ML20248J638
| ML20248J638 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248J637 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1151-98-03, 70-1151-98-3, NUDOCS 9806090229 | |
| Download: ML20248J638 (12) | |
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I V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No.:
70-1151 License No.:
SNM-1107 i
Report No.:
70-1151/98-03 Licensee:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Facility:
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division Columbia. SC 29250
' Inspection Conducted:
April 13-17, 1998 Inspectors:
D. Ayres. Senior Fuel Facility Inspector Approved by:
E. McAlpine. Chief
)
Fuel Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I
Enclosure i
P 00 51
.C.
PDR u_
Executive Summary Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division NRC Inspection Report 70-1151/98-03 The primary focus of this routine, unannounced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the licensee's programs for operational safety and management controls. The report includes inspection efforts of one regional inspector. The inspection identified the following aspects of the licensee programs as outlined below:
Safetv Ooerations Safety instructions concerning outdoor storage of flammable liquids near a UF6 cylinder storage area were not consistent. A potential route for spread of contamination was identified between the chemical and mechanical. areas.
Criticality safety postings were found damaged on certain fuel rod transport carts. (Section 2.a)
Housekeeping in outdoor areas was deficient in that unlabeled drums were discovered in various locations, compressed gas cylinders were not adequately supported, ar.d debris from maintenance activities was commonly found around the plant site. (Section 2.b)
Licensee response to the bucket elevator boot failure was adequate to lessen the likelihood of recurrence. Corrections of a weakness in the operability alarm for equi] ment important to criticality safety are still being considered. T11s is identified as Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 98-03-01.
(Section 2.c)
The internal safety audit program was performed as required by license conditions. The reassignment of responsibilities for conducting the audits correlated with a significant decrease in. audit findings. (Section 3.a)
The Regulatory Compliance Committee membership, scope of meetings, and reports were in accordance with license requirements.
The new format for reporting the committee's outputs was adequate for closing IFI 97-05-02. (Section 3.b)
Attachment:
Persons Contacted and Exit Interview Attendance Inspection Procedures Used List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed List of Acronyms l
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Summary of Plant Status This report covered a one week period.
Special activities during the week included the restart of powder and pellet aroduction equipment after completion of the annual Special Nuclear laterial inventory listing.
There were no unusual plant operational occurrences during the onsite inspection.
Three members of Region II management and an NRC Headquarters Division Director were on-site during the week to discuss the results of the 1998 Licensee Performance Review with Westinghouse management.
2.
Plant Ooerations (88020) (03) a.
Conduct of Ooerations (03.01)
(1)
Insoection Scone The canduct of operations in the chemical, mechanical, and outdoor areas were reviewed to verify compliance with safety postings and procedural requirements.
(2)
Observations and Findinas The inspector toured outdoor operations and storage areas.
The inspector observed conflicting postings concerning the storage of flammable liquids in an area adjacent to the UFs cylirder storage area.
The inspector observed an instruction painted at the edge cf a concrete 3ad that stated no flammable liquids were to be stored aeyond that point.
The instructions included an arrow that pointed toward the )ad, indicating no flammable liquids were to be stored on tie pad. The inspector also observed an area of the pad that was designated as a flammable liquid storage area, apparently in conflict with the painted instruction.
The ins)ector discussed this conflict with the licensee and found tlat the arrow painted on the pad pointed in the wrong direction. Flammable liquid storage was actually prohibited outside the concrete pad due to the proximity of an outdoor smoking area. Thus, all flammable liquids were required to be on the pad instead of prohibited from it.
The licensee planned to correct the misdirecting arre m the painted instruction as soon as weather permitted.
The inspector observed operations in the plant mechanical i
area where filled rods are inspected tested. and placed into fuel assemblies.
The inspector observed a large opening in a wall where empty rods and rod carriers are transferred from the mechanical area (where anti-contamination [ anti-c] clothing is not required) into the chemical area (where anti-c clothing is required). The opening was approximately three meters wide by one meter i
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2 high with a ledge approximately 20 centimeters deep.
corresponding to the thickness of the wall through which the opening was made.
The inspector observed a licensee employee from the mechanical area (without anti-c clothing) sitting on the ledge between the two areas.
Minutes later.
the inspector observed a licensee employee on the chemical area side of the opening (w.ith anti-c clothing) ) lacing his l
knee and then forearms onto the ledge such that lis anti-c-clothing contacted the ledge.
The inspector discussed.this potential contamination control problem with the licensee.
The licensee immediately surveyed the ledge to confirm that no contamination existed on the ledge. The licensee posted signs such that the ledge was not to be touched by personnel from either side of the wall opening. Additionally. the licensee placed the ledge on its list for routine contamination surveys.
The inspector observed operations in the fuel assembly production areas. The inspector observed that some of the carts used to transport loaded fuel rods had damaged or missing criticality safety postings.
This damage was due to postings being placed on the vertical outer surfaces of the j
transfer carts, and carts rubbing against each other when being positioned for temporary storage. The licensee immediately replaced the damaged and missing postings and showed the inspector other carts that had been modified to hold postings such that they would not be damaged by other carts.
The licensee was reviewing the feasibility of modifying the remaining carts to eliminate thic problem.
The inspector observed operations in the powder and pellet production areas of the chemical area.
No departure from safety postings and procedural requirements were observed by the inspector in these areas.
(3)
Conclusions Safety instructions concerning outdoor storage of flammable quids near a UFs cylinder storage area were not
.esistent.. A potential route for s) read of contamination i
9 1sted between the chemical and meclanical areas.
.citicality safety postings were being damaged on certain fuel rod transport carts.
b.
Housekeeoina (03.06)
(1)
-Insoection Scone l
Accessibility of egress routes and safety equipment were l
examined in outdoor areas around the plant.
Overall storage of site debris was also reviewed.
3 (2)
Observations and Findinas During the outdoor tour, the inspector observed numerous (about twenty) 55-gallon drums in areas surrounding the plant that were not empty, but were not laoeled as to their contents. Some of these drums had lids bolted onto them, but most of them had loose lids.
The inspector discussed the contents of these drums with the licensee.
Most of the drums with loose lids were one-time trash receptacles that now contained rainwater.
Drums with bolted lids were found to contain metal scraps from a non-contaminated area of the plant.
Other drums had been used as anchors for signs posted around the outdoor chemical bulk storage area. After the inspector discussed the concern with the licensee, the unlabeled drums were immediately labeled or discarded.
The inspector observed the various emergency exits from the uranium processing facilities. The inspector found one double-door exit that had 1-gallon and 5-gallon cans of paint and floor sealant blocking one of the two double doors. This material was left from work performed the previous week during an inventory shutdown.
The inspector pointed out the concern with the licensee anc the cans were immediately removed.
The inspector observed other equipment and debris scattered around the back of the plant site adjacent to the process facility. The ins)ector observed a compressed gas cylinder standing upright tlat was not chained or supported in any way.
The inspector observed two other gas cylinders that were manifolded together with metal tubing, but did not have safety chains in place.
The licensee immediately corrected these deficiencies. The inspector also observed collections of debris in several places where maintenance work had been performed. but clean up of the area had not been completed.
The debris were not blocking routes of egress or accessibility of safety equipment but would be considered a potential hazard if allowed to accumulate further.
The licensee indicated that these debris would be removed as soon as practical.
(3)
Conclusions Housekeeping in outdoor areas was deficient in that unlabeled drums were discovered in various locations.
compressed gas cylinders were not adequately supported, and debris from maintenance activities were commonly found around the plant site.
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c.
Review of Previous Events (03.07)
(1)
Insoection Scooe Certain incidents previously identified to the NRC and/or contained in the licensee's Redbook system were reviewed to asser-the adequacy of the licensee's actions in response to operi ional problems.
(2)
Observations and Findinas 1
The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding a flexible boot failure at the top end of a bucket elevator used to transport Ammonium Diuranate.
The boot failure caused airborne radioactivity in the area to be several times the allowed Derived Air Concentration for soluble uranium. The inspector interviewed the area engineer and found that the boot failure was such that its clamp came loose from its mounting instead of rupturing.
The area engineer also indicated that the boots in that area had been I
in service for approximately ten years without a failure.
l The licensee ~s investigation identified the need to periodically check these boots on all process lines to ensure tightness.
I The inspector was briefed on a problem concerning the failure of the recirculation pumps serving a large uranyl l
nitrate (UN) solution storage tank.
Prior to entering the unfavorable geometry tanks. UN solutions )assed through the i
primary in-line gamma monitor to verify tlat solutions entering the tanks were within the allowable concentration limits.
The recirculation pumas on each tank were necessary to pass the UN solution throug1 a second in-li e gamma j
monitor to verify the concentration of the tank's contents.
Thus, the recirculation loop acted as a backup monitoring system during the filling of the tanks.
Upon restarting the process following a plant power outage, the recirculation pumps did not restart on one tank that had been filled and i
was isolated from further inputs. Also, the flow switch I
that indicated pump failure did not signal an alarm as designed. The area operator discovered the system failure during a routine process equi ament overcheck serformed at four-hour intervals.
Since t1e contents of t1e tank had been measured during filling and recirculation before the power outage occurred, and the filled tank had been sampled and isolated to prevent Nrther additions, the loss of recirculation capability wcs not considered a loss of double contingency. However, since the flow switch did not detect the loss of recirculation, a weakness in the licensee's alarm configuration existed that could contribute to the loss of double contingency during the filling of a tank.
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5 The inspector discussed this with the licensee who agreed that an improvement in the system was needed.
The improvement in the UN tank recirculation alarm systems =;s identified as Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 98-03-01.
(3)
Conclusions Licensee response to the bucket elevator boot failure was adequate to lessen the likelihood of recurrence.
Corrections of a weakness in the operability alarm for equipment important to criticality safety are still being considered and are identified as IFI 98-03-01.
'd.
Follow-uo on Previous 1v Identified Issues (IPs 97201/97202)
(03.08)
(1)
Insoection Scoce The progress on corrective actions associated with IFIs and responses to violations were reviewed for possible closure.
(2)
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the arogress of IFIs 97-03-01 and 97-03-03. both concerning tie revision of outdated Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSEs). The inspector-observed that with the completion of the Integrated Safety Assessment (ISA), the licensee was beginning to revise the CSEs based on concerns expressed in previous NRC inspections and the findings of the ISA. These items were targeted for completion by July 31, 1998, and will remain open.
j The ins ector reviewed corrective actions associated with one vio ation (VIO 97-205) cited in an NRC Headquarters-based (HQ-based) inspection report. The inspector reviewed certain corrective actions involving modification of procedures in response to the Notice of Violation.
The inspector could only partially verify the completion of the committed procedural changes.
This information was forwarded to pertinent NRC H0-based inspection staff.
This violation remains open.
1 (3)
Conclusions L
The corrective actions associated with IFIs 97-03-01 and L
97-03-03 are targeted for completion by July 31, 1998.
These items remain o)en. The corrective actions for L
VIO 97-205 have not )een completed and this item remains L
open.
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3.
Manaaement Organization and Controls (88005) (05) a.
Internal Reviews and Audits (05.u]),
(1)
Insoection Scone Monthly audits of regulatory program performance were reviewed to verify compliance with license requirements.
(2)
Observations and Findinos The inspector reviewed the internal safety audits conducted over the past six months by licensee staff. The inspector observed that the audits had been performed as required.
However, the inspector noted that the audit findings had diminished significantly.
Previous reviews of these audits had shown that seven to ten findings per month were being documented. The latest review revealed that only about two or three items being identified each month. The inspector discussed these findings with the licensee and noted that the licensee had reassigned the responsibility of these audits since the last NRC review.
(3)
Conclusions j
The internal safety audit program was being performed as required by license conditions. The reassignment of responsibilities for conducting the audits correlated with a significant decrease in audit findings.
b.
Safety Committees (05.04)
Follow-uo on Previousiv Identified Issues (IP 92701) (05.06)
(1)
Insoection Scoue The actions of the Regulatory Comaliance Committee were reviewed to verify compliance wit 1 license requirements.
(2)
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the meeting minutes of the Regulatory Compliance Committee (RCC) for the past six months.
The inspector verified that meetings were being held at least quarterly and that the scopes of the meetings were in accordance with licensed requirements.
The inspector also verified that the membership of the RCC met license requirements.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the format of the meeting minutes and verified that the i
identification of the RCC's outputs (findings conclusions i
and recommendations) was more clearly communicated.
This clearer format satisfied the inspectors concern raised l
n,,n,.
7 during a previous inspection and thus IFI 97-05-02 is considered closed.
(3)
Conclusions The Regulatory Compliance Committee membership, scope of meetings, and re] orts were in accordance with license requirements.
T1e new format for reporting the committee's outputs was adequate for closing IFI 97-05-02.
4.
Maintenance / Surveillance (F1) a.
Follow-uo on Previously Identified Issues (IP 92701) (F1.08)
(1)
Insoection Scooe The status of corrective actions associated with previously identified maint9 nance issues were reviewed.
(2)
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's actions to prevent deletion of required preventive maintenance as identified in IFI 98-02-01. This item was listed in the licensee's Commitment Tracking System with a target completion date of April 30. 1998, and was not yet complete.
This item will remain open.
The inspector reviewed the status of the licensee's actions to assess the adequacy of post-maintenance functional testing of process equipment and control software as identified in IFI 98-02-03. This item was listed in the licensee's Commitment Tracking System with a target completion date of June 30. 1998, and was not yet complete.
This item will remdin open.
(3)
Conclusions The licensee's actions for preventing deletion of required preventive maintenance (IFI 98-02-01). and for assessing the adequacy of its post-maintenance functional testing system (IFI 98-02-03) were not yet completed.
These items will l
remain open.
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5.
Manaaement Meetinas a.
Exit Interview (M1)
On April 17. 1998, the inspection scope and results were summarized with licensee representatives.
The inspector-discussed.'in detail, the routine program areas inspected and the inspection findings.
The licensee did not identify any of the materials provided during the inspection as proprietary.
.b.
Licensee Performance Review Meetino (M2)
On April 16. 1998. the ins)ector, the NRC Region II Public Affairs Officer. four members of tie NRC management staff, and the licensee's management staff attended an o]en public meeting to discuss the licensee's performance over tie past two years. The licensee's program strengths, areas needing im)rovement. and challenges to performance were discussed from )oth licensee and NRC viewpoints.
Details of the specific items discussed were published in a Public Meeting Summary dated April 24, 1998.
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.b.
ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
- J. Allen. Plant Manager
- J. Bush, Manager. Manufacturing
- R. Ervin Senior Engineer. Chemical Process Engineering
- M. Goddard. Team Manager. Uranium Recycle and Recovery Services
- W. Goodwin. Manager. Regulatory Affairs
- J. Heath. Manager Regulatory Engineering and Operations
- N. Kent. Senior Engineer. Regulatory Affairs
- N. Parr, Manager, Chemical Process Engineering
- E. Reitler. Fellow Engineer. Regulatory Engineering and Operations
- T. Shannon Regulatory Affairs Technician
- R. Williams. Regulatory Affairs Advisory Engineer
.0ther Licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, security and office personnel.
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- Attended exit meeting INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88020 Region Nuclear Criticality Safety Inspection Program IP 88005 Management Organization and Controls IP 92701 Follow-up on Inspector Problems IP 92702 Follow-up on Violations / Deviations LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ocened 70-1151/98-03-01 IFI Review Licensee's Actions to Prevent Comme: 711ure of Uranyl-Nitrate Recirculation Pump Alarm System (Section 2.c.(2))
Closed j
70-1151/97-05-02 IFI Provide Clearer Identification of the Regulatory Compliance Committee's Outputs in its Meeting Minutes (Section 3.b.(2))
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2 Discussed 70-1151/97-03-01 IFI OPEN Follow-up on Testing of the Centrifuge Instrumentation (Section 2.d) 70-1151/97-03-03 IFI OPEN Follow-up on Actions to Supplement CSE Documents (Section 2.d) 70-1151/98-02-01 IFI OPEN Follow-up on Actions to Prevent Deletion of Required Programmed Maintenance (Section 4.a) 70-1151/98-02-03 IFI OPEN Follow-up on Actions to Assess the Adequacy of Post-Maintenance Functional Testing of Process Equipment and Control. Software (Section 4.a) 70-1151/98-205 VIO OPEN Corrective Actions in Response to Violations Involv1ng Investigation of Faulty Criticality Safety Analyses (Section 2.d)
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Anti-C Contamination CSE Critical Safety Evaluation H0 Headquarters IFI Inspector Follow-up Item IP Inspection Procedure ISA Integrated Safety Analysis NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCC Regulatory Compliance Committee UF Uranium Hexafluoride 6
UN Uranyl Nitrate VIO Violation t
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