ML20205S910
| ML20205S910 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1985 |
| From: | Bowers D, Kaplan B, Kaplan Bk, Margulies N, Rice C, Stratton W AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, IRVINE, CA, EG&G, INC., IDAHO STATE UNIV., POCATELLO, ID, LRS CONSULTANTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J043 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-153, FOIA-86-A-17 NUDOCS 8606120974 | |
| Download: ML20205S910 (33) | |
Text
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COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION:
ALLEGED CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION -
l SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ,
1 l
Bruce L. Kaplan -- Team Leader .
EGLG Idaho, Inc.
David G. Bowers Resea,rch Scientist Newton Margulies University of California, Irvine
, Charles M. Rice LRS Consultants, Inc.
William E. Stratton Idaho State University March 1985 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT I
8606120974 860602 PDR FOIA GARDE 86-A-17 PDR Fo(A- t5-tr3 Page 1
T TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1
ABSTRACT............................................
- 1. INTRODUCTION...................................
- 2. DATA SOURCES...................................
2.1 Depositions...............................
2.2 Survey Data...............................
2.3 Reports and Correspondence................
- 3. ANALYS S.......................................
3.1 Analysis Using Additional Depositions &
Testimony.................................
3.2 Further Analysis of the 1979 Management Review Board Survey.......................
3.3 Analysis of Additional NRC Reports of Investigation and Inquiry.................
3.4 Further Comments on Managerial Style......
- 4.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS........................
APPENDIX A - 1979 Management Review Board Survey Analysis By David G. Bowers..........
l l
[
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i COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION:
ALLEGED CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
- 1. INTRODUCTION An initial report on the issue of intimidation of QA/DC personnel at Comanche Peak was written by this team in August 1984. Conclusions in that report were based on information that had been received and analyzed by the team up to that time. This report is presented as a supplement to that initial report and is based upon the incorporation of all information received prior to February 1985.
The numbering of the sections in this Supplementary report follow the general outline of the original report to facilitate the comparison of related sections between the two reports. It is not intended that this report stand alone. It is a supplement to the original report and must be read in conjunction with the original.
- 2. DATA SOURCES Additional information of various kinds was received and utilized in arriving at the supplementary conclusions presented here.
2.1 Depositions Depositions were received for review after September 1984 from the following three individuals:
- 1. Brooks Griffin, NRC Investigator Page 3 l
l
- 2. Arthur London, Startup Electrical Engineer, Impell
- 3. David Ethridge, TUGC0 ,
Prefiled testimony from the following sixteen individuals was also received:
- 1. Antonio Vega
- 2. Gregory Bennet en
- 3. Neil Britton
- 4. William Darby 5,6,7. Liford, Johnson, and Callicut
- 8. Richard Simpson
- 9. Gordon Purdy
- 10. Robert Duncan 11,12. James Zwahr and Daniel Wilterding
- 13. Ronald McGee
- 14. Alan Justice
- 15. James Brown
- 16. Danny Wright l
l 2.2 Survey Data No additional survey data were obtained. However, an additional analysis of both the substance and the pattern of responses was performed on the 1979 Management Review i
Board Survey data by the same expert in survey methodology who previously analyzed the 1983 OA/DC Questionnaire Survey.
Page 4
2.2 Reports and Correspondence A number of additional NRC Office of Investigation Reports of Investigation and Reports of Inquiry have been received since September 1984, as follows:
Inquiry Reports Investigation Reports 82-0005 82-012 82-0011 83-005 82-025 83-006 83-025 83-011 83-026 83-016 84-007 84-008 84-011 .84-012 84-014 84-016
- 3. ANALYSIS The sections which follow present updated findings of the study team. The conclusions reached are the result of integrating additional analysis, including review of the materials received subsequent to the drafting of the original report, with the work done previously.
3.1 Analysis Using Additional Depositions and Testimony 3.1.1 Gegetal ggnsidecatige gi gtganizatige glimatg The climate of an organization as conceptualized by the study team refers to "how it feels to work here", and is therefore a perceptual phenomenon. Certain characteristic " facts" about any organization, such as its structure, wage and salary policies, procedures, job descriptions, standards of performance, supervisory practices and the like are part of its climate and can be l Page 5
described in detail. What is often more important, however, is how these " facts" are perceived and how .
people ultimately feel about them. The interpretive diagram on page 12 of the original report illustrates that in the absence of explicit threat of the use of negative sanctions or explicit threatening behavior used against an individual, the interpretation of the intimidating adct is largely in the perception of the individual and cannot be clearly interpreted as intimidation. The collective result of individual judgments comparing organizational characteristics against individual expectations is what social and organizational scientists refer to as " climate." Climate has a direction, whether people feel good or bad about theorganization, and it has an intensity, the degree to which they feel favorable or unfavorable.
Climate can affect performance. A climate of intimidation refees to thedegree to which there is or was a general perception that not complying with directives I
(generally those that contradict appropriate work practice) will result in the use of negative sanctions, that is that the person will be terminated, transferred, or some such " punishment" will be applied.
Other climate factors can affect the quality of work that would not be classified as " intimidating". These will l
be discussed later in Section 3.4 of this report which deals with management style.
Page 6
s 3.1.2 EElROt gi Ollegattges gi intimidatign At the time of the first report, September 1984, the analysis, and therefore the conclusions reached, was based on the data the study team had received and analyzed up to that point in time. This supplemental report now includes a review and analysis of information available through February 1985.
While this section concentrates on the depositional data, it is important toreiterate the position and approach of the study team. This set of depositional data represents only one avenue or perspective on the issue of intimidation. The final conclusions of the study team are ultimately based on all the different types of data available f or analysis. In this context, whether the various data sources and analyses support the same conclusions, or whether there are conflicting results is of key importance. One major source of information was, of course, the depositional material provided. Depositional material including information from 83 individuals up to September 1984 and three additional individuals after September was analyzed to reach the conclusions in this part ofthe study. A summary of the data is shown in Table 1 of this section.
In addition to the depositions, the data pool also included 16 individuals who provided data in the form of prefiled testimony. For the most part these individuals supplemented or repeated information provided in the Page 7
TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF DEPOSITIONAL DATA .
Prior to Sept. After Sept. Total Total Data Providers 83 3 86 OA/DC Managers 18 0 18 QA/DC Employees 26 0 26 Craft Managers 21 1 22 Craft Employees 15 1 16 NRC Personnel 3 1 4 Units Identified 8 1 9 Number of A11egers 27 1 28 Number of Intimidators 13 0 13 depositions. In some cases these were new data providers elaborating on incidents identified through the depositions.
Analysis of these data was intended to explore whether or not there were widespread instances of intimidation, that is, whether in fact there were numerous incidents reported, whether those instances were in isolated units or occurred in a variety of different units across the organization, and whether those incidents were distributed over time or concentrated in a particular time frame.
Review of the depositional material identified 28 allegers, those claiming that there were specific instances afintimidation (regardless of whether these were proven cases or not). Similar review of the data indicated that Page 8
there were 10 named intimidators, individuals who were supposedly involved in intimidating incidents... Again, whether these were legitimate is not considered at this point.
The September report indicated that there were relatively few allegations and relatively few named l intimidators. Having now reviewed all the depositional material, the conclusions of the study team do not differ from those original conclusions. Again, as stated in the original report, considering the number of people employed at the site from 1979 to the present, the normal pressures created by scheduling and economic considerations, and the natural conflicts between craft and QA/DC the conclusion is that thenumber of incidents, the number of allegers, and the number of named intimidators does not indicate a climate of intimidation. Thin conclusion supports the initial conclusion as stated on page 15 of the September report.
3.1.3 Beview gi Seegifig lecidents gi letimidatige The study team also reviewed the specific incidents of reported intimidation. This analysis had two purposes:
- 1) to identify which instances appeared to be " legitimate" incidents of intimidation according to the definition used l in the study, and 2) to discern how these instances were l
dispersed over time. Analysis indicates that there are 31 l
l reported incidents that span the time period from 1979 to l
1984. The dispersion is as follows:
l r
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1979 1 incident reported 1980 0 incidents reported 1981 3 incidents reported -
1982 6 incidents reported (5 from one alleger) 1983 13 incidents reported (5 from one alleger) 1984 8 incidents reported (6 from two allegers)
The reported incidents seem to be concentrated between 1982 and 1984. It may be important to note that in 1981 the three incidents reported involve D. Stiner and H. Stiner.
In 1982 five of the six incidents reported are also from D. Stiner. So, of these nine incidents all but one involve the Stiners. This is only important in understanding the dispersion--the concentration is clear, with very few allegers until 1983 and 1984.
In 1983, 13 incidents are reported, and five are from a single alleger. In fact there ere seven allegers involved in the 13 incidents. Again, from the point of view of dispersion, there is no evidence of widespread allegations of intimidation. In addition, review of the responses on the 1979 and 1983 surveys indicates there was no reluctance to voice concerns nor was there a climate to l
discourage reporting of inappropriate behavior. In the 1984 incidents, eight were reported, but again six were identified with two allegers.
! In conclusion, there is no evidence to conclude the l
l existence of widespread intimidation based on the l
l relatively low number of allegations dispersed over a five-l year period involving as few as 11 different allegers.
(
The analysis thus f ar has made no judgments regarding Page 10
the validity of the allegations themselves. Each claimed incident was assumed to have face validity. The study team did subsequently review each incident according to their definition of intimidation. It should be noted that a conclusion concerning any one specific incident in and of itself would not lead to any conclusion about the climate of intimidation. All data must be considered for the purpose of assessing the climate.
The anlaysis of the individual incidents of alleged intimidation resulted in the following number of incidents judged to be " legitimate".
1979 0 incidents 1980 0 incidents 1981 1 incident 1982 1 incident 1983 5 incidents 1984 3 incidents When judgments about the legitimacy of the incidents are made, the case against a climate of intimidation is even stronger. There are very few incidents in the opinion of the study team that could be classified as " intimidating" if one includes the following necessary criteria: 1) an act which includes clearly stated or implied negative sanctions or an act that is clearly threatening, 2) perception of that act as intimidating, and 3) some resulting behavior that indicates the individual acted to avoid the threat.
Of the incidents included as legitimate acts of intimidation, some were not very clear or were perhaps only mildly intimidating. These cases were, however, included Page 11
s in the listing below. The ten incidents identified as potentially intimidating events were the following:
1981 D. Stiner - Weave Welding on Pipe Support 1982 D. Stiner - Bus Incident 1983 Dunham - Intimidation of Protective Coatings h/
Inspectors Neumeyer - Liner Plate Traveler Incident Allen - Detergent on Coated Surface Incident 8[W'7 Allen - Cigarette Filter Incident 1984 Neuneyer - Stanford Incident T-Shirt Incident Witness "F" - Ferro-Resonant Transformer Incident These incidents identified involve five different allegers, excluding the T-Shirt Incident which involved some eight " targets" of potentially intimidating actions.
It is not clear that all of these incidents deserve equal weight as significant events in creating a climate of intimidation. The study team concluded that the Stiner Bus Incident, the Neumeyer Liner Plate Traveler Incident, and the Witness "F" Incident were only mildly or moderately '
significant in contributing to any overall climate of intimidation.
3.1.4 Cgnclugigng Baggd gn Dggggitignal Qata In conclusion, revciew of the depositional data regarding the number of alleged incidents of intimidation and their dispersion over time and over organizational units, and review of the specific incidents themselves, has resulted in no change in the original findings of the study team. The data do not suggest that a climate of intimidation exists or existed at CPSES.
Page 12
3.2 Analysis of the 1979 Management Review Board Survey The original report included a content analysis of a subset of questions from the 1979 Management Review Board Survey. Additional analysis has now been performed of both the substance and the pattern of responses on an expanded set of questions from that survey. This analysis was completed by the same expert in survey methodology who previously analyzed the 1983 QA/DC Ouestionnaire Survey, and the results are summarized below. The complete analysis is attached to this report as Appendix A.
3.2.1 19Z9 Managgmggt Bgvigw Bgard Sutvgg To provide a more complete picture of findings from the 1979 survey, a more extended analysis of the data was undertaken. In addition to the five survey questions to 1
which responses were analy=ed in the earlier report, 21 additional questions were included representing all questions which seemed likely to contain information at all relevant to the issue of intimidation. All 120 respondents were included. Their responses were then content analyzed into code categories develcped from initial inspection of a sample of questionnaires. As in the case of the 1983 questionnaire data, the responses were then analyzed to determine whether either their substance or pattern of response reflected possible intimidation.
Concerning the gattgtn of response, the principal Page 13
findings were: )
I
- The non-response rate was quite low; on the average, ,
1 92 percent of the respondents gave usable responses to any particular question.
- The overall pattern was overwhelmingly positive; 78 percent of the responses were positive (f avorable) .
- Although the average favorability was quite high, there was not an absence ofnegative opinion.
Approximately one response in four was negative.
- The least f avorable response was to the mggt threatening items, not the reverse (which one might expect from a pattern of intimidation).
The conclusion, therefore, is that the gattern of response did not suggest intimidation.
The gubstance of response was another matter, however.
Since the 1979 survey, unlike that in 1983, was not focused upon the issue of intimidation, one would expect that most of the responses would refer to issues other than that.
Indeed, that was the case. In general, on those items to which the average response was least positive, the concerns were primarily those of money, lack of formal preparation, or "other" (a mixture of miscellaneous l
l concerns or complaints).
i l
On O.2A ("How would you rate management support of f
Page 14
QC7"), 28 percent responded eatgical or inadgguatg.
Information which perhaps explains or amplifies this came from an analysis of all written comment conceivably relating to intimidation. There were 38 relevant comments of this type, given by 32 persons. An analysis indicated that the acts of intimidation came almost exclusively from craft / construction, not from management or supervision.
For a minority ofthese, there was also the perception that management had too often acquiesced to craft / construction, rather than backed OC.
3.2.2 A Cgeggtigge gi 12ZT and 12@g gutvgy Eggylig ,
Consideration of both the 1979 and 1983 survey results j jointly presents some interesting and perhaps useful similarities and contrasts. In neither yeardid the gattgte of response reflect any indication of widespread feelings of intimidation. Indications of intimidation occurred with ,
any frequency f or the gubstancg of response only for the 1979 survey. That this was true'despite the fact that that l
l survey involved f ace-to-f ace interviews, rather than l
l anonymous questionnaires, and was generally focused upon issues other than intimidation, seems significant. Had there been pervasive intimidation throughout this five year l period, it seems likely that it would have been more i
in evidence in 1983 than in 1979, simply because the 1983 Page 15
format made it easier and safer to respond. This was not the case, however.
Instead, what appears to be the more parsimonious explanation is that there was, in fact, intimidation in ,
1979, that it wasfelt to various degrees by at least a minority of persons, and that it came almost exclusively from craft / construction. For a minority of that minority, there was, with this, a perception that management too often acquiesced to craft / construction. This explanation would suggest, however, that by 1983 the problems had all '
but disappeared.
The reason for this change can only be a matter of speculation. Perhaps programs and actions by management j to correct and prevent such instances had the becessary effect. Perhaps there was a shift in thenature of persons l
doing craft / construction work over the period, e.g. from rough-and-tumble concrete workers to more skilled crafts l
l such as electricians.
What these two sets of data taken togethar do say, in l
sum, is that there was no evidence of a pervasive climate
! of intimidation on the part of, or fostered by, management or supervision. At most, there is a perception (by less than 10 percent of respondents) that management often did not take action on intimidation by craft / construction l
Page 16
strongly enough, soon enough.
3.3 OI Investigation and Inquiry Reports In addition to the three NRC Office of Investigation reports discussed in the initial report, seven investigation reports and nine inquiry reports have since been reviewed. Most of the events triggering these investigations and inquiries were touched on, and in some 4
cases covered in depth, in the depositions, prefiled ,
testimony and hearing records. Some useful information ,
related to the issue of intimidation was gleaned from these reports.
3.3.1 Inguity geagtta In eight of the nine inquiry reports evaluated, there was indication of neither intimidation nor the possible existence of a climate of intimidation. These eight j inquiry reports and their subject matter were as follows:
1 82-0005 Alleged Improper Weld Practices 82-0011 Alleged Improper Termination of a DC Inspector l
82-025 Alleged Radiographic Irregul ari ti es
+
83-025 Alleged QA Supervisor Discouraging the Use l Nonconformance Reports I
Page 17 T
83-026 Alleged Deficiencies in Coatings Program f84-007' Alleged Violations of Construction Practices84-011 Alleged Intimidation of a BOP Inspector 84-016 Alleged Improper Construction Practices The ninth inquiry report, however, appeared to present some information that might support the existence of a climate of intimidation. A Brief description of this ,
report follows.84-014 Preserved Testimony of a Witness This Report of Inquiry tends to support a conclusion that the termination of a Document Control Center supervisor was at best poorly handled and at worst contributed to a possible climate of intimidation.
This was not a unique event as considerable other information on this individual and events exists in several depositions and board testimony.
3.3.2 Ingesti gatigg Reggt t s The NRC investigation reports generally went into considerably a. ore depth than did the inquiry reports.
Consequently, these reports are discussed briefly below together with the conclusions drawn in each.
Page 18
82-012 Alleged Electrical Deficiencies Four specific concerns were presented by a for'mer electrician. All were investigated and found to be wrong. There were no ramifications of intimidation in this investigation report.83-005 Alleged Improper Construction Practices A former CPSES supervisor provided allegations of improper practices and procedural violations in several areas of mechanical and civil construction, including unauthorized cutting of rebar, main steam line overtensioning, use of a cutting torch on hanger material, and failure to purge stainless steel piping during welding.
Ten individuals alleged to have knowledge of improper rebar cutting provided sworn statements to the effect that all reber cuts were made with proper authorization.
Four witnesses testified that the relocation of the main steam line was done under the direction of engineers to remove stress on the line.
Six witnesses testified to having no knowledge of improper use of cutting otrches on hangers. Two witnesses testified to the scrapptog of a hangor due Page 19
to procedural violation, with replacement by new material.
In addition, a former employee, who came forth in January 1984 af ter reading these allegations in the newspaper, refuted several of the allegations as reported in the Inquiry Report 84-007.
In summary, the weight of evidence disproved the allegations, and there were no aspects of this report -
that would support the existence of a climate of intimidation.83-006 Alleged Falsification of QC Records A QC inspector alleged that a signature had been forged on an NCR that had previously been a controversial issue before the ASLB.
The former DC inspector who had identified the nonconforming condition was interviewed as was the former Quality Assurance supervisor. There was clear testimony that the NCR had been handled appropriately and the investigation disclosed no evidence of forged signatures.
I There was no indication of intimidation or supnort for the existence of a climate of intimidation in this Page 20
- a. .
!)
report.83-011 Suspected Falsification of DC Records A OC inspector alleged that records of some of his inspections had been altered or falsified. He suspected this had been done by reviewing supervisors.
Of three other inspectors-Interviewed, two indicated that this particular inspector was deficient in completing his reports and one stated that he had heard rumors that other inspection personnel regularly helped this inspector by completing his paperwork.
This paperwork situation was confirmed by a document clerk, while two clerks testified they did not know of any falsifications of inspector checklists. DA/QC supervision and management denied knowledge of alteration or falsificati,on of coatings records.
Upon reinterviewing the alleger, the investigator found that the basis for his contention was that he had been unaware of earlier inspection practices, and l
he assumed that reviewing supervisors must have made the copies he originally alleged had been changed, since neroxed copies ere now a violation of existing .
i procedures. -
, s l
l Much of the testimony developed in these interviews l
l related to various other allegations that have been l '
- Page 21
considered in other portions of this supplement and in the original study team report.
As it relates specifically to the allegation for which this investigation was initiated, there is no evidence of intimidation nor grounds to support the possible existence of a climate of intimidation.83-016 Alleged Discrimination Against DC Inspectors The allegation was that a DC lead inspector was fired for complaining in a meeting about intimidation by a supervisor, and that this termination had an intimidating effect on the GC coatings inspectors.
There is much testimony and many depositions that relate to this particular event with a clear
, difference of opinion between management and the i
alleger as to the reason for his termination. It is l
1 apparent that there was some reason for the alleger's concerns about the supervisor, and it is probable that the alleger had been disruptive to some extent in the DC meeting. It is also quite clear that the r.easons
! for termination were not communicated well to supervision or inspectors, Consequently, it is concluded that the incidant could have had an intimidating effect on inspectors.
l i
l Page 20
84-008 Alleged Intimidation of GC Personnel This reports covered several instances of intimidation alleged by a QC inspector. T'he specific allegations were that the inspector was subjected to.a series of eight meetings intended to intimidate and discourage her in performance ofher work following her Appearance before the ASLB.
It appears that, in fact,' the company provided information on maternity benefits six weekb before her
~
ASLB appearance and approximately six weeks after.
In addition, the alleger's work duties were changed from field to shop inspections soon after her appearance, an office was arranged near the fabrication shop, and special arrangements were made for parking and transportation to an from her'. work area. Finally, at her request, she was allowed to terminate rather than take a leave of absence in order to be eligible for unemployment compensation.
i It is felt that CPSES management went well beyond normal employee benefits because of the alleger's appearance before the ASLB. Although these incidents do not support the possible existence of a climate of intimidation, the alleger could, in fact, have felt intimidated.
Page 23
84-012 Alleged Intimidation of Welding Crews An ironworker alleged that an ironworker superintendent regularly threatened and intimidated his subordinates. Interviews with fifteen individuals determined that seven had personal knowledge of or knew ofthis superintendent's reputation as an intimidator.
In the specific incident investigated, it was alleged that the superintendent forced the ironworker to chip concrete in a room in which safety system welding was being performed. It is likely that this was a case of intimidation of the ironworker by the superintendent.
More pertinent to this report on intimidation of DA/DC personnel is the fact that a DC inspector, when advised of the problem, shut the welding job down until the chipping was stopped and the dust settled.
This shutdown occurred despite its going against the orders of a superintendent known to many as an intimidator, and illustrates the independence and authority of DC with respect to the crafts.
l 3.3.3 Conclusions From Investigation and Inquiry Reports Analysis of 16 NRC Reports of Inquiry and Investigatior. resulted in two incidents that provide some Page 24
indication of the existence of a climate of intimidation at CPSES. These incidents each involved the termination of an individual, and both were considered by the study team in preparing their original report.
These two incidents are counte'rbalanced by, and should be considered in conjunction with, two other factors.
First, it would be expected that when allegers step forward ,
to claim the existence of either peor workmanship or intimidation that a relatively high percentage of allegations would prove to be accurate. Instead, in the 16 inquiries and investigations a preponderance of allegations were disproven, both from a technical and intimidation standpoint. Secondly, the extensive investigations and interviews turned up a large number (approximately 87) of present and past employees who refuted the charges of the allegers and very few (approximately 14) who supported the allegations. Of the 14, half are craft, supporting the claims of intimidation on the part of craft supervision.
In conclusion, the analysis of these additional NRC Office of Investigation Reports of Inquiry and Investigation results in no findings that modify the conclusions of the study team in their original report.
Page 25
P 0
3.4 Further Comments On Management Sty 1.e The study team implied in its discussion of management style in the September report (Section 3.3, pages 37-40) that there are many factors which may contribute to individual performance on the job. Intimidation, or the existence of an " intimidating climate", is only one such factor.
Organizations are complex mechanisms of interwoven characteristics, procedures, and behaviors, making it not only impossible, but illogical, to assume that any one factor can be isolated in drawing cause and effect conclusions. Indeed, in the social sciences in general, and especially with regard to the study of organizational phenomena, the best that can often be done is to show that certain outcomes seem to be correlated with, that is to occur in conjunction with, the presence of certain other factors. This correlative relationship does not prove the existence of any causal relationship, nor can the direction of any possible causation be inferred from mere correlation alone.
With regard to job performanc4e, factors such as job skills, the quality of motivation of the work force, the levels of compensation and the perceived equity of the compensation system, the effective management of interfaces Page 36 __. _ ..
between interacting functions or departments, the .
establishment of clear and realistic standards of performance, and the structure of the organization are all important as contributors to the performance of individuals on the job. It is the opinion of this study team that there are issues of a management nature that may have an impact on the performance of work at CPSES.
3.4.1 Jgb Skill 2 In the 1979 and 1983 surveys there were some concerns expressed about the lack of feedback on Job performance $nd the lack of sophistication of management. Complaints about the inadequacy of training and the poor communication between inspectors and management were clearly identified as areas of concern in the 1979 survey. In fact, in response to a question on " problems at CPSES" technical training of inspectors wasthe second most mentioned item.
3.4.2 Cgmagnsatign and Wagg Ingguitigs The perception that there are inequities in the administration of wage an salary programs and the general dissatisfaction with compensation could have a demotivating effect on individuals and on the subsequent perfo4rmance of the job. This issue was the most mentioned item on the 1979 survey. Complaints about wages were also dominant in the 1983 survey.
i 1
3.4.3 Intetfacg Managgment .
There should be little doubt that there are multiple, complex, and difficult interfaces which must be effectively managed in the CPSES environment. There does seem to'be some concern that these interfaces are a continual source of conflict and problems. It also appears that these resulting difficulties are accepted as given in the situation, as a reality to be coped with rather than managed, as an organizational phenomenon that is unresolvable.
The surveys, both 1979 and 1983, point to difficulties in the DC-Craft interface. Complaints about the lack of cooperation, the inability of management to deal adequately with these difficulties, the problems with " personalities",
and the impression that the Craft personnel don't
" understand the role of OC", all lead to the conclusion that the interface management does not seem to be very effective. The interf ace between Craf t and OC is viewed as an adversarial one. While the nature of the working relationship must include checks and reviews of work performed, it appears to be taken for granted that the relationship must necessarily be a conflictful one. The result is that the interf aces are merely coped with, and little attention is devoted to improving or managing the interface to foster a more cooperative working relationship.
rp_n eva_ m e
\
l l
1 l
It is also possible that the role and working relationships of the NRC create some ambiguity and conflict among the relevant parties. While there is very little information specific to this subject, it would be hard to believe that the NRC in its role is not a primary player and does not influence the overall working relationship between Craft and QC.
3.4.4 Cigat and Rgaligtig Standards In both the 1979 and 1983 surveys there were concerns about the clarity of standards, the usefulness of some procedures, and the seeming lack of consistent application of these procedures. It is probably the case that procedures are designed to accomplish certain results.
owever, when coupled with consistent concerns about communication, there is the possibility that the procedures themselves, or their usefulness and purposes, may not be fully understood. There is some evidence in the depositions and in some of the " intimidating incidents" identified, that procedures may have been applied rather mechanically, or that inspectors were asked to perform operations without fully understanding what was expected and why certain procedures were to be performed in particular ways.
3.4.5 Otganigatignal Situgtute TPfveva_3
The overall organization at CPSES is no doubt.a l
massive bureaucracy, with many levels and myriad rules and regulations. This complexity is further compounded by the many different entities--contractors and subcontractors--
involved in the projec't, each with its own rules and procedures with regard to personnel and the like. Managing this complex environment takes a special skill and sensitivity, an ability to see the whole, and to understand the various nuances of personal and technical issues that arise. The structure itself produces interface conflicts that are predictable. The very separation of OC from Craft and the roles they play inevitably results in conflict, both of a personal and interdepartmental nature. All this complexity simply increases the probability that difficulties will arise--it is clearly predictable.
l Given this structure, special management skills are l
l required, skills which do not seem to be evident in great l
l abundance. These would surely include people skills--
communication, interface management, conflict resolution, counseling and coaching skills (the counseling sessions described in depositional material are reprimand sessions, not counseling), to name a few. All seem to be lacking yet to be of prime importance in this type of hectic, pressure packed, complex organization. Evidence from the depositional data and from the surveys leads to the conclusion that the organi:ation(s) are not without l ceran_se _ _ _ _ _
significant management problems and that these problems are worthy of attention.
3.4.6 Managgment Stylg In the Saptember report, there was some discussion of the importance of Management Style. One of the factors i
discussed briefly was that of management philosophy and hoiw the prevailing philosophy might influence organi:ational behavior. It seems clearer now that the styla of management is related toissues ic'entified on the previous pages. The management methods utilized in the company reflect an operating philosophy rooted in construction and utility organi:ations. These approaches tend to linger beyond their usefulness.
Bureaucracirs are slow, autocratic, and tend to be reactive rather than proactively anticipating future difficulties and moving to manage them. They remain technically up to date, however, but are often riddled with j cumbersome management practices that impede themaximum use of technology. These kinds of organizations are often impersonal, viewing good human relations as unnecessary, and in fact maintaining that such practices simply impede the rapid accomplishment of tasks. Loyalty is considered i
an important quality, and unquestioned loyalty is often demanded by such organizations. However, because of the impersonality and lack of attention to the human dimension, Pmo 3B
these organizations often generate mistrust and lack of credibility of management.
The degree to which these characteristics have h'd a any effect on the quality of work or the performance of any individual is difficult to assess. The academic literature indicates that concerns of these sorts most assuredly influence morale, and morale may affect job outcomes. It may be that characteristics such as these are more representative of Comanche Peak than any " climate of o
intimidation."
- 4.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS l
In summation, the study team findings indicate that there does not appear to be a climate of intimidation at CPSES. The number of incidents of alleged intimidation seem to be relatively few, and the significance of those identified in creating a climate of intimidation is questionable since only a few were classified as potentially influential in this regard. The actors involved are also relatively few, with several identified allegers involved in quite a number ofincidents.
Most importantly, there is a good deal of compatibility in what the data from different sources wo
indicate. Analysis of data from the depositions, a_nal ysi s )
of both the content and the pattern of responses from the 1979 and 1983 surveys, analysis of the NRC Office of Investigation Reports of Investigation and Inquiry, and the analysis of the individual incidents alleged to have been intimidating all lead essentially to the same conclusion.
Analysis of all these data lead the study team to reaffirm the conclusions reached in their September report.
In the judgment of the study team a general climate of intimidation did not and does not exist at CPSES.
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Pace 33