Text

Intervenor Exhibit I-State-48,consisting of FEMA-REP-3, Dynamic Evacuation Analyses:Independent Assessments of Evacuation Times from Plume Exposure Pathway EPZs of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations, Dtd Feb 1981
	ML20207C469
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/16/1988
From:	; Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	;
References
	OL-I-STATE-048, OL-I-STATE-48, NUDOCS 8808090235
	Download: ML20207C469 (42)
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l UNITED STATES MUCLEAR REGULATOR" CO!U4TcSION MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENE"AL

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In the Matter of: .

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF )

) Docket No.

NEW HA'4PSHIRE, et al ) 50-443-OL

) 50-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) Offsite Emergency

) Planning O

LOCATION: Concord, New Hampshire DATE: June 14 through 16, 1988

....................................................-...c 4

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION O owne 1129 L Street N.W., Sales 600 Wantdeston, D.C. 20005 esoso90235 e80616 PDR G

ADOCK 05000443 PDR (2$2) 6M

T - S fr/e MF #26 FEMA REP 3 FEBRUARY 1981 abr74-a sqg b

DYNAMIC EVACUATION ANALYSE [@ R 19 P6:42 Independent Assessments of Evacuation Times from the Plume Exposure Pathway :

Emergency Planning Zones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division Population Preparedness Office l Federal Emergency Management Agency

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6 Dynamic Evacuation Analyses:

Independent Assessments of Evacuation Times from the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations O

j Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division Population Preparedness Office Federal Emergency Management Agency February 1981 O

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'A FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Washington D.C. 20472 January 16, 1981 Mr. William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Dircks:

Under the Memotandum of Understa.. ding between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of January 14, 1980, FEMA agreed to provide NRC with an independent assessment of evacuation times around 12 reactor sites which have the highest population density within t h t., 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone or are mutually agreed by FEMA and NRC. The enclosed report, "Dynamic Evacuation Analyses,"

fulfills this agreement. The report was completed by our new Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division. The FEMA independent assessment of the 12 reactor sites consists of contractor assessments, major conclusions by the contractors, commentary by pertinent State and local government of ficials on these assessments and a critique of the contractor' methodologies. In addition, the report was reviewed by our Mitigation and Research Of fice and our Government Prepareoness Office, both of which deal with the evacuation of people from natural disasters and nuclear attack.

The report concludes that evacuation times are highly sensitive to the assumptions used by the contractors with respect to physical conditions and local government policies. For example, for persons using their own automobile, evacuation times can vary from 2 to as long as 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months . The evacuation times for the public transport dependent populations and those persons in institutions are for the most part within this range. The report emphas12es that good planning, in addition to much emergency manpower and resources, is necessary to achieve the shorter estimates of evacuation t ime s. Comparisions of these times with guidance on initiation and duration of accidental releases from nuclear power stations also suggest that shelter-ing and evacuation are significantly interrelated, and they should be considered jointly when judging the appropriateness of protective actions.

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based on the experience gained from conducting evacuation dynamic analyses for 12 Emergency Planning Zones for NRC, a 3 pronged acproach is recommended to further enhance several aspects of State and local government radiological emergency glanning and preparedness: 1) assistance to State and local assist-ance to State and local government; 2) development of a standardized evacuation dynamic assessment model; and 3) snelter dynamic analyses.

de are pleased to suomit to you our report on dynamic evacuation analyses.

Sincerely, F r ank A . C amm Associate Director Plans and Preparedness Office Enclosure O

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TABLE OF CCNTENTS i (Continued)

Page i I l III. Contractor Conclusions and Recommendations A. Indian Point 12

1. Introduction 12

2. Definition of EPZ and Population Estimates 12

3. Definition of Evacuation Time 12 4 Evacuation Times 15

5. Special Facilities 15

6. Confirmation Times 18

7. Principal Recommendations 18 18 B. Zion

1. Introduction 18

() 2.

3.

Definition of EPZ and Population Estimates Definition of Evacuation Time 19 19

4. Evacuation Times 19

5. Special Facilities 19

6. Confirmation Times 24

7. Princinal Recommendations 24 C. Nine Nuclear Power Stations (Bailly, Beaver Valley, Enrico Fermi, 24 Limerick, Maine Yankee, Midland, Millstone, Shorenam, and Three Mile Island)

1. Introduction 24

2. Definition of EPZ and Population Estimates 25

3. Definition of Evacuation Time 25 4 Evacuation Times 31

5. Special Facilities 31

6. Confirmation Times 43

7. Principal Recommendations 43 44

0. Seabrook Introduction 44 1.

2. Definition of EPZ and Population Estimates 44

3. Definition of Evacuation Time 44

4. Evacuation Times 44 O

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t TABLE OF CONTENTS

[

r Letter of Transmittal Contents List of Tables t

List of Figures List of Exhibits Acknowledgement I. Introduction, Conclusions and Recomendations j A. Introduction

/ B. Conclusions

1. Independence G

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2. Evacuation Times (t 3. Impact of the 15-minute Alert and Notification Requirement I ;

4. Achievement of Evacuation Times

5. Sheltering as an Alternative Protective Measure i

6. Comparision with Licensee Estimates of Evacuation Times

7. Appropriate Criteria for Evacuation Times

8. State & Local Government use of FEMA Sponsored Assessments l

C. Recomendations

1. Assistance to State and Local Governments

2. Development of a Standardized Evacuation Dynamic Assessment Model

3. Shelter Dynamic Analyses II. Contractor Assessn, ants A. Statements of Work B. Competitive Negotiation Process C. Cooperation of State and Local Government Officials and the Licensees D. Seabrook - A Special Case $

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l TABLE OF CONTr. HTS ,

(continued) )

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Special Facilities a5 !

5.

Confirmation Times 46 l 6.

Summary of Local Meetings 48 7.

Principal Recommendations 48 8.

Comparison with Licensee Estimates of Evacuation Times 49 E.

IV. Major Comments frcm State and Local Of ficials 51 A. Indian Point 55 B. Zion 1

56 C. Nine Nuclear Power Stations 58

0. Seabrcok V. Discussion of the Methodologies O A. Major issues 60 Definition of the Plume E.xposure PatNay Emergency 60 1-Planning Zone Population Estimates 60 2.

Public Response Time Di stributions 61 t

3.

4 Highway Model 62 j' 62

5. Special Facilitie, Shel tering 65 6.

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7. Confirmation Time 65

8. Recommendations A Standard Methodology 86 B.

Footnotes O

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List of Tables P332. \

4 Table 1-1: Range of Evacuation Times for the General Populatic' from EPZs l 6

Table 1-2: Evacuation Time Estimates by Licensees 6

Table 1-3: Guidance on Initiation and Durat ;on of Release 30 Table 111-1: EPZ Populations for 9 Nuclear Power Stations 33 Table 111-2: Maximum Evacuation Times of the 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zones for 9 Huclear Power Stations 50 Table 111-3: Licensee Estimates of Evacuation Times for the General Population hl 66 Table V-1: Resource and M>J, power Requirements for Zion EPZ i

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1 List of Finures Figure 111-1: Indian Point Plune Exposure Pathway Energency Planning Zone Showing Political Jurisdictions and Analyis Units Indian Foint EPZ (continued) Showina Evacuatien Metwork l Figure 111-2: Evacuation Tires at the 50, 90 and 100 Percent Level of Evacuation f rom the Emergency P1&nnina Units at Indian Point Ficure 111-3: Derformance Characteristics of Best and Wcest Case F.neraency Plannino Utiits Concared to Total EPZ at Indian Point Figure 111 4: Zie;. Plure Exoosure Pathway Energency Planning Zone Ficure 111-5: Tires Pecuired for Auto Ownina Population to Prepare for Evacuatina Home fcr the Zion EPZ Figure 111-6: Sector Plan for the Zion EPZ Figure !!I-7: Evacuation Times for the Zion EDZ According to Selected Sectors Figure !!I-8: Quadrant of Evacuation f:etwork for Three Mile Island Ficure 111-9: Public Resconse Distributions for tre 'lorral Workday Figure 111-10: Eailly 10-nile Erercency Planning Zone Figure III-11: Deaver Valley 10-mile Energency Dianning Zone Figure 111-12: Enrico Ferni 10-mile Energency Planning Zone Figure III-13: Linerick . nile Energency Planning Zone Figure 111-14: ?'aine Yankee 10-nile Emergency Planning Zone Finure 111-15: "idland 10-mile Emergency Diannina Zone Figure III-16: Millstone 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone Figure 1:!.17: Shorehan 10. mile Emergency Planning Zone Figure 111-18: Three !!ile Island 10-nile Energet cy Planning Zone Figure 111-19: Seabrock Plure Excesure Pathway Enernency Planning Zone Show4 no Evacuation Routes and Autoc.apacity h 4 Figure 111-20: Seabrock Traf fic Concestion location vii l

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List of Figures (continued )

Page Traf fic Congestion Analysis for Zion Showing 63 L Figure V-1:

' severity of Delay Typical Traf fic Delays in the Zion EPZ 64 Figure V-2:

67 Figure V-3: Actions and Resources for Notification Actions and Resources for Traffic Control 68 1 Figure V-4:

Figure V-5: Actions and Resources for the Carless Population 69 l

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List of Exhibits Page Exhibit 11-1: Letter from Mr. John W. Macy, Jr., Director FEMA to 11 Governor Hugh Carey, State of New York Topics for Review by State and local government 52 Exhibit IV-1:

of fici al s Revision of Appendix 4, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 70 Exhibit Y-1:

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. i ACXNOWLEDGMENT The author would like to thank the other members of the review ccmmittee of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division (REP), Sheldon A. Schwartz, Project Manager and author of the original statements of work and Marshall E. Sande rs. Additional important technical criticues were supplied by Robert T. Jaske and Kenneth Green, REP, FEMA. The devotion and efficiency ];

of the contracting of ficer, Donna M. Darlington, FEMA Aquisition Hanagement Division is recognized The author tharks Glenda Somenille-Campbell and i Deborah L. Ondish for typing this ma nu sc ri pt.

The important contributions by the contractors are acknowledged, especially those of Andrew Kanen and Walter Kulash of Alan M. Voomees and Associates; ,

Donald Matzzie and Douglas Sharp of CONSAD Research Corporation; George Barber of Center for Planning and Research; and John Cosby, Wilbur Smith and Associ ates.

Gratitude is due to the many State and local government of ficials for their assistance to the contractors and the review of their wort. While too many to mention here, their names are included by means of the reference on comments.

Without their participation, the assessment would not have been as useful to h

all concerned.

Finally, the author thanks the utilities and their consultants for their cooperation ir. this ef fort. Only with the cooperation of the industry and ,

all levels of government is it possible to achieve the objectives of President '

Carter's Decenter 7,1979, statement where FEMA i s to head up of f-site emer-gency planning and preparedness.

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Stephen N. Sal anon', Ph. D . Qf/.2/&2 Project Of ficer Assessments of Evacuation Times Around Nuclear Power Stations Radiological Emergency Preparedness i Di vi sion '

Federal Emergency Management Agency l

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Introductics. Conclusions and Reconrendations A. Introduction Evacuation dyaanic analysis results in estimates of the time recuired to carry out evacuation procedures in the plume exposure oathway Energency P.lannina Zone (EPZ). The conceot has always been an important criterion of radiologica ene rce ncy response plans and preparedness around conreccial nuclear power stations.-}j !!ew York State was the first gyp toAnprepare such an evacuation time estirate out to earlier version, based on a 5-mile radius, was 10 miles

,>ubli shedini nDecertier May 1970.-1{9.-

!IRC renuested licensees, by reans of letters in October, tjovenber, and Decent >er 1979 t elure exoosure oathway EPZ.p' 5f'egpre

- The inoortance such evacuation of evacuabili dynanic analyses ty, the abili ty to for th evacuate in a tinely fashion, was discussed at a hearino hefore Environment, Enerey and Fesources Subsonnittee of the Reoresentatives, l'ovember 1,1979.ggnnittee The licensees and onState Governnent Ooerations, U.S. H and local covernment nust have such evacuation dynamic analyses accordina to the principal plannino document, "Criteria for Preparation for Padiological Erergency Response Plans and Preparednes s January 1980.g Sueport Also, of Concerci HP.C oublished in the Federal al Huclear Power Register on Dece Platernts," HlREC-0654 19, 1979, a nroposed rule on eeernency planning that could reautre a nanic analyses prepared by the licensee and/or the States.9/ All of this review activityof evacua helped to set the stage for the following.

The !!RC/ FEMA f*enorandum of Understanding (MOU) of January 14, 1980, states that in succort of HRC licensing reviews, "FEMA will provide NRC with an independent assessment of evacuation tires around 12 reactor sites which have the nighest population density witg the For 10-mile theseEmergency assessnents, Planning Zone or are FEMA interpreted nutually agreed "independent" as upon by FEMA and HRC."_

independent from the licensees and State and local government. Futhemore, "FD4 A and HRC agree to discuss future arrangements for similar assesse.cnts to be perfon'ed by FEMA at ger sites with operating reactors and at plants currently under con-s tructio n. "_

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Nuclear Power Station State,

1. Indian Point

New York

2. Zi o n* Illinois

3. Lime rick Pennsylvania

4. Bailly Indiana

5. Three Mile Islar.d* Pennsylvania

6. Femi Michigan

7. Beaver Valley

Pennsylvania

8. Shoreham New Yoit

9. Seabrook New Hampshire

10. Midland Michigan

11. Millstone

Connecticut

12. Maine Yankee

Maine

Licensed to Operate Although the above 12 sites are those selected for evaluation during FY 1980, HRC requested priority attention fganother 13 sites as FEMA re-sources become available. These sites are:_ g Nuclear Power Station State

13. Turkey Point

Florida 14 Oyster Creek

New Jersey

15. Pil grim

Massachusetts

16. Sal em* New Jersey

17. Perry Ohio

18. Duane Arnold

towa

19. Haddam Neck

Connecticut

20. St. Lucie* Fl orida

21. T roj a n* Oregon

72. San Onof re* California

23. Rancho Seco* California

24. Ca tawba South Carolina

25. Dresde n* Illi noi s

Licensed to Operate FEMA agreed to evaluate independently the first 12 selected by NRC. The FEMA independent assessment consists of contractor assessments, the contractors' major conclusions, commentary from State and local government of ficials, and a FEMA critique of the contractors' methodologies. FEMA did not have adequate financial resources to evaluate the above 13 sites in FY 1980. What to do in FY 1981 is now under evaluation. This study should help to provide a number of different policy h options.

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1. Indeoendence l l

Within the constraints of tire, manpower, and funds, FEMA produced assess- )

rents that are as independent as oossible frcrt the licensees and State and local I covernment and should be useful to flRC in suoport of licensing reviews. The assess-rents should be viewed in their total context. This includes the 3 contractors expertise and experience; contractors reports; assistance by State and local govern-rent officials, and the utilities and their consultants; correntary by State and local of ficials; and the c^itioue of rethodologies. Becaun each contractor used J

dif ferent acoroaches, assu*Dtions and data, each assessnent differs on a site-by-site basis. There is no affective way to easily compare the results of the 3 Contractors.

2. Evacuation Times All 3 contractors define evacuation tire fece the beginnina of the first alert to the public for evacuation to the tire that the last vehicle crosses the plure exposure oattvay EP2 boundary. Two contractors define the EP2 boundary by applying radiological erergency planning guidelines to the nominal 10-nile radius that results in an irrecular shaped boundary that is in general nreater than a circle of 10-mile radius. The other contractor defines ti,e EPZ boundary as a circle of 10-mile radius for the purposes of the estinate of evacuation times.

Evacuation tines are estimated for 3 population qroups: 1) the general

$ oopulation, namely those who own their autorobiles or eouivalent; 2) the public transport dependent populations, such as school children and non-auto owning per-sons; and 3) the populations, in institutions, such as' hospitals, wtio recuire special vehicles. The populations of the last 2 groups consistute about 30 cercent or less of the entire copulation in need of evacuation and varies on a site-hv-site basis.

Sone indication of the rance of evacuatian tires under a wide variety of conditions and assurptions is niven in Table 1-1. The tire estimates are based on 100 percent evacuation of the general population from the entire EP2 and rounded to the rearest hour. They reflect various conditions, such as time of dav, season of the year and weather. Various assumptions include, for exarple, speed of alert and notification, erercency ranpower and resource avail 3bility, education of the public, and behavioral response of drivers. For the 12 EPZs analyzed by the contractors l

and reviewed in this report, evacuation times rance from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for 4 EoZs (Fen-1, l Shorehan, t'idland and Paine Yankee) to as lona a tire as 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months for 1 EPZ (Se ab rook ) . The short tines reflect nighttine, winter and good weather for rela-l tively low occulation EP2s assuring 15-ninute alert and notification, available l

energency ranpower and resources, education of the public, and effective behavioral l

response of the drivers. The loncest tire of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months reflects surrer peak noc ul a -

tions on the beach, current alert and notification, and the inef fective behavioral response of the drivers on account of the lack of adeouate enervency rarpower and resources.

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Table I-1: ranne of Evacuation Ti es for the Ceneral Donulation from EPIs 5.'uclear Power Station EPZ Ev,acuation Time (Hoursi 4

1. Indian Point 70

2. Zion 5-6

3. Line rick

3 4 Pailly' 3-5 l S. Three il e Isla nd* 3

6. Fe rni

2

7. Deaver Valley

4 3 Shorehan* 2-3 6 Seabrook 4-1R

10. Pidland* 2-3

11. rillstone* 3-5

12. "aine Yankee

2-6 10-rile radius E02 and 15-ninute alert and notification assumption Tire dependent analyses of evacuation of the ceneral occula tion show that there are lonn tails renresentino a snali nercentane of the renula tion wno take a loncer tire to evacuate because they are relativelv late in heirn nctified,lll nobilized, and 5 ave to drive the loncest distances. Consequently, i t may take an additional Pour or so for the last 10 percent of the penulation to be evacua ted.

The description of these tails is not well ceveloped. Therefore, the analyses more accurately describe the evacuation tires at the en cercent level of evacuation than they do the 100 percent. The observation suagetts that a sinale criterion for evacuation tire estirates is the tire when on cercent of t -aneral ocaula tion is i evacuated acerss t"e EP: "ourrary. ' ti e deperdent analysis rervivos the ~cs..

i accurate and cornlete inforration for t"e emernency planner and i s sucolied (c:. l Indian Point, Zion and Seabrook. The required input data exists for the other EP:s. I The evacuation times for the nublic transport dependent nonulations and i those rersons in institutions are for the rest part within the rance of evacuation l tires for the neneral ronula tion shown in Table I-1. However, these estimates are

. baser on the assurntion that the large number of buses, arbulances, and other i

special vehicles that are required can be nobilized in a tirelv f ashion. The mobil-ization of public sector resources to insure the evacuation of 30 cercent or less )

i of tFe norulation in the EPZ is a sinnificant planning issue that requires ruch l

attention.

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3. Iroact of the 15-minute Alert and !!ctification 7ecuirerent ,

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A ouantitative corparison of the 15-ninute alert and notification re- !

cuirerent in the FCC planning rule with the current alert and notification systen )

is evaluated only for the Indian Doint, Zion, and Seabrock EPZs. For these cases, l a

O 15-ninute alerting and notification does not help in reducing evacuation time sub-

'd stantially, under a number of conditions, because of traffic conoestion already present in the highway network. For the other EPZs, the current alert and notifi-cation systems are judged to be totally inadeauate by the contractors and their view is supported by State and local of ficials. Therefore, these assessnents were done only under the condition of 15-ninute alerting and traffic congestion is also significant.

4 Achievenent Of Evacuation Tines The contracturs' reports illustrate that much energency manpower and re-sources are necessary to achieve the estimates of evacuation tires. This reaufres dedicated peonle and noney. The contractor reports on Zion and Seabrook are especially illuminating in this recard.

5. Sheltering as an Alternative Protective Peasure The contractors' reports sugoest a number of instances where sheltering could be considered as an alternative protective neasure, such as hosoitals and correctional institutions. Because of the lack of practical planning guidance, alot more has to be done in this area.

6. Connarison with Licensee Estimates of Evacuatitn Tines Eleven out of the 12 licensees subnitted estimates of evacuation times to NRC based on its reouests in 1970 The renainino licensee should subnit its esti-nate according to NRC. Seven of the licensee estinates were completed in time to be used in limitted ways by tr.e contractors as they saw fit in view of their charge to perforn independent estimates. Citations are given for the nost part where used. Recause of the differences between the NRC reauest and the FE"A statements of work, many of the assumptions and bases are different for the 2 sets of estinates and therefore i,re not comparable. For exanole, the licensee estimates do not necessarily include the assumption of the 15-minute alert and notification of the public as evaluated by the FEMA contractors. The licensees were recuired to report 2 time estimates, a best estimate and an adverse weather estinate. The con-ditions for best estimate were undefined by the NRC request. For information purposes, the 11 licensee estinates for the general population are sunmarized in Table 1-2 where the evacuation times are rouded to the nearest hour. New York State and Suffolk County, New Yort, are the only governmental estimates of evacua-tion times and are identified by brackets.

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Table 1-2: F <acation Time Estimates by Licensees Evacuation Times (Hours)

Nuclear Power Station EPZ Best Adverse weathy 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months (9)'

1. Indian Point Not available 21

2. Zion 9 11

3. Limerick 8 3

4. Bailly

5. Three uile Island Hot available 4 5

6. Fe mi 7

7. Beaver Valley 5 (11)D (12)D

8. Shoreham 1 3

9. Se abrock 4 3

10. Midland 8 11

11. Millstone a 7

12. Maine Yankee aState of New Yort bSuf folk County , New York

7. Acerooriate criteria for Evacuation Time FE"A and State and local government of ficials are concerned about how to best allocate scarce manocwer and resources to achieve appropriate evacuation times Currently, the only guidance on targets for evacuation times is fecrn the princpal FEW A/NAC planning document HUREG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1. See Table I-3.

Table 1-3: Guidance on initiation and Duration of Release 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to one day

, (1) Nme from the initiating event to start of atrospheric r= lease C.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to several days (2) Time period over which radioactive matt. rial may be continuously released 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to 1 day af ter (3) Time at which major portion of release start of release may occur (4) Travel time for release to exposure 5 miles -- 0.5 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months point (time af ter release) 10 miles -- 1 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Source:

Table 2, page 17, NUREG-0654/FEW A-REP-1, Revision 1 November 1980.

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O This guidance on the initiation and duration of release suggests, when com-V pared with the estimates of evacuation times, that there is adequate time to complete an evacuation for a slowly developing release. However, if there is an accident with a relatively fast release, the guidance suggests that the time from the initiating event through travel time to the 10-mile EPZ boundary may be as short as 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

This time is detemined by adding 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months each fran lines 1 and 3, plus I hour fran the last line of Table 1-3. Within this 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months time frame, the 12 IPZs can only be partially evacuated. For an accident under these conditions, sheltering could be a viable protective action. Accordingly, sheltering and evacuation are significantly inter-related that they should be considered jointly when judging the appropriate-ness of protective actions.

8. State and Local Government use of FEMA Sponsored Assessments For State and local governments in the initial planning stages for the EPZs, the FEMA assessments are found to be of some help by defining the plume exposure pathway EPZ and sub-areas and getting State and local of ficials to think about evacuation planning and its consecuent timing. To some degree, each assessment acts as a planning teol and catalyst. State and local of ficials objected, however, that not enough plannino detail was considered by the contractors. For State and local governments in a more advanced stage 'f planning, the FEMA assessments are helpful to confirm various planning assumpt.ons already made.

C. Recommendations P Based on the experience gained from conducting evacuation dynamic analyses of 12 EPIs for NRC, a 3 pro ged approach is recomnended to further enhance several as-pects of State and local ?overnment radiological energency planning and preparedness:

1) assistance to State ano local government; 2) development of a standardized evacua-tion dynamic assessrent model; and 3) and shelter dynamic analyses.

1. Assistance to State and Local Governecnts Independent assessments, such as those described in this report, have served to identify methodologies and some ranges of evacuation times. A standardized evac-uation dynamic assessment model is not yet completely developed. However, State and local governments are nod in the development phase of their plans and prepared-ness where expert assistance in key areas related to evacuation dynamic analyses is most needed. The best FEMA can do on a short term basis is to supply expert con-sultants to assist State and local government to prepare their own evacuation plans and estimates of evacuation times. Such an approach would reouf re federally funded consultants work 4ng along side State and local of ficials rather than conducting in-dependent assessments as was dcne previously. In tnis way, various assunctions could be tested and sensitivity analyses made as part of an integrated planning process. Alternatively, NRC could recuest its licensees to of fer the appropriate ter.hnical support.

2. Development of a Standardized Evacuation Dynamic Assessment Model Many nethodological problems related to the assessment of evacuation times are close to resolution. For the long range, FEMA, in conjunction with NRC, should O eeveloo e stanaerdizee evaccation di na 4c model that can de esefoi for seas 4tivitx 7

.l analyses of alternative assunctions. Such a nodel is a refinenent of Aopendix 4,

'1UREC-06F4/FE!'A DEP-1, f!ovenber 1980, which is currently recorrended by FE!'A and MC for licensees and State and local of ficials to fomulate evacuation olans and tire (See Exhibi t Y-1, p. 70.) Eventually, the rodel could supplant this ao-es tica tes .

nroach. Cf particular irportance is the rodeling of oublic behavior to warnino and resconse. Petter use of the existing civil defense literature could he beloful in this regard. The 13 additional sites that !mC wants FE"A to evaluate for licens.

ing purposes could be included along with the first 12 alreedy studied by FEt'A con-trac to rs . Since these 25 sites represent the rost difficult ones, the use of a standarcized nodel for sensitivity analyses at the 25 sites could lav the basis for analyses of the recaining sites in the country.

3. Shelter Dynanic Analyses Sheltering as a protective response has not been integrated into evacuation.

In other words, there is no clear understanding and outdance under what set of shelter rather than evacuate, how long i t takes conditions it is nore crudent to seek tn seek shelter, the dose saved, and how the risks frm sheltering emnare to con-Also, the ri sks from evacuation, such as automobile accidents and dose received.

sistent sets of assurptions nave to be nade to not bias evacuation as a protective l response ccrearea to sheltering. Ho corprehensive studies of protective action In the near future, alternatives have been perfomed on a site specific basis.

FE"? should assist State and local governcents to address this issue by pMviding cuidance and exrr t consultants, f.n alternative worthy of consideration is to have

'9C reauest its licensees to supply t"e sare kind of technical expertise in a way The 75 sites identified si~ilar to forwhat wasanalyses, srecial done for because evacuation of tire their esticates.

hinh population or other difficult a by "'C evacuation Octor, should be given first nriority, f'nono them, operatino nuclear W rcwer stations $bould be given highest oriority.

O 8

a II.

Centractor Assessrents Contractor assess ents were used to beln FE"A achieve the objective of inde-rendent assessrents. Prirarily because of their biqb conulations within the 10-nile The re-EP2, Indian Point and Zion were to be analyzed by different contracturs.This way various raining 10 EPIs were to be analyzed by still another contractor.

approrches and rethodolgies could be tested. The followino discusses the statenents of work, the coreetitive biddino process used to select the contractors, FD'A's request for ccoceration with State and local of ficials and the licensees and the scecial case of Seabrock.

A. Staterents of Work FE"A reco1nizes that there is no standard rethod of gesp' gcuation was fortimes.

each Theref ore, a central cortion of all 3 staterents of wort _ '

contractor to outline a rethodolocy nrovided that an adenuate basis for assessine evacuatien tires is described. Additionally, visits to the 10-rile Esercency nian-ning Zone 3 and dis.ussions of the assessment with the principal local of ficials and the nuclear power station ranacenent were renuired. Tbc objective was to assess the transportation system and routes, the demogranby of the area under study, and revis other evacuation studies that were coroleted for the area includino the esticates of evacuation tires trerared by the nuclear licensees in response to the in70 re-quest by M C. The general public evacuation assessnent was to re conducted under both ideal and adverse conditions. These conditions were to be detemined by in-p vestinatino a wide variety of assuretions, e.g., speed of alert and notification, V tire of day and week, season and weather. The rationale in tems of traf fic ficw and weather conditions, in addition to any other conditions, was to be fully des-cribed. An assessment of the evacuation of soecial f acilities, such as hospitals, prisons, recreational f acilities, at.d transient tourist population at beaches, where special precedures ray have to be applied was reouired and also conducted under both ideal and adverse conditions.

Each contractor was asked to present rethods and esticates of times for confire-ing the evacuation analyses under the different conditions. There were 2 notifica-tion assunctions for the assessment. First, the public was notified by whatever reans are currently in oltce within the 10-nile Energency Plannino Zone. Second, the public was to be notified within the 15-ninute tine f rane as provided by the MC proposed rule on emergency planning. Finally, the contractor is asked to provide any reconrcndations on ways to inorove evacuation times around nuclear power plants. Where aporopriate, the contractor is to provide a cost estirate for carry-inc out each recorrendation.

D. Corcetitive Mecotiation Process By means of the standard Federal covernment comoetitive negouation process, The tire frame for the suitable contractors were selected to nake the assessnents.

A rester of potential contractors was coroletion of all 3 assessments was 90 days.

drawn from a list sunolied by t*e American Society of Civil Engineering and f rom cersultants known to FEPA staf f to be competent in civil defense evacuations and related traf fic enqineering expertise. A renuest for preposal was issued and of fers 9

. . _ - - - - . - _ . . _ _ _ . _ - - - . _ - .-_ . _. . -~

I l

)

I were received. Then, a review connittee f rom the radiolonical Enerqeocy Prepared.

ness Division selected the best ores based on tachnical rerit ord the experience c'

' the potential centractor personnel .

!ccordincly, the followiM contractors were selected by FE"A: Indi an point -

C MS/0 Eesearch Ccaoration, oittsburnn, Dennsylvania, and its subcontractor, Center for Planninn and Researcm, Inc, Palo Alto California; Zion - Alan t', voornees and Associates, t' clean, Virninia; Je rerainina sites (with the exception of Seabrock) -

"ilbur Smith and Associates, Colum51a, South Carolina.

C. Seabrook - A Special Case Curing the initial chases of the s tudy, Governor Galen of tlew l'aroshire objected to Wilbur Smith and Associates conducting the assessrent around the Seabrook nuclear power station. The basis for the objection was concern over oublic acceptance of the assessrent beca'Jse Uilbur Smith and Associates did an estimate of evacuation tire lirited to S niles for the Public Services Coreany of ?:ew ilarnshire, the operator nf Seabrock , in in74 The technical cornetence of the ornanization was not an issue, in order to accomodate the Covernor's objection, wod by Wilbur S*ith '

and Associates was stopped and the contract with Alan t'. Voorrees and Associates was I

modified to include the assessment for Seabrock, g I de-9eca veloped._g Seabrook Part way throuqh becare a special case, a separate statenent of woA clude additional reetinas with 1ocal of ficials beyond those ominally schedule i

This was done on the insistance of State and local of ficials that wanted to insure that all of their input was included in the contractor's assessment. As a conse-cuence, the Seabrook stuc'y includes a surrary of local reetinos.

D. Cooceration of State and Local Governrent Officials and the Licensees The contractor assessrents could not be accomplished without the enoperation of State and local government of ficials and the licensees. A request for cooperation I

was made to all governors inpacted by the EPIs of the 12 nucig power stations by u r. John W. !'acy , J r. , Di rector, FE" A._ An example is shown means of a letter from in E xhibi t 11-1. Also, nenoranda were sent to other State and local governrent of ficials, and the licensees reouestinq their cooperation.

I O 1 i

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. 3eatronk

1. Introeuction Alan M. Voorhees and Associates chose to user for the most cart, the sare rethodolony that was developed for Zion. A discussion is cresented in 1;I.R.1. The main oistinguishing feature is the high beach population. n ecause of the lack of State of local data in this reoard, the contractor set uo traf fic counters to esti-mate the nurber of vehicles on a typical Sunmr Sunday. In addi tien, photoorachs taken by the licensee were reviewed to cross check the number of people on the beach.

Finally, a summary of local meel' 3 is o vided to sum up the hich degree of con.

cern on the cart of nany local e

. _ al s .-./

2. i Definition of Eo? and E Q stion Estimates The Seabrook EPZ boundary is defined almost entirely along town boundaries, as shown in Figure 111-19. Exceptions are the inclusion of small and lightly poDu-lated parts of the Cities of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Haverhill, Massachusetts.

Vhether or not to include the entire city of Portsrtuth T ' C issue that was raised by local of ficials. Its resolution is lef t to the plann'" - tess.

The total cemanent resident coeulation is about 111,000, spread rairly evenly throughout the EP!. Durino the sunner months, the population of the EPI is O greatly increased by seasonal residents and transient persons visiting the area for short periods of time, overnight and day trips. Under peak condi tions, on a Sumrer Suncay, 78,000 seasonal and transient persons are added to the pemanent EPZ popula-tion of 111,000. This additional population is concentrated in the beach towns.

3. Definition of Evacuation Times The evacuation time is defined frm the beginnino of the alert through the crossino of the EP2 - usirq the same definition as the contractor develrced for Zion. Population sec"*nts and evacuation secuences are similar to those developed for Zicn. '!otificatior .f the copulation under current conditions is projected to be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 15 minutes based on discussions with Iccal of ficials, which is similar to the time estimated at Zion. Therefore, the tratal time to com-plete the secuences through preparing for evacuating the home is estimated at about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 20 minutes.

4 Evacuation Times The best and adverse (worst) evacuation times are detemined by investigat-ing a possible time periods - nighttirne, daytine on a suncer weekend ("SuWer Sunday" case), daytime on a winter weekend, and daytime on a "winter weekend" case.

The worst (longest) cases are defined as the "Summer Sunday" when the population and vehicle accumulation in the EPZ are the greatest and the "Winter Weekday" when the time needed to asserble f amily units is likely to be at its maxinun, and schools are in session. The impact of severe winter weather, the 15-minute alerting and notifi-cation system, and sectors are analyzed.s 44

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O rigure 111-19: Seabrook Plume Exposure PatNay Emergency Planning Zone Showing Evacuation Routes and Auto Capacity 45

i, O

Based on the 100 percent evacuation of the entire EPZ, the Surmer Sunday case for evacuation of the entire population is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 10 minutes. The controll-ing f actor is the large size of the beach population. Ninety percent of the beach population is evacuated within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months 15 minutes. In contrast, the non-beach population is evacuated within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 25 minutes. For the Winter Weekday case, the entire EPZ population is evacuated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 55 minutes. The 15-mi nute warning and notification system does not reduce the evacuation time for the Summr Sunday case. However, for Winter Weekday, the evacuation time is reduced to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 40 minutes. Severe winter weather lengthens this time to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 30 minutes.

Evacuation time by sectors within the EPZ and under the 15-minute alerting and notification for Summr Sunday ranges from 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months 10 minutes to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 10 minutes depending on the combination of sectors.

The basic conclusions are:

o The evacuation tirne for the Sunrer Sunday case is detemined almost totally by the rate at which the beaches can be evacuated. Spe edi ng up the alerting and notification process simply accelerates the rate at which motorists enter the existing traf fic congestion, that ranges i up to a maximun of a hours 15 minutes. Figure III-20 shows the long oueues (backups) along the beaches.

o The. behavior of drivers who are caught in congestion within direct sight of the Seabrook Station can only De guessed at this time.

Any breakdown in orderly evacuation traf fic flw will result in evacuation times greater than the ones estimated above. Total evacuation times could range from 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months 30 minutes to la hours 40 ninutes for an evacuation in which traf fic control is generally i nef fective.

5. Special Facilities The entire school coeulation of 21,600 students can be evacuated by a fleet of 220 school buses within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 40 minutes af ter alert and notification for the condition of winter weekday. The detemining f actor is mobilizing the avail 3ble l schocl bus fleet. There are 7,180 pecole in the non-automobile owning population and 3,500 pecole in institutions. Together, they constitute 10 cercent of the total resident population within the EPZ. From A0 to 90 transit buses are recuired for se evacuation of the transit dependent popula tion. Frer 90 to 130 arbulances are

, required for the evacuation of the non-anbulatorf porulation in institutions. Evac-uation is completed within the 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 40 minute tire frane provided these vehicles l '

are available. All vehicle resources and maroower recuirerents are estimated for

,q the entire evacuation including speci al f acilities.

6. Confir-'ation Tires i A cassive sarclino concept is recrmended for confir ation.

firmation is censidered to be a good method. No estimate for the tire Telephone con h is given.

~1 8 LOCATION OF TRAFFIC QUEUES X.

,,, (SACKUPS) DURING SUMMER ' !:.

W:.sp.i:iM%@:b SUNOAY EyACUATION. IN t THESE QUEUES. TRAFFIC SPEEDS RANGE FROM ZERO To s MILES Ti: * . MAMPTON PER MOUR. ; -

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o Figure 111-20: Seabrook Traf fic Congestion Location 47

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7. Sumary of Local Meetings The contractor found that local of ficials are capab of directing a success-ful evacuation and that some of the resources are in place.gj On the other hand, some be costlyby provided resources 1983. are not now in place, and there is no assurance that they will Some of these resources are buses, antulances, siren systems, mot.ile public address equipment, and supplemental YHF radio equipment. The funding question is totally unanswered. Until it is answered, local officials are not like-ly to take evacuation planning seriously. Local officials are frustrated by funding issues and the planning process itself. There is considerable confusion over what actually constitutes an evacuation plan. With respect to evacuation planning, the predominant local concern is the lack of resources and the uncertainties surround-ing the funding of needed resources. With enough resources, the feasibility of an effective evacuation is not an important local concern. Local of ficials are con-cerned tion. They over the process for planning the evacuation and feel that they need direc-are concerned that they will not receive timely notification of events at the Seabrook Station that might lead to an evacuation order. The contractor has 4 recommendations:

infom local of ficials about the possible sources of funding for resources needed for evacuation; identify the actions that must be planned, and the resource needed for each action; recognize those action / resource combinations that should be planned first; and assign evacuation routes in detail, so that local officials can proceed with planning elements of local interest.

8. Principal Recommendations The gap in funds and manpower resources at the local level needs to be filled in order to achieve the estimated evacuation times.

Arranging for a fleet of buses and ambulances large enough to evacuate the transit dependent population needs to be addressed in local plans.

I The behavior of drivers on the beach and within sight of Seabrook needs to be addressed. Some possible action include sequential evacuation, sheltering the population, building supplemental and evacuation-only entrance ramps to I-95.

O 48

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E. Comparison with Licensee Estimates of Evacuation Times Eleven out of the 12 licen based on its requests in 1979 gs. submitted estimates The remaining of evacuation licensee timesitstoestimate should submit PlRC according to flRC. Seven of the licensee estimatts were completed in time to be used in limited ways by the contractors as they saw fit in view of their charge to perfom independent estimates. Citations are given nost places where used. Because of the differences between the NRC request and the FEMA statements of work, nany of the assumptions and bases are different for the two sets of estimates and therefore are not comparable. For example, the licensee estimates do not necessarily include the assumption of the 15-minute alert and notification of the public a3 evaluated by the FEMA contractors. The licensees were reauired to report 2 time estimates, a b5st estimate and an adverse weather estirate. The best estimate conditions were undefined by the NRC request. For infomation purposes, the 11 licensee estimates !

for the general population are summarizea in Table III-3 tiew York State and Suffolk County, flew York, are the only governmental estimates of evacuation times available and are identified by brackets.

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49

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'O Table III-3 Licensee Estimates of Evacuation Times for the General Population -

Evacuation Time Huclear Power Station EPZ Best Adverse Weather a

1. Indian Point 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 55 minutes 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 15 minutes

2. Zion 21 hours2.430556e-4 days 0.00583 hours 3.472222e-5 weeks 7.9905e-6 months not available

3. Limerick 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months 11 hours1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months 15 ninutes 4 Bailly 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 41 minutes 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 45 minutes

5. Three Mile Igland not available

6. Enrico Fermi 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 20 minutes 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 50 minutes

7. Beaver Valley 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 45 minutes 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 15 minutes c 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months 30 minutes 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months -

8. Shoreham

9. Seabrookd 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 10 minutes 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 10 minutes

10. Midland 8 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 10 minutes 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 50 minutes

11. Mil ls tone 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 35 minutes 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months 35 minutes

12. Maine Yankee 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 50 minutes 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 25 minutes

]

a state of New York estimates a worst case of 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months , bPrompt notification estimates are 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 40 minutes and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 20 minutes, respectively.

c These estimates are by Suffolk County.

dSeabrook estimates are only for vehicle evacuation time. The high population summer peak is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 30 minutes.

' Midland estimates are only for vehicle evacuation time assuming 10 minute l oadi ng.

50 m

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~.

}' IV.

Major Connents From State and local Officials

. An integral part of FEMA's independent assessment of evacuation times around 12 nuclear power stations is the ccrnmengy by State and local of ficials based on their review of the contractor reports._ To focus the review, FEMA asked 20 ques-tions dealing with methodology, assumptions and results. The topics for review are shown in Exhibit IV-1. The following is a synopsis of the commentary by stations.

. Indian Point ommenters: Disaster Preparedness Program of the Division of Milita nd Naval Af fairs and Department of Transportation, Stat of New Yo d .

1. nerally, the contractor is believed to have an adequat . e thodol ogy that yield reasonable and conservative answers for the road - od. An alterna-tive dynamic odel is suggested that could yield a closer si ation to actual con-di tions . Furtha study of congestion and shif ting popula n and auto occupancy rates is needed (u sensitivi ty analysis.

2 and 3. For thespurposes of the evacuation t .e estimates, the EPZ boundarias and population size and omposition are adequat O 4. There is no way to erify the contr tor's evaluation of the time of noti-fication based on the curren alerting an notification system without doing another s tudy.

5. The contractor greatly exag' rates the abrupt loading of the road network, completed within 35 minutes, by m ns the rapid 15-minute public notification system. People can not get not' i ed an o their cars that fast.

6. Generally, the conte ctor's definitions of ideal and adverse conditions are properly defined. However the bad weather scen4rios understate the ef fect of ad-verse weather on evacuat n times. Evacuation wob d take more time.

1. The evacuatio subareas are more reasonably de ned east of the Hudson River Furt r segregation is needed.

than on the west s)(e, especially Rockland County.

8. Local ro(teorology supports evacuation route assignme using general radial dispersion.

9. independence or objectivity of the contractor's assessme t was not im-pededb./T the use of previous assessments.

The evacuation times estimates for schools are fairly addressed b many 1.

plapning issues related to schools and other public institutions need to be dressed.

51

I rr.~

l j( 15.

Opinion with regard to recommendations vary considerably. State and local 1

j i government with less experience value the recommendations more highly than those with more experience who desire detailed analyses.

k !

16.

, Generally, the estimates of the evacuation times of the population are be-lieved to be far too short, mainly on account of the overly optimistic assumptions.

Indiana believes that the estimate for Bailly seems reasonable.

j 17.

For State and local government officials with much experience, the ass?ss-conceptualnot ments are tooisuseful in decisionmaking. For those with less experience, some j value achieved.

\

t 18 and 19.

I The assessments by the contractor are not useful as a planning tool for many State and local officials because they are not of sufficient detail nor i

did the consultants work sufficiently with those State and local of ficials. .

l

20. :

I that warrant Many interesting additional conments are made by State and local officials study.

i jl dL D. Seabrook l

Commenters :

New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency; Civil Defense Agency and Of fice of Emergency Preparedness of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Civil Defense, Hampton Falls, New Hampshire.

NOTE: Comments refer to the draf t report _.

1.

j Generally, the methodology is supported but some of assumptions, 'especially from the perspective of local government, are questioned.

=

[ 2 and 3.

For the purposes of the assessment, the EPZ boundaries and population yi estimates and compositions are adequate. There is local government concern that not enough detailed infonnation was gathered to support the overall estimates.

4.

I The description but the system is not. of the current alert and notification seems to be adequate 1

gj 5.

This question appears not to be understood by State and local officials.

S 6.

Ideal and adverse conditions are reasonably defined. There is local con-cern about weather conditions that invalidate an evacuation.

7. The subareas appear to be reasonably defined.

I 8. The impact of meterology is adequately addressed.

I 9.

The fact that there is general agreement with other studies might suggest independence but it is difficult to say with certainity.

58 o---- -- - - - - - , ,

'H .

l

'Y 10.

State and local officials challange the assumptions that lead to evacuation tiine estimates for the school population.

,,2 11 Views on confirmation of evacuation methods vary. No time estimate is g{ presen. ted.

12. There is not adequate treatment of sheltering.

13. The treatment of evacuation time for the special f acilities is treated ade-quately for the assessment, but not for planning purposes.

14. Other consideraticns may have to be taken into account before State and local of ficials can agree that all roads in the networt should be utilized in order to minimize evacuation times.

15. The reccrnr:mdations present ideas that are worthwhile considering in the context of the whole planning process. Only then could they be adopted.

16. State of ficials believe the evacuation time estimates are reasonable but some local of ficials are skeptical .

I

17. State and local of ficials do not find this assessment very helpful in de-ci sionmaki ng.

18. State and local of ficials did not find the assessment of evacuation time useful as a planning tool because of the way the study was conducted. More in-volvement of State and local of ficials should be required in any future FEMA spon-sored work.

19. There was insufficient interaction among the contractor and State and local official of ficials. A poor work program design and contractor perfonnance are both atteibuted to the f ailure to neet State and local goverrrnent expectations.

20. New Hampshire feels put upon by FEMA, i.e. , that "FEMA's concept of the Emergency Management Partnership was grossly violated by the Federal Partner in this endeavor and what benefit should have been derived from the project was lost."

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i V.

Discussion of the Methodolo,gies Generally, there are many similarities among the various A: L'aodologies used by the 3 contractors.

and specifically, in a number of assumptions that arevaricus madepoints atThe controversy a thex ghout, tention. in this part, first a discussion highlights the major issues of con-used in theThen, a standard principal planningmethodology, document, isthat is an alternative to the one currently presented to help in tha planning process t

A. Major Issue,s, i

i 1.

Definition of the, Plume Exposure Pat,hway EPZ Three dif ferent approaches are t4 ken by the contractors. CONSAD accepts e given the EPZ developed by the State of New York, although some reservations were comfrunicated to FEMA staf f, but never backed up by analysis in its report. Because of the relatively large size of the Indian Point EPZ, an average radius of 11.8 miles compared to traversetothe a radius EPZ isofgreater.

10 miles, the EPZ has a larger population and the distance tinie es timate. This combined ef fect results in a larger evacuation dcceptedVoorhees proposes governments.

by their respective EPZ's for both Zion and Seabrook, neither of which are yet The contractor uses the guidelines con-tained b ounda ri es . in the principal planning document, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, to determine the

! These are considerations of local conditions such as demography, top graphy, land characteristics, access routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries.

,i Generally, these EPIs have an average radius larger than 10 miles and include a correspondingly greater popula tion and longer travel routes.

in size than a circle of 10-mile radius to be used for planning purpose 1Tiith evaluates evacuation time on the 'aasis of the population within a EPZ circle 9n w -c, i

of 10-mile radius for assessment purposes.

The principal advantage of the approach used by C.WAS and Voorhees is that

j. evacuation time estiinates are useful for State and local government planning pur-poses.

, The principal advantage of the Smith approach is that it is more suitable for comparative purposes than for planning.

'i' 2.

Pooulation Estimat_es I

tion timePopulation estimates. estimates of all kinds are significant input data to the evacua-peak and seasonal populations at beaches.Of special concern are the frag.nentary and uncert For example, becaus- of the lack of any government data for the beaches near Seabrook, the contractor set up te4 Tile coun-l ters to help estimate the number of vehicles.

l Also, aerial photographs taken by the utility consultant were analyzed. Elsewhere, on account of the 90-day contract constraints, the contractors had to rely to various degrees on population data already 4

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N nerated by the utilities and therefore these data do not reoresent truly indenen-nt data inputs. Furthemore, there is some indication the c 1080 census data These

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ght indicate sinnificant population chances and shif ts w: thin sore EPZs.

[ uld be taken into account in future assessnents.

l; 3. Public Resconse Time Distributions .

- I There are a public response time distributicns - receive alert and notifi-All of these are e tion, leave work , travel time-wort-to here, and evacua te bore.

Aecessary action steos before evacuation of the auto-ownino cooulation benins The contractors dif fer in their analyses and

.Assuminn 't orininates from the home.

, 'assurotions with renard to the shane of the distributions and the tire durations.

..ye distributions also vary acccrdino to tire of tiay, season and weather cond For exarole, Snith assumes, without a basis, nomal distributions to des-J Voorhees uses a different distribution for each action ca rse . C0" 7 he.Cribe 'each action steo. step based on whatever local infomation is available, i'g. draws fra, tire the civil thed.efense literature The 'itterfor receivina warnino an s

.' preparation to cover next three steps. seers to have sore basis

.. jn the civil defense literature.

L Mj- !!otwithstandinq the dif ferent approaches, Voorhees and CO"SAD arrive at

similar tires for 100 cercent preparation for evacuation under the condition of Y nomal wortday and current alertinq and notification. These tires are 3 bours

. 10 minutes and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 30 minutes for Zion and Indian Point respectively.

- For the 15-minute alerting and notification assurotion, CMSAr e s tira tes 4k about 35 ninutes whereas Snith esticates 75 ninutes. Voorhees does not oresent enough infomation to determine this factor. Smi th truncates the uppe r tails of the distribution with the ef fect of shortening the naxinum time for the cur'ilative distribution to 100 percent.

l The rodelinn of the various public response time distributions is critical l

l ; because it accounts for ruch time and detemines the rate which autorchiles enter l

the hichway network and therefore the concestion that builds uo if there a capacity constraint with its Consecuent delay tires. Of narticu* ar concern is the unne r tail of the distributions that helps to detemine the final evacuation time.

Al so ,

Field research is needed to better describe the various distributions.

better use of the existing civil defense literature could be be17ful in for-ulatirn !

a rore profound understandino of human behavior under evacuation corditions. For exarnle, FE"A is conducting studies on the implications of natu bazards evacua-tion warninq for crisis relocaticn planninn for nuclear attack _ An "ei^e rce nt nom" theory of collective behavior was developed that could possibly arply in the present situation. Thc theory explains collective action of reople on the basis of a spontaneous search for meanina by oeople that would be confronted by an otherwise unstructured situation; the social noms which are created as an outco"e of the Search for reaning which provide structure or Cuidelines for subsenuent 9roup Mtions. In '.be "eanti"e, sersitivity analyses can be ccnducted to de *er-rine tae influence of the shape and duration of the distriFutions on the evacuation tires.

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Y 4 Highway Model, There are 4 aspects of the highway evacuation model that warrant attention -

dynamics, capaci ties, queuing, and wea ther.

All 3 contractors used models that recognize the rate at which vehicles en- O ter the highway network. The rate aspect appears to be th.s most significant dynami-cat aspect of the model, especially in view of the 15-minute warning and notifica-tion assumption. All contractors use models that approximate what happens on the network as a function of time, by identifying critical intersections, or links, where congested or queuing may occur. However, h'ew York State seems to think that still more should be known in tenns of networt behavior as a function of time. Ap-parently, this improvement would require further refinement of the models and addi-tional data inputs. Models that estimate the physical length of queues omi their impact on the network would be an improvement. The Voorhees model has elements that can do this.

There is much controversy over the assignment of capacities to particular highwsys, and in this regard, which highways to seli?ct as evacuation routes in vies of the capacities assigned. Perhaps the only way to resolve this controversy 1: by means of sensitivity analyses that can be conducted by selecting ranges of capaci-ties and evaluating the differences by the changes in estimate of evacuation ti.nes.

The phenotnenon of queuing, or cars waiting in lines at critical intersec-tions or where there are capacity bottlenecks, is highlighted by all 3 contractors as being an evacuation problem. The severity of delay is illustrCed in Figures V-1 and V-2 for Zion. More study on how to relieve queuing is needed, especially under conditions of the 15-mir.1te warning and notification assumption. The behavior of trivers in queues is a related topic of concern, especially at Indian Point, Zion, f tillstone and Seabrcok.

The contractors investigated the impact of weather, but only under conditions O

where vehicles could s?.lli move, which accounts for the bulk of time. Incapacitating snowstorms are recognized but not studieri in depth by any of the contractors. Stra-tegies, snch as snow removal or sheltering, need to be addressed in future assess-ments or in the plannin;; process itself. Even when the highwdy networt is still cperational, many of the State and local commenters do not believe that weather impacts have been taken adequately into account. Of special interest is the re-lationship between weather and congestion.

5. Special Facil,ities The treatment of special facilities by all contractors gives a great deal of insignt into the planning problems for persons falling into this category. In the broadest sense, special facilities includes school populations, the public transport dependent populations, and the special vehicle dependent populations.

CONSD mi Voorhees choose to evacuate school children by school bus to schools O

62

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l htside the EPZs. Smith chooses dispersb1 cf school children within the EPZ to l

their parents custody, as being the quickest way to evacuate them. How this will be done finally remains the responsibility of State and local planners. The vari-ous contractor approaches do illustrate the problems associated with resource constraints and mobilization times and the exploration of these options could be helpful to planners in their final decisionnakira.

Evact. tion of public transport and special vehicle dependent populations of various kind is less well evaluated in tFe contractor reports, but qualitatively do explore some of the options and their consequences. The resource-time tradeof f is the most interesting one studied by Voorhees at Zion and Seabrook. Fore elaborate analyses appear to be best conducted in the centext of local planning rather than the assessnent because of the detailed nature of the individual facilities and popula tions .

6. Sheltering Sheltering is not well addressed by the cetractors, although there is sone coerentary on special facilities on a site-by-site basis. A great deal more work needs to be done on this subject and its interrelationship with eguation. It is important to note that there is an absence of practical guidance

7. Confirmation Time The contractors explore the concepts of a number of active and passive

{-d would take to confirm evacuation.lstens More but ofon work ferthis no subject detailedis analyses needed tothat es- are really useful tablish some preferred method or methods that would be help'ul to State and local pla nners .

8. Recommendations The contractors present a broad range of recommendations on various aspects of improving the evacuation time. There are 2 major categories, planning and re-sources. Planning is the category that shows a lot of ootential, but cannot be j accomplished without the proper resources. The Voorhees assessments of Zion and Seabrook are particularly good in highlighting, as examples, what can be gained I through adequate planning and resources. An example of the resource and manpower requirements for Zion is shown in Table V-1. Action / resource matrices were dev-eloped in connection witn the study of Seabrook and are illustrated in Figures V-3 through V-5. For each individual action in the evaluation secuence, the resources necessary for its implementation are identified.

B. A Standard Methodolg Many of the issues above can be better understood by usg a standard metho-dol ogy. As a result of the work ccrnpleted by FEMA and NRC - supported by the FEMA l

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O contractors, the utilities and their contractors, and comments by State and local officials, a more standard cethodology was developed to replace Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, January 1980. (See Exaibit Y-1.) Although not the final word, it represents the next stage in the methodological development of the esti-mates of evacuation times. The development of a standardized computer simulation model would be helpful to State and local of fi~cials to test various assumptions and data inputs. Accordingly, good evacuation times might be move speedily put into place.

Table V-1: Resource and Manpower Requirements for Zion EPZ RANGE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR EVACUATION OF RESOURCE ENTIRE ZION EPZ I! VEHICLES I

h School Buses 480 buses Transit Buses 170-200 buses Ambulances 180-290 :inbulances

! Traf fic Control 140 police cruisers l

Towing 30-50 towing vehicles 1

l t MANPOWE R School Bus Orivers 480 drivers Transit Bus Drivers 170-200 drive rs Antulance Drivers 180-290 drive rs Traffic Control 140-210 traf fic of ficers Towing Operators 30-50 towing operators O

66 m

f n Footnotes V

Many of the listed documents can be obtained for a fee from:

The National Technical Information Service (NTIS)

Springfield, Virginia 22161;

U.S. Government Printing Of fice (GPO)

Washington, D.C. 20402; and The NRC Public Document Rocm (PDR) 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555

1/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Of fice of International and State Programs.

"Guide and Check List for the Development and Evaluation of State and local Government Radiological Emergerncy Response Plans in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities," NUREG-75/111 (Reprint of WASH-1293) (Revision No. 1 12/01/74),

1975. See planning element J 6, p. 26. Available from NTIS.

-2/ New Yort State, Of fice of Disaster Preparedness, Nuclear Civil Protection Planning Section. ' Evacuation Ar.alysis--10 Mile Radius--Indian Point Nuclear Reactor Si te," December 1979.

3/ New York State, Office of Disaster Preparedness and Department of Health.

"Evacuation Analysis: Indian Point Site," May 1978.

-4/ Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactors, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Letter to all power reactor licensees, October 10, 1979.

5/ Brian K. Grimes, Director, Emergency Preparedness Task Group, Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Letter to all power reactor licensees, November 29, 1979.

6/ Brian K. Grimes, Director, Emergency Preparedness Task Group, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Letter to applicants for construction permits ar.d licensees of plants under construction, Decenter 26, 1979,

7/ U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress,1st Session, Committee on Government Operations, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee.

Hearing, November 1,1979, "Response to Committee Report on Emergency Planning and Related Safety Issues: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversignt," GPO,1980.

8/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission and Federal Emergency Management Agency.

"Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plan's and Preparedness in Support of Huslear Power Plants, for Interim Use and Comment," (HUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1) (January 1980).

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rgency Planning" (Proposed Rule),10 CFR Part 50, 44 Fed. Reg. 75167, ester 19,1979).

.4emorandum of Understanding Between NRC and FD4A to Accomplish a Prompt Improvement in Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness," 45 Fed.

Reg. 5847 (January 24, 1980).

See footnote 10.

John F. Ahearne, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiesion. Letter to the Honorable John W. Macy, Jr. , Director, Federal Emergency Management

,, Agency, March 4,1980. )

l e

/ See footnote 12. )

Statement of Wort - Indian Point.

}/ Statement of Wort - Zion.

s L6/ Statement of Wort - Limerick, Bailly, Three Mile Island, Enrico Fenni, Beaver 7 Valley, Shoreham, Seabrook, Midland, Millstone, and Maine Yankee.

17/ Statement of Wort - Seabrook.

h/ Modification of Statement of Wort for Seabrook.

M/ John !!. Macy, Jr. , Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, letters to Governors of the States of New Yort, Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, April 22, 1980.

E/ CONSAD Research Corporation and Center for Planning and Research, "An Assess-ment of Evacuation Time Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," Final Report, Contract Number EMW-C-0257, June 20,1980, and revised June 23, 1980.

"Executive 3ummary: An Assessment of Evacuation Time Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," Draf t Final Report, Contract Number EMW-C-0257,

August 21, 1980. Letter to Mr. Joseph Hein, New York Of fice of Disaster Preparedness, August 4,1980. "Proposal for Assessment of Evacuation Time ,

y Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," Technical Proposal, Request for Proposal No. EMW-R-0257, February 15, 1980.

i 21/ Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, "Zion Nuclear Power Station Evacuation Analy- i l ,e sis, Estimate of Evacuation Times," Final Report, Contract Number EMW-C-0256,

June 1980. "Definition of Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Boundary," Technical !

l ; . Memorandum #1, April 1980. "Methodology for Computing Evacuation Times,"

' '

Technical Memorandum #2, April 1980. ' Assessment of Evacuation Time Around i

the Zion Nuclear Power Station," Technical Proposal, Request for Proposal i i

-) . No. EHW-R-0256, February 15, 1980. ;

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22/ Wilbur Snith and Associates, "An Evacuation Tine Assess'mnt of t!ine ttuclear Power Plants Energency Plannino Zones," Progran P.eport, Volume 1, Contract t'urber EPW-C-0250, June 1980. Also, "Proposal for An Assessnent of Evacuation Tire Around Ten t!uclear Power Plants," Technital Proposal, Volume 1, Reouest for Pronosal tio. E!"A a-0258, Fehn;ary 13, 1980. Individual assessments are as

, follows:

Volume II. Bailly f!uclear Power Plant Evacuation Tire Assessment Volume III. Peaver '! alley fluclear Power Plant Evacuation Time Assessnent Volune IV. Enrico Femi !!uclear Power Plant Evacuation Tine Assessment Volure V. Linerick Nuclear Power Plant Evacuation Tine Assessment Volure VI. "aine Yankee iluclear Power Plant Evacuation Tine Assessment Volure VII. i'idland "uclear Power Plant Evacuation Time Assessment volure VIII. "illstone '!uclear Power Olant Evacuation Tine Assessnent Volure IX. Shoreham t'uclear Power Olant Evacuation Time Assessnent Volume X. Three ?'ile Island !!uclear Power Plant Evacuation Tine Assessment "Executive Sunnary" is also available.

-23/ Alan t'. Voorhees and Associates, "Seabrook Station Evacuation Analysis, Esti-mate of Evacuation Tires," Final Report, August 1980. Also, Draf t Pecort, July 1980, and "Sairmary of Local Peetinos," August 1980.

2a/ See footnc' 23, "Surmary of Local "eetings."

25_/ Indian Point: Parsons Prinkerhof f Cuade and Douqlas, Inc. for Power Authority of the State of !!ew York and Consolida ted Edison of !!ew York , Inc. , "Evacua-tion Time Estimates for Areas !! eat the Site of Indian Point Power Plants,"

Ja nuary 31, 1980.

Zion: Stone and Webster Engineering Cornoration for Conmnnwealth Edison Company, "Prelirinary Evacuation Time Study of the 10-mile Radius Eeercency Dianning Zone at the Zion Station," January 1980.

Lirerick: !!US Comoration for Philadelphia Electric Conpany, "Linerick I. clear Generating Station Preliminary Evacuation Tine Estinates," July 19P0. j l

Dailly: ETA Enqineering, Inc. and Lester B. Knight and Asociates, Inc. for ;

l'orthern Indiana Public Service Connany, "Evacuation Tine Estimate for !! orth-ern Lake and Porter Counties, Indiana.," August 1,1980.

Enrico Femi: PRC Voorhees for Detroit Edison Company, "Preliminary Estimate of Evacuation Times," October 10, IcPO.

Reaver Valley: Alan fi. Voorhees and Associates for Ducuesne Light, "Prelin-inary Estinates of EPZ Evacuation Tires," January 30, 1980.

Shorehan: Suffolk County Departnent of Transportation for Departrent of Ener-gency Preparedness, "The Transnortation Element for Evacuation in the Vicinity l of the Shoreham ):uclear Power Station," a prelininary report. Submi tted by l Long Island Lighting Connany, August 7,1980. g 88

Seabrook: } tift Associates for Public Service of New }{ampshire, "Preliminary

.= Evacuation Claar Time Estinates for Areas near Seabrook Station," August 4, l 1900.

7 tiidland: IN Associates for Consumers Power Company, "Evacuation Clear-Time

- ,P -. Estimates for Areas near the Itidiand, flichigan fluclear Power Station," March 1990.

f tillstone: Storch Enoineers and flortheast Utilities Senice Company for I!ortheast ?!uclear Energy Company, "A Feasibility Report on Evacuation of the Area Around the !!illstone l'uclear Power Station," t' arch 1980, l'aine Yankee: Edward C. Jordan Company for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Coreany,

""aine Yankee EPZ Evacuation Time Estimates Energency Planning Zone," f'ay 23, 1980, 26/ Corrents from State and Local Of ficials.

27/ F.onal d '.!. Perry, Principal Investigator, Battelle flunan Af fairs desearch Centers, Seattle, Washington 00105. Prepared for Federal Emergency ?'anace-ment Agency under contract CCPA 01-78-C-0301, Wort Unit 4821f. "The Irplica-tions of l'atural Hazard Evacuation !!arninq Studies for Crisis Relocation Pl a nni ng ." Draf t Final Report, August 1979.

28/ Federal Emeroency Manacenent Agency, "Report to the President, State Radio-

~

logical Emergency Planning and Preparednes. in Support of Comrercial t!uclear Power Plants," June 30,19o0, p.111-3 5. Available fro- the Radiologic.al Erergency Preparedness ".ivi sion, FE"A.

20/ Thoras Urbanik, Arthur resrosiers, '1ichael K. Lindell, and C. Pichard Schuller, na ttelle !! uran Af fairs Research Centers, Seattle, Washington. Prepared for the U.S. !!nclear Degulatory Comnission under contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830.

"Analysis of Tecnicues for Estiratine Evacuation Times for Emercency Planning Zones." nitADC 401/CO-017, June lord. Available as t't! REG /CR-1745, ?!ovember 1990.

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ML20207C469

Text

Dear Mr. Dircks:

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