Text

Proposed Tech Specs Addressing Range of Issues,Including Update to Index.Justification & Safety Analysis in Support of Proposed Changes Encl
	ML20211H238
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	02/17/1987
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20211H188	List: ML20211H180; ML20211H238;
References
	NUDOCS 8702260123
	Download: ML20211H238 (49)
	v • d • e

a ,y . .a a. . ..-. , + - = - 1.2 --- - - - x- - .n -

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ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES i

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(JBD120) i

INDEX SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS PAGE SECTION 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

.......... .......... .. 2-1 2.1.1 REACTOR C0RE........................

............... .. 2-1 2.1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE....... ..

FIGURE 2.1-1. UNIT 1 RCACTOS CORE S?FETV L'"IT - FOUP LOOP 9-TN 22 0?CRATIO"...................... .................... .

l em o 2.

FIGURE 2.1-1M UNIT 52 REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMIT - FOUR LOOPS IN 2-2a OPERATION................ ............................

....................... ...... 2-3 FIGURE 2.1-2 (BLANK)..... .........

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2-4 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS ...............

2-5 TABLE 2.2-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS.....

BASES PAGE SECTION 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

. . ... B 2-1 2.1.1 .... . .

REACTOR C0RE.........................

... . .. . 8 2-2 j 2.1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE. ..... ... ..

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l 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS t

l . .......... 8 2-3 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP S/ STEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS.

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(

III Amendment No. (Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 2)

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION Control Rod Insertion Limits............................. 3/4 1-21 RELA TVE FIGURE 3.1-1 ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS EMSRNRL POWER 20tE C00F UPERATTON............... ................... 3.4 1-22 i

flaunt 3.1-2 (r_a--)................. ............................. 3/ ir 3/4.2 POWER OISTRIBU'.' ION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX OIFFERENCE..l/35.9)............................. 3/4 2-1 FIGURE 3.2-la AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER (Unit 1)....................... 3/4 2-3 FIGURE 3.2-lb AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER (Unit 2)....................... 3/4 2-4 3/4 2-6 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - F 9 (Z)......................

FIGURE 3.2-2g K(Z) - NORMALIZED F (Z) AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT

("";; 1t....... 9................. ............... 3/4 2-12 r FIgger ; rn ggty - g. = 77rr r-(" 2c : r=.r ;nwc.: c . r ar;;;;; -

qu-- - - -......................... ...............

3/4.2.3 RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL

... 3/4 2-14 FACT 0R..............................................

RaiE vERsUs R Ginir ....... ...... ~2/" z-1E FIGURE 3.2-3a RC5 TO ai A il.

FIGURE 3.2-3,( RCS FLOW RATE VERSUS Rg AM0=2p - FOUR LOOPS 3/4 2-17 IN OPERATION Cinir i............................

/^^4^ -

Flau::E 3. 2-i R6E EO eEwai 74 si a '"= ilu- 0F EUra^ (U=-:' Ti ....

.. ............... 3/4 2-19 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO..............

..... ... ...... 3/4 2-22 l 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS...........................

............. 3/4 2-23 TABLE 3.2-1 DNB PARAMETERS.................. .. .

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

................... 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATI0d...

V Amendment No. (Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 2)

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION

... ... 3/4 3-2 TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION.........

3/4 3-9 TABLE 3.3-2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES..

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE 3/4 3-11 REQUIREMENTS.... ..... .. ... ...... ... .....

3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 3/4 3-15 INSTRUMENTATION......... .. . ....... ... .. ... ..

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM .... 3/4 3-16 INSTRUMENTATION. .... .............. ... ..

I TABLE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN 5TROMEN THTION TR\ P 5 ETPolN T5 ... . . . - . . . J/q 3 -25

(//tseer- Armcfe/)

3/4 3-45 Movable Incore Detectors....... ..... . . ... . .... .....

..... ... 3/4 3-46 Seismic Instrumentation. .... ..... ... .

........ ... 3/4 3-47 TABLE 3.3-7 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION...

TABLE 4.3-4 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SUR.'EILLANCE ..... .. 3/4 3-48 REQUIREMENTS.... .. .......

3/4 3-49 Meteorological Instrumentation.... . . .. . .. .. .. .

.. .. 3/4 3-50 TABLE 3.3-8 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.. .

TABLE 4.3-5 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . 3/4 3-51 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS... .

.. . . .. 3/4 3-52 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation. .

l l . 3/4 3-53 TABLE 3.3-9 REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION.

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i VI Amendment No. (Unit 1) l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 2)

a m - - a- -------

~ TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY IT.ATURES RESPONSE TIMES.............................. 3/4 3-30 TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 3-3 4 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS... 3/4 3-40 TABLE 3.3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS........................ 3/4 3-41 TABLE 4.3-3 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS................................ 3/4 3-43 l

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- ,e,.--, - - -- - - , , - -,-r- , ------m ,--- -- -

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant System........ ........................

.. 3/4 4-30 FIGURE 3.4-2a UNIT 1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY..... ....... ... ....... 3/4 4-31 FIGURE 3.4-2b UNIT 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP LIMITATIONS-APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EFPY......................... 3/4 4-32 FIGURE 3.4-3a UNIT 1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM C00LDOWN LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EPFY............................ 3/4 4-33 FIGURE 3.4-3b UNIT 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM C00LDOWN LIMITATIONS-APPLICABLE UP TO 10 EPFY...... . ................... 3/4 4-34 TABLE 4.4-5 REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE ?ROGRAM - 3/4 4-35 WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE................. ...............

. ............ 3/4 4-36 Pressurizer.............................

3/4 4-37 Overpressure Protection Systems........... ............ ..

.. .... . .. . ..... 3/4 4-39 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY...... ......

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

............ ..... ......... 3/4 5-1 Cold Leg Injection..........

3/4 5-3 Upper Head Injection. C.9f t?Tf?. 0fe".

oe THe dv??.N.d5'964.Fr!?9Y44.....

sreu

....... .. ..... 3/4 5-5 3/4.5.2 ECCS S.UBSYSTEMS - T,yg > 350*F............

. . ..... ... 3/4 5-9 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T avg 1 350 F............

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... ... .... 3/4.5-11 3/4.5.4 [0eleted].................................

. . .. ....... 3/4 5-12 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK.............

IX Amendment No. (Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 2)

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

^

PAGE SECTION 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION High Water Leve1......................................... 3/4 9-10 Low Water Leve1..........................................

3/4 9-11 3/4 9-12 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4 9-13 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - STO RAGE P00 L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4 9-14 3/4.9.11 FUEL H

( t w A Ha c isc/y0 ) LING VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4 10-1~

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN..........................................

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS... 3/4 10-2 3/4 10-3 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS............................................

............ 3/4 10-4 3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS ....................

............. 3/4 10-5 3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN.....

3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4 11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS i 3/4 11-1 Concentration.............................................

TABLE 4.11-1 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PR0 GRAM................................... 3/4 11-2 3/4 11-5 00se......................................................

Liquid R'adwasta Treatment System..........................

3/4 11-6 3/4 11-7 Liquid Holdup Tanks.......................................

Ponds..............'............. ...... 3/4 11-8 Chemical Treatment 3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

.............. 3/4 11-9 Dose Rate..................................

XIV McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

3/4.9.12 FUEL STORAGE - SPENT FUEL P00L........................ 3/4 9-16 FIGURE 3.9-2 MINIMUM BURNUP vs. INITIAL ENRICHMENT FOR REGION 2 STORAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 9-17 i.

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INDEX BASES PAGE SECTION B 3/4 0-1 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY................................................

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATION CONTROL.... ... . ............................ .. B 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.1

.......................... B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS...............

B 3/4 1-3 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX OIFFERENCE...... .............................. B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 and 3'/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and RCS FLOW B 3/4 2-2 RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR.......

c!GUDE a 3/d .2-1 'vo! CAL INOIC.aTED ^MI A'c FLUX GIFf tntnut '

VERSUS T lEP"AL PCUEP. . . . . . . . . . ............... O /^ 2 : j

...... ........ B 3/4 2-6 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO................

............... B 3/4 2-6

. 3/4.2.5 ONB PARAMETERS.............. ...........

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES B 3/4 3-1 ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION..... .

............ ... ........... B 3/4 3-2 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION..

.............. B 3/4 3-5 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION...............

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.1 REACT,0R COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.............

.............. B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES..............................

............... 8 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 PRE 55URIZER...............................

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......... ............... B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES...................

B 3/4 4-3 1

i 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS.... .....................................

XVI Amendment No. (Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 2) l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTOOWN_

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the baron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump OPERA 8LE or capable of being powered from an OPERA 8LE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required ' ' '

charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by

~- a differential pressure across the pump of l ve ri fyi ng,_-

greater than or equal to 2380 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All centrifugal charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 3 are secured in the open position or by verifying the discharge of each charging I pump has been isolated from the Reactor Coolant System by at least two isolati valves with power removed from the valve operators.

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l 3/4 1-9 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two# charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; res ore t at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At least two charging pumps shall be cemonstrated OPERA 8LE by ,

essure across each pump of verifyinn ~ __

.._. r _ a differential greater than or equal to 2380 psid is developed wnen tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.4.2 All centrifugal charging pumps, except the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position or by verifying the discharge of each charging pump has been isolated from the Reactor Coolant System by at_least two isolation valves with power removed from the valve operators.

A maximum of one centrifugal cnarging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold eegs is less than or equal to 300*F.

J McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 1-10

k '

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MOVA8LE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES GROUP HEIGHT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 All full-length shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within 2 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES la and 2*.

ACTION:

a. With one or more full-length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUT 00WN MARGIN require-ment of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within i hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With more than one full-length rod inoperable or misaligned from the l

group step counter demand position by more than i 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. With one full-length rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more . nan 2 12 steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:

1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or

2. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within t 12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figuree 3.1-1 : : 1.1 The THERMAL l POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification l 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or

3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUT 00WN MARGIN POWER requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied.

OPERATION may then continue provided that; a)

A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valic for the duration of operation under these conditions; The SHUT 00WN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 b) is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ;

See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 1-14

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL R00 INSERTION LIMITS .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figurep 3.1-1,2sd 2.?-2. l APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to specification 4.1.3.1.2:

a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figures, or

c. Be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months except during time intervals -

when the Rod Insertion Limit Monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

t l

see Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

With K eff greater than or equal to 1.0.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 1-21

y-TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- With the Reactor Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.

N - Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

N# - Below P-10 (Low 3etpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

N (1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.

-) (2) - Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3) - Single point comparison of incore to excore axial flux difference above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL' CALIBRATION.

(4) -

(5) - Detector plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated, and compared ,

to manufacturer's data. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The (6) -

provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(7) - Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(8) - With pcwer greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the required operational test shall consist cf verifying that the

' interlock is in the required state by observing the permissive

- annunciator window.

i Monthly surveillance in MODES 3*, 4* and 5* shall also include

& (9) -

verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window. Monthly surveillance shall include verification a j-of the 2:r:- Di' f r Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to five

~

times background, t g;3hflat at Shutdcwn, (10) - Setpoint verification is not required.

(11) - At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment L of the Reactor trip breakers, the TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include independent verification of the Undervoltage and Shunt trips.

McGUIRE . UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-14

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continumi) .

N o ENGINEERED SAFEIY fEAluRES ACIUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENI ATION

!ii -

1 MINIMUM i CHANNELS APPLICABLE IOIAL NO. CHANNELS ACTION c OPERABLE MODES Of CHANNELS TO TRIP 3^

fUNCIIONAL UNil v,

> - 3. Containment isolation (continued) .

a, E b. Phase "B" Isolation 1,2,3,4 18 1 2 2

1) Manual Initiation 1, 2, 3, 4 14 1 2 2

2) Automatic Actuation i Logic and Actuation i Relays 1, 2, 3 16 2 3

4

3) Contairment Pressure--High-High

c. Purge and Exhaust i

" isolation 1,2,3,4 11 4 2 1 2

1) Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 Il

, 1 2 2

2) Automatic Actuation logic and Actuation a

' Relays See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating fun'ctions and

3) Safety Injectica ,

requirements Tech 6pec 3 3 3 *'l See l and Table '< 3 - 9 ;

H) EMr -39 iNoble l l

% m c,n m ') l + e rn 5 .

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

N ENGINEEHED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E

m MINIMUM APPLICABLE /

CHANNELS TOTAL NO. CHANNELS ACTION OPERABLE MDDES E OF CHANNELS TO TRIP FUNCTIONAL UNIT .'

}

7. Auxiliary Feedwater 1, 2, 3 22 2

E 2 1

" a. Manual Initiation 21 ro 1 2 1,2,3 Automatic Actuation Logic 2 b.

and Actuation Relays

c. Sta. Gen. Water Level-

-l Low-Low; w 1, 2, 3 19*

) 1) Start Motor- 4/sta. gen. 2/sta. gen. 3/sta. gen.

' Driven Pumps in any opqra- in each w

operating 4

H ting sta gen.

sim. gen.

1, 2, 3 19*

2) Start Turbine- 4/stm. gen. 2/stm. gen. 3/sta. gen Driven Pump in any in each .

2 operating operating T sts. gen. sta. gen

, 2, 3 29 Auxiliary Feedwater 2/g, D ,ven 2f go,np 2gfyy;.;y d.

Suction Pressure - Low s, 2, 3 7y (Suction Supply Automatic W rm un,n..a 2 /A , g 2 e 4 4 3m rroia /p<,mp Realignment) P av Imx "c e's 6.u na rmS gs 1,, n i aq,e (c ,- yo d(eg s qct o c .s 7

e. Safety Injection Start Motor-Driven Pumps onct req = . r einc o rs .

4 fee-all--Safety-Injection-init4at-ing-ferrtica:; : d re:;;irements-Le I'.e 1 -"c::

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) f

@ INGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACIUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION M

m

MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE E ACTION

! tj FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CUANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES vs .

E' 7. Auxiliary feedwater (continued) i a f. Station Blackout (Note 1) l h) Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine-Driven Pump 6-3/ Bus 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3 19*

~

Either Bus

g. Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps l Start Motor- 2.- 1/MFW P 2.-i//#wP ?_- 1/MN P y 27 u, Driven Pumps 2/pc-p 4/puep 1/pu-p 1, 2 -bt- ,

A

u, 8. Automatic Switchover to j J, Recirculation l

s2 RWST Level 3 2 2 1,2,3 15*

ll ,

i 9. Loss of Pcwer _m f 2/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 afgr 4 kV Emergency Bus 3/ Bus ;

i Undervoltage-Grid .

Degraded Voltage

10. Engineered Safety features Actuation System Interlocks

, a. Pressurizer Pressure, 3 2 2 1,2,3 20

< P-11

b. 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 20 Low-Low T,yg, P-12

c. Reactor Trip, P-4 2 2 2 1,2,3 22 Steam Generator 3/ste gen. 2/stm gen. 2/stm gen. 1, 2, 3 20 d.

Level, P-14 in any in each l operating operating s t- at. sta gen.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-il (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.

N Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam pressure is not blocked.

"The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

"*These values left blank pending NRC approval of three loop operation.

OC k 0 # M9**

NOTE 1: Turbins dnven auxihory feedwa$aNmp coincJoen, w ith a wat nu msic t3 Injecr(en en a.$

a na g

ACTION STATEMENTS l

ACTION 14 Wit 5 the number of OPERABLE channels.ese less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLO SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided '

the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped concition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION ISa.With the number of OPERABLE channels mas less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable l channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .W.,-h mere Than one. Channel i ne v erable,e.nrer- Spect Hcaracet 3.6.l I-ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge supply and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-23

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specifica-tion 4.3.1a and Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 20 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. .

j ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels omeuless than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 nours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the action required by Specification 3.7.1.4.

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the associated auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable and take the action required by Specifica-tion 3.7.1.2. With the channels associated with more than one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, immediately declare the associated auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable and take the action required by Specification 3.7.1.2.

Amendment No. . Unit 2) 3/4 3-24 Amendment No. ' Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

ACTION 25 - With one of the two trains of doghouse water level instrumenta-tion inoperable (less than the minimum required number of channels operable), restore the inoperable train to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

After 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months with one train inoperable, or within one hour with 2 trains inoperable, monitor doghouse water level in the affected doghouse continuously until both trains are restored to operable status.

ACTION 26 - With any of the eight channels inoperable, place the inoperable channel (s) in the start permissive mode within one hour and apply the applicable action statement (Containment Spray - T.S. 3.6.2, Containment Air Return / Hydrogen Skimmer - T.S. 3.6.5.6).

ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may pro-ceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

MCGUIRE - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-24a Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

?

l 8 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS "o

m

' TRIP SFTPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES FUNCTIONAL UNIT E

Q 7. Auxiliary Feedwater vi N.A. N.A.

" a. Manual Initiation E N.A.

s

" b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

" and Actuation Relays

' c. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low Start Motor-Driven Pumps 1 12% of span from 0 to 3 11% of span from 0 to

1) 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER, 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER, increasing linearly to increasing linearly to 2 40.0% of span at 100% 3 39.0% of span at 100%

t'

of RATED THERMAL POWER. of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Start Turbine-Driven Pumps ? 12% of span from 0 to 2 11% of span from 0 to

2) 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER, 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER, c'

increasing linearly to increasing linearly to i

2 40.0% of span at 100% 1 39.0% of span at 100%

l of RATED THERMAL POWER. of RATED THERMAL POWER.

d. Auxiliary Feedwater 1 2 psig 2 1 psig y

o3 Suction Pressure - Low RR (Suction Supply Automatic 22 Realignment) 55 e. Safety Injection - See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints 2z and Allowable Values PP Start Motor-Driven Pumps gg f. Station Blackout - Start 3164 1 173 volts with a 3 3200 volts Motor-Driven Pumps and 8.5 1 0.5 second time S. 3. delay l *" Turbine-) l

mg (Note s Driven Pump

! vv N.A. N.A.

g. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps -

Start Motor-Driven Pumps

' TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) i

! ?F ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SET o

C i E m ALLOWABLE VALUES TRIP SETPOINT

' FUNCTIONAL UNIT E Automatic Switchover to Recirculation l ; 8.

us 1 90 inches 1 80 inches 2

H RWST Level

=

E 9. Loss of Power

m 4 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage- 3464 1 173 volts with a 1 3200 volts l

Grid Degraded Voltage 8.5 1 0.5 second time

) delay l'

J 10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks l'

us 1 1955 psig i 1965 psig I 30 a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-Il q

u> > 553*F

> 551*F

! [g b. T,yg, P-12 N.A. N.A.

c. Reactor Trip, P-4 See Item 5. above for all Trip Setpoints and Allowable

d. Steam Generator Level, P-14 Values.

i h

wAa sc, tag pu,,,p wat no r sea <r on a vae w r s,9n d ca,nc,see l

Norr t: -rs a ru,s,g g,, van injee roon sigad i

i i

t

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

- ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

7. Steam Generator Water Level - Low-Low

a. Motor-driven Auxi1iary.

Feedwater Pumps 5 60

b. Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 5 60

8. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate - High Steam Line Isolation 57

9. Start Permissive Containment Pressure Control System N.A.

10. Termination Containment Pressure Control System N.A.

11. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure - Low Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (Suction Supply Automatic Realignment) 5 13

12. RWST Level Automatic Switchover to Recirculation 5 60

13. Station Blackout

a. Start Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 5 60

b. Start Turbine-Driven Auxiliary i

Feedwater Pump (O $ 60 l

14. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 5 60

15. Loss of Power 4 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage- 5 11 Grid Degraded Voltage Amendment No. (Unit 2) 3/4 3-32 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish Safety Injection path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps, Safety Injection and RHR pumps.

(2) Valves 1KC3058 and 1XC3158 for Unit 1 and Valves 2KC305B and 2KC3168 for Unit 2 are exceptions to the response times listed in the table. The following response times in seconds are the required values for these valves for the initiating signal and function indicated:

2.d < 30(3) 3.d 4.d 7 30((3)/40(4) 530 3)/40(4)

(3) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included.

Offsite power available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to estabiish Safety Injet'. ion path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and Safety Injection pumps.

Response

(4) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

' time limit includes openir.g of valves to establish Safety Injection path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and i Safety Injection pumps.

(5) Response time for motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps on all Safety time

Response

Injection signal shall be less than or equal to 60 seconds.

limit includes opening of valves to establish Safety Injection path and attainment of discharge pressure for auxiliary feedwater pumps.

((, ) The. tur b im. dri ven pump b /c< ck ca syncb

dces no t stor t on a l

\

coincidera wth a swey mjecr7m s a]nct0 1

l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-33

TAllLE 4.3-2 (Continued) '-

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEAIURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS M

i TRIP .

c ANALOG ACTUATING MODES 3 CilANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WillCil d CilANNEL CilANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE r FUNCTIONAL UNIT CilECK CAllBRATION TEST TEST 10 TEST TEST TEST IS REQUlHLD k3.ContainmentIsolation "A" Isolation y a. Phase

1) Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A. R N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3, 4

2) Automatic Actua- N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1) M(1) Q 1,2,3,4 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

3) Safety Injection See item 1. above for all Safety injection Surveillance Requireaents.

{ b. Phase "B" Isolation y 1) Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A.

R N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3, 4

$ 2) Automatic Actua- N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1) M(1) Q 1, 2, 3, 4 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

3) Containment S R H N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 Pressure-liigh-liiuh

c. Purge and Exhaust Isolation

1) Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A. R N.A. N.A. I'. A . 1, 2, 3, 4 ;

2) Automatic Actua- N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A M(1) H(1) Q 1, 2, 3, 4 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

3) Safety injection See item 1. above for all Safety injection Surveillance Requirements.

q) EMt -39 (Ndle. See Table y,3 Ci; nem S for a l I app ccctble. i 6urveIllonce.

% Y**

Requ cremen1 s .

1ABlf 4.3-2 (Continued)

(NGINif RED SAFEIY f f AlllRl S ACTilA110N SYSl[M INSTRtMENTATION SURVLILLANCE REQUIREMfNIS

{

'" 1 RIP ANALOG ACIDAllNG MODES CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WillCil I

E dLLAY 1,URVE !LL Al;CE OPERA 110NAL OPERATIONAL AC10AT10N RELAY U CHANNEL CilANNEL 10GIC IEST ifs) I S RI QlliltI D CHECK CALIBRATION IEST IEST lLSI FUNCTIONAL UNIT

[s TO. Engineered Safety

. features Actuation

", System Interlocks M N.A. N.A. N.A. N. A. 1, 2, 3

d. Pressurizer . N.A. R Pressure, P-11 Low- Leiv To 3 P-s2 g N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 M-- =

e r T eip j P 1 H.A. 16Mr. AW.*1 K N 11. N.A.

b.

Beac toa- Trup, P-4 N.A. K N 4. TN. A . 1ti A. R N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3

c. L L-- ! *-+f

- 9' t'

d. Steam Generator 1,2,3 Level, P-14 5 R M N.A. M(1) M(1) Q

[

o>

I 1

)

IABLE 3.3-9 l d E REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION i E MINIMUM CHANNELS

' 10fAL NO.

READOUT OPERABLE OF CHANNELS

, E LOCATION

]

INSTRUMENT 1/ trip breaker 1/ trip breaker Reactor Trip

" 1. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication Switchgear 1

l $ Auxiliary Shutdown 1 4

2. Reactor Coolant Loop D Hot Leg m Control Panel Temperature 1 j Auxiliary Shutdown 1 j

3. Pressurizer Pressure Control tanel 1 Auxiliary Shutdown 1

4. Pressurizer Level Control Panel 1/ steam generator 1/ steam generator Auxiliary feedwater S. Steam Generator Pressure Pump Motor Control g

i w Panel 1/ steam generator 1/ steam generator J. Auxiliary Feedwater w

6. Steam Generator Level Pump Motor Control Panel 1)stturn generaTo r Auxiliary feedwater 1[rm3emrator

7. Auxiliary feedwater flow Hate Pump Motor Control Panel l

1 1

TABLE 3.3-10 g ACCIDENT N0HTTURTHrTH5TRUMENTATION E REQUIRED MINIMUM

NO. OF CHANNELS m

CHANNELS OPERABLE INSTRUMENT c 2 1 1 5 1. Containment Pressure 2/r ., 2/Tc., 1/Lr I < * "

d 2. Reactor Coolant Temperature - TH and TCOLD (Wide Range) o g 3. ReactorCoolantPressure-WidekInge 2 1 1

2

. 4. Pressurizer Water Level 2/ steam generator 1/ steam generator a 5. Steam Line Pressure 2/ steam generator 1/ steam generator

6. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range u 2 1

7. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 2/ steam generator 1/ steam generator

8. Auxiliary Feedater Flow Rate l

9. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2* 1 2/ valve 1/ valve

10. PORV Position Indicator

1/ valve 1/ valve

11. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator ** 2/ valve 1/ valve

12. Safety Valve Position Indicator 2 1

13. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2/ core quadrant w

In Core Thermocouples 4/ core quadrant 2 14. 1 1 j

w 15. Unit Vent - High Range Noble Gas Monitor J, (High-High Range - EMF-36) 1/ steam line 1/ steam line

!

16. Steam Relief - High Range Monitor (Unit 1 - EMF-24, 25, 26, 27)

(Unit 2 - EMF-10, 11, 12, 13) 1 1

17. Containment Atmosphere - High Range Monitor (EMF-Sla or 51b)

18. Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentatiori" 2 1

a. MidFRange_- D3 nom,c. Hen d ( D/P ) Roq e 1 2

gF b. -Na??MT L o w e e la ngc e.

UU MW "Not applicable if the associct ed block valve is in the closed position.

99

"" **Not applicable if the associated block valve is in the closed position and power is removed.

t un& ds.n! ;: e-it ir,-.;;i.4 we!! ther.hf the first-cefueliagioutage-fol4ewir.c-1/^4, for eachMt.

~ s

= wi. . 277 Heahle-wAi1 the-beg 4ening4fJycle-4:fmUr.it 2 ::d Op!:-3 %7 Ur.it&

n; ce

TABLE 4.3-7 j!F ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRiliEliTATT5il SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION M INSTRUMENT

1. Containment Pressure M R "x

2. Reactor Coolant Temperature - TH0T and T COLD (Wide Range) M R

] Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range M R

~ 3.

4. Pressurizer Water Level M R sa

5. Steam Line Pressure M R

, m

6. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range M R

7. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level M R l 8. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate M R

! 9. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor M R PORV Position Indicator M R g 10.

11. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator M R

$ 12. Safety Valve Position Indicator M R

13. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) M R In Core Thermocouples M R 14.

15. Unit Vent - High Range Noble Gas Monitor M R (High-High Range - EMF-36) l gg 16. Steam Relief - High Range Monitor M R j yy (Unit 1 - EMF-24, 25, 26, 27)

gy (Unit 2 - EMF-10, 11, 12, 13)

NN 17. Containment Atmosphere - High Range Monitor M R 2x (EMF-Sla or 51b)

?? 18. Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation

a. E i " ;e hoam,c fiend ( D/P)Ibqje. M R M R

b. ";;;. "r; = Lowe r Rang t

, EE

! n t

OS T

TABLE 4.3-8 n RADI0 ACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION ANALOG S

CHANNEL E

CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL SOURCE

' CALIBRATION TEST CHECK _ CHECK E INSTRUMENT U l.

Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm e And Automatic Termination of Release P R(3) Q(1)

D

a. Waste Liquid Effluent Line (EMF-49) g Q(1) m b. Containment Ventilation Unit D M R(3)

Condensate Line (EMF-44)

2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release R(3) Q(2)

D M Conventional Wastewater Treatment Line (EMF-31)

M 3. Continuous Composite Samplers And Sampler Flow Monitor

] Q S a. Containment Ventilation Unit D(4) N.A. R

Condensate Line Q N.A. R D(4)

b. Conventional Wastewater Treatment Line

4. Flow Rate Measurement Devices N.A. R Q Waste Liquid Effluent Line 0(4)

a. N.A. N.A. Q Discharge Canal Minimum Flow Interlock D(4) b.

Containment Ventilation Unit Condensate N.A. R Q

c. D(4)

Line N.A. R q D(4)

d. Conventional Wastewater Treatment Line l

YO C f

TABLE 4.3-8 (Continued) gg g cn u-TABLE NOTATION [f; */r/

(1) The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that a isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if

' any of the following conditions exists;

a. Irr.trument indicates measured levels above the Alarm / Trip Setpoint, i

b. . Circuit f ailure (alarm only), and

c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure (alarm only).

(2) The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that contr room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint,

b. Circuit failure,

c. Instrument indicates a downscal.a failure, and

< (3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, energy and measurement range.

sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months on days on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.

i I

i McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-70

TABLE 3.3-13 RADI0 ACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

% MINIMUM CHANNELS N! APPLICA8ILITY ACTION OPERABLE 8 INSTRUMENT l! 1. WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM CI a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - Providing *** 35 e' Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release 1 per station g (Low Range - EMF-50 or IEMF-36, low-range)

36 Effluent System Flow Rate Measuring Device 1 per statica b.

2. WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM Explosive Gas Monitoring System -

- 41 Hydrogen Monitor 1 per station

a. ** 39 Oxygen Monitors 2 per station b.

3. Condenser Evacuation System

,, dP17 37 Noble Gas Activity Monitor (EMF-33) 1 35 l

ya 4. Vent System

37 S$ a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor 1 (Low Range - EMF-36)

40 1

b. Iodine Sampler 1

,40

c. Particulate Sampler

36 1

d. Flow Rate Monitor -

36 1

e. Sampler Minimum Flow Device l

l l

l

TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION n

At all times.

nn During WASTE GAS HOLOUP SYSTEM operation.

- - 0uring gaseous effluent releases. k#When air ejec1ces are operob -

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 3L - With the numoer of channels OPETABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERA 8LE requirement, the contents of tne tank (s) may be released to the environment for up to 14 days provided that prior to initiating the release:

a. At least two independent samples of the tank's contents are analyzed, and

b. At least two technically qualified members of the facility staff independently verify the discharge valve lineup:

1) The manual portion of the computer input for the release rate calculations performed on the computer, or

2) The entire release rate calculations if such calcula-tions are performed manually.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTIG'i 36 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided tne flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

ACTION 37 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, ef fluent releases via this pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and these samples are analyzed for gross radioactivity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 38 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the 4

Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend

! PURGING or VENTING of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

l ACTION 39 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by

' the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation of this system may continue for up to 14 days. With two channels inoperable, be in at least HOT STANOBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 40 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERA 8LE requirement, effluent releases via the effected pathway may continue for up to 30 days provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment as required in Table 4.11-2.

ACTION 41 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend oxygen supply to the recemoiner.

Amendment No. (Unit 2) 3/4 3-74 Amendment No. (Unit 1) l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

f TABLE 4.3-9 g RADIDACTIVE GASIOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING ANALOG INSTRUMENTAT CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH

$ CHANNEL OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE g CHANNEL SOURCE CALIBRATION TEST _

REQUIRED _

CHECK CHECK c INSTRUMENT

1. WASTE GAS HOLOUP SYSTEM P a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor - .

Providing Alarm and Automatic

a; a Termination of Release (Low Range - P P R(3) Q(1)

N EMF-SO or 1 EMF-36) 4

b. Effluent System Flow Rate D N.A. R Q Measuring Device

2. WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM Explosive Gas Monitoring System M 0 N.A. Q(4) **

a. Hydrogen Monitor M l $ Oxygen Monitor D N.A. Q(5) **

y b. Q{S) M l' 0 N.A.

5 c. Oxygen Monitor (alternate) i Condenser Evacuation System "#

3. M R(3) Q(2) J O

Noble Gas Activity Monitor (EMF-33)

4. Vent System R(3) Q(2)

D M

a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor *

(Low Range - EMF-36) N.A. N.A.

7 W N.A. *

' b. Iodine Sampler N.A. N.A.

W N.A. *

c. Particulate Sampler R Q D N.A. *

d. Flow Rate Monitor R Q D N.A.

e. Sampler Minimum Flow Device

TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION At all times except when the isolation valve is closed and locked.

==

During WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM oper:ttion.

ir k/ hen air ejecJers a re. opernb 4 (1) The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST sni i also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm / Trip Setpoint,

b. Circuit failure (alarm only), and

c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure (alarm only).

(2) The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists: ,

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint,

b. Circuit failure, and i c. Instrument indicates a downscale failure.

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, l

sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples l

corresponding to alarm setpoints in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

! (5) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standardIngas samples a addition, in accordance with the manuf acturer's recommendations.

standard gas sample of nominal 4 volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen, shall be used in the calibration to check linearity of the oxygen analyzer.

l l

Amendment No. (Unit 2) 3/4 3-77 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying thaf. the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

Valve Function Valve Position Valve Number Cold Leg Recire. Open*

NI162A Closed NI121A Hot Leg Recire.

Hot Leg Recirc. Closed NI1528 Closed NI1838 Hot Leg Recirc.

RHR Pump Discharge Open*

NI173A Open*

NI1788 RHR Pump Discharge SI Pump RWST Suction Open nil 008 Open*

FW27A RHR/RWST Suction SI Pump Mini flow Open NI147A

b. At least once per 31 days by:

1) Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the 1

ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge

7, servicepiping high ce nave. ma(npoints, in se rv i ce.,

unless tkpumps and speciotto pipeg om ws+hin 31 day, and

2) Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause This restriction visual of the inspection shall pump suctions during LOCA conditions.

be performed:

I 1)

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establish-ing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and

2) Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of t

each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR System from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that:

a)

With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 425 psig the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and b) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal less than or equal to 560 psig the interlocks will cause the valves to automatically close.

A Valves may be realigned to place RMI System in service and for testing pursuant to Specification 4.4.6.2.2.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-6 L

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2) A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

a. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on Safety Injection actuation and automatic switchover to Containment Sump Recirculation test signals, and

2) Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection actuation test signal:

a) Centrifugal charging pump, b) Safety Injection pump, and c) RHR pump.

f. By verifying that each of the following pt.mps ._ when develops tested the indicated pursuant to di fferential pressure c;; . __ . . . - l l Specification 4.0.5:

1) Centrifugal charging pump 1 2380 psid,

2) Safety Injection pump 1 1430 psid, and RHR pump > 160 psid.

3) _

g. By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:

1) Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and l

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 5-7

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be OPERA 8LE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION': ,

ccnnunme n t V

Withoneormoreofth'eiiolationvalve(s)specifiedinTable3.6-2 inoperable, i maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4' hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or d Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

-+ j nsert hached 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f

4.6.3.1 T n valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

i McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 6-22

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with ACTION b. or c. above, and provided that the associated system, if applicable, is declared inoperable and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are performed.

lu 4

i i

t

TABLE 3.6-2 1 x CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES j

MAXIMUM m"

ISOLATION FUNCTION TIME (SEC) c: VALVE NUMBER i

JF

- d 1. Phase "A" Isolation I Steam Generator A Blowdown Containment Outside Isolation <10 BB-1B#

Steam Generator B Blowdown Containment Outside Isolation 210

] E BB-2B#

710 m B8-38# Steam Generator C Blowdown Containment Outside Isolation 4

Steam Generator D Blowdown Containment Outside Isolation 210 B8-48#

BB-5A# Steam Generator A Blowdown Containment Inside Isolation -210 i

Steam Generator 8 Blowdown Containment Inside Isolation <10 l BB-6A#

Steam Generator C Blowdown Containment Inside Isolation <10

! 88-7A# 210

BB-8A# Steam Generator D Blowdown Containment Inside Isolation a

<5 1 CF-26A8# Steam Generatnr D Feedwater Containment Isolation Steam Generator C Feedwater Containment Isolation 75 l t CF-28AB# 25 CF-30A8f Steam Generator B Feedwater Containment Isolation Steam Generator A Feedwater Containment Isolation 75 T CF-35AB#

% CF-126B Steam Generator A Main Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater -<10 l

i Nozzle Isolation Steam Generator B Main Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater <10 CF-1278 l

Nozzle Isolation

! CF-128B Steam Generator C Main Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater ~<10 l

l Nozzle Isolation Steam Generator D Main Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater <10 i IIs CF-1298 Nozzle Isolation

$$ Steam Generator A Feedwater Containment Isolation Bypass <10 aE CF-134A Steam Generator B Feedwater Containment Isolation Bypass 210 [

CF-135NA Steam Generator C Feedwater Containment Isolation Bypass 210 j CF-136A 210 ll CF-137A Steam Generator D Feedwater Containment Isolation Bypass i

~'

Auxiliary Nozzle Temper SG A <10 i CF-151B f IEIE

,i e.tc e.t c

N&

j %# %s

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 5;

m MAXIMUM ISOLATION g VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION TIME (SEC)

1. Phase "A" Isolation (continued)

I CF-15g8 Auxiliary Nozzle Temper SG B <10 l

c. CF-155B Auxiliary Nozzle Temper SG C 710 N CF-1578 Auxiliary Nozzle Temper SG D 310

KC-305B# Excess Letdown Hx Supply Pent. Isolarion Outside <30 t

KC-3158# Excess Letdown Hx Ret. Hdr. Pent. Isolation Outside 730 KC-320A NCDT Hx Supply Hdr. Pent. Isolation Outside 315 KC-332B NCDT Hx Supply Hdr. Pent. Isolation Inside <15

KC-333A NCDT Hx Return Hdr. Pent. Isolation Outside 715 i KC-4298 RB Drain Header Inside Containment Isolation 215

{ KC-430A RB Drain Header Outside Containment Isolation 315 NB-2608 Reactor Makeup Water Tank to NV System $15 2

w i NC-53B Nitrogen to Pressurizer Relief Tank Containment <10 Isolation Outside

! NC-54A Nitrogen to Pressurizer Relief Tank Containment $10 Isolation Inside NC-568 PRT Makeup <10 NC-195B HC Pump Motor Oil Contairment isolation Outside 215 h*3I NC Pump Motor Oil Containment Isolation Inside 315

gg NC-196A i

aa S$ NF-228A Air Handling Units Glycol Supply Containment $15 Isnlation Outside i (( NF-233B Air Handling Units Glycol Supply Containment $15 Isolation Inside l gg NF-234A Air Handling Units Glycol Supply Containment

-< 15 Isolation Outside 33 er . ,

m- NI-47A Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Outside Containment $15 Isolation s

NI-95A Test HDR Inside Containment Isolation <10 s

k l '

t RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS GASEOU3 RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

.' . .. 3.11.2.4 The VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM and the WASTE GAS HOLOUP i S'(STEM shall tue OPERABLE and appropriate portions of these systems shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in 31 days due to to gaseous affluent releases, from each unit, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) would exceed:

a. 0.2 mrad to air from gamma radiation, or

b. 0.4 mrad to air from beta radiation, or

--r c. 0.3 mrem to any organ of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With radioactive gaseous waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits, in lieu of a Licensee Event Report, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days,

,~

pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:

1. Identification of any inoperable equi ment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,

2. Actions (s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERA 8LE status, and N

3. Summary description of actions (s) taken to prevent a recurrence.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS s .

z 4.11.2.4.1 Doses due to gaseous releases from each unit to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARf shall be projected at least once per 31 days in

.s accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM when gaseous

- streams are being released without being processed by its Radwaste Treat-ment System.

- 4.11.2.4.2 The installed Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System shall be demon- f strated OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 er 3.11.2.3.

and 3/4 11-15 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

MCGdIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 Amendment No. (Unit 2)

~ _ . . , - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . _ . . , . _ . _ . _ . .- . . _ . - . __ _~. -

ATTACHMENT 2 JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS 1

I

- - .- .. . -- - . --- . . _-= - . - _ - - . - _ - _ - -

JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are minor / administrative in nature. The changes to the Index will bring the Index up to date and will have no effect upon plant operation.

The proposed changes to Specifications 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.6 seek to delete refer-I ences to Figure 3.1-2. There is no figure 3.1-2 in the McGuire Technical Speci-fications. Figure 3.1-2 would correspond to control rod insertion limits for three loop operation which is not permitted at McGuire (reference Specification 3.4.1.1). This change is therefore purely administrative in nature and will not

impact plant operation.

i The proposed change to page 3/4 3-14 is to correct table notation under item (9).

! The proposal would change "Beron Dilution Alarm" to "High Flux at Shutdown Alarm".

l The change is a correction of terminology, administrative in nature, and would not impact plant safety or operation.

The proposed change to Table 3.3-3, Item 7.e to relocate the statement "See Item 1 above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements" is editorial in nature. The proposal is to clarify that the statement applies only to Item 7.e i

and not to the entire page 3/4 3-21. Similarly, the proposed change to Table 4.3-2 Items 10.b and 10.c (page 3/4 3-38) is editorial in nature. The change l would simply switch the position of the two items with no changes to the actual surveillance requirements. The change would make the order consistent with Tables 3.3-3 and 3.3-4 which are the corresponding LCO's for the surveillance required by Table 4.3-2. This change is strictly editorial and will not impact plant opera-tions.

The proposed changes to Table 3.3-10 Item 18 and Table 4.3-7 Item 18 are strictly administrative in nature and will not impact plant operations. The proposed changes would rename the ranges of the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS).to " Dynamic Head (D/P) Range" from " Wide Range" and to " Lower Range" from

" Narrow Range" to be consistent with plant terminology. Two footnotes are also

deleted as they expired following the 1986 refueling outages. These changes are

- strictly administrative and will not impact plant opera. ion.

l The proposed change in Table 3.6-2 is to correct two errors recently introduced to j the table due to typographical errors. An earlier request (dated 5/14/86 and supplemented 7/14/86, issued by amendments 63 and 44 dated 9/29/86) changed CF-135A to CF-135B. The train designation for valve CF-135 should not have been changed while the designation for CF-153 should have been changed from train "A" to train "B"; this proposal would remedy this error and would not impact plant operations.

As these changes are administrative, and will cause no hardware or operational changes, the proposed changes would not: involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3

involve a reduction in a margin of safety, r

, (1)

The proposed changes to Specifications 4.1.2.3.1, 4.1.2.4.1, and 4.5.2(f) seek to delete the words "on recirculation flow" from the surveillance requirements. The change would clearly permit testing the pumps in a normal flow path versus a recirculation flow path. Testing of the pumps in normal systems alignment pro-vides more conservative results than testing on recirculation flow. A test in the normal system alignment is more indicative of system performance than would be a test in recirculation flow as the actual components required to function would be tested. Any degradation of the pump would be identified in either alignment, however, degradation of other components within the system may be identified only on normal system alignment and not on recirculation.

The proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change would clearly permit a more conservative test method which would not affect the proba-bility of an accident and may slightly reduce the consequences of an accident.

The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. No hardware changes are to be made, thus no new accident scenarios are created. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposal would clearly permit the use of a more conservative test method which may slightly increase allowed safety margins in terms of system performance.

The proposed changes to Table 3.3-3 Item 3.c and Table 4.3-2 Item 3.c adds the Noble Gas Monitor (EMF-39) to the tables to ensure that the ability to isolate Containment Purge exists at all times when required. This proposed change is the result of an event at McGuire in which both trains of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) were inoperable for testing which disabled the automatic isolation capacity of the containment purge system from EMF-39 (reference LER 369/86-10 dated July 8, 1986). The change will clarify the requirements for operability of EMF-39.

The proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change would ensure the automatic isolation capability of the containment purge system thus aiding in the mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The change involves no hardware changes and ensures a safety function is enabled. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The change would ensure a safety function is enabled when required, thus no margins of safety are affected.

Several changes are proposed to correct or clarify the number of channels for the auxiliary feedwater system and reactor coolant temperature. These changes affect Table 3.3-3 Item 7.d, Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure Low (Suction Supply Automatic Realignment); Item 7.g Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor Driven Pumps; Table 3.3-9, Item 7, Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate; and Table 3.3-10, Item 2, Reactor Coolant Temperature - T-Hot and T-Cold (Wide Range) .

These changes are corrections or clarifications and will not affect the safety or operation of the plant.

The proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes correct or clarify the Technical Specifications to represent the present "as-built" (2)

l station. The proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No modifi-cations are made to the plant to affect or create any accident scenariou. The proposed changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The clarifications and corrections will not impact any safety margins.

Additional changes address the start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump on a blackout signal. The system is designed such that a safety injection signal (for which no turbine driven pump start is initiated) coincident with a blackout signal (which alone would initiate a turbine driven pump start) does not initiate a start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Such a situation would start the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and would not prevent the turbine driven pumps from starting on a different signal, i.e. manual initiation or low-low water level in two steam generators.

The proposed change would not involve a sigcificant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are not used during normal operation, thus the probability of an accident is unaffected. In the unlikely event of a blackout coincident with a safety injec-tion, the motor driven pumps will start immediately. If the motor driven aux-iliary feedwater pumps cannot meet demand, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will start on low-low steam generator level in two generators as required by Technical Specifications (Table 3.3-3, Item 7.c.2), thus cooling water to the steam generators is assured and the consequences of an accident previously eval-usted are not increased. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No hardware modifications are being performed as to create or affect any accident scenarios. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The change is to clarify the start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump under specific conditions and will not affect any safety margins.

Several changes are made concerning the Action statements of Table 3.3-3. For the start of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFPs), the Action is changed from Action 14 to Action 27 (new).

The proposed ACTION 27 would read as follows:

ACTION 27 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

The functional capability of this system is maintained as required in the bases of l Technical Specifications ( B 3/4 3.1 ) with one channel inoperable provided that i the inoperable channel is placed in the trip condition. System operation logic with both channels operable requires that 2 out of the 2 operable channels ( n out l

of n logic ) sense a trip of the main feedwater pumps (MFWPs) prior to the auto-matic start of the MDAFPs. The same level of conservatism in the system logic is maintained under the proposed action statement where it would be required that with one channel operable and the other channel inoperable but in the tripped condition that the remaining operable channel ( n out of n logic ) sense a trip of a MFWP prior to the automatic start of the MDAFPs. This change in the action statement has no impact on the accident analysis in the FSAR given the fact that the automatic start of MDAFPs on trip of all MFWPs was not taken credit for in the

! accident analysis.

l (3) l

The Action statement for Item 9 of Table 3.3-3 is revised to be specific and clear for Item 9 " Loss of Power" by creating Action 15A. The new Action directs the use to Specification 3.8.1.1 (Electrical Power Systems, A.C. Sources) if more than one channel is not Operable. This is proposed because with more than one channel inoperable (thus in the tripped condition), the two out of three logic for the loss of a bus is satisfied, with Actions for these conditions covered in Speci-fication 3.8.1.1.

Action statements 14 and 21 are changed to be consistent and conservative. As written, with one channel inoperable, the Actions require the unit to be in Hot Standby within six hours; with two (or more) channels inoperable, the unit would be placed in Specification 3.0.3, allowing an additional hour before the unit is forced to Hot Standby. The latter (gse clearly being inconsistent with the intent of the Specifications.

The proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The function capability of the auxiliary feedwater system is maintained, additionally, the start of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps or loss of main feedwater pumps was not assumed in the accident analysis. The proposed change to create Action 15a is also no less conservative than before. Specification 3.8.1.1 allows operation (provided for in the appropriate action statement) with an inoperable power source. The new Action 15a refers the user to this specification when the logic (two out of three) for the loss of a power source is satisfied. The proposed change to Actions 14 and 21 are more conservative due to potential entry into Specification 3.0.3 as discussed previously. The proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. None of the proposed. changes involve any modifications or significant operational changes, thus no accident scenarios are created or affected. The proposed changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The auxiliary feed-water action statement change will not affect an actual start of the pumps as the inoperable channel is already in the tripped position. The proposed change to create Action 15A for the loss of power functional unit is no less conservative than is presently allowed under Specification 3.8.1.1. Operation with two chan-nels on a bus inoperable would satisfy the logic to indicate an inoperable bus, which is allowed within the Action statements of 3.8.1.1, thus no margins of safety are affected.

The change to Table 4.3-8, Items 3.a and 3.b is to add Note 4 to the daily channel check to indicate that a channel check is to be performed during periods of release. This is due to the fact that a channel check cannot be performed unless a release is in progress. This has no safety implications as if the channel check cannot be performed, there is no release.

The proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change is to note that a Surveillance Required is to be performed daily during a release. The system monitors releases thus cannot affect the probability of an accident. The monitors are allowed to be inoperable for up to thirty days (with grab samples in accordance with the Action Statement), thus the consequences of system inopera-bility during a release are not significantly affected. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any acci-dent previously evaluated. No system modifications are to be made, thus no accident scenarios may be affected. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The monitors are still required to function and the Action statement still applies if the monitors are inoperable; (4)

the change revises the surveillance requirement to make it consistent with the system. The possibility of an unmonitored release is not significantly affected as the system may be inoperable for up to thirty days (in accordance with the action statement), or twenty four hours may pass between channel checks, during i which time the monitor may fail, thus allowed margins are unaffected.

Changes proposed for Tables 3.3-13 and 4.3-9 add a footnote to revise the sur-veillance requirements for EMF-33, a low range noble gas monitor on the condenser evacuation system, to require surveillance only when the air ejectors are opera-ble, i.e., there is a source of gas to the monitor. The monitor serves no purpose when the source of air to the monitors are not operable. Therefore, surveillance on the monitor during periods when the air ejectors are not operable serves no purpose.

The proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The changes affect only the surveillance requirements of the instrument, which itself is a monitor. If the air ejectors are not operable, the monitor serves no purpose so the probability or consequences of any accident are not affected. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No hardware modifications are made to affect any accident scenarios; the change simply would change the Surveillance Requirements to not

require surveillance be performed when the monitor is not serving a purpose. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The change to not require surveillance on the monitor when the monitor is not needed will not affect any safety margins; additionally, the present Specification allows the monitor to be inoperable for up to thirty days if grab samples are taken every twelve hours and analyzed within twenty four hours, thus no margins are significantly affected.

The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2b.1) is to clarify that venting of the ECCS is not necessary if the system is in service or has been in

service within thirty one days, with thirty-one days being the currently allowed curveillance interval. Venting pumps and piping while in service is neither necessary or safe. The purpose of the requirement is to ensure system opera-bility; if the system is in service, this is already assured. Also, venting the system while at pressure causes contamination problems and does not follow ALARA ,

i philosophy since entry into the radiation area would be necessary.

The proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or i consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change ensures ECCS operability while also ensuring personnel safety and being consistent with ALARA considerations. The Surveillance Requirement is intended to assure system operability; if the system is in service, operability is assured. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not involve any codifications or significant operational changes as to affect any accident se-quences. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change ensures system operability as venting the ,

! pumps and pipes is unnecessary (and dangerous) if the system is in service. The specification that venting of the system is not required if the system has been in service within the past thirty one days is to clearly maintain current margin of thirty one days between surveillances to assure operacility. This will ensure, without loss of margin or additional radiation exporure, that ECCS cperability requirements are met.

I (5)

The proposed change to Specification 3.6.3 is to clarify the specification. The new Action statement e would clearly allow mode changes with inoperable contain-ment isolation valves provided that the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Action b or e and the operability of the system associated with the inoperable containment isolation valve is affected. The proposed change is consistent with the intent of the Specification and will not impact containment integrity.

Additional changes were proposed to this Specification by letter dated May 14, 1986; these changes are not indicated on the enclosed " mark-up".

The proposed changes would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change will not affect required containment integrity or impact system operability. The proposal ex-plicitly states to comply with Accion b or e of the Specification (isolating the penetration) and to comply with Specifications applicable to the affected sys-tem (s) . The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or dif-farent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No hardware i

changes are to be made as a result of this change; operability of systems is unaffected. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. No safety margins are affected as this is a clarification of the existing Specificarton and specifically requires compliance with any other appropriate Specifications, thus safety margins are unaffected.

The proposed change to Specification 4.11.2.4.2 is to make a correction. As written, the requirement is to meet 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 or 3.11.2.3; the pro-posed change will correct this error to specify 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 and 3.11.2.3. The proposed change is more conservative than the existing require-

nents.

T'te proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of au accident previously evaluated. The proposed change involves i

the gaseous radwaste treatment system, and the change is more conservative than i the existing Specification, so the probability or consequences of an accident are unchanged or reduced. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The change will not involve any system modifications, thus no accident scenarios may be created. The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The change is more restrictive than the existing specification, thus any change in safety margin will be to increase that margin.

All of the above changes are either minor, administrative, or more conservative than the existing Specifications. Each, according to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91, has an analysis to support the conclusion that the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

Based upon the preceding, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amend-tents do not involve a significant hazard consideration.

(6)

__ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-. ____ _ _ . _ _ - . ._.

ML20211H238

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