ML20198H655

Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $13,750 from Insp Conducted on 970825-29. Violations Noted:Licensee Failed to Conduct Adequate Incident Investigation & Followup Actions

ML20198H655
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	01/06/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198H648	List: ML20198H644 ML20198H655
References
70-1151-97-205, NUDOCS 9801130362
Download: ML20198H655 (6)

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4 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Westinghouse Docket No. 70-1151 Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division License No. SNM-1107 Columbia, South Caronna EA 97-442 During an NRC inspection conducted on August 25-29.1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 19M as amended (Act),42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2,205. The particular violations and associ6d civil penalty are set forth below:

Condition S-1 of Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-1107, Authorized Use, requires use of licensed materials in accordance with statements, representations, and conditions in the License Application dated April 30,1995 (License Application), and supplements dated May 11 May 18, August 4, August 25, and September 25,1995; and July 25 and August 11,1997.

1. Section 3.7 of the License Application, incident investigations, states, "At the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF), the organizational structure... and procedures... will provide for:

systematic investigation of abnormal events; making decisions on corrective measures to prevent recurrence of such events; and, follow-up on the implementation of preventive measures. Further, CFFF will have in place a structured methodology for determining and categorizing the root cause(s) of the failure (s) that led to investipa' id events."

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to conduct adequate incident investigation and followup actions, as evidenced by the following-

a. As of August 29,1997, the licensee failed to adequately determine and categorize *e root cause(s) of the failurt(s) that led to the June 22,1997, loss of volume control foi the Line 1 grarulator hopper. Specifically, the rort cause analysis focused narrowly on the material accumulation in the hopper and did not address the broader problems of the loss of volume control (i.e., did not address the reason the Criticality Safety Evaluation assumed a faverable volume when the "as-built" configuration was a non-favorable volume), system restart authorization after exceeding a defined mass controllimit without approval by the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) group, and the failure of the Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to meet the technical requirements specified in Section 6.0 of the License Application.

b. As of August 29,1997, the licensee had not followed up on the implementation of preventive measures for the June 22,1997, loss of volume control for the Line 1 granulator hopper. Specifically, the recommendations of the Root Cause Analysis Team, which was formed to review this safety significant event, had not been reviewed or approved by site management [the organizational structure].

c. On August 25,1997, the licensee experienced a safety significar.t event involving the loss of a criticality control for the pellet area ventilation moisture drop-out tanks in that the tanks were erroneously assumed to he"e been favorable geometry (and no other controls were identified in the existing CSE), and no root cause analysis was initiated prior to the restart of the system on August 26.1997- (01013) 9901130362 900106

[DR ADOCK 07001151 PDR

l Notice of Violation

2. Section 6.2.1 of the License Application, General Control Program Practices, iequires, in part,' that "For each significant portion of the process, a defense of one or more system parameters will be employed and documented within the Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE).. . CSEs are utilized to identify the specific controls necessary for the safe and effective operation of a process. Nuclear Criticality Safety controls will be incorporated into the process design criteria documentation

• Section 6.4.3(e) of the License Application Technical Review, requires,in part, that an independent technical review be performed for criticahty safety assessments, criticality safety evaluations, or calculations in support of limits specified in CSAs (Criti,ahty Safety Approvals) or CSEs by a qualified reviewer.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to conduct an adequate criticahty safety evaluation and technical review for each significant portion of a process to ioentify the specific controls necessary to assure safe operation, and incorporate those controls into the process design cnteria, as evidenced by the following:

a. On June 23,1997, it was discovered that the efanulator hopper CSE performed in 1996 developed criticahty safety contrc,ls based on assumed favorable volume, reportedly in documents that could not be located, when the actual hopper volume was 43 liters, which is unfavorable. Both the original evaluation and the independent technical review failed to identify that the dimensions on the system print (process design entaria] did not match the dimensions necessary to assure favorable volume for this significant portion of the process.

b. ' On August 26,1997, it was discovered that the Pellet Area Ventilation System CSE, conducted for a 1993 modification, developed controls based on an assumed criticality favorable volume of less than 6 gallons, when the actual volume was 20 gallons, which is unfavorable. Both the original evaluation and tha independent technical review failed to identify that the dimensions on the system print [ process design criteria) did not match the dimensions necessary to assure favorable volume for this significant portion of the process. (01023)

3. Section 6.2.1 of the License Application, General Control Program Practices, requires, in part, that prior to use in any process, controls necessary for the safe operation of a process will undergo a functional verification to assure that the controls selected and installed match the requirements identified in the design criteria.

4 Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to functionally verify that controls necessary for the cafe operation of a process were installed to match the requirements identified in the design criteria, as evidenced by the following:

a On June 23,1997, the licensee determined that the installed granulator hopper was not a favorable volume as assumed in the nuclear criticality safety analysis. Since favorable volume was an analyzed contingency necessary for the safe operation of this system, this constitites a design requirement that was not functionally verified pnor to use.

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Notico of Violat'on

b. On August 26,199L the licensee determined that the instaHed pellet grinder ventilation  !

system moisture drop-out tanks were not favorable volumes as assumed in the nuclear cnticality safety analysis, Specifically, the analysis identified the volume as less than 5 gallons, but the actualinstalled volumes were about 20 gallons each. (01033)

4. Section 0.2.4 of the License Apphcation, Cr.hcahty centrolled Safety Parameters, requires that the CSE process willidentify the significant parameters affected within a particular system and that all assumptions relating to pres / equipment / material theory, function, and operation, including credible upset conditior3, wi., > justified, documented, and independently reviewed.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to assure that all assumptions relating to process / equipment /matenal theory, function, and operation, including credible upset conditions are justified, documented, and independently reviewed as evidenced by the following-a As of August 29,1997, the Granu'ator Hopper CSE was not updated following the June 23,1997, event to reflect the physical changes made to the system and no independent review was conducted.

b. Ar, of August 29,1997, the Pehet Area Venblation System CSE was not updated to reflect all of the analytical changes and new controls added to the inoisture drop-out tanks on August 26,1997, and no independent review was conducted.

c As of August 29,1997, the CSEs for the Granulatian & Compaction, Pellet Press Area and Sintering Furnace processes did not document or justify the assumptions relating to process / equipment /matenal theory, function, and operation, including credible upset conditions. (01043)

5. Section 3.6.1 of the License Apphcation, Recorde, ,equires, in part, that written precedures will specify the management progtum for licensed activity records including: (e) Nuclear Cnticahty Safety Evaluatiors, Analyses and Methodology Validations. Further, records of nuclear criticahty safety analyses are required to be retained for the hfetime of the facikty.

CA 004, Columbia Plant Records Management Policy, Revision 6, defines policies and procedures that establish records management programs for Columbia plant departments, and assures the implementation of required Quahty Assurance records systems. CA-004 was identified by the licensee as the implementation procedure for Section 3 8.1 of the License Application.

Contrary to the above:

a. As of August 29,1997, the licensee failed to establish adequate written poculures to specify the management program for Jicensed activity records involving nactent criticahty safety evaluations and analysis. Specifically, nuclear enticahty evaluations, analyses and methodology vahdatics are not listed as examples of Columbia Plant Quality Assurance Records under the program specified in CA-004, the prucedure identified by the bcensee as addressing the requirements of Section 3.8.1 of the License Application.

. i Notice of Violation b The onginal Nuclear Safety Analysis for the Pellet Area Grinder Hopper, a nuclear enticality safety analysis, was not rminteined for tiie life of the plant, in that it could not ,

be located dunng the week of August 25 29,1997. (01053) t 6 Section 6.1.1(b) of the License Application, Facility Procedures Regulatory Affairs Guidance Procedures, requires, in part, that ' Regulatory Significant procedures define the policies of the Regulatory CompSnent, including huclear enticality safety, and identify the requirements for implementation of applicat2e NRC regulations and license conditions?

Cc,ntrary to the above, as of August 29,1997, the licensee failed to develop or implement nuclear criticality safety procedures and policies that identify the requiremt,,its for implementation of applicable NRC regulati is and license conditions, as evidenced t:y the following examples:

a. RA 311. NCS Program Review, prc ies enteria for performing and documenting program reviews to assess the effectidness of all components of NCS programs to comply with Section 61.2 of the License Application. The scope of the NCS program that is required to be reviewed did not include the following NCS license elements: the Venfication Program, the Me!ntenance Program, methods of cnticality safety control, ase and imWmentation of allihe controlled parameters defined in the license, and contrul of cnticality safety documentation,

b. No procedure covered the development and implementation of passive engineered controls, such as geometry and volume, to assure that they are analyzed and evaluated for fabrication tolerances and dimensional changes that may occur through corrosion, wear, or mechanical distortion. In additior, : hey did not include provisions for the periodic inspection, if credible conditions exist for changes in dimensions of the equipment that may result in the inability to meet NCS limits, as specified in License Application Section 6.2.4(a).

c. RA 305. Evaluations Using the NITAWL XSDRN KENO Codes, and no other procedure provicied to the inspectors, provided guidance for computer software and hardware configuration control, as specified in License Application Section 6.4.3(d).

d RA 303, Control of Moderating Materials for NCS, nor any other procedure provided to the inspectors, provided guidance for c';tablianing a program to maintain the quality of the outermost moderator barrier and to conduct routine inspections, as specified in License Application Section h 2.4(c.2).

e. RA 304, Cnticality Accident Alarm System, $d not provide any guidance concerning the suspension of special nuclear material movement within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following the placement of the alarm system out of service, as specified in License Application Section 6.31.

f. RA 310, Regulatory Affairs Technical Reviews, did not provide appropnate guidance for conducting independent reviews, as exemplified by no requirement to.

1. Venfy that the proposed calculational geon etry model and configuration adequately represented the system being analyzed, as specified in License Application Section 6.4.3 e,

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Notico of Violation

2. Have the NCS Function t.ianager review and approve the technical review, as ,

spec 5ed in License Application Section 6.4.3 e; or

3. Venfy that the a3 built passive controls, such as geomet:f and volume, matched the design critena, as specified in License Application Section 6.2.1.

g. RA 107, Internal Reporting and NRC Notification of Unusual Occurrences, Revision 6, I did not address the requirements contained in the Westinghouse letter of August 14,1996, and approved by NRC letter of October 30,1996. (01063)

These violations represent a Severity Level lli Proolem (Supplement VI): Civil Penalty -

$13,750.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR e 201, Westinghouse Electric Corporation is nereby required to submit a wntten statement or explana'" to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regdatory Comm,ssion, within 30 dm of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of >

the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that wili be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence,if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protert imposition of the civil penalties, in whole or in part. by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.

Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may; (1) deny the violation (s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating c 9 stances (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.

In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any wntten answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10

' CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2 201 reply by specific reference (e.g .

citing page and paragraph numbers) *o avoid repetition The attention of the Licensee is

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Notict, of Violation 1

- directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.'205, regarding the pro edure for imposing civil j penalty, j

- Upon faili e to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in [

vtos dance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, thrs matter may be referred to the f Attomey General, ard the penalty, unless compromised, semitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234(c) of the Act. 42 U S.C. 2282c. .

The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and -  ;

Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:- James Lieberman, Director, Office of-Enforcement,' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North,11555 Rockville ,

Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 11. -j Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent

. possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so

-that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction if personal prP/acy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that shaut be protected and a redacted copy of your  :

response that deletes such information, if you request withnolding of such material, you must

-specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in ,

detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will l create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial ,

information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 6th day of January 1998 j l

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