ML20198G829

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Forwards Draft Response to 850718 Memo Re Inspector Feedback /Request for Technical Assistance on NUREG-0737,Item II.F.1.Response Based on Review of Util Position on Iodine plate-out
ML20198G829
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 01/06/1986
From: Bradfute J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Pederson R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
CON-WNP-0847, CON-WNP-847, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM TAC-59549, NUDOCS 8601130606
Download: ML20198G829 (4)


Text

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8 7. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 W ASHING TON, D. C. 20555 l

\*****/ January 6, 1986 -

Docket No.: 50-397 -

MEMORANDUM FOR: Roger Pederson, EGCB, DEPER, IE FROM: John 0. Bradfute, Project Manager WNP-2

SUBJECT:

INSPECTOR FEEDBACK / REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, NUREG-0737 ITEM II.F.I, ATTACHMENT 2

Reference:

(1) Memorandum, Scarano, RV, to Jordan, IE, (same subject) i dated July 18, 1985 (2) Letter, Sorensen, SS, to Martin, RV,

Subject:

WNP-2 Position on Iodine Plate-out, dated June 27, 1985 Attached is a draft response to the Reference (1) memorandum. The response is based on a review of the Supply System's position on Iodine plate-out, Reference (2), that was conducted by the Accident Evaluation Branch. AEB ,

also drafted the response.

l This action completes the action required by TIA 85-53 and closes TAC No. 59549.

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@ s John Bradfute, Project Manager l Project Directorate No. 3 Division of BWR Licensing  :

Attachment:

As stated ,

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Docket No.: 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ross A. Scarano, Director Division of Raciation Safety and Safeguards, Region V FROM: E. L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparednes:

and Engineering Response, IE

SUBJECT:

INSFECTOR FEEDEACX/ REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ,

NUREG-0737 ITEM II.F.1, ATTACHMENT 2 This is in response to your memorandum to me dated July 18, 1985, subject as '

above, in which you requested an evaluation of the WhP-2 licensee's position on the subject requirement, and an assessment of possible generic in:pilcations at a)) other boiling kater rpactors.

By letter dated June 27, 1985, to Mr. J. B. Hartin, Region V, Washington i Public Power Supply System presented its position on iodifie plateout in post accident effluent sample lines. In brief, they claim that following an accident all released iodine species that could plate out or be filtered out will do so before the effluent airstream carrying these elements (or ccepounds)

reach the location where the airstream is sampled. Therefore, only the "non-plateable" forms of iodine (such as the gaseous methyl iodide) could exist at-the point of sampling. Accordingly, no plateout of significance will occur in the sample lines. As a result, testing to detennine iodine attenuating factors from iodine plateout in these lines is not relevant and should not be required.

We have evaluated the licensee's position and concluded that there is insufficient support for the licensee's position with respect to WNP-2 and

<3WR's in general, and that the assumption of no plateout in the sample line is unacceptable. This conclusion is based on our experience with nonnal releases and on the principle that the NUREG-0737 requirements were intended for unexpected or abnonnal release modes. However, other considerations, particularly the presence of heat tracing at WNP-2 and the general complexity of the problem, lead us to conclude that any requirement for testing the WND-2 sampling system should be deferred pending development of definitive guidance on line-loss determination. Work is presently undenvay on this problem at the DOE Pacific Northwest Laboratory under a contract with NRR. Guidance should be available by late 1986.

In the interim, regional inspectors should rely on guidance provided in ANSI N13.1, 1969, in assessing the adequacy of installed sampling systems.

Generally, where the design of sample lines is consistent with this standard, the lines are heat traced and have flows and lengths such that approximately half the 0.01pm particles will not deposit on the walls (see ANSI N13.1 Table

r 82), the sampling lines should be considered acceptable, pending completion of the PNL studies.

. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i

.