ML20198H644

Discusses Insp Rept 70-1151/97-205 on 970825-29 & Forwards NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $13,750

ML20198H644
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	01/06/1998
From:	Ten Eyck E NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Allen J WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
Shared Package
ML20198H648	List: ML20198H644 ML20198H655
References
70-1151-97-205, EA-97-442, NUDOCS 9801130356
Download: ML20198H644 (6)

Text

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1j; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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January 6, 1998 EA 97-442 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division ATTN: Mr. J. B. Allen, Columbia Plant Manager P.O. Drawer R Columbia, SC 29250 ,

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY -

$13,750 (NRC INSPECTION F.dPORT NO. 70-1151/97-205)

Dear Mr. Allen:

I This refers to the criticality safety inspection conducted on August 25 - 29,1997, at the -

Westinghouse Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division facility in Columbia, South Carolina, to review the circumstances surrounding the June 23 and August 25,1997, loss of criticality control +

events. The findings of this inspection were discussed with yourself and mrmbers of your staff during two exit meetings, the last of which was hem on September 22,1997. The inspection report documenting the issues was sent to you by letter dated October 2,1997, and the pre decisional enforcement conference was conducted at NRC Headquarters on October 29,1997.

t Based on the information developed during the inspection, and the information that you provided during the conference and in your November 6,1997, letter, NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These issues are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in deta!! in the subject inspection report.

On June 23,1997, Westinghouse Columbia Plant staff identified that the volume control assumed by the Line 1 granulator hopper criticality safety analysis (CSA) had not been established. By early August, discussions between NRC and your staff indicated that the corrective actions and recommendaticos identified by your Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Team had not yet been completed. During the NRC inspection to review the RCA and determine whether appropriste corrective actions had been implemented in a timely manner, a second case was identified by your staff on August 25,1997, involving the failure to establish a volume control assumed in a CSA. The NRC inspection subsequently revealed significant weaknesses with the implementation of your Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program. Based on the results

of this inspection, six violations were identified.

Collectively. the violations demonstrate that Westinghouse failed to implement a comprehensive program to ensure that plant operations involving the processing of special nuclear material (SNM) were conducted in accordance with the safety requirements specified in

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Westinghouse Electric Corporation the renewed license. NRC intervention was necessary to identify the scope and magnitude of the problems and to assure that appropriate corrective actions were taken to establish that the as-exists plant conditions regaring engineered controls matched the plant safety basis. The various audit, surveillance, and self-assessment programs implemented by Westinghouse were ineffective in identifying these problems. Prior notice of this failure was documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 70-1151/96-204 which raised several issues involving the performance of your self-assessment program and noted in the cover letter that 'no mechanism was developed to assure that specific license requirements were being impiemented in accordance with management's expectations."

Briefly, the violations that are the subject of this proposed enforcement action, involved the failure to: (1) conduct adequate incident investigations, identify root causes, and take timely corrective actions; (2) conduct adequate criticality safety evaluations; (3) functionally verify that installed safety controls anatched the design documents; (4) update criticality safety evaluations following changes; (5) control criticality safety evaluation records: and (6) develop or implement various NCS procedures and policies that cover certain license conditions, including notification requirements. These violations are significant because they substantially degraded the approved processes in the license used to establish and maintain the safety program for processing SNM and are indicative of a significant lack of attention or carelessness towards licensed responsibilities. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level 111 problem.

At the October 1997 pre-decisional conference, you generally acknowledged the occurrence of the violations, with the exception of Violation 1.c, and disagreed with one of the potential violations. You stated that the programmutic rmot causes relevant to the two incidents were:

(1) Regulatory Engineering activities were not implemented in a disciplined, timely, and well-documented manner; (2) the issues were not identified in a timely manner by the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF) self-assessment process; and (3) management oversight and review activities did not elevate these issues to produce corrective actions on a programmatic basis. Additionally, you provided your perspective on the safety significance of the two

incidents, asserting that " Double Contingency Protection (DCP), in reality, (existed] at all times."

NRC does not agree with your perspective on the safety significance of the two events. While it was fortuP. sus that the actual safety margin could be demonstrated after the fact, your licensing basis requires the identification, establishment, and maintenance of appropriate safety controls prior to and during the processing of vNM.

At the enforcement conference, you dwagreed with Violation 1.c on the basis, among other things, that your criticality engineers confirmed and verified that the components could be operated safely. However, following the conference, you could not find a documented review or l technical verification. A judgement call by criticality engineers is not an acceptable substitute for completing the formal safety evaluation and review process required by your license.

Regarding the seventh potential violation identified in the subject inspection report and discussed during the conference, after considering the exercise of reasonable engineering judgment on the part of your staff, NRC has determined that the granulator hopper event was adequately reported. Therefore, this example has not been included in the enclosed Notice.

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Westinghowse Electric Corporation -31 The second example of the potential violation also is not included in the Notice because we have determined that an example cited in the Violation 6 already encompasses this issue.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $13,750 is considered for a Severity Levellli problem, Because your facility b s been the suoject of an escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years,' NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Correctivo action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No credit was given for identification of the violations because they were identified by NRC as a result of the inspectiLn into the adequacy and timeliness of your corrective actions for the June 1997 event. As to the factor of Correct /vo action, credit was warranted because your immediate corrective actions and plans for long term actions, once the violations were identified by NRC, were considered prompt and comprehensive. These actions included: (1) the August 29,1997, shutdown of the pellet processing area; (2) the conduct of a comprehensive investigation and root cause analysis for each event; (3) establishment of a Regulatory Process Review Team to initially focus on the nuclear criticality safety process; (4) implementation of procedure revisions and personnel training; (5) initiation of an ongoing facility-wide field venfication to demonstrate that the as-built or installed ecopment conforms to the safety documentation; (6) verification that the documentation conforms to the analyses; (7) increased pace for conducting Process Hazards Analyses for remaining systems; and (8) specific commitments to increase management oversight and control. Finally, due to th9 scope and complexity of the ide d 9d issues, you committed to providing n finalized plan and schedule for lasting corrective at,Las by December 15,1997. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining a comprehensive program to assure that SNM operations are conducted in accordance with NRC safety requirements, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the entiosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $13,750.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice v' hen preparing your response. Additionally, NRC continues to be concerned that inadequate management attention has been directed toward ensuring that an appropriate level of communications with NRC is established and maintained by your staff. Specifically, durinc, the pre-decisional enforcement conference, it was noted that NRC representatives, who were onsite at the time of the discovery that two fuel rods had been inadvertently shipped to a foreign plai,t, v/are'not informed of the event. Then, again in August 1997, plant personnel did not inform NRC inspectors, who were onsite at the time, of the moisture drop-out tank event until 2 days after the system was restarted. Your response also should address actions taken or planned to address this concern. NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements i

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'A Notice of Violation for a Seventy Level lil problem (EA 97-244) was issued without a civil

penalty on July 28,1997, for violations related to the unauthonzed shipment of two SNM fuel rods in a replica assembly to a foreign plant.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation 4-in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure. and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

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Elizabeth O. Ten Eyck, Director

/L I Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Docket No. 70-1151 License No. SNM-1107

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation

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Westinghouse Electric Corporation - In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,-its 1

enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document RoomJ ,

Sinccety. - ,

Elizabeth O. Ten Eyck, Director ,

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Docket No. 70 1151-License No. SNM 1107

Enclosure:

! Notice.of Vio'ation Distribution:

- Docket File 70-1151 PDR SECY ,

CA LCallan, EDO HThompson, DEDR Case File LReyes, Rll- JLieberman, OE CPaperiello, NMSS FDavis, OGC . EMcAlpine, Ril BMallet, Ril CGaskin, FCLB JDavis, FCOB EA File, OE NMSS r/f FCSS r/f HBell, OlG DWhaley, FCOB WSchwink, FCLB GCaputo,' 01 - CBassett, Ril TMartin, DEDO Enforcement Coordinators FCOB r/f SCaudill, FCOB - ,,

Rl, Ril, Rlli, RIV- CTripp, FCOB DMorey, FCOB y

- DOC:\Troskoski\97-442.wst f r

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE Y  !

'0FC FCOB- FCOB- DE b* FCOB- E FCSfr/ FCES,[

NAME PHarict6dh WikNski- M berman PTing* Edl$rYch bdTebEyck DATE? A/F/97 /

A 30/97 N/v/97 12/08/97 / // /97 iLNN C= COPY F = COVER-& ENCLOSURE- N = NO COPY OFFICIAL' RECORD COPY G:\0ECASES\442REV.JD:

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Westinghouse Electric Corporation In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely, Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Docket No.- 70-1151 License No. SNM-1107

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation Distribution:

Docket File 701151 PDR SECY CA . LCallan, EDO HThompson, DEDR Case File LReyes, Ril JLieberman, OE CPaperiello, NMSS FDavis, OGC EMcAlpine, Rll BMallet, Ril CGaskin, FCLB JDavis, FCOB EA File, OE NMSS r/f FCSS r/f HBell, OlG DWhaley, FCOB WSchwink, FCLB GCaputo,01 CBassett, Rll TMartin, DEDO Enforcement Coordinators FCOB r/f ECaudill, FCOB 'y RI, Ril, Rlli, RIV CTripp, / COB DMorey, FCOB DOC:\Troskoski\97-442.wst .

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE /h 0FC FCOB FCOB OE FCOB E FCSM) FASS)

NAME PHarictWh WTkdbski "qikberman PTfng* ENch ,' Eh,Te Eyck DATE />/P/97 A /P/97 N/*W/97 12/08/97 / // /97 j 2/M9i C= COPY E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY G:\0ECASES\442REV.JD y y ) g alcN bjn N '

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