ML20198A842

Insp Rept 70-1151/98-09 on 981109-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Programs for Operational Safety & Facility Support

ML20198A842
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	12/03/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198A840	List: ML20198A834 ML20198A842
References
70-1151-98-09, 70-1151-98-9, NUDOCS 9812170147
Download: ML20198A842 (10)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Docket No.: 70-1151 License No.: SNM-1107 Report No.: 70-1151/98-09 Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Facility: Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility Columbia, SC 29250 inspection Conducted: November 9-13,1998 Inspectors: D. Seymour, Senior Fuel Facility inspector Approved by: E. McAlpine, Chief, Fuel Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 9812170147 9812M PDR ADOCK 07001151 Enclosure C PDR

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i EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division NRC Inspection Report 70-1151/98-09 The primary focus of this routine, unannounced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the licensee's programs for operational safety and facility support. The report includes inspection efforts of one regionalinspector. The inspection identified the following aspects of the licensee programs as outlined below:

Plant Ooeration_s Powder production and nitrate waste / recycle operations were performed with an adequate emphasis on established safety controls (Section 2.a).

Engineered and administrative (procedural) controls were used in the UF. cylinder wash process as identified in the CSE License Annex. A cylinder wash operator was knowledgeable of the active engineered and administrative controls for the process (Section 2.b).

The licensee's root cause analysis and corrective actions for the pellet accumulation event were thorough, and were adequate to prevent future pellet accumulations and improper grinder bowl replacements. A non-cited violation was identified for failure to l follow procedure and for loss of configuration control (Section 2.c).

Maintenance Safety related equipment associated with the uranium hexafluoride cylinder wash  !

process was calibrated as specified by the CSE License Annex (Section 3.a).

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Persons Contacted

Lists of items Opened, Closed, and Discussed l List of Acronyms l

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Summary of Plant Status

- This report covered a one week period. Powder, pellet, and fuel assembly production proceeded at normal rates. There were no unusual plant operational occurrences during the onsite inspection.

2. Plant Ooerations (Insoection Procedure (IP) 88020) (O3)

a. Conduct of Operations (O3.01)

(1) Inspection Scope Process tours were performed to verify that operations were safely controlled through the ure of area postings.

(2) Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed operations and safety postings in the powder production and nitrate waste / recycle handling areas. The inspector found no deviations from established safety controls for operations in those areas.

(3) Conclusions Powder production and nitrate waste / recycle operations were performed with an adequate emphasis on established safety controls.

- b. Implementation of Process Safety Controls (O3.03)

(1) Inspection Scope The uranium hexafluoride (UF.) cylinder wash process was reviewed to verify adequate implementation of process safety controls.

(2) Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the criticality safety evaluation (CSE) license annex for the UF. cylinder wash process dated August 31,1998. The inspector noted the CSE identified the process controls relied upon for criticality safety. The inspector observed, during process tours, that passive engineered controls, active engineered controls, and administrative controls with computer or alarm assist as identified in the CSE were as described and available to perform their specified safety function.

The inspector reviewed the UF. cylinder wash process operating procedures. The inspector noted that administrative process safety controls listed in the CSE as defenses to initiating events were present in the operating procedures. The inspector also discussed the active engineered and administrative controls with an operator who performed

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l (3) Conclusions Engineered and administrative (procedural) controls were used in the UF, cylinder wash process as identified in the CSE License Annex. The cylinder wash operator and supervisor were knowledgeable of the active 3 l

engineered and administrative controls for the process. <

c.

Review of Previous Events (IP 92700) (O3.07) l (1) Inspection Scope  ;

The licensee'- avaluation and corrective actions for a previously reported 4 event was reviewed for adequacy to prevent recurrence. l (2) Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of an event involving the  ;

accumulation of pellets in the poly pack and chute below the grinder bowl l i feeder, as reported in NRC Event Notice No. 34462. The inspector l

reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation of the event, which identified three causal factors for the event.

l The first causal factor was that operators failed to follow their procedure l which requires the polypack below the feeder bowl be checked at the end i of each shift. The licensee's investigation determined that the operators {

thought they only had to check the polypack at enrichment clean-outs l (ECO). The last ECO for Line 3 was performed on July 20,1998. The  !

inspector discussed this causal factor with the licensee and learned that a 4

the requirement to check the polypack at the end of each shift was added I to the procedure in 1992. Powever, the licensee thinks that, after a time, the practice was abandoned because, hlstorically, very little or no material was found in the polypacks. The licensee did not know if a procedure revision was initiated but not completed.

t The inspector determined, through discussions with the licensee, a records review, and discussions with, and observations of, the operators, t,

' that, subsequent to this event, the operators received training conceming the procedure requirements for checking the polypacks at the end of each shift. In addition, the inspector reviewed the procedure revisions which clarified and enhanced these requirements. The inspector noted that the revised procedure required the operators to weigh the polypacks and record the results on a specified form at the end of each shift. The form included an action for when 5 kilograms or more of pellets accumulated.

The second causal factor was that the wrong grinder bowl was installed l l on Line 3. The bowl on Line 3 was a bowl obtained from the mothballed

Manufacturing Advanced Process (MAP) area. Three unused bowls from i the MAP area had been placed in the plant storeroom. However, these I

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l bowls had not been upgraded (rebuilt) when the pellet dimensions were  ;

changed (the bowls were still in the mothballed MAP area when the other  ;

bowls were rebuilt to the new pellet dimensions). The licensee  !

determined that the grinder bowls on Lines 1,2, and 4 were the correct  ;

type (rebuilt); the grinder bowl on Line 5 was also a bowl from MAP area.

l l However, operators on Line 5 had not used the bowl to feed pellets to the '

' grinder. The inspector determined, through discussions with the licensee, l

that the bowls had been replaced on the lines during an April 1998 plant shut down. ,

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- The third causal factor was that the licensee did not have a system to l identify rebuilt spare bowls. The inspector noted that equivalent rebuilt i bowls have differences because they are individually handcrafted. The i inspector also noted that the differences in the bowls, rebuilt versus l

! non-rebuilt, which allowed the pellets to fall to the chute and polypack, '

were not readily obvious.

l The licensee's corrective actions for the second and th:rd causal factors included inspecting and verifying all grinder bowls were acceptable for use; ensuring that all applicable grinder bowls were rebuilt as needed; '

attaching tags to grinder bowls indicating bowls were ready for use, or I were not acceptable for use; attaching tags to grinder bowls identifying the drawing number and revision; and development of instructions for grinder bowl repair.

The inspector concluded that the root cause analysis and corrective actions for the specific problems resulting in the pellet accumulation were thorough. However, inspector Followup Item 98-09-01 will evaluate the  !

licensee's generic review of configuration management and administrative '

controls to preclude similar occurrences in other areas of the plant.

The failure to check the grinder bowl at the end of each shift and the loss of configuration control (use of non-rebuilt grinder bowls) identified by the a licensee during this event review are examples of a violation. This non- {

repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement policy (NCV 98-09-02).

(3) Conclusions l

The licensee's root cause analysis and corrective actions for the pellet  !

accumulation evr t were thorough, and were adequate to prevent future l pellet accumulations and improper grinder bowl replacements. An NCV was identified for failure to follow procedure and for loss of configuration i control.

d. Follow-up on a Pmviously identified issues (IP 92701) (O3.08)

(1) Inspectic:: ' .o A previously identified issue was reviewed for possible closure.

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4 (2) Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions for addressing the failure of a recirculation alarm on a bulk uranyl nitrate (UN) tank (Inspector j Follow-up Item (IFI) 98-03-01). The licensee made software changes to 4

the system which corrected this problem. Operators in the solvent extraction control room monitor the condition of the uranyl nitrate tanks and recirculating pumps via computer screen. In this case, after a planned power outage, when power was restarted, the master controller (affiliated with the ammonium diuranate control room) did not reestablish communications with the solvent extraction control room, for the recirculating pumps. This was not noted by the operators because, when

the system power was terminated, the system failed "as is." When the power was reestablished, the monitor for the recirculating pump remained j in the failed mode, and displayed the earlier "as is" values which reflected conditions immediately prior to the power outage. The licensee has

, modified the software system to test the communication link between the two control rooms, and if communications are lost and are not reestablished in a timely fashion, to sound an alarm and to reestablish communications. Based on this review IFl 98-03-01 is closed.

1 (3) Conclusions The inspector evaluated licensee actions for IFl 98-03-01 and concluded that the concerns were adequately addressed.' This item is closed.

3. Maintenance / Surveillance (88025) (F1)

a. Calibrations of Equipment (F1.07) l (1) Inspection Scope The conduct of maintenance was reviewed to verify that safety-related

, systems and components were calibrated as required by the CSEs.

(2) Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed computerized maintenance records for equipment specified in the CSE License Annex for the UF. cylinder wash process.

p' The inspector verified that the equipment associated with the active engineering controls and administrative controls with alarm assist, were calibrated as specified in the CSE. Where applicable, the inspector also 4

verified that calibration stickers were accurate.

(3) Conclusions

. The inspector concluded that safety related equipment associated with the UF, cylinder wash process was calibrated as delineated by the CSE License Annex.

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b. Follow-up on Previously identified issues (IPs 92701, 92702) (F1.08)

(1) Inspection Scope Several previously identified issues were reviewed for possible closure.

(2) Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed an Energy System Business Unit (ESBU) audit, ESBU-97-08, conducted December 8 through 12,1997 (IFl 97-02-03).

The audit identified two findings in the maintenance area. One finding i

! was product-quality related, and was not reviewed. The second finding concerned non-safety-related preventive maintenance (PM) exceeding the PM grace period and written notifications not being issued. Procedure MPC-108000, Preventive Maintenance, was revised to clarify the actions required for overdue safety related PMs and routine PMs. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure and concluded the corrective actions

were adequate.

The audit also included several recommendations. The inspector determined that the recommendations were evalueted and addressed.

Based on this review, IFl 97-02-03 is closed.

The inspector also reviewed the status of Violation (VIO) 98-02-02 and l

the licensee's corrective actions included in the response to the 1 associated Notice of Violation (NOV). This violation involved five examples where the licensee failed to conduct maintenance activities in accordance with the requirements for using computer programs and/or approved procedures. The inspector determined that the licensee adequately implemented the long term corrective actions for the first three examples in the NOV.

The inspector noted that the one of the immediate corrective actions for the third example was superceded by the results of the long term corrective actions. The immediate corrective action involved updating MAPCON to issue maintenance work orders for a required ventilation duct inspection on/about the 20* of each month, regardless of the status of the previous month's work order. At the time of the inspection, this immediate corrective action was no longer implemented.

The long-term corrective action involved evaluation by the licensee of ventilation duct procedures to determine if they were consistent with operations and regulatory requirements. As a result of this evaluation, the licensee determined that the ventilation duct inspection should be scheduled on a quarterly frequency, since, historically, insignificant amounts of material was found during the rnonthly inspections. The l

licensee also re-characterized the ventilation duct inspections as safety-related, resulting in the PM receiving a higher priority. The licensee's evaluation used information from the ventilation system integrated safety l assessment.

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] Also as a result of this evaluation, the licensee found that the automatic <

issuance of ventilation duct inspection work orders on/about the 20* of each month was an inefficient way to manage work orders, particularly if equipment was out of service. Instead, the licensee updated MAPCON to generate a list, on a weekly basis, of safety-related work orders approaching their due date, and assigned an individual to track and ensure completion of safety-related work orders. The licensee found that these program changes effectively eliminated the need to automatically issue work orders by a certain date each month.

The inspector concluded that these changes adequately addressed the concems associated with the third example of the NOV. The long term corrective actions fcr the remaining two examples were still in progress.

Based on this review, and because the long term corrective actions were still ongoing for two examples, VIO 98-02-02 will remain open.

The inspector also reviewed the licensee's progress on assessing the adequacy ofits post-maintenance functional testing of process equipment and control software (IFl 98-02-03). This item was not yet completed and i will remain open.

(3) Conclusions ,

The inspector evaluated licensee actions for three previously identified issues; IFl 97-02-03, VIO 98-02-02, and IFl 98-02-03. Based on this review, IFl 97-02-03 is closed. Violation 98-02-02 and IFl 98-02-03 remain open pending completion of the licensee's long term corrective actions.

4. Exit Interview (30703)(M1)

On November 13,1998, the inspection scope and results were summarized with licensee representatives. The inspector discussed, in detail, the routine program areas inspected and the inspection findings. Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

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ATTACHMENT l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l

l Licensee l J. Allen, Plant Manager

• J. Bush, Manager, Manufacturing

• M. Corum, Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer i

• R. Ervin, Chemical Process Engineer l *D. Goldbach, Manager, Chemical Operations

• W. Goodwin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs J. Heath, Manager, Regulatory Engineering and Operations l *E. Keelen, Manager, Product Assurance

• R. McCormac, Chemical Process Engineering

• S. Mcdonald, Manger, Technical Services

• W. Newmyer, Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer

• N. Parr, Manager, Chemical Process Engineering

• C Perkins, Manager, Maintenance

• T. Shannon, Regulatory Affairs Technician

• R. Williams, Advisory Engineer, Regulatory Affairs Other Licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, security and office personnel.

• Attended exit meeting INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

- IP 88020 Region Nuclear Criticality Safety inspection Program IP 88025 Maintenance and Surveillance Testing IP 92700 Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities

, IP 92701 Followup IP 92702 Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

~ Opened / Closed 70-1151/98-09-01 IFl Evaluate the Licensee's Generic Review of Configuration Management and Administrative Controls to Preclude Similar Occurrences in Other Areas of the Plant (Section 2.c).

70-1151/98-09-02 NCV Failurs to Follow Procedure and Loss of Configuration Control with Regard to a Pellet Accumulation Event (Section 2.c).

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2 l Closed 70-1151/98-03-01 IFl Review Licensee's Actions to Prevent Common Failure of Uranyl l

Nitra'.e Recirculation Pump Alarm System (Section 2.d).

l 70-1151/97-02-03 IFl Completion of Maintenance Audit (Section 3.b).

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l 70-1151/98-02-02 VIO Several Examples of Failure to Follow Required Work Controls (Section 3.b).

70-1151/98-02-03 IFl Follow-up on Actions to Assess the Adequacy of Post-Maintenance Functional Testing of Process Equipment and l Control Software (Section 3.b).

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS CFR Code of Federal Regulations CSE Critical Safety Evaluation ECO Enrichment Clean-out i ESBU Energy Systems Business Unit IFl Inspector Follow-up Item IP Inspection Procedure MAP Manufacturing Advanced Process MAPCON Maintenance Planning and Control NCV Non-cited Violation NOV Notice of Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PM- Preventative Maintenance UF. Uranium Hexafluoride UN Uranyl Nitrate VIO Violation l

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