ML20209D130
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a Docket Nos.: 50-275/323 JUL 12 M MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FRON:
Victor Nerses, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing Harry Rood, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing j
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SUBJECT:
EVALUATION OF DIABLO CANYON 1 OPERATIONAL READINESS l
l Per your request, we attended the Diablo Canyon Operational Readiness meeting at the plant site on June 20 and 21, 1984. At the meeting we discussed with the 4
licensee about 40 issues that we have found to be of concern in our experience as Project Managers for the staff review of several CE plants, i.e., St. Lucie i
'I and 2, San Onofre 2 and 3, and Calvert Cliffs 2.
The following is a sumary of those issues discussed at the meeting that we believe to be relevant to operational readiness at Dia,blo Canyon 1.
j 1.
SAFETY INJECTION (SI) PUMP ROOM DRAINS - We noted during the site i
tour an unusual situation at the ninety foot level in the SI pump room housing pumps 11 and l'2.
All the other places on site we toured were clean and tidy, but in the SI pump room there was an area of the floor that was wet and had a residue of sand. The SI pump room drain and its piping should lead to a sump which is pumped into a holding tank; therefore, one should not be getting sand from this system. The sand. appeared to be " beach" sand, and it was in a i
pattern indicating flow emanating from (or to) the drain.- The water and sand extended half way around the pump foundation of both pumps.
i We requested an explanation, and.the licensee stated that there was a " burp" back through the drain, but no explanation as to how the drain system could have sand in it..
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-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TERRY TURBINE-THROTTLE VALVE - During the site tour, we noted a "Do Not Paint" tag attached to the valve near the overspeed trip relays. -Nevertheless, the valve bonnet and relays had been painted. The licensee could not explain how this came-to be nor what assurance they had that this was not a generic problem (i.e. other plant equipment may have been mistakenly pain-ted).
3.
LIGHTING - In the auxiliary building where we. toured, lighting in a l
number of passage ways to safety related equipment was poor or absent. This appeared to be due to unreplaced burned-out light bulbs.
4.
SAFETY VS. PLANT SECURITY - We discussed whether or not the licensee had demonstrated (by analysis, test, etc.) that in the worse case scenario operators or appropriately qualified personnel would be able to get to required locations and perfom the necessary actions within the required accident analysis time constraints. The licensee stated they did not anticipate a problem because NRC credit for operator action is never less than 30 minutes, and they thought that 30 minutes would be more than sufficient time to get personnel to the required locations to perform their necessary actions.
5.
T0XIC GAS ISOLATION SYSTEM - The toxic gas detection and isolation -
system at Diablo Canyon is for chlorine only. On site we noted ammonia bottles used for reproduction of engineering drawings and an annonia tank used for the volatile steam generator chemistry.
Furthermore, the licensee recently added a condensate demineralizer system with its attendant chemicals. This was done after the staff had reviewed the toxic gas isolation system. We questioned the licensee about these items, and they admitted not having~ studied the-added hazards associated with the chemicals, but they stated that they did not anticipate a problem because they believed the plant ventilation system should prevent the gas getting into the control room, given the location of the toxic chemicals 6.
EMERGENCYOPERATORPROCEDURE(EOP)OPERATORTRAININGPROGRAM-Operators are presently trained (or being trained) to interim-events
- based E0Ps. There is a license condition to have operators re-trained by March 1985 to E0Ps based on the revised Westinghouse.
Owners Group Guidelines. Five crews need to be retrained. Each crew is in a five week training cycle. Hence, once training starts, it will be twenty-five weeks before all five crews are prepared to be authorized to use the E0Ps.
In other words, the licensee's plan is such that the first crew trained will still be using the interim i
events based E0Ps for twenty-five weeks although they will have been trained and qualified on E0Ps based on the revised Westinghouse Owners Group Guidelines. When questioned on whether it was. good practice to have a crew trained and qualified to two differently fomatted E0Ps for the same accidents and transients at the same time, the licensee stated there were no better options and that they did not anticipate' problems.
7.
CONTROL ROOM INTEGRAL PRESSURE TEST-- The applicant has indicated that although the work on Unit 2's control panels,-which shares the same room
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as Unit l's control panel, is yet to be completed, the control room integral pressure test performed last year will not be performed after the Unit 2 control room work is finished and before Unit 2 operation. Instead, no test will be run until required by the Technical Specifications (18 months after the previous test).
8.
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL RESOURCES - The licensee stated that when Unit 2 begins operation, the electrical and mechanical maintenance personnel staff will need to be increased by 30% to support the work activities of the two units.
It was not clear that the licensee will have hired, trained and qualified personnel in time to support two units (Unit 2 is scheduled to be licensed Nov.19S4).
9.
PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM - We noted that there is no public address system at the plant, although the licensee has committed to install one. At present, a beeper system is used.
10.
PURGE SYSTEM - The Diablo Technical Specifications allow the 48" purge system to be operated up to 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> per year. However, SSER
- 13 states that operation will be limited to 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year. The basis for allowing 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> per year appears to be undocumented.
11.
IDVP - Since the NRR staff is actively persuing this issue, we did not get into it; therefore, we have no recommendations.
12.
OPERATOR TRAINING & STA QUALIFICATION - Since Beckham was actively persuing these issues during the same visit of ours at Diablo, we did not get into it; therefore, we have no recommendations.
Victor Nerses, roject Manager Licens'ing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing Harry Rood, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing h
DISTRIBUTION D: 8#3 DL:LB#3 DL.
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