ML20198A008

Forwards SER Input Re Nonconformance W/Requirements of App R as Defined by Region V Task Interface Agreement 85-37. Licensee Corrective Actions & Interim Compensatory Measures Acceptable,W/Exception of High/Low Pressure Valves

ML20198A008
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	09/09/1985
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0808, CON-WNP-808 TAC-59319, NUDOCS 8509110535
Download: ML20198A008 (3)

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SEP 9 935 Docket No. 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

WNP APPENDIX R NONCONFORMANCE - TIA 85 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH _ TAC N0. 59319 Enclosed is the Auxiliary Systems Branch's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) input concerning the nonconformance with the requirements of Appendix R at the Wash-ington Project No. 2 as defined by the Region V Task Interface Agreement No.

85-37. As indicated in the enclosed SER input, we find the licensee's cor-rective actions and interim compensatory measures acceptable with the excep-tion of the high/ low pressure interface valves.

This completes our work on TAC No. 59319. Since there has been no communi-cation with the licensee, there is no basis for a SALP evaluation and therefore we are not providing a SALP evaluation. ,,

'lWai c!;:n ,6 l:y I S %wn L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/ enclosure:

R. Bernero

0. Parr J. Wilson J. Ridgely W. Butler J. Bradfute

Contact:

J. Ridgely X29566 Distribution Docket File ASB Rdg. File ASB Members LRubenstein 50909 d

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

SAFETY FVALUATION REPORT WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS - NONCOMPLIANCE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH ,

We have reviewed the licensee's submittal dated June 17, 1985 per Region V's request for NRR's assistance dated June 19, 1985, concerning the conformance  ;

of WNP-2 to the requirements of Appendix R. The region's letter stated that certain equipment required to safely shutdown the plant "may become inoperable in the event of a design basis control room fire." This same letter implies that the requirements of, Appendix R apply to WNP-2 by stating in the subject of the letter: "Nonconformance of Safety Equipment to Appendix R Require- -

ments." Appendix R does not apply to WNP-2. Only the guidelines of Section 9.5.1 of NUREG-0800 (Standard Review Plan) apply to WNP-2.

The licensee's submittal dated June 17, 1985, referenced WNP-2 License Condition No. 12. This license condition refers to having an operable second panel for remote shutdown by the first refueling. A discussion of this licensee condition can be found in Section 7.4 of the SER and is associated with meeting General Design Criterion 19. " Control Room," not the require-ments of Appendix R or the guidelines of Section 9.5.1 of NUREG-0800.

The attachment to the licensee's submittal idonti ted seven items which, if they failed during a control room fire, would impair the ability to safely shutdown the plant. The licensee stated that these items and the associated design modification packages will "be reported in LER 84-031-04." Thus the licensee has been and continues to be conscientiously informing the staff of problems as they are discovered, of interim measurer, and of planned resolution. Of the seven items, five of the items deal with loss of power from diesel generator Number 2 by tripping various output breakers. For each of the five items the licensee has proposed interim procedures in the event of a control room fire in order to maintain the capability to safely shutdown the plant. The proposed long term corrective actions, which will be completed by the second refueling outage, are reasonable.

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2 The sixth item concerns the loss of a 24 VDC instrument power supply. The loss of this power supply would result in no standby service water pump dis-charge header pressure indication in the remote shutdown room. The loss of this instrumentation is acceptable because indication of proper operation of the standby service water pump can be inferred by local observation. of the operating pump and of the ultimate heat sink, perfonnance of the serviced equipment, and diesel generator loadings. The licensee will install a trans-fer switch, by the second refueling, to isolate the power supply from the control room. The proposed corrective actions are acceptable.

Item seven deals with the potential opening of the high/ low RHR pressure interface due to a control room fire generating an open signal to both valves RHR-V-53A and RHR-V-123A which are in series. As an interim measure, the licensee must remove power from one of these valves, such.as by opening the breaker to the valve. Although this is an acceptable means to resolve the high/

low pressure interface problem the licensee has proposed installing a transfer switch outside of the control room in order to isolate one valve from the control room in the event of a fire in the control room. This is acceptable provided that the transfer switch is maintained normally in the " isolate from the control room" position. Pending acceptance of this interim measure, the interim measures and corrective actions are acceptable.

Based on the low probability of a control room fire, the ir.terim compensatory measures, the ability to safely shutdown, and the acceptability of the corrective actions, we conclude that with the power removed from an RHR isolation valve and the RHR isolation switch maintained in the isolate position that the approach taken by the licensee is reasonable and acceptable. Therefore we conclude that continued operation of the facility will not adversely effect the health and safety of the public and is, therefore, acceptable.

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