ML20207C493

Intervenor Exhibit I-State-28,consisting of 860113 Memo Re Issue of Probable Exposure or Contamination During Accidental Release from Station

ML20207C493
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/25/1988
From:	Oleson F Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Eric Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency
References
OL-I-STATE-028, OL-I-STATE-28, NUDOCS 8808090246
Download: ML20207C493 (3)

Text

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g January lg19M 19 P6 :02 MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward A. Thomas, Division Chief Natural & Tecnnological Hazaras 0 % :. < . . -r 00CKE UNU N CEi<v>CT.

FROM: Fred B. Oleson, Health Physicist Emergency fianagement a National i Prepareoness Programs Division

SUBJECT:

Seaorook Emergency Plans l Regarcing the issue of probable exposure or contamination which would produce health effects on the "beacn population" during an accidental l release from Seabrook Station:

ISSUE el Assume trans1ent beacn population could be evacuated by car or bus in a 7-8 hour perico. (Preliminary estimates are that the entire beacn population including summer residents could be evacuated in that time perica). Since all credible accident scenarios would not result in loss of all containment ano since over 18-20 hours of warning could be expected i I

before any major leakage would occur (again conservative), evacuation of the "transient beacn" population would be feasible before significant releases  ;

(af fecting health or producing surf ace contamination) 'would occur. This is I

(_') to be sure a personal coinion but it is shared by many of my health physics colleagues.

The population most at risk would be the individuals or f ami'y groups l who would have travelled to the beaches on a hot summer day by automobile.

This segment of the risk population could be evacuated first at the Site Emergency level or deniea access as early as an Alert condition.

All of tnese people would not be expected to nave been exposeo or contaminatea at all. They could return to their homes without having to go througn reception centers. We need to know wnat numoer of the "transient population" is in relation to the maximum summer beach population.

The next important segment to be evacuated would be residents (year round plus su rer) in the area from 0 .5 mile. This segment should be accordeo the same prior 1ty as the first group, re preventative evacuat1on.

All residents f rom .5 to 2 miles should te sheltered during the prevent-ative evacuation time frame. No release has occurr'ed containment is intact.

What artea it involvad 'a 'his option not counting emergency workers reauired to implement evacuation?

Further evacuation should only be considered based on serious deter-ioration of plant conditions or breach of containment. This would be recom-do " '"a O memeea desec o" tne "et c "a't'o"> est'"etee so"rce terms . etc distance of EPZ towns, capacity of road network, constraints (weather con-ditions, time of day, etc.) .

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%/ l If this sequence of evacuation and sheltering is applied to the pre-ventive action guidance, the issue importance will be minimized, if maximum of f-site cose rates of 1 rem /hr are predicted downwind at f 0.5 mile for a duration of 3-5 hours the beach population (now reduced) could be evacuated out to 3 or 5 miles (or even 5 to 10 miles) cepenalng on l the lodine and particulate conmponents of the plume and wind stability,  !

If people in these zones evacuate before the plume has been detected or any dosimeter readings observed there will be minimal requ1rements for decon-tamination at reception centers. For the majority of persons evacuating by car or bus f rom a plume af f ected area serious exposure, contamination or  ;

ingestion will not occur curing evacuation or continued sneltering since the l vehicle or house / cottage affords a degree et protection agalnst contam1 nation, moderate protection against ingestion and minimizes requirements for personal i decontaminat1on at a future time such as transit to recept 1on centers.

Since the unimpecea transit times are of the order of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and in view of the intermittent nature of the plume exposure, no serious health ef fects are expected even if these levels of precicted exposure occur and I l

require evacuation.

ISSUE a2 l V Whether or not the plans are "in adequate shape" is not as important as whether the corriunications and warning systems are in place, whether the l people assigned to execute or operate the plans are trained, available and l willing to be exercised (especially at local level), and whether all three l States are going to be able to coordinate in the matter of public advisories. l The drill did not demonstrate that these requirements for a successful exercise could be in place by February.

Radiological teams, laboratory equipment /procecures, cecontamination capability at local EOCs or reception centers, equipment or instruments for loca; and state emergency worker exposure control, etc., are not yet in olace or understood.

The New Hampshire Emergency Broadcast Systen is not useable for the emergency programing neecea to inplement the Seabrook Station REP.

Arrangements are being naae with an Fit Station in Dover for emergency warnings to the public in the Seacoast Area. However, this should not be confusea with the Emergency Broaacast System plan in existence wnich can only be changed witn FCC anc FEMA approval.

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