ML20205L225

Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Revised SFP Storage Configuration,Revised SFP Storage Criteria & Revised Fuel Enrichment & Burnup Requirements

ML20205L225
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	04/05/1999
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20205L214	List: ML20205L209 ML20205L225 ML20205L234 ML20205L243 ML20205L253
References
NUDOCS 9904140192
Download: ML20205L225 (73)

Text

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1 l

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I I ATTACHMENT 1 l

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE >

MCGUIRE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l l i

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9904140192 990405 PDR ADOCK 05000369 P PDR j.s

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage LCO 3.7.15 The combination of initial enrichmehp and number f of IFB racks shall be within the following configurations:e a.

New or irradiated fuel may be stored1Ainf Regi the spent fuel poolin accordance with these limits:

SEE NEXT PAGE 1.

FOR INSERT Unrestricted 15-1 nr storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3

Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-1 of ,

b.

hictLdoes not meet the criteria of Ta Table 3.7.15-12. ~

poolin accordance with these limitsd fuelpent may fuel be stored in Regio 1.

Unrestricted 3.7.15-3; or storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 2.

fuel which meets the criteria of Table 3.7.1 ,

3.

ADD fuel which does agt meet the criteria of Ta ..

j c. .

[ New or irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days e stored in Region 2A of the spent fuel poolin limits: accordance with t 1.

Unrestricted 3.7.15-6; or storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 2.

fuel which meets the0 criteria of Table 3.7.15 ,

3.

fuel which does no! meet the criteria of Tao .. -

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-1 Amendment Nos. tem'ts6

T'-

L INSEHT FOR PAGE 3.7.15-1

2. Unrestricted storage of fresh fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-12; or i

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Spent Fuel Assembly Storage ADD w 3.7.15

' d. New or irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days may be s stored in Region 2B of the spent fuel pool in accordance with these limits:

1. Unrestricted storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-9; or i l

i

2. Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-6, of i fuel which meets the criteria of Table 3.7.15-10; or i I

3. Checkerboard storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-7 of j fuel which does n.ot meet the criteria of Table 3.7.15-10.  !

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.

! ACTIONS i

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

, A. Requirements of the A.1 ----

NOTE-l LCO not met. LCO 3.0.3 is not l applicable.

I initiate action to move the immediately noncomplying fuel assembly to the correct i location.

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l DELETE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS \

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.15.1 Verity 4 s m Prior to storing the burnup+y_administrativfunaans f4hyT0el assembly is in accordance the)initiaFerniciniwid with the eriu in fuel assembly specified configurations. the spent fuel pool McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-2 Amendment Nos. Itpttte6

c

( REPLACE tl Ass:mbly Storage l WITH NEXT 3.7 15 PAGE Table 3.7.15-1 (page 1 of 1)

N Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 1 Storage initial Nominal Enrichment l

Assembly Burnup

! (Weioht% U-235) (GWD/MTU) l 4.19(or less) 0 4.20 0.04 4.50 1.92 l

4.75 3.40 t

5 i S 4 Eii N

l E

0 3

X ACCEPTABLE E For Unrestricted Storage CS 2 l A UNACCEPTABLE l

4 h3 For Unrestricted Storage

, l

! / '

O l- \

l 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 Initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight % U-235)  !

i NOTES:

f Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-1 l

may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1 storage by means of an analysis using NRC

. approved methodology to assure that k n is less than or equal to 0.95. Likewise, previously l unanalyzed fuel up to a nominal 4.75 weight % U-235 may be qualified for Restricted Region 1 storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k.n is less i than or equal to 0.95.

l McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-3 Amendment Nos.184/446

l NEW PAGE 3.7.15-3 # 7 Futl Assembly Storaga 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-1 (page 1 of 1)

, Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment l

for Unrestricted Region 1 A Storage i Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /koU) i 3.78 (or less) 0

4.00 1.58 4.50 4.92 4.75 6.66 l

10 9-o y 8-i O

! 3 7-2 0' 6-a For Unrestricted Storage z i i m 5 l o I co

>d E

3-i 2 )

$ ~

UNACCEPTABLE For Unrestricted Storage 1-

! O 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 l INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

l Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Tabit; 3.7.15-1 l

may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1 A storage by means of an analysis using NRC l approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for se;uble boron. Likewise, previously unanalyzed fuel up to a nominal 4.75 weight % U-235 may be qualified for Restricted Region 1 A storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that ken is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

~

l McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-3 Amendment Nos. i i

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REPLACE H NEXT -

Sonnt Funi Asssmbly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-2 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 1 Filler Assemblies initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup (Weiaht% U-235) (GWD/MTU) 2.92 (or less) 0 3.00 1.57 3.50 13.30 4.00 18.32 4.50 23.36 4.75 25.84 30 y' 25

$ ACCEPTABLE g 20 For Use As Filler Assembly c 15 5

g 10 UNACCEPTABLE 5 For Use As Filler Assembly M5 0

2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 4.75 f

/ Initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight % U-235)

NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-2 may be qualified for use as a Region 1 Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that ken is less Inan or equal to 0.95.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-4 Amendment Nos. SP4M96

F:

l~ NEW PAGE 3.7.15-4 7 usi Assembly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-2 (page 1 of 1)

(-

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus Initial Enrichment for Region 1 A Filler Assemblies Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

' j

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.76 (or less) 0 2.00 5.12 2.50 13.57 3.00 19.80 l

l 3.50 25.85

! 4.00 31.50 4.50 36.93 l 4.75 39.54 50 45 -

l j D f

{ 40 - ACCEPTABLE O For Use As Filler Assembly l 3 35 l 2 ~

Q 30 -

o z

E 25 -

o m

y 20 i$ ' 15 ~

2 UNACCEPTABLE l cn For Use As Filler Assembly

{  !

l cn 10 l '8' S

j l

0 . .

2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 l INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 i

NOTES:

1 Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-2 may be qualified for use as a Region 1 A Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-4 Amendment Nos.

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l l Sp::nt Fuel Assembly Storage REPLACE 3.7.15 WITH NEXT PAGE

\ Table 3.7.15-3 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qua!ifying Burnup Verstu fnitial Enrichment for Unrestricted Regio i 2 Storage j Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup (Weiaht% U-235) (GWD/MTU) 2.00 (or lessi 10.54 2.50 17.96 i 3.00 24.64 3.50 30.86 4.00 36.75 4.50 42.38 4.75 45.10 60 It l

g 50 - ACCEPTABLE hE: 40 For Unrestricted Storage '

S a

y 30 cE R 20 UNACCEPTABLE i 5 For Unrestricted Storage

$ 10 0

2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 4.75 Initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight % U-235)

NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-3 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 2 storage by raeans of an analysis using NRC l approved methodology to assure that k n is less than or equal to 0.95.

l McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-5 Amendment Nos.184496

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NEM PAGE 3.7.15-5

% el Assembly Stora e Table 3.7.15-3 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 1B Storage Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) 1.78 (or less) 0 2.00 3.96 ,

2.50 11.35 3.00 17.61 3.50 23.35 4.00 28.86 1 4.50 34.10 1 4.75 36.67 50 45 -

o y 40 -

O ACCEPTABLE 35 For Unrestricted Storage

~

0. 30 o

z

[ 25 o

co y 20 d 15 3 UNACCEPTABLE For Unrestricted Storage

$10 5

0 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 j

NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-3 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1B storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and le,:s than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.  ;

_/

l McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-5 Amendment Nos.

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REPLACE "

Spc ssembly Storago WITH NEXT 3.7.15 PAGE Table 3.7.15-4 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Restricted Region 2 Storage with Fillers i

Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

! (Weicht% U-235) (GWD/MTU) l 2.00 (or less) 4.22

! 2.50 10.75 l 3.00 16.80 3.50 22.41 4.00 27.92 l 4.50 33.14  !

4.75 35.65 l 1

I 60  ;

I l 9 50 l

r Ei N 40 ACCEPTABLE ,

8 For Restricted Storage l t ct l @ 30 l

! c5

$ 20 '

f 5 UNACCEPTABLE A 10 - For Restricted Storage I 0

2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 4.75 l

Initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight % U-235)

! i j

NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-4 may be qualified for Restricted Region 2 Storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved l methodology to assure that ka is less than or equal to 0.95. ,

i

/

McGuire Units 1 and 2 - 3.7.15-6 Amendment Nos.104Me6

.NEW PAGE l '3.7.15-6 Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 l

l. Table 3.7.15-4 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifiing Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Restrict J Region 1B Storage with Fillers initial Nominal Er'richment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) l 2.20 (or less) 0 2.50 3.91

3.00 9.65 l / 3.50 15.04 f 4.00 19.87 4.50 24.68 4.75 27.01 1

30 l Q25-4 O

3: ACCEPTABLE 2 20 -

For Restricted Storage 1 a D

z I 15-D to

- /

i>d 10 - UNACCEPTABLE

{ 2 For Restricted Storage tu en i k5 i l f ,

! 0 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 i

I i

NOTES:

l Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-4

( may be qualified for Restricted Region 18 Storage by means of an analysis using NRC 1 approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

x '

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-6 Amendment Nos.

L

I Spant Fusi Assembly Storage l

3.7.15 REPLACE WITH NEXT Table 3.7.15-5 (page 1 of 1)

PAGE Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 2 Filler Assemblies 1

, Initial Nominal Enrichment l Assembly Burnup

j. (Weiaht% U-235) (GWD/MTU) 2.00 (or less) 18.03 2.50 26.71 3 3.00 33.79

. 3.50 40.56

)

I 4.00 46.83 4.50 52.86 4.75 55.78 l \

60 -

. ACCEPTABLE -

S 50 For Use As Filler Assembly l Ei N

ES 40

E m UNACCEPTABLE f20 8

For Use As Filler Assembly e 10 I

O 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 4.75 1

initial Nominal Enrichment (Weight % U-235) l

, NOTES:

l Fuel which diffem from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-5 may be qualified for use as a Region 2 Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k.n is less than or equal to 0.95.

( # ~

j McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-7 Amendment Nos.184Me6 l

Rn t Fu::1 Assembly Storage NEW PAGE' 3.7.15 3.7.15-7 Table 3.7.15-5 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichna1nt l for Region 1B Filler Assemblies l

Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) l 1.45 (or less) 0 2.00 12.68 2.56 20.17 l 3.00 27.03 3.50 33.35 l 4.00 39.33 4.50 45.07 l 4.75 47.89 50 l.

l 45 a ACCEPTABLE y40 For Use As Filler Assembly O

3 35 2

! n.' 30 -

! o

! z l

C 25 -

a

$ 20 - UNACCEPTABLE d For Use As Filler Assembly

. 3 15 -

m

$10 5

0 , .

2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50

INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-5

. may be qualified for use as a Region 1B Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC .

approved methodology to assure that k.n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal )

gwith credit for soluble boron.

j McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-7 Amendment Nos.

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-8 Spsnt Fusi Assembly Storage N

3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-6 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 2A Storage Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) 1.61 (or less) 0 2.00 7.79 2.50 15.14 3.00 21.45 3.50 27.42 4.00 33.00 4.50 38.32 4.75 40.91 60.00 50.00 - l j ACCEPTABLE f 2 40.00 For Unrestricted Storage i

o k 30.00 -

o m

y 20.00 -

2 UNACCEPTABLE y For Unrestricted Storage to 10.00 0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-6 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 2A storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kg is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

j McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-8 Amendment Nos.

I l NEW PAGE 3.7.15-9 nt Fusi Asssmbly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-7 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment j for Restricted Region 2A Storage with Fillers initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 2.12 (or less) 0 2.50 5.10 l 3.00 10.88 3.50 16.19 4.00 21.07 4.50 25.81 4.75 28.11 i

30.00 D

C2 25.00 -

4 I Q ACCEPTABLE For Restricted Storage 20.00 -

i e

D l Z a 15.00 -

D co

! b 30 ,00 _ UNACCEPTABLE

$ For Restricted Storage w

w m 5.00 -

0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 l

NOTES:

%el which differs from those deuigns used to determine the requirements of Table 3.715-7 may be qualified for Restricted Region 2A Storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal o 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-9 Amendment Nos.

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-10 t Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-8 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Oualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 2A Filler Assemblies initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) .

1.20 (or less) 0 2.00 19.80 -

2.50 27.64 3.00 34.56  !

3.50 41.08 )

4.00 47.25 4.50 53.15 4.75 56.01 i

60.00 l

3 50.00 ACCEPTABLE i 8 For Use As Filler Assembly l 3:

2 40.00 -

n' D

Z

[ 30.00 -

D f UNACCEPTABLE For Use As Filler Assembly d 20.00 2

uJ m

m 10.00 -

0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 l

NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-8 may be qualified for use as a Region 2A Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal ho 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-10 Amendment Nos.

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-11 -

Spant Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-9 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichme for Unrestricted Region 2B Storage Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.11 (or less) 0 2.00 21.58 2.50 29.00 3.00 35.69 3.50 41.97 4.00 47.90 4.50 53.57 4.75 56.33 60.00 3 50.00 ACCEPTABLE

[ For Unrestricted Storage 1 3:

2 40.00 a.'

D Z

m 30.00 -

D f UNACCEPTABLE d 20.00 For Unrestricted Storage 2

Lu

$ 10.00 -  !

0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL. NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 l NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-9 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 2B storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-11 Amendment Nos.

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-12 Spant Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-10 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Restricted Region 2B Storage with Fillers initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.22 (or less) 0 2.00' 17.55 2.50 24.73 3.00 31.31 3.50 37.40 4.00 43.15 4 50 48.65 4.75 51.33 60.00 D

2 6 'UU ACCEPTABLE j For Restricted Storage 2 40.00 -

d D

Z

[ 30.00 -

D m '

>. UNACCEPTABLE d 20.00 - For Restricted Storage ,

2 I tu  !

m 1 m 10.00 I i

O.00 , ,

2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 l INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-10  !

may be qualified for Restricted Region 2B Storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal .

to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron. l McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-12 Amendment Nos.  ;

1 L-

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-13 Sp:nt Funt Ass:mbly Storage 3.7.15 l

N Table 3.7.15-11 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 2B Filler Assemblies initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) 1.08 (or less) 0 2.00 23.14 2.50 30.59 3.00 37.42 3.50 43.74 4.00 49.72 4.50 55.49 4.75 58.33 60.00 ,

3 50.00 ACCEPTABLE

[ For Use As Filler Assembly a

2 40.00 o'

D z

c 30.00 -

S UNACCEPTABLE

> For Use As Filler Assembly d 20.00 i*u w

(n 10.00 0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-11 may be qualified for use as a Region 28 Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal iiii u udit-fossoluble boron. _

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-13 Amendment Nos.

i NEW PAGE 3.7.15-14 Spent Fugl Assembly Storage l -

3.7.15

, Table 3.7.15-12 (page 1 of 1) l Minimum Qualifying Number of IFDA Rods Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 1 A Storage of Fresh Fuel Initial Nomina! Enrichment

(% U *c .'#J Number of IFBA Rods 3.78 (or less) 0 4.22 16 i 4.56 32 4.75 48 50 45 m 40 -

O O 35 m ACCEPTABLE

$ 30 - For Unrestricted Storage o

u. 25 -

O E 20 -

m 2 15 ,

D UNACCEPTABLE  !

10 For Unrestricted Storage l 5

0 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-12 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1 A storage by means of an analysis using NRC .

approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

s_ 1 McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-14 Amendment Nos.

Spein Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED FUEL FUEL FUEL FUEL men N

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED FUEL FUEL FUEL FUEL 1

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FU5L LOCATION FUEL LOCATION I

Restricted Fuel: Fuel which does not meet the minimum burnup requirements o Table 3.7.15-tor Table 3.7.15-12) (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-0__or Table 3.7.15]-12 or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in restricted fuel locations as needed).

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-2, or an empty cell.

w w Boundary Condition: Any Restricted Region 1 A Storage Area row hnunded by any Q1beh stor aerea shall contair(a combination of restricted fuel assemblies and filler locations arranged such that no restricted fuel assemblies are adjacent to each other. Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column 1 can not be adjacent t(another storage arehbut row 4 or column 4 can be.

Figure 3.7.15-1 (page 1 of 1)

Required 3 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Regio Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-15 Amendment Nos. 184/166

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION l _

i i

FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION 1

r FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL Restricted Fuel: Fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-4, or non-fuel components, or an empty location.

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table i 3.7.15-5, or an empty cell.

Boundary Condition: No restrictions on boundary assemblies.

t Figure 3.7.15-2 (page 1 of 1)

Required 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Regio 1B Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-16 Amendment Nos.164/196

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 CHECKERBOARE EMPTY OHECKERE,JARE EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL El8 "~  ::HECKERBOARE EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE FUEL CELL FUEL )

l l

1

HECKERBOARE EMPTY CHECKERBOARE EMPTY I FUEL CELL FUEL CELL

!.- l EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE CELL FUEL CELL FUEL Checkerboard Fuel: Fuel which does no.1 meet the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-4. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-4, or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in checkerboard fuel locations as needed)

Boundary Condition: At !sast4wo-opposits sides shall be bounded by either an empty rowy ceiis, w a sperj H uelpooLwall. f

/

h restrictions on boundary asse i

i Figure 3.7.15-3 (page 1 of 1)

Required 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Checkerboard Region' 1 Storage McGu' ire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-17 Amendment Nos. 444f,6 I

J

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-18 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 RESTRICTED FILLER l RESTR OTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION D

FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL l

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION l

FlLLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL t

Restricted Fuel: Fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15 7, or non-fuel components, or an empty location.

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-8, or an empty cell.

Boundary Condition: No restrictions on boundary assemblies.

I Figure 3.7.15-4 (page 1 of 1)

Jequired 2 out of 4 Loading Patte n'or Restricted Region 2A Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-18 Amendment Nos.

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-19

' uel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 i

OHECKERBOARC EMPTY OHECKERBOARE EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL EMPTY OHECKERBOARE EMPTY CHECKERBOARC CELL FUEL CELL FUEL OHECKERBOARE EMPTY CHECKERBOARC EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL l

rv EMPTY OHECKERBOARE EMPTY OHECKERBOARC CELL FUEL CELL FUEL Checkerboard Fuel: Fuel which does not meet the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-7. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-7, or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in checkerboard fuel locations as needed)

Boundary Condition: No restrictic ns on boundary assemblies.

I Figure 3.7.15-5 (page 1 of 1) equired 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Checkerboard Region 2A Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-19 Amendment Nos.

NEW PAGE 3.7.15-20 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 w

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION

~

/

FILLER FILLER FILLER FILLER LOCATION LOCATION LOCATION LOCATION

.l l -

1 RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION l

FILLER FILLER FILLER FILLER LOCATION LOCATION ' OCATION

. LOCATION Restricted Fuel: Fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-10, or non-fuel components, or an empty location.

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-11, or an empty cell.

Boundary Condition: Any Restricted Region 28 Storage Area row bounded by any other storage area shall contain only filler locations arranged such that no Restricted Fuel assemblies are adjacent to any other fuel except Region 2B Filler Locations. Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column 1 can n_ot be adjacent to another storage area, but row 4 or j column 4 can be. l Figure 3.7.15-6 (page 1 of 1) i Required 1 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Region 2B Storage l

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-20 Amendment Nos.

U

NEW PAGE 3.7.15- 1

\ Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 I:HECKERBOARD EMPTY 1:HECKERBOARD EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY CELL CELL CELL CELL l l

1 1:HECKERBOARD EMPTY I;hECKERBOARD EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL I

EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY CELL CELL CELL CELL Checkerboard Fuel: Fuel which does eqt meet the minimum burnup requirements of Table l 3.7.15-10. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-  !

10, or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in checkerboard fuellocations as needed) i Boundary Condition: Any Checkerboard Region 2B Storage Area row bounded by any other storage area shall contain only empty cells arranged such that no Checkerboard Fuel assemblies are adjacent to any fuel. Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column 1 can not be adjacent to another storage area, but row 4 or column 4 can be.

Figure 3.7.15-7 (page 1 of 1)

Required 1 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Checkerboard Region 2B Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-21 Amendment Nos.

Dssign Featuras 4.0 1

4.0 DESIGN FEATURES l 4.1 Site Location The McGuire Nuclear Station site is located at latitude 35 degrees,25 minutes,59 seconds north and longitude 80 degrees,56 minutes,55 seconds west. The Universal Transverse Mercator Grid Coordinates are E 504,669,256, and N 3,920,870,471. The site is in northwestern Mecklenburg County, North Carolina,17 miles north-northwest of Charlotte, North Carolina.

4.2 Reactor Core 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies The reactor shall contain 193 fuel assemblies. Each assembly shall consist of a matrix of Zircalloy fuel rods with an initial composition of natural or slightly enriched uranium dicxide (UO2 ) as fuel material. Limited substitutions of i zirconium alloy or stainless steel filler rods for fuel rods, in accordance with approved applications of fuel rod configurations, may be used. Fuel assemblies shall be limited to those fuel designs that have been analyzed with applicable NRC staff approved codes and methods and shown by tests or analyses to comply with all fuel safety design bases. A limited number of lead test assemblies that have not completed representative testing may be placed in nonlimiting core regions.

4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 53 control rod assemblies. The control material shall be silver indium cadmium (Unit 1) silver indium cadmium and boron carbide (Unit 2) as approved by the NRC. l l

4.3 Fuel Storage i 4.3.1 Criticality l

l 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained j with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum nominal U-235 enrichment i of 4.75 weight percent;

b. kon 1. if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an !

ADD allow ce for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; t

c. k.n s;0.95 if fully flooded with water borated to 440 ppm, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as de Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; ~

McGuire Units 1 and 2 4.0-1 Amendment Nos.1e&%s 1

D: sign Features 4.0 4.O DESIGN FEATURES 4.3 Fuel Storage (continued)

c. A nominal 10.4 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies placed in Regiohs 1 A and 1 Bland

d. A nominal 9.125 inch center tn mnt distance between fuel assemblies placed in Regio (s 2A and 2 4.3.1.2 The new fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with;

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of 4.75 weight percent;

b. k n s 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, wh:ch includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR;

c. k n s 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; and

d. A nominal 21 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.

4.3.2 Drainaae The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 745 ft.-7 in.

4.3.3 Capacity l

The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage l capacity limited to no more than 1463 fuel assemblies (2861 total spaces in )

l l

Qions 1 A and 18 and 1177 total spaces in Regions 2A and 2B). f McGuire Units 1 and 2 4.0-2 Amendment Nos. 44M6

W i

l ATTACHMENT 2 REVISED MCGUIRE TECHNICAL i

SPECIFICATIONS

l Sp:nt Funt Ass mbly Storags j 3.7.15 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l

3.7.15 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage LCO 3.7.15 The combination of initial enrichment, burnup and number of IFBA rods of each new or spent fuel assembly stored in the spent fuel pool storage i racks shall be within the following configurations-  !

l

a. New or irradiated fuel may be stored in Region 1 A of the spent fuel pool in accordance with these limits:

1. Unrestricted storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-1; or

2. Unrestricted storage of fresh fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-12; or

3. Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-1, of fuel which does ag! meet the criteria of Table 3.7.15-1 or Table 3.7.15-12. )

b. New or irradiated fuel may be stored in Region 1B of the spent fuel i pool in accordance with these limits:

1. Unrestricted storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-3; or

2. Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-2, of fuel which meets the criteria of Table 3.7.15-4; or

3. Checkerboard storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-3 of fuel which does nol meet the criteria of Table 3.7.15-4.  ;

c. New or irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days may be stored in Rt.gion 2A of the spent fuel pool in accordance with these limits:

i

1. Unrestricted storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-6; or i

2. Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-4, of fuel which meets the criteria of Table 3.7.15-7; or l 3. Checkerboard storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-5 of fuel which does not meet the criteria of Table 3.7.15-7.

I McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-1 Amendment Nos.

l k

Sp:nt Furl Assembly Storag3 3.7.15

d. New or irradiated fuel which has decayed at least 16 days may be l stored in Region 2B of the spent fuel pool in accordance with these limits:

1. Unrestricted storage of fuel meeting the criteria of Table 3.7.15-9; ct

2. Restricted storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-6, of fuel which meets the criteria of Table 3.7.15-10; or

3. Checkerboard storage in accordance with Figure 3.7.15-7 of fuel which does not meet the criteria of Table 3.7.15-10.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 ------NOTE ---------

LCO not met. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Initiate action to move the immediately noncomplying fuel assembly to the correct location.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.15.1 Verify by administrative means the fuel assembly is in Prior to storing the accordance with the specified configurations. fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-2 Amendment Nos.

1

I i

Spant Fu:1 Assembly Storage 3.7.15 i

, Table 3.7.15-1 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Bumup Versus Initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 1 A Storage l

Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup l

{% U-235) (MWD /kau) 3.78 (or less) 0 4.00 1.58 4.50 4.92 4.75 6.66 10 9-D O

8-37 2

d6- For Unrestricted Storage 3

Z tr 5-D CD 4-cD 2 3-

$ ~

UNACCEPTABLE

$ For Unrestricted Storage 1-0 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

i Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-1 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1 A storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron. Likewise, previously unanalyzed fuel up to a nominal 4.75 weight % U-235 may be qualified for Restricted Region 1 A storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-3 Amendment Nos.

i m

Sp:nt Funi Assembly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-2 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 1 A Filler Assemblies initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.76 (or less) 0 2.00 5.12 2.50 13.57 3.00 19.80 3.50 25.85 4.00 31.50 j 4.50 36.93 4.75 39.54 1

50 45-o y40 ACCEPTABl.E O For Use As Filler Assembly 3: 35 -

2 i 30 -

D z

1 25 o

a3 y 20 -

2d 15 3 UNACCEPTABLE For Use As Filler Assembly

$ 10 -

5 0 .

2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 )

INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 i

NOTES:

Fuel which differs f m those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-2 may be qualified for use as a Region 1 A Filler Assembly by means of an analys!: =ing NRC approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with cred' for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-4 Amendment Nos.

Spant Fusl Asssmbly Storaga 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-3 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 1B Storage Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.78 (or less) 0 2.00 3.96

.2.50 11.35 3.00 17.61 3.50 23.35 4.00 28.86 4.50 34.10 4.75 36.67 I

50 45 - l o  !

{ 40 - ]

o ACCEPTABLE 35 - For Unrestricted Storage n.' 30 - '

a b 25 -

o co y 20 2$

315 UNACCEPTABLE

$ 10 - For Unrestricted Storage 5-0 . .

2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES: l Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-3 i may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1B storage by means of an analysis using NRC  ;

approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2. 3.7.15-5 Amendment Nos.

I i

Sp nt Fus! Assambly Storaga 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-4 (page 1 of 1)

- Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment

! for Restricted Region 1B Storage with Fillers i

Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 2.20 (or less) 0 ,

l 2.50 3.91 1 3.00 9.65 l 3.50 15.04 ,

4.00 19.87 l 4.50 24.68 4.75 27.01 I

l 30 1

3 25 -

4 Q

3: ACCEPTABLE 2 20 ~

For Restricted Storage

a.

o z

[ 15-a co l id UNACCEPTABLE 2 For Restricted Storage w  ;

en

$ 5-0 l 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

l Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-4 l may be qualified for Restricted Region 1B Storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that ken is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-6 Amendment Nos. )

I y

i Spant Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-5 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Bumup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 1B Filler Assemblies l

l Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

! (% U-235) (MWD /kaU) l 1.45 (or less) 0 2.00 12.68 2.5n 20.17 3.00 27.03 3.50 33.35 4.00 39.33 4.50 45.07 4.75 47.89 50 l 45 -

2 ACCEPTABLE y40 For Use As Filler Assembly Q

3 35 -

2 i 30-o z  !

1 25 -  !

o 4 co

> 20 - UNACCEPTABLE d For Use As Filler Assembly i s 15 -

m

$ 10 -

5 0 4 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 l

l NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-5 I

may be qualified for use as a Region 18 Filler Assembly by means of an an tlysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and I,ess than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-7 Amendment Nos.

I

Sptnt Fus! Asssmbly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-6 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying 3urnup Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 2A Storage initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U 935) (MWD /kaU) 1.61 (or less) 0

-2.00 7.79 2.50 15.14 ,

3.00 21.45 3.50 27.42 4.00 33.00 4.50 38.32 4.75 40.91 60.00 D

g 50.00 -

@ ACCEPTABLE 2 40.00 - For Unrestricted Storage i

a z

m 30.00 -

a co d 20.00 -

s UNACCEPTABLE

$ For Unrestricted Storage CD 10.00 -

0.00 -

2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

l Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-6 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 2A storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that km is less than 1.0 with no boron ar'd less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

i McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-8 Amendment Nos.

l Sp nt Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 l

Table 3.7.15-7 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Bumup Versus initial Enrichment for Restricted Region 2A Storage with Fillers

/

Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) 2.12 (or less) 0 2.50 5.10 3.00 10.88 3.50 16.19 4.00 21.07 4.50 25.81 4.75 28.11 30.00 cn 25.00 -

g ACCEPTABLE For Restricted Storage 2 20.00 -

i o

b 15.00 -

a co d 30 00 UNACCEPTABLE y For Restricted Storage ua 5.00 -

0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-7 may be qualified for Restricted Region 2A Storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that kw is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-9 Amendment Nos.

I

l Sp nt Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 l

l Table 3.7.15-8 (page 1 of 1)

! Minimum Oualifying Burnup Versus Initial Enrichment for Region 2A Filler Assemblies l

Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.20 (or less) 0 2.00 19.80 2.50 27.64 3.00 34.56 3.50 41.08  ;

4.00 47.25 l

4.50 53.15 4.75 56.01 60.00 3 50.00 - ACCEPTABLE

[ For Use As Filler Assembly 3

2 40.00 a'

D b 30.00 -

S UNACCEPTABLE For Use As Filler Assembly d 20.00 -

2 w

$ 10.00 -

0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to deterrnine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-8 may be qualified for use as a Region 2A Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-10 Amendment Nos.

I Sp:nt Funi Ass:mbly Storago 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-9 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 28 Storage initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kaU) 1.11 (or less) 0 2.00 21.58 2.50 29.00 3.00 35.69 3.50 41.97 4.00 47.90 4.50 53.57 4.75 56.33 60.00 3 50.00 - ACCEPTABLE Q For Unrestricted Storage 5

2 40.00 d

D Z

m 30.00 -

D

$ UNACCEPTABLE d 20.00 - For Unrestricted Storage 2

Lu m

W 10.00 0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

l Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-9 l may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 28 storage by means of an analysis using NRC l approved methodology to assure that kon is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron. j l ,

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-11 Amendment Nos. l l

l l

3

l Sp:nt Fu:1 Ass:mbly Storaga f 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-10 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Oualifying Burnup Versus Initial Enrichment for Restricted Region 2B Storage with Fillers 1

initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

~(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.22 (or Jess) 0 2.00- 17.55 2.50 24.73 3.00 31.31 3.50 37.40 4.00 43.15 4.50 48.65 4.75 51.33 60.00 D

Y 60'UO ACCEPTABLE y For Restricted Storage 2 40.00 -

d D  !

Z  !

E 30.00 -  :

D <

cn i

> UNACCEPTABLE '

d 2

20.00 -[ For Restricted Storage Lu in 1 cn 10.00 - 1 0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50  ;

INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-10 may be qualified for Restricted Region 2B Storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that k n is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal  ;

to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.  !

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-12 Amendment Nos.

Sp:nt Fuel Ass:mbly Storage 3.7.15 I-Table 3.7.15-11 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Burnup Versus initial Enrichment for Region 2B Filler Assemblies l

l l Initial Nominal Enrichment Assembly Burnup

(% U-235) (MWD /kau) 1.08 (or less) 0 2.00 23.14 2.50 30.59 3.00 37.42 3.50 43.74 4.00 49.72 4.50 55.49 4.75 58.33 60.00 -

?n 50.00 ACCEPTABLE

@ For Use As Filler Assembly 3

2 40.00 -

d D

Z OC 30.00 5 UNACCEPTABLE For Use As Filler Assembly y> 20.00 i'u m

m 10.00 0.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-11 may be qualified for use as a R1 Ji on 2B Filler Assembly by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that ken is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal to 0.95 with credit for soluble boron.

t McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-13 Amendment Nos.

l

Sp:nt Fu:1 Ass:mbly Storage 3.7.15 Table 3.7.15-12 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Qualifying Number of IFBA Rods Versus initial Enrichment for Unrestricted Region 1 A Storage of Fresh Fuel Initial Nominal Enrichment

(% U-235) Number of IFBA Rods 3.78 (or less) 0 4.22 16 4.56 32 4.75 48 50 45 g 40 Q

O35 ACCEPTABLE

$30 For Unrestricted Storage b

u 25 O

@ 20 -

m llii 15 D UNACCEPTABLE 10 For Unrestricted Storage 5-0 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 INITIAL NOMINAL ENRICHMENT, %U-235 NOTES:

Fuel which differs from those designs used to determine the requirements of Table 3.7.15-12 may be qualified for Unrestricted Region 1 A storage by means of an analysis using NRC approved methodology to assure that ke is less than 1.0 with no boron and less than or equal l

to D 35 with credit for soluble boron.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-14 Amendment Nos.

L

l Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED FUEL FUEL FUEL FUEL RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION

)

l RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED FUEL FUEL FUEL FUEL l

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LoCADON FUEL LOCABoN I

l Restricted Fuel: Fuel which does not meet the minimum burnup requirements of either Table 3.7.15-1 or Table 3.7.15-12. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-1 or Table 3.7.15-12, or non-fuel ,

components, or an empty location may be placed in restricted fuel J

locations as needed). l 1

Filler Location: Eithe- fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-2, or an empty cell.  !

Boundary Condition: Any Restricted Region 1 A Storage Area row bounded by any other storage area shall contain a combination of restricted fuel assemblies i and filler locations arranged such that no restricted fuel assemblies are !

adjacent to each other. Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column l 1 can noj be adjacent to another storage area, but row 4 or colurnn 4 i can be. l i

Figure 3.7.15-1 (page 1 of 1) l Required 3 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Region 1 A Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-15 Amendment Nos.

1

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION t

FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL  ;

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION

=- j FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL Restricted Fuel: Fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-4, or non-fuel components, or an empty location.

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-5, or an empty cell.

Boundary Condition: No restrictions on boundary assemblies.

1 Figure 3.7.15-2 (page 1 of 1)

Required 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Region 18 Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-16 Amendment Nos.

L Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 P

OHECKERBOARE EMPTY OHECKERBOARE EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE CELL FUEL CELL FUEL

HECKERBOARE EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL 1

i l

4 EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE EMPTY  ::HECKERBOARE CELL FUEL CELL FUEL Checkerboard Fuel: Fuel which does not meet the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-4. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Tablo 3.7.15-4, or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in checkerboard fuel locations as needed)

Boundary Condition: No restrictions on boundary assemblies.

Figure 3.7.15-3 (page 1 of 1) ,

Required 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Checkerboard Region 1B Storage '

McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-17 Amendment Nos.

i

1 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 l

RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTFi!CTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL l l

l RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FUEL l

Restricted Fuel: Fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-7, or non-fuel components, or an empty location.

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table i 3.7.15-8, or an empty cell.

Boundary Condition: No restrictions on boundary assemblies.

j Figure 3.7.15-4 (page 1 of 1)

Required 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Region 2A Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-18 Amendment Nos.

I

~

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage l

3.7.15 l

OHECKERBOARE EMPTY CHECKERBOARE EMPTY l FUEL CELL FUEL CELL t

l .

(

EMPTY CHECKERBOARE EMPTY OHECKERBOARE CELL FUEL CELL FUEL 1

l CHECKERBOARC EMPTY OHECKERBOARE EMPTY l FUEL CELL FUEL CELL y

l EMPTY HECKERBOARE EMPTY OHECKERBOARE l

CELL FUEL CELL FUEL l

l '

l I I

l Checkerboard Fuel: Fuel which does not meet tne minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-7. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-7, l or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in checkerboard fuel locations as needed)

Boundary Condition: No restrictions on boundary assemblies. i l

Figure 3.7.15-5 (page 1 of 1)

Required 2 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Checkerboard Region 2A Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-19 Amendment Nos.

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.15 RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FILLER FILLER FILLER FILLER OCATION LOCATION LOCATION LOCATION l

l RESTRICTED FILLER RESTRICTED FILLER FUEL LOCATION FUEL LOCATION FILLER FlLLER FILLER FILLER LOCATION LOCATION LOCATION LOCATION P

Restricted Fuel: Fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-10, or non-fuel components, or an empty location.

Filler Location: Either fuel which meets the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-11, or an empty cell.

Boundary Condition: Any Restricted Region 2B Storage Area row bounded by any other storage area shall contain only tiller locations arranged such that no Restricted Fuel assemblies are adjacent to any other fuel except Region 2B Filler Locations. Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column 1 can not be adjacent to another storage area, but row 4 or column 4 can be.

Figure 3.7.15-6 (page 1 of 1)

Required 1 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Restricted Region 2B Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-20 Amendment Nos.

i Spent Fuel Assembly Storage  !

3.7.15 j 4

I;HECKERBOARD EMPTY I;HECKERBOARD EMPTY l FUEL CELL FUEL CELL i

EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY CELL CELL CELL CELL 1 HECKERBOARD EMPTY I;HECKERBOARD EMPTY FUEL CELL FUEL CELL EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY CELL CELL CELL CELL 4 Checkerboard Fuel: Fuel which does not meet the minimum burnup requirements of Table 3.7.15-10. (Fuel which does meet the requirements of Table 3.7.15-10, or non-fuel components, or an empty location may be placed in checkerboard fuel locations as needed)

Boundary Condition: Any Checkerboard Region 2B Storage Area row bounded by any other storage area shall contain only empty cells arranged such that no Checkerboard Fuel assemblies are adjacent to any fuel. Example: In the figure above, row 1 or column 1 can not be adjacent to another storage area, but row 4 or column 4 can be.

Figure 3.7.15-7 (page 1 of 1)

Required 1 out of 4 Loading Pattern for Checkerboard Region 28 Storage McGuire Units 1 and 2 3.7.15-21 Amendment Nos.

1 D: sign Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.1 Site Location The McGuire Nuclear Station site is located at latitude 35 degrees,25 minutes,59 seconds north and longitude 80 degrees,56 minutes,55 seconds west. The Universal Transverse Mercator Grid Coordinates are E 504,6G9,256, and N 3,920,870,471.

The site is in northwestern Mecklenburg County, North Carolina,17 miles north-northwest of Charlotte, North Carolina.

4.2 Reactor Core 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies The reactor shall contain 193 fuel assemblies. Each assembly shall consist of a matrix of Zircalloy fuel rods with an initial composition of natural or slightly enriched uranium dioxide (UO2 ) as fuel material. Limited substitutions of zirconium alloy or stainless steel filler rods for fuel rods, in accordance with approved applications of fue! rod configurations, may be used. Fuel assemblies shall be limited to those fuel designs that have been analyzed with applicable NRC staff approved codes and methods and shown by tests or analyses to comply with all fuel safety design bases. A limited number of lead test assemblies that have not completed representative testing may be p! aced in nonlimiting core regions.

4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 53 control rod a!.semblies. The control material shall be silver indium cadmium (Unit 1) silver indium cadmium and boron carbide (Unit 2) as approved by the NRC.

4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 Criticality 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with;

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of 4.75 weight percent;

b. k.n < 1.0 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR;

c. k,n s 0.95 if fully flooded with water borated to 440 ppm, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; McGuire Units 1 and 2 4.0-1 Amendment Nos.

Design Features 4.0 l 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES j 4.3 Fuel Storage (continued)

d. A nominal 10.4 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies placed in Regions 1 A and 1B; and

e. A nominal 9.125 inch center to center distance between fuel assemolies placed in Regions 2A and 28.

4.3.1.2 The new fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with;

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of 4.75 weight percent; ,

b. kon 5 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR;

c. kon s 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, which includes an l allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the l UFSAR; and

d. A nominal 21 inch center to center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the storage racks.

l 4.3.2 Drainaae The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 745 ft.-7 in.

L 4.3.3 Capacity l

l The spent fuel storage pool is dec gned and shall be maintained with a storage

! capacity limited to no more than 1463 fuel assemblies (286 total spaces in l Regions 1 A and 1B and 1177 total spaces in Regions 2A and 2B).

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l McGuire Units 1 and 2 4.0-2 Amendment Nos. )

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ATTACHMENT 3 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES AND TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION i

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Attachment 3 i Page 1 of 8 Description of Proposed Changes The existing design basis for preventing criticality in the McGuire spent fuel storage pools is that, including uncertainties, there is a 95% probability at a 95% conLidence level that kert of the fuel storage assembly arra, will be less than or equal to 0.95 with full density moderation under both accident and non-accident conditions. A design basis standard condition states that the spent fuel pool water is assumed to be unborated. This LAR proposes an exception to this standard condition and a revision to the existing McGuire TS's and spent fuel storage pool design bases. The proposed changes are described below and are based upon the assumptions of the amount of Boraflex remaining in tne pools as described in the new McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis (Attachment 6):

1. McGuire TS 4.3 will be revised to provide additional criteria j for ensuring acceptable levels of subcriticality for spent I fuel storage. Upon incorporation of the proposed changes to TS 3.7.15, these acceptable levels of suberiticality are an effective neutron multiplication factor (kerr ) less than 1.0 if fully flooded with unborated water, includia an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 on the McGuire UFSAR 1 and keer 5 0.95 if fully flooded with water borated to 440 ppm, I including an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR.

2. McGuire TS 3.7.15 will be revised to provide new opent fuel i pool storage configurations, new spent fuel pool storage I criteria, new fuel enrichment and burnup requirements. With the applicable minimum concentration of soluble boron present in the spent fuel storage pool, credit for the presence of IFBA rods where applicable, and reduced credit for the l

degraded spent fuel rack Boraflex neutron absorber panels, i these changes will ensure that the pool storage rack keer is 5 0.95 under non-accident conditions (including the unlikely occurrence of e worst case spent fuel storage pool dilution event with thorough mixing) and accident conditions. The applicable minimum concentration of soluble boron would be eusured by existing McGuire TS 3.7.14. Note that credit for soluble boron is currently used at McGuire for Mode 6 reactivity control in the reactor vessel, to compensate for a misloaded fuel assembly in the spent fuel storage pools and i will be used for control of reactivity during the loading rf I spent fuel storage casks.

l In the unlikely event of a worst case spent fuel storage pool dilution event without thorough mixing, the proposed changes l will ensure that the pool storage rack kerr is < l.0 under non-I accident conditions with no credit for soluble boron, credit for the presence of IFBA rods where applicable, and reduced h

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p Attachment 3 Page 2 of 8 credit for the degraded spent fuel rack Boraflex neutron absorber panels.

As stated above, the proposed changes are based upon the assumptions of the amount of Boraflex remaining in the pools as described in the new McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis. A proposed addition to Chapter 16 of the McGuire

-UFSAR, " Selected Licensee Commitments", would provide for periodic monitoring- of future Boraflex degradation. If this monitoring determined that the Boraflex in a spent fuel storage pool degraded to levels that would not support the conclusions of the McGuire Fpent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis, then a future LAR would be sabmitted proposing additional changes to the-

.McGuire TS's and spent fuel storage pool design bases as needed to maintain acceptable levels of subcriticality in the McGuire fuel pools. Note that a review of the TS criteria specified in 10 CFR. 50.36 (c) (2) (ii) determined that incorporation of this Boraflex panel monitoring into a TS was not required for the following reasons:

• Boraflex monitoring and inadequate Boraflex levels are not associated with plant instrumentation used to detect or l

indicate a degradation of the reactor coolant pressure l boundary.

• Boraflex monitoring and inadequate Boraflex levels do not I represent or affect a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is the initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis. A review of non-spent fuel pool storage related accidents described in the McGuire UFSAR determined that neither Boraflex monitoring nor inadequate Boraflex levels represent or affect a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is the ir'tial condition of any of these accidents or transients. The only spent fuel pool storage related design basis accidents or transients analyzed in Chapter 15 of the McGuire UFSAR are a fuel assembly drop and a weir gate drop. Neither Boraflex monitoring nor inadequate Boraflex levels are a process variable',. design feature, or operating restriction that represents an initial condition of either of these events. In ,

addition, Boraflex levels do not represent an active design  !

feature.or operating restriction that is needed to preclude a l risk or safety significant unanalyzed accident or transient.

This position is based upon risk analysis which indicates that inadequate Boraflex levels is not a high probability occurrence and . not risk significant givnn the presence of soluble boron in the spent fuel storage pools. l

• Boraflex nonitoring and inadequate Boraflex levels do not represent or affect a structure, system, or component which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or  ;

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i Attachment 3 Page 3 of 8 i

transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. A review of non-spent fuel pool storage related accidents described in the McGuire UFSAR determined that neither Boraflex monitoring nor inadequate Boraflex levels represent or affect a structure, system, or component which functions or actuates to mitigate these analyzed design basis accidents or transients. The only spent fuel pool storage related design basis accidents or transients analyzed in Chapter 15 of the McGuire UFSAR are a fuel assembly drop and a weir gate drop.

The consequences of both of these accidents is ruptured fuel assembly cladding and the resulting release of radioactivity.

Neither Boraflex monitoring nor inadequate Boraflex levels represent or affect a structure, system, or component which l

functions or actuates to mitigate these consequences. I

• Boraflex monitoring or inadequate Boraflex levels do not represent or affect a structure, system, or component which operating experience or a probability risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Technical Justification Normal Conditions:

The McGuire spent fuel storage racks were analyzed taking credit for- soluble boron as allowed in the NRC approved " Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology" described in WCAP-14416-NP-A (Reference 1).

Utilizing the spent fuel pool storage configurations, spent fuel pool storage criteria, and the fuel enrichment and burnup requirements described in the new McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis, that analysis demonstrates that under non-l accident conditions a spent fuel storage pool boron concentration

! of 440 ppm would be adequate to maintain the spent fuel storage rack kett 5 0.95 with credit for the presence of IFBA rods where i

applicable, and reduced credit for the degraded spent fuel rack Boraflex neutro absorber panels. Existing McGuire TS 3.7.14 states that the spent fuel pool storage boron concentrations shall- be maintained within ' the limits specified in the McGuire Core ~ Operating Limits Report (COLR). The spent fuel pool boron

. concentration limit currently specified in the COLR is 2675 ppm which is well above the minimum required boron credit of 440 ppm for non-accident conditions.

It is possible that the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool could be lowered below the COLR limit by a pool dilution event. Consequently, an analysis of dilution event spent fuel storage pool boron concentrations is necessary to ensure i

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Attachment 3 Page 4 of 8 j

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that acceptable levels of subcriticality are maintained during i and following the event (Attachment 7). Note that based upon the double contingency principle, this dilution event is assumed to occur under non-accident conditions. As part of this spent fuel storage pool dilution event analysis, calculations were performed to define the dilution time and volumes for the spent fuel pool. q The dilution sources available at McGuire were compiled and '

evaluated against the calculated dilution volume to identify the bounding dilution event. The McGuire dilution analysis concluded 4 that the bounding event was dilution from the McGuire Recycle Holdup Tanks (RHT's) while they are in " piggy-back" alignment with the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) and the spent fuel storage pool cask loading pit is isolated and drained.

Given the volume of water in these tanks and the capacity of the pumps in the flowpath to a spent fuel storage pool, the dilution analysis determined that it would take over 3-% days for all the water in these tanks to be added to a fuel pool. It is likely that such a worst case dilution event would be detected by a spent fuel storage pool level alarm or by plant operations personnel walking through the area before the entire volume of the RHT's and the RMWST was added to the fuel pool. Note that in the unlikely event this worst case dilution event was not detected and the entire volume of the three tanks was transferred to a fuel pool, the dilution analysis indicates that the boron concentration of a pool would be reduced to approximately 937 ppm assuming a conservative starting boron concentration of 2475 ppm and thorough mixing of the non-borated water added to a pool.

This post-dilution boron concentration is well above the minimum required boron credit of 440 ppm for non-accident conditions. q Note that the above post-dilution event boron concentrations are based upon the assumption that all of the non-borated water added i to a spent fuel pool is thoroughly mixed with the water in the pool. Given the spent fuel storage pool cooling water flow and convection from the spent fuel decay heat, it is likely that this t.iorough mixing would occur. However, 2f mixing was not adequate, i* is possible that a localized pocket of non-borated water could form somewhere in the spent fuel pool. This possibility is addressed by the calculation in Attachment 6 which shows that a spent fuel storage pool kerr will still be less than 1.0 on a 95/95 basis with the spent fuel pool filled with non-borated water.

Thus, in the unlikely event that the worst case dilution event occurred and then a pocket of non-borated water formed in the spent fuel pool due to inadequate mixing, acceptable subcritical conditions would still be maintained in the McGuire spent fuel storage pools.

Accident Conditions:

Many of the postulated spent fuel pool accidents at McGuire will not result in an increase in keer of the spent fuel racks. Such accidents are the drop of a fuel assembly on top of a rack, the drop of a fuel assembly between rack modules, and the drcp of a

Attachment 3 Page 5 of 8 L

fuel _ assembly -between rack modules and the pool wall. At McGuire, the spent fuel assembly rack configuration is such that it precludes the insertion of a fuel assembly between rack l modules. The placement of an assembly between the rack and the

_ pool wall would result in a lower ken relative to the criticality L analysis due to the increased neutron leakage at the spent fuel pool wall because the criticality analysis assumes an infinite

! array of fuel assemblies. In the case where a dropped fuel assembly in its most reactive condition is dropped onto the spent fuel racks, it is assumed that the rack structure pertinent for criticality is not excessively deformed. For this event, previous accident analysis with unborated water showed that a dropped fuel assembly resting horizontally on top of the spent fuel rack has sufficient water separating it from the active fuel height of stored fuel assemblies to preclude neutronic L interaction.

However, three accidents can be postulated which could result in l

an increase in reactivity in the spent fuel storage pools. The first is a drop or placement of a fuel assembly into the cask loading area. If a fuel assembly were to be dropped or placed into the cask loading area of a pool, any reactivity increase would be bounded by the fuel assembly misload accident described

below._ The other two postulated accidents which need to be l

addressed are a significant change in the spent fuel pool water temperature and the misloading of a fuel assembly. A fuel

assembly misload accident relates to the use of restricted storage locations based on fuel assembly type, initial enrichment, burnup and IFBA rod loading requirements. The misloading of a fuel assembly constitutes not meeting the enrichment, burnup or IFBA rod requirements of that restricted location. The result of the misloading is to add positive reactivity, increasing ken toward 0.95. Note that special administrative controls are placed on the patterning and region loading of assemblies into these restricted locations. A significant change in the spent fuel pool water temperature can be either the loss of normal cooling to the spent fuel pool water which causes an increase in the temperature of the water passing through the stored fuel assemblies or a large makeup to the pool with cold water which could happen if the spent fuel pool were l

used an as emergency source of borated water. The loss of spent fuel pool cooling causes a decrease in water density which would result in a decrease in reactivity when Boraflex neutron absorber panels are present in the racks. However, since Boraflex is not considered to be present for some regions and the spent fuel pool water has a high concentration of boron, a density decrease results in a decrease in boron density which causes a positive reactivity addition. The decrease in pool temperature causes an increase in water density which would normally result in an increase in reactivity.

For each storage configuration proposed in the revised TS 3.7.15,

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Attachment 3 Page 6 of 8 i

j a McGuire spent fuel rack criticality analysis was performed as described in the McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis (Attachment.6). This new McGuire Criticality Analysis evaluated the amount of soluble boron necessary to ensure that the spent fuel rack k,,r r will be maintained less than or equal to 0.95

.following a significant change in spent fuel pool temperature or the misloading of a fuel assembly. For each of these accidents, that evaluation established that a minimum boron concentration of i

1170 ppm is required to maintain kert less than or equal to 0.95.

l A separate McGuire TS states that the spent fuel pool storage

( boron concentrations shall be maintained within the limits specified in the McGuire Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

The spent fuel pool boron concentration limit currently specified l

in the COLR is 2675 ppm. Consequently, under the applicable accident conditions, maintaining spent fuel pool boron concentrations within the COLR limit in the presence of IFBA rods l where applicable will ensure that the spent fuel storage rack kort is 5 0.95 when fuel is stored in accordance with the new spent fuel pool storage configurations, new spent fuel pool storage criteria, new fuel enrichment and burnup requirements specified in the proposed change to TS 3.7.15. Note that, based on the i double contingency principle, the margin for accident conditions included in the boron concentration limit does not have to account for both a loss of cooling accident, a misload accident, or a spent-fuel pool dilution event occurring at the same time. I J

Conclusion l Revision of the McGuire TS's and design bases as proposed in this LAR will provide a level of safety comparable to the conservative criticality analysis methodology required by References 1, 2, and 3 of this attachment. Consequently, the health and safety of the public will not be adversely affected by the proposed Technical Specification changes. The bases for these conclusions are as follows:

l 1. Utilizing the new spent fuel pool storage configurations, new I

spent ~ fuel pool storage criteria, new fuel enrichment and burnup requirements specified in the proposed change to TS 3.7.15, the new McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis demonstrates that, under non-accident conditions

!. (including thorough mixing of pool water following the unlikely occurrence of a worst case spent fuel storage pool dilution : event), a minimum spent fuel storage pool boron ,

credit of 440 ppm would be adequa*.e to maintain the spent fuel i storage rack kerr 5 0.95 with credit for the presence of IFBA rods where applicable and reduced credit for the degraded spent. fuel- rack Boraflex neutron absorber panels. This minimum boron concentration would be ensured by existing McGuire TS 3.7.14.

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r Attachment 3 Page 7 of 8

2. Utilizing the new spent fuel pool storage configurations, new spent fuel pool storage criteria, new fuel enrichment and burnup requirements specified in the proposed change to TS 3.7.15, the new McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis demonstrates that, under non-accident conditions and non-thorough mixing of pool water following the unlikely

, occurrence of a worst case spent fuel storage pool dilution

~

j event, spent fuel stor' age' rack keer would remain < l.0 with

! credit for the presence of IFBA rods where applicable and reduced credit for the degraded spent fuel rack Boraflex neutron absorber panels.

3. Utilizing the new spent. fuel pool storage configurations, new spent fuel pool storage criteria, new fuel enrichment and l burnup requirements specified in the proposed change to TS I 3.7.15, the new McGuire Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis

n demonstrates that under accident co'ditions a minimum spent l fuel storage pool boron credit of 1170 ppm would be adequate to maintain the spent fuel storage rack kerr < 0.95 with credit for the presence of IFBA rods where applicable,and reduced credit for the degraded spent fuel rack Boraflex neutron absorber panels. This minimum boron concentration would be t ensured by existing McGuire TS 3.7.14.

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! Note that the existing TS 3.7.15 specifies the requirements for spent fuel pool storage configurations, fuel pool storage criteria, fue'. enrichment, and fuel burnu; Consequently, plant operating procedures already include c o). rols to ensure these existing requirements are satisfied ,e procedural controls i will be revised and maintained a3 net . ed under the revised TS 3.7.15 In c W. tion new controls necessary to ensure that l independent r aministrative c nfirnation of the number of IFBA rods will be incorporated into plant operating procedures prior i tL implementation of the proposed TS chu.ges. Finally, current {

administrative controls on spent fuel pool boron concentration l l and water inventory will be evaluated and procedures will be l upgraded as necessary to ensure that the spent fuel pool boron l concentration and water inventory are controlled during both )

( normal and accident situations. Note that existing McGuire spent j

[ ' fuel pool storage systems, supporting systems, and instrumen.ation are not modified as a result of this proposed LAR.

l l References

1. WCAP-14416-NP-A, " Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", Revision 1, November 1996.

2. USNRC Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, NUREG-0800, June 1987.

Attachment 3 Page 8 of 8

3. USNRC Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Bases (for Comment)

Proposed Re1rision 2, 1981, Regulatory Guide 1.13. -

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ATTACHMENT 4 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION EVALUATION l

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Attachment 4 Page 1 of 5 l

No Significant Hazards Consideration Evalo_ation In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92, McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.

The radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool do not change by taking credit for soluble boron in the pool because the current spent fuel pool boron concentration limit is not being changed.

1. Will the change involve a significant increase in the i probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?

No, based upon the following:

Dropped Fuel Assembly There is no significant increase in the probability of 6 fuel assembly drop accident in the spent fuel pools when considering the degradation of the Boraflex panels in the spent fuel pool racks coupled with the presence of soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water for criticality control. l The handling of the fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool has always been performed in borated water, and the quantity of Boraflex remaining in the racks has no affect on the probability of such a drop accident. l 1

The criticality analysis showed that the consequences of a  !

fuel assembly drop accident in the spent fuel pools are not I affected when considering the degradation of the Boraflex in the spent fuel pool racks and the presence of soluble boron.

Fuel Misloading There is no significant increase in the probability of thu accidental misloading of spent fuel assemblies into th' spent fuel pool racks when considering the degradation or the Boraflex in the spent fuel pool racks and the presence of soluble boron in the pool water for criticality control.

Fuel assembly placement and storage will continue to be l controlled pursuant to approved fuel handling procedures to ensure compliance with the Technical Specification requirements. These procedures will be revised as needed to comply with the revised requirements which would be imposed by the proposed Technical Specification changes.

F Attachment 4 Page 2 of 5 l'

There is no increase in the consequences of the accidental misloading cf spent fuel assemblies into the spent fuel pool racks because criticality analyses demonstrate that the pool will remain suberitical following an accidental misloading if the pool contains an adequate boron concentration.

Current Trchnical Specification 3.7.14 will ensure that an  ;

adequate .; pent fuel pool boron concentration is maintained I in the McGuire spent fuel storage pools. A McGuire Station UFSAR cl.ange will revise Chapter 16, " Selected Licensee Commitmr.nts", to provide for adequate monitoring of the remaining Boraflex in the spent fuel pool racks. If that L monitoring identifies further reductions in the Boraflex panel s which would not support the conclusions of the McGuire Criticality Analysis, then the McGuire TS's and )

design bases would be revised as needed to ensure that i

! acceptable subcriticality are maintained in the McGuire l spent fuel storage pools.

l

! Significant Change in Spent Fuel Pool Temperature There is no significant increase .in the probability of

, either the loss of normal cooling to the spent fuel pool l water or a decrease in pool water temperature from a large emergency makeup when considering the degradation of the Boraflex in the spent fuel pool racks and the presence of i

soluble boron in the pool water for subcriticality control l since a high concentration of soluble boron has always been i maintained in the spent fuel pool water. Current Technical l Specification 3.7.14 will ensure that an adequate spent fuel i pool boron concentration is maintained in the McGuire spent l fuel storage pools l

l A loss of normal cooling to the spent fuel pool water causes j an increase in the temperature of the water passing through the stored fuel assemblies. This causes a decrease in water density that would result in a decrease in reactivity when i

Boraflex neutron absorber panels are present in the racks.

-However, since a reduction in the amount of Boraflex present l

l in the racks is considered, and the spent fuel pool water l has.a high concentration of boron, a density decrease causes a positive reactivity addition. However, the additional negative reactivity provided by the current boron concentration limit, above that provided by the concentraf .on required to maintain kert less than or equal to 0.95 ( l' s ppm), will compensate for the increased reactivi which could result from a loss of spent fuel pool ,

cooling vant. Because adequate soluble boron will be ]

maintai' sd in the spent fuel pool water, the consequences of

a. loss of normal cooling to the spent fuel pool will not be increased. Current Technical Specification 3.7.14 will ensure that an adequate spent fuel pool boron concentration I J

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Attachment 4 Page 3 of 5 is maintained in the McGuire spent fuel storage pools.

A decrease in pool water temperature from a large emergency makeup causes an increase in water density that would result in an increase in reactivity when Boraflex neutron absorber panels are present in the racks. However, the additional negative reactivity provided by the current boron concentration limit, above that provided by the concentration required to maintain keer less than or equal to 0.95 (1170 ppm), will compensate for the increased reactivity which could result from a decrease in spent fuel pool water temperature. Because adequate soluble boron will be maintained in the spent fuel pool water, the consequences of a decrease in pool water temperature will not be increased. Current Technical Specification 3.7.14 will ensure that an adequate spent fuel pool boron concentration is maintained in the McGuire spent fuel storage pools.

2. Will tha change create the possibility of a new or different kit..I of accident from any previously evaluated?

No. Criticality accidents in the spent fuel pool are not new or different types of accidents. They have been analyzed in Section 9.1.2.3 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and in Criticality Analysis reports associated with specific licensing amendments for fuel enrichments up to 4.75 weight percent U-235. Specific accidents considered and evaluated include fuel assembly drop, accidental misloading of spent fuel assemblies into the spent fuel pool racks, and significant changes in spent fuel pool water temperature. The accident analysis in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report remains bounding.

The possibility for creating a new or different kind of accident is not credible. The amendment proposes to take credit for the soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water for reactivity control in the spent fuel pool while maintaining the necessary margin of safety. Because soluble boron has always been present in the spent fuel pool, a dilution of the spent fuel pool soluble boron has always been a possibility, however this accident was not considered credible. For the proposed amendment, the spent fuel pool dilution evaluation (Attachment 7) demonstrates that a dilution of the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water which could increase the rack kort to greater than 0.95 l (constituting a reduction of the required margin to criticality) is not a credible event. The requirement to maintain boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water for reactivity control will have no effect on normal pool operations and maintenance. There are no changes in equipment design or in plant configuration. This new requirement will not result in the installation of any new l l l

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Attachment 4 Page 4 of 5 equipment or modification of any existing equipment.

Therefore, the proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. Will the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. The proposed Technical Specification changes and the resulting spent fuel storage operating limits will provide adequate safety margin to ensure that the stored fuel assembly array will always remain subcritical. Those limits are based on a pl,;nt specific criticality analysis (Attachment 6) based on the " Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology" described in Reference 1.

The Westinghouse methodology for taking credit for soluble boron in the spent fuel pool has been reviewed and approved by the NRC (Reference 6). This methodology takes partial credit for soluble boron in the spent fuel pool and requires conformance with the following NRC Acceptance criteria for  !

preventing criticality outside the reactor:

1) kort shall be less than 1.0 if fully flooded with unborated water which includes an allowance for uncertainties at a 95% probability, 95% confidence (95/95) level; and:

2) keer shall be less than or equal to 0.95 if fully flooded with borated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties at a 95/95 level.  !

I The criticality analysis utilized credit for soluble boron to ensure k,,, will be less than or equal to 0.95 under normal circumstances, and storage configurations have been i defined using a 95/95 k,,, calculation to ensure that the spent fuel rack k,,, will be less than 1.0 with no soluble boron. Soluble boron credit is used to provide safety margin by maintaining k,, , less than or equal to 0.95 including uncertaintie:, tolerances and accident conditions in the presence of spent fuel pool soluble boron. The loss of substantial amounts of soluble boron from the spent fuel pool which could lead to exceeding a k,, , of 0.95 has been evaluated (Attachment 7) and shown to be not credible.

Accordingly, the required margin to criticality is not reduced.

The evaluations in Attachment 7, which show that the dilution of the spent fuel pool boron concentration from the conservative assumed initial boron concentration (2475 ppm) l to the minimum boron concentration required to maint k err 5 0.95 (440 ppm) is not credible, combined with th '95 calculation which shows that the spent fuel rack k,,, , w_1 l

l Attachment 4 Page 5 of 5 remain less than 3.0 when flooded with unborated water, provide a level of adety comparable to the conservative criticality analysis methodology required by References 2, 3 and 4.

Therefore the proposed changes in this license amendment will not result in a significant reduction in the plant's margin of safety.

References

1. WCAP-14416-NP-A, " Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology", Revision 1, November 1996.  !

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2. USNRC Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, NUREG-0800, June 1987.

3. USNRC Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Bases (for Comment)

Proposed Revision 2, 1981, Regulatory Guide 1.13.

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4. ANS, Design Requirements for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel l Storage Facilities at Nuclear Pcwer Stations, ANSI /ANS-57.2-1983.

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5. Attached McGuire Criticality Amalysis and other attached documentation (including references therein) forming the basis for this license amendment request.

6. Letter from TE Collins (NRC) to T Greene (WOG), Acceptance i for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report WCAP-14416-P,  !

" Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis ]

Methodology." (TAC No. M93254), Dated October 15, 1996 '

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ATTACHMENT 5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

I Attachment 5 Page 1 of 1 Environmental Impact Assessment:

The proposed Technical Specification amendment has been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 51.22 for environmental l considerations. The proposed amendment will allow credit to be l taken for soluble boron in the spent fuel storage pool water to maintain an acceptable margin of subcriticality. Appropriate controls are in place or they will be implemented to monitor the soluble boron concentration in the spent < fuel pool water and to monitor for future degradation of the Boraflex panels in the spent fuel storage cells. Consequently, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, nor increase the types and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Therefore, the proposed amendment meets the criteria given in 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9) for a categorical exclusion from the requirement for an Environmental Impact Assessment.

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