ML20140B825

Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Re Conformance to App R Requirements

ML20140B825
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/04/1985
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20140B816	List: ML20140B811 ML20140B819 ML20140B825
References
TAC-59319, NUDOCS 8603240525
Download: ML20140B825 (2)

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.i. r SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS - NONCOMPLIANCE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH We have reviewed the licensee's'. submittal dated June 17, 1985 per Region V's request for NRR's assistance dated June 19, 1985, concerning the conformance

-of WNP-2 to the requirements of Appendix R. The region's letter stated that certain equipment required to safely shutdown the plant "may become inoperable in the event of a design basis control room fire." - This same letter implies that the requirements of Appendix R apply to WNP-2 by stating in the subject of the letter: "Nonconformance of Safety Equipment to' Appendix R Require-ments." Appendix R does not apply to'WNP-2. Only the guidelines of Section 9.5.1 of NUREG-0800 (Standsrd Review Plan) apply to WNP-2.

The li onsee's submittal dated June 17, 1985, referenced WNP-2 Licens'e

-Condition No. 12. This license condition refers to having an operable second panel for remote shutdown by the first refueling. A discussion of this

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licensee condition can be found in Section 7.4 of the SER and is associated with meeting General Design Criterion 19, " Control Room," not the require-ments of Appendix R or the guidelines of Section 9.5.1 of NUREG-0800.

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The attachment to the licensee's submittal identified sesen items which, if they failed during a control room fire, would impair the ability to' safely ,

_ shutdown the plant. .The licensee stated that these' items and the associated design modification packages will "be reported in LER 84-031-04." Thus the licensee has been and continues to be conscientiously informing the staff of problems as they are di. overed, of interim measures, and of planned resolution. Of the seven ftems, five of the items deal with loss of power from diesel generator Number 2 by tripping various output breakers. For each of the five f.tems the licensee has proposed interim procedures in the event of a control room fire in order to maintain the capability to safely shutdown

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the plant. The proposed long term corrective actions, which will be completed by the second refueling outage, are reasonable.

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2 The sixth item concerns the . loss of a 24 VD_C instrument ~ power supply. The loss of this ~ power supply would result-in no standby service water pump dis-charge header pressure indication in the remote shutdown room. The loss of this instrumentation is acceptable because indication of proper operation of the standby service water pump can be inferred by local observation of the operating punp and of the ultimate heat sink, performance of.the serviced equipment, and diesel generator loadings. The licensee will install a trans-fer switch, by the second. refueling, to isolate tne power supply from the.

control room. The. proposed corrective actions are acceptable.

Item seven-deals with the potential opening of the high/ low RHR pressure 3 interface 'due to a control room fire generating an open signal to both valves )

RHR-V-53A and RHR-V-123A which are in series. As an interim measure, the \

licensee must remove power from one of these valves, such as by opening the

-3 breake'r to the valve.~ Although this is an acceptable means to resolve the high/ ,

low pressure interface problem the licensee has proposed installing a' transfer switch outside of the control room in order to isolate one valve from the control room in the event of a fire in the control room. This is acceptable provided that the transfer. switch is maintained normally in the " isolate from the control: room" position. Pending acceptance of this interim measure, the interim measures and corrective actions are acceptable.

Based on the low probability of a control room fire, the interim compensatory measures, the ability to safely shutdown, and the acceptability of ~the corrective actions, we conclude that with the power removed from an RHR isolation _ valve and the RHR isolation switch maintained in the isolate position that the approach taken by the licensee is reasonable and acceptable. Therefore we conclude that continued operation of the facility will not adversely effect the health and safety of the public and is, therefore, acceptable.

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