ML20147G485

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Provides D Garner Notes from Conversation W/L Lois Re Lois Concerns on WCT LTC
ML20147G485
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 02/07/1997
From: Novendstern E
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Huffman B
NRC
Shared Package
ML20147G451 List:
References
NUDOCS 9703280178
Download: ML20147G485 (13)
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o f *1 Mr 9/ s fi r O C O V E R %p '# fay ghadFAX S H E E T To: Bill Huffman (NRC) cc: B. McIntyre (Informal NRC File), Dan Garner, Bob Kemper, Lany Hochreiter, File 7.6

Subject:

WC/T Date: February 7,1997 Pages: Two, including this cover sheet. l COhnfENTS: i

Bill, In speaking with Dan Garner regarding his conversation with Lambrose Lois, he indicated that he made some notes regarding Lambrose's concerns on WCT LTC. These are attached and might be of use to Lambrose in writing up his RAls. Please give a copy to Lambrose. Thanks.

From the desk of.. Earl H. Novendetern Manager, Advanced and WER Plant Safety Analysis Westinghouse PO Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15235 (412)374 -4790 Fax: (412) 374-5744 reers ry 20. test une act.t 2,1 9703280178 970321 PDR ADOCK 05200003 E PDR

\\ 2/11/97

Subject:

Comments by Lambrose Lois on LTC WCAP 14776, 2/10/96. Comments by Mr. Lois addressed the data comparisons in Section 5. The major thru of his concems was that the calculations have not been run long enough. This surfaced i number of his specific comments. Note that the comments relate to specific figures. j

1. Section 5.1, Figures 5.15 and 5.1-6, Sump Injection Flow Rates. With additional calculatio of 1000 to 2000 sec, will the sump flow rates continue to track the data?
2. Section 5.1, Figure 5.1-8 (and 5.1-10), Total Integral DVI Flows. Even though the deviation between the calculated and test flow rates is small, will it persist with additional time or will it j diverge? What happens in 1000 to 2000 more seconds?
3. Section 5.1, Figures 5.1-11 and 5.1 12, Liquid Temp. at DVI Nozzles. Will the temperature deviation of the injection water impact boiling in the core and cause future deviations in the

'i comparisons?

4. Section 5.2.1, second paragraph, pg. 5 34. What is the uncertainity in the pressure data, or why is there a 2.5 psia pressure deviation?

i

5. Section 5.2.1, fourth paragraph, pg. 5-34. Why not run the calculation another 500 to 600 seconds to cover the opening of the motor operated sump isolation valves?
6. Sect' ion 5.2, Figures 5.2-11 and 5.2-12, Liquid Temp. at DVI Nozzles. With the significan change in temperature at 14,700 seconds at the opening of the. motor operated sump isolation 4

valves, why not demonstrate the code capability with some additional calculations?

7. Section 5.2, Figures 5.2-14 and 5.2-28, Break Flow and Hot Leg Level. Since the break flow is under predicted why isn't the hot leg level over predicted, or why is it underpredicted also, (it looks backwards)
8. Section 5.3.1, fifth paragraph, pg. 5-65, Why not run the calculation longer to include the effect of sump injection instead of simplifying the calculation by inhibiting the valve?

AP6001ois

4,. I i

f FAX to DINO SCALETTI February 25,1997

] CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copies for: Diane Jackson Ted Quay 1 Don Lindgren Ed Johnson Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk Brian McIntyre OPEN ITEMS FOR SSAR SECTION 3.6.3 This is a background package for the remaining open items for SSAR section 3.6.3. SSAR section 3.6.3 is of interest because by our joint NRC/W schedule, the FSER for this section should be turned into Projects by the end of March. There are 11 Open Items with NRC Status of Action W. Five (5) of these items (611,614,616,618 and 620) still require some Westinghouse action and will be addressed in letter NSD-NRC-97-4997 when it is issued. In addition, item 608 is readdressed in this same letter, NSD-NRC-97-4997. Westinghouse believes the other five (5) items (1883, 2430, 2431, 2432 and 3518) have already been addressed at least two months ago. We request that NRC provide a definitive action for Westinghouse or provide direction to change the status of these items. We recommend " Action N" Thank you. l Jim Winters 412-374-5290 l Ie[T

W AP600 Open Item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 2/25M7 Selection: Inrc St codej=' Action W' And IDSER Section] Iike '3.6.3** Sorted by item # hem OSER Secuont Tule/Desenpum Resp (W) NRC No Franth Questam Type Detad Staus Engineer Status Staus Letter No / Dme any to replace ADS Stage I with for audn. Resdved - IVndmg SSAR revisam. Responses and SSAR eevisums were provided in letter NSD-NRC-%4873 Cimed - SSAR Revisums idenursed in NSD-NRC-%4873 were included in SSAR Resisam 10. Actum W - Add a descnptum in SSAR 3B 313 and 38.313 (boundmg curve constructum pucedures) or m 3 6 3 3 (lum:ndmg analysis) to explan how tnumdmg curves meet LBB acceptan cnteria NRC will audit calculanes to ensure ihm the tuummhng curves sansfy LBB acaptana cnterta-Unartamties in applying utB to small hnes (see NUREGCR-6443, Section 35 on pressureavaluced tendmg effects to leakage flaw size and man stress) needs to be dmussed. Wesunghouse should perform sensitismy studies. Applying the LHB mettuulology to the FW ime is unacceptable. Revisams to the SSAR to delete the main feedwater hne from LBB consulerarum edl be tracked under DSERW 3 6 3 5-5 (OITS 614) For fur'her discussum of this issue, see NRC letter dmed January 24, BW7.. j Results from the PICEP computer code do not agree with Westinghouse LBB analyses. Need an esplananon 61i NRR/EMEB 36.35-2 DSER-O! Johnson Actum W Actum W NSD NRC-%4743 Westmghouse slmanki provute addnional discussum concerning the dafferences m aralyses, fatocatum, and inspet1um between Class I and 2 systems. dee

Q252.51

' Closed - Included in Appendia 3B Rev. 7 - A farmiue crack growth analysis will be performed on the mam feedwaser hne. This along with the preserv inspectum and Section XI required inservice inspection will provide for the irnegnty of each system-k Closed - Respmse provided by NSD-NRC-%4743-e { Actum - Revise SSAR to same that there is no difference or ASME Code Class I. 2, and 3 ppng systems in LBB evaluamm due to inspectum or fabricanon differences. Reference addinonal,_,_._ for Class 3 ECCS hnes Resolved - Pending SSAR revisim Respmses anni SSAR sevisams were provided in letter NSD-NRC-%4873 Cimed - SSAR Revisions idenuried in NSD-NRC-96-4873 were included in SSAR Revision 10. Actum W - Explam why the fangue crack growth analyses and augmented m-service inspectum (ISI), wlucli are performed for the felwater norile connectums to sacam generator, are not performed at the maan sicam nor21es. Revision of SSAR Sectums 38 2.4, and 3B 8. Rev 10 may le needed 614 NRICEMEB 363.5-5 DSER-OI Johnson Actum W Actum W NSD NRC-96-4743 .Westmginusse should provide in the SSAR. more detaled discussums with sufficient informarum to support the conclusam that the MS and FW ppmg syseems do not fall within the hmaations delmeated in Section 5.I of Volume 3 of NUREG-1061. i Closed - Addanmal descussion added to the SSAR Appendix 3B Rev. 7 to support the melusum of the mamsteam and feixfwater hnes as LHB hnes See Fidtow on questions 210 202 through 210.212,(Items 2422 through 2432) for specsfic NRC requests. Cimed - Respmse provided by NSD-NRC-964743. Actum W - 8/2tW96 NRC letter reqia se that the mam feedwater hne te deleted from hst of LBB hues. The remammg unresolved issue is size of l waverhammer loads See open item 620 (DSER item 3 6.3 6-20) l

Acuan N - pendmg NRC respmse to the request for mformanon on the mettumis used by the NRC for the wanerhanmeer load esaluaimm Respmse was provided in letter NSD-NRC-%4873 i

} ' Actum W - The Westinghouse proposal to apply LBB mettumlology to the FW hne is unacceptable _ Westmglamse needs to revise the SSAR to delete the mam feedwater hne from UlB consideratum. For further dncussion of tlus issue, see NRC letter ilated January 24,1997. 616 NRR/EMEB 3636-2 DSER-OI Johnson, E. Action W Acann W NSD NRC-96-4743

The sample analysis for the RCL pepmg was based on routed RCL piping supported by pnmary equipment supports, but inserconnected ppng te g., the i

pressunzer surge 1.ne) was sut included in the truxlel. This response may be acceptable; however, the staff antends to review these stresses in future pipmg i audits. l 5 Closed - Discussed at meetmg with NRC on February 14 & 15,1995. Any issues raised dunng audits mdile treated as separate items. I Closed - Response provided by NSD-NRC-964743. I i ' Actum W. This sterin will be evaluated as a part of DSER,Open liem 3 6 3 4-l. I i i l'. ige. 2 Total Records: II

4 AP600 Open item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 2/25/97 Selection: lnre 51 cte]= Actum W' And [DSER Section] like '3 6.3* Sorted by item # hem DSLR Sectnm/ Title /lkscnptum Resp (W) NRC No tirara h Questum Type Iktail stmus Engmeer Staus Status kner No / Date 608 NHR/EMEB 3634-1 DSER4)I Bhownuck Gowd Actum W NSD-NRC-96-4743 Westmginar.e should perform and mutuna for staff review buunding LBB analyses for candulate ppng systems includmg esalumans its suscepidwhty to degralsum mechanswns for the projected 60-year APNK) design hic. Oosed - Boundmg analyses and information to perform independent calculatum has been provided to the NRC l Actum W -letter dated August 20,1996 identified a&btumal nems for Westinghouse action A phone call on August 27 povided addanmal clarificamm. { Clanfy how PSI and (augmented)ISI rcymrenents will provide for integray of ASME Code Gass 2 and 3 pping syseems. Cimnfy:.. the highest stressed point (cntical location) has to be less than the tumumbng analysis curve. Actum - The 5th bullet will te sevised to clanfy the

compartson i3 6 3 3 Revise pans of thn SSAR section whwh are inconsistent with tuundmg analysis approach.

l Provale a desenptum of WB acceptance cntena and demonstrate how tuunang analysis appouch satisfies tnese cntena Actum - 3 63.2 and 3 63 3 will be reviewed for changes that clarify how lumindmg analysis metimmi is accornphsheit l [ ' Actum - he fadure meci anism for non-stamiess steel matenal wi!I be ecluded m 3 6 33 1 h i3B l Explan the relatumship triween the tunnuhng analyses and the iv...m.as of SRP 3 6 3 and NUREG-1061. Vol 3. Ihscussed durmg plume call. l

3B 2 Explan if waser chenustry requirements wdl mminuie stress corrosion in auxihary stamless steel ppng If so, provide Ascussion in 3B2.2.

thscussed dunng phone call no SSAR changes proposed. Explan in 3B.2 3 how pressunzed safety valve discharge lomis are considered in analysis. Note

  • in 3B 3 3.8 wdi te revised so specifically address safety

[ ! valve operung. i N Explan m 3B2 4 how fmigue effects due to thermal and other cychc kmds are evalumed in ASME Code.Cass 2 and 3 ppng (Cf 3 6 I 82 of CE System q 80+ SSAR). Actum - Additumal informatum to be a& led to 3B 2.4. t N Explan in 3B23 how dynamic stran aging (DSA) effects were evalumed thscussed en plume call. No SSAR changes pnpried. Clanfy the statement in the durd paragraph in auxdiary stantess sicci sectum of 3B 2 6 that unisolable sectams of identified carmhdate LBB pipng syseems

are susceptible to adverse stresses as descnbed in Bulletm 884)R. Action - Revised 3B 2 6 wdl state that tirre is no unisolateath sections.

Explan in 38.2 how suscepidulay of falures due to creep fatigue and indirect causes and cleavage type fadures were evaluated. N l !3B 3 Explan how the bounding analyses we consissent wah themethodology in GDC-4. SRP 3 6 3 and NUREG-1061. Vol 3 i Ganfy the load margm in the tinrd bullet of 3 B 3. Clanfy in 383 I the inclusum of 3GtL. 6 Clanfy in 38313 how the louer magnaude of tendmg stress es selected. l Clanfy in 383.2.4 how the higher magmtude of tending stress is selected. Derme Y and Z axes in 3B 33 I through 3B 33 3. Action - Changes to clanfy the alwnive wd1 he meluded in the SSAR 3B 4 Revise 3B 4 to inchade ASME Code Gass 3 ppng systems (3B 6 indicates there are Gass 3 candalme LBB systems) Actum - Reviw subsection to { focus on differences due to masenal not Code Class. t Revise 3B 4 to dncuss diffenences in design analyses for ASME Cale Gass 1. 2. and 3 systems, instead of differences in LBB analyses. Actum - See l previous question '3B 5 Discuss the segmficance of the differences in inspectum cntena for ASME Code Cass 1. 2. and 3 ppng syssems identified in 3B 5 for LBB apphcaixms. Actum - Revise SSAR to same that there is no efference in LBB evalumum due to inspecum efferences. Reference a&htional.mr..;.-..;s for Class 3 ECCS lines l 3B 6 Discuss the significance of the differences in fabncatum requuenents for ASME Code Class I. 2. and 3 peng systems identified in 38 6 for LBB apphcatums. Actica Revise SSAR to stare that there is no difference m LBB evaluarum due to fabncatum diffesences '3B 7 Delete 3B.7 on monitonng unanticipmed dynamic loads in the ManFeedwater Line. Actum Westmglumse wdl povale al&tional infonnation to i support LBB for main feedwater hne i 3B 8 Delete 3B 8 for augmented 151 for Mam Feedwater ruirries on steam generators Actnin - Westarigheisse wdl povule additumal information to support LBB for man feedwater hne Tables Add hne site and mmenal totable 38-1 Actum W - Move ADS stage I hne from WB hne Boundmg Curves Analyses for the foilowing selected bounangcurves Figs 3B-2 thruugh 3B-80 wdl he audited durmg nretmg: j (l) Mam Steam-A j (2) Mam Feedwater-A (3) Surge Line (4) PRilR Supply Lme - 12" (5) CMT A i (6) ADS Stage I Westingimmise should perfonn wnsitivay analyses to assess differences in calculated least rates for 4 inch ADS hne Actum N - Staff wdl decide what line of l i IS e; 1 Total Records: 1I F

AP600 Open Item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 2/25/97 Selection: lnte st ctxlel='Actkm W' And (DSER Sectmn] like '3.6.3*' Sorted by item # Item DSER Settonf Tale /Descnpum Resp (W) NRC No Branch Quesque Type Detail Status Engmeer Status Staus Letter No / Date 618 NRR/EMEH 3636-4 DSER Of Bhownuck Actum W Actum W NSD-NRC-%-4743 Westmghouse should benchmark its leak rate evaluarum mettuxtology against nrttumis currently acceped by the staff (such as using the P code) I Closed - NRC meeting 7/25/95 - NRC ctmsultant is to review matenal subnutted on South Texas Ckmed - Response povided by NSD-NRC-964743. l Action W - This issue will be evaluated as a part of DSER Open Item 3 6 3 4-1. 620 NRR/EMEH 363 % DSER-01 Jotmson Action W Actum W NSD NRC-964743 Westmghouse should a&lress whether the water hammer type keds frtwn condensatum events need to be considered in stic LHH analyses,if ruit. Westinghouse stundo justify why these kah can be eschuled Actson W - Evaluamms of plant loadmgs from condensarum events are being performed, usmg in part daa inun the AIW10 test facabty at Oregon Stae .Umveruty. Upon completum of the esaluarum, loadmgs from condensation events m all be mcluded m the plant analyus as appropiare. Ckwed - Respmse provuled by NSD-NRC-964743. Q,, l Actum W - 8/28/96 Resolve dafferences between Westmghouse and NRC estimates for water hamnuner kals for the mam feedwater pipe. ( Acton N - pendmg NRC response to the request for mformarum on the nwtlusis used by the NRC for the warterhamerwr kal evaluation Respmse was vg provided in lener NSD-NRC-W873 { Actum W - Preliminary results from small tweak IBCA tests performed at Oregon Staie Umveruty indicate that rand condensarum events have the potential to cause unanticipated dynamic kals to occur in the AIW10 RCS 'these water hamner type kais have nit two ctmsulered in the ppmg design l kals to justify a LHH approach for the Al%00 main coolant kop and attached piping. Westmgluiuse was requested to address w hether these water hammer 4ype loads from condenssum eve:Ws need to be considered m its I.BH analyses or, if rug, justify why these kals can te excluded and inctwporate relevant discussums in the SSAR. 1883 NRR/EMEH 3634-1 DSER-COL LandgrervBhowmn;k Ckxed Actum W N SD-N RC-M743 3 6 3 4-l The CUL appbcant shoukt venfy that the actual matenal poperties and final as-tuult pepmg analyses meet the acceptance paranweers established i m the boundmg LHH analyses. Okned - Specific requirement for as bush wenficaum to Comtuned License informarum item was a& led in the SSAR 3 6 4 2 for rtumcihatum of the LHH analysis. Cksed - Respmse povided by NSD-NRC-%-4743. 2430 NRR/EMEH 363 MTG-Ol Luktgren/BhowmnL Gosed Actum W NSD NRC-96-4743 Follow on questum 210 210 Westmghouse shoukt discuss m the SSAR how crosion<orrosion effects have twn mimmned or elmunated m the feedwarer Ime msule ctmtamment Ckned - SSAR Appendia 3B revisum 7 sectum 38 2.'l provides a descriptum. i ~ Ckned - Response pmided by NSD-NRC-N743 2431 NRR/EMEH 363 MTG-OI LmdgrervBhownuck Chwed Actum W NSD-NRC 96 4743 Follow on questum 210.21i Westmghouse simukt discuss in the SSAR how fangue etfects due to dyn.ume operatumal vitwatum cycles have turn trumnured m the feedwater imes. Chmed - SS AR Appendia 3B revisum 7, wctum 3H 2 4(under tugh<ycle fatigue) erkheated that mam feedwater pump wituarum is isolmed from the leak-tefore-tweak feedwater hne mside containnent via the piping and equipment suppens Ckwed - Respmse prtwuled by NSD NRC-96-4743 l' age. 3 Total Records: 1I

~ -(.. ', AP600 Open Itens Tracking Syssesn Database: Executive Susaniary Date: 2/25/97 Selecties: Inre u ctxlel=' Action %" And IDSER Sectum] like *3.6.3** Sosted by item 0 Item DSER Sectumf TatidDewnption Resp (W) NRC No. Branch Question Type DetalStatus S :--- - L*- Status ' taer No / Duse l 2432 NRREMEH 363 MTG-Oi Landgren/Bhownuck Ckmed Action W Follow on questam 210.212 Westinghouse should commst in the SSAR b provide instrumentation for momtonng any .;d dynanac loads an the feedwater imes inssde ---- [ .-. u _ Cimed - SSAR Appendis 3B revision 7. section 3B.7 indicased that instrumentation for momeonag -- , _" dynamic loads in the feedwaser lees inside a- -

wdl be povided in the h plant.

~ 3318 NRREMEB 363 RAlot Johnson Closed Action W NSD-NRC-96-4873 RAI 210228 NUREG/CR-6443 andu.ases that the effects of: I) restrant of pressure induced hending, and 21 residual stress can resuk in gros overestanases of leak raies in small diameter (44nch) piping. Westmghause stundd be prepand to discuss and quantsfy these effects. Closed - pending review of response. Responses wese povided 'in letter NSD-NRC-96-4873 .j M 1 k L t t e I t r l t ? L t

d VV yy8SilligilguSg 8 m vv vcn once esas I j RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: Re.tu,q 24,1997 NAME: LIg., TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER - nU'Mr, lActcsco EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: Omce:qfa_37q 3a w COMPANY: Facsimile-MO-284 4887 y gfg outside: (412)374 4887 LOCATION: l 8 Cover + Pages 1+/ The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call: I' WIN: 284 5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374 5125. COMMENTS: hlOAlf ~ [ifil, m %D1 /n%ev e TucoLO /2 e"St a r MCA) 6/40 ( T}v fl-d -3 rAc c u ed if ? %tLL CC ' A.: TD SShi l Cot $< ch ( b in A> L L;:>i lui F{C'K % lCU C ^ b u%dcew re p c s.v ;y/ v (v e m v5 / lev U t [UIC w cn D.N f{lu Yi It % id .7Es% by fur % 3 eme 0

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9. Auxili ry Syst:ms j

9.3 Process Auxiliaries 9.3.1 Compressed and Instrument Air System i The compressed and instrument air system (CAS) consists of three subsystems. instmment air, I service air, and high pressure air. Instrument air supplies compressed air for air-operated I valves and dampers. Service air is supplied at outlets throughout the plant to power air-I operated tools and is used as a motive force for air-powered pumps. The service air subsystem is also utilized as a supply source for breathing air. Individually packaged air purification equipment is used to produce breathing quality air for protection against airbome contamination. The high-pressure air subsystem supplies air to the main control room i emergency habitability system (VES), the generator breaker package, and fire fighting i apparatus recharge station. Major components of the compressed and instmment air system are located in the turbine building. 9.3.1.1 Design Basis i 9.3.1.1.1 Safety Design Basis ne compressed and instrument air system serves no safety-related function other than containmem isolation and therefore has no nuclear safety design basis except for containment isolation. See subsection 6.2.3 for the containment isolation system. 9.3.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis I ne instrument air subsystem provides filtered, dried, and oil-free air for air-operated valves 1 and dampers. The instrument air subsystem consists of two compressors and associated I support equipment and controls that are powered from switchgear backed by the nonsafety, I relat investment protection category load. Tlc 5"' pmQ>onsite standby diesel generators as argad us W Aasr/sv S.M %h,J(kW* %Q* hq p3 m o-rr~~+... o vn. I Re service air subsystem provides filtered, dried, and oil-free compressed air for service I outlets located throughout the plant. The service air subsystem consists of two compressors and their associated support equipment and controls. Plant breathing air requirements are satisfied by using the service air subsystem as a supply source. Individually packaged air 1 purification equipment is used to improve the service air to Quality Verification Level D l breathing air as defined in ANSI /CGA G-7.1. De high-pressure air subsystem consists of one compressor, its associated air purification i system and controls, and a high-pressure receiver. It provides clean, oil-free, high-pressure air i to recharge the main control room emergency habitability system cylinders, refill the individual fire fighting breathing air bottles, and recharge the generator breaker reservoir. I Quality Verification i.evel E air as defined in ANSI /CGA G-7.1 is produced by this I subsystem. See Section 6.4 for a description of the main control room habitability system. Revision: 7 [ WBStinghouse 9.3-1 April 30,1996

W Westinghouse FAX COVER SHEET e mp I RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORM ATION l

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18. Hum:n Fcct:rs Engineering in 2 CMukt / 9

~ i Table 18.12.2-1 (Sheet I of 2) MINIMUM INVENTORY Paceehc l -..i.....u.u uugny Control Display Alarm"' l Neutron flux x x l Neutron flux doubling x l Startup rate x x l RCS pressure x x d C .WR T. x i IAd f-l WRTa x x l RCS cooldown rate compared to the limit x x I based on RCS pressure Change of RCS temperature by more than x l 5'F in the last 10 minutes l Containment water level x x l Containment pressure x x I l Piessurizer water level x x l Pressurizer water level trend x l Pressurizer reference leg temperature x jg l Reactor vessel - llot leg water level x x l Pressurizer pressure x l Core exit temperature x x l RCS subcooling x x l RCS cold overpressure limit x x l IRWST water level x x Al PRHR flow x x l PRHR outlet temperature x x l PCS storage tank water level x l PCS cooling flow x l IRWST to RNS suction valve status x x l Remotely operated containment isolation x l valve status

  • l Contairiment area high range radiation level x

x l Containment pressure (extended range) x l Containment hydrogen concentration x l CMT level

  • x l

Mxnual reactor trip (Also initiates turbine x l trip Figure 7.2-1, sheet 19.) W{sg) toMfdeh b be llrm0 K g basel. On A6 fresw/c-Revision: 11 W Westinghouse 18.12 9 February 28,1997 rut e = 1 4

18. Hum:n Fcctors Engineering 9

Table 18.12.21 (Sheet 2 of 2) MINIMUM INVENTORY l -f..a. ......uD6pi.i-Control Display Alarm'2' Manual safeguards actuation x Manual CMT actuation x l Manual main control room emerSeacy x l habitability system actuation'* l Emergency habitability system actuation i Manual ADS actuation (1-3 and 4) x Manual PRHR actuation x Manual containment cooling actuation x Manual IRWST injection actuation x l Manual containment recirculation actuation x Manual containment isolation x Manual main steamline isolation x Manual feedwater isolation x l Manual coi..ainment hydrogen igniter x I (nonsafety-related) l Notes: 1 1. Although this parameter does not satisfy any of the selection criteria of subsection 18.12.2. its importance to l manual actuation of ADS justifies its placement on this list. ) l 2. Dese parameters are used to generate visual alerts (safety-related displays for the main control room; nonsafety-j l related displays for the remote shutdown workstation) that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. l 3. Rese instruments are not required after 24 hours. (Subsection 7.5.4 includes more information on the class IE I valve position indication signals. specified as part of the post-accident monitoring instrumentation.) l 4. This manual actuation capability is not needed at the remote shutdown workstation. i 1 l i Revision: 11 February 28,1997 18.12-10 W Westinghouse h

~ ~,. uurumusuva E wouvu e. ,,n y, w D + One re te shutdown workstation is provided. He remote shutdown workstation contains for the safety-related equipment required to establish and maintain safe shutdown. controls, ally, control of nonsafety related components is available, a Addition 1 l control when ac power is available. The design basis for the remote shutdown workstation I does not require the installation of safety related, dedicated, fixed-position displays, alarms, I and controlsgThe controls, displays, and alarms listed in Table 18.12.2 1 are retrievable from l the remote shutdown workstation. Subsection 18.12.3 provides more discussion on the remote l shutdown workstation displays, alarms, and controls. i ne remote shutdown workstation is provided for use only following an evacuation of the e main control room. No actions are anticipated from the remote shutdown workstation during T}lc. @ylote normal, routine shutdown, refueling, or maintenance operations. LANo@ ne remote shutdown workstation has sufficient communication circuits to allow the operator (Cg( O bbM to effectively establish safe shutdown conditions. As detailed in subsection 9.5.2, i communication is available between the following stations: QM,7ff[ej, Main control room Remote shutdown workstation I + 45 Mt reado('- Onsite technical support center Diesel generator local control station 2 / OffMO f > gg'g 3perator control capability at the remote shutdown workstation is normally disabled, and operator control functions are normally performed from workstations located inside the main g./M t control room; however, operator control capability can be transferred from the main control room workstations to the remote workstation if the control room requires evacuation. This IWi4Uf(rMf/8I Operator control transfer capability can not be disabled by any single active failure coincident with the loss of offsite power. De control transfer function is implemented by multiple transfer switches. Each individual transfer switch is associated with only a single safety-related or single nonsafety-related division. These switches are located behind arrunlocked access panel. Entry into this access panel will result in alarms at the main control room and remote shutdown workstation. The access panel is located within a fire zone which is separate from the main control room. Actuation of these transfer switches results in additional alarms at the main control room and remote shutdown workstation, the activation of operator control capability from the remote workstation, and the deactivation of operator control capability from the main control room I workstations, ne operator displays located in the main control room and on the remote shutdown workstation are not affected by this control transfer function. 7.4.3.1.2 Controls at Other Locations In addition to the controls and indicators provided at the remote shutdown workstation, the following controls are provided outside the main control room: Reactor trip capability at the reactor trip switchgear Revision: 11 February 28,1997 7.4-12 3 Westinghouse e

e. 1 ]

    • TX CONFIRMATION REPORT **

AS OF FEB 26 '97 14:48 PAGE.01 LJETSO/RM 468 EC EAST DATE TIME TO/FROM MODE MIN /SEC PGS Ct1D# STATUS 07 02/26 14:45 516 344 4900 G3-5 02'33" 004 OK i i f 1

a.

    • TX CONFIRMATION REPORT **

AS OF FEB 26 '97 14:44 PAGE.01 UETSO/RM 468 EC EAST DATE TIME TO/FROM MODE MIN /SEC PGS CMD# STATUS 06 02/26 14:41 301 504 2222 G3--S 02'25" 004 OK i l i l 1 I}}

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