ML20207C460
| ML20207C460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1988 |
| From: | Bores R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Eric Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| References | |
| OL-S-006, OL-S-6, NUDOCS 8808090231 | |
| Download: ML20207C460 (24) | |
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- 88 JLL 19 PS :37 Edward A. Thomas, Chaiman Regional Assistance Comittee
.f Federal Emergency Management Agency f0Ck...ib 6 ~.NEi.
John W. McCormack Post Office and Court House susc8 Boston, Massachusetts 02102
Dear Mr. Thomas:
Reference:
RAC Coments on Transient Beach Population for Seabrook Station subsequent to our April 15, 1987 meeting of the.kegional Assistance Committee on the above subject, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i: sued its MEMORANDUP AND ORDER on April 22, 1987 relative to the Public Service Company of New Hampshire petition for a one-mile plume emergency planning zone, in that document, the Board concluded that the current studies provided by the applicant did not provide a prima facie showing to warrant the granting cf the one-mile plume EPZ petition. The Board deliberately left open the possibility of granting the petition if convincing infomation'is subsequently provided.
Even though the beach population issues differ substantially from the above litigation, because of it and because the NRC staff has not yet completed its review of all issues in the Seabrook and BNL" studies, I recomrend that the O
r^c aot re< reace these steeses or spec $<4c coateats ia cor preseat coasie-eration of the beach population issues.
revisee sections for the RAC report.
With that in mind, I am proposing seven through ten.
These proposed revisions involve pages For your convenience, a clean, rewritten copy of the RAC position paper incorporating these revisions is enclosed.
Should yow have any questions concerning the above, please contact r.e at FTS 486-1213.
! woulc be very happy to treet with yot, and/or the RAC to discuss my response.
Robert J. Bores
-A Technical Assistant Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
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O PROTECTION OF NEW HMPSHIRE,8EACH POPULATIONS The requiresnents for emergency preparedness stem free 10 CFR (2), which state that except as provided in 10 CFR 50.47(d) (relative licensing of a facility for operation up to 5% of rated pewtr), no license for a nuclear pcwer reactor will be issued unless a fin the NRC that 'there is reasonable assurance that adequate protec base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings a i
The NRC will whether state and local ee.ergency plans art adequate and whether th) reasonable assurance that they can be irnplerented The FEPA finding is prir.arily based on the review emergency plans.
in considering whether there is reasonable assurance t implecentee.
Paragraph b offsite eeergency respons(e) plans for nuclear power re of 10 CFR 50.47 requires that the onsite and planning standards.
NUREG 0654/FEFA-REP-1, ' Criteria for Preparation and Evalua O
was issued to provide a comon reference and guidance scurce for state and Erergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear local goverrc.ents and licensees in the developrent of ecergency response plans and preparedness for response to a radiological ecergen j
for FEMA, kRC and other federal agencies for use in the rtview of t and preparedness.
nuclear pcmer plants was taken frce NUREG 0396/ EPA Basis for the Developcent of State and local Goverreen/1-78-016, ' Planning Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Pcwer Plants' gical Emergen t Radiolo objective of the emergency response plans is to provide dcse savin
'The overall some cases irrediate life sayings) for a spectrVF produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs" (NUREG 0654).of accidents that it attempted to identify the boundarthat the planning basis range from s and of potential accident consequences, y parameters based on available knowledge timing of releases, and release charac-teristics (source ters).
PAGs do not equate with loss of life or even c health hazardIt sho between radiation risk and that of taking a protec The PAGs were nce constraints to that action.
ence of O
Enclosure
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O Relative to the adequacy of erergency preparedness for the Seabrock beach population..NUREG 0654 elecents J.9 and J.10 appear to be pertinent to the s i tua tion.
Elerent J.9 states, in part, that each state and local plan must establish a capability for implecenting protective measures based upon protec-tive action guides and other criteria.
Element J.10 states that these plans to feplerent protective measures shall include in part: aaps showing evacuation routes and areas, relocation (reception) cen,ters and the population distribution around the nuclear facility by evacuatien areas; the means to notify all segeents of resident and transient population; the reans for pro-tect'.ag persons whose robility r.ay be impaired; the rearts of reloca*. ion reception centers / host facilities; projected. traffic capacities of svacu;ation routes under erergency conditions; control of access to evacuated areas and organizational responsibilities for control; identification of and r.eans for dealing with potential impediments to use of evacuation routes and contingenc ceasures; tire estfrates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based i
on a dynamic analysis; and the bases for choice of recoenended protective actions for the plure exposure pathway during erergency caditions, including consideration of local protection available and estimated evacuation times.
REYlEY OF NEY HAMPSHIRE PLAN, REYlS!0N 2, AUGUST,1986 J.9
-- The RAC review of eierent J.9, the establishrent of capability for O
implereatias protective measures, for both the state aad locai ievei plans, has indicated that no apparent action was warranted by the State at this time for this element.
This eierent was rated
' inadequate
- for the State, hcwever, because the RAC had not yet resolved the "beach population issue' the subject of this document New Hampshire is also currently reexam,ining 411 ecergency resource.
needs and the resource availability and distrib. tion to support protective act'a implerentation.
The resource needs and availability acea will be reviewed by the p.AC after ccepletion of the NF study.
Based on the RAC and my examination of the plans and preparedness for the beach population and those individuals in unwinterized housing, I conclude that these populations can be appropriately protected by implecenting those provisions of the current NH ecergency plans.
this area that has not been adequately addressed.There appears to b J.10.a -- The RAC review of eierent J.10.a relative to beach population protective action implerentation, i.e., the raps of evacuation both the State and local plans, reveal no inadewacies. ro o
' inadequacy" was identified with re (An mental sampling locations; however, gard to the map of the environ-population protection c4asure implementation.this is unrtlated to beach fications were _recocr. ended for bus route raaps. Several minor clari-the beach population, this' eierent appears to be adequate,Hcwever, rela i
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J.10.b -- The PAC review of element d.10.b. maps showing population distri-bution by evacuation areas around the nuclear facility, indic' ate no iriadequacies for either the State or local plans.
No actions were required of nor recorrended to the State for this element.
J.10.c -- Relative to J.10.c. the neans for notifying all segments of the population, the RAC left the evaluation of the State portion of this element 'open* pending completion of the FFERIP-43 (now FD%. REP-10 Nov. 85) review of the alert / notification system.
For the local plans this element was rated ' inadequate" because details were not provided relative to provisions for identifying siren failures and for providing backup notffication in those instances of identified siren failures.
It should be noted that this inadequacy was generic for all town plans and was not applicable only to the beach population.
The physical siren system and the administrative procedures, plans and means for alerting and notifying the public appear to be in place and adequate.
Provisions for early notification of beach populations with both siren tones and voice message capability are in place. The alert / siren system can be activated on an individual siren basis, in i
groups, or as the entire system to provide flesibility to the Q
decision makers to acccmodate the circumstances of the event.
J.10.d -- Relative to J.IO.d. the neira for protecting persons whose mebility is impaired, the PAC identified no inadequactes at either the State or local level.
Provisions were found adequata for health care facilities, Rockingham County Jail, schools, etc.
Relative to
' individuals with special needs", bewever, the RAC left this item
'open* pending a review at a future date by FDM of the lists of such i
special needs individuals.
This open item is generic to the entire i
EPZ and is NOT unique to the beach population.
The PAC also recccrended that the protection factors for special facilities be considered in any K! administration decision as they are when considering evacuation of these facilities. (The current provisions use no designated protection factors for special facil-ities when calculating projected thyroid doses for purposes of K!
administration decisions.)
j J.10.e -- Element J.10.e, provisions for use of XI, is not applicable to the beach population, at least not in any unique sense.
Therefore, no evaluation is considered here.
The PAC rated this element 'ade-quate".
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J.10.f -- Element J.10.f. decision making for use of K! is not directly applicable to the beach population and, therefore-~Ts not conside he re.
The MC rated this element ' adequate',
i J.10.g -- Relative to J.10.g. the rieans of relocation, the UC found p visions to be "adequate' at both the State and local levels.
did, however, have a nurber of recoesnendations in this area relat The MC to plan and procedure inconsistencies in the bus and arbulance the nechanism for determining precisely the number o These inconsistencies, howeverpersons to be accoernodated by th were judged _not to result in a, lack of resource provisions tow l
adequately accormodate those needing transportation.
J.10.h -- Relative to J.10.h. relocation centers, the MC found that pr for reception centers and host facilities wert ' adequate".
tional needs or recoceendations were identified.
No addi-J.10.1 -- Relative to J 10.1, projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes, the MC indicated that the appropriate traffic capacity data were provided.
No inadequacies were identified for this element.
O 0.10.j -- Relative to J 10.j, control of access to evacuated areas o
found no inadequacies.
the MC provisions to perfore this function.The State has responsibility and adequa workers and access logs.for this element concerned radio J.10.k -- Rela tive to J.10. t, identification of and means for dealing with potential irspediments to the use of evacuation routes, the MC found no inadequacies but did have one additional recocr.endation to be considered by the State for possible improvement.
found to be ' adequate". equi;> ment, procedures and letters of ag Inventories of J.10.1 -- Relative to J.10.1, evacuation tire estimates, the MC has rev the 'Seabrook Station Evacuate Time Estimate Stud RERP) and concluded that although the study was
'y" (Vol. 6 of the adequate' in terir.s of femat, there still exist a number of technical essentially l
issues that are of concern and need be addressed.
technical concerns can be grouped into several areas:The bulk of these tions" were generalltimes appear to be overly pessimistic in that th the evacuation data or conditions; y utilized whenever there were uncertainties in inconsistencies in data or results were not clear; and r.aps and tables had some inconsistencie 0
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l It should be noted that the purpose of Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) is not to provide data showths that any or all areas can necessarily be evacuated prior to plume arrival, but rather to provide the decision makers with the best estimate of times needed to evacuate a given area (s) under the circumstances such that the most appropriate decision can be made relative to uttether to evacuate an area (s) and the timing of such recosmendations.
J.10.m -- Relative to J.10.m. bases for choice of protective actions for the plume exposurt pathway, the RAC left this ites 'open', citing element J.9 in its coerents.
No specific actions were asked of nor recom-l rended to the State to resolve this issue.
As with J.9, there appears to be no unique problem associated with the beach populations which has not Fiien adequately addressed by the NH plans.
Sumary - In reviewing the RAC coments relative to the adequacy of provisions for being able to protect the beach population, only element J.10.c was lef t "inadequate" (lack of detailed provisions in local plans concerning the identification of siren failures and backup notifica-tion capability). Element J 10.d was left "open' pending FEMA review of lists of ' individuals with special needs'.
This item is not O
specific to the beach population but is generic to the EPZ.
Elements J.9 and J.10.m were lef t "open', basically awaiting RAC resolution of the ' beach population issue', but citing no specific inadequacies.
As noted above, no' additional or unique actions appear to be required to adequetely protect the beach populations. Element J.10.1, although rated ' adequate", can be conndered 'open" pending the provision of additional clarification of data / assumptions /results in the evacuation time study.
Overall, there appears to be no identified technical problem which has a significant potential for precluding adequate protection of the beach populations (including those persons residing in unwinterized shelters).
ADDITIONAL PLAN DISCUSSION C454 criteria (after RAC cowents are resolved) in the generi This rieans that the plan should be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety can be protected during a spectrum of emergency scenarios.
the offsite land uses and demography.In addition, particular attention was high seasonal populations have been studied in depth over a number by a number of organizations.
Volume 6 of the KH RERP, Seabrook Station Evacuation Tire Study, incorporates many of the results of those studies, expands on other studies and provides additional data and clarifications in other areas.
Q attention was focused on the beach areas, the seasonal pop of conditions in all were examined in this study). evacuation durin For surner accident
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scenarios, the evacuation tine estimates for the beach populations ranged from about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 10 minutes to about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 20 minute evacuate individual 4reas has been given.
Steilar evacuation tire estimates 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 20 minutes to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes according to th these studies tended to raximize parameters in the direction of increasing
- Again, e vacuation times.
(The more likely situation would involve more rapid evac.
ua tions. )
As noted earlier, the ETEs are required to provide the decision of the tic)es likely to be needed to evacuate a given ar circumstances at the tine of the accident. This inforvation is necessary to make the opticum decision relative to the type and timing of protective action recorrendations for a given situation.
The State and local plans include rany special considerations for protecting t.he beach populations.
Some of those considerations are listed below.
1.
public access to the beach at the Alert erergency class classification level, no offsite action would be ordinarily warranted to At this protect the public, but its consideration here would provide additional tire to clear the beaches or prevent addit
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beach, just in case the situation worsens.ional public access to the O
Note: Even at the Site Area te.ersency c, ass 4rscatioa, one cuid oreinar11 tective actions would not be necessary to protect the public.7 excect that offsite pro 2
An alert and notification system has been installed with the beach areas to provide siren coverage.
The strens can be activated individually, in j
selected groups or as the total system, can be rotated for better cover or fixed in any direction, and can also carry voice ressages and erargenc ins t ruc tions.
The system has backup activation capability locally in each tow n.
3.
Administrative provisions and wordinaticn of eeergency instructions to be broadcast have been provided to enable the decision rakers the flexi to get the rest appropriate ressage aired in a ticely ranner for the spectrum of pssible scenarios.
free that wten the ecergency organizations are fully staffed and follcwing a slowly developing situation to the unlikely case when the situation is rapidly developing, obviously severt in nature, and occurs t
prior to erergency organizationt being able to fully staff or assess the situation.
4 Procedures and resources have been provided to assist the public in evacuating the beaches, for directing and controlling traffic, for providing transportation for those without vehicles and for removing impedirents or obstructions along evacuation routes.
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Provisions have also been made to coordinate New Hampshire decisions regarding New Har6pshire beach populations with Massachusetts for consid-eration regarding the Massachusetts beach areas.
CISCUSSION The foregoing discussions have indicated that the current NH plans meet or will meet the criteria of NUREG 0654 in a generic sense. Specific and cetailed procedures have been provided to assure early notification and evacuation of the beach population can be effected should the plant status appear to be threatening.
The review of these plans and procedures do not indicate the presence of concerns or situations involving the beach popu-lations which warrant unique solution or provisions beyond those already incorporated.
Relative to the beach population, the distance to the Seabrook Station from the nearest beach area is almost two miles. This distance provides additional time to evacuate beach areas from the time of release until the frors edge of the plume arrives over the beach area (assuming the wind is blowing to the beach). This distance also can provide considerable dispersion and oilution of the plume activity in traveling from the sito to the beach.
(The magnitude O
dut covie de severe, oreert of mesaituee-)cf concentration decrease is depen sot <:
if eispersioa eae eilution are small, then the impact (d, albeit "hot" area must Le small and the corresponding number of affected persons is also con;iderably smaller and presur. ably easier to protect.
It is also noted that when large, seasonal beach crowds ara likely to be present (on hot and sunny days), the typical wind pattern is from the off-shore, cooler surface to the onsbore, warmer surfaces of the land masses.
This means that any "sea breezes" would likely prevent the plume from traveling directly to the nearby beach areas when the beaches are most heavily populatec.
The sea breeze would also dilute a short tern plume even if a portion of it was recirculated to beach areas.
The analyzed sevtre accident scenarios (core melt with early containment failure) indicate that the major portion of the dose to the affected popula-tion from such an event is due to exposure to deposited radioactive materials on the ground surfaces rather than from the passing plume.
The risk / consequence codes generally used (CRAC models or MACCS) all assume that the population is exposed to this ground deposition for 24-hours after the -
arrival of the first portion of the plume and to any additional plumes over that area.
In other words, the codes assume that no protective actions are implemented for 24-hours after the release reachesThe beach (or other areas of interest).
In view of the NH plans for beach closure and access control as O
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eerly as the Alert classification, the plume travel tirne to the beach areas and the r'elatively short (2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) time estimated to clear the beaches, there is reasonable assurance that the beach population would be adequately protected in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station. Thus, even if there were a prompt, severe, contaminating release and a portion of the beach population were cau evacuation process,ght in or under the plume for two hours during the their exposure to deposited radioactivity would only be approxinately 2/24 or less than one-tenth of the code assumed dose.
In addition, they would be avoiding any additional exposure to the plume (s) af ter leaving this area.
The overall objective of emergency response plans', as cited in NUREG 0654, is
"...to provide dose savings (and in some cases, imediate life savings) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs.
It has never been the intent of emergency preparedness / emergency plans to guarantee that no one would ever be exposed to radiation, or exposed in excess of the epa PAGs as a result of any accident or postulated accident.
- Rather, the purpose is to minimize the risks (produce dose savings) to the extent possible under the circumstances of the given accident.
In this context, it is clear that it would be inappropriate to judge the adequacy of emergency planning on the basis of whether or not the plans and preparedness can guarantee that no one would be exposed in excess of the PAGs as a result of p
any accident scenario.
As stated earlier, the PAGs are guidance tools for use by decision makers and are not levels of acceptable or unacceptable risks.
The adequacy of emergency plans must be based on a finding that "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."
Edward Christenbury of the NRC cefined the hRC position relative tc "reasonable assurance" in his letter to Spence Ferry of FEMA, dated June 18,1986, (copy attached). This position appears to be applicable to the protection of the Seabrook area beach popu-lations.
A similar analysis for persons inhabiting non-winterized facilities wculd parallei the above.
Further, this subset of the beach population would opear to be less at risk than the beach population with no,helter; would be a smaller number than the beach population; and would generally be treated as part of the local population group.
(Those persons in properties on the beach front would be considered part of the beach population during daytime beach season.)
Since precautionary evacuation for nearby areas appears to be the accepted -
federal and state protective action strategy if the EPA FAGS are projected to be exceeded, the sheltering potential of buildings, other than identified special facilities, is generally not considered for populations within about a 2 mile radius.
Fersons inhabiting unwinterized buildings in this area would be treated in the same manner as other (year round) residents, i.e.,
evacuated.
Persons outside this area may be considered separately on an ad n
hoc basis by the decision makers. Finally, it is noted that habitation of V
unwinterized buildings is generic to all sites with nearby beach or resort areas and that this situation is not unique to Seabrook. The New Hampshire provisions for these individuals near the Seabrook site appear to be well advanced in comparison with those at other applicable sites.
9 1
O CONCLUSIONS Following ar'e some of the areas considered above which were utilized in arriving at a conclusion relative to the beach populations.
NM state and local plans essentially meet NUREG 0654 criteria generically Special provisions for beach populations in place No identified problems requiring unique or unaddressed solutions Provisions for early warning of beach populations Adequate transportation resources available for those needing public transit Beaches are nearly two miles from station affording delay in plume arrival and dilution and dispersion of plume Sea breezes would tend to keep plume from traveling directly toward beach when beaches are most populated ETEs for beaches are relatively small "keasonable assurance" coes not equate with "absolute safety", i.e.,
guarantee of no exposures or exposures above the PAGs Esased on the above, it appears that contingent on the completion of action by the State to resolve the other RAC concerns with the New Hampshire and local plans, those plans appropriately provide for dose savings for the spectrum of possible accidents and are adequate to provide reasonable assura.1ce that the teach and unwinterized housing popu'lations will be protected and that these plans will essentially meet the criteria of NUREG 0654 anc the intent of the hRC regulations in this area.
Attachment:
Letter from Christenbury to Perry dated June 18, 1986 0
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Nt)CLCAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MA MM ton. o. c. Mos June 18,1986 cc:
J. Allan
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J. Gutierrez Spence W. Perry, Acting General R. Starostecki Counsel
- 8. Kane Federal Emergency Management Agency S. Ebneter g,ou g4g B. Johnston 500 C Street S.W.
T. M n Washington, D.C.
20471 R. Bellamy B. Lazarus 6/24/86-TEM In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al.
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
~~
Docket Noe. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL
Dear Mr. Perry:
In nsponse to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we han e valuat ed, in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your office, an ur: Md memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Ropes and Gray on t
w; of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear plant
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evaluation is set forth in the following discussion.t Att ch= at
.e The Dignan Memorandum addresses what are described as "three mismnc tion s" pertaining to offsite emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear plant, and concludes that they are "fals e as matter of law" (Dignan Memorandum at 1).
These purported "misconceptions" an as follows:
A.
That the plan s must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and sa.fety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.
D.
That it must be demonstreted that the plans wiD assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planedng Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain tima.
In' particular, there have been assertions that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in approximately 1/2 hour.'
O 1 It should be noted, however, that under the Commission's regulations.
10 CFR l 50.3. only written regu1& tory interpretations provided by the General Counsel will be recognl ed as binding upon the Commission.
ATTACHMIMT
spence Perry Esq.
- O C.
That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to co particular, pe with a particular type of accident -- in one involving an early release of radioactivity oft-site.
For the reasone set forth below, it is ou'r opinion tnat fleation Mr. Dirnan's conclusions are essentially correct as to item with minor clari-(B) above; however which requires corre,ction.his discussion of item (C) appears to contain an error and DISCUSSION A.
_ Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.
As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health emergency effects wiu occur, regardless of what y
plant.
In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[n]eithe)d Atocic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with r the emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect s (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2).
aey lations require a finding "thatAs you know, prior to issuance of a fu O
se. NRC regu-protective measures can and wiu bethere is reasonable assurance that adequate in C.F.R. 5 $0.47(a)(1).taken in the event of a radiological emergency."
NRC will base With respect to offsite matters, the its finding on a determinations "as to whether State end local emergency pla review of the FEMA findings and and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be im l ns are adequate Id.,
f 50.47(e)(2).
These regulations plainly do not require any Eimonstration p emented."
of "absolute aesurance" that the will be totally the Commission's emergency planning reprotected in the even Rather, the intent of into consideration piant conditions,an accident and achieve "dos through protective actions that take other conditions that may edat at the time of the accidentshelter factors, an evacuation times, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):
N UREG-0654 /
The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savinga (and in some cases ic2 mediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doces in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs).
The Appeal Board has simDarly stated. "[t he basic goal of planning is.
. the achievement of maximum] dose savings in a radio emergency emergency."
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm.
H.
Station. Unit No.1) ALAS-iti.17 NRCTO, 770 (1983)7.immer Nuclear Power i
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Spence Perry. Esq.
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(San Or.ofre Nuclear Centrating Station.
Units 2 and 3).
CLI-83-10, 77 NRC 528 533 (1983), the Commission summarized-its rationale for selecting an follows:
emergency planning basis as The underlying assumption of the planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is thatNRC's emergency i
application of stringent safety measures, a ser,ious nu-despite clear accident may occur.
This presumes that offsite Individuals may become contaminated with radioactive materic] or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi-j atton or perhaps both.
Planning for emergencies is individuals. required as a prudent risk reduction measure for those Since a dJffering offsite consequencesrange of accidents with widely 1
can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a
)
particular type of accident may or wiu occu.r.
In fact no specific accident sequences should be s;+:ified be-both in nature and degree.cause each accident could have differe Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident oe-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-including the core meltsidered in development of the Commission O
accident the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). release categories of i
These statements demonstrate reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of acciden that the to that emergency plann.ing m a," satisfy NRC regulations even thou
, and potential for adverse heajth effects in an emergency has not been totally elininated.
Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentiaDy correct in his conclusion as to item (A),
two statements contained in this portion of his memorandum requirr clarification, first,
has been recognized from the outset he goes too far in asserting that "st accident with offs
.. that if one assumes a major peunition, occur" ite releases.
(Dignan Memorandum at 2some adverse effect on the public _ win, by leases wiu not necessarily lead to adverse health effects emphasis added).
y offsite re-circumstances, amergency planning may serve to avert the occ Rather in some adverse health effects.
- Further, and the extent of any such effects, wiD depend upon a host of factor as the ty conditions,pe and quantity of relesse,
,such i
the plume direction, meteorological exposure durations and the timely implementation of an appropriate p ective response.,
Se.N. n'dly, his memorandum states that Q Limit any adverse health effecta to as lowemergency planning is intended to "given the facilities at h an d (&).
a level as reasonably possible.
possibly implying that additional
.cpence Perry. Esq..
O facilities w1D never be required to be built or installed to satisfy HRC emergency planning regulations.
cites the San Onofre decision, supra.In support of this statement. Mr. Dignan However, that decision provides only limited suppori for this conclusion.
There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary meas'ures are not requ!Md.
B.
Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.
The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the Applicante must demonstrato that an or pArt of the plume. exposure pathway EPZ can be evacuated in some s; ecified time; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour.
It is FAr. Dignan's conclusion that imC regulations do not require that an evacuation be assured within any particular time (Dignan Memorandum at 2).
We concur with Mr. Dignan's conclusion as to this item.
Ju support of his conclusion on this matter Mr. Dignan cites twc decisions:
Cincinnati Gas n Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. Unit E 1). AL A 6-7 27, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983), and Dettelt Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant. Unit 2). ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 O
(1983).
In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as follows:
The applicants are... correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergmey planning requirements do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evaeus-tion of plume EPZs.
The matter of the time in which evacuation can be accomplished is left to be determined a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele-o')
t ant cor.dtions prevailing in the specific locality.
But it does net follo, as the applicants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efficiency with which evacution might be accom-plished given the conditions under which it must take place [n. 16 ).
Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary.
If the responsible govern-mental officials are to make an in formed decision respecting what is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergenc'. they must have available
/
to them time estimates which are rerJistic appraisals of the minimum period in which, in lir< t of existing local conditione r evacuation could reascrably be accom-plished.
And, the nearer to the plant the area that might have to be Svacuated, the greater the importance of acsurate time estimates.
- n. 16/
Those conditions include, for example, the size
'aW nature of the population,
the available
-__._ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.__. _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ ~,
Epence Perry, Esq..
O transportation facilities, the existing road topographical features und political boundaries. network,
-Zimmer, supra,17 NRC at 770-71.
Similarly, in the Fermi decision the Ap-peal IIoar_d stated:
[T]he tions do not Commission's emergency planning regula-EPZ must be evacuated in the event of a nuclear emer-s 10 C.F.K. Part 50 Appendix E, I IV, requires gency.
only that applicants provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure nent populations. pathway EPZ for transient and perma-Fermi, su ra,17 NRC at 1069 n.13.
e accocap!!shed within 30 minutes.Thus, there is no requirement that a evacuat on White see other functions must be capable of being accomplished within that time frame, those ft.nctions generally invo've the notification of appropriate governmental officials ar.d notifleation of the public.
I IV.D.
See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.
~
O C.
Planning for A Particular Type of Accident.
The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether s' facility's emerg plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and, in particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site."
Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard:
tha t while emergency plans must (1) be designed to cope with a spectrum of acciden ts, they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident
- any worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4),
and (2) that or l
emergency pleas are not reicase of radioactivity (Id., at 9-3). required to be designed to cope with an early conclusions, the second~3nclusion is While we agree with the first of these incorrect and require & clarification.
signed to cope with a crectrun of accidents, but are n any partfeular accident sequence or a "worst casa accident. "
The Commission has decided, on a gene ric basta, that compliance with ita emergency planning regulations provides the reasonab)e assurance required oy 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(a): accordingly, offsite emergency plans are act reaufred to address particular accident sequences.
In the Statement of planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows: Cons The Commisslor. recognizes that no single accident...
Q scenario should form the basis for choice of notification capability requirements for offsite authorities and for G
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Spence Perry, Esq..
the public.
Emergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibiEty to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents.
This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notif! cation capability.....
Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of f!ssion i
products in the containtrent would warrant immediate public notification and consideration, based on the particular circumst snees, of appropriate protective action because of the ootential for leakage of the con-tainment building.
In addition, the warning time avail-able for the public to take action may be substantially less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioactive re-leases take place....
The reduction of noti 6 cation times from the several hours required for street-by-street notif! cation to clinutes will algnificantly increase the options available as protective actions un-der severe accident conditions.
These actions could O
include staying indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionar case of a potential release thought'y evacuation in the to be a few hours away.
Accidents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releases for which protective actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant vicinity, are desirable.
45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (1980).
Similarly, NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev.
1, provides as follows (at 6-7):
No single speelfte accident sequence should be isoleted as ths one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree.
Further, the range of possible selection for a i
planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant off-site radiological scrident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re-gardless of its extreciely Icw likelihood.
The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences.
Rath-er, it ider)tified the bounds of the paremeters for which planning is recomc> ended, based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, cnd releante characteris-O tics of a spectruca of accidents.
Although the selected planning bar.is is independent of tpecifle accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in the developmcnt of the goldance, including 1,
e y,
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Spence Perry, Esq..
O the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
Accord, San Onofre, s upra, 17 NRC at 533.
In ten r Island Lighting Co.
~[Shoreham Nuclear Power Station). LBP-85-12, 21 tiRC 4 03, 888 (1985) (cited in Dignan !Jemorandum at 4), the Lic+nsing Board dismissed a contention as-serting that the emergency plans must be capable of coping with any worst case accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board stated, "NUREC-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst possible accident' at Shoreham.
In sum, these regulatory pronouncemen ts and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency planning for a nuc! car plant is not require < to particular accident sequence or a "worst case accident.'be, designed to cope with a In this respect, we concur with Mr. Dignan's memorandum.
The Dignan Memorandum is incorrect, however, in its conclusion that the emergoney plans are not re. lease of radioactivity (Dignan Memorandum at 2-3), required to be desig have resulted by confusing the "worst possible accident
- for any accidantThis involving an early release.
While the ' worst possible accident' could involve an early release of radioactivity, other less severe acciQnts might also result in early releases and were included within the parameters which established the Commission's emergency planning basis.
Q Consideration. quoted above, clearly recognizes that 'early releases" me The Statement of occur; it is for this reason, in part, that the licensee is required to notin'
- offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the licensee has declari emergency, and that responsible offsite authorities have a capability to l
the licensee of an emergency condition.netify the pub!!c within 15 min The following guidance is provided in NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1. Rev.1 (at 13-14):
The range of times between the onset of accident condi-tions and the start of a ma}or release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours.
The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release).
(G]uidance on the time of release...
. has been used in developing the criteria for notification capabilities..
(Other reasons for requiring prompt notiScation capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective, actions are desirable and the need for sub-stantial lead times to carry out certain protective mea-sures. such as evacuation, plant conditions.)
when this is indicated by Q
It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessar required, in all cases, to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have
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Spence Perry Esq. -
received notification by the licensee.
notided. will range from immediate noti $ cation (within' 15 minute is i
state and local officials are notifled that a situation exists which requires urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time availtble for them to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the s
public notiScation system.
Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute i
criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive I
notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to be completed.
In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notiacation of the emergency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an euergency, and the offaite authorities must have the capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee.
Emergency planning for accidents involving 'early releases" is required -- although the protective action recommendations may be issued be fore, during or after the occurrence of an offaite release of radioactivity.
There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency.
_ CONCLUSION i
For the reasons set forth above, the following conclusions are offered as to the matters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum:
1.
The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents ;
- however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that adverse radiological effects will not occur.
2.
The Commission's energency planning regula-tions do not require that the evacuation of all or pa.rt of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within any particular time.
l 3.
The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emergency planning regulations and there-by should be capable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents; however, the plans are not required to be designed for any specific accident sequence or a "worst case accident."
~
O
~
! pence Perr.". Esq. -
4.
Accidents involving early releases are within the Commission's emergency planning basis, however.
the regulations do not specify a time within which the recommended protec,tive ections are to be completed.
Sincerely, p
Edward S. Christenb[
Director and. Chief Hearing Counse!
Encloture y
cc:
J. Taylor E. Jordan T. Mu:-ley O
4 4
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.y.EMORANDUM This.memerandum addresses thre. misconceptions whach have arisen as to the standards to,which state and munacipal emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding These misconceptions are:
A.
That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook.
B.
That it must be demonstrated that the plans vill assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planning Zonu or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time.
In part;:ular, there have been assertiens that i
the plans must assure the shelcering or evacuat:en of persons f rom the beaches in approximately 1/2 hcur.
C.
That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able.
to cope with a particular type of accident in particular.
involving an early release cf one radioactivity off-site.
Each of these prepcsttions is false as a matter of law.
First, the issue of absolute safety:
Neither the Atomic Energy Act ner any regu;atien of NRC.
whether deal r.g with O) q.
eme rgency pla..ning er net, requires absolute assurance of
perie : safet:.
Indeed, it has been recognized from the i
outset of the formulation of the current emergency planning regulattons that if one assumes a major accident with effsite releases, some adverse eff,ect on the public will def nition, by cecur.
The purpose of emergency planning is to,
have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order to keep those effects to as low a level as reasonabl-/ pessible given the facilities at hand Southern California Edison Co.
_ (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Daits 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, S33 (1983).
_second, as to the proposition that the plans must be demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certain areas within a certain time:
()
This simply is not the law.
The Appeal Scards of the Commission have so h ld
- flatly e
and without e:uivocation.
C;ncinnati Cas & Electric Comeane
( W.-
H.
- .- er Nuclear Power Sta len, Unit No.
1, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983): The Detroit Edison Co. ( Enrico Fe rT.:
Atomic Power ?lant, Unit 2), ALA3-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1065 n.13 ( 19 83 ). -
Indeed, the only activity which the regulat::ns specifically require to be capable of accomplishment in one-half hour is public notification.
And it is in that context the 1/2 hour rule is discussed in NUREC-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document Third the propositten that the plans will be judged as
- adequacy aga:nst a certa:.. type of accident and in particular ene involv:ng a re.' ease as socn as '/2 hour:
c _ _ _ _ - _
O ha prepositzen is not only bad law.
It as directly contrary to the theory of the NRC emergency planning criter:a.
The theory upon which the regulations were based was that the planners should consider a spectrum of accidents.
The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible and capable cf reducing the adverse effects to the gr eatest extent reasonably possible.
The Commission itself has stated:
differing offsite consequences can be"Since a r postulated, the regulation does not depend e'en the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur.
In fact, no speci:ic accident sequences should be specified because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.
O Although the emergency plar.ning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in development of the Commissien's regulations, :ncluding the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
"It was never the intent of the regulatien to require directly or indirectly that state and local governments adopt extraordinary measures, such as construct:on of additional hospitals or recruitment cf substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents.
The emphasis i prudent risk reduction measures.s on regulation does not The require dedication of resources to handle every possible accident that can be imagined."
CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 533.
O 3-
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~~
)
Furthermore. there is no requirement that it be demonstrated that a plan vill cope with any worst case accident.
NURIC-0654 simply does not require an adequate k
response for the worst possible accident.
Long faland Lighting Co_.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 888 (1985).
In short. the standard by which any emergency plan is to be judged is whether or not it represents the best efforts of knowledgeable people through the use of reasonably available fae:1 ties to reduce to the maximum extent reasonably possible the adverse effects on the public health and safety which vill result from off-site releases resulting from a spectrum of accident scenarios.
The
()
guiding pr:nciples, as recently stated by an NRC Licensing
- d Scard are:
"The purpcse cf emergency planning
- s to ach eve dose savings to the general pub 1:e in the event that radioact ve mater:al is accidentally released off site.
There is.no minimum standard cf pub' e radiation dcte which must be met in emergency planning.
"Absciute protection of the public agal..st all radiation doses cannot be guaranteed and is not required for all possible accident scenarios.
"The emergency response plan should not be developed for any specific prectnce.:ved ace: dent sequence.
It should instead be framed to cope with a spe=trum of accident possibilities ine'uding the worst ace: dents.
O _
e
)
e.
"There is no standard time required to
(
be met for evacuation in a radiological emergency.
Estimates are necessary to determine accurately the actual time required for evacuation.
These estimates are needed to aid in protective action decisionmaking.
"No massive investment of resources (stockpiling ci supplies or construction of hospitals) are required for emergency planning.
We wf.11 apply a practical standard of efficience of utili.=ation of existing resources (such as roadways and manpower) in evaluati'ng the acceptability of the evacuation plan."
LBF-85-12 at 782.
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