ML20217H554

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs Supporting Replacement of Three Safety Related Narrow Range Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Instruments W/Three Safety Related Wide Range Level Instruments
ML20217H554
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/1997
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20217H551 List:
References
NUDOCS 9710160135
Download: ML20217H554 (28)
v • d • e


Text

'

ATTACHMENT 1 MARKED UP BASES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES REVISED PAGES (CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION)

?$A'I8 sero $$85369 P PDR

F. 0 4 i

4 BASES AND CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS His vilivsn luw n w ee BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the HTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the HTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICAllTY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactol Coolant System average temperature less than 551'F. This limita-tion is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it an11yzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT g temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORAT10N SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to erform this function includes (1) borated water sources, p(3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, (5)(2) charging associated Heat pumps, Tracing Systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The bora-tion capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Core Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LC0 value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume during Modes 1-4 is based on the recuired volume to maintain shvioown margin, an allowance for unusable volume anc additional margin as follows:

Boric Acid Storaae Tank Reauirements for Maintainina SDM - Modes 1,_a Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 4,190 gallons Additional margin 6,470 gallons McGUIRE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2

f BfACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS usvu w uw w s yk s BASES j R@ATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Refuelina Water Storage Tank Reautrements for Maintainina SDM - Modes 1-4 Required volume for maintainin presented in the COLR Unusable volume (below nozzle)g SDM 16,000 gallons Additional margin 1EB91 gallons 2.3,500 With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 300*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. Allowing two Centrifugal Charging pumps to operate simultaneously for s15 minutes increases the margin of safety with respect to the Reactor Coolant pump seal failure resulting in a LOCA in that the Reactor Coolant pump seal injection flow is not interrupted during pu p swap. For the 15 minute period during which simultaneous Centrifugal Charg ng pump operation is allowed, the safety margins as related to the mass addit on analysis are not appreciably reduced. Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires two PORVs to be o)erable during this period of operation, thus a mass addition transient can )e relieved as required assuming the two PORVs function properly.

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHU100WN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140'F. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Core Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LC0 value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume during Modes 5 and 6 is based on the required volume to maintain shutdown margin, an allowance for unusable volume and additional margin as follows:

Boric Acid Storace Tank Reauirements for Maintainino SDM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 4,199 gallons Additional margin 4,100 gallons Refuelina Water Storage Tank Requirements for Maintainino SOM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintainin presented in the COLR Unusablevolume(belownozzle)gSDM 16,000 gallons Additional margin E5UIE gallons 23#00 McGUIRE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS h"'

hy Il v s yn s BASES MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEfflCIENT(Continued)

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the HTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confit i that the HTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICAllTY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551'f. This limita-tion is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT NDT temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORAT10N SYSTEMS The Boron injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of f acility operation. The components required to perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths (4) boric acid transfer pumps, (5) associated Heat Tracing Systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200'f, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The bora-tion capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.3% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'f. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Core Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LC0 value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume during Modes 1-4 is based on the recuired volume to maintain shutdown margin, an allowance for unusable volume anc additional margin as follows:

jLqric Acid Storace Tank Reauirements f'>r Maintainino SDM - Modes 1_1 Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 4,199 gallons Additional margin 6,470 gallons McGUIRE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-2

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES ,

BORAT10N SYSTEMS (Continued)

Befuelina Water Storaae Tank Reauirements for Maintainina SDM - Modes 1-4 Required volume for maintainin presented in the COLR Unusable volume (below nozzle)g SDM 16.000 gallons Additional margin T H I gallons 23,500 With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on .he basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 300'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. Allowing two Centrifugal Charging pumps to operate simultaneously for sl5 minutes increases the margin of safety with respect to the Reactor Coolant pump seal failure resulting in a LOCA in that the Reactor Coolant pump seal injection flow is not interrupted during pump swap. For the 15 minute period during which simultaneous Centrifugal Charging pump operation is allowed, the safety margins as related to the mass addition analysis are not appreciably reduced. Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires two PORVs to be o)erable during this period of operation, thus a mass addition transient can )e relieved as required assuming the two PORVs function properly.

The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140*F. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Ccre Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LC0 value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume a'uring Modes 5 and 6 is based on the required volume to maintain shutdown margin, an allowance for unusable volume and additional margin as follows:

Boric Acid Storaae Tank Reauirements for Maintainina SDM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintaining SDH presented in the COLR Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 4,199 gallons Additional margin 4,100 gallons l Refuelina Water Storaae Tank ReauiremeMs for Maintainino Sid - Modes 5 & 6 1

l Required volume for maintainin presented in the COLR l Unusable volume (below nozzle)g SDM 16,000 gallons Additional margin SE5HIEgallons

( 2.b5cc) l l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 l

y ........u... ....i.,,,...... . . . .

e i

=

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) -

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS -

-FUNCTIONAL! M TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

7. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
f. Station Blackout - Start Motor-Driven Pumps and '

Turbine-Driven Pump (Note 1)

1) 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3174 45 volts with a 2 3I22 volts 8.5 i 0.5 second time delay
2) 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3678.5 volts with s 11 2 3661 volts second with SI and s 600 second without SI time delays
g. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps - N.A. N.A.

Start Motor-Driven Pumps

8. Automatic Switchover to Recirculation /80 I7 8r inches RWST. Level 2 afinches
9. Loss of Power
i. 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3174 1 45 volts with a 2 3122 volts 8.5 1 0.5 second time delay
b. 4 -kV Degraded Voltage 2 3678.5 volts with s 11 2 3661 volts second with SI and s 600 second without SI time delays
10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation l System Interlocks
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 s 1955 psig s 1965 psig
b. T,yg, P-12 2 553*F 2 551*F
c. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. N.A.
d. Steam Generator Level, P-14 See Item Sb. above for all Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Note I: The turbine driven pump will not start on a blackout signal coincident with a safety injection signal.

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-31 Amendment No.. 166 t_. . _. -

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) "-

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS ,

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

7. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued) -
f. Station Blackout - Start Motor-Driven Pumps and

. Turbine-Driven Pump (Note 1)

1) 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3157 1 45 volts with a 2 3108 volts 8.5 1 0.5 second time delay

.2) 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3703 volts with s 11 2 3685.5 volts second with SI and s 600 secrnd without SI time delays j

g. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps - N.A. N.A.

Start Motor-Driven Pumps

8. Automatic Switchover to Recirculation /gg /75.85' RWST Level 2 inches 2 finches
9. Loss of Power
a. 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3157 i 45 volts with a 2 3108 volts 8.5 1 0.5 second time delay
b. 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3703 volts with s 11 2 3685.5 volts second rith SI and s 600 second without SI time delays
10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks a .l Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 s 1955 psig s 1%5 psig
b. T,yg, P-12 ;e 553*F 2 551*F
c. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. N.A.
d. Steam Generator Level, P-14 See Item Sb. above for all Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Note 1:' The turbine driven pump will not start on a blackout signal coincident with a safety injection signal.

McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-31 Amendment No. 148

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Refuelina Water Storace Tank Reauirements for Maintainino SDM - Modes 1-4 Required volume for mainiaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (below nozzle) 16,000 gallons Additional margin 23,500 gallons l With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting.

CORE M 7ERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inopera m below 300*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can te *elieved by the operation of a single PORV. Allowing two Centrifugal Charging pumps to operate simultaneously for sl5 minutes increases the margin of safety with respect to the Reactor Coolant pump seal failure resulting in a LOCA in that the Reactor Coolant pump seal injection flow is not interrupted during pump swap. For the 15 minute period during which simultaneous Centrifugal Charging pump operation is allowed, the

safety margins as related to the mass addition analysis are not appreciably reduced. Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires two PORVs to be operable during this period of operation, tie a mass addition transient can be relieved as required assuming the two PORVs .'anction properly.

The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140'F. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to l maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Core Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LC0 value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume during Modes 5 and 6 is based on the required volume to maintain shutdown margin, an allowance for unusable volume and additional margin as follows:

Boric Acid Storaae Tank Reauirements for Maintainina SDM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 4,199 gallons Aalitional margin 4,100 gallons Refuelina Water Storaae Tank Reauirements for Maintainino SDM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (below nozzle) 16,000 gallons Additional margin 23,500 gallons l

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORAT10N SYSTEMS (Continued)

Refuelina Water Storace Tank Reauirements for Maintainina SOM - Modes 1-4 i Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (below nozzle) 16,000 gallons Additional margin 23,500 gallons l

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 300'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. Allowing two Centrifugal Charging pumps to operate simultaneously for s15 minutes increases the margin of safety with respect to the Reactor Coolant pump seal failure resulting in a LOCA in that the Reactor Coolant pump seal injection flow is not interrupted during pump swap. For the 15 minute period during which simultaneous Centrifugal Charging pump operation is allowed, the safety mi.rgins as related to the mass addition analysis are not appreciably reduced. Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires two PORVs to be operable during this period of operation, thus a mass addition transient can be relieved as required assuming the two PORVs function properly.

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140*F. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Core Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LC0 value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume during Modes 5 and 6 is based on the required volume to maintain shutdown margin, an allowance for unusable volume and additional margin as follows:

Boric Acid Storage Tank Reauirements for Maintainino SOM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe) 4,199 gallons Additional margin 4,100 gallons Refuelina Water Storace Tank Reauirements for Maintainino SDM - Modes 5 & 6 Required volume for maintaining SDM presented in the COLR Unusable volume (below nozzle) 16,000 gallons Additional margin 23,500 gallons l

McGUIRE - UNIT 2 B3/41-3

~~

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS .

FUNCTIONAL" UNIT' TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

~

7. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
f. ' Station Blackout - Start Motor-Driven Punps and Turbine-Driven Pump (Note 1)
1) 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3174 45 volts with a 2 3122 volts 8.5 1 0.5 second time delay
2) 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3678.5 volts with s 11 2 3661 volts second.with SI and s 600 second without SI tint delays
g. Trip of Main Feedwater Punps - N.A. N.A.

Start Motor-Driven Pumps

8. Automatic Switchover to Recirculation RWST Level 2 180 inches 2 175.85 inches
9. Loss of Power
a. 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3174 45 volts with a 2 3122 volts 8.5 0.5 second time delay
b. 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3678.5 volts with s 11 2 3661 volts second with SI and s 600 second without SI time delays

'10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks

a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 s 1955 psig s 1965 psig
b. T ,g,'P-12 2 553*F 2 551*F
c. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. N.A.
d. Steam Generator Level P-14 See Item Sb. .above for all Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Note 1: The turbine driven punp will not start on a blackout signal coincident with a safety injection signal.

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 L3/4 3-31 Amendment No.

^ ~~

< TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS -

1 FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

^ '

7. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
f. Station Blackout - Start Motor-Driven Punps and Turbine-Driven Punn (Note 1) i
1) 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3157 45 volts with a 2 3108 volts l 8.5 0.5 second time delay
2) 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3703 volts with s 11 2 3685.5 volts second with SI and s 600 second without SI time delays
g. Trip of Main Feedwater Punps - N.A. N.A.

Start Motor-Driven Pumps

8. Autonatic Switchover to Recirculation RWST Level 2 180 inches 2-175.85 inches
9. *_sss of Power
a. 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3157 i 45 volts with a 2 3108 volts 8.5 0.5 second time delay
b. 4 kV Degraded Voltage 2 3703 volts with s 11 2 3685.5 volts -

second with SI and s 600 second without SI time delays '

10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ' Interlocks
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 s 1955 psig s 1965 psig
b. T,,g, P-12 2 553*F 2 551*F
c. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. N.A.
d. Steam Generator Level, P-14 See Item 5b. above for all Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Note 1: The turbine' driven pump will not start on a blackout signal coincident with a safety injection signal.

McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/43-31 Amendment No.

iiii-q g 6 9 +

IMPROVED i

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

~..

.*'s  ;

i h,3. Zh TABLED M fContinuedl ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRtMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWA8LE VALUES i bX Auxiliary feedwater (continuec) 44 Station Blackout a bN

  • Note 1)

, 1) 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3174

  • 45 volts with a a 3122 volts 8,5 2 0.5 second time delay 2)4kVDegradedVoltage a 3678.5 volts with s 11 2 3661 volts second with SI and s 600 ^

second without SI time delays eg Ariof T Main Feedwater Pumps - N.A. N.A.

QIart % 4.ho . ,i g i

'7f. Automatic Switchover to Recirculation '

k RWST Lese 1 @ . @ g m g{ inches

"" "9. Loss of Power af inc U Iy\

a. 4 kV Loss of Voltage 3174 2 45 volts with a

\

b. 4 kV Degraded Voltage 8.5 2 0.5 second time delay a 3122 volts

\

( a 3678.5 volts with s 11 second with SI ind s 600 2 3661 volts

% second without SI time delays )

8, 26. Engineered Safety features Actuation System Interlocks b/. Pressurizer Pressure, P-ll s 1955 psig s 1965 psig CA. Ty , P-12 2 553*F = 551*F A4 Reactor Trip P-4 N.A. N.A.

Q sy Generator Le , r- a item Sb. above ([all Trip 3etp[ts and)tilowable)

" Note 1: nne unive y - ,, wisi not stjrt on a blackouy stgnal co dent with a sa ety injectio3 R

signal. [ t, ,

p 1 &

McGUIRE - WIT 1 r 3/4 3-31 Amendment No. 166 $ b ,,,, Anw ,deraf IcMI'

% s

/* / 1 'T y 5

~

s

.- s

@ c.3.bb

~

TABLE @ fContinuedi ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRislENTATION TRIP SETPOINT

, FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

(, f. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)

~1 J #. Station Blackout - r r at )

1) 4 kV Loss o , 6.yc 3157
  • 45 volts with a = 3108 volts 8.5 0.5 second time delay
2) 4 kV Degraded Voltage a 3703 volts with s 11 2 3685.5 volts second with SI and s 600 second without SI time delays' e., g. Tri Nain Feedwate'r P N.A.

_ art)l5 tor-DriverPumpt N.A.

LA.1 S 7 J. Automatic Switchover to Re rculation tEF RWST Level A 4,3 = inches 2 inches 'N N"" f.

9 Loss of Power T '

N

a. 4 kV Loss of Voltage tr$ 3.Af  ! 3157
  • 45 volts with a a 3108 volts
b. 8.5
  • 0.5 second time delay 4 kV Degraded Voltage = 3703 volts with s 11 2 3685.5 volts

' second with St and s 600

_ second without SI time delays 6 Ifr. Engineered Safety fea res Actuation Systen Interlocks  !

b p. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 s 1955 osig s 1965 psig c, Jr. Tm , P-12

= 553*F = 551*F

-;P g c'. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. m N.A. y

{oT Stea[mnerator l'evel, Pg S em Sb. above ip Setpoi nd Allowable k~

h t g

e j,s5 Note 1: I turbine driven p 9nal. )~

ill not start on a b dEkU signal col n't with a safetyjnjection) 3*

g f

McGUIRE - UNIT 2

  • 3/4 3-31 Asene' ment No. 148 Ylgtesyge/ Jet (Ad N N

/*/f7

o ESFAS Instrtsnentation 3.3.2

, , 1obte 3.3.21 (pepe F of an Enfinnered Safety feature actuetten System instrumentation 8MtitAstt e

A88CIl0h til L Coelitoet stal EME V m, IN

6. Aueltiery fee & eter (centirmand)

C.G. severy injection sever te entien 6Gl atead """ " "1 (seteer anloctions " "* tw att inteletion (py10 9 _

d./.tooefened " .2.3 (EU) G

@/D i

gg g"""Og

@ . (,ge,3 eI wNt .

m 3.3. -- .co u.

i.G O

~~

cat w a W "g d e, o - 3aM4 . , M, .

..n1iisec3 c .t c 9: id1To '

. x. .... .f .. . -,n

..e e. -

c. e. ,ee.,n.,

EEra ,xd. f c% d% e@

.te, ... 3

,a

. CD ,r ti.n ,,ane,-

r;d*"te.

e, , . ...

3.3..

g3e j er top T. Automatic Sultchrc.c g,q.,) g i to centein=nt s

a. Aut le 1.2.3.4 tre(ns C d'a f  % M eA g

3.3.2.6) g g lF0 4 /. Refueling w eer 1.2 g m 3.3.2. ye m, t ,*

Love - Lo" I !!5 and t I

@ M 3. 2 m 3.3.2.

8 telnclaient with Safety injection esfer to Psattler.1 (sefety injectlan) fee ett initiation functione and repairements.

tcentinued)

) Rev Ils un c laptamentatt

~

any centeln enty [susbte Vetum deperding tpoint studv

@ % awe.

  • P \\ ( Pamst- Pen tbrl4L
  • M 3.3 38 Mc.b h. '1. Rev 1. 04/07/95 4 Leer,.n W e d n } b1 '* O

/*/93

e ESFAS Instrtmentation 3.3.2 febte 3.3.21 (p ge 7 et 4)

Engineered lefety feature Actuetten System tratrumentation APPitCASLE MuDil De Ofutt SPicipit0 REGUIRED fUntil0N sutVtitlamCE ALithiAtti int >

C0m il10e3 CMAeWELS CON 0!!! OMS REQUIREMENTS VALLE SETPOtt

6. Atattlery feceseter (centinued)

C. @. safety injection Refer to rection 1 (sefety injection) var ett intstetten

% gg,4Q I'" # #**""'"*** (i.s- 16@ _

(310 t d./. tee. p t,.ial y g,gg ,( v,Wjt

' ,2,3 i ,er

@/D g; sa 3.3.2.

g v sec 1 me g'4.bg

'ees time '

0 0+

det eeley c r> => w

. it 1.h A T3 per /0 se 32l, !.7/ t w ,A $1 e.1a s i> > <m Qbijnhd~y $ ),( h t )

lh e f. ,, , e. eti oin

--~

i. S m ,.c m y --

fx pmsg

. uw a, he

f. /. - in e,y Suc fr tow er
i. .3 A @/%o 9 P# #

1 se 3.3 b %.1.L9 )

th eg G @

7. Autematic Suitchover

, t. Centainment su.,

e. Aut (c 1,2,3,6 treins and untien C .

mA / g

$4 3.3.2.6) p,g j 4 % netuettne water 1,2, g

5terage tank (tW57) LewL = Leu sa 3.3.2.

st 3.3.2 sa 3.3.2 s

15 X

t h

3R 3.3.2.

Celewident with tafety injection aefer to Fmetten 1 (Safety injectlan) far ett inittetten fmettens and regsirements.

(centimand)

(a) Rev uste: tmi O$ ep y

-dieweey . d w tt s M ific taptementett may cantain only [ausble Vetue deperding ehtpint s

@ g % ,. m pit (enwau Po M '#' '

M 3.3 38 Rev 1. 04/07/95 Mc.Guk A

$ Lutan h"*b****

i./c

g O ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2 1 (page 4 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER

$PICIFl[0 Rt0UIREb $URVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCT10W CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDIT10h3 REQUIR[MENTS VALUE $tTP0!NT

6. Auxtltery Feedwater (continued)
c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 ($afety injection) for all initiation -

functions and requirements.

'd. Station 81ackout (1)Lossof 1.2.3 3 per 0 SR 3.3.2.7 a 3122 Y a 3174 s 45 voltage bus SR 3.3.2.9 with 8.5 t V with 8.5 a 0.5 see time 0.5 see time delay delay (2) Degraded 1.2.3 3 per u $R 3.3.2.7 Voltage a 3661 V a 3678.5 V bus SR 3.3.2.9 with s 11 with s 11 see with $! see with $1 and s 600 and s 600 see without see without 51 time $1 time delay delay

e. Trip of all Main 1.2(a) I per K SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA f eedwater Pumps MFW pump $R 3.3.2.9
f. Auxil t a ry 1.2.3 - 2 per $R 3.3.2.7 Feedwater Pump N.0 a 1 pstg a 2 pstg MDP. 4 SR 3.3.2.8 Suction Transfer per TDP SR 3.3.2.9 on Suction-Pressure . Low ,
7. Automatic $witchover to Containment Sump h l
a. Refueling Water 1.2.3 3 SR 3.3.2.1 Storage Tank P a inches a inches SR 3.3.2.3 (RW3T) Level Low $R 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 ($afety injection) .for all initiation Safety injection functions and requirements.

.(continued)

(a) Above the P 11 (Pressurtzer Pressure) Interlock.

McGuire Unit 1 3.3-33 9

__ n

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.21 (page 4 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System lastrumentation APPLICA8LE MODE $ OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED $URVII'.LAhCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQU'REMEhis VALUE SETPOINT l.

6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements,
d. Station Blackout

.(1) Loss of 1.2.3 3 per 0 $R 3.3.2.7 a 3108 V a 3157

  • 45 voltage 4

bus $R 3.3.2.9 with 8.5 : V with 8.5 * "

0.5 sec time 0.5 see time delay delay (2) Degraded 1.2.3 3 per D SR 3.3.2.7 a 3685.5 V a 3703 V Voltage bus SR 3.3.2.9 with s 11 . with s 11 sec with $1 sec with $1 and s 600 and s 600 see without sec without

$1 time SI-time delay delay

e. Trip of all Main 1.2(a) I per K SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA Feedwater Pumps MFW pump $R 3.3.2.9
f. Auxlltary 1.2.3 2 per N.0 SR 3.3.2.7 a 1 psig a 2 psig Feedwater Pump MDP. 4 $R 3.3.2.8 Suction Transfer per TDP SR 3.3.2.9 on Suction Pressure . Low
7. -Automatic $witchover to Containment Sump

_gd

a. Refueling Water 1.2.3 SR 3.3.2.1 a g8ches Storage Tank 3 P akinches

$R 3.3.2.3 / /

. (RLST) Level . Low SR 3.3.2.8 SR '3.3.2.9 Coincident with R. ? r to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation Safety injection func. ions and requirements.

(continued)

(a) Above the P.11 (Pressuriger Pressure) Interlock.

McGuire Unit 2 3.3-33 5 0/

' "

  • ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2 1 (page 4 of 6)

. Engineered Safety Feature Actuetten System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER

$PECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEltLANCE All0WABLE FUNCil0N CONDill0NS CHANNEL 5 CONDITIONS REQUIREMEN15 VALUE TRIP SETPOINT

6. Auntliary f eedwater (continued)
c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements,
d. Station Blackout (1) Loss of voltage 1.2.3 3 per bus D $R 3.3.2.7 a 3122 V with a 3174 s 45 V SR 3.3.2.9 8.5 s 0.5 see with 8.5 s time delay 0.5 see time delay (2) Degraded 1.2.3 3 per bus SR 3.3.2.7 a 3661 V D a 3678.5 V Voltage SR 3.3.2.9 with s 11 see with s 11 sec with 51 and s with 5! and s 600 sec 600 see without $1 without Si time delay time delay
e. Trip of all Main 1.2("I 1 per MFW K SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA I Feedwater Pumps pump SR 3.3.2.9
f. Auntliary Feedwater 1.2.3 2 per N.0 $R 3.3.2.7 a 1 psig a 2 psig l Pump Suction MDP. 4 SR 3.3.2.8 i Transfer on Suction per TOP SR 3.3.2.9 I

Pressure . Low

7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump
4. Refuelin Water 1.2.3 3 P SR 3.3.2.1 a 175.85 a 180 inches Storage ank (RW5T) SR 3.3.2.3 inches level - Low SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions Safety injection and requiremerts.

(continued)

(a) Above the P-ll (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock.

McGuire Unit 1 3.3-33 9/22/97

. 4 *

' " ' F.SFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2 1 (page 4 of 6)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODE 5 OR OTHER

$PICIFit0 REQUIRED SURVilLL ANCE ALLOWABLt FUNCTION CON 01110NS CHANNEL 5 CONDIT10N5 REQUIREMENI5 VALUE TRIP 5tiP0lNT

6. Auntitary Feedwater (continued)
c. Safety injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
d. Station Blackout (1) Loss of voltage 1.2.3 J per bus D $R 3.3.2.7 a 3108 V with a 3157 s 45 V 3R 3.3.2.9 8.5 0.5 sec with 8.5 e time delay 0.5 see time delay (2) Degraded 1.2.3 3 per bus D $R 3.3.7.7 a 3685.5 Y a 3703 Y with Voltage SR 3.1.2.9 with s 11 set s 11 see with with 51 and s Si and s 600 600 sec see without without 51 51 time delay time delay
e. Trip of all Main 1.2(a) I per MFW K SR 3.3.2.7 NA NA f eedwater Pumps pump SR 3.3.2.9
f. Austilary Feedwater 1.2.3 2 per N0 SR 3.3.2.7 a 1 psto a 2 pstg Pump Suction MDP. 4 SR 3.3.2.8 1ransfer on Suction per TDP 5R 3.3.2.9 Pressure . Low
7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump
a. Refueling Water 1.2.3 3 P $R 3.3.2.1 a 175.85 a 180 inches 5torage Tank (RW5T) $R 3.3.2.3 inches l level - Low $R 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.9 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety injection) for all initiation functions Safety injection and requirements.

E (continued)

(a) Above the P ll (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock.

McGuire Unit 2 3.3-33 9/22/97

'l ',.',, .

ATTACIDENT . E a t TR9JpEC 'EL,739t'L TFICATION Rackaround The Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) is designed to provide a source of borated water, at refueling water boron concentration, to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) during a design basis accident requiring safety injection. The FWST also provides a source of borated water to the refueling cavity during refueling operations and make-up water to the spent fuel pool.

The Refueling Water (FW) system is designed such that when the FWST level reaches the LOW 1evel setpoint (in conjunction with a safety injection signal) it will automatically initiate switchover of the ND (RHR) pumps to the containment cump. This is accomplished by automatically opening containment sump suction valves and closing the RHR suction valves from the FWST. The FWST level instruments also provide multiple safety related FWST LOW level alarms to alert the operator that the RHR pumps have been switched over automatically and the necessary manual actions for completing the transfer to cold leg recirculation must be started (i.e., begin transferring the remaining ECCS pumps to the containment sump). The FWST low level selpoint is established such that adequate time is provided for completion of all required manual operator actions to i complete the switchover to cold leg recirculation prior to the loss of usable FWST volume and loss of suction to the ECCS pumps. With this Technical Specification change, the requirements for delivered volume of water from-the FWST assumed in the accident analysis are still met.

Proposed Technical Snecification Chance A modification to replace the existing three (3) safety related narrow range transmitters with three (3) safety related wide range transmitters-that monitor full range tank level is being planned.

An increase in instrument uncertainty associated with wide range level instruments will require revision to the ESF trip setpoint for the FW automatic switchover to the recirculation mode. A revision to Table 3.3-4, Functional Unit No. 8, of the Technical Specification will reflect the new setpoint.

The FWST level setpoint for automatic switchover to recirculation is being revised from 1 90 inches (allowable value 1 80 inches) to A 180 inches (allowable value 1 175.85 inches) in Table 3.3-4 of the Technical Specification (see Attachment 1). The tank water level setpoint increase compensates for the additional instrument uncertainty associated with wide range instruments and to allow

-additional time for operator response for manual actions between LOW and_LO-Lo water level conditions. The setpoint revision also I

corrects a previously identified non-conservative Technical Specification value for the ECCS GwitchcVer setpoint.

The Additional Margin value provided lu the bases for Technical Specification 3/4.1.2, Boration Systems, has also been revised to account for the change in instrument uncertainty due to the replacement of the transmitters.

Justification and Safety __ Analysis The three (3) safety related FWST level transmitters that provide level indication and the automatic switchover to recirculation function are presently narrow range and are off-scale high during normal operation. These level transmitters are also used to initiate the LOW level alarm that alerts the operator of the automatic switchover of the RHR pumps and the need to start the manual actions re7uired to complete the transfer to cold leg recirculation. These transmitters are routinely checked for calibration and verified acceptable. However, because of the transmitters' normal offscale indication, operators are unable to diagnose certain instrument failures, including past failures that were caused by exposure of the instruments to sub-freezing temperatures and insect blockage of instrument reference legs.

l Additionally, replacing the present transmitters with three (3) safety related wide range transmitters will allow operators to observe the entire range of the tank level using safety related instruments prior to receipt of the LOW level alarm. Although other non-safety related indications are presently available, the operators only have a very short period of time to observe the safety related tank level indication between the time that the instruments are on-scale and the time that the automatic cwitchover is initiated.

The proposed change in the switchover to recirculation setpoint accomplishes three objectives:

1) Accommodates the additional instrument uncertainty of the wide range instruments.
2) Provides additional time for the manual operator as . ions required to complete switchover to cold leg recirculation prior to the loss of usable FWST volume.
3) Corrects a previously identified non-conservative Technical Specification value for the ECCS switchover setpoint.

The change in the FWST LOW level setpoint reduces the FWST volume that is delivered to the primary system in the injection phase of a LOCA. This volume reduction affects the containment pressure response during a LOCA. A reanalysis of the containment pressure response using the NRC-approved methodology of DPC-NE-3004 demonstrates that the peak containment pressure remains below the design limit.

2

'. S .

The LOCA blowdown, refill, and reflood phases of the analysis are not affected by the change in switchover setpoint. Therefore, the fuel clad integrity will not be impacted as a result of this change.

The dose consequence calculations include assumptions regarding the start of ECCS recirculation and are minimally impacted by this change. The impact of the setpoint changes is to shorten the time that is assumed for ECCS recirculation to begin. This would tend to increase the calculated dose from this potential leak path but the impact is so small that the currently reported results remain unchanged (calculation results are the same within roundoff, such that reported results do not change). Therefore, the change does not significantly impact the radiological consequences of the design basis LOCA.

The new volume of water injected into containment from the FWST provides a water depth within the containment sump to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the ECCS pumps and protection against vortexing.

An analysis was performed of the FWST reduced borated water volume delivered to the primary system during a LOCA. The resulting primary system boron concentrations were compared to boron concentrations required to keep the core subcritical and found to be acceptable.

Conclusion For all design basis transients, all acceptance criteria are met with the switchover to recirculation setpoint change. Replacing the existing narrow range transmitters with wide range transmitters would enhance ECCS reliability and provide operational margin during post-accident conditions. Indication over the entire range of the tank level becomes available with wide range instrumentation. Also, operators will have additional response time for performing manual actions and to more quickly diagnose some instrument failure modes.

3

ATTACHMENT.3 HQ_gIgMIFJ_q6Ji#Jp3BATION EVALUATION The following analysis is provided in accordance with the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92 to determine if the proposed change will involve a significant hazards consideration. This determination ensures that the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

l First standard Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Probability-

The FWST and its associated instrumentation are not considered accident initiators. The instrumentation change is from a narrow range type instrument to a wide range type instrument. A failure of either type of-instrument could result in an undesired switchover or failure to switchover. However, the failure could not initiate any subsequent accident sequences.

Consecuences With the switchover to recirculation setpoint change, the system design will still provide enough injected water to ensure that the reactor remains shutdown, as well as provide sufficient water depth within the containment sump to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the ECCS pumps and protect against vortexing. Also, adequate time is provided to ensure the completion of all operator actions necessary for switchover to cold leg recirculatior. prior to the loss of all usable FWST inventory and loss of suction to the ECCS pumps.

The nange in the FWST LOW level setpoint reduces the FWST volume t..at is delivered to the primary system in the injection phase of a LOCA. Thus, this volume reduction affects the containment pressure 4

l

' . * . . o.

response during a LOCA. A reanalysis of the containment pressure response using the NRC-approved methodology of DPC-NE-3004 demonstrates that the peak containment pressure remains below the design limit for the proposed FWST LOW level setpoint.

The LOCA blowdown, refill, and reflood phases of the analysis are not affected by the change in switchover setpoint. Therefore, the fuel clad integrity will not be impacted as a result of this change.

The containment response was analyzed and found to be within acceptable limits. Therefore, the fission product b3rriers are unaffected by this change in setpoint.

The radiological calculations include assumptions regarding the start of ECCS recirculation which could be impacted by this change.

-The impact of the setpoint changes is to shorten the time that is assumed for ECCS recirculation to begin. This would tend to increase the calculated dose from this potential leak path but the impact is so small that the currently reported results remained unchanged (calculation results are the same within roundoff, such that reported results do not change). The change does not significantly impact the radiological consequences of the design basis LOCA.

An analysis was performed of the FWST reduced borated water volume delivered to the primary system during a LOCA. The resulting primary system boron concentrations were compared to boron concentrations required to keep the core subcritical and found to be acceptable.

Therefore, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Second Standard The amendment 'would not create the possibility of= a new or different kind of accident from any kind of accident-previously evaluated.

The failure modes of the new level transmitters remain the same.

The instrumentation interacts with the same equipment and provides the same function. Therefore, failure of the new instrumentation can not produce a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated. .However, some failure modes will be more readily detectable because of the change to wide range instrumentation.

-Th.ird standard The amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The change to the FWST instrumentation does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety. Although increased instrument uncertainty is'being introduced, the FWST low level setpoint is being adjusted 5

'.~..,

to compensate for this chan90. The overall analysis results continue to be bounded such that there is no loss of suction from the FWST prior to ECCS pump switchover to the containment sump, There is adequate FWST inventory injected to maintain the reactor shutdown. There is sufficient water depth within the containment sump to satisfy NPSH and vortex concerns. In addition, the peak containment pressure remains below the design limit for the proposed FWST LOW level setpoint.

The rate of injection and back pressure of the FWST is not affected by the setpoint change. Analysis shows that the peak cladding temperature occurs prior to ECCS pump switchover to the containment sump, and thus is unaffected by this change.

Therefore, the new instrumentation and revised setpoints do not cause a reduction in the margin of safety associated with containment pressure or fuel cladding integrity.

Conclusion Based on the above evaluation and the supporting technical justification, chere is no significant hazard involved in this amendment request.

l l

I l

l l

6

a . ~

  • / . . ,

ATTACHMENT 4 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION I The proposed technical specification amendment has been reviewed against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazard, nor increase the types and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor increase individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. Therefore, the proposed amendment meets the criteria given in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for an Environmental Impact Evaluation.

7

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20217H554&oldid=3199059"