, the spurious' operation of these transmitters will not prevent safe shutdown.
b) Chemical and Volume Control (CS) System l i
1 The redundant volume control tank isolation valves CS-LCV- l l
112B and CS-LCV-112C are -located in the same fire area. The l valves are in separate concrete cells with concrete walls !
and a solid controlled access door between them. There are no in situ combustibles or cables in trays in the cells.
Th'e cables for the Train B valve CS-LCV-112C are routed in barriered conduits.
]
~
L l 3.2-214
ATTACHMENT C TO SBN-1208 MARKUP OF AFFECTED PAGES OF "SEABROOK STATION FIRE PROTECTION' PROGRAM EVALUATION AND COMPARISON TO BTP APCSB9-5.1, APPENDIX A"
SB 1 & 2 .
, i. In many cases small quantities of grease are contained in valves, 1
motors, fans and pumps. Since these small quantities are con-tained within a packing gland or a bearing, it is not considered ;
as contributing to a fire. .
- j. Air cleaning units, which contain roughing filters, HEPA filters and charcoal filters, are contained in heavy metal casings and are not considered in the . fire hazard analysish*#It h2e beer to%l F:m.Lo4L L A A% Aneu oJ:L 48+7ab3L Co-%% bie s .
deter =inedthrcuh.2nalysis that c fire duppressien eyete- ic net required en chercoaM14ter . Ecfer-tG DeiEtEN' * '
-datad v. arc e , 000.
TT4Sc dT A
- k. Pipe and its insulation are not combustible and are not considered in the fire hazard analysis, however, if the pipe is in the cone of fire influence and the temperature of, the fire is greater than 1
7000*F for a duration greater than ten (10) minutes, the pipe is considered to rupture, incapacitating the system that it is a part of.
- 1. Bare structural steel is not combustible but tends to degrade structurally when an ambient temper, are of greater than 1100*F is maintained for longer than ten (10) minuts. Fireproof-coated steel maintains its integrity for at least three (3) hours.
- m. The fire hazard analysis of each fire area / zone is conducted as follows:
- 1. The original postulated fire is a fire that starts t hrou.gh the ignition of combus t ibles and covers a certain floor l area. The effects of this fire forms a vertical shaft of E-6
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- 9
SB 1 & 2 TABLE1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION METHODS BY FIRE AREA AND ZONE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA # AREA NAME PRIMARY SECONDARY DETECTION CONTAINMENT C-F-1-Z Containment Floor Port..Exting. Hose Station Ionization C-F-2-Z. Containment Floor Port. Exting.- Hose Station Ionization C-F-3-Z Containment Floor' Port. Exting. Hose Station None CAM-5:-S gest, nmea C.aw m.e..A EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING 4**A'w',W C,h4
- a nTem s &b
- y. h EFF-F-1-A Feedwater Pump Room Port. Exting. Rose Station Ionization MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPE CLIASE MS-F-1A-Z Lower Level. Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization MS-F-1B-Z Lower Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization MS-F-2A-Z ' Upper Level -
Port. Exting. Hose Station Beam ,
MS-F-23-Z ., Upper Level Port. Exting. Hose Station Beam MS-F-3A-Z Electrical Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization MS-F-3B-Z Personnel Hatch Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization MS-F-4A-Z H2 Analyzer Room Port.'Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization MS,-F-5 A -Z Cable Tunnel Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization
> RER, S.I. EQUIPMENT VAULT <
RER-F-1A-Z Containment Spray Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Pump 95, RER-F-1B-Z Containment Spray Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization ,
Pump 9A RER-F-lC-Z RHR Pump 8B Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization RHR-F-lD-Z RHR Pump 8A Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization RRR-F-2A-Z Safety Injection Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Pump 6B
Ud 8'b 8 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA # AREA NAME PRIMARY SECONDARY DETECTION
/
- 4. RHR, S.I. EQUIPMENT VAULT (CONTINUED)
RHR-F-2B-Z Safety Injection Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Pump 6A RER-F-3A-Z RHR Rt. Exch. 9B Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization RHR-F-3B-Z RHR Rt. Exch. 9A Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization RHR-F-4A-Z Stairway & Manlift Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Area RHR-F-4B-Z Stairway & Manlift Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization I
Area
- 5. CONTROL BUILDING CB-F-1A-A Switchgear Room "A" Port. Exti,ng. Hose Station Ionization (Includes MG Set Rod Drive Rooms) .
l CB-F-13-A Switchgear Room "B" Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization CB-F-lD-A Battery Room B-lC Port. Exting. . Hose Station Ionization CB-F-lE-A' Battery Room B-1A Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization CB-F-1F-A Battery Room B-1B Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization CB-F-lG-A Battery Room B-lD Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization CB-F-2A-A Cable Spreading Room Auto. Deluge Port. Exting. Photoelectric
& Ionization CB-F-2B-A Mechanical Rn. North Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization CB-F-2C-A Mechanical Rs. South Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization CB-F-3A-A Control Room Port. Exting. Hose Station- Ionization
& Thermal CB-F-3B-A HVAC Eqpt. & Duct Rm. Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization j Ca 4ew W moidt.D& M i CB-F-38-A Emerg.. Clean-Up Air Bom STWnow
- Monitored Temp Unit CGl4-F-? Indication CB-F-3C-A Computer Room Fixed Halon' Port Exting. Ionization 1301 System CB-F-4A-A Computer Engineer's Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Work Space l
1 3 4-
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM S FIRE AREA # AREA NAME PRIMARY SECONDARY DETECTION
'7. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING (CONTINUED)
DG-F-S1-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None DG-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None
- 8. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING PAB-F-1A-Z Chiller Pump Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization PAB-F-1B-Z' Demin. Filter & Valve Port. Exting. Hose Station None Maint. Area PAB-F-lC-A Charging Pump - 2A Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Area PAB-F-lD-A Charging Pump - 2B Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Area PAB-F-lE-A- Reciprocating Charg- Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization ing Pump Area PAB-F-lF-Z Letdown Degasifier Port. Exting. Hose Station None PAB-F-lG-A Electrical Chase Pre-Action Hose Station - Ionization &
Dry Pipe Photoelectric PAB-F-2A-Z Resin Fill Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization PAB-F-2B-Z Boric Acid Tank Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization PAB-F-2C-Z Primary Component Pre-Action Port. Exting. Ionization &
Cool. Pump Area Dry Pipe Photoelectric l- PAB-F-3A-Z Water Cooler Heat Port. Exting.
Hose Station Ionization Exch. Area %*he dwsh =a Chaba C AP-F-Ho M5c Swiod do&ie, beted;. u Ph PAB-F-3B-Z PAB Supply & Exhaust Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Fan Area A C u b.a tuo~,v La t>eb PAB-F-4-Z Filter Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Temperature .
Elementsjin PM-F- R wst, sup.9 Filter PAB-F-1J-Z Aux. Steam Cond. Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Tank Area l PAB-F-1K-Z RCA Walkway and Non- Port. Exting. Hose Station None Rad. Pipe Tunnel
SB 1 & 2 FIRE' SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FIRE AREA # AREA NAM.E PRIMARY SECONDARY DETECTION
- 8. PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING (CONTINUED)
PAB-F-SI-0 Stairwell Port. Exting. Hose Station None PAB-F-S2-0 Stairwell Port. Exting.- Hose Station None
- 9. FUEL STORAGE BUILDING FSB-F-1A-A Elev. 7-0, 10'-0", Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization 21'-6", 25'-0", -
g g4 64'-0", 84'-0 ;n m t.v3,
@N- F- 91 @9 g gpg C m' bo n b nud d e-
- 10. WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING "D+3 e 'U* m W-F-1A-Z Compactor & Drum Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Storage Area (at Compactor) l W-F-1B-Z Decontamination Area Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization l
U-?-2A-Z Extruder /Evap. Area Deluge System Hose Station Ionization &
Thermal W-F-2B-Z Crystalizer Pump Rs. Port. Exting. Hose Station None W-F-2C-Z Asphalt Meter Pump Deluge System Hose Station Ionization 6 Room Thermal W-F-2D-Z Turntable & Drum Deluge System Hose Sation Ionization &
Conv. Areas Thermal W-F-2E-Z Waste Solidification Port. Exting.~ Hose Station Ionization Control Room TF-F-1-0 Tank Farm (RWST) Port. Exting. Standpipe / None
- 11. , SERVICE WATER PUMP HOUSE Hose' Reel SW-F-1A-Z Circulating Pump Area Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None i SW-F-1B-A Electrical Control Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Room "A" SW-F-LC-A Electrical Control Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Room "B" SW-F-lD-A Fan Room Port. Exting.. Yard Hydrant Ionization SW-F-1E-Z Service Water Pump Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Area
, B-io
- FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
'. PRIMARY SECONDARY DETECTION FIRE AREA # AREA NAME 0 SW-F-2-0 Service Water Intake Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None ,
& Dischrg. Structure
- 12. SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER CT-F-1A-A Switchgear Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Unit #2 Train "B" CT-F-1B-A Switchgear Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Unit #2 Train "A" CT-F-lC-A Switchgear. Room #3 Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Unit #1 Train "B" CT-F-lD-A Switchgear Room Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization Unit #1 Train "A" CT-F-2A-A Ventilation & Mich. Port Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization .
Room for Unit #2 CT-F-23-A Ventilation & Mech. Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant Ionization i Room for Unit #1 l' ,
CT-F-34 Top of Cooling Tower Port. Exting. Yard Hydrant None .
,13. CONTAINHENT ENCLOSURE VENTILATION AREA AND CONTAINMENT ANNULUS CE-F-1-Z Containment Enclosure Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Ventilation 'TEmpe mkvo E.kmd s , l S f44 - F -9 nost. Er@ od C M 6 h o w' h -
- 14. FIRE PUMP HOUSE h -\ee b a., h Fig g FPH-F-1A-A Diesel Pump Room-West Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Thermal FPH-F-13-A Electric Pump Room Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Ionization FFH-F-1C-A Diesel Pump Room-East Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. Thermal-
- 15. TURBINE BUILDING (AREAS ADJACENT TO CONTROL BUILDING)
TB-F-1A-Z Battery Power Area Auto Sprinkler Hose Station, None TB-F-13-A Battery Room Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization TB-F-lC-Z Relay Room Port. Exting. Hose Station None TB-F-2-Z Mezzanine Auto Sprinkler Port. Exting. None 4 TB-F-3-Z Start-Up & Turbine Port. Exting. Hose Station Ionization Erector's Office - ;
Electronic Work. Area
~
SAS & Computer Room Halon 1301 Hose Station -
Ionization Photo Electric B-11 .
SEABROOK STATION FIRE BAZARD ANALYSIS (j 1.0 BUILDING contab-ant Build 4ne 1
2.0 FIRE AREA OR ZONE C-F-2-Z i
2.1 AREA NAME Cont =4 - nt Floor 2.2 14CATICRI EL O '-0" DRANING NO 9763-F-805052 3.0 CONSTRUCIION OF AREA MATERIAL MIN. FIRE RATING 3.1 WALLS NCETE Concrete 3 hr.
SOUTH Concrete 3 hr.
EAST Concrete 3 br.
- WEST Concreta 3 hr.
3.2 FLOOR Conc /rratina & St1 Plate 3.3 CEILING Conc /aratint & St1 Plate ---
3.4 DOORS none 3.5 OTHERS -- =-
4.0 FLOCE AREA 15.400 SQ. FT. DIAMETER 140'-O" HEIGHT 25' 5.0 VOLUME 385,000 CU. FT.
6.0 FIAGE DRAINS NUCLEAR X NON-NUCHAR 7.0 EXRAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM Containment Racirculation System j 7.1 PERCENTAGE OF SYSTEM'S CAPACITT Mo M ="at 8.0 8 HR. EMERGENCY LIGHTING IN AREA YES NO X 8.1 OUTSIDE AREA AT EXIT POINIS YES
- X NO ,
l 9.0 OPERATIONAL RADI0 ACTIVITY 9.1 EQUIPMENT / PIPING YES X NO 9.2 AIRBORNE YES X No l 10.0 FIRE PROTECTION TYPE
- 10. 1 - PRIMARY Fire Extinnuisher(s) 10.2 SECONDARY standnine and Mose Reel 10.3 _ DETECTION
- Ionization 10.4 OTHER r. M G o N iA6Mov $O9. Db 4.*u b C.AW-
- Ref. Deviation No. 2, SBN-904, b8 '
11.0 FIRE IDADING IN AREA dated Dec. 2, 1985.
3 - (ANALYSIS CONTINUED PC. 2, 2A &3) 11.1 REFER TO PAGE .
I
! Page 1 of 3
! l
w-,- -,--=-------e-- ----..---_.-,--,.m.. ,..r_ -e. . . - - - - - - ,-g , y y-, -.,--m-..
C-F-2-2 13.0 DESIGN BASTS FIRE
/
13.1 Combustibles in Area . Fire ImadinR in Area i
NorE I Oil: 1060 (a r m.) gallons oenn BTU / S q. ft.
~
Grease: pounds Class A: pounds {
Charcoal: Boo pounds -M-chemicals: pounds Plastics: pounds Resins: pounds Other:
13.2 Total Fire loadina in Area: 2580 BTU / S q. ft.
39,750,000.
- 13.3 Total Combustibles BTU >
j 14.0 DESIGN BASIS FIRE DESCRIPTION.
See Appendix B of this report.
t.
O ,
geA,s b .
4 6
9 Page 3 of 3 1
1 SEABROOK STATION l
(
' FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS f
1.0 BUIDING Control Building f 2.0 FIRE AREA OR ZONE CB-F-3B-A i
- 2.1 AREA NAME HVAC Equipment & Duct Area 2.2 LOCATI N c a.. ch u..e r1 7s'.nu DRANI1E N0 otAS.r.snnnen i
l' 3.0 CONSTRUCTION OF AREA MATERJAI, MIN. FIRE RATING 3.1 WALLS NORTH MCG 3 hr.
SOUTH concrete outside
. EAST MCG 3 hr.
WEST Concrete outside 3.2 FLOOR Concrete 3 hr.
3.3 CEILING Concrete outside 3.4 DOORS Metal -
~3 hr.
fireproof ceiling beamjs 14 hr.
~
3.5 OTHERS ,
1
! 4.0 FLOS AREA 1116 SQ. FT. LENGTH 26' WIDTH 51' HEIGHT- 21' i
j 5.0 VOLUME 27.930 CU. FT.
6.0 FLO E DRAINS -NUCLEAR NON-WUCIZAR NONE X
( 7.0 EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM R euen mir.- ne .$havet ,
7.1 PERCENTAGE'0F SYSTEM'S CAPACITY
~
j 8.0 8 HR. EMERGENCY LIGHTING IN AREA YES NO y l
- 8.1 OUISIDE AREA AT EXIT POINIS YES X NO i 9.0 OPERATIONAL RADI0 ACTIVITY 9.1 EWIPMENT/ PIPING YES NO y
- i. .
9.2 AIRBORNE YES NO I i
10.0 FIRE PROTECIION TYPE
! 10.1 PRIMARY Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.2 SECONDARY xanapipe and nose 2 re:el 4
10.3 DETECTION .Ionhem _
10.4 OTHER e n4% Ao,._ A c. _ V er %q 11.0 FIRE LOADING IN AREA G C (h 6 - r - 8
- j. 11.1 NONE X (NO FURTHER ANALYSIS REWIRED) i k
PAGE 1 OF 2 i
- --,-+,.,-,---ww ,e.
,e.-.-es...cr.e, -w - - - - - - e.--- %#,y w y em - yw. r+--y.,m----,--.v-a,- + - . . - - - - - ,--.m-, - - - - - - - - - . ,ym w.y --ev6-- v.w--,
SEABROOK STATION FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS 1.0 BUILDING Primary Auxiliary Building 2.0 FIRE AREA OR ZONE PAB-F-38-Z 2.1 AREA NAME PAB Supply and Exhaust Fan Area 2.2 IDCATION South Side E1. 53'-0" DRAWING NO 9763-F-805063 3.0 CONSTRUCTION OF AREA MATERIAL MIN. FIRE RATING 3.1 WALLS NORTH M e.1_on..
SOUTH co. .... outslae/J nr.
EAST eno,,.e. outside/3 br.
- WEST can,,.c. outslae/- -
3.2 FLOOR cm.,...c.
3.3 CEILING coo,, e. ----/outside 3.4 DOORS Metal 3 nr./----
3.5 OTHERS Exposed Ceiling Beams ----
4.0 F140R AREA _6600 SQ. FT. IINGTH 88 WIUrH 75 IEIGHT 26 5.0 VOLUME 171,600 CU. PT.
6.0 Fi40R DRAINS -
NUC12AR X NON-NUCIZAR 7.0 EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM PAR 7.1 PERCENTAGE OF SYSTEM'S CAPACITY 100 8.0 8 HR. EMERGENCY LIGHTING IN AREA YES NO X 8.1 OtfrSIDE AREA AT EXIT POINrS YES X NO 9.0 OPERATIONAL RADIOACTIVITY 9.1 EQUIPMENT / PIPING YES X No 9.2 AIRBORNE YES NQ X 10.0 FIRE PROTECTION TYPE Fire Extinguisher (s) 10.1 PRIMARY 10.2 SECONDARY Standpipe and Hose Real
- 10. 3 DETECTION Ta=4. e w 10.4 UTHER C,e b Now: Ac 'Ceiec4 lo n d 11.0 FIRE IAADING IN AREA 11.1 REFER TO PAGE 3 (ANALYSIS CONTINUED PC. 2, 3 & 4)
.
- 3 Hr. fire damper has not been provided in exhaust duct at the i point of connection to unit plant vent. Reft Deviation No.1 1 SBN-904 dated 12/2/85 PAGE 1 0F 4 4
PAB-F-3B-Z 13.0 DESIGN BASIS FIRE 13.1 Combustibles in Area (in-situ) Fire loading in Area NOTE Oil and Class A Fire Oil: 0.5 gallons 231 BTU /Sq.ft.
Grease: Pounds _ _
Class A: 50 pounds 1231 a -
Charcoal: 6,ra O o Pounds #
Chemicals: Pounds "
Plastics: Pounds "
Resins: Pounds Other:
13.2 Total Fire loadina in Area: 1462 BTU /S q. ft.
Total Combustibles: 475,000 BTU
% Cheno>,\ Trlo.c Le*Mnj w.s n.t consikevel ' t.hA % , see cLppon& } ( D.
14.0 DESIGN BASIS FIRE DESCRIPTION
- 1. Oil reservoir in the monorail crane hoist ruptures and 1/2 gallon of oil spilla covering 6.4 sq. ft. of the boric acid storage area floor. The oil runs under two stacked wood pallets, which has a burning area of 24 sq. f t 2 The oil is ignited and burns along with the pallets.
- 3. Design Basis Fire is separated from the fan area by metal partitions.
14.1 DBF fire loading 28,386 BTU /S q. ft.
14.2 Fire Duration 4.8 minutes.
14.3 Peak Temperature 1,560 F
" -" 3 or 4
SEABROOK STATION FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS I
- , 1.0 BUILDING Primary Auxiliary Buildina PAB-F-4-Z 2.0 FIRE AREA OR ZONE 2.1 AREA NAME Filter Area 2.2 IACATION E1. 81'-0" DRAWING NO 9763-F-805063 3.0 CONSTRUCTION OF AREA MATERIAL MIN. FIRE RATING j 3.1 WALLS NORTH r-,... outside SOUTH Concrete outside EAST Concrete outside WEST Concrete outside 3.2 FLOOR Concrete ----
3.3 CEILING Concrete outside 3.4 DOORS Metal ___-
3.5 OTHERS Exposed ceilina Beams SQ. Fr. ENGrH 54' WIDTH 49' HEIGHT 25' 4.0 FLOOR AREA 2650 5.0 VOLUME 66,000 CU. PT.
6.0 FLOOR DRAINS NUCHAR X NON-NUCMAR 7.0 EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM Mechanical Room ino
{ 7.1 PERCENTAGE OF SYSTEM'S CAPACITY i
8.0 8 HR. EMERGENCY LIGHTING IN AREA YES NO )(
8.1 OUTSIDE AREA AT EXIT POINIS YES X NO j
i
, 9.0 OPERATIONAL RADIOACTIVITY 9.1 EQUIPMENI/ PIPING YES NO X i 9.2 AIRBORNE YES NO X ,
i 10.0 FIRE PRCIECTION TYPE Fire Extinguisher (s) i 10.1 PRIMARY 10.2 SECONDARY Standpipe & Hose Reel 10.3 DETECTION T iwrature El-- =tm in ri t e.n
- 10.4 OTHER Cnobonth eaAC Mee h in l 9M-F-\b 11.0 FIRE IDADING IN AREA
, 11.1 NONE X (NO FURTHER ANALYSIS REQUIRED) M i
4 Chmecd LocS $ oA Y 's 25%o l6 4 eMco,S .
l M - nb COM.kortb b M k oMct.
l ChpAton.k 6 % kondie3 u% l l
C gg g ., g, PAGE 1 0F 2 t
. - - - - , - - - - - . , . - - . - , - . . . - , . , - , _ _ _ . - , - . - , --,,,,.---~.----,-.,--,_.,-----,..n_ ____,.-.,..v..
SEABROOK STATION FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS 1.0 BUILDING Fuel Storane Building 2.0 FIRE AREA OR ZONE FSB-F-1-1 .
2.1 AREA NAME 2.2 LOCATION EL 7'-0". 1 m*-0" ?1'-6" - 7s"-n" u"-0" & 84 '-0" DRAWING NO 9763-F-805058, 805059, 805084 3.0 CONSTRUCTION OF AREA MATERIAL MIh. FIRE RATING 3.1 WALLS NOKIH Concrete 3 hr/outside SOUTH Concrete outside ,j EAST Concrete outside '
WEST MCG/ Concrete 3 hr./outside **
3.2 F100k concrete outside .
- 3.3 CEILING Concrete outside 3.4 DOORS Meeal 3 hi,/- -
)
i 3.5 OTHERS ---- =
4.0 FLOOR AREA 5350 SQ. 7T. IZNGTH 93' WIDTH variesHEIGHT varies 5.0 VOLUME 579.100 CU. Fr.
_ 6.0 FLOOR DRAINS NUCIA'.R X NON-NUCLEAR 7.0 EXHAUST"VENTIIATION SYSTEM FSB Normal Erhaust 4 7.1 , PERCENTAGE OF SYSTEM'S CAPACITY 100 8.0 8 HR. EMERGENCY LIGHTING IN AREA YES NO X 8.1 OUISIDE AREA AT EXIT POINIS YES X NO 9.0 OPERATIONAL RADI0 ACTIVITY 9.1 EQUIPMENT / PIPING YES X NO 9.2 AIRBORNE YES X NO 1
10.0 FIRE PROTECTION ""YPE 10.1 PRIMARY T! 7 ExtEnguishcr(s) 10.2 SEC(2fDARY Eandpipe & Rose Reel 10.3 DETECTION Ionization l 10.4 OTHER O ggow now % mmo g g l 11.0 FIRE IDADING IN AREA FM-F -91 49 i '
1
, I 11.1 Refer Page 3 (analysis continued on pages 2, 3 a 4). l
- Nalkway and pininn tunnel between colum A of ven and colurm D of I PAB has 3 Hr. Fire rated ceiling. )
- 3 Hr. Fire rated fire damper has not been provided in exhaust i duct to the point of connection at plant vent. Ref. to Deviation No.1 {
SBN-904 Dated 12/2/85 PAGE 10F 4 l
FSB-F-1-A 13.0 DESIGN BASIS FIRE 13.1 Combustibles in Area (in situ) Fire Loading in Area NOTE Oil Fire 011: 3 gallons 84 BTU /Sq.ft.
Grease: pounds Class A: pounds Charecal: 2\% 5o pounds -
E Chemicals: pounds Plastics: pounds Resins: pounds Other:
13.2 Total Fire Loading in Area: 84 BTU /Sq.ft.
13.3 Total Combustibles: 450,000 BTU
, 4Chnmo.& he. LonAh ma n ,-N- c o ,3',1 . u l, 'Aggd % , q%
I 14.0 DESIGN BASIS FIRE DESCRIPTION OPP" b
- D *
- 1. One of the spent fuel pool pumps ruptures, lube oil spills on floor.
For conservatism, the oil from the other two adjacent pumps are also
, considered as combustibles, therefore, all 3 gallons of oil are as-
- sumed spilled on floor covering an area of 40 sq.ft. Qi1 thickness is 1/8". *
- 2. Oil ignites and is consumed.
, 3. Maximum peak temperature throughout the entire fire area will reach i
1460F (460F + 100%0F ambient).
i 14.I DBF fire loading 11,250 BTU /Sq.ft.
14.2 Duration of Fire 4-1/2 Minutes 14.3 Peak Temperature 146 0F ;
a I a .
j Page 3 of 4
SEABROOK STATION FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS -
I i
l 1.0 BUILDING Containment Enclosure Veneilation Area l 2.0 FIRE AREA OR ZONE CE-F-1-2 2.1 AREA NAME Cont. Encl. Ventilation Area & cnnt. Annulus YY 2.2 14 CATION El 21'-6" DRAWING NO 9763-F-805051. 50 NR2. 8090% FC5 ' ' C, 8C50%,8090M 3'. O CONSTRUCTION OF AREA MATERIAL MIN. FIRE RATING 3.1 WALLS NORTH concrete 3 hr.
SOUTH e-re e. 3 hr./outaide 1 EAST canremen 3 hr.
WEST concreta 3 hr.
l 3.2 FLOOR concreen outside 3.3 CEILING c - emen outsida l 3.4- DOORS Meemt 3 hr. /14 hr.4 stairs) l 3.5 orHERS Fire Proofed Columns ----
1633 SQ. ET. (-f x 130' )( 4') K 125 '= 4')S25 cu.f t . ,
4.0 FI40R AREA . 3060 SQ. FT. LENGTH 112 WIUTH variesHEIGHT 29.5' I forat.5 4,693 /A. Fr. =30j270cu.ft. I 5.0 VOLUME,To rAL*. 131095 CU. FT. j 6.0 FLOOR DRAINS NUCIZAR v NON-NUCLEAR 7.0 EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM PAB Nomal Exhaust S[ stem 7.1 PERCENTAGE OF SYSTEM'S CAPACITY 30 8.0 8 HR. EMERGENCY LIGIITING IN AREA YES NO X 8.1 OUTSIDE AREA AT EXIT POINTS YES Y NO 9.0 OPERATIONAL RADIOACTIVITY 9.1 EQUIPMENI/ PIPING YES NO X 9.2 AIRBORNE YES NO X 10.0 FIRE PROTECTION TYPE 10.1 PRIMARY Fire extinguisher (s) 10.2 SECONDARY Standpipa & Hosa Rael
, 10.3 DETECTION Ionization / None * /CARhn hx Ac. beieckon t
10.4 OTHER Yard Hydrant M r M- V'-3, M .
- Cont. Annulus Portion has no detection.
11.0 FIRE IDADING IN AREA Ref. Deviation No.2 SBU-904 wg Dated 12/2/85 11.1 NONE X (NO FURTHER ANALYSIS REQUIRED)
- Cont. Encl. Vent Eq. Area and Cont. Annulus are in communication with
.' each other thru structural openings.
i Yvw Chnmeedl lmA Ca. bA E N4 -F -%W 7dd Ss 2.lo o % ched .
3 Chanced F;nc., kmL' PAGE 1 0F 2 mS nd cons'.b e '
m bhd cN ~ . Sw Oppn Q % D,
l 1
SB 1 & 2 O .
APCSB 9.5-1, Ano. A Pace Paragraph 20 D.4 (d)
Protection of Charcoal Filters Fire suppression syste=s should be installed to protect charcoal filters in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Clean-Up Air Filtration".
Response
Charcoal filters provided for this project. are not equipped with fire .
suppression systems. Ref.: Occi2tica L. 13, 40N 70, -da:cd 1 ca, 10,
-ww S W --Pto seN \2.o 8,dds9. , clo3.a.c0 Oc+.6 3,\m a ma a,nw Revision I Regulatory Guide 1.52, dated July 1976, states that a single failure-proof low flow air bleed system or other cooling mechanisms is acceptable to prevent excessive temperature rise in the charcoal filter
~
~
bed.
b-d:&R $oA. \ 51 b %- )
4 A lov flow air bleed system is provided for the following safety-related charcoal filters:
Iov Flow Filter No. System Air Source EAH-F-9 & Containment Enclosure Emergency By-Pass Air from EAH-F-69 Exhaust (Redundant Filter and Redundant Fan Fans) . q FAH-F-41 & Fuel Storage Building Exhaust By-Pass Air from j FAH-F-74 Unit (Redundant Filter and Redundant Fan <
Fans)
~ - - . s e ns o .
_ ~m. - . - . . ~.e -e-.*..- -* - "
Ye k0 h sJ . nom . - -T.o[1t-n.deh O ebceeS. @ Nw do not M ._ ~ W g. \ L \ .w 4 R.G. l.52-4 NovSv%
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n . a y. % .-m
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. 13 r
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Filter No. System L .__. -
~~
1
. I b CAH-F-8
.)g g _ _. _ _ _.
Containment Recirculation Unit ~~~~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~'-~~
'{
.J t
. . . _ _.._ - - - - - . ~ . - _ . - - - - - -- - * ~ ~ ^' __ ._.._.._ -- . - - \
1 r..__-_.
{.h .._.-._- - --
' ~
3.- .
- :{
PAH-F-16 PA3 Normal Zahaust Unit 1 >.
L---------- " ~~ :j r _ _
caA-F-38 Control Roca Emergency Clean-Up u.a b I p 1
. , _ _ _ _ . - - - -~ - - ~ L; -
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._._. ___ _._ -_. _ - _ _c eie-- E- s o -
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