ML20209C643
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j SUPPLEMENT TO SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 I
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH 9.1.8 Overhea'd Heavy-Load-Handling Systems
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As a result of 13eneric Task A-36, " Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel," a set of guidelines was developed to assure safe handling of 1
heavyloads over structures, systems and components important to safety.
These recomendations were documented in NUREG-0612. " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." Following the issuance of NUREG-0612, a generic letter dated December 22,1980 was sent to all operating plants, applicants for operating licenses and holders of construction pemits requesting that responses be prepared to indicate the degree of compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612. The responses were to be made in two stages. The first response (Phase I Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612) was to identify the load handling equipment within the scope of NUREG-0612 and to describe the associated general load handling operations such as safe load paths, procedures, operator i'
training, special and general purpose of. lifting devices, maintenance, j
testing and repair of equipment and the handling equipment specifications..
The second response (Phase II) was intended to show that either single-failure-proof handling equipment was not needed or that single-failure-proof equipment has been provided. This safety evaluation report and the attached Technical Evaluation Report (TER) constitutes the staff's evaluation of Phase I.
An evaluation of Phase II is continuing and i
will be provided in a future evaluation.
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o As indicated above, in accordance with the generic letter dated December 22, 1980, the-licensee for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 (Pacific Gas and Electric) was-requested to review their provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 facility to determine the extent to which the guidelines of NUREG-0612 are satisfied and to commit to mutually agreeable changes and modifications that would be required in order to fully satisfy these guidelines.
The staff and its consultant, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) have reviewed the applicant's submittals for the Diablo Canyon, Unit 1.
As a result of its review, INEL has issued the attached TER.
The staff has reviewed the TER and concurs with its findings that the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 have been satisfied. Con-sequently, the TER is incorporated as a part of this SSER. We conclude that Phase I of NUREG-0612 for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 is acceptable.
The staff review of Phase II of NUREG-0612 for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 will be the subject of a future evaluation. Until that review is
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complete, the following condition shall be included in the Catawba operating license:
Prior to startup;following the first refueling outage the licensee shall submit commitments necessary to implement changes and modifications as required to satisfy the guidelines of Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 (Phase II).
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EGG-HS-6329 Revision'I-CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC DIABLO CANY0t; UNIT 1 (PHASE I)
Docket No. 50-275 2
1 Author a
S.*A. Jensen Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley s
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2 Published July 1984 EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under 00E Contract No. OE-AC07-76ID01570 i-FIN NO. A6457 A b m
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. __m ABSTRACT she Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants either operating or under construction submit a response of i
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compliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power l
Plants." EG&G Idaho,'Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with.the intent of the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
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i w-t CONTENTS ABSTRACT............................................................
i EX EC UT I V E S UMMA RY :....................................................
- 11 1.
INTRODUCTION....................................................
1 1.1 Purpose of Review.........................................
1 1.2 Generic Background........................................
I 1.3 P l a n t-S p ec i f i c Ba c kg ro und.....................~........~.~...
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EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................
-4 2.1 Overview.................................................
~4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems......................
4 2.3 General Guidelines........................................
7 2.4 Interim Protection Measures...............................
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3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
- 22 3.1 Applicable Load Handl ing Systems..........................
22 3.2 Guideline Recommendations.................................
22 4.
REFERENCES......................................................
31 TABLES 2.1 Category 1 overhead handling systems............................
5 3.1 NUREG compliance matrix.........................................
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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 (PHASE I) 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,
review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Otablo Canyon Unit 1.
This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612,
" Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," (1], Section 5.1.1.
This constitutes Phase I of a two phase evaluation.
s 1.2 Generic Background Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff'on May 17, 1978 [2], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of 1
Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of l
heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.
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i In order _to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted approach or. protection philosophy. The' first. portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines. identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handl_ing systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidel.ines identified in NUREG-0612, Art'icles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result-in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, i
in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident i
consequences is, quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the_ staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows:
o Provide sufficient operator training, handling system design,' load-handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system o
Define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy j
loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment 1
o Provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity i
to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
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Staff guidelines resulting from the. foregoing'are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.
1.3 Plant-Soecific Background,
t On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter-[3] to Pacific Gas and Electric'(PG&E), the applicant for Diablo Canyon, requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at Diablo Canic'n, evaluate these. provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On September 24,.1981, PG&E provided the initial response-[4] to this request. On September 30, 1982, PG&E_provided a
-revised response [9] to this request. An additional revised response
[10] to the request was provided by pG&E on May 9, 1983.
Information was also sent by PG&E on October 14, 1983 [11],and June 15,1984[12].
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' 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The'following sections summarize Pacific Gas and Electric's review of j
heavy load-handling at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant. The applicant has indicated the weight of a heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2) as:1813 pounds.
2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems a
This section reviews the appitcant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above-mentioned list.
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" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or-decay heat removal-(taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead j
handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required.for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements The applicant's review of overhead handling systems identified the cranes and hoists shown in Table 2.1 as those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel j
or safe shutdown equipment.
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TABLE 2.1 CATEGORY I OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS Crane Descriotion T
C-140-01 200 Containment Structure Polar Crane C-140-06 2T Reactor Head Stud Tensioner Monorail C-140-13 IST Missile Shield Hoist T
AF-140-08 125 Fuel Handling Area Crane T
AF-115-04 12 Monorati for RHR Heat Exchangers 1-1,1-2 AF-115-05 12 Monorail for RHR Heat Exchangers 2-1, 2-2 T
AF-115-10 2 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 1-1 T
AF-115-11 2 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 1-2 T
AF-115-12 3 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 2-1 T
AF-115-13 2 Monorail for Motor-Generator Set 2-2 T
AF-100-06 3 Monorail for Motor Oriven Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-2 T
AF-100-07 3 Monorail for Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 1-1 T
AF-85-01 1-1/2 Monorail for Safety Injection Pumps 1-1,1-2 T
AF-85-09 1-1/2 Monorail for Safety Injection IPumps 2-1, 2-2 T
AF-73-01 3 Monorail for Component Cooling Water Pumps 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 T
AF-73-02 3 Monorail for Component Cooling Water Pumps 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 T
AF-73-03 3 Monorail for Charging Pumps 1-1, 1-2 T
AF-73-04 3 Monorail for Charging Pumps 2-1, 2-2 T
AF-73-05 2 Monorail for Containment Spray Pumps 1-1,1-2, and Charging Pumps 1-3 1
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TABLE 2.1 (Continued)
Crane Description
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T AF-73-06 2 Monorail for Containment Spray Pumps 2-1, 2-2, and-Charging Pumps 2-3 T
AF-64-04 Oual 2 Monorail for RHR Pumps 1-1,1-2 T
AF-64-05 Oual 2 Monorail for RHR Pumps 2-1, 2-2 T
T-140 115 Turbine Butiding Bridge Crane T
T-140-02 115 Turbine Building Bridge-Crane T
T-119-05 20 Monorail for Moisture Separator Reheater 1-2A T
T-119-06 3 Monorail for Building Heater Reboiler 0-1 T
1-17.5-01 50 Intake Structure Gantry Crane 9
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The applicant has also identified numerous other cranes that have been excluded from satisifying the criteria of.the general guidelines of NUREG-0612. The first criteria used to exclude cranes was physical separation. The applicant defined physical separation "as horizontal offset between the load path and any target component at any elevation underneath the load, accounting for the width of the load
- and the-target." Load-handling systems were also excluded "if the only component which could be damaged by the load drop would already be out of service for repair or maintenance." Systems carrying loads less than the defined heavy load of 1813 lb were also excluded.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The applicant has used criteria consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612 to exclude cranes from satisfying the criteria of the general guidelines.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations On basis of the information provided, EG&G concludes that the applicant has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the. general guidelines of NUREG-0612.
2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1.
EG&G*s conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.
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The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
o Guideline 1--Safe Lead Paths o
Guideline 2--Load Handling Procedures o
Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training o
Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices o
Guideline S--Lifting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6'--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7--Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where.a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.
2.3.1 Safe load Paths [ Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(1)]
"Saf a load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to i
impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the l
spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
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A.
Summary of Acolicant's Statements PG&E included in their response several drawings showing load paths for the cranes listed in Table 2.1.
The applicant also stated that these " load paths were determined with the objective of avoiding the spent-fuel pool, the reactor cavity, and other safety-related equipment where possible." The applicant stated that detailed procedures 5
will identify areas of exclusion and other administrative requirements. The lifting procedure (s) will require the rigger-in-charge to provide visual aid to the crane operator.
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EG&G Evaluation 1
l PG&E has developed and shown load paths on equipment layout drawings for all of the applicable cranes. While marking the load path on the floor is not mentioned by the applicant, they have stated that visual aid will be provided by the rigger-in-charge with the help of detailed drawings.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Procedures and safe load paths for heavy loads at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 are consistent with the intent of Guideline 1 based on the information provided by PG&E.
2.3.2 Load-Handling procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612. Article 5.1.1(2H
" Procedures should be developed to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures should include:
identification of required I
equipment; inspections and acceptance critria required l
before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and 1
other special precautions."
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Summary of Aoplicant'stStatements PG&E uses a general procedure for handling' heavy equipment (PG&E Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure C-702). They also stated that additional procedures '.' identify major lifts, handling, interlocks, and other administrative
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requirements."
8.
EG&G Evaluation The, applicant states that load-handling procedures have been l
developed at the Otablo Canyon Nuclear Plant. These procedures were also stated to contain the information specified in the guideline.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with Guideline 2 in that procedures have been developed by the applicant.to meet the criteria of this guideline.
2.3.3 Crane Operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)]
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapters 2-3 of ANSI-830.'2-1976,
' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [5]."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements PG&E stated that " training courses, operator certification, 1
and procedures to control operator conduct all meet the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 without exception. A training course for qualifying crane operators, " Maintenance Training Course M-21," has been developed as " Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure B-750."
In developing courses, ANSI B30.2-1976 is being followed without exceptions.
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t Based on the applicar.t's response, train {4q. courses,
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operator certification, and conduct are consistent hith this s
guideline.
C.
EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations
. t Diablo Canyon Unit'l procedures'and requirements are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 3 based on the p
information provided.
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<3 2.3.4 Special Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4,- NUREG-0612, i'/t Article 5.1.1(4)],
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- Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping W
Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or.liore for Nuclear Materials' [6]. This standard should-' apply to'all special i ;
lifting devices which carry heavy loads.in areas as. defined-above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the
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standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in i
Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the comoined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will c
be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of 1
ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the
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weight (static load) or the lord and of the intervening-components of the special handling device."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements J
b The applicant identified five special lifting devices that-
>9 must conform with ANSI N14.6 requirements. They were the 4
P reactor vessel head lifting device, the reactor internals lifting device, the reactor vessel inspection tool (RVIT) lifting device, the reactor coolant pump motor (RCP) lifting 5 i r
device, and.the component cooling water (CCW) pump motor lifting device.
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PG&E stateinents regarding these lifting devices are stated as follows:
The first four devices have been shown to satisfy the intent of all applicable ANSI'N14.6-1978 requirements.
PG&E is presently procuring a new CCW pump motor lifting device which will meet the ANSI N14.6 structural requirements.
The reactor vessel head lifting device, consists of a welded and belted structural steel frame, with suitable rigging for lifting and storing the head during refueling operations.
It is evaluated in detail against ANSI N14.6.
The reactor internals lifting device is another structural steel frame susoended from the Containment Polar Crane.
When used to remove the upper internals, it is lowered onto the guide tube support plate and manually bolted to the plate with three bolts. The lower internals are removed and 5
installed in a similar fashion, with three bolts into the support flange. Bushings on the lifting device frame engage g
guide studs in the vessel flange to provide lateral guidance during removal and replacement of the internals packages.
The device's adequacy while lifting the upper internals is 1
evaluated in detail against ANSI N14.6. The lifting device 1
is not evaluated for the lower internals lift, since there is no possible safety effect from a lower internals drop.
The reactor coolant pump motor lifting device consists primarily of three sling assemblies and a spreader assembly. The sling assemblies are' connected at the top to a master link engaging the polar crane hook. Each sling-(
assembly consists of a sling, a pair of shackles, and a turnbuckle, all general purpose catalogue items. The slings are now being replaced with new slings, each rated at j
20 tons under ANSI B30.9-1971. Design safety margins for 4. these items'were derived by comparing the rated loads, proof
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loads, and the ultimate loads against the actual lifted loads. The spreader assembly consists of three tubular members attached end to end to form a triangle. Three side plates are bent around and welded at the corners. The sling assemblies, spread by the triangular structure, bear against these side plates. The lift rig was supplied by Westinghouse, who performed a design evaluation recently to verify its compliance to NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978 requirements. The evaluation results, modified for the new 20-ton slings, are presented in detail.
PG&E plans to contract out the reactor vessel inspection to specialized contractors, and to require the contractor's RVIT lifting device to comply with all applicable portions of ANSI N14.6. PG&E's present reactor vessel inspection contractor is Westi.ghouse Nuclear Services Division (WNSD). The lifting device consists of a double tripod of structural steel with a central hook. Once the hook engages the eye at the top center of the RVIT, the feet of the lower tripod are forced down onto three steadying pads by t'1e hydraulically-actuated' upper tripod, forming a rigid unit.
WNSD has qualified this lifting device under ANSI N14.6.
The calculations are filed at the WNSD offices in Pittsburgh, PA, in file 95041-9, with reference number PDC-TSST-C-80-157. They are available on reouest The CCW pump motor lifting device is used to transmit-the motor weight from the two lift points to the hook of the monorail hoist above.
It is required because of the limited headroom beneath the hoist. A new device will be built before the next CCW pump motor lift. The new device will satisfy the requirements of ANSI N14.6. The CCW pump motor is not a critical load as defined in Section 2 of ANSI N14.6, so Section 6 requirements do not apply.
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.The remaining special lifting devices are not important to-safety. They do not carry loads over. spent fuel, or over safe-shutdown components except those.that are needed to serve the lifted equipment. These lifting devices are thus excluded from the ANSI'N14.6 evaluation.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The= applicant identified five special lifting devices.
In EG&G's judgment, PG&E's evaluation of these devices is consistent with the intent of this guideline and the requirements of ANSI N14.6.
PG&E evaluation showed that in one case the stress design factors of ANSI N14.6 are not satisfied. However, the design factors in all cases meet AISC-allowables. EG&G feels that for the case where ANSI N14.6 stress design factors-are not satisfied, a testing and inspection program with special attention to those parts'which have lower safety factor is consistent with the intent of the guideline. Also, procedures to reduce the possibility of impact or dynamic loads should be used for.this device.
PG&E has stated that they will restrict the hoist speed of all cranes to 20 ft per minute, and that this will reduce the dynamic load with this device.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with the intent of Guideline 4 and ANSI.N14.6-1978. -PG&E commitments to this guideline should be complete for each special lifting device before it is used to lift a heavy load near fuel or safety-related equipment.
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' 2.3.5 Lifting Devices (Not 'Soecially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)]
" Lifting devices that'are not specially-designed should be.
installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI'830.9-1971,' Slings'.[7]. However,.in. selecting'the proper sling,.the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in-terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain i
cranes,:the slings-should be clearly marked as to.the cranes with which they may be used."
A.
Summary'of Applicant's Statements i
The applicant states that all slings used at Diablo Canyon Unit 1-meet or exceed _the requirements of ANSI 830.9-1971, except that approximately-half of the slings were proof-tested and tagged since they had not been tagged prior-to the applicant's initial response. The applicant also states that dynamic loads ar'e accounted for in sling marking and use.
8.
EG&G Evaluation 4
The applicant's response provides sufficient information for EG&G to state that they are consistent with Guideline 5.
C.
EG&G Cocclusions and Recommendations The.Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant is consistent with Guideline 5.
2.3.6 Cranes (Insoection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)]
"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'.with the exception that. tests and inspections 15 7
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should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."
A.
Summary of Aoplicant's Statements Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance meets or will meet the requirements of ANSI B30.2 except for certain test frequencies which cannot be met due to inaccessibility as noted in NUREG-0612 Guideline 6.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The applicant states that PG&E's crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program is based on ANSI B30.2-1976.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Unit 1 is consistent with Guideline 6.
The crane inspection, testing, and maintenance programs are based on the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976.
2Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI B30.2-1976.</br></br>2" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..3.7 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5~.1.1(7)]
"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [8]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."
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' Summary of Acplicant's Statements Bridge cranes at Diablo Canyon were designed prior to publishing of CMAA-70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI 30.2-1967.
The main code used in their design was the " Specification for Electrical Overhead Traveling Cranes for Steel Mill Service," Association of Iron and Steel Engineers Standard No. 6'(tentative) dated May 1, 1969. Specific differences-,
between the design codes used and those required by Guideline 7, identified by the applicant include the following:
(1) Welding on the cranes was done in accordance with AWS D.2.0 rather than AWS D.14.1.
(2) Impact loading requirements are different, but all the cranes conform to the CMAA 70 specification at their rated capacity.
(3) CMAA 70 requires higher. moments of inertia for longitudinal stiffeners than the AISE code, but load testing has not indicated any problems.
(4) No'minal allowable stresses vary between the before-mentioned standards. The applicant justified
- some differences by comparing crane use and loading criteria between the standards and-by stating that cranes have been successfully tested to 125% of rated capacity.
(5) Mechanical differences in required horsepower, tolerances for wheels, and clearances between wheels and rails were also noted and deemed not to be-significant.
17
~
... ~....
- --w Monorails:and hoists which do not fall into' classifications of which CMAA 70 and ANSI 830.2 apply wereLcompared to other similar codes and standards..The monorails ~ and hoists were stated to satisfy;the' requirement of these standards, except for five monorails'which do not satisfy AISC allowable stresses. The monorails are being modified to satisfy the AISC requirements.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The cranes at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Unit I were procured to industrial standards of the time. Based on-PG&E's comparison of differences, EG&G would concur that the cranes which PG&E included in their response meet the intent of Guideline 7.
Monorails and other cranes which do not easily fall into the classifications for which CMAA 70 and ANSI B30.2 apply were compared to similar standards, and were stated to comply with those standards, or that modifications were'being done to ensure compliance.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Unit 1 overhead bridge or gantr'y cranes are consistent with Guideline 7 on the basis of compliance to AISE Standard No. 6 criteria.
Information available on design standards for the cranes. listed as being subject to the guidelines shows that they are consistent with standards comparable to those specified by the guideline.
2.4 Interim Protection Measures The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power 18
7 i
plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent-fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to-impact on fuel in the core or spent-fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of.the report consist of Guideline 1, Safe Load Pathsf Guideline 2,. Load-Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator'eTraining; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining.
interim measures cover the following criteria:
o Heavy load technical specifications o'
Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
~
The applicant's implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures are contained in the -succeedings paragraphs of this section.
2.4.1 Interim protection Measure 1--Technical Specifications
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure proof overhead crane in the fuel storge pool area should be revised to include r specification comoarable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, ' Crane Travel -Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWRs and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWRs, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
A.
Summary of Aoplicant's Statements Station maintenance procedures prohibit movement of heavy.
loads over the spent-fuel stor. age pools or the open reactor cavity except under detailed p'rocedures.
19
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- -use aswh6-
--=#8
+vs 4 se
=
+44w-w De4
.. =
_ = z=:===.=-
m B.
EG&G Evaluation Diablo Canyon Unit I meets the intent of the requirements of Interim Protection Measure 1 because the reactor cavity and the fuel pool area are restricted areas unless a detailed
. procedure has been written. directing or permitting such action.
The applicant should review administrative controls to ensure that the previous statement is true for all cases.
C.
EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations Diablo Canyon Unit 1 complies with Interim Protection Measure 1, based on the above evaluation and recommendation.
2.4.2 Interim protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and S--Administrative Controls
" Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load-handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]... can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of[NUREG-0612]."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements Summaries of applicant's statements are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.
B.
EG&G Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations EG&G evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.
20 p
r r
---v W-
a
., -,e 2.4.3 Interim protection Measure 6--Special' Reviews for Heavy Loads' Over the Core j
"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and> personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or ve,ssel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (a) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that-sufficient detail is provided and that inr: ructions are clear and concise; (b) visual inspections of. load-bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of d
the component; (c) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (d) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are: familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements The applicant has stated that the intent of this action has been met by the development of detailed procedures. These procedures require, pre-lift visual inspection of the crane and all special lifting devices.
In addition, pre-lift meetings will be held to review the procedure.
B.
EG&G Evaluation and Conclusion Diablo Canyon Unit I complies with the intent of Interim I
Protection Measure 6.
4 l
21
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==-ee.my 4
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y
m m.
3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
3.1 Applicable Load-Handling Systems The list of cranes and hoists supplied by the applicant as being subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is adequate (see Section 2.2.1).
3.2 Guideline Recommendations Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load-handling (Section 2.3) is satisfied at Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1.
l Guideline Recommendation 1.
(Section 2.3.1) a.
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with' this guideline.
2.
(Section 2.3.2) a.
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with this guideline.
3.
(Section 2.3.3) a.
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with this guideline.
4.
(Section 2.3.4) a.
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is consistent with the intent of this guideline.
22 m-wg, e -
mm--e -
- ' ~ ~
9
-*W*-
_ -. -. ~. -.
e.
TAtlLE 3.1 DI ABLO CANYON COMPLIANCE MAIRix 1
Weigh t Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guidellre 4 Guidellre 5 ' Guideline 6 Gui.let tre /
or Crane Special
~
reane-Test Equipment Capac ity Safe Lnad operator Lif tirq amt r
Designatton Heavy Loads ltons) _
Paths __ Procedures Training Devices Slings
_I nspec t inn Crane lh sign i }
C-140-01 Containment C
C C
C
-C Polar Crane (200T Gantry)
I I '. Reactor head w/CRDM 172.5 C
C C
lif ting device 2.
Upper internals w/
77.5T C
C C
lif ting device 3.
Lower internals w/
142.5I C
C C
lif tteg device 4.
Missile shield gyT C
C C
5.
Internals Ilfting 7.5T C
C C
device 6.
Reactor head 12.5T C.
C C
s.
'd lif ting device 7.
Reactor coolant 3.8T C
C pump motor 8.
Reactor coolant 43.8T C
C C
l pump internals l
9.
Reactor coolant 6.4T C
'C C
pump flywheel
- 10. Reactor coolant 1.5T C
C pump hatch C
II. Containment fan 2T C
C j.
cooler motor C
1 i
- 12. Head bolts and 5.4T C
C C
]
nuts t
+ -, - a
..w.
- a IABLE 3.1 (Continued) l Weight Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7' or Crane Spec ial Crane-Test Equipment Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting arul Designation Heavy toads Jtons)
Paths _
Procedures Training,,
Dev ices
' S lings' I nsner t ion -.Crandes,13n.
- 13. Reactor vessel 5.25I C
C C
inspection tool 4'
- 14. Main hoist load 7.3T C
block CF-140-06 Tensioner 1.3I C
C C
HegdStudTensioner C
C (2 Monorall)
AF-140-08 C
C C
C C
Fuel HandI%g 5
Area Crane
- I T
(125 Bridge)
T 1
1.
New fuel in 3
C C
shipping container s i
n
}.*
2.
Spent-fuel 67.5T C
C shipping cask 3
3.
RCP motor 43.8T C
C C
Main hoist load
'2.5T.
C
.i 5
block i
AF-ll5-04 and -05 C
C C
C C
RHR Heat Exchangers -
T (12 Monorails)
T Hatch Cover 4.3 C-C C
Heat Exchangers ll.55T C
C C
(Shell and Tubes)
AF-Il5-10. -11, C
.C C
C C
' i
-l{ and -13 MG-Sets T
Motor 1.25 C
C' C
Generator
<2T C
C C
i 4
4 I
l l
}
____..m-
____m
.m
.a e,
IA8tE 3.1 (Continued)
+
Weight Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Gu idel inia 5' Guideline 6-Guideline 7 or Crane
_Special Crane-Test Equipment Capac ity Safe Lomt Operator '
Lifting and Designation Heavy _ toads (tons L P at_hs
' Proceduret Train,ing _
Dev ices S lings, ;,, _ Inspection Crane Design..
{
r AF-100-06 C
C C
C C
Motor Driven Auxiliar Pumps (3y feed.
Monorall)
T Pump 2.0 g
c c
Mutor 2.3T C
C C
4 l
AF-100-07 C
C C
C C
t furbine Driven i
7 Auxiliary Feed Pup No.'l-1 (3 Monorail)
T Pump 2.75 C
C C
Turbine 1.25T C
C C
O!
AF-85-01 and -09 C
C' C
Safety injec C
C 1
Pumps (l-1/2gion Monorails)
I T
. Pump 1.04 C
C
.C l
L Motor 1.33T
.C-C C
4 AF-73-01 and -02 C
C C
C.
C-
'4 Component Cool Water Pumps (3lng 4
j Monorat1).
T 1
Pump 2.95 C
C C-i Motor 2.15I C
C C
AF-73-03 and -04 C
C
.C C
C Charging Pumps 1-1
( 3{. 2-1, and 2-2 1-t Monorall)
I T
Motor 3.75 C
C C'
]
i '
Pump I.95I C
'C C
I y
- h i
+
l h
t t.
e TABLE 3.1 (Continued) i 4
Weigh t Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guidelire 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 1 or Crane Spec ial Crane-Test Equipment Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting
- an.1 Designation lleavy loads (tonsL Paths Procedures Training _
Dev ices Slings inspec t ion Crane Design, AF-73-05 and -06 C
C C
Containiment Spray C
.C P umps I-1. 1-2, 2-1,
'j and 2-2 and t
Charging Ppis 1-3 4
and 2-3 2 t
Monorall(}
Containment spray pump 1.7T C
C motor C
Containment spray pump I.35T C
C
' C Reciprocating charging IT C-C C
pump motor Reciprocating charging 0.95T C
C C
fluid urive 1 g AF-64-04 and -05 C
C C
C C
C Nesidual Heat i
3 RepwalPumps
.i '
l (4 Monorall)
Motor uith ispeller 2.li C
C C
I-140T01 and -02 C
C C
2-115 Turbine C
C Building Bridge Cranes T
I.
Generator rotor 192 C
C C
(% each crane) t 2.
Exciter housing 8.5T C
C I
C
}.
3.
Exciter 40T C
C N/A C
4.
LP turbine 22T C
C C.
crossover tee 5.
LP rotor 105T C
C N/A 6.
IF turbine rotor SST c
c I
gfg i
I, b.
f
__._.._..m.
. ~. _
^$
~
(
TABLE 3.1 (Continued)
. [
4 j
Weight Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3. Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 '
i or Crane Special Crane-lest l
Equipment.
Capac ity Safe Load Operator lifting and
{-
Designation-
_ Heavy I.nads JtonsL Paths Prncedures frainin3 Dev ices Slin3s inspec t inn.,
Crane;,Deji,qn, 1.
HP outer cover 85T C
C N/A 8.
F.W. pump turhine 9T C
C C
aver 9.
F.W. pimap turbine 1.9T C
C C
rotor 10.' LP turbine outer 70T C
C C
cover
- 11. LP turbine 28T C.
C N/A i
cylinder cover No. I
- 12. LP turbine 51.5T C
C C
g cylinder cover R$
No. 2
- 13. Turbine hearing 2T C
C N/A C
covers
.(max) i
- 14. Turbine blade 4.25T C
C C
j rings 4
f
- Mobile crane
- 20T C
C C
i Condensate pump 5.5T C
C C
motor Main holst load 3T C
block 3 i l T-119-05 C
C C
C
-C Moisture Separator HehgaterNo.1-2A T
High pressure tube '
14.5 C
C C
C C
bundIe Low pressure tube 9.85T C
C C
C C
hundle i
e t
6
i.
l-r-
~ I ABLE 3.1 (Continued)
Weight Guideline I Guideline 2 Guideline 3' Guidellen? 4 -Guideline S _ Guideline f.
Guld line 7 '
I or Crane Snecial frane-Test l
Equipment.
Capac ity safe Loa.1 Operator Liftinq and Designation Heavy Loads (tons) _
Paths Procedures Traigng Devices S l i n3s_,,, _ Inspect ion. fr.ene Desiqu T-Il9-06 C
C C
C
't BuildingHeaging j
Re-Boller (3 i
- Monorall)
T Tube bundle 1.08 C
C C
C C
l l.
l 50l7.5-01 I-C C
C C.
C Intake Structure Gantry l
I.
Circulating water 34.75T C
C N/A pump motor rotor and shaft 2.
Circulating water 32.5T C
C N/A pump motor stator j
and winding i
i 3.
Circulating water 24.5I C
C N/A ce pump shafL and
-t j,p,y3,7 4.
Circulating water 7T C
C
.- C pump hatch cover 3-5.
Circulating water 8.5I C
C C
discharge valve 6.
Auxiliary salt 2.6T
.C C
C-water pump motor 7.
Auxiliary salt 2.6T
.C C
N/A water motor I.3T C
C C
8.
Auxiliary salt I
water pump hatch cover l.
I b
, l_
{
1, k
e 1
l.
m
~
'um w...
TABLE 3.1 (Continued)
Weight Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline $ Guideline 6 Gu id== l i ni. 1 or Crane Special Crane-fest Equipment Capac ity Safe Load Operator Lifting and Designation Heavy Loads Jtm L Paths Procedures _ Jr_aining_
- Dev ices Slin3L,,
,Inspec t ion Crane D.= sign 9.
Bar racks 4.5I C
C.
C
.[
'I
- 10. Circulating water 23.0T C
C C
traveling screens o
- 11. Auxiliary salt water 13.6ST C
C C'
t traveling screens'
- 12. Screen wash pump 1.2T C
C C
motor
- 13. Screen wash pump 1.8I C
C N/A i
~
f
- 14. Auxiliary salt 3I C
C-C water gates
- 15. Screen gates 6T C
C
.C
- 16. Load block 1.7T C
m*
t C = Applicant action complies with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
NC = Applicant action does not comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
R = Applicant has proposed revisions / modifications designed to comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
l = Insufficient informatiM provided by the Applicant.
i b
1 6
f' 8
4 D
a e
Q..
O Q
1 9
.E f
,w
.-...a.
-.-.--..--. = -.. - -.._
. ;..=. --...=-- =.:
-m
-~
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(-
Guideline Recommendation-A 5.
(Section 2.3.5) a.
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 slings are consistent with this guideline.
6.
(Section 2.3.6) a.
PG&E's crane inspection testing and
~
maintenance program is consistent-with this-guideline.
7.
(Section 2.3.7) a.
Cranes and hoists at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 are consistent with the intent of this guideline.
The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final Jmplementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of-NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load-handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and-special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. The evaluation of information'provided by the applicant indicates that Diablo Canyon Unit I complies with the staff's measures for interim protection.
1 J'*
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e 77'
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- e M
er
o!-
i 4.
REFERENCES 1.
NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.
2.
V. Stello,' Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants.
Subject:
Request for--
Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 17 May 1978.
3.
Subject:
NRC Request-for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 22 December 1980.
4 P. A. Crane, Jr. (PG&E), Letter to F. J. Miraglia, Jr. (NRC).
Subject:
Response Request for Additional Information, PG&E, 24 September 1981.
5.
ANSI 83.0.2-1976, " Overhead and Gantry Cranes."
6.
ANSI N14.6-1978, " Standard for Lifting'Oevices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials."
7.
ANSI B30.9-1971, " Slings."
8.
CMAA-70, " Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes."
9.
P. A. Crane, Jr. (PG&E), Letter to F. '. Miraglia, Jr. (NRC).
J
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 30 September 1982.
10.
P. A. Crane, Jr. (PG&E), Letter to G. W. Knighton (NRC).
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 9 May 1983.
11.
J. O. Schuyler (PG&E), Letter to G. W. Knighton (NRC).
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E, 14 October 1983.
12.
J. O. Schuyler (PG&E), Letter to G. W. Knighton (NRC).
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads, PG&E,15 June 1984.
23349 31
-