ML20147G530

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Submits Draft Ssar Changes to Support Senior Mgt Meeting
ML20147G530
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 02/27/1997
From: Lindgren D
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Diane Jackson
NRC
Shared Package
ML20147G451 List:
References
NUDOCS 9703280186
Download: ML20147G530 (32)
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I To: Diane Jackson, NRC

Subject:

Draft SSAR changes to suppon the senior management meeting February 27.1997 j Attached are draft SSAR changes to provide a site interface on soil variability. These requirements are l to be added to subsection 2.5.4.5.2 as a COL requirement. Also provided is a new subsection 3.8.5.4.3 to be added provide limits on construction sequence.

This information'is provided in suppon of the March 3,1997 senior management meeting. I Don Lindgren i

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7 9703280186 970321 PDR ADOCK 05200003..

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2. Site Clerr.cteristics l

2.5.4.5 Combined License Information 1

Combined License applicants referencing the AP600 design will address the following site specinc infomiation related to the geoteclutical engineenng aspects of the site. No funher j action is required for sites within the bounds of the site interface enteria.

j 2.5.4.5.1 l

Site and Structures Site specific infonnation regarding the underlying site conditions and  !

geologic features will be addressed. This infonnation will include site topographical features. I as well as the locations of seismic Category I structures. '

2.5.4.5.2 Properties of Underl>ing Materials - A detennination of the static and dynamic engineering propenies of foundation soils and rocks in the site area will be addressed. T!us information will include a discussion of the type, quantity, extent, and purpose of field explorations. as well as logs of borings and test pits. Results of field plate load tests. tield penneability tests.

and other special field tests (e.g.. bore hole extensometer or pressuremeter tests) will also be  !

provided. Results of geophysical surveys will be presented in tables and profiles. Data will be provided penaining to site-specific soil layers (including their thicknesses, densities.

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moduli, and Poisson's ratios) between the basemat and the underlying rock stratum. Plot plans and profiles of site explorations will be provided.

Laboratory Investigations of Underlying Materials - Information about the number and type of laboratory tests and the location of samples used to investigate underlying materials will l be provided. Discussion of the results of laboratory tests on disturbed and undisturbed soil and l rock samples obtained from field investigations will be provided.

I Key considerations with respect to the materials underlying the nuclear island are to define I the type of site, such as rock or soil, and to determine whether the site can be considered I uniform; or, if the site is nonuniform, to define the nonuniform soil characteristics such as the I location and profiles of soft and hard spots. Rese key considerations can be assessed with I the information developed in response to Regulatory Guides 1.132 and 1.138. He geological I investigations of subsection 2.5.1 and 2.5.4.5.1 provide information on the potential for the

! site to be non uniform, whether it may be geologically impacted, and whether the bedrock I may be sloping or undulatory. His information should be considered in planning the I geotechnical investigations.

I I 2.5.4.5.2.1 Site Evaluation for Uniform Sites 1

1 Appendix C to Regulatory Guide 1.132 provides guidance on the spacing and depth of borings i for safety related stmetures. Specific language in the Regulatory Guide suggests a spacing I of 100 feet supplemented with borings on the periphery and at the comers for favorable.

I uniform geologic conditions.

I I For foundation engineering purposes, a series of borings should be drilled on a grid pattem I that encompasses the nuclear island footprint and 40 feet beyond the boundaries of the I footprint. De grid need not be of equal spacing in the two orthogonal directions, but it I should be oriented in accordance with the tme dip and strike of the rock in the immediate area

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Westingh0US8 2 11 February,1997 e

I T WM 2. Site Characteristics i 1

I of the nuclear island footprint. If geologic conditions are such that tme dip and stnke are not I obvious, or if the dip is practically nat then the orientation of the grid can be consistent with I

the major onhogonal lines of the nuclear island. The spacing of the borings on the gnd I should be on the order of 50 to 60 feet. For example, an acceptable grid could have 5 borings j l in the short direction and 7 borings in the long direction, resulting in 35 borings to cover the  ;

I footprint and 40 feet beyond. The depth of borings should be detennined on the basis of the j l geologic conditions. Borings should be extended to a depth sufficient to define the site  !

I geology and to sample materials that may swell during excavation, may consolidate I subsequent to constmetion, may be unstable under earthquake loading, or whose physical l

l properties would affect foundation behavior or stability. At least one-founh of the primary I borings should penetrate sound rock or, for a deep soil site, to a maximum depth do ,taken I as the depth at which the change in the vertical stress during or after construction for the i

I combined foundation loading is less than 10 percent of the in situ effective overburden stress. l l Other borings may temiinate at a depth of 160 feet below the foundation (equal to the width I of the stmcture).

I ne subsurface may consist of layers and these layers may dip with respect to the horizontal.

I The physical propenies of the foundation medium may or may not vary systematically across ,

i a horizontal plane. If the dip is less than 20 degrees, the genene analysis using horizontal l l .

layers is applicable as described in NUREG CR-0693 (Reference 28).

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I The recommended methodology for checking uniformity is to calculate from the bonng logs I l a series of "best estimate" planes beneath the AP600 footprint that define the top (and bottom)

I of each layer. The planes could represent stratigraphic boundaries, lithologic changes.

I unconformities, but most important, they should represent boundaries between layers having I different shear wave velocities. Shear wave velocity is the primary propeny used for defining i uniformity of a site.

I I The depth to a given layer indicated on each boring tog will not fall precisely on the I postulated plane. There will be some deviation between the elevations indicated on the boring I logs for the top of a layer and that suggested by a "best estimate" plane. A deviation of 5 l percent of the depth from the ground surface to the plane is considered acceptable. If the I deviation is greater than 5 percent, additional planes may be appropriate or additional borings I may be required, thereby diminishing the spacing. After the calculated planes are established.

I the unifonnity and dip of the layers are compared againzt the site interface criteria defined

! below.

I The AP600 is designed for application at a site where the foundation conditions do not have I extreme variation within the footpnnt of the nuclear island. The Combined License applicant I shall demonstrate that the foundation subgrade modulus is within the range considered for I design of the nuclear island basemat or a site specific analysis shall be perfonned. The I subgrade modulus is a function of the soil layers below the footprint. De variation of shear I wave velocity in the material below the foundation to a depth of 80 feet below the basemat I within the footprint of the plant shall meet the following criteria for the site to be considered I acceptable as a uniform site:

Resision: Draft .-tewm February,1997 2-12 3 W85tingh0058

s l 2. Site Characteristics t 1

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For a rock site having consolidated natural material with an average zero strain shear I

wave velocity greater than or equal to 2500 feet per second at die ground surface, die I

layers should be approximately equal thickness, should have a dip no greater than i

20 degrees, and the shear wave velocity at any location within any layer should not vary I from the average velocity within the layer by more than 20 percent.

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For a soil site having consolidated natural material with an average zero strain shear I wave velocity less than 2500 feet per second at the ground surface, the layers should be l

approximately equal thickness, should have a dip no greater than 20 degrees and the i

shear wave velocity at any location within any layer should not vary from the average  !

I velocity within the layer by more than 10 percent.

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For a site consisting of soil layers on top of rock, the rock and soil layers should meet 1 I the interface criteria for rock and soil sites respectively as decnbed above.

I 2.5.4.5.2.2 Site Evaluation for Non Uniform Sites l i if it is detennined during the course of the geological investigations that there is a possibihty  !

I that the site is non-uniform or the borings associated with an investigation for a uniform site 1 I indicate that the site is actually non-uniform, the investigation effort should be extended in I such a way that the site may be demonstrated to be acceptable for an AP600. As the AP600 i foundation / structural system design is robust, the probability of being able to show compliance I for all but the worst of sites is high, unless liquefaction or faulting is prevalent on the site.

I As stated in Regulatory Guide 1.132, where variable conditions are found. spacing of I boreholes should be smaller, as needed, to obtain a clear picture of soil or rock propenies and I

their variability. Where cavities or other discontinuities of engineering significance may  ;

I occur. the normal exploratory work should be supplemented by borings or soundings at a l I spacing small enough to detect such features.

j i Appendix 2A presents a survey of 22 commercial nuclear power plant sites in the United i States. This survey focused on site parameters that affect the seismic response such as the i depth to bedrock type and characteristic of the soil layers, including the variation of shear I

wave velocities, the depth to the ground water level, and the embedment depth of the plant I structures. Of the 22 sites.1I are rock sites where competent rock exists at relatively shallow I depths. At the other sites, the depth to bedrock varies from about 50 feet (Callaway) to well I in excess of 4.000 feet (South Texas). A review of these 11 soil sites, all of which are I marine, deltaic, or lacustrine deposits, did not reveal any significant variation of soil I characteristics below the footprint of the plant. There was one possible nonuniform site.

1 Monticello, which is underlain by glacial deposits; the geologic desenption is such that diere I might be lateral variability in the foundation parameters within the plan dimension of the I plant. The review of the 22 commercial nuclear power plant sites in the United States I suggests that the majority of AP600 sites exhibit " uniform" soil propenies within the plant i footprint. These " uniform" sites would be evaluated as described in subsection 2.5.4.5.2.1.

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[ WOSHngh00S8 2-13 February.1997

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2. Site Characteristics i

To provide guidance for the site investigation of non uniform sites, three non-uniform cases I

are described that might occur for nuclear plants. For each of these cases, the type of site I investigation is described.

I l Sloping Bedrock Site I

i The sloping bedrock site as shown on Figure 2.5 2 is typical for a river front site vhere in I

die geologic past the bedrock has been eroded to a valley slope and dien the valley was I

subsequently filled with alluvium. The bedding in the rock is nearly horizontal. but die I

surface of the rock is sloping on a stnke parallel to the direction of the river. The shear wave 1

velocity of the unifonn soil layer overlying rock may vary between 1.000 and 2.500 feet per i

second. The shear wave velocity of 3,500 feet per second for the bedrock is representative 1

of sites with a sloping rock surface. Sites where the bedrock has much higher shear wave I velocities are not likely to exhibit such conditions.

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Investigations for a site with a sloping bedrock surface'must define the depth to bedrock as I

a function of plan location and the shear wave velocity of the overlying soil and bedrock. The I

bedrock profile can be identified in the same manner as described in subsection 2.5.4.5.2.1 i

for the various layers for a uniform site. The same criterion, i.e, deviations up to 5 percent 1

of the depth are acceptable. More borings may be necessary than required for a uniform site I

in order to establish the vanation in depth to bedrock within the nuclear island footprint.

I I Undulatory Beurock Site i

I An undulatory bedrock site as shown in Figure 2.5-3 is one where the bedding planes in the l

bedrock are (or nearly) horizontal but the surface is undulatory. Such a situation may occur 1

if the bedrock surface is an erosion surface in a marine or lake environment. Another i example might be a limestone site overlain by saprolite as in the southeast United Stt.tes. The 1

undulations could be the result of differential weathering or by soft zones associated with I solution activity in the limestone.

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Investigations for a site with an undulatory bedrock surface associated with weathenng or I

karst condition must define the depth to bedrock as a function of plan location and the shear I

wave velocity of the overlying soil and bedrock. For cases with the overlying soil layer I

between the foundation level and the bedrock less than 40 feet, the pattem dimensions of the I

undulations must be defined with borings, specifically the width and depth of the undulations.

I Boring spacings on the order of 10 feet may be required for undulations having dimensions I

on the order of 20 feet in order to establish the variation in depth to bedrock within the I nuclear island footprint.

I Geologically impacted Site l l

l A geologically impxted site as shown on Figure 2.5-4 is one where the bedrock has abrupt I I

facies change or has been interrupted either by a fault (shear zone) or by an intrusive such as I

a dike. "Ihis leads to the possibility of lateral variation in the bedrock properties affecting soil I

structure interaction and bearing pressure. Three subcases are identified. The first type Revision: Draft evenen:w l l

February,1997 2 14 3 Westiligl10use

2. Site Charecteristics I

includes an abrupt facies change. The second type has a shear zone of varying width and I

position. The third case is an intrusive dike of very competent rock compared to the i surrounding rock.

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investigations for a geologically impacted site must define the width of the zone of the higher I (or lower) shear wave velocity. The location of the zone of higher (or lower) shear wave i velocity must be detennined in relation to the center of containment. The azimuths of the l

bounding postulated venical planes of the higher (or lower) shear wave selocity must be I detennined.

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The zone of the higher (or lower) shear wave velocity has been shown in Figure 2.5-4 l bounded by non-curvilinear venical parallel planes. It is recognized that such a situation is I highly unlikely in nature. A procedure similar to that described in subsection .'.5.4.5.2.1 for I

identifying the horizontal layers of uniform sites can be used to define the nearly venical  !

I planes of a geologically impacted site. Deviations between the site condition and the idealized l l

postulated situations on the order 5 percent are considered acceptable.

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In order to define the width and location of the zone of higher (or lower) shear wave velocity.

I die spacing of the borings will have to be on the order of 10 feet for a zone with a width of l {

20 feet. it may be more practical to trench the site to locate and define the dimensions and l l locations of the intrusive or shear zone. thus eliminating many of the borings that would  !

I otherwise be required. l l

I l Acceptance criteria for non-uniform sites i

The key attribute for acceptability of the site for an AP600 is the bearing pressure on the l

1 underside of the basemat. This is a function of the subgrade modulus at the elevation of the I

foundation. The lateral variability of this subgrade modulus is acceptable if the layers satisfy I the criteria for uniform soils given in subsection 2.5.4.5.2.1. A site having local soft or hard I

spots within a layer or layers does not meet the criteria for a uniform site. The subgrade I modulus is a function of the propenies of the layers below the foundation and failure of one I layer to meet the uniform criterion may not make the overall foundation unacceptable. An I

alternative evaluation criterion is therefore defined to evaluate sites that do not satisfy the i requirement for all layers to be uniform.

1 A site with nonuniform soil propenies may be demonstrated to be acceptable by site-specific i analyses of the bearing pressures on the underside of a rigid rectangular basemat equivalent I

to the nuclear island. Bearing pressures are calculated for dead and safe shutdown earthquake I

loads. The safe shutdown eartnquake loads are those from the AP600 design soil case I

representative of the site specific soil. Altematively, the safe shutdown canhquake loads may I be determined from a site specific seismic analysis of the nuclear island. For the site to be 1

acceptable, the bearing pressures from the site-specific analyses need to be less than or equal I

to 120 percent of the bearing pressures calculated in similar analyses for a site having uniform

. I soil properties. This evaluation method is expected to demonstrate that sloping and undulating i bedrock sites are acceptable when the soil layer over the bedrock is sufficient. It will also o w,,,te:wmmw Revision: Draft

[ W85tlDgh0US8 2-15 February,1797 9

e e, 2. Site Characteristics I

show acceptability for geologically impacted sites where there is a soil layer between the i

foundation level and the abrupt stiffness change of the bedrock.

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For sites having bedrock close to the foundation level the assumption of a rigid basemat may I

be overly conservative because local defonnation of the basemat will reduce the effect of local I

soil sariability. For such sites, a site-specific analysis may be perfonned using the AP6(M)

I basemat model and methodology desenbed in subsection 3.8.5. The safe shutdown canhquake i

loads are those from the AP600 design soil case representative of the site-specific soil.

I Attematively, bearing pressures may be determined from a site-specific soil structure i

interaction analysis. For the site to be acceptable the bearing pressures from the site specific l

analyses need to be demonstrated to be less than the capacity of each ponion of the basemat.

2.5.4.5.3 Excavation and Backfill - Information conceming the extent (horizontal and venical) of seismic Category I excavations, fills, and slopes if any will be addressed. The sources.

quantities, and static and dynamic engineering properties of borrow materials will be desenbed in the site-specific application. De compaction requirements, results of field compaction tests, and fill material properties (such as moisture content, density, penneability, compressibility, and gradation) will also be provided. Infonnation will be provided I

conceming the specific soil retention system, for example. the soil nailing system including the length and size of the soit nails, which is based on actual soil conditions and applied construction surcharge loads.

2.5.4.5.4 Ground Water Conditions - Groundwater conditions will be described relative to the foundation stability of the safety-related structures at the site. De soil propenies of the various layers under possible gmundwater conditions during the life of the plant will be compared to the range of values assumed in the standard design in Table 2-1.

2.5.4.5.5 Response of Soil and Rock to Dynamic Loading - Re dynamic characteristics of the soil and rock will be compared to the assumptions made in the standard design regarding the variation I of shear wave velocity and material damping. The parametnc analyses desenbed in Appendices 2A and 2B cover a broad range of dynamic characteristics appropriate for most soil types (sand silts, clays, gravels, and various combinations). The shear wave velocity (based on low strain best estimate soil properties) must be greater than or equal to 1000 feet per second.

For sites where the soil characteristics are outside the range considered in Appendix 2A.2 and Appendix 28.2. site specific soil structure interaction analyses may be perfonned by the Combined License applicant to demorsisate acceptability by comparison of floor response spectra at the following locations. These analyses would use the site specific soil conditions and site specific safe shutdown earthquake. The three components of the site specific ground motion time history must satisfy the enveloping criteria of Standard Review Plan 3.7.1 for the response spectrum for damping values of 2, 3. 4. 5 and 7 percent and the enveloping criterion for power spectral density function. Comparison of the floor response spectra at these locations is sufficient demonstration that the site seismic conditions are within the AP600 design basis.

Revision: Draft .ere.w m February,1997 2 16 3 Westinghouse

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3.8.5.4.3 Analysis for Loads during Construction Construction loads are evaluated in the design of the nuclear island basemat. This evaluation is performed for soil sites meeting the site interface requirements of subsection 2.5.4 at which settlement is predicted to be maximum. In the expected basemat constnaction sequence, concrete for the mat is placed in a single placement. Construction continues with a portion of the shield building foundation and containment interior structure and the walls of the auxiliary building. The cntical location for shear and moment in the basemat is around the perimeter of the shield building. Once the shield building and auxiliary building walls are completed to elevation 82' 6". the load path changes and loads are resisted by the basemat stiffened by the shear walls. Locked-in stresses during construction beconie secondary after completion of the auxiliary building walls. They do not reduce the strength of the section and are not included in the design load combinations for the completed structure.

Altemate construction scenarios and schedules are analyzed to continn the adequacy of the basemat for unexpected changes in the construction plan. These analyses of altemate construction scenarios show that member forces in the basemat are acceptable. For soft soil sites, the auxiliary building must be completed to elevation 82' 6" prior to placement of concrete in the shield building above elevation 82' 6" or in the containment internal structures above elevation'83' 0". For construction sequences in which the auxiliary building progresses ahead of the shield building, concrete should not be placed in the auxiliary building above elevation i17' 6" before the shield building is completed to elevation 82' 6"

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.l RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: /Macn 3 /397 NAME: y w,y%

TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER -

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Cover + Pages 1+o l The f'ollowing pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this fransmission, please call:

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WIN: 284-5125 (Janice) or'Outside: (412)374 5125. l 1

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~( l FAX to DINO SCALETTI l February 25,1997 CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copies for: Diane Jackson Ted Quay Don Lindgren Dan McDermott Don liutchings .

Gene Piplica 1 Brian McIntyre Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk OPEN ITEM #5 (RAI 410.263)

In my quest to make sure we have provided NRC with everything you need to prepare an FSER, I am iesearching open items from the smallest number on. Attached are copies of some of the relevant documentation related to Open Item #5 (RAI 410.263). We provided a revision to the SSAR on August 9,1996 which we considered to be adequate. After discussion with NRC and receipt of an additional request, we provided a revised a revised response to RAI 410.263 on February 7,1997.

This response included additional SSAR revisions which should be incorporated into Revision 11, to be issued February 28,1997. We recognize that NRC review and confirmation of incorporation into the SSAR is not complete. liowever, Westinghwse knows of no further action required for this item and it seems a reasonable request that NRC acknowledge receipt of the revision of the response for I RAI 410.263 and its SSAR change promise. We request that NRC provide a definitive action for i Westinghouse or provide direction to change the status of this item. We recommend " Action N" or i

" Confirm N". Thank you.

Jim Winters 412-374-5290 l

I Ik

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APn00 Open item Tracking System Database: Executive Sosnaary pase: 2/25/97 -

Selection: litem nol between 5 And 5 Sorted by item #

hem DSER Sectum/ Resp (W) NRC Tale /tWum No Branch Quesum Type Detal Staus Engmeer Status Staus gf,,e,3o f twee

.5 NRR/SPLH 10 4.7 RAl4)I Wuners.1 Cimed Actam W NSt>NRC-97-4977

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Quenson 4l0263 (FEDWATER SYSTEM. FWS, WATER HAMMER)

Branch Tectumal Ibsaum ASB 10-2 grovides design gualance to niect GDC 4 on dyinamsc effects assariased wah puble waer hammers en the feedomer gnping Specifically,the feedwaner syssem should be designed to (a) peeseni or delay wanes draming fran the Icedrmg followag a dry an weam generasor waser level. Ib) mnwntae the volume of feedwater piping emnernal to the steam generasar whoch cuald pdet sa am usmg the simweess honamtal run (less than 7 feet),(c) perform tests acceptable to NRC to venfy that unaccessable feedwaser hammer will nos occur and gemide the procahmes for these nests for approval. and (d) nyiernent pape sefill flow hnuts wheve practical. Address the APtd10 feedsmer system design agamst these gudelines_

Gosed - Respmse provided by letter NSD-NRC-9t>-4806 deced September 5.1996 l

NRC Status Updese grovided in Sepsender 5.1996 levier:

,In a letter dased May 13.1996, Westmghaisse sepsonsed to RAls 410 263 l The staff reviewed this sesponse and found it was innaccept4Ie in a r eclephoneconferenceon August 16,1996, Westinghainse stased that the i .w....a for nests to venfy thes unaccrytabee feedwaser hammer will not occur is incorporased en SSAR Chapeer 14. Revisum 9. The staff N reviewed SSAR 14 2.9.l.7 and others and found at dMI not adtkess weer hammer tests. Action Wesunghanane

,Omed A. Action N - Resporue provided by NSD-NRC-97-4977 of 2n/97.

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Westinghouse Energy Systems m 3ss Electric Corporation "

  • p p a s m ais22 n ass NSD-NRC-97-4977 l DCP/NRC0734 Docket No.: STN-52-003 i February 7,1997 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 )

l ATTENTION: T.R. QUAY l l

SUBJECT:

WESTINGHOUSE RESPONSES TO NRC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL  !

INFORMATION ON THE AP600 j

Dear Mr. Quay:

j Enclosed are three copies of the Westinghouse responses to NRC requests for additional information  ;

on several AP600 Design Certification topics. RAls addressing the SSAR include 280.10 Rev.1, 410.244 and 410.263. RAI 440.197 addresses plant transient performance. Responses to RAls 440.395, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 580, 581, and 582 provide additional information on the test program.

These responses are also provided as electronic files in Wordperfect 5.1 format with Mr. Kenyon's copy. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation copyright notice, proprietary information notice, application for withholding and affidavit are also attached.

This submittal contains Westinghouse proprietary information consisting of trade secrets, commercial information or financial information which we consider privileged or confidential pursuant to

! 10CFR2.790. Therefore, it is requested that the Westinghouse proprietary information attached hereto be handled on a confidential basis and be withheld from public disclosures. The non-proprietary copy of Enclosure 1 is provided as Enclosure 2.

This material is for your internal use only and may be used for the purpose for which it is submitted.

It should not be otherwise used, disclosed, duplicated, or disseminated, in whole or in part, to any other person or organization outside the Commission, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and the necessary subcontractors that have signed a proprietary non-disclosure agreement with Westinghcuse without the express written approval of Westinghouse.

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I NSD-NRC-95-4977 f DCP/NRC0734 February 7,1997 Correspondence with respect to the application for withholding should reference AW-97-1076, and should be addressed to Brian A. McIntyre, Manager of Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing,  !

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15230-0355. l A

Brian A. McIntyre, Manager  ;

Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing

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Enclosures Attachment cc: T. Kenyon, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

W. Huffman, NRC (IEl, IE2)

R. C. Jones, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

G. D. McPherson, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

F. Eltawila, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

R. Landry, NRC (IEl)

L. Lois, NRC (IEl)

A. Levin, NRC (IEl)

P. Bochnert, ACRS (4EI)

N. J. Liparulo, Westinghouse (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

I 1

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION libi Question 410.263 Branch Technical Position ASB 10-2 provides design guidance to meet GDC 4 on dynamic effects associated with possible water hammers in the feedwater piping. Specifically , the feedwater system should be designed to (a) prevent or delay water draining from the feedring following a drop in steam generator water !cvel,(b) minimize the volume of feedwater piping external to the steam generator which could pocket steam using the shonest horizontal run (less l than 7 feet),(c) perform tests acceptable to NRC to verify that unacceptable feedwater hammer will not occur and provide the procedures for these tests for approval, and (d) implement pipe refill flow limits where practical.

Address the AP600 feedwater system design against these guidelines.

Response

As indicated in SS AR Section 10.4. the Startup Feedwater system and the condensate and feedwater systems include many features to minimize the potential for unacceptable water hammers in the feedwater piping.

Rese features are further delineated in SSAR subsection 3B.2.3. Rese features include: )

(a) ne design of the feedwater system includes a number of features specifically intended to minimize water l

hammers. For example, the startup feedwater system is entirely separate from the main feedwater system.

j including its entry point into the steam generators. His allows the system flowtates and pipe sizes to be l

more consistent with their intended function than if startup feed flows were directed through main feed l

headers and feedrings. In addition, the main feedring itself is designed to minimize the potential for water I hammer. ne spray tubes are located on the top of the feedring so that the feedring does not drain when steam generator levels drop below the feedring level. The thermal sleeve is welded which also presents drainage when steam generator levels fall.

(b) ne main feedwater line is cc.itinuously sloped upward to the steam generator nozzle. The horizontal run from the steam generator to the feedwater elbow is minimized.

(c) Tests have been performed on many Westinghouse feedring type steam generators in the United States.

Dese tests venfy the effectiveness of Westinghouse feedring designs like that described above for AP600 in preventing water hammer. Westinghouse does not consider that further design testing is required.

(d) Pipe flow limits, especially on startup feed, are not required for AP600 because the startup feed path is separate from the main feed path, including its entry into the steam generator. In addition, unlike other PWRs. AP600 has no auaillary feedwater system and associated lines and operations.

In addition. Chapter 14 of the SSAR lncludes a preoperational test (subsection 14.2.9.l.7) to verify unacceptable dynamic effects do not occur for expected startup and restart conditions. The changes below explicitly reinfo plant dynamic effects testing includes feedwater related tests.

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! 410.263-1 W Wesdnghouse R*V I Q-

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

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lll111 1

SSAR Revision:

Section 3.9.2.1, second paragraph, second sentence:

The pre operational testing programs are outlined in subsecdon 14.2.8.9.

Section 14.2.9.1.7 subsecdon " Purpose"-

De purpose of the expansion, vibration and dynamic effects tesdng is to verify that the safety-related, high ,

energy piping and components are properly installed and supported such that expected movement due to thermal expansion during normal heatup and cooldown, and as a result of transients; thermal stratification and thermal I

cycling; as well as vibrations caused by steady-state or dynamic effects duig =dy :te =d t=ir. do not result in excessive stress or fatigue to safety-related plant systems and equipment, as described in Section 3.9.

Section 14.2.9.l.7. subsecdon " General Test Method and Acceptance Criteria", subparagraphs b) and c):  ;

1 b) Vibration testing is performed on safety related and high-energy system piping and components during both cold and hot conditions to demonstrate that steady state vibrations are within acceptable limits. See l l

Subsecuon 3.9.2.1.1 for the acceptable standard for alternating stress intensity due to steady-state vibration.

This testing includes visual observation and local and remote monitoring in critical steady-state operating modes. Results are acceptable when visual observations show no signs of excessive vibration and when measured vibration amplitudes are within acceptable levels.

c) Testing for significant vibrations caused by dynamic evens effects is conducted during hot functional testing l and may be performed as part of other specified preoperadonal tests. His testing is conducted to verify that stress analyses of safety related and high-energy system piping under transient conditions are acceptable.

See Subsection 3.9.2.1.1 for the acceptable standard for alternating stress intensity due to dynamic effects vibration. Rese tes's are performed to verify that the dynamic effects = Oih =p=:=' =k= caused by deg transients such as pump starts and stops, valve stroking, and significant process flow changes are within expected values. Dese tests include anticipated normal operating evolutions with system differential temperatures, such as, startup, which could induce dynamic effects.

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410.263-2 Revision I WN#88 l

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FAN-te4MNO SCAM % i i

February 25,1997 /

CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copics for:

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( Diane Jackson ) g%

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Don Lindgren Dan McDermott Don Hutchings Gene Piplica Brian McIntyre Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk OPEN ITEM #5 (RAI 410.263)

In my quest to make sure we have provided NRC with everything you need to prepare an FSER, I am researching open items from the smallest number on. Attached are copies of some of the relevant documentation related to Open Item #5 (RAI 410.263). We provided a revision to the SSAR on August 9,1996 which we considered to be adequate. After discussion with NRC and receipt of an  ;

additional request, we provided a revised a revised response to RAI 410.263 on February 7,1997.

This response included additional SSAR revisions which should be incorporated into Revision 11, to be issued February 28,1997. We recognize that NRC review and confirmation of incorporation into  ;

the SSAR is not complete. However, Westinghouse knows of no further action regired for this item l and it seems a reasonable request that NRC acknowledge receipt of the revision of the response for )

RAI 410.263 and its SSAR change promise. We request that NRC provide a definitive action for I Westinghouse or provide direction to change the status of this item. We recommend " Action N" or

" Confirm N". Thank you, i

Jim Winters 412-374-5290

.. IS

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Y AP600 Open Item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 2/25/97 Selecties: [iiem no] between 5 And 5 Sorted by item #

lesen DSER Section/ Resp (W) NRC Tath No. Branch Quewson Type Detail Stasus Enguicer Stams Starus 3.mie, No_ p one S NRIUSit.B 10.4.7 RAIOl Winners. L Clouxi Acuan W NSD-NRC-97-4977

' ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ '"~

' Question 410263 '(FEEDWATER SYSTEM. FWS. WATER HAEhiER) ~'

Branch Techrutal Posnion 4.5810-2 pnmdes design guedance to nwet GDC 4 on dynamic effects asanciased wah pouable waser hammers in the feedwaser gapens. Speci6cally, the feedwaner syseem should be designed to (a) prevent or delay water dramung from the feednns following a drty in inearn genersaw water level (bl muunuse the volume of feed =aser pipeng etternal to the secam generasor which could pusiet sacara unang the shoness honaontal run (less than 7 feet). (c) perfonn tests surpeable to NitC to venfy than unexeptable feedwater hammer will nue ucer arut pmvide the pruordures for itsene tests for approval, and (d)(. , --- -- pape se6B flow heruts wiese practical. Address the APbOO feed =aser system desage agesnst these quedehnes_

~ ~ ' ~

Closed - Respimise M'by lesser NSD NRC-95-4806 E desed S$peender'5.1996 NRC Status Updese provided in Sepeember 5.1996 leacr:

In a levier dated May 13.1996. Westinghaine sepsonsed to RAls 410263.

The staff reviewed thes sesponse and found is was unacceptable. In a telephone conference on Auges 16,1996. Weninglunae stased that the

. ._.; for tests to venfy that unacceptable feedwaser hamrner wdl not occur is incorpurased in SSAR Chapeer 14. Revissun 9. The naaff g reviewed SSAR 84.2.9 I.7 and others and found it did not address waser hammer tests. Action Wesanghoine k Closed & Action N.- Respunne provided by _NSD-NRC-9_7_-4977 of 2nN7. _ _

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ .

7, f-(Ay -

1 Westinghouse ' Energy Systems ea * '

Electric Corporation ^*8*******-

NSD NRC-97-4977' i DCP/NRC0734 l Docket No.: STN 52-003 i

February 7,1997 j Document Control Desk l U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: T. R. QUAY

SUBJECT:

WESTINGHOUSE RESPONSES TO NRC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE AP600 ,

Dear Mr. Quay:

Enclosed are three copies of the Westinghouse responses to NRC requests for additional information on several AP600 Design Certification topics. RAls addressing the SSAR 'melude 280.10. Rev.1,

[ 410.244 and 410.263. RAI 440.197 addresses plant transient performance. Responses to RAls

! 440.395,570,571,572,573,574,575,576,577,580,581, and 582 provide additional 'mformation on the test program.

These responses are also provided as electronic files in Wordperfect 5.1 format with Mr. Kenyon's copy. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation copyright notice, proprietary information notice, application for withholding and affidavit are also attached.

l This submittal contains Westinghouse proprietary information consisting of trade secrets, commercial information or financial information which we consider privileged or confiden ial pursuant to 10CFR2.790. Therefore, it is requested that the Westinghouse proprietary information attached hereto r be handled on a confidential basis and be withheld from public disclosures. The non-proprietary copy of Enclosure 1 is provided as Enclosure 2.

i This material is for your internal use only and may be used for the purpose for which it is submitted.

It should not be otherwise used, disclosed, duplicated, or disseminated, in whole or in part, to any other person or organization outside the Commission, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and the necessary subcontractors that have signed a proprietary non-disclosure agreement with Westinghouse without the express wrinen approval of Westinghouse.

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NSD-NRC-95-4977 )

DCP/NRC0734 February 7,1997 l l

l Correspondence with respect to the application for withholding should reference AW-97-1076, and l

should be addressed to Brian A. McIntyre, Manager of Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15230 4 355.

A Brian A. McIntyre, Manager j Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing {

/jml l

J Enclosures Attachment cc: T. Kenyon, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments) ,

W. Huffman, NRC (IEl, IE2) i R. C. Jones, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

G. D. McPherson, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

F. Eltawila, NRC (w/o Enclosures / Attachments) l R. Landry, NRC (IEI) l L. Lois, NRC (IEl)

A. Levin. NRC (IEl)

P. Boehnert, ACRS (4EI)

N. J. Liparulo, Westinghouse (w/o Enclosures / Attachments)

I i

0-i W4

i6 1 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATION 1

g l

f Question / to.263 Branch Technical Position ASB 10 2 provides design guidance to meet GDC 4 on dynamic effects associated with possible water hammers in the feedwater piping. Specifically, the feedwater system should be designed to (a) prevent '

or delay water draining from the feedring following a drop in steam generator water Icvel (b) minimize the volume i

of feedwater piping external to the steam generator which could pocket steam using the shortest horizontal run (less than 7 feet). (c) perform tests acceptable to NRC to verify that unacceptable feedwater hammer will not occur and provide the procedures for these tests for approval, and (d) implement pipe refill flow limits where practical.

Address the AP600 feedwater system design against these guidelines.

Response

As indicated in SSAR Secdon 10.4, the Startup Feedwater system and the condensate and feedwater systems include many features to minimite the potential for unacceptable water hammers in s.he feedwater piping.

These features are further delineated in SS AR subsection 3B.2.3. These features include:

(a) The design of the feedwater system includes a number of features specifically intended to minimize water hammers. For example, the startup feedwater system is entirely separate from the main feedwater system, including its entry point into the steam generators. This allows the system flowrates and pipe sizes to be more consistent with their intended func6on than if startup feed flows were directed through main feed headers and feedrings. In addition, the main feedring itself is designed to minimize the potendal for water hammer. The spray tubes are located on the top of the feedring so that the feedring does not drain when steam generator levels drop below the feedring level. The thermal sleeve is welded which also prevents drainage when steam generator levels fall.

(b) The main feedwater line is continuously sloped upward to the steam generator nozzle. The horizontal run from the steam generator to the feedwater elbow is minimized.

(c) Tests have been performed on many Westinghouse feedring type steam generators in the United States.

These tests verify the effectiveness of Wes6nghouse feedring designs like that described above for AP600 in preventing water hammer. Westinghouse does not consider that further design testing is required.

(d) Pipe flow limits, especially on startup feed, are not required for AP600 because the startup feed path is separate from the main feed path, including its entry into the steam generator. In addition, unlike other PWRs, AP600 has no auxiliary feedwater system and associated lines and oper:6ons.

In addition, Chapter 14 of the SSAR includes a preoperational test (subsection 14.2.9.1.7) to verify unacceptable dynamic effects do not occur for expected startup and restart conditions. The changes below explicitly reinforce th plant dynamic effects testing includes feedwater related tests.

l 410.263-1 3 UN@G88 [*

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,y NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

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SSAR Revision:

Section 3.9.2.1, second paregraph, second sentence:

The pre. operational testing programs are outlined in subsection 14 2.8.9.

Section 14.2.9.1.7, subsection " Purpose":

)l The purpose of the expansion, vibration and dynamic effects testing is to verify that the safety related, high )

energy piping and components are properly installed and supported such that expected movement due to thermal expansion during normal heatup and cooldown, and as a result of transients; thermal stratification and thermal cycling; as well as vibrations caused by steady state or dynamic effects hip:=fy :e= nd t enine do not result in excessive stress or fatigue to safety-related plant systems and equipment, as described in Section 3.9.

Section 14.2.9.l.7. subsection " General Test Method and Acceptance Criteria", subparagraphs b) and c):

b) Vibration testing is performed on safety-related and high-energy system piping and components during both cold and hot conditions to demonstrate that steady-state vibrations are within acceptable limits. See Subsection 3.9.2.1.1 for the acceptable standard for attemating stress intensity due to steady state vibration.

This testing includes visual observation and local and remote monitoring in critical steady state operating modes. Results are acceptable when visual observations show no signs of excessive vibration and when ,

measured vibration amplitudes are within acceptable levels. I c) Testing for significant vibrations caused by dynamic evems effects is conducted during hot functional testing and may be performed as part of other specified preoperational tests. His testing is conducted to verify that stress analyses of safety related and high-energy system piping under transient conditions are acceptable.

See Subsection 3.9.2.1.1 for the acceptable standard for alternating stress intensity due to dynamic effects vibration. These tests are performed to verify that the dynamic effects ::c =!i!: =p=:cd =! = caused by des transients such as pump starts and stops, valve stroking, and significant process flow changes are within expected values. These tests include anticipated normal operating evolutions with system differential temperatures, such as, startup, which could induce dynamic effects.

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! 410.263 2 W Westinghouse Revision 1 ~

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., y FAX to DINO SCALETTI March 4,1997 CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copies for: Diane Jackson Ted Quay Don Lindgren Robin Nydes Dick Miller Brian McIntyre Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk OPEN ITEM #142 (M3.11-9)

In my quest to make sure we have provided NRC with everything you need to prepare an FSER, I am researching open items from the oldest on. Attached are copies of some of the relevant documentation related to Open item #142 (M3.11-9). We provided a revision to SSAR subsection 3D.4.10.2 prior to February 29,1996 (over 1 year ago) and then modified SSAR subsection 3D.6.2.1 for clarification in the February 29,1996 revision it seems a reasonable request that NRC acknowledge receipt of the change. Note that in the Open item the staff has not requested explicit changes, they simply pointed out a potential future concern for Combined License applicants.

Although we have other open items on environmental qualification, our records show no outstanding Westinghouse action on this item (#142) and we request that NRC provide a definitive action for Westinghouse or provide direction to change the status of this item. This is the second request to NRC for a status change. The first was on February 3,1997 (over a month ago). We recognize that NRC review of the adequacy of our SSAR changes for Open Item #142 may not be complete.

However, the act of determining the NRC position on this item makes its status " Action N". Thank you.

Jim Winters 412-374-5290 s

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AP600 Open Item Tracking Systeni Database: Executive Sunimary Date: 3/4/97 Selectiost: [iiem no] between 142 And 142 Sorted by item s L

lsem DSER Section/ Tule/Descnption Resp (W) NRC No Hranch Question Type Detal Status Engineer Status Starus Letter No I thue 142 NRR/SPLB 3 11 MTG4M Miller Closed Actaan W

~

,M3 t i-9 (EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION) l lThese is no evidence anywhere in Industry or in NRC acceptana practia to suppon the posanon stated in the SSAR or mi the sespone to the Q270.10 in

,regards to smulanty hetween equipment frorn different manufacturers. Smularuy twtween manufacturers es not stetranty exchaled. however, the staff as

{ simply pointing out that at has not been satisfactonly demonstraned previously in order so prevent the rassing of falw hopes and unnecessary caprese for potential COL Applicants. . . _

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l Closed - Revined SSAR 3 D 4 lb 2 to[clanfy[ l L

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3 ,

3. Design of Structures, Components, Equipmrt, and Systems 1

3D.4.10.1.3 Material Link I This documentation certifies that the materials used in the equipment are represented in a materials aging analysis, such as that described in Attachment B. (Subprogram B). His link applies only to equipment whose equipment qualification data package references the materials aging analysis and reflects a comparison of the as-built drawings, baseline design document, or other documentation of thTplantspeedig equipment to the materials aging analysis listing.

/ wX s 3D.4<10.2 Similarity N

/ , N Where differences exist between items of equipment, analysis may be employed to demonstrate that the test results obtained for one piece of equipment are applicable to a similar piece of equipment. Documentation of this analysis conforms with guidelines in IEEE 323 and 627, and Subsection 3D.6.2.1 and Section 3D.7 of this appendix.

3D.5 1 cations x

ne conditions and parameters considered in the environmental and seismic qualification of AP600 safety-related equipment are separated into three categories: normal, abnormal, and design basis event. Normal conditions are those sets and ranges of plant conditions that are expected to occur regularly and for which plant equipment is expected to perform its safety-

! related function, as required, on a continuous, steady-state basis. Abnormal conditions refer I to the extreme ranges of normal plant conditions for which the equipment is designed to operate for a period of time without any special calibration or maintenance effort. Design basis event conditions refers to environmental parameters to which the equipment may be subjected without impairment of its defined operating characteristics for those conditions.

Equipment required to operate while subjected to the design basis event and its extreme I conditions and if not replaced, may require that tests, inspections, and maintenance be performed on the equipment, before retuming to normal operating conditions.

He following subsections define the basis for the normal, abnormal, design basis event, and post-design basis event environmental conditions specified for the qualification of safety-related equipment in the AP600 equipment qualification program. (these are cited in Section 1.7 of each equipment qualification data package; See Attachment A.)

He setvice conditions simulated by the test plan are identified in equipment qualification data package Section 3.7. (See Subsection 3D.7.4.6 and Attachment A.) In general, the parameters employed are selected to be equal to (normal and abnormal) or have margin (design basis event and post-design basis event) with respect to the specified senice conditions of equipment qualification data package, Section 1.7, as recommended by IEEE 323. nese conditions are conservatively derived to allow for possible altemative locations of equipment within the plant.

Revision: 5 3D-17 February 29,1996 T Westinghouse 3 [3

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FAX to DINO SCALETTI March 4,1997 CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copies for: Diane Jackson Ted Quay Don Lindgren Gordon Israelson Jim Grover i Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk j Brian McIntyre OPEN ITEMS FOR SSAR Chapter 11 This is a background package for the remaining open items for SSAR Chapter 11 for your information. SSAR Chapter 11 is of interest because by our joint NRC/W schedule, the FSER for this section should be turned into Frojects by the end of March. There are 5 Open Items with NRC Status of Action W. Of these,4 items still require some Westinghouse action. A SSAR markup for the fifth (1172) was provided on February 21 and should be made final in Revision 11. This item (1172) should have its status changed to " Action N". Thank you.

Jim Winters 412-374-5290 I

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AP600 Open item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 3/4M7 Selection: (nre st codel=' Action %" Ats! [DSER Section] like 'll** Sorted by Item #

leem DSER Sectum/ Tule/Descnpum Resp (W) NRC No Branch Questam Type Detail Status Engineer Staus Staus getter No I the 1871 NRR/SPLB 1125 DSER-OI Israelson / Grover Actum W Actam W Westmgtunase has not respeded to Q460 28, which deals with AP600 LWMS'comphance with 10 CFR 20.1302.

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iActum W: Discussion is needed with staff to resolve the question regarding what Ai use for desagn lusis fuel defect level Winen alus is determoed arkt l= hen the revised GALE aide analyus is completed, the arrected report of effhsent concentranons (and comprison w wh 10 GR 20 Imuts) wdl be pked in the SSAR.

01 - Actum W - revise table 11.2 see detal l Closed - SSAR table i118 Revision 8, includes appropnase data and foot mises. j Resolved - Based on iI/2 th6 meetmg and acceptable response in 10f17h6 le:ter. See NRC lener of 12NN6. j f Actum W - See NRC letter dase 100/97.

' Action W - W needs to fin Section ll.I, Table il I-2 and TechSpec bases 3 4.11 to conectly refect our agreement on usmg 1% fated fuel as our basis l cacept where there is a techspec luna on iodme and ncNe gases. I

! l l Action W - Westmghouse wdl clanfy the SSAR Section l1.1; Table 11.1-2 and Technical Specificatum (TS) basis for 3 4 Il to reflect the I percent fuel }

c falure , , , - ---(except few plunns e aime and _mble gases) (See _NRC letter dme 2/2 th7) _

l 1872 NRR/SPLB 11.2 4 DSER-OI Israelson, G Ckned Actxm W

Wesunghouse has not yet clanfied'whether indotw LWMS tanks will have usrbs or threduAls wah fkxx drains roused to the LWMS '

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N [ Closed ISSAR tble i 113 descnbes features to contan5 inventory of ruptumi tanks The desued informaram is also included in the ecsponw to RAI 460 6RI.

V ,01 - Acuan W - updme and include RAI 460.20 response onto SSAR;jusufy why no local alzm system for

, liquid radwasse; clarify where monitor tanks are located, CST is in the yard and miuves a dike,jusufy if sma; provide COL action to provide QA program Closed - SSAR Revision 8, includes instrumentaion, QA and other detals requred for tlus item. No other nems have been idenursed by NRC.

Actuun W - W needs to fix i1.5 6 4 and appendra 1 A to be hke the other Quahty Assurana prurmws in Giapser I1. .

Closed - Markup sectums faxed on 2/2 tN7. I 3424 NRR/SPLB 11.1 2 RAI4)I Wuners Actum W Actam W (Received in July 24.1996 NRC letter) l This is a new open item ansing from reuew of Reviuon 6 to SSAR Chapter I 1. PalDs for LWMS, GWMS and SWMS resuhing from Revisum 6 are yet l to be provided. l ClosedfAction N - Westmglunase provated seven samphrned P&lDs in Revision 8 of the SSAR Sectum 112 and 113 The staffis reuewing them I I

, Action W , See NRC letter dated 1/3G97.

Actum W -i)W needs to satisfy RegGuate 1.70 by includmg all informanon specified for system informamm The cunent simplified P& ids dont do a NRC will address all simphfied PalDs in a genenc lener addressign tlus key issue. ii) Figure II 2-1 is so sample a doesnt simw all of the fearines  ;

I discussed in the systems descnptum part of the SSAR sectum We need to anchade recycle ime to waste holdup tanks frurn nahle cyterment.

i

' Actum W - (1) Westinghouse will revise SSAR Figure Illi to include the pipmg from the trable equipment to the wasic holdup tanks. (2) i Westmgtnese needs to address the staff conwrn of sufficient mformanon and legsbehty of the ppng and instrumentatum drawmgs and system figtwes.

Page: 1 Total Records: 5

3 AP600 Open Item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 3/4/97 Selection: [nre st codel=' Action W' And [DSER Section] hke *ll* Sorted by item e item DSER Section/ Title /Desenptm, Resp IW) NRC No Branch Questum Type Detad Status Engmeer Simus Staus I_ener No 1 Dme i 5004 NRR/ Spill i12-8 DSERol Israelson. G. Actum W Action W DSER 01 l1.2-8

! Issue - Das open nem was raned from the staffs seview of Revisson 6 of SSAR. De followmg concerns were i&ntified.

i 1. An earher SSAR Section i1.2.2.1.2 assigned awo names no two subsysaems, nanely.cffhens waste sutsyssern armi general easte subsysaem. Dere es no justificanon for deleting the identificanon of these subsystems.

t 2. Dere is no jusnficsson for deleting I momsar tank from a sceal of 4 monnor tanks,2 ca;h for each of the above 2 systems (De 4 tanks are hard m the cartner SSAR versiant 3 SSAR Sectum 11.2.2.5 4 semes the followmg:"mben comtuned wah detergent masses.rVy may be smtable fw processing armi ducharge." W  ;

subject sectum also sames the followmg *when not sustable for praissmg.they can te treo A by use of nm4=le espapmem or by shipment offsne

  • l j De SSAR Section deals wah chenucal wasses. It is mm clez mhat the above samena.as rrean j l 4. After detergent waste is peuwssed, how is it dispowd of'  !

i 5. Will chenucal wasses ever be roused to general waste subsystem Ithis questam anses since in the earter propmed design, thrs mas an optum)? l

6. SSAR Section 9 29 stases that secundary coulant system samphng dran wasses udl be ruuted to the plant's wasse waser system the plant's masse  ;

water. in tum, if detected to te radioactive, when sampled, wdl be divened so the hqual emhoactive waste systern for praessmg SSAR Sectum 9 2-9, anJJ schemanc Il.2-1 do not provide aformation on the specific subsystem to which the rabumetive stream u 11 he ruuted for processmg }

faction W - See NRC letter dated 1/30i97. Note asems I through'5 ine'usive, l are actuary have the " Resolved

  • simus Item 6 has the "Actum W* status.  !

f

, W needs to sesolve genene issues on P&lD legitulay and w..@- l

$003 NRR/SPLil I l .1-6 DSER-OI israelson, G. Actum W Actam W

,DSER 0111.14 i Issue - Das is a new stem tryond Reference I selaimg SS AR Table 3 2-3 to radioactive waste systena Reference 1: NRC letter,*Open leems Samus Regardmg Several Plant Systems Branch Revsew Areas for the AlWM) Adsanced Reactor Design d.ned July ,

j {24,19 %

bW SSAR Table 3 2.3 dies not identify whu.h components of the rainoactive masse syssems are housed in the scismscally quahfied auuhary tunkhng, and wluch cuenpanents are luxased in the non-sessrruc radeoactive waste tsuldmg As a resuk, the staff identirees the following specific problems

1. SS AR Appendix 1 A. RG I.I43 Item C.I.I .3 indicates thm tanks in the impud rahoactive maste system are supposed to te in the Scisnuc Category I l auuhary tunkhng. In Table 3 2-3, p. 49 of S t. tanks are hssed ans *NS,* and it does me mihcate whether those tanks are located in the muuhary tunkhng ' ;

or in the radioactive waste tunkhng. i 2 SSAR Appendis I A. RG I.143, Item C.2.13 indicates that the guard bed and the delay beds m the gaseous rahoactne waste syuem are suppmed to :

I te in the Seisnue Casegory I auxihary budding in Table 3 2-3, p 49 of 51. they are hsted ans "NS? arkt n does not umhcare whether tinwe beds are located in the aunhary Innkhng or in the radioecove waste tuuldmg

! 3. SSAR Appendia i A, kG 1.143 Item C.I.13 indicates that spera tesm tanks in th solut radmactive maae system are suppmed to te en the auuhary tuniding. Tath 3 2-3 hsts them as *NS.* '

4. SSAR Appendis i A. RG 1.143,liem C.S.2:Westmghouse sames thm *those portums* of the raduative waste systems that reqmre seismic design by :

6 RG 1.143 are housed in the auxihary tunkiing that is Seisnue Category I. *those postsons* are not defined Ust 'thme portsons* in Table 3 2-3. l l l Esplan why those components that need to te in the seisnucally quahfsed auuhary buikhng per RG 1.143 are hsted as *NS* Inim-seismac)in Table 3 2-3. ,

Revne the Tatie 32.3 informatum in radioacave waste systems to be consistent wnh RG 1.143 and to include the selmed locatnm informaten (

1 Action W - See NRC letter daed 1/30/97.

Acnon W - Westinghouse beheves that the interested informanon alrealy esists in the SSAR. Westingtwusse mill provide the staff reierences Addttumally, f Westmghouse wdl provide via facsinule a copy of refised Table 3 2-3 for the rahomtive waste systems his SSAR restsson is scheduled to be submmed - '

on February 28.1997. (See NRC letter dmed 2/21/97.)_

P. ige: 2 Total Records: 5

4a l

t l

FAX to DINO SCALETTI March 4,1997 CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copies for: Bill Huffman l Ted Quay l Don Lindgren  !

Moshe Mahlab Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk Brian McIntyre OPEN ITEMS FOR SSAR Chapter 4 l

This is a background package for the remaining open item for SSAR Chapter 4 for your action.

SSAR Chapter 4 is of interest because by our joint NRC/W schedule, the FSER for this section should be turned into Projects by the end of March. There is 1 Open Item (854) with NRC Status of Action W. This item (attached) has been discussed repeatedly with NRC and the technical description is included in the item's " Status Detail." We believe that no further Westinghouse action is required. J We believe that this information resolves the concerns of item #854. It seems a reasonable request l that NRC acknowledge receipt of this information. We request that NRC provide a definitive action i for Westinghouse or provide direction to change the status of this item. We recommend " Action N" or " Closed". Thank you.

Jim Winters 412-374-5290 l

. l

+ .-,

Q AP600 Open Itens Tracking Systen Database: Executive Senunary page: y4/97 Selection: [nrc st ctmlej=' Action W' And (DSER Section] hke'4' Sorted by item 0 hem DSER Sectum/ Resp (W) NRC I Tale /Descnreme No Hranch Quesium Type Detail Samus Engmeer Status Status  % No. f pese  !

854 NRR/5RXB 428-1 DSERol More D G Ckud Aaion W ,

t

,The staff and Westmghouse should resolve the VANTAGE-511 flow- mduced vibratum pruidem, wahout an imposed thermal margia penaky. _[

F

.: : . : --. -.- : = . z . x . =:: :. . .. . . -  : . .:. :- . : . : _
  • Chud - The gnd to te used en the Al%00 core has tuen redesigned F1gwe 4 2 5 in Sectum 42 of the SSAR has tren resued to neflect the design change i (The gno deugn wiu preclude any flow induced v2 ration problems. The pressure drop accsuss the gnd is not adversely affcceed. De thennel4ydraubc

. design besas for the APvd10 core cushned in SSAR Section 4 4 as conussent with the one of thes gnd There is aos a thermal merges pranky assaw mish 1 the ene of this gno design. The gnd design is the same as that wtuch wdl be irred in Vantage 5H+ fuelin tpermng @ j  !

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